Prudential Insurance Co.

PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY Prudential Insurance Company of America and Marie Spencer. Case 7-CA-16314 January 14, 1981 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND TRUESDALE On August 27, 1980, Administrative Law Judge William F. Jacobs issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex- ceptions and a supporting brief, and Insurance Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find- ings,l and conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order,3 as modified herein. 4 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi- fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Prudential Insurance Company of America, Oak Park, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and i Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi- bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con- vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products. Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 2 In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that the Union did not, through the collective-bargaining agreement with Respon- dent, waive the right of unit employees to insist on the presence of a rep- resentaive at an investigatory interview that could, or which the em- ployee reasonably believes would, result in disciplinary action, we rely on the reasoning set forth in Prudential Insurance Company of America, 251 NLRB 1591 (1980). 3 In ordering Respondent to remove from Charging Party Marie Spen- cer's personnel file all references to the incident which occurred on Feb- ruary 2, 1979, we agree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that District Manager Mullins' description of the event as described in the memo is utterly preposterous and that the memo was written by Mullins to protect himself from any future charges. See fn. 15 of the attached De- cision. Moreover, we find that Respondent has not met its burden of proving that the decision to write the memo was not based on informa- tion obtained at the unlawful interview. Kraft Foods Inc., 251 NLRB 598 (1980). Member Jenkins does not rely on Kraft Foods. Inc.. supra, in which he dissented. 4 The Administrative Law Judge omitted from his recommended Order an appropriate provision requiring Respondent to cease and desist from in any like or related manner infringing on the employees' Section 7 rights. We shall modify the recommended Order accordingly. 254 NLRB No. 20 assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: 1. Substitute the following for paragraph I: "1. Cease and desist from: "(a) Requiring any employee to take part in an interview or meeting without union representation if such representation has been requested by the employee and if the employee has reasonable grounds to believe that the matter to be discussed at such interview or meeting may result in his being subject to disciplinary action. "(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the ex- ercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act." 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a full hearing at which all sides had the op- portunity to present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we have vio- lated the National Labor Relations Act, and has or- dered us to post this notice. We will carry out the Order of the Board, and comply with the follow- ing: WE WILL NOT require that any employee take part in an interview or meeting with us without union representation if the employee requests such representation and if the employ- ee has reasonable grounds to believe that the matter to be discussed at such interview or meeting may result in his being subject to dis- ciplinary action. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL remove from Marie Spencer's per- sonnel file all references to the incident which occurred on February 2, 1979. PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE WILLIAM F. JACOBS, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard in Detroit, Michigan, on January 16 and 17, and February 14 and 15, 1980, pursuant to a charge 247 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD filed on April 26, 1979,' by Marie Spencer, an individ- ual. The complaint which issued June 20, 1979, alleges that Prudential Insurance Company of America, hereinafter called Respondent, denied the requests of Marie Spencer to be represented by the Insurance Workers International Union, hereinafter called the Union, during an interview in which she had reasonable cause to believe that disci- pline or other threats to her job status might result and carried on such interview, notwithstanding the denial of her request, thus violating Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Re- spondent filed an answer denying the substantive allega- tions of unlawful conduct set forth in the complaint. Upon the entire record 2 including my observation of the witnesses, and after consideration of the briefs of the parties, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Respondent is an insurance company engaged in the sale of insurance contracts throughout the United States, with offices in Oak Park, Michigan, the location of the unfair labor practice alleged herein. Jurisdiction is not in issue. The complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that at all times material herein Respondent has been and is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The Union has represented Respondent's insurance agents for purposes of collective bargaining for a period in excess of 20 years. The most recent collective-bargain- ing agreement relevant to the instant case was effective September 26, 1977, through September 24, 1979. Marie Spencer, an insurance agent, employed by Re- spondent in the Detroit (Woodward) office, attended a conference in Minneapolis on January 31 and February 1, 1979. While in Minneapolis, Spencer inquired as to whether or not her personal file contained authorization for her to sell property and casualty insurance since she believed at the time that she had met all of the necessary requirements to be so authorized and had in fact sold several policies in that category, but had been denied commissions on her sales. She was told that the neces- sary authorization form was not in her file. That afternoon, a message was sent to Spencer's home office, which was received by District Manager Lewis Mullins through his secretary, to the effect that Spencer had been asking questions while in Minneapolis, and that he should speak with Spencer and straighten out any questions she might have. Spencer returned to work at the Detroit office on Feb- ruary 2.3 About 11 a.m., after the usual Friday morning meeting of the district agents, Mullins asked her to come I Hereinafter, all dates are in 1979 unless specified otherwise. 2 The General Counsel's and Respondent's unopposed motions to cor- rect the record are hereby granted. 3 Mullins testified that this incident occurred on February 5. not Feb- ruary 2, that February 2 was a Friday and Friday mornings are too busy to hold such meetings. I credit Spencer. Notes she took were all dated and I believe them to be accurate as to both date and content. into his office. According to the credited testimony of Spencer, when she did so Mullins asked her what ques- tions she had asked Linda concerning district agents. There is no indication in the record that Spencer asked anyone anything about district agents when she was in Minneapolis so she did not know what Mullins was talk- ing about. 4 At least momentarily, she did not even know who Mullins was talking about when he mentioned the name "Linda." 5 Mullins repeated his question but Spen- cer still did not understand to which questions Mullins was referring since she had not asked Linda anything about district agents. 6 Mullins became angry, quite ap- parently feeling that Spencer was trying to hide some- thing, had been inquiring into matters which he felt should not concern her, or was simply being obstinately uncooperative. According to notes which Spencer wrote immediately after the interview, and upon which I rely in partial support of her testimony, Mullins stated, "Any- thing you want to know about the agents7 or the run- ning of this district, you direct your questions to me. I run this district. I am the district manager." Spencer tes- tified that after Mullins asked her several times about her questions concerning district agents and after she contin- ued to insist that she could not answer his inquiry unless he were more specific about what questions he was asking about, Mullins stated that Spencer's attitude was affecting her job, and that with that kind of an attitude she was not going to get too far in the business. At this point, Spencer asked Mullins to excuse her while she went to get a union representative with whom she would then return.8 Mullins did not reply to this statement and Spencer left Mullins' office to seek out her union repre- sentative without interference from Mullins.9 4 Apparently in the transmission of the message from Minneapolis through his secretary to Mullins, the message was somehow garbled. I Subsequently Mullins explained that he was referring to Linda Nelson, an administrative assistant in Minneapolis, to whom Spencer had briefly spoken the day before. 6 I feel that if Mullins had simply asked Spencer what she wanted to know about her right to sell property and casualty insurance or even what she had asked Linda about this subject, the problem would perhaps never have developed as it has. At the time, however, Mullins thought that Spencer had been asking questions concerning district agents, a matter which he felt did not concern her but was solely within his own area of responsibility. 7 Mullins admitted interrogating Spencer concerning questions she had asked at the home office regarding district agents or agencies. 8 Mullins testified that during this interview Spencer did, in fact, ask that a union representative be present and described how he tried to talk her out of it. He denied, however, that when she left she stated that she was going to get a union representative. I credit Spencer where her testi- mony differs from that of Mullins. 9 In addition to asking Spencer what questions she had asked at the home office about district agents, Mullins testified that he asked her what questions she had asked about PRUPAC. If Mullins had done so, howev- er, I feel certain that Spencer could and would have answered that ques- tion for she had, in fact, asked Linda Nelson about that subject. But Spencer nowhere testified that PRUPAC was mentioned during the inter- view. Nor is the subject of property and casualty insurance anywhere mentioned in her notes of that day or in her affidavit to the Board. In the note placed in Spencer's personnel folder by Mullins on February 6, which purports to cover this interview, there is no indication that either PRUPAC, as such, or property and casualty were mentioned during the discussion between Spencer and Mullins on the morning in question. During the discussion that occurred later in Chapman's office, discussed infra, Chapman did not testify that PRUPAC was the subject of Mullins' Continued 248 PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY After Spencer left Mullins' office, she tried to find her unit chairman, Chuck Furlotte, to have him represent her in her confrontation with Mullins, but was told he had momentarily stepped out.t 0 While she was waiting for Furlotte's return, she sat down at her desk and began to jot down notes concerning her meeting with Mullins. At this point, however, Henry Chapman, sales manager and Spencer's immediate supervisor, asked to see her in his office for a few minutes. He did this at Mullins' behest. According to Mullins," after Spencer left his office, he went to Chapman's office and gave him his version of what had occurred during his meeting with Spencer. He asked Chapman to call Spencer into Chapman's office so that they could both talk with her. Chapman then did so. When Spencer entered Chapman's office, Mullins 12 announced that he was charging her with insubordina- tion and wanted her resignation. Spencer then asked Mullins to excuse her while she went to get her union representative. Mullins, at this point, placed himself be- tween Spencer and the door and refused to let her out. She tried to get hold of the doorknob but he continued to prevent her departure. He stated that he had a right to speak to her without the presence of a union representa- tive. He then asked Spencer the same question that he had asked her during the previous discussion that had occurred in his office; namely, what questions she had been asking at the north central home office pertaining to district agents. Spencer, apparently ignoring his ques- tion because she still did not understand what he was talking about, again asked Mullins to excuse her so she could go out and get a union representative.' Mullins refused to move away from the door. He again asked for her resignation. He requested a pencil and a piece of paper from Chapman upon which he asked Spencer to write her name to be used as her resignation. Spencer re- fused to accept the pencil and paper or to resign. Mullins then reminded Spencer that she had been given the special privilege of reporting late on Tuesdays and Fridays, 4 and stated that he was rescinding that questions directed to Spencer. In my opinion, Mullins testified that he asked Spencer about PRUPAC when in fact he had not done so, in order to make her appear obstinate and uncooperative and to make his position appear to be more reasonable. In short, I credit Spencer's description of this interview, and where Mullins' testimony is at variance with it, I do not credit him. O0 Furlotte may already have left for vacation at this time since he tes- tified that he left for vacation February 2 and did not return to work until February 12. " Chapman's testimony on this point supports Mullins'. 12 According to Spencer's affidavit, after Chapman invited her into his office, she stopped momentarily to talk with two other employees. At this point Mullins came out and requested that she come into Chapman's office. At the hearing she could not recall that this occurred. There was also another apparent minor inconsistency in regard to whether Mullins was already in Chapman's office or came in a little later. These discrep- ancies I do not consider of controlling importance and do not affect my judgment of Spencer's overall credibility. II Mullins initially denied that Spencer made this statement or that she at anytime requested the presence of a union representative. Later, under cross-examination, Mullins admitted that Spencer said that she did not have to talk to Chapman or himself without union representation. 14 The privilege had been extended to Spencer upon her request in order to enable her to see her children off to school. After February 2, according to Spencer, she reported at the scheduled hour on these days as did all of the other agents. have to go over his head in order to keep that privilege. He challenged her "to just try and see what would happen." As he had during the earlier discussion, Mullins spoke once again about Spencer's attitude, how it was af- fecting her job and how she would not get very far with that attitude. Spencer complained that Mullins should not talk to her in that fashion. Mullins, apparently in an effort to be sarcastic, told her to write down on the pre- viously offered piece of paper the way that she wanted him to talk to her. Spencer declined the invitation. After Mullins once again interrogated Spencer about the questions she had asked in Minneapolis concerning district agents, and after he reminded her that her special privileges had been rescinded and mentioned her attitude once again, he permitted her to leave and she did so.' s 'i The description of the meeting in Chapman's office is in accordance with Spencer's fully credited testimony. Mullins' description of what oc- curred differs markedly from Spencer's credited testimony. As was the case with regard to the earlier Mullins-Spencer confrontation, Mullins testified that he asked Spencer if she had any questions that he might be able to answer for her that she asked at the home office pertaining to P and C. According to Mullins, Spencer replied, "I don't have any ques- tions, and I am not going to answer any questions." Chapman at this point interrupted in order to remind Spencer that Mullins was a manager who was "trying to get to the bottom of the situation" and admonished her to be cooperative. Spencer replied that she did not have to talk to either Chapman or Mullins. Despite the fact that Spencer had already in- dicated that she did not have any questions, Chapman, again according to Mullins, stated, "All he wants to know is whether or not you have any questions. Why don't you be cooperative?" Spencer then said that she was leaving and would not talk to either one of them. Mullins testified that at this point he advised Spencer that she was "being a little bit insub- ordinate" and warned, "If you continue to act that way, maybe you should think about resigning." Spencer then walked out of the office. Mullins denied that he made any effort to physically prevent Spencer from leaving Chapman's office; that he ever gave her a blank piece of paper upon which she was asked to sign her resignation; as noted, that she ever requested union representation; that he rescinded the privilege which he had bestowed earlier permitting her to report to work late on Tuesdays and Fridays; or that the meeting was emotional or heated. Though Mullins denied, in his testimony, that Spencer's actions or behav- ior was heated, and affirmatively stated that neither she nor the other participants raised their voices during that meeting in Chapman's office, on February 6 Mullins placed a memo in Spencer's personnel file describ- ing this incident which included the statement, "Spencer got very loud. Enough to disturb the other agents in the office." Even more interesting is the fact that, although Mullins explicitly denied in his testimony that he physically prevented Spencer from leaving Chapman's office, in the memo which he placed in her personnel file on February 6, he stated that during this incident Spencer was "saying we had no right to hold her in the S/M's office. Point being no one was holding her or attempting to stop her from leaving." Since no one, as of February 6, had filed a griev- ance over the incident or charged Mullins with preventing Spencer from leaving Chapman's office, Mullins' denial was premature. It proves first that Spencer did not make up the story of her "imprisonment" at some later date merely to support a case based on a fiction and it proves second that one of two things occurred-either the incident occurred precisely as Spencer described it or as Mullins reported in his memo; namely, that Spencer, though free to leave at any time, loudly com- plained that she was being detained against her will. I find Mullins' de- scription of events as contained in his memo utterly preposterous. I be- lieve that, after the incident occurred as Spencer described, he was wor- ried that someone in the outer office may have heard Spencer's loud pro- tests and, to cover himself against any future charges, he wrote the memo and placed it in Spencer's file. I find Spencer a sane and rational individ- ual, incapable of acting out the charade she is charged with by Mullins in the February 6 memo. I find Mullins totally incredible. 249 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Spencer testified credibly that while all of this was transpiring Chapman' 6 said virtually nothing, other than to ask what was going on. After Spencer left Chapman's office she went to her desk, sat down, and began once again to note down what had occurred. Mullins, in the meantime, left Chapman's office and returned to his own. Shortly thereafter, Chap- man came out of his office and called Spencer back in. Once in the office Chapman asked Spencer what it was all about. Spencer said that she did not know. He asked her what had occurred at the home office and Spencer replied that to her knowledge nothing had occurred. Chapman asked her why Mullins was asking her all those questions and again Spencer replied that she did not know. Chapman asked her why she was so upset and Spencer replied that it was because she did not know what was happening. Chapman told Spencer not to worry and once again she left. 7 Subsequently, Spencer filed both a grievance and the charge in the instant case. Analysis The course of events on February 2 clearly reflects a Weingarten situation. 18 Mullins' reprimand of Spencer for asking questions in Minneapolis about district agents, his insistent interrogation of her about these questions, and his threat directed at her that her attitude was affect- ing her job and that she was not going to get far in the business provided a sufficient basis for Spencer to demand union representation if the interview were to continue. Mullins was advised of her desire to be repre- sented. Despite being placed on notice by Spencer that ' Chapman testified that, when all three were ensconced in Chap- man's office, Mullins for the second time told Chapman that he had just asked Spencer about "some questions" which she had raised at the home office and she had walked out of the office. He then suggested that maybe the two of them together could find out "why she walked out of the office and what her problem is." Mullins, according to Chapman, then asked, "Marie, I will ask you again, what was the question that you raised at the home office, that they wanted me to answer for you?" Spen- cer then said, "I don't have to answer your question. I don't know what you are talking about." Mullins then insisted that Spencer tell him what questions she had asked. Spencer then stated, according to Chapman, "I don't have to talk to you and I don't have to talk to Mr. Chapman. and I don't have to answer your questions." Chapman said, "This is a district manager. At least you can answer his questions." Spencer said she did not have to, whereupon Mullins said, "Marie you are being a little insub- ordinate. So, if you can't cooperate, maybe you should think about giving your resignation." After sitting there a couple of minutes she got up and walked out. In his description of this meeting Chapman did not at any time mention that the terms "PRUPAC" or "property and casualty" were the subject of Mullins' questions about what had occurred in Minneapolis. Chapman testified that Mullins asked about questions in general. Chapman, like Mullins, denied that Spencer said anything about union representation; that Mullins at any time physically blocked the door or did anything to prevent Spencer from leaving the office; that Mullins asked him to offer Spencer a pencil and paper so that she could submit her resignation; that special privileges were discussed; or that Spencer's attitude was discussed. In my opinion Chapman's testimony was designed solely to support Mullins' testimony. Where it differs from that of Spencer, I credit Spen- cer and decline to credit Chapman. Mullins is Chapman's immediate su- perior. 17 This conversation between Spencer and Chapman appears as de- scribed by both. Neither mentioned PRUPAC nor property and casualty insurance. Clearly, neither Chapman nor Spencer knew what Mullins was talking about. Ia N.L.R.B. v. J. Weingarten. Inc., 420 U.S. 251 (1975). she did not want to continue the interview without rep- resentation, after a brief hiatus, she was called into Chap- man's office where, without the requested representation, Mullins forced the interview to continue. While in Chap- man's office, Mullins accused Spencer of insubordination and asked her to resign. By making these statements, Mullins afforded Spencer an objective basis for believing that the interview was going to result in disciplinary action. She once again requested that she be permitted to obtain representation. Instead of permitting Spencer to obtain the representation to which she was entitled before continuing the interview or, in the alternative, dis- continuing the interview, Mullins interfered with Spen- cer's Section 7 rights by denying her representation by deliberately and forcefully blocking the door so that she could not leave to obtain such representation. He then stated that he had a right to speak with her without the presence of a union representative, and proceeded to continue the interview begun earlier in his own office. As more fully described supra, he interrogated her, again demanded her resignation, told her that he was rescind- ing certain privileges which he had granted her earlier, criticized her attitude, and again threatened her by stat- ing that she would not get very far. He again denied Spencer her right to representation and all the while continued to physically block the door so she could not get out, until he had completed the interview. I can scarcely imagine a more classic example of a Weingarten violation. I find Respondent in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Contract Respondent contends that the Union, by virtue of the collective bargaining agreement, has waived its right to be present during employee interviews so that employees of Respondent do not have Weingarten rights. The con- tract provision in question, article XIX, is as follows: The Union further agrees that neither the Union nor its members shall interfere with the right of the Employer: b. To interview any Agent with respect to any phase of his work without the grievance committee being present. The key words in this provision are "with respect to any phase of his work." To determine the literal meaning of this provision one should ask, "What is the business of Respondent?" The obvious answer to this question is: Respondent's business is to sell insurance. The next ques- tion is, "Why does respondent employ agents?" or "What is the work of the agent?" The answer again is obvious: The agent's work consists of selling insurance policies. Quite clearly then, what the parties have agreed by the inclusion of this provision in the contract is for the Union to refrain from interfering in any interviews of agents by management concerning the agents' work; i.e., the selling of insurance and related matters. 250 PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY The next question to be asked is, "What is the business of the Union?" The equaily obvious answer is: The busi- ness of the Union is to represent Respondent's employees with regard to wages, hours, and working conditions. The cited contract provision does not state that the Union has abdicated as the bargaining representative of Respondent's employees or that it has agreed no longer to represent them. Nor does the cited provision in any way indicate that Respondent's employees have surren- dered their rights to representation. There is, therefore, no express waiver. If an analysis of the provision itself reveals no inten- tion on the part of the parties to waive the Union's Wein- garten rights, certainly the history of bargaining can hardly be said to support Respondent's contention that the Union has waived them. Thus, not only was the pro- vision negotiated into the contract long before Weingar- ten, but it has remained unchanged ever since its incep- tion. Clearly the parties could not have had Weingarten in mind when the provision was first inserted in the con- tract. Moreover, ever since the Weingarten decision the Union has tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to negotiate changes in the provision which would spell out its rights under Weingarten. It cannot therefore be said that it con- sciously yielded up or clearly and unmistakably waived the statutorily protected rights of employees to have union representation at any employee interview from which the employee might reasonably conclude that his job security might be in jeopardy. 19 There is, therefore, no implied waiver. It is quite evident that the circumstances which gave rise to the incident here involved were clearly not such as to fall within the exclusive business of Respondent so that the cited contract provision might legitimately be in- voked, but were rather such as to fall within the prov- ince of the Union requiring it to fulfill its obligation to Respondent's employees to represent them when request- ed to do so while concomitantly permitting said employ- ees to avail themselves of the right to representation by the Union; in the instant case, in accordance with the Su- preme Court's holding in Weingarten. It might aptly be enjoined: Render therefore unto Prudential the things which are Prudential's; and unto the Union the things that are the Union's. There is no waiver. For reasons stated, I find and conclude that, by deny- ing Spencer's request for union representation under the circumstances herein found, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, and the entire record in the case, I state the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By denying Spencer's request for union representa- tion at an interview conducted by Respondent under cir- cumstances from which Spencer could reasonably con- clude that her job security was in jeopardy, Respondent 19 VeH' York Telephone Company, 219 NLRB 679 (1975). interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, and thereby engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be required to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed and found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 20 The Respondent, Prudential Insurance Company of America, Oak Park, Michigan, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from requiring any employee to take part in an interview or meeting without union repre- sentation, if such representation has been requested by the employee and if the employee has reasonable grounds to believe that the matters to be discussed at such interview may result in his being subject to disci- plinary action. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed and found necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Remove from Marie Spencer's personnel file all references to the incident which occurred on February 2, 1979. (b) Post at its office in Oak Park, Michigan, copies of the attached noticed marked "Appendix." 2 1 Copies of the said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Di- rector for Region 7, after being duly signed by an autho- rized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to insure that said notices are not al- tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith. 20 In the event that no exceptions are filed as provided in Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 21 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu- ant to a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National l.abor Relations Board." 251