De Queen General Hospital

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD De Queen General Hospital and Professional Divi- sion, Retail Clerks Union, Local 1583, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO. Cases 26-CA-8433, 26-CA- 8493, 26-CA-8517, 26-CA-8609, 26-RC-6184, and 26-RC-6185 September 30, 1982 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS FANNING, JENKINS, AND ZIMMERMAN On December 14, 1981, Administrative Law Judge James T. Youngblood issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respond- ent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, finding,' and conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge, and Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi- bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con- vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products. Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. In fn. 6 of his Decision, the Administrative Law Judge incorrectly stated that the May 6, 1980, advertisement by Respondent's medical staff was signed by Ray Kimble and that Kimble is a physician. In the section of his Decision entitled "Mary Margaret Neumeier," the Adminstrative Law Judge stated that Pat Athey was the lab supervisor and a registered nurse, rather than the "chief tech" and supervisor of the radiology de- partment, the nuclear medicine department. EKG, and ultrasound, and a licensed radiological technician. He also stated that Neumeier's June 24 reprimand was given "in violation of' Respondent's rule prohibiting em- ployees from engaging in activities other than assigned duties, whereas it is clear from the context that he intended to state that her August II rep- rimand was given for violating the above rule These inadvertent errors are insufficient to affect our decision. The Administrative Law Judge found that there were 13 employees in Unit A on March 11, 1980. In so doing, he excluded employee Travis in accordance with the parties' agreement The record shows that the par- ties' agreement was based on the fact Travis resigned on April 19, and therefore was ineligible to vote in Unit A at the May 7 election. We find that, since she was employed in a unit classification at all material times prior to April 19, she properly should have been included in the unit in determining the Union's majority status. The Administrative Law Judge also included, in accordance with the parties' agreement, employee Effie Turner. However, Turner was not hired by Respondent until March 29. We therefore find that she should not have been included in the unit for purposes of determining the Union's majority status. Accordingly, we agree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that there were 13 employees in Unit A on March 11, 1980. We futher note that, since nei- ther of the above employees signed authorization cards, the Union's ma- jonty status is not affected by these findings. In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the units herein are appropriate, we note that the parties stipulated to the appropri- ateness of such units in Cases 26-RC 6184 and 26-RC-6185. 2 In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that Re- spondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating employee Stultz, we rely onl his affirmative crediting of Stultz' testimony, based on 264 NLRB No. 69 to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein. 3 AMENDED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Substitute the following for the Administrative Law Judge's Conclusion of Law 3: "3. By interrogating its employees concerning their union membership, activities, and sympathies; by warning its employees that they could get into trouble for supporting the Union; by threatening its employees with a loss of jobs if the Union was voted in; by creating the impression of surveillance of its employees' union activities; by promising em- ployees increased benefits if they curtailed their union activities; by threatening employees with plant closure if the Union was voted in; by threat- ening employees that bargaining would begin from scratch, that benefits negotiated would not be as good as those now enjoyed, that it would not bar- gain with the Union, and that employees could be fired if they did not curtail their union activities; by warning its employees that they were heading for trouble and were troublemakers, and that they had received warnings because of their union activ- ities; and by issuing a personnel policy and proce- dure manual which included a rule prohibiting em- ployees from engaging in activities other than as- signed duties, Respondent has engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act." 2. Substitute the following for the Administrative Law Judge's Conclusion of Law 6: "6. Since March 18, 1980, the Union has repre- sented a majority of the employees in the appropri- ate units described below, and has been the exclu- sive bargaining representative of said employees within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. The appropriate bargaining units are: "(A) All full-time and regular part-time regis- tered nurses employed by the Employer at its De Queen, Arkansas, hospital in the following his finding that her testimony was straightfforward and had a ring of truth. In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's colclusion that a bargain- ing order is warranted, we find it unnecessary to pass on his finding, at fn. 10, that the representation petitions filed in Cases 26 RC-6184 and 26-RC 6185 on March 18, 1979, constituted a demand for recognition Further, in the absence of exceptions, we adopt the Administrative l.aw Judge's dating of Respondent's bargaining obligation from March 18, 1980. We shall amend the Administrative Law Judge's Conclusions of I aw to more closely conform to the violations found 3 We shall modify the Administrative L aw Judge's recommended Order, inter alia, to conform more closely to the violations found Addi- tionally, we shall modify the recommended Order so as to require Re- spondent to expunge from its files any reference to the discriminatory warnings issued to employees Neumeier and Anita Turner and to the un- lawful discharges of employees Stultz, Harris, Neumeier, and Bryson, and to notify them in writing that this has been done and that the evidence of Respondent's unlawful conduct will not be used against them. See Ster- ling Sugars. Inc., 261 NLRB 472 (1982) 480 DE QUEEN GENERAL HOSPITAL classifications: registered nurses, excluding all other employees, including employees in Unit B, anethesiologists, confidential employees, clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. "(B) All full-time and regular part-time techni- cal employees employed by the Employer at its De Queen, Arkansas, hospital in the follow- ing classifications: lab technicians, respiratory therapists, X-ray technicians, ambulance drivers/emergency medical technicians, para- medics, LPN's, nurses' aides and ward clerks, excluding all other employees, including em- ployees in Unit A, clerical employees, profes- sional employees, confidential employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act." ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi- fied and set out in full below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, De Queen General Hospital, De Queen, Arkansas, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Interrogating employees concerning their union membership, activities, and sympathies. (b) Threatening its employees with reprisals or that they are about to get in trouble because of their union activities. (c) Threatening its employees with a loss of jobs if the Union is voted in. (d) Threatening employees with discharge be- cause of their discussions about the Union. (e) Informing its employees that their activities are under surveillance or creating an impression among its employees that their union activities are under surveillance. (f) Promising its employees better working con- ditions if they would stop the election or if they would not file objections to the conduct of the election. (g) Threatening its employees with plant closure if the Union was voted in. (h) Warning employees that bargaining would begin from scratch, that any benefits negotiated would not be as good as those in the existing policy manual and that it will not bargain with the Union. (i) Warning employees that they could be fired or would be fired if they did not cease their .nion activities. (j) Warning its employees that they were head- ing for trouble because of their union activities and that they were troublemakers because of their union activities. (k) Informing its employeees that they had re- ceived warnings because of their union activities. (I) Maintaining or promulgating any rules which prohibit employees from engaging in activities other than assigned duties and to cease issuing warnings based on such rules. (m) Discouraging membership in Professional Division, Retail Clerks Union, Local 1583, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by issuing discriminatory warnings, discriminatorily discharging, or in any other manner discriminating against its employees in regard to hire, tenure, or other terms and conditions of employment. (n) In any other manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Recognize and, upon request, bargain collec- tively with Professional Division, Retail Clerks Union, Local 1583, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, as the ex- clusive representative since March 18, 1979, of the employees in the appropriate bargaining units de- scribed below, with regard to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such under- standing in a signed agreement. The appropriate bargaining units are: (A) All full-time and regular part-time regis- tered nurses employed by the Employer at its De Queen, Arkansas, hospital in the following classifications: registered nurses, excluding all other employees, including employees in Unit B, anesthesiologists, confidential employees, clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (B) All full-time and regular part-time techni- cal employees employed by the Employer at its De Queen, Arkansas, hospital in the follow- ing classifications: lab technicians, respiratory therapists, X-ray technicians, ambulance drivers/emergency medical technicians, para- medics, LPN's, nurses' aides and ward clerks, excluding all other employees, including em- ployees in Unit A, clerical employees, profes- sional employees, confidential employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Offer Doris A. Stultz, Patsy Harris, Mary M. Neumeier, and Univee Bryson immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if such jobs 481 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD no longer exist, to substantially equivalent posi- tions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and make them whole for any loss of earnings that they may have suffered by reason of Respondent's discrimi- nation against them, as set forth in the section of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision entitled "The Remedy." (c) Immediately rescind the discriminatory warn- ings issued to Mary M. Neumeier and Anita Turner pursuant to its illegal rule against employees engag- ing in any activities other than assigned duties. (d) Expunge from its files any reference to the discriminatory warnings issued to, and/or dis- charges of, the above-named employees, and notify them in writing that this has been done and that evidence of these warnings and/or discharges will not be used as a basis for future personnel actions against them. (e) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copy- ing, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (f) Post at its De Queen, Arkansas, facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 4 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 26, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con- secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in- cluding all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 26, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not found herein. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the elections held on May 7, 1980, in Cases 26-RC-6184 and 26-RC- 6185 be, and they hereby are, set aside and that the petitions therein be, and they hereby are, dismissed. 4 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu- ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees concerning their union membership, activities, or sympathies. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with reprisals or that they will get into trouble be- cause of their union activities. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with a loss of jobs if a union is voted in. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with discharge because of their union discussions. WE WILL NOT inform our employees that their union activities are under surveillance and WE WILL NOT create an impression among our employees that their union activities are under surveillance. WE WILL NOT promise our employees better working conditions if they stop union elections or if they do not file objections to the conduct of union elections. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with plant closure if a union is voted in. WE WILL NOT warn our employees that bar- gaining will begin from scratch, that any bene- fits negotiated will not be as good as benefits already enjoyed by the employees, and that we will not bargain with a union. WE WILL NOT warn our employees that they can be fired or will be fired if they do not cease their union activities. WE WILL NOT warn our employees that they are heading for trouble because of their union activities or that they are troublemakers because of their union activities. WE WILL NOT inform our employees that they have received warnings because of their union activities. WE WILL NOT maintain or promulgate any rules which prohibit our employees from en- gaging in activities other than assigned duties, and WE WILL cease issuing warnings based on such rules. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Professional Division, Retail Clerks Union, Local 1583, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization by issuing dis- criminatory warnings, discriminatorily dis- charging, or in any other manner discriminat- ing against our employees in regard to hire, 482 DE QUEEN GENERAL HOSPITAL tenure, or other terms and conditions of em- ployment. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Sec- tion 7 of the Act. WE WILL, upon request, recognize and bar- gain collectively with Professional Division, Retail Clerks Union, Local 1583, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative since March 18, 1979, of the employees in the following appropriate units and, upon request, embody in a signed agreement any understand- ing reached. The appropriate bargaining units are: (A) All full-time and regular part-time regis- tered nurses employed by the Employer at its De Queen, Arkansas, hospital in the fol- lowing classifications: registered nurses, ex- cluding all other employees, including em- ployees in Unit B, anesthesiologists, confi- dential employees, clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (B) All full-time and regular part-time tech- nical employees employed by the Employer at its De Queen, Arkansas, hospital in the following classifications: lab technicians, res- piratory therapists, X-ray technicians, ambu- lance drivers/emergency medical techni- cians, paramedics, LPN's, nurses' aides and ward clerks, excluding all other employees, including employees in Unit A, clerical em- ployees, professional employees, confidential employees, guards and supervisors as de- fined in the Act. WE Wlli. offer Doris A. Stultz, Patsy Harris, Mary M. Neumeier, and Univee Bryson immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if such jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and WE WIt L make them whole for any loss of earnings they may have suffered as a result of our unlawful discrimination against them, plus interest. WE will. rescind the discriminatory warn- ings issued to Mary M. Neumeier and Anita Turner pursuant to our illegal rule against em- ployees engaging in any activities other than assigned duties. WE WI.IL expunge from our files any refer- ence to the discriminatory warnings issued to, and/or the discharges of, the above-named em- ployees, and notify them in writing that this has been done and that evidence of these warnings and/or discharges will not be used as a basis for future personnel actions against them. DE QUEEN GENERAL HOSPITAL DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES T. YOUNGBLOOD, Administrative Law Judge: These cases were heard before me in De Queen, Arkan- sas, on January 28, 29, and 30 and February 24, 25, and 26, 1981, pursuant to a consolidated complaint issued on October 16, 1980. De Queen General Hospital (herein Respondent or Hospital) filed an answer denying the commission of any unfair labor practices. The consoli- dated complaint alleges various violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, and that said violations are so serious and substantial that they warrant the entry of re- medial bargaining order. Briefs were filed by all parties and they have been duly considered. Upon the entire record, and from my observations and the demeanor of each witness while testifying, and the briefs filed herein, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCI USIONS 1 I. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDE-NT The Respondent is engaged in the operation of a gen- eral health care hospital in De Queen, Arkansas. The consolidated complaint alleges, the Respondent admits. and I find that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. It. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The consolidated complaint alleges, Respondent admits, and I find that the Professional Division, Retail Clerks Union, Local 1583, United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO (herein the Union), is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES As indicated Respondent is engaged in the operation of a general health care hospital in De Queen, Arkansas. In February 19802 the Union began an organizational The facts found herein are a compilation of the credited testimonNy. the exhibits, and stipulation of facts, viewed in light of logical consisten- cy and inherent probability Although these findings may not contain or refer to all of the evidence, all has been weighed and considered. To the extent that any testimony or other evidence not mentioned in this Deci- sion may appear to contradict my findings of fact, I have not disregarded that evidence but have rejected it as incredible. lacking in probative weight, surplusage, or irrelevant Credibility resolutions have been made on the basis of the whole record, including the inherent probabilities of the testimony and the demeanor of the witnesses Where it may be re- quired I will set forth specific credibility findings. 2 Unless otherwise specified all dates refer to 1980 483 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD campaign at the hospital facility in De Queen, Arkansas. At that time the hospital employees began attending union organizational meetings and the Union began ef- forts to solicit authorization cards from the hospital em- ployees.3 On March 18, the Union filed two representa- tion petitions, one for a unit of registered nurses and an- other for a larger unit of all full-time and regular part- time technical employees.4 Elections were held in both units on May 7, and the Union failed to receive a majority of the valid votes cast in either unit. On May 14, the Union filed timely objec- tions to conduct affecting the result of the elections. Certain of these objections were found by the Region- al Director to raise material and substantial issues and were consolidated with the consolidated complaint herein for hearing. At the hearing the General Counsel introduced into evidence (G.C. Exh. 3) a copy of Respondent's rules and regulations which were drafted in 1976 and revised in 1977. As revised these rules were in effect at Respond- ent's facility during the union campaign and at the time of the hearing. Respondent's administrator, James Pearce, testified that these rules were placed at every work area in the hospital and all supervisors were en- couraged to go through these rules with all new employ- ees during their orientation period. These rules are enti- tled, "Personnel Policy & Procedure Manual" and, on page 16, certain conduct is listed as offenses. Among other offenses, the manual lists as offense 13, "Engaging in activities other than assigned duties," and provides for the first offense a 1- to 3-day suspension and discharge on the second offense. The complaint alleges that this rule is unlawful on its face and constitutes an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. There is no doubt that this rule was maintained during the Union's organizational campaign and was still in ex- istence at the time of the hearing. On its face this rule prohibits employees from engaging in any type of activi- ty other than "assigned duties." Thus it is clear that em- ployees are prohibited from engaging in any type of ac- tivities other than those assigned by management, includ- ing union solicitation or distribution of union literature. And as such the rule is obviously too broad. As the rule I After the name of the Union the cards were captioned, in bold-faced type, "AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRESENTATION," and stated, "I hereby authorize the United Food & Commercial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO CLC, or its chartered Local Union(s) to represent me for the purpose of collective bargaining." The card had a place for the employee's name, address, date, and signature. 4 The appropriate units are as follows: (A) All full-time and regular part-time registered nurses employed by the Employer at its De Queen, Arkansas, hospital in the following classifications: registered nurses, excluding all other employees, in- cluding employees in unit B, anethesiologists, confidential employees, clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (B) All full-time and regular part-time technical employees employed by the Employer at its De Queen, Arkansas, hospital in the follow- ing classifications: lab technicians, respiratory therapists, X-ray tech- nicians, ambulance drivers/emergency medical technicians, paramed- ics, LPN's, nurses' aides and ward clerks, excluding all other em- ployees, including employees in Unit A, clerical employees, profes- sional employees, confidential employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act contains no words of limitation it would appear that it is applicable from the time the employees walk in, or begin their work shift, until the time they clock out, or end their work shift. On its face the rules would prohibit em- ployees from engaging in any form of solicitation or dis- tribution during the entire day including time alloted for lunchbreak and the normal break periods. Such a rule is obviously illegal on its face and violates Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. See Parker Seal Company, 233 NLRB 332 (1977), and cases cited therein. Employee Paulette Downs, a licensed practical nurse, was asked by Illeen Dossett, Respondent's director of nurses and admitted supervisor, around March 6, if she were going to attend the union meeting that was being held at the home of employee Cleta Hodge that morning. When Downs informed Dossett that she was not going to the meeting, Dossett replied that she hoped Downs was not going to the meeting because she was afraid that Cleta Hodge was going to get into a lot of trouble if she kept this up. Dossett testified that she could not recall whether she had a conversation with Downs during the month of March. Employee Dee Ann Smith testified that, around March 6, Dossett asked her if she had been invited to the meet- ing to be held at Cleta Hodge's home that morning. Smith replied no and that she did not think they were having a meeting that morning. Dossett remarked that Cleta Hodge was off that day. Although it was not gen- erally known around the hospital a union meeting was scheduled to be held that morning at the home of Cleta Hodge. Dossett did not testify with regard to this con- versation with Smith. I credit the testimony 'of both Smith and Downs and conclude that Dossett interrogated these employees con- cerning their union activities in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Additionally, the statement by Dossett to Downs that she was afraid that Hodge was going to get in trouble over the union meeting was a clear threat relating to the union activities of Hodge in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5 Employee Doris Stultz testified that, around March 21, Dick Jones, the lab supervisor, asked her if she and Mary Margaret Neumeier had been talking about the Union, and asked Stultz if she had signed up for the Union. Jones stated that he figured they were talking about the Union, as they were in the X-ray department alone. Although Jones testified, he did not testify con- cerning this conversation with Stultz. Mary Margaret Neumeier, a staff X-ray technician, tes- tified that, in early March, Dick Jones, the lab supervi- sor, asked her whether she was for the Union. She re- sponded by asking him what management had done to solve the problems that existed between management and the employees, and then told Jones that the hospital had done nothing. She said the only way was for the employ- ees to group together, to have some job protection, and to receive better benefits. She stated that Jones reminded her that her husband was a part of management for an- other company, and that he, Jones, thought she had s These violations are covered by pars. 7(a) and (b) and 8(a) of the complaint. 484 DE QUEEN GENERAL HOSPITAL better sense than to get involved with the Union because of her husband's position. He told Neumeier that any- body who is associated with the Union and supported the Union would be in trouble with the Hospital. Jones testified that he had a conversation with Neumeier con- cerning the Union but that this dealt primarily with her family life and that it seemed to him that the Union was the center of the breakup between her and her husband. That her husband had indicated to him that he could not tolerate her union activities much longer, and that he, Jones, probably told Neumeier to "cool it on this," as union activities were not worth it. Jones denied that he told Neumeier that if she kept up her union activities or associated with people that were engaging in union activities she would be in trouble with the hospital administration. I credit the testimony of both Stultz and Neumeier over that of Jones. Both Stultz and Neumeier testified straightforward and their testimony had a ring of truth. Jones did not testify concerning the incident with Stultz, and admitted that he discussed union activities with Neu- meier. Respondent would discount the interrogation of Neumeier by Jones because they were personal friends and that any statements made to her would not consti- tute violations of the Act because they were not meant to be coercive. On the contrary, such statements coming from a personal friend in management tend to have a greater impact on employees in view of the authenticity and credibility of the source. See Coach and Equipment Sales Corporation, 228 NLRB 440 (1977). As indicated, I do not credit the denial of Jones. Therefore, it is my conclusion that Jones interrogated Stultz and Neumeier as alleged in paragraphs 8(b) and (c) of the complaint in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Additionally, Jones warned employees that they could get in trouble with the hospital administration if they continued to engage in union activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged in paragraph 13 of the complaint. Neumeier testified that, around March 25, she told Su- pervisor Dick Jones that she was upset about a repri- mand she had received. She testified that Jones told her to be careful because as long as she associated with people who management thought were for the Union, such as Cleta Hodge, she would be grouped with them and assumed to be associated with them. Jones told Neu- meier that this was going to get her into trouble and that she should watch herself and just be careful. As I have credited the testimony of Neumeier over that of Jones it is my conclusion that Respondent engaged in violations of Section 8(a)(1) by Jones warning employees that they were headed for trouble because of their union activities, as alleged in paragraph 16 of the complaint. Employee Paulette Downs testified that, around April 23, she was working with her supervisor, Jo Anne Hol- combe, when Dr. Ridlon came by and asked Holcombe to come along with him. When Holcombe returned she informed Downs that Dr. Ridlon had told her that he had hoped that a union would not get into the hospital, because he could not keep his practices there, because he and his partner could not get another partner to come into a union hospital. Holcombe also told her that Dr. Ridlon said they should convey this message to the em- ployees. Supervisor Holcombe testified that she had been called into the labor suite by Dr. Ridlon, and that he told her that if the Union came in he and his partner would defi- nitely be leaving town because they could not work in a hospital where there was a union. Ridlon instructed Hol- combe to convey this message to the employees. Hol- combe testified that the first person she conveyed Rid- Ion's message to was employee Downs. Dr. Ridlon was not called to testify. Later in the day Downs was in the intensive care unit and informed Supervisor Joan Compagna that she was upset and hated to lose two good physicians in De Queen and mentioned Dr. Ridlon's leaving if the Union were successful at the hospital. Compagna informed Downs that she had heard the same thing. Compagna testified that she had heard a rumor around the hospital that a couple of doctors, including Dr. Ridlon, were going to leave the hospital if the Union were voted in. She indicated that she was sure she had informed some employees of this possibility. Both Holcombe and Com- pagna admit that they informed employees that certain doctors might leave the hospital if the Union were voted in. It is obvious that these statements certainly conveyed to the employees that there would be a decline in busi- ness at the hospital in the future if the Union were voted in. Any decline in services at the hospital would neces- sarily result in a curtailment of employment at the hospi- tal and therefore would affect the employees' job secu- rity. Such statements certainly threaten employee job se- curity and constitute restraint and coercion within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Accordingly, I find that the General Counsel has sustained his burden of proof in support of paragraphs 12(c) and 14 of the com- plaint. Paragraph 9 of the complaint alleges that, on or about May 6, Respondent threatened, coerced, and intimidated its employees by calling other hospitals, in the presence of employees, to ascertain available patient space in the event the Union were voted in. Employee Dee Ann Smith testified that on the morn- ing of the election, May 7, she was in the cardiac inten- sive care unit and heard Jo Anne Holcombe telephone other hospitals, inform them that a union campaign was in progress at the De Queen Hospital, and ask, in the event of a strike, could the hospital take care of some of the De Queen patients. Jo Anne Holcombe, called as a witness for the Gener- al Counsel, testified that Respondent's management had indicated to the supervisors that if the Union were suc- cessful that there would most likely be a strike and that the hospital should be prepared in the event that a strike did occur. Therefore, Administrator Pearce told her to call other hospitals to determine if they had available beds for the De Queen patients in the event of a strike. She said on Pearce's instructions she called four or five of the surrounding hospitals from the telephone in the labor room at the nurses station outside of the delivery room. She testified that this phone was as private as any 4R5 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD she had access to, and that there were no patients in the labor room at that time. In response to a question as to whether any employees were present when she made the calls she stated, "There was no one present; there were several housekeepers who came through to empty trash, or whatever, and Paulette came back to ask me a question while I was on the phone." Joan Marie Compagna, the cardiac intensive care unit supervisor, testified that 2 days before the election, in ac- cordance with instructions from Mr. Brody, an admitted agent of Respondent, she called other hospitals in the area to make preparation for patients that came in for in- tensive care in the event that there was a strike at the De Queen Hospital. She testified that she made this call from the phone in the intensive care unit at the nurses station. There was no evidence offered that any employee heard Compagna making any of the calls to the other hospitals in the area. It appears to me that a hospital has a duty and an obli- gation to make preparations for the care of its patients in the event of a strike by a labor organization representing its employees. It also appears that the hospital made its preparations in this regard in a very nondisruptive and quiet way, in that only one employee among all of Re- spondent's employees could testify concerning the calls and the hospital's preparations. Had Respondent intended to instill in the minds of its employees that there would be problems if the Union were voted in, it could have used more drastic measures which would have guaran- teed that all of the employees were aware of Respond- ent's preparations. However, it made its preparations in this regard in a matter that only one employee of the entire hospital staff was aware of its plans. Under these circumstances, I cannot conclude that Re- spondent threatened, coerced, or intimidated its employ- ees as alleged in paragraph 9 of the complaint, and there- fore, recommend that paragraph 9, subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) be dismissed. Paragraph 10 of the complaint alleges that on or about May 6 Respondent, by placing an advertisement in the De Queen Daily Citizen, and by posting this advertise- ment at various locations throughout its De Queen, Ar- kansas, facility, threatened its employees with plant clo- sure. Jim Pearce, the administrator of the De Queen Gener- al Hospital, testified that the medical staff at the hospital became concerned about the union election and decided to convey their feelings to the hospital employees by placing an ad to this effect in the De Queen Daily Citi- zen, the local newspaper. The Sevier County Medical Society provided the funds for the placement of the ad. This covered all of the physicians working out of the De Queen General Hospital. On May 6, 1980, the day preceding the election, the following ad appeared in the De Queen Daily Citizen: OUR PATIENTS FIRST QUALITY PATIENT CARE IS DE QUEEN GE-NERAL HOSPITAL'S ONLY REASON FOR EXISI rTING. IN SOME HOSPITALS WHICH HAVE BEEN UNION- IZED, PATIENT CARE HAS SUFFERED. IF THIS OCCURRED AT DE QUEEN GENERA., WE MIGHT BE OBLIGATED TO TAKE OUT PATIENTS ELSE- WHERE. WE URGE THE EMPLOYEES OF DE QUEEN GENER- AL HOSPITAl T1O VOTE "NO" ON WEDNESDAY! This ad admonished the hospital employees to vote against the Union, and informed the employees that the doctors may be obligated to take their patients elsewhere if the hospital is unionized and patient care suffers. 6 The obvious message of the ad was information to the employees that if they decided to unionize the hospital they could expect that the doctors would remove their patients from the hospital and their work opportunities at the hospital would be diminished. Thus, the employees are informed that their jobs are in jeopardy, and that there is a possibility that unionization could result in the closing of the hospital. Under the circumstances of this case, particularly in view of the other 8(a)(l) violations engaged in by Respondent, it is my conclusion that Re- spondent is responsible for the advertisement and as the threatened closure of the hospital is particularly coer- cive, it constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I so find. See Star Kist Samoa. Inc., 237 NLRB 238 (1978). Employee Cleta Hodge, a known union adherent, testi- fied that shortly before the election Supervisor Donna L. Montezuma grabbed her by the arm and pulled her to the side of a corridor and informed her that she, Monte- zuma, had received word that Hodge was under close observation. Montezuma told her that if she did not quiet down she was going to lose her job. Hodge asked Mon- tezuma if she was telling her that she could not talk about the Union. Montezuma said no, but that she should quiet down before she, Hodge, got into trouble. Monte- zuma was not called to testify and Hodge's testimony stands unrebutted on the record. It is my conclusion that by these statements Respondent created an impression among its employees that their union activities were under surveillance, and threatened its employees with 6 Three of the physicians signatory to the ad were Frank Daniels, C N. Jones, and Ray Kimble. All were ilemnbers of the board of directors of the l)e Queen General Hospital, and Doctor Daniels was ,ice presi- dent of the board of directors and Doctor Ray Kimble wsas the owner and editor of the De Queen Daily Citizen. According to Pearce the sig- natories to the ad comprised the membership of the local medical society. According to Pearce the ad ,sas typed up at the hospital and his secre- tary took it around to each individual doctor to sign and it v as then pre- sented to the newspaper. In addition. to being generally circulated throughout the De Queen area Pearce said that on his Instructions about 10 copies of the ad were posted throughout the De Queen Hospital on May 6, and they stayed posted during the election and were removed im- mediately after the election. It is obvious that the members of the board of directors of the hospital are agents of the hospital within the meaning of the Act and the hospital is responsible for their actions. Therefore to the extent that agents of Respondent participated in the preparation and circulation of the ad it is my conclusion that Respondent is responsible for the ad Moreover, as the ad was posted throughout the hospital at the direction of the administrator Pearce, it is obvious that Respondent adopted the ad and is therefore responsible for its consequences 486 DE QUEEN GENERAL HOSPITAL discharge because of their talking about the Union, as al- leged in paragraphs 1 I(a) and (b) of the complaint in vio- lation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. On May 8, the day following the election, a meeting was held at Supervisor Jo Anne Holcombe's home. Su- pervisors Holcombe, Montezuma, and Wanda Staggs were present at the meeting along with employees Cleta Hodge, Judy Price, Cheryl Cureton, Paulette Downs, and Diane Smith. Employee Judy Price testified that Su- pervisor Holcombe told those present that E. W. Brody, the management consultant, had stated that if they could prevent any charges from being filed against the hospital, he would work up a better policy and procedures outline that would benefit the employees more than the Union could. When Holcombe was informed that the employ- ees did not have the authority to stop any litigation, Hol- combe asked the employees to talk to the union repre- sentatives and try to get them to not file any charges. Cleta Hodge testified that Holcombe began to discuss how the employees at the hospital could work together and work with Brody because he could help them with their problems. Holcombe testified that she told the em- ployees that if charges were filed against the hospital it would delay the employees from being a part of the new policies to be implemented. Staggs, Montezuma, and Holcombe told the employees that if any of the employ- ees at the hospital were going to benefit from the new policies, they wanted all of the employees to benefit and not just part of them. Paulette Downs testified that Holcombe and Montezu- ma told the employees that if they would not file charges Brody would include the employees in the bargaining unit he was setting up, and also told them that the em- ployees could not get any raises or other benefits if any charges were filed, but if they were included in the new bargaining unit they would be able to receive these bene- fits. It is clear from this testimony that Respondent prom- ised its employees better working conditions if they would drop their objections to the conduct of the elec- tion and if they would not file objections to the conduct of the election, as alleged in paragraphs 11(c) and 12(b) of the complaint, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I so find. Cleta Hodge was to be an observer for the Union at the election on May 7 and was to attend a preelection conference that day at 1:15 p.m. Around 12:15 p.m. Hol- combe approached Hodge and told her that she, Hol- combe, wanted Hodge to talk to Brody. Holcombe ex- plained to Hodge that she had been in conference with Brody for several hours discussing new policies and working conditions, including a proposed grievance committee. Hodge agreed to meet with Brody, but, as she did not want other employees who had worked with her in the union campaign to think that she was betray- ing them by going to management, suggested that they meet in a private area. A few minutes later Holcombe and Brody met Hodge in the sterilizing room, where Brody told Hodge that he had been hired by the hospital to work on the problems the hospital was having. He said he was working on a new policy, working condi- tions, a grievance committee, and better insurance, and that the employees who were tied up in the bargaining units sought by the Union could not be a part of the new policy procedures. He told Hodge that, if the employees went to an election and lost, it would be 12 months before they could pick up with the Union again, but if they called the election off they could pick up with an- other union tomorrow, or could begin campaigning again with the Retail Clerks in 6 months. After Brody left, Hodge asked Holcombe what Brody meant by getting the election stopped. Holcombe told Hodge that if the employees went to an election and lost they could not be a part of the new policy. Holcombe told Hodge that she knew the employees were going to lose the election, and that Hodge knew how to get the election called off. Hodge replied that she could find out, but that she would have to leave the hospital. Holcombe told Hodge not to worry about it, and loaned her the keys to her car to go check on whether or not she could get the election stopped. Hodge then went to the Land- O-Lakes Motel, where the union representatives were staying and asked if the election could be called off. The election was not called off and was held later that day. Holcombe admitted that she was the one who ar- ranged for Hodge to meet with Brody and that she was present during the meeting. She stated that Brody told Hodge the new policies being instituted would not con- cern the employees who were involved in the bargaining units with the Union, and that if the election were called off they could solicit another union immediately, or could go back with this Union after 6 months. She stated that Hodge asked Brody what the employees' options were, and Brody told her that they could still solicit an- other union immediately if the election were called off, but they could not go back with the same union for at least 6 months. Brody named five unions to Hodge that she could contact immediately, including the American Federation of Teachers. Brody reminded Hodge that the employees in the bargaining units involved in the union campaign would not be included in the new policies and would have to remain under the old policies. Brody testified that he did meet Holcombe and Hodge in the sterilizing room, and informed Hodge that his pur- pose for being at the hospital was to work toward revi- sion of the hospital's personal policies and procedures. According to Brody he told Hodge that as some of the policies and procedures involved with his work could conceivably be subject to negotiations, as they pertained to the people within the bargaining units, if the Union won the election what he proposed might not apply to every employee in the hospital. He testified that he did not recall how the issue of having the election called off came up, but that he told Hodge that if the employees wanted to they could stop their campaigning and later start again. Based on the foregoing it is clear that the Respondent through its agents Holcombe and Brody promised Re- spondent's employees better working conditions if they would stop the union election, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged in paragraphs 12(a) and 15(b) of the complaint, and I so find. 487 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Supervisor Holcombe testified that numerous supervi- sory meetings were held during the union campaign with the first being around the time the petition was filed. These meetings were attended by the department heads, Administrator Pearce, Brody, the management consult- ant, and the hospital attorneys. Holcombe testified that in the beginning when they first heard about the Union it did not make too much difference, nobody seemed to think too much about it. But as time wore on, things changed and Pearce began saying that if the employees think they have it bad now, just wait. This appeared to be the general attitude, and management concluded it had to do something to stop the union campaign. She testified that at these meetings the union ringleaders, such as Cleta Hodge, Doris Stultz, Pat Hill, Pat Harris, Paulette Downs, and Cheryl Cureton were mentioned. Holcombe stated that at one of these meetings Pearce in- formed the group that even if the Union won the elec- tion the hospital would not bargain with the Union. Pearce also told those in attendance at the meeting that the people who were involved in the bargaining units would not benefit from the new policy manual and that it would be thrown out and they would have to start over from scratch. Holcombe testified that she related these statements to employees Downs and Hodge and also told them that the employees would not even have the benefits that they had prior to the union election. Holcombe also testi- fied that she was at a meeting in which Pearce stated that he thought five or six employees were the real trou- blemakers who were pushing the Union, and was present when it was discussed that the hospital finally had a reason to possibly terminate Cleta Hodge because she had interfered with staffing patterns. Following this meeting, Holcombe testified that she told employees Judy Price and Paulette Downs to tell Hodge to keep her mouth shut, because she was in trouble and was going to get fired. Under the circumstances, statements that bargaining would be from scratch; that the employees would not even have the benefits that they had prior to the union election; that even if the Union won the election the hos- pital would not bargain with the Union, and the sugges- tion to employees that those who were supporting the Union might be in trouble and would be fired, clearly conveys to the employees that the Respondent is against the collective-bargaining process and restrains and co- erces employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and I so find. Accordingly, I conclude that the Re- spondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) as set forth in para- graph 12, subparagraphs d, e, and f of the complaint. Paragraph 15(a) of the complaint alleges that Respond- ent, through E. W. Brody on or about May 7, promised employees that the terms and conditions of employment would improve regardless of the outcome of the election. As there is no evidence in this record to indicate that such a promise was communicated to the employees, I shall recommend that this allegation of the complaint be dismissed. E. W. Brody, the management consultant to Respond- ent, testified that, around May 9, he forwarded to Re- spondent an opinion survey to be administered by Re- spondent to the nonbargaining unit personnel. He testi- fied that after discussion with attorney Starling and with Administrator Pearce the decision was made that the opinion survey was not to be administered to the em- ployees involved in the union election on May 7. He tes- tified that the survey was administered to the nonbar- gaining unit personnel about a week after May 9 by leav- ing forms in the lunchroom for the employees and, after they were completed, the employees were to put the forms in a sealed receptacle. This opinion or attitude survey by its very nature sought grievances from the employees and also called for suggestions on a way which these grievances could be improved. It is obvious that such solicitation by an em- ployer carries with it an implied promise that such griev- ances will be remedied. It is also clear that under Board law if such a solicitation is made by an employer in the midst of an organizational campaign it violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See Apple Tree Chevrolet, 237 NLRB 867, 871 (1978). Here the opinion survey was not administered to the employees in the bargaining units involved in the elec- tion on May 7. It was administered only to employees outside the bargaining units involved in the election on May 7. Although no petition for an election had been filed by any union at the time this opinion survey was administered to the nonbargaining unit employees at the De Queen General Hospital, the General Counsel con- tends that there was in fact an organizational campaign going on among the housekeeping employees in the non- bargaining unit at the De Queen General Hospital. In support of this position, the General Counsel in his brief refers to the testimony of Managing Consultant E. W. Brody, in which Brody testified that he in fact met with certain of the housekeeping employees to discuss their problems. I have carefully read the testimony of Brody and I find nothing in his testimony that would indicate that he was aware that a union organizational campaign was going on among the housekeeping employees at that time. In fact his answer to that question by the General Counsel was: I don't know, sir, whether I was aware of it on that day or not. At a point in time, I became aware of it. I doubt that I was, or I would have raised a ques- tion as to whether-in talking to Mr. Starling whether they should have been included. Administrator Pearce denies knowledge of any campaign among the housekeeping employees, and so far as this record is concerned I cannot conclude that Respondent was aware of an organizational campaign at the time it administered the opinion survey. Therefore, I cannot conclude that Respondent violated the Act in this regard and I shall recommend that para- graph 15(c) of the complaint be dismissed. Mary Neumeier testified that in late July she had a conversation with Supervisor Jones in which she in- formed him that she was worried because she had re- ceived two reprimands and that she had a feeling that as soon as her supervisor, Pat Athey, returned from sick leave that she was going to be terminated. Neumeier in- 488 DE QUEEN GENERAL HOSPITAL formed Jones that the hospital administration had as- sumed a great deal about her union activities even though they had no proof as to whether she supported the Union or not. Jones said her name had been men- tioned at almost every supervisory meeting concerning union activities and that her name was linked with the Union. He told her that management assumed that she was for the Union and that her reprimands and discrimi- natory action against her were because management had that belief. He was careful to warn Neumeier that if she repeated the conversation he would deny it. As indicated above Jones admitted that he told Neumeier to cool it about her union activities and his testimony can be treat- ed as a denial of the remainder of the complaint allega- tions. As indicated I have credited the testimony of Neu- meier over that of Jones and therefore conclude that by informing Neumeier that her name had been mentioned at every supervisory meeting concerning union activities and as being associated with the Union obviously created the impression that her union activities were under sur- veillance by Respondent, and by informing Neumeier that management had taken disciplinary action against her because of her union activities clearly violates Sec- tion 8(a)(l) as alleged in paragraphs 17(a) and 17(c) of the complaint, and I so find. A. The Alleged Unlawful Discharges 1. Doris Stultz Stultz was employed by Respondent for approximately 4 years prior to her separation on June 13. At the time of her separation she worked in the Respondent's ambu- lance department and was employed as a paramedic. Her supervisor at that time was Ronnie Turner. She had worked in the ambulance department for approximately 2 years prior to her separation. Stultz was involved in the Union's organizational campaign and actively worked on behalf of the Union. She obtained many union cards from other employees and probably was one of the most prolific card solicitors. Stultz had a union bumper sticker on her truck which was displayed for ap- proximately a month before the election, and wore a "YES" button on the day of the election. Stultz' supervisor, Ronnie Turner, admitted that he was aware of her active role in the union campaign and was aware of the fact that she was an avid union sup- porter during the time of her leaving the employment of the hospital. Turner also admitted that Stultz' name had been brought up at supervisory meetings as an employee who was supportive of the Union. Pearce, the hospital administrator, also admitted that he was well aware of Stultz' feeling toward the Union and that he knew that she had a union bumper sticker on her truck, and that she never tried to conceal the fact that she was support- ing the Union. Supervisor Holcombe also testified that Stultz' name had been mentioned at the supervisory meetings and that she was included among the employees considered to be ringleaders of the Union. She also testified that in these meetings supervisors were told to make it rough on em- ployees and to enforce the policies to a tee and if there was any reason to reprimand or get rid of an employee to do so. As indicated, Stultz was a paramedic and as such would work in the back of the ambulance with the pa- tients while her partner drove the vehicle. Sometime in July 1979, Pearce received a notice from Respondent's insurance carrier that Stultz was no longer insurable and that she would no longer be insured while driving any of the hospital's ambulances. Stultz was informed by Super- visor Turner that her insurance had been canceled, and that she was no longer to drive the ambulance. She was informed that if she drove the ambulance it would be grounds for dismissal. Although Stultz was no longer permitted to drive the ambulance she was retained by Respondent as a paramedic and remained in Respond- ent's employ in the ambulance service. Sometime around May 14, Stultz asked Supervisor Turner if she could possibly get 2 weeks' paid vacation on her paycheck and at the same time give her 2 weeks' notice of separation. At that time Stultz informed Turner that she might want to go somewhere else and work but she was not quite sure. Turner said he would check it out and get back to Stultz. Several days later Turner in- formed Stultz that they could work it out the way she had suggested and she said okay and left. At this point Turner stated that Stultz told him that she would be leaving on June 13. Apparently Stultz had indicated that she would be leaving around June 17. Around May 20, Stultz went to Turner and informed him that she had changed her mind and did not want to quit. Turner then told Stultz that he would have to check this out and would let her know. Turner met with Pearce and they decided not to allow Stultz to rescind her resignation based, in part, because she had a "bad at- titude." Pearce testified that his refusal to rescind Stultz' resig- nation was also based, in part, on the fact that she had been driving the ambulances after the insurance had been canceled. Stultz admitted that she did in fact drive the ambulances on several occasions after the insurance notice in July 1979, but she did this on long transfers at the request of the driver. Pearce testified that he did not become aware of Stultz' driving the ambulance until he received an anonymous call. According to Pearce, an anonymous caller informed him that at least three wit- nesses could verify that Stultz had been driving the am- bulances since the insurance cancellation. Pearce testified that he approached James Gatlin, the ambulance driver, and asked him if Stultz had been driving the ambulance. According to Pearce, Gatlin admitted that Stultz had been driving the ambulance, but that he did so very "re- luctantly." Gatlin, on the other hand, testifying in rebut- tal for the General Counsel stated that when Pearce asked him whether or not Stultz had been driving the ambulance he refused to tell Pearce. In fact during his testimony at the hearing Gatlin refused to answer wheth- er or not Stultz had driven the ambulance. When Stultz received her paycheck on June 4 she found that it included her vacation pay as she had origi- nally proposed. She then drafted a letter and handed it and her paycheck to Turner. In the letter Stultz notified 489 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the hospital that she did not wish to quit her employ- ment. When she handed the letter to Turner, he replied that she had quit, and that the hospital was going to pay her vacation pay, and returned the letter to her. Later, Turner told Stultz that he wanted her to know that if she pursued the matter of her quitting any further, he had two, and possibly three, witnesses that had seen her driving the ambulance when she was not supposed to. Stultz asked Turner if she were being fired and he re- plied no, and she stated, "O.K. we'll see about it with a lawyer." Stultz then wrote letters to Pearce and Turner and mailed them on June 5. These letters again indicated that Stultz did not wish to resign her employment and that she wanted to continue working at the hospital. Stultz was informed on June 6 that the letters had been received and that her check was at the hospital. When she went to pick up the check she discovered that it was the same one that she had received on June 4 and that it still included her vacation pay. She refused to accept this check and left the hospital. Later she wrote a letter to Pearce indicating that she wished her check to be corrected. She hand delivered this letter to Pearce on June 6 without any conversation. On June 13, Turner handed Stultz her termination slip and informed her that she would no longer be needed, inasmuch as Randy Burns was going to start working in her place. Following the receipt of her termination slip, Stultz sent one final letter to Pearce indicating that she did not wish to quit and that she considered herself to have been terminated by the hospital. Pearce testified that Stultz' resignation could not be re- scinded because a replacement had already been hired and he had learned that Stultz had been driving the am- bulance. Thus, Respondent's position is that Stultz was not permitted to withdraw her resignation because ar- rangements had been made to replace her, and as Pearce found out that she had operated the ambulance she would have been discharged in any event for this unau- thorized operation of the ambulance. The General Counsel argues that Respondent's refusal to permit Stultz to rescind her resignation was because of Stultz' union activities and not for the reasons as- signed by Respondent. This record adequately reflects that Respondent was well aware of the union activities of Stultz. It is also clear that Stultz' name was brought up at various super- visory meetings as an employee who was very support- ive of the Union. Additionally, Supervisor Holcombe tes- tified that in these meetings supervisors were told to make it rough on employees, to enforce the company policies to a "tee," and if there was any reason to repri- mand or get rid of an employee to do so. These particu- lar meetings were held after Pearce had positively identi- fied Stultz as one of the ringleaders of the Union. It is true that Stultz was relieved from her driving duties on the ambulance because the insurance company carrier informed Respondent that Stultz was no longer insurable. Stultz admitted that she was not supposed to drive the ambulance but that she did so on several occa- sions at the behest of the driver. Respondent contends that it took no action against Stultz earlier because it was not aware of the fact that Stultz had been driving the ambulance until sometime after she made known her in- tention of quitting. Turner, Stultz' supervisor, testified that, after Stultz in- formed him of her resignation, he made arrangements for James Gatlin to step up to this position and that another individual by the name of Randy Burns would be trans- ferred out of surgery into ambulance service. On the employee termination report made out by Turner it appears that the only characteristics about Stultz that were classified as being "poor" by Respond- ent were her cooperation, hospital spirit, and her loyalty. As indicated, Respondent was well aware of Stultz' very active support for the Union. It is my conclusion that Respondent has presented no reasonable basis for its refusal to allow Doris Stultz to rescind her proposed resignation. The argument that Stultz had already been replaced, in my view, has little merit, particularly as her so-called replacement was already employed by Respondent and the replacement for that employee was also employed by Respondent, and the transfers were not to occur until June 13, the day on which Stultz was to be terminated. Additionally, the assigned reason that Stultz had a "bad attitude" in my view is totally unacceptable in view of the fact that both Turner and Pearce testified that Stultz was a good worker and notwithstanding the fact that her insurance had been canceled she was permitted to con- tinue working for the hospital. Moreover, her lack of "cooperation," "hospital spirit," and "loyalty" probably stems from the fact that she was a very good supporter of the Union. The other assigned reason for not allowing Stultz to rescind her resignation was the fact that after she had given her resignation Respondent learned that she had been driving the ambulance. While I have no way of knowing when Pearce became aware of the fact that Stultz was driving the ambulance, his testimony in this respect is highly suspect because he claims this was veri- fied through employee Gatlin, and Gatlin denies that he informed Pearce that Stultz was driving the ambulance. It is as reasonable to assume that Pearce was well aware of the fact that Stultz was driving the ambulance long before the advent of the Union as it is to assume, as Pearce would have us believe, that he did not learn about this until after she had given her notice of resigna- tion. I do not believe that this occurrence was that fortu- itous for Respondent. Therefore, I do not accept Re- spondent's assigned reasons for its refusal to allow Stultz to withdraw her resignation and conclude that Respond- ent seized this opportunity to rid itself of one of the lead- ing union ringleaders. Moreover, Respondent has pro- duced nothing to indicate that Stultz would have been treated in a similar manner whether the Union was on the scene or not, and that Stultz would have been dis- charged even if the Union were not present. In my view, Respondent has failed to sustain its burden of establishing that Stultz would have been terminated regardless of the Union. Under the circumstances, it is my conclusion that Re- spondent refused to permit Stultz to withdraw her resig- 490 DE QUEEN GENERAL HOSPITAL nation because Respondent was aware that Stultz was a leading union adherent and one of the ringleaders and that it took this opportunity to rid itself of a thorn in its side. The evidence adequately demonstrates that Stultz' union activities were a motivating factor in Respondent's action in refusing to allow her to continue in her em- ployment at Respondent's facility. On the other hand, Respondent has failed to demonstrate that this action would have been taken against Stultz notwithstanding the advent of the Union. Therefore, it is my conclusion that Respondent took its action against Stultz because of her union activities, which certainly discourages union membership among the remainder of Respondent's em- ployees in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and I so find. 2. Pat Harris Pat Harris was employed by Respondent for approxi- mately 8 years as a registered nurse prior to her termina- tion on June 23. Harris was an active supporter of the Union in that she attended union meetings and solicited union authorization cards. This fact was well known to Respondent. Jo Anne Holcombe testified that Harris had been specifically mentioned at supervisory meetings prior to the election as being one of the ringleaders for the Union. During May, Harris was working the 3 to 11 p.m. shift at the De Queen Hospital. During that period an opportunity arose for her to take a job as the director of nurses at a small nursing hospital in De Queen, work- ing the hours of 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. On June 1, Harris informed Illeen Dossett that she wanted to go part time at the De Queen Hospital at the end of the month. Dossett informed Harris to turn in a request stating her desires. On June 15, Harris submitted the following request: I would like to change from perm. full-time status to perm. part-time status starting on the next work sheet. I would like to work every Wed. if possible (2-3-1 Il's a pay.) to start out with and maybe every other Sunday at a later date. This request was given to another employee to be put on Dossett's door. The usual practice for leaving notes for Dossett was to tape it to the outside of her door in her absence. On June 16, Harris began working at the nursing home on the 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. day shift. During the first and second day at work Harris learned that Administrator Pearce had twice called the director of the nursing home. Concerned, Harris called Dossett when she went home for lunch and asked her if there was any problem with her request to go part time. Dossett replied that they did not know whether they were going to allow, or be able to let, key personnel go from full time to part time. Harris asked Dossett when did she become key personnel as she thought she was just a staff member. Dossett told Harris that she and Pearce were going to have to make a decision. Harris told her fine, and that she would talk to a lawyer. Harris called Dossett again on June 20 to find out if a decision had been made and was informed that a decision had not been made. On Monday, June 23, when Harris arrived at the hos- pital for her regular shift Dossett approached her and handed her an envelope which contained a letter from Illeen Dossett informing Harris that her "resignation of full-time employment dated 6/16/80 and effective as of the end of your assigned work shift on 6/28/80 was ac- cepted."7 The letter further stated that the hospital has no permanent part-time positions which meet the specifi- cations in Harris' June 16 letter. Harris then called Pearce and informed him that she had not turned in her resignation. Pearce responded by saying, "Well you are working at the De Queen Nursing Home" to which Harris replied, "yes." Pearce asked her if she were capa- ble of holding down two jobs and Harris asked Pearce if he thought she were not capable of holding down two jobs. Pearce made no reply. Pearce informed Harris that he had a new policy of not hiring registered nurses for part-time work. Harris responded by saying that she had only requested part-time work if it were possible. Pearce admitted that he had not read the letter and in response to Harris' statement that she would be glad to work whenever they needed her, Pearce told her to submit an- other request for an evaluation. Pearce also remarked to Harris that he heard she had hired a lawyer. To the extent that there is any discrepancy in the testimony be- tween that of Pearce and Harris I have accepted Harris' testimony. Harris testified that she prepared another re- quest for part-time work and taped this to Dossett's door, as was the usual practice, but that she never re- ceived any response from the hospital. By letter dated September 11, Respondent notified Harris that it had part-time work on the 11-to-7 shift and that Respondent needed someone to work every other Friday and Saturday night and two other nights the next week. She was asked to advise Respondent if she were interested, and to Iet Respondent know by the time the next worksheet is posted on Friday, September 19. On September 16, Harris responded confirming receipt of the letter and informed the hospital that the offer was made in bad faith in an effort to terminate its backpay liability and that her rejection of this offer should not be construed as a waiver of her desire to be reinstated to the job from which she was illegally discharged. The General Counsel contends that Respondent dis- charged Harris from her full-time position and denied her part-time employment because of her union activities. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that Harris ac- cepted full-time employment at the nursing home and re- signed her full-time employment at the De Queen Hospi- tal and applied for a part-time position at the hospital which she was informed was not acceptable. That when a part-time position became available she was notified and offered the position and she refused it. Respondent asserts that the General Counsel has failed to meet its burden of showing that protected activity was a substan- tial or motivating factor behind the hospital's action with regard to Harris. Respondent points out that there was no evidence that Harris was engaged in any protected I Harris continued working full time at De Queen Hospital while working full time at the nursing home. 491 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD activity when she made her request for part-time em- ployment. There is no doubt that Harris was one of the leading union adherents, that Respondent was well aware of this fact, and that her name had been mentioned as a ring- leader in the various supervisory and management meet- ings held during the union campaign. Following the receipt of Harris' request for part-time work, Dossett and Pearce testified that they took the re- quest under consideration and concluded that they had no part-time work. There is no question that this fact was not communicated to Harris prior to June 23, when she was presented with her termination slip. The testimo- ny of Pearce indicates that a request to go part time is in effect a resignation if part time cannot be granted. To the extent that it is necessary, I credit the testimony of Harris over that of Pearce and conclude that not only is Pearce's testimony in this regard incredible, it is absurd to conclude that an employee who requests part-time work is in effect giving the employer an ultimatum that if part-time employment is not granted he is resigning. According to Pearce's own testimony there was a short- age of registered nurses in the area and this appears to be a fact throughout the United States. As Pearce testified that he was willing to consider another request from Harris for part-time employment, and as his testimony in- dicates that he had a hard time filling the position, one questions why her request for part-time work was treat- ed as a resignation. As Respondent was well aware of the fact that Harris was a ringleader in the Union's organizational campaign, and as the Union had just lost the election, it is my con- clusion that Respondent wanted to ensure that another election did not bring about a different result. Therefore, Respondent engaged in a systematic elimination of some of the leading union adherents. In this regard, as I have previously concluded, Respondent terminated employee Stultz for her union activities. Here, Respondent without notice to Harris treated her request for part-time employ- ment as a resignation and terminated her employment. I can only conclude that this decision was made in retali- ation for Harris' support of the Union. There is no doubt that such conduct discourages membership in the Union, and I so find. It would appear that if Respondent were not illegally motivated in its actions, it could very easily have informed Harris that it had no part-time work avail- able and let matters take their natural course. Or, if the request made by Harris was unreasonable, Respondent could merely have informed Harris of that fact and re- quested her, as Pearce testified that he did, to submit an additional request on a different basis. Respondent chose not to do either of these things, as it was again presented with an opportunity to rid itself of a leading union ad- herent and it did so without hesitation. Accordingly, it is my conclusion that Respondent terminated Harris in vio- lation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 3. Mary Margaret Neumeier Neumeier was employed by Respondent for approxi- mately 15 years prior to her termination in August. She was employed as an X-ray technician and was under the supervision of Pat Athey, the lab supervisor. Neumeier was very active in the Union and Respondent was well aware of Neumeier's union sentiments, as indicated by Pearce who testified that it was common knowledge that Neumeier was one of the leading union activists in the hospital. Neumeier testified that, around March 20, she received her first reprimand in her 15 years of employment with the hospital. She said at the time she felt that she was being harassed and so she talked to Supervisor Dick Jones about the reprimand. She told him that she thought she was being harassed. Jones told her to be careful, and as long as she associated with people that management thought was for the Union, such as Cleta Hodge, she would be grouped with them and that she was going to get into trouble. After she received this warning she appealed to Pearce and they discussed this matter with Athey. At that point Pearce told her that whatever Athey said he would assume was true and he would take Athey's word for it, and that was the end of the appeal. Neumeier testified that around June 24. she arrived at work around 7 a.m., clocked in, and went to the X-ray department to check the day's requisitions. She said that around 7:30 a.m. employee Doug Pinkerton arrived while she was typing up the patient cards and she stopped typing to discuss a personal matter with Pinker- ton. Around 8 a.m. Mrs. Athey arrived in the depart- ment and Neumeier was sitting in a chair in front of her typewriter and Pinkerton was sitting in the chair across from her. Athey checked the requisitions for the day's work, looked around the room, and left. She said that Athey was in the department no more than a couple of minutes. Later, around 10 a.m. Athey came into the X- ray room and asked Neumeier to go to the file room with her, where Athey handed her a second warning. Neumeier tried to explain and Athey told her, "In my opinion you were loafing on the job, this is your second reprimand and with one more you will be terminated." Pinkerton did not receive a warning for this incident. Athey testified that on the morning in question she looked in the logbook on her arrival, and found that nothing had been logged in and that no X-rays had been taken. She made a visual inspection and it appeared to her that the typing had not been started. She admitted that she was only in the X-ray room long enough to check the log and glance at the typing, and then immedi- ately went to the front office to pick up a form to be used for the reprimand to be issued to Neumeier. Athey admitted that she did not question Neumeier, or employ- ee Litchford who was also in the X-ray department at the time, prior to going to the office to pick up the repri- mand to be issued to Neumeier. She did talk to Litchford after she went to the office to get the reprimand. Neu- meier testified that while there were requisitions for pa- tients to be X-rayed that morning none of these requisi- tions fell in the categories which would require her to perform any of this work between the hours of 7 and 8 in the morning. Respondent offered no requisition nor other evidence to rebut this testimony of Neumeier. Neumeier testified that Litchford, an aide in the X-ray department, had been complaining that X-ray reports 492 DE QUEEN GENERAL HOSPITAL were not being completed on time, and that as a result the filing did not get done. Neumeier testified that she had told Litchford that, if the employees in the X-ray department happened to be busy in the afternoon, this was the cause of the reports not being filed and not the delay in receiving the completed reports. Around August 7, Neumeier informed Anita Turner, another X-ray tech- nician, what Litchford had been complaining about and they decided to go see Dorothy Parker, the supervisor of the employee who was responsible for the typing, to make a suggestion regarding the X-ray reports. After dis- cussing the problem with Supervisor Parker, Turner and Neumeier told Parker that Litchford had been complain- ing and that this was going to cause trouble for Binge, the typing employee, when Athey returned from her sick leave. On Monday, August 11, Athey returned from her sick leave and late in the afternoon Neumeier received a mes- sage that Athey wanted to see her. Neumeier got a hold of Athey and told her that she had been trying to con- tact her, and Athey said she would talk to her tomor- row. Neumeier asked Athey if this was it, to which Athey replied yes, and Neumeier said she would see her tomorrow. On August 12, Neumeier reported for work as usual, performed the X-ray work for a wreck victim, and then met with Athey in the file room. Athey handed Neu- meier her termination slip. Neumeier told Athey that she and Turner were not trying to undermine her, but they were just trying to cover Binge. Athey told Neumeier that Parker had gone to Pearce about it and that they were very upset over the situation. Athey then told Neu- meier that this was her final warning and that she was terminated. In addition to the discharge of Neumeier, employee Anita Turner also received a warning slip for this inci- dent. Turner's testimony is substantially the same as Neu- meier's. She stated that on Monday, August 11, Athey approached her and asked her to come into the file room at which point Athey handed Turner a reprimand. Athey remarked that Turner did not seem overly concerned, and Turner replied that she was surprised that she had not received a reprimand before. Turner asked Athey about the reprimand and Athey told Turner it was not her idea to issue the reprimand. Turner indicated that it did not make any difference, a reprimand was a repri- mand, and it would be a black spot on her record. Athey asked Turner whose idea it was and Turner indicated Neumeier. Athey then told Turner that she had better watch what she had to say about her at the hospital. Turner asked Athey if this was a threat and Athey re- plied no. The reprimand was given for insubordination and states that it was given because of a deliberate attempt to undermine and reduce the respect of Supervisor Pat Athey in the view of Supervisor Dorothy Parker. The reprimand also stated that the employee suggested de- partmental procedure changes without proper authority with the intention of establishing that Pat Athey, RN, is not an objective or a competent supervisor. Additionally, and most importantly, the reprimand indicated that it was given for offense no. 13 in the policy and procedure manual "engaging in activities other than assigned duties." It is also noted that the reprimand given Neu- meier over this incident contained the same reference to offense no. 13 in the policy and procedure manual. As indicated Respondent had a disciplinary system whereby employees who receive three written repri- mands are terminated. Neumeier received a reprimand in March, and following this reprimand she discussed the problem with Supervisor Dick Jones and indicated to him at that time that she felt she was being harassed. Jones cautioned her about the Union and informed her that her reprimand was a result of her union activities and so long as she associated with union adherents this problem would follow her. Consistent with this warning given by Jones, on June 24, Supervisor Athey with only a cursory inspection of the X-ray department concluded that Neumeier was loafing and gave her a second repri- mand. Although Athey claims that she questioned Litch- ford regarding this incident. Athey admitted that this did not occur until she had picked up the reprimand form which she intended to give Neumeier that morning. Other than the assertion by Athey that there was work available in the X-ray room that morning, Respondent offered nothing to support this testimony. The fact that Athey did not give Pinkerton a warning for the same conduct clearly establishes disparate treatment on the part of Respondent, as Respondent was aware that Pin- kerton was an antiunion employee. 8 On August II, prior to issuing the warning to Neu- meier and Turner, a supervisors' meeting was held in which the disciplinary measures to be accorded Neu- meier and Turner were discussed, and it was decided that a reprimand was warranted. Following the determi- nation that a warning should be issued to Neumeier, her union activities were discussed, but it was determined that they should proceed with the disciplinary action notwithstanding the Union. Both warnings to Neumeier and Turner were given in part because of a violation of Respondent's rule prohibiting engaging in activities other than assigned duties. In view of the circumstances of this case, particularly as Jones had told Neumeier that her reprimands were the result of her union activities and warned her that she would be watched in the future; Pearce's admission that Neumeier was a leading union activist; Supervisor Hol- combe's uncontradicted testimony that management iden- tified Neumeier with the Union; that Pearce had instruct- ed the supervisors to use any excuse to get rid of the union supporters; the disparate treatment accorded Neu- meier involving the June 24 reprimand in that Respond- ent did not also give Pinkerton such a reprimand, and the June 24 reprimand was given in violation of Re- spondent's rule prohibiting employees from engaging in activities other than assigned duties, which I have found to be unlawful, it is my conclusion that Respondent gave the warning to Neumeier, and discharged her, for her union activities. There is no doubt that such conduct dis- courages union membership and clearly violates Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Additionally, I find that " See G.C. Exh 32. 493 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Turner was a victim of Respondent's discrimination against Neumeier and that her warning was also in viola- tion of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. Univee Bryson Bryson had been employed by Respondent for ap- proximately 8 months until her termination on August 8 for dishonesty. The record reflects that Bryson support- ed the Union by attending union meetings and soliciting union cards from other employees. Bryson also signed a union handbill which was distributed to Respondent's employees in the parking lot of the hospital sometime shortly before the election.9 Bryson's uncontradicted tes- timony revealed that she was warned by Supervisor Donna Montezuma that this letter, or signed union hand- bill, had caused quite a stir at the hospital and her name was being included in a list of employees that Respond- ent was going to terminate. Additionally, Kenneth Moore, Respondent's controller, who filled out the ter- mination slip given to Bryson, admitted that he had seen Bryson's prounion letter or union handbill which was distributed to employees during the union campaign. As indicated Bryson worked as a nurses aide and had applied and was accepted to licensed practical nurses school. In an attempt to obtain CETA funds to help in her schooling, she contacted that office and learned that she would have to be unemployed for at least a week before she could apply for CETA funds. In discussions with other nurses at the hospital, she learned, apparently erroneously, that one employee who received CETA funds had worked while she was attending school be- cause with Supervisor Dossett's consent the CETA people had been informed that she was unemployed at the time. In an attempt to do the same thing, Bryson tried to talk with Administrator Pearce and Supervisor Dossett and in their absence discussed this problem with Kenneth Moore. Moore asked Bryson if she had planned to quit and she told him no and he said he was glad as they were shorthanded. According to Bryson, Moore readily accepted her request and asked her what day she wanted to say she had quit. They selected a date and Moore wrote it down telling Bryson that if anyone called he would tell them that she was not employed. Bryson then went to the CETA office and applied for the CETA funds but she discovered that she had made too much money during the year to qualify her for CETA funds. She later called Moore and told him what had occurred and Moore told Bryson that it was a tough break but at least they had tried. Moore testified that when Bryson first approached him he did not understand what she was asking him to do and told her that he would have to check it out. Moore stated that he called the employment security office to inquire about having to pay Bryson unemployment com- pensation if he discharged her for trying to involve him and the hospital in her CETA fund scheme. Moore stated that he found out that the employment security di- vision also handled the CETA applications and that a Mr. Lawson told him that Bryson had filled out a CETA 9 See G.C. Exh. 16. application and that she put on the application that she had quit her job at the hospital on July 28. Moore stated that he prepared a termination slip and gave it to Bry- son's supervisor, Illeen Dossett, based on her attempt to involve the management of the hospital in her plan to re- ceive CETA funds under the misrepresentation that she was unemployed while attending school. On August 8, the following day, Bryson reported to work and was told by Supervisor Dossett that she was going to have to terminate Bryson and handed her a ter- mination slip, indicating that she was terminated for dis- honesty. At the time she handed Bryson the slip, Dossett also told Bryson that this was not the first time that she had lied and at that point they discussed an incident where Bryson had been absent from work and the reason she had given for her absence. According to Bryson, Dossett explained that if she had not bothered to tell anybody about the CETA funds nobody would have known about it. Bryson replied that she understood it was hospital procedure to discuss the problem because she understood it had been done for another employee, but refused to inform Dossett who that employee was. While this discharge is not entirely free from doubt, and while I cannot condone the attempt by the employee involved to illegally obtain CETA funds, it is my conclu- sion that Respondent did not discharge Bryson for that reason but in fact used that as a pretext to cover its un- lawful actions in discharging Bryson for her union activi- ties, in accordance with the warning given to Bryson by Supervisor Montezuma earlier that she had been selected for discharge because of her union activities. Therefore, under the circumstances, it is my conclusion that Re- spondent discharged Bryson because of her sentiments for and activities on behalf of the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act, and that the reason given by Respondent, namely, Bryson's dishonesty, was a mere pretext. Moreover, absent her union activities, no attempt was made by Respondent to establish that Bryson would have been discharged in any event. Such conduct clearly discourages membership in the Union and I find that Respondent's action in this regard was violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. B. The Requested Bargaining Order On May 7, elections were conducted in two separate units of employees at Respondent's premises. The units were Unit A and Unit B as described above. The complaint alleges that Unit A and Unit B consti- tute appropriate units for the purpose of collective bar- gaining; that, since March 18, a majority of the employ- ees in Unit A and Unit B designated the Union as their majority representative," and at all times material herein Respondent has failed and continues to fail to recognize and bargain with the Union notwithstanding its majority status; and because the Employer's unfair labor practices, as alleged in the complaint in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, are so serious and substantial in char- l' On March 18, 1980, the Union filed representation petitions with the National Labor Relations Board seeking elections among the employees in Unit A and Unit B. These petitions constitute a demand for recogni- tion. 494 DE QUEEN GENERAL HOSPITAL acter and effect the entry of a remedial order requiring Respondent to recognize and bargain with the Union in Unit A and Unit B is warranted. Stated otherwise the General Counsel is requesting that a bargaining order be entered against Respondent in both Unit A and Unit B because the unfair labor practices Respondent engaged in following the Union's demand for recognition, or the filing of the petition, were so serious and substantial that they make the holding of another election impossible. In order to determine whether a bargaining order is appro- priate as requested by the General Counsel it must be first determined that the Union at some point had a ma- jority status in the units found to be appropriate and that an employer's unfair labor practices will have such a lasting effect in the minds of the employees that the holding of a second election would be futile. I will deal first with the question of whether the Union ever represented a majority of the employees in the appropriate bargaining units. In this regard the Em- ployer argues that the Union never represented a major- ity of the employees in either Unit A or Unit B because of the invalidity of the cards, either because of misrepre- sentation, lack of authenticity, or some other reason making them invalid. The Excelsior list placed in evidence as General Coun- sel's Exhibit 25 contains a list of 15 employee names. Both the General Counsel and Respondent agree that the names of Ann Clarkson and Cerise Travis should be eliminated from that list leaving 13 eligible voters in Unit A. The General Counsel submitted seven authorization cards from employees in Unit A to establish that, as of March 11, the union representated a majority of the em- ployees in that unit. Respondent. on the other hand, con- tends that three of the cards, General Counsel's Exhibits 13(gg), 13(hhh), and 13(dd), the cards of Mary Mowatt, Marilyn McElroy, and Mary Grantham, were obtained on the basis of misrepresentation made to the signers of the cards and therefore cannot be used in determining the Union's majority status. If either of the cards is con- strued to be invalid the General Counsel has not met its burden of establishing that the Union represented a ma- jority of the employees in Unit A. Steve Mowatt testified that when he received the cards he was told by the person giving him the card that they were needed to find out how many people wanted to find out more about the Union, and that he later gave his wife, Mary, an authorization card at home and told her to sign it if she wanted to hear more about the Union. He stated that he did not tell his wife that the card was for an election, for a vote, or for representa- tion. As indicated earlier on its face the authorization card states that the employee authorizes the Union to represent the employee for the purpose of collective bar- gaining. It is well established that if the authorization card itself is unambiguous (states on its face that the signer author- izes the Union to represent the employee for collective- bargaining purposes), it will be counted unless it is proved that the employee was told that the card was to be solely for the purpose of obtaining an election. See Midland-Ross Corporation, 239 NLRB 323 (1978), enfd. 653 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 1980), and cases cited therein. As this employee was told that the purpose of the card was to find out more about the Union, I find that there is no misrepresentation surrounding this card and it shall be counted. See Federal Alarm, 230 NLRB 518 (1977). Marilyn McElroy testified that at a union meeting she was given an authorization card by one of the union rep- resentatives and was told that the card was for authoriza- tion for the Union to represent them, to show that she was interested in having the Union and to get one start- ed. She said that she was also told that one of the pur- poses of the card was to see if there was enough interest to have an election and that she was not obligated in any regard. And that she in turn informed employees who she solicited cards from of the same message. As it is clear that Mrs. McElroy was not told by the Union that the only purpose of the card was to obtain an election, it shall be counted. Employee Cleta Hodge testified that she gave the au- thorization card to Mary Grantham, and that she told her to read the card and that it was for authorization for representation. She stated that Grantham gave her the card back after she had signed it. Mary Grantham testi- fied that she signed the card at a union meeting and she was told that the card did not obligate her in any way to join the Union, that it gave the Union the right to talk to them collectively. It is clear that there was no misrepre- sentation surrounding the circumstances under which this card was signed and it shall be counted. Therefore as it appears that Respondent did in fact have authorization cards from 7 of the 13 employees in Unit A it is clear that, as of March 11, 1980, the Union had a majority status among the employees in that unit. ' The Excelsior list for Unit B, the larger of the two units, contains a total of 168 names. The General Coun- sel and Respondent agree that nine employee should be deleted from that list. L2 At the hearing the General Counsel introduced 109 authorization cards signed on behalf of the Union. The General Counsel admits that four of these cards are from employees not on the Excel- sior list and should be deleted.'3 Of the remaining 105 cards submitted all were signed by employees on the Ex- celsior list. However, six of these employees were among the nine employees who were deleted from the list and their cards should also be excluded. 4 This leaves the I The employees in Unit A who signed authorization cards are: Hazel Cohen, her card was dated 3/1/80 and introduced as G C. Exh. 13(kkkk); Janice Gates, her card was dated 3/I/80 and introduced as G.C. Exh. 131(Ujj); Patsy Harris, her card was dated 2/28/80 and introduced as G C Exh. 13(iiii); Mary E. Grantham, her card was dated 3/h/80 and intro- duced as G.C. Exh. 13(dd); Patricia Hill, her card was dated 3/11/80 and introduced as G.C. Exh. 13(ee); Marilyn McElroy, her card was dated 2/28/80 and introduced as G.C. Exh. 13(hhhh): and Mary Mowatt, her card was dated 3/7/80 and introduced as G.C. Exh. 13(gg). 12 These employees are Christine Smith, Anthony Jackson, Sherry Bolin, Lynn Mitchell, Agnes Nix, Sherry Dollarhide. Deborah Irvan, Elhel Peters, and Tammy Ward. i3 These employees are Peggy Minor, Steven Mowatt. Deborah Nich- olson, and Sheila Smith. Their cards are G.C Exhs 13(vv), 13(ff), 13(n), and 13(h}, respectively. 14 These employees are Anthony Jackson, Agnes Nix, Sherry Dollar- hide, Lynn Mitchell. Sherryl Bolin, and Tammy Ward. Their cards are G.C. Exhs. 13(vvvv), 13(uuu). 13 (eee), 13(y), 13(111), and 13(xxx), respec- tively 495 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Union with a total of 99 authorization cards, which the General Counsel contends shows that the Union repre- sented a majority of the employees on March 18. Re- spondent contends, however, that many of these cards were obtained through misrepresentation, and other cards were invalid because of improper identification or lack of authenticity. If Respondent is correct in a suffi- cient number of these cards, this could determine wheth- er or not Respondent ever represented a majority of the employees in Unit B. Therefore, I shall discuss these cards as raised by Respondent, and as set forth in its brief. ' 5 The authorization card of Lenora Rynders, General Counsel's Exhibit 13(s), dated March 1, was introduced through the testimony of employee Judy Price. Price tes- tified that she, Paulette Downs, and several other people were present when Rynders signed the card. She said Rynders looked at the card, thought about it for a while, filled it out, signed it in her presence, and returned the card to her. Respondent questioned Price about her affi- davit given to the Board in which she stated that she did not recall anyone signing any union cards. She was asked to explain the inconsistency and she explained that at the time she gave the affidavit, the female Board agent that was questioning her made her very uncomfortable in that she appeared to be hostile, and this caused her to be very confused. I observed Price as she testified, and she ap- peared to me to be straightforward and truthful. I accept her explanation that she was confused at the time she gave her affidavit to the Board agent and conclude that the authorization card was signed by Lenora Rynders in her presence on March 1, and the card shall be counted. Respondent also objects to the authorization card of Deborah Nicholson, dated March 3. This card was intro- duced through the testimony of Felix Bell, and is marked General Counsel's Exhibit 13(n). According to the cred- ited testimony of Bell, it was signed by Deborah Nichol- son in his presence on March 3. As indicated earlier this card was excluded by the General Counsel. 6 General Counsel's Exhibit 13(v) purports to be the au- thorization card of Beverly Graves dated March 6. This card was introduced through the testimony of Mary Hockersmith. In her testimony at the hearing Hocker- smith testified that she did not see Graves sign the card, but Graves returned the card to her filled out and signed. In an affidavit given to the Board, referring to several employees, including Beverly Graves, Hocker- smith stated that she could not say for sure that she wit- 'I G.C. Exh. 27 reveals that 169 employees were in Unit B on March 18. The Excelsior list shows 168 employees in Unit B on election day. Deleting the 9 employees that the parties agree should be excluded leaves 159 employees in Unit B on election day and 160 employees in the unit on March 18. Therefore, to be a majority representative on March 18, the Union must have 81 valid authorization cards. '" The General Counsel and Respondent agreed that nine employees who left the employment of Respondent before the election should not be included in Unit B. I agree that these employees should have been ex- cluded from the Excelsior list and not allowed to vote in Unit B on May 7, because they were not employees in the unit at that time. I do not agree that these employees should be excluded from the unit as it existed on March 18. They were employed by Respondent at that time and prop- erly belong in Unit B on that date. However, as their status will not ulti- mately affect the outcome of the Union's majority status, I shall exclude them from Unit B as agreed by the parties. nessed their signing the cards or that they gave her their signed cards. By way of explanation, Hockersmith stated that she knew Graves by the name of Denise, and not Beverly Graves, and therefore in her affidavit she indi- cated that she was not certain that Beverly Graves gave her the signed card. But she said she was never uncertain about whether the individual she knew as Denise Graves gave her a signed authorization card. As I accept this ex- planation I conclude that the card of Denise or Beverly Graves is a valid authorization card and it shall be count- ed. General Counsel's Exhibits 13(www), 13(iiiii), and 13(Jjjj) were introduced through David Porter, the busi- ness agent for the Union. These cards bear the signatures and names of Helen Sherrouse, Cheryl Cureton, and Carolin Hockersmith, respectively. Porter testified that he witnessed the employees sign the cards on the date on the card at union organizational meetings. Respondent points to the testimony of Jennie Smith who testified that Business Agent Porter did not stand over each person as he or she signed a card as he indicated, and that she her- self filled out a card during the meeting and gave the completed card to Porter at the end of the meeting. Based on this testimony, Respondent argues that the evi- dence submitted is insufficient to establish that these three cards were signed by the individuals named there- on. As there is nothing to indicate that the three individ- uals did not sign the cards, as indicated by Porter, I shall accept his credited testimony that they did in fact sign the cards in his presence and returned them to him, and these cards shall be counted. Porter also testified that the card of Ida Williamson, General Counsel Exhibit 13(aaaa), dated March 6, was signed by Williamson in his presence and was returned to him by Williamson. As I have credited Porter's testi- mony in this regard, and rejected Respondent's assertions in this regard, I shall accept the testimony of Porter and count the card of Ida Williamson. Doris Stultz testified to the introduction of 18 authori- zation cards. These cards were marked General Coun- sel's Exhibits 13(qqqq) through 13(hhhhh). In each case Stultz testified that she told the individuals involved that the purpose of the card was for authorization for repre- sentation by the Union, and that she witnessed the cards being signed. All but 4 of these 18 authorization cards bear the initials of Doris Stultz and the date on the back. Stultz testified that she put her name or initials on the cards she obtained to show that she had them signed. On General Counsel's Exhibit 13(wwww) Stultz' name or initials do not appear. She explained that her name or ini- tials do not appear on this card because she took it di- rectly to Cleta Hodge after it was signed. General Coun- sel's Exhibit 13(xxxx) bears the name and signature of Kelly Lewis and is dated February 27. Stultz' name does not appear on the back, however, the name of Cleta Hodge appears on the back next to the date March 3. General Counsel's Exhibit 13(ggggg) bearing the name and signature of Lenda Taylor also bears the name of Cleta Hodge on the back next to the date of March 8, and Stultz' name does not appear anywhere on the exhib- it. This card is dated March 7. The authorization card of 496 DE QUEEN GENERAL HOSPITAL Tamara Milan, General Counsel's Exhibit 13(yyyy), dated March 6, was witnessed by Stultz but her name or initials do not appear on the card. Stultz testified that she probably forgot to put her name on the back of the cards that did not bear her initials or signature. Stultz testified credibly that she witnessed the signatures on these 18 au- thorization cards. Respondent has offered nothing to in- dicate that these cards were not properly authenticated, and there is nothing to indicate that they were obtained by misrepresentation. Therefore, I shall accept these 18 authorization cards. Mary Hockersmith testified to the introduction of nine authorization cards, marked General Counsel's Exhibits 13(jj) through 13(rr), including her own. On the back of three of the cards the name Mary Hockersmith appears. The other five cards, excluding hers, do not bear her name on the back. Hockersmith testified that she did not know whether she put her name on the back of every card she obtained. It appears that, of the five cards on which her name does not appear, she did not witness the signing of three of these cards. However, she testified that she passed out all of the cards in blank to the eight employees and that they either signed the card in her presence or signed it somewhere else and each employee returned the card to her on the date the card bears. In my view this is sufficient to establish that the employees did in fact read and sign the cards and returned them to Hockersmith on the date the cards bear. Therefore, these nine cards shall be counted. General Counsel's Exhibits 13(iii), 13(ijj), 13(kkk), 13(111), 13(mmm), 13(nnn), 13(qqq), 13(rrr), 13(ttt), 13(uuu), and 13(xxx) were offered into evidence by the General Counsel without any witnesses to identify any of these exhibits. Respondent objected to their receipt and objected again in its brief contending they are invalid for lack of authenticity or identification. At the hearing on January 30, 1981, the General Coun- sel offered into evidence exhibits marked General Coun- sel 13(hhh) through General Counsel 13(aaaa), which are union authorization cards purportedly signed by employ- ees of Respondent. Along with the cards the General Counsel offered into evidence corresponding W-4 forms and employment applications, supplied by Respondent from its files, which bear the signature and handwriting samples of each of the employees who purportedly signed the union authorization card. During the hearing the General Counsel did offer testimony establishing the authenticity of some of these cards. Therefore, I will ad- dress myself only to those cards objected to by Respond- ent in its brief as set forth above. General Counsel's Exhibit 13(iii) purports to be the au- thorization card of June Brett. Pat Harris, a former em- ployee of Respondent, testified that when she worked at the hospital she worked with Brett and in fact was her supervisor for approximately 9 months. And that she had occasion to see her handwriting and in her opinion the signature on the card of General Counsel's Exhibit 13(iii) is the signature of June Brett. Additionally, although I am not a handwriting expert, I have compared the signa- ture on the authorization card dated March 3 with that on the employment application of June Brett, dated June 8, 1978, and the employee withholding statement IRS form W-4, and conclude that the signatures are very similar. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary it is my conclusion that the signature of June L. Brett on the authorization card is valid and the authori- zation card shall be counted. General Counsel's Exhibit 13(ijj) purports to be the authorization card of Karen Burcham dated March 6. Belva Jones, an employee of Respondent, testified that she knows Karen Burcham, that she is familiar with her handwriting, and that it is her signature on General Counsel's Exhibit 13(iii). I have carefully compared the signatures on the docu- ments in evidence, and believe that they are very similar, and as there is no evidence to indicate that the signature is not the valid signature of Karen Burcham, I shall con- clude that it is her signature and shall count the authori- zation card bearing the date of March 6. See Claremont Polychemical Corporation, 196 NLRB 613 at 625 (1972), and Cato Show Printing Co., Inc., 219 NLRB 739 at 756 (1975). General Counsel's Exhibit 13(kkk) dated March 2 pur- ports to be the authorization card of Mary B. Davis. There was no testimony regarding this card. However, the General Counsel indicated that the card was submit- ted to the Region by the Union in support of the repre- sentation petition. I have compared the signature on the authorization card with the signature of Mary B. Davis on the W-4 form and the application for employment and conclude that they are similar. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary it is my conclusion that it is the signature of Mary B. Davis on the authorization card and it shall be counted. General Counsel's Exhibit 13(111) purports to be that of Sherrie Dollarhide, dated March 3. There is no testimo- ny regarding this card and like the card of Mary Davis it came into the General Counsel's hands along with other cards in support of the representation petition. I have compared the signature on the authorization card with that of the signature on the W-4 form and conclude that they are similar, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary conclude that this is the authentic signature of Sherry Dollarhide. 17 General Counsel's Exhibit 13(mmm) dated February 29, 1980, purports to be the authorization card of Bonita Gaffney. Marilyn McElroy testified that she is familiar with Bonita Gaffney and that she worked with her on the same shift at the hospital. That during this period she had occasion to see her handwriting on worksheets, diet lists, and nurses notes. And in her opinion the signature on the authorization card is that of Bonita Gaffney. I have compared the signatures on the W-4 form and the application form and that on the authorization card and conclude that they are similar. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, I shall count this card. General Counsel's Exhibit 13(nnn) purports to be the card of Francis Louise Goode dated March 10. There was no testimony regarding this card. It was submitted to the General Counsel along with the representation pe- T7 The signature on the employment application dated March 4, 1977. was signed by Sherrie Whitehead, which appears to be her maiden name This card was one of the nine excluded by agreement of the parties. 497 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tition. I have compared the signature on the authoriza- tion card with that on the W-4 form and the application for employment and conclude that they are similar, and the card shall be counted. General Counsel's Exhibit 13(qqq) purporting to be the authorization card of Martha A. Jackson dated March 7 was offered in evidence along with other cards submitted to the General Counsel in support of the rep- resentation petition. Marilyn McElroy testified that she works with Martha Jackson at the De Queen Hospital and that she is familiar with her handwriting, and in her opinion the signature on the authorization card is that of Martha Ann Jackson. I have compared the signature on the authorization card and the signature on the W-4 forms and the employment application,1 8 and conclude, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that the signatures are similar and that the authorization card is valid and shall be counted. General Counsel's Exhibit 13(rrr) is an authorization card purportedly from Sue Jamison dated March 7. This card was offered in evidence by the General Counsel and was submitted by the Union with the representation petition. There was no testimony offered in regard to this card. However, I have compared the signatures on the forms submitted and conclude that they are one and the same and that the card has been properly authenti- cated, and it shall be counted. General Counsel's Exhibit 13(ttt) dated March 14 pur- ports to be the authorization card of Lorena Faye Key. There was no testimony regarding this card. However, it was submitted by the Union in support of the representa- tion petition. I have compared the signatures on the doc- uments submitted by the General Counsel, and conclude that they are similar to that on the authorization card, and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, con- clude that the card is authentic and it shall be counted. General Counsel's Exhibit 13(uuu) dated March 2 pur- ports to be the authorization card of Agnes A. Nix. There was no testimony surrounding this card and it was one submitted along with the representation petition. I have compared the signature on this authorization card with the signatures on the W-4 form and the application form and conclude that they are one and the same.19 General Counsel's Exhibit 13(xxx) dated March I pur- ports to be the authorization card of Tammie Lynn Ward. There was no testimony regarding this card and it was submitted to the General Counsel along with other cards with the representation petition. I have compared the signature on the authorization card with those on the W-4 form and the application for employment and con- clude that they are similar, and, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, conclude that the signature is authentic. 20 In addition to the above cards Respondent objected to the authorization cards of Beverly Morrison, Steve Mowatt, Martha Marshall, and Mary Dillahunty, Gener- al Counsel's Exhibits 13(hh), 13(ff), 13(bb), and 13(hhh), respectively, on the grounds that the cards were invalid 'I One of the W-4 forms and the employment application contain the name of Martha Ann Stallings, the maiden name of Jackson. 19 This card was one of the nine excluded by agreement of the parties 20 This card was one of the nine excluded by agreement of the parties. because the signatures were obtained on the basis of mis- representations made to the signers of the cards concern- ing the reasons for the cards. General Counsel's Exhibit 13(hh) was signed by Bev- erly Morrison on March 3, as admitted by Morrison. The card was introduced, however, through the testimony of Mary Margaret Neumeier. Beverly Morrison testified that Neumeier gave her the card and told her that it was to find out how many would be interested in finding out about a union. Morrison testified that she was aware of the fact that there was a union organizational campaign going on at the hospital and that she thought "the pur- pose of signing the card was to find out how many people would be interested in the Union, so that repre- sentatives would come and explain to us what a union is like-what it means." And, that is what she was told when she signed the card. It is obvious that Morrison was not told that the sole purpose of the card was to obtain an election, and it is also obvious that there was no misrepresentation surrounding the card. Under these circumstances, I conclude that the card is a valid author- ization card and it shall be counted. General Counsel's Exhibit 13(ff) is the authorization card of Steve Mowatt. For the same reasons that I have concluded that Mrs. Mowatt's card was valid I shall also conclude that Steve Mowatt's card is a valid authoriza- tion card and it shall be counted. General Counsel's Exhibit 13(pp), the authorization card of Martha Marshall, was introduced into evidence through the testimony of Mary Hockersmith. Marshall testified that Hockersmith gave her the card and told her that she had to sign it if she wanted to go to a union meeting being held on the following Thursday. Marshall testified that she read the card and questioned Hocker- smith about the fine print, "I hereby authorize the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union to represent me for the purpose of collective bar- gaining." Hockersmith told her that it did not mean any- thing unless a union was organized. She said that she signed the card and returned it to Hockersmith and later attended a union meeting where the union explained about some of the benefits that they would try to negoti- ate for the employees. It is clear that Marshall was not told that the sole pur- pose of the card was for the purpose of getting an elec- tion. It is also clear that there was no misrepresentation surrounding this card. Marshall read the card and signed it and in my view there was no misrepresentation. 2i The authorization card of Mary Dillahunty, dated March 8, General Counsel's Exhibit 13(rrrr) was intro- duced through the testimony of Doris Stultz. Stultz testi- fied that she gave the card to Mary Dillahunty, at Dilla- hunty's home, and told her that the card was for authori- zation for representation by the Union named on the card. She told her to read the card and Dillahunty read 21 As this card was dated 4/4/80, after the filing of the petition on March 18, it shall be excluded for the purpose of establishing a union ma- jority on March 18. Additionally, the cards of Perrie Brooks, Maxine Cook, Darlene Smith, Francis Timms, and Frances Westbrook, G.C. Exhs. 13(kk), 13(b), 13(11111), 13(rr), and 13(cc), respectively, were ob- tained after March 18 and shall also be excluded. 498 DE QUEEN GENERAL HOSPITAL the card, signed it, and gave it back to Stultz. The card was dated March 8. Dillahunty testified that she signed the card because she thought Stultz was against the Union. She said she told Stultz that she did not want a union and that she signed the card thinking that it was against the Union. Dillahunty's testimony reflects that she did not read the card but relied on what Stultz told her. In the examination of Dillahunty it was apparent that she could read and that she could understand what she was reading. There is a material difference between the testimony of Stultz and that of Dillahunty. The testimony of Doris Stultz was straightforward and had a ring of truth, and I credit her testimony over that of Dillahunty, to the extent that there is a material difference. It is my finding that Dillahunty was aware of what she was signing and that she knew that the card was for union representation and that it was not for a vote against the Union as she testified. Therefore, it is my conclusion that there was no misrepresentation, and the card shall be counted. In its brief Respondent also objected to the authoriza- tion card of Lucy Pettigrew, dated March 5, and intro- duced as General Counsel's Exhibit 13(pppp). Pat Harris testified that she gave Pettigrew the card and told her that it was for authorization for representation of the Union and that about a week later Pettigrew returned the card and signed it in her presence. Lucy Pettigrew testified that she received the card from Harris, that she signed the card, and was told that if enough cards were signed the union representatives could come down and present their qualifications to see if the people wanted the Union. And that by signing the card it did not obli- gate her to join the Union and that she was not obligated in any way. She testified that she did read the card before she signed it. It is obvious that Pettigrew was not mislead in any way by Pat Harris and that she was told that the purpose of the card was to obtain union repre- sentation. There is nothing in her testimony to indicate otherwise and it is clear she was not told the sole pur- pose of the card was to obtain an election. Under these circumstances, I find no misrepresentation and conclude that the card shall be counted. As indicated earlier the General Counsel introduced into evidence 109 authorization cards in support of its position that the Union represented a majority of the em- ployees in Unit B. Six of these cards, namely, the cards from Sherry Bolin, Sherry Dollarhide, Anthony Jackson, Lynn Mitchell, Agnes Nix, and Tammy Ward, were from employees whose names had been excluded from the Excelsior list at the preelection conference. Addition- ally, four cards, those of Peggy Minor, Steven Mowatt, Deborah Nicholson, and Sheila Smith, are from employ- ees who were not on the Excelsior list. Subtracting these 10 cards, and the 6 cards that I excluded because they were dated after March 18, from the 109 cards received in evidence leaves 93 valid authorization cards. As I have not excluded any of the cards objected to by Re- spondent on the basis of either lack of authenticity or misrepresentation, it is clear that the Union represented a majority of the employees at all times from the date of the filing of the petition on March 18. As I have concluded that the Union had authorization cards from a majority of the employees in both Units A and B prior to the filing of the representation petition on March 18, under the rationale of Gissel,2 2 I must now determine whether Respondent's conduct thereafter was so egregious or serious in character to foreclose the holding of a second election and make a bargaining order appropriate. As indicated previously the Union lost the election in both Units A and B on May 7, as a majority of the em- ployees in both units voted against representation by the Union. The General Counsel contends that the change in heart of the employees was a result of the Employer's unfair labor practices, and coupled with the unfair labor practices following the election it is clear that a fair elec- tion cannot be held and that a bargaining order is appro- priate under Gissel. In situations where a union enjoys a majority status on a given date in an atmosphere free of unfair labor prac- tices and then subsequently loses that majority in a Board election we must look to intervening circum- stances to determine what caused the lost of majority status. If there were intervening unfair labor practices which can be attributable to the loss of the majority, then a bargaining order may be appropriate. We must also look to any unfair labor practices which occurred following the election and determine on a whole wheth- er an employer's conduct has or will prevent the em- ployees from exercising their free choice in a second election. I have found, beginning in early March, that Respond- ent engaged in a campaign of interrogating its employees regarding their union membership, activities, and sympa- thies, and threatened employees with trouble with Re- spondent because of their union activities, and that this conduct occurred both before and after the filing of the representation petition. Additionally, I found that Re- spondent threatened its employees with plant closure; that Respondent gave the impression to its employees that their union activities were under surveillance; and that Respondent threatened employees with discharge if they talked about the Union. These unfair labor practices continued following the filing of the petition, and after the election. Also following the election Respondent began to issue warnings to its employees, some of which were predicated on Respondent's illegal rule prohibiting employees from engaging in activities other than as- signed duties, which I have found to be violative of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. Also following the election Re- spondent discharged four employees because of their union activities in order to discourage the remaining em- ployees from engaging in union activities i.i the future. The Board has concluded that the discriminatory dis- charge of employees because of their union activities is one of the most flagrant means by which employers can hope to dissuade employees from selecting a union as their bargaining representative, because no other event can have more crippling consequences to the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 than the lost of em- 22 N.L.R.B. v. Gisel Packing Co.. Inc. 395 U.S. 575 (1965). 499 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ployment. Accordingly, these acts in discharging the four employees, combined with Respondent's other unfair labor practices in Respondent's antiunion cam- paign in my view fatally impedes the election process and warrants the issuance of a bargaining order. The possibility of erasing the effects of these unfair labor practices and insuring a fair election by the use of tradi- tional remedies is very slight. And as the employees have once expressed their sentiments through cards that ex- pression is best protected by a bargaining order.23 IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The acts of Respondent set forth, above, occurring in connection with its business operations, have a close, in- timate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE. REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in, and continues to engage in, certain unfair labor practices it will be recommended that the Board issue an Order re- quiring Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act, including bargaining with the Union as the duly designated representative of Respondent's employees in Unit A and Unit B, the appropriate units as described above, effective from March 18, 1980, the date on which the Union requested bargaining and the date on which it filed its petition, at a time when it represent- ed a majority of the employees in the units described. Respondent will also be ordered to immediately offer re- instatement to Doris Stultz, Pat Harris, Mary M. Neu- meier, and Univee Bryson, to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to equivalent positions of em- ployment, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and make them whole for any loss they may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against them in the manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest computed in the manner set forth in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 's Although I have concluded that there cannot be a fair election based on Respondent's totality of conduct, if the Board should disagree, I do find, however, that Respondent's conduct raised by the Union's objec- tions to the election is sufficient to warrant the holding of a second elec- tion. And if the Board should reverse me on the bargaining order, I would remand this matter to the Regional Director to conduct the appro- priate second election. NLRB 651 (1977).24 Respondent will also be ordered to rescind the discriminatory warnings issued to Mary M. Neumeier and Anita Turner pursuant to Respondent's il- legal rule against employees engaging in any activities other than assigned duties and to expunge these warnings from their files. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in this matter I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) and is engaged in commerce as defined in Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By interrogating its employees concerning their union membership, activities, and sympathies; by warn- ing its employees that they could get into trouble for supporting the Union; by threatening its employees with plant closure; by creating the impression of surveillance of its employee's union activities; by threatening employ- ees that bargaining would begin from scratch and that benefits negotiated would not be as good as those now enjoined and that employees could be fired if they did not curtail their union activities; by promising employees increased benefits if they curtailed their union activities; by warning its employees that they were heading for trouble and were troublemakers and that they had re- ceived warnings because of their union activities; and by issuing a personnel policy and procedure manual which included a rule prohibiting employees from engaging in activities other than assigned duties, Respondent has en- gaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By issuing warnings to employees Mary M. Neu- meier and Anita Turner predicated on Respondent's rule prohibiting employees from engaging in activities other than assigned duties, Respondent has engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act. 5. By discriminatorily discharging Doris Stultz, Pat Harris, Mary M. Neumeier, and Univee Bryson, because of their union activities, to discourage membership in the Union, Respondent has engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 6. The units described above as Unit A and Unit B constitute appropriate units for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of the Act. 7. The above-described unfair labor practices affect commerce within the contemplation of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] 24 See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Hearing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). 500