Type Rite Ribbon Mfg. Co., Inc.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Type Rite Ribbon Mfg. Co., Inc. and Truck Drivers Local Union 807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and Local 106, Internation- al Production, Service and Sales Employees Union, Party to the Contract. Case 29-CA- 9112 September 30, 1982 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN VAN DE WATER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND HUNTER On February 12, 1982, Administrative Law Judge James F. Morton issued the attached Deci- sion in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent and the Party to the Contract filed exceptions and sup- porting briefs, and the General Counsel filed excep- tions and a letter in lieu of a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions, briefs, and letter, and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein. 3 ' Respondent and the Party to the Contract have excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incor- rect Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. The Administrative Law Judge referred to "Local 107" in sec. Il,A, par. 4, sentence 1, and sec. 11,8, par. 3, sentence 10, of his Decision. It is clear from the context that he meant to refer to Local 807. We hereby correct these inadvertent errors accordingly. 2 We find it unnecessary to pass on the General Counsel's exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge's dismissal of the 8(a)(3) allegations in the complaint because the remedy here granted would not be affected by findings of 8(a)3) misconduct, in addition to the present findings of 8(a)(l) and (2) misconduct. Chairman Van de Water would affirm the Administrative Law Judge's Decision, including his finding, citing Pennco, Inc., 212 NLRB 677 (1974), that an 8(a)3) allegation is not viable because the underlying unfair labor practice charge did not allude to Sec. 8(aX3) He notes that Pennco, in which Member Jenkins participated, has been adopted by the Board in Red Food Store, 252 NLRB 116 (1980) (Pennco was cited and elaborated upon by the Administrative Law Judge), in which Member Jenkins also participated. Chairman Van de Water refuses to weaken this precedent indirectly by declining to pass upon an exception to the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. 3 The Administrative Law Judge, citing Presbyterian Community Hospi- tal, 230 NLRB 599 (1977), recommended that the Board issue a broad cease-and-desist order. We note that Presbyterian issued prior to Ilsckmott Foods. Inc., 242 NLRB 1357 (1979). We have considered this case in light of the standards set forth in Hickmott Foods, and have concluded that a narrow remedial order is appropriate here. We shall modify the Adminis- trative Law Judge's recommended Order and notice accordingly. We shall also conform the notice with the recommended Order by including 264 NLRB No. 87 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi- fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent, Type Rite Ribbon Mfg. Co., Inc., Long Island City, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: 1. Substitute the following for paragraph l(c): "(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requiring mem- bership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act." 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. par. 2(a), which the Administrative Law Judge inadvertently omitted from his notice. The Administrative Law Judge recommended that we rescind Local 106's Certification of Representative issued in 1978. However. we note that Type Rite is the only Respondent in this proceeding, and that in any event the Order herein effects the same result practically speaking as would be achieved by rescinding Local 106's certification. For these rea- sons, we decline to adopt this portion of the Administrative Law Judge's proposed remedy. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAl LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT recognize Local 106, Interna- tional Production, Service and Sales Employ- ees Union, or any successor thereto, as the ex- clusive representative of our production, main- tenance, shipping, and receiving employees employed at our Long Island City plant for dealing with us with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other terms and conditions of employment, unless and until Local 106 shall be certified by the National Labor Relations Board after having demon- strated its exclusive majority representative status pursuant to a Board-conducted election among our employees in the appropriate unit. WE WILL NOT give effect to our collective- bargaining agreement of July 30, 1981, with Local 106, to any extension, renewal, modifi- cation, or supplement thereof, or to any super- seding collective-bargaining agreement with 650 TYPE RITE RIBBON MFG. CO. Local 106; we are not required, however, to vary those wages, hours, seniority, or other substantive terms of employment established under such agreement. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employ- ees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. WE WII.L withdraw and withhold all recog- nition from Local 106 as the exclusive bargain- ing representative of our above-mentioned em- ployees for the purpose of dealing with us concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, unless and until Local 106 demonstrates its exclusive majority status pursuant to a Board-conducted election among our employees. WE WILl. reimburse our employees for moneys deducted since August 1, 1981, from their earnings for initiation fees, dues, assess- ments, or other obligations of membership in Local 106, with interest. TYPE RITE RIBBON MFG. CO., INC. DECISION STArTEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES F. MORTON, Administrative Law Judge: On August 20, 1981, Truck Drivers Local Union 807, Inter- national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America (herein called Local 807), filed the unfair labor practice charge in this case against Type Rite Ribbon Mfg. Co., Inc. (herein called Respondent), contending that it had engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l) and (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (herein called the Act). On October 6, 1981, the com- plaint issued in this case alleging that Respondent had violated Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act. In partic- ular, the complaint alleges, inter alia, that Respondent had interrogated employees concerning their union activ- ities in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act; that it had entered into a renewal collective-bargaining agreement with Local 106, International Production, Service and Sales Employees Union (herein called Local 106) despite the fact that Respondent knew that Local 106 did not then represent a majority of the employees covered by that contract and that Respondent thereby violated Sec- tion 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act; and that Respondent, by having included a union-security clause in that contract, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. At the hearing, I granted the General Counsel's motion to withdraw the complaint allegation that Re- spondent had interrogated its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1). Respondent's answer placed in issue the remaining alleged unfair labor practices. The hearing was held before me on November 2 and 3, 1981, in Brooklyn, New York. After the close of the hearing, I wrote re- spective counsel for their views as to whether the 8(a)(3) allegation of the complaint could stand since the under- lying unfair labor practice charge alluded to only Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. Counsel for the General Counsel responded that it could. I disagree as, in my view, the definitive case law is to the contrary. I Accord- ingly, I now strike the complaint allegation involving Section 8(a)(3). That ruling does not preclude effectively remedying conduct which would also violate Section 8(a)(1). Upon the entire record and my observation of the de- meanor of the witnesses, and after careful consideration of the oral argument made at the hearing and of the briefs filed after the hearing by the General Counsel, by Local 807, and by Respondent, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Based upon the pleadings and the stipulations received at the hearing, I find that Respondent is an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that Local 807 is a labor orga- nization as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act, as is Local 106. 11. THE At LEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Relevant Evidence Respondent manufactures typewriter ribbons and relat- ed products in its factory in Long Island City, New York. In 1978 Local 106 was certified by the Board as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all of Respondent's production, maintenance, and shipping and receiving employees. Local 106 and Respondent then entered into a collective-bargaining agreement ef- fective until July 31, 1981, which covered that group of employees. On April 27, 1981 (all dates hereafter are for 1981 unless otherwise noted), Local 106 gave Respond- ent written notice that that contract would terminate on July 31 and advised Respondent that it desired to meet with Respondent to negotiate a renewal contract. On June 3, Local 106 mailed a letter to Respondent, which contained its renewal contract demands. On June 5, Local 807 filed a petition, Case 29-RC- 5448, with Region 29 of the Board for an election among Respondent's production and maintenance employees. On that same date, Local 807 wrote Respondent to state that it represented a majority of Respondent's production and maintenance employees, that it requested recognition as exclusive bargaining representative of those employ- ees, and that it desired to negotiate a contract. No evi- dence was offered to show that Respondent answered that letter. On June 16, Region 29 dismissed Local 807's petition in Case 29-RC-5448 on the ground that it had been filed I See Pennco. Inc., 212 NLRB 677 (1974). The General Counsel cited Presbyterian Community Hospital, 230 NLRB 599 (1977), but there the Board noted that no exceptions were filed respecting the 8(a)3) recom- mendation. 651 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD during the last 60 days of Local 106's contract. Local 807 then, in an effort to block negotiations for a renewal contract, had its attorney draw up the statement set out below with signature lines underneath it. A Local 807 representative gave that paper to one of the unit employ- ees who also was Local 106's steward. On June 19, that employee signed the first signature line on that sheet and he then obtained the signatures of 44 other employees. By June 22, 45 of the 67 employees then in the unit had signed that sheet. The following statement was typewrit- ten at the top of that sheet: We the undersigned employees of Type Rite Ribbon Mfg. Co., Inc. ("Type Rite"), currently rep- resented by Local 106, International Production, Service & Sales Employees Union ("Local 106") hereby advise, the management of Type Rite that we don't wish to continue being represented by Local 106 and demand, in accordance with our rights, under the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, that Type Rite and Local 106 not enter into negotiations with 106 for a successor labor agreement and that Type Rite not continue to rec- ognize Local 106 as our bargaining representative after the expiration of our current labor agreement. A copy of this petition is being directed to Local 106 and has the object of giving both the Type Rite and Local 106 notification of the expressed desires of the Type Rite employees that they don't desire any negotiations, arrangements, agreements or un- derstanding regarding our terms and conditions of employment to be reached between Type Rite and Local 106 until there is an election by the National Labor Relations Board certifying our bargaining representative. On June 22, a Local 107 representative delivered to Respondent a copy of that statement signed by the 45 employees. The statement was not itself dated. On June 22, Local 807's attorney mailed another copy of that signed statement to Respondent, together with a letter on that date, whereby he referred to the enclosure as a peti- tion which directed Respondent not to engage in any ne- gotiations towards a successor contract. Respondent does not question the authenticity of the employees' signatures on that document and I find that the signatures are valid. While Respondent concedes having received the state- ment containing 45 signatures, it disputes the General Counsel's claim that a second signature sheet, with 8 names thereon, was ever given to it. As the evidence of- fered thereon by the General Counsel respecting that second signature page was confused and contradictory in part, I find that the General Counsel has failed to estab- lish that Respondent received the second signature sheet. 2 ' The General Counsel's witness, in a prehearing affidavit, had ex- pressed doubt that the second page was sent Respondent. Further, the original of that second page was located late in the hearing, separated from the original of the first sheet, which was received in evidence earli- er. In any event, the second sheet contained four valid additional employ- ee signatures. A fifth was a repetition of one that appeared on the first page and three other signatures did not correspond to any on the em- ployee roster in evidence. Notwithstanding the receipt of the statement signed by 45 unit employees that they did not want Respondent to negotiate a renewal contract with Local 106, Respondent and Local 106 scheduled a negotiating session for July 3. Joseph Lovell, Local 106's secretary-treasurer, arrived at Respondent's plant that day and brought the Local 106 steward and its assistant steward to the front office where they met Respondent's president and also its labor counsel. Respondent's attorney told Lovell that Re- spondent "had a problem" and he held up a copy of the statement signed by the 45 unit employees. Lovell testi- fied that he knew what that statement was and that he was not concerned with it. He asked for and received permission to meet with the unit employees in the lunch- room that day. The meeting with the employees was loud and disor- derly. No representative of Respondent was present. Lovell told the employees that the Labor Board had dis- missed Local 807's petition because it had been filed at the wrong time. He also told them that Local 106 had the right to negotiate a contract and that it would do so with or without an employee committee to help him. The testimony indicates that Lovell was not blunt in his discussion with the employees. Rather, it appears that he explained the principle of contract bar to them and tried to calm down the employees. Local 106's steward testi- fied that he and most of the employees reluctantly went along with Lovell's request that they designate a com- mittee to accompany him to the front office. The stew- ard and the assistant steward were so named. Lovell asked the employees if they had any further contract proposals to make and they indicated they had none. There was no discussion at the meeting of the statement signed on June 19 by 45 employees. Rather, the only "petition" discussed was the representation case petition which Local 807 had filed and which Region 29 had dis- missed. As Lovell left that meeting, four employees ex- pressly told him that, regardless of what he had said, they did not want Local 106 to represent them. Lovell, again accompanied by the Local 106 steward and assistant steward, left the lunchroom and went back to the front office to meet with Respondent's president and attorney. Lovell told them that "the petition was thrown out" and that he was there with the stewards to start negotiating. Lovell testified at the hearing that he used the word "petition" to refer only to the representa- tion case petition that had been filed by Local 807 in Case 29-RC-5448. The remainder of that July 3 session was spent in reviewing the renewal contract proposals that Local 106 had sent Respondent in April. Respond- ent's labor counsel asked the Local 106 stewards if they went along with the discussion and they answered in the affirmative. It appears that they did not otherwise make any statement at that meeting. Respondent and Local 106 ended the meeting after arranging to meet again. When Local 106 met again with Respondent in mid- July, Respondent's labor counsel advised Lovell that Re- spondent was aware "that there is some kind of turmoil in the shop [that] the people don't feel that [Local 807] are not going to represent them . . . that the people be- lieve the [representation] petition filed by [Local 807] is 652 TYPE RITE RIBBON MFG. CO. still a good petition." There were no contract negotia- tions at that meeting. Lovell then went back to his office and made copies of the letter by which Region 29 had dismissed Local 807's petition. He returned to the plant and distributed copies of that letter to everyone in the unit. Also in mid-July, Respondent had sought assurance from Lovell that the Local 106 constitution permitted him to enter into a binding contract with Respondent without having to submit it to a ratification vote by the unit employees. On July 16, Lovell sent Respondent a copy of Local 106's constitution and, in the letter which accompanied it, Lovell wrote that the constitution was mute on the subject of contract ratification by members. About this same time, Lovell tried without success to talk to his stewards by phone while they were at work and it appears that they ignored the paging system used by Respondent's office personnel to call them to the tele- phone to speak with Lovell. On July 28, Lovell met with Respondent. He was not accompanied by any of the unit employees. In a 2-hour negotiating session, agreement was reached on a renewal 3-year contract with provisions for a 50-cent-an-hour wage increase each year, two additional holidays, in- creased fringe benefits, a union-security clause, and dues- checkoff arrangements. That contract was signed on July 30 and is effective from August 1, 1981, to July 31, 1984. The unit employees were not afforded a ratification vote; they had ratified the initial contract, i.e., the 1978-81 agreement. The renewal contract has been put into effect. The wage increases provided for therein have been granted; dues deducted for Local 106 have been placed in escrow. On August 3, Local 807 filed another representation case petition, Case 29-RC-5499. That petition was dis- missed on August 18 as the renewal contract constituted a bar. B. Analysis While there may not be harmony in the legal princi- ples applicable to this case, the principles themselves are clear. Thus, an employer may assert contract bar to defeat an effort by an outside union to challenge an in- cumbent union's status during the last 60 days of a col- lective-bargaining agreement but that same employer could not then lawfully negotiate a renewal contract if the incumbent lacks majority support and the employer is aware of that fact.3 In essence, Respondent sought in the insulated period of its contract with Local 106 to avail itself of the opportunity for stability, which is the purpose of the contract-bar rule, and to avoid the pros- pect of being found guilty of assisting Local 106. In the circumstances of this case, it was faced with an impossi- ble task thereon, as discussed below. The issues presented are (1) whether Local 106 lacked majority status when it negotiated a renewal contract with Respondent and (2) if so, whether Respondent was aware that Local 106 did not have majority support. I Campus Housekeeping. Inc.. 252 NLRB 485 (1980); Clark Equipment Company, 249 NLRB 660 (1980); General Fibre Box Company. Division of Longview Fibre Company, 219 NLRB 569 (1975). Weighing the relevant evidence on the question of Local 106's majority status, there are several factors, pro and con, to be considered. Of course, the statement signed on June 19 by about two-thirds of the unit employees whereby they expressly disavowed Local 106 is strong evidence that Local 106 lost its representative status. To counter that evidence, Respondent observes that Local 106 had been certified as majority representative by the Board and that the Board has dismissed Local 807's chal- lenge thereto. Respondent notes too that the unit em- ployees expressly authorized two of their group to par- ticipate as committeemen in the renewal contract negoti- ations. I am not persuaded by Respondent's contentions on this point. Its first contention essentially is a reliance on the legal presumption of majority status arising out of Local 106's certification; I conclude that the statement signed by the 45 employees in June 1981 disavowing Local 106 has effectively overcome that presumption. Respecting the fact that the unit employees had designat- ed the Local 106 stewards to accompany Lovell in the contract negotiations, I note that the designation came about only after Lovell had told them that he intended to negotiate with or without their support. In that con- text, no evidentiary weight can be given to that designa- tion. I find that, when Respondent negotiated a renewal contract with Local 106, Local 106 was not the majority representative. The next question is whether Respondent was aware of Local 106's loss of majority status. Clearly it knew on June 22 that the great majority of the unit employees did not want Local 106 as their representative for purposes of negotiating a renewal contract. Notwithstanding that fact, Respondent met with Local 106 on July 3 to negoti- ate a renewal contract. At the outset of that meeting, it sought to delegate to Local 106's secretary-treasurer the resolution of the problem Respondent faced in dealing with Local 106 in the face of the statement signed by 45 employees opposed to Local 106. Respondent asserts that it accepted Lovell's statement, after having met with the unit employees, that he was there to negotiate a contract, and thereby had a good-faith belief that the employees had so authorized Local 106. Respondent further notes that the Local 106 stewards, one of whom was the most active supporter for Local 807, answered in the affirma- tive when they were asked if they accepted Lovell's comment. In effect, Respondent urges that the evidence establishes that Lovell's remarks, and the stewards as- sents thereto, misled Respondent into thinking that the 45 employees had rescinded their signed statement against Local 106. 1 find no merit in that contention. It is unlikely that Respondent would accept as an objective fact a matter asserted by Local 106 which is so much in Local 106's interest and so contrary to a demonstrated fact. It is even more unlikely that Respondent was so misled when viewed in context with the fact that Re- spondent expressed further doubts at a later date when it voiced concern that the employees, in effect, still wanted Local 107. Its contention loses all substance when con- sidered in the light of its own insistence that Local 106 prove to it that it need not have the renewal contract ratified and in light also of the obvious unwillingness of 653 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Local 106 stewards to answer the paging calls placed at Lovell's request and of their absence at the short ses- sion on July 28 when the substantive negotiations were held and concluded in a 2-hour meeting. 4 On the totality of the evidence I find that Respondent at all times was aware in July 1981 that Local 106 lacked majority status. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By having negotiated with Local 106 on and since July 3, 1981, for a renewal contract and by having en- tered into a renewal contract and by having deducted union dues and initiation fees pursuant to applicable pro- visions of that renewal contract, Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(l) and (2) of the Act. 2. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 3. Respondent cannot be found to have violated Sec- tion 8(a)(3) of the Act as the underlying unfair labor practice charge does not authorize the General Counsel to proceed on that subsection of the Act. THE REMEDY Should the Board adopt the recommendation herein, it should also vacate Local 106's Certification of Repre- sentative issued in 1978. Respondent should cease giving effect to its renewal contract with Local 106 but should not be required to abandon or vary any wage, hour, seniority, or other sub- stantive term of employment which it may have estab- lished under that renewal contract. Respondent should also reimburse its employees with moneys deducted from the wages of their employees as union dues or initiation fees pursuant to the provisions of the renewal contract and pay them interest thereon in accordance with the Board's decisions in F: W Wool- worth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962), and Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). In addition, I recommend that Respondent be ordered to take the other remedial steps provided below. I further recommend that a broad cease-and-desist order issue as the Board has noted that such remedy is appropriate where the infringement on employees' rights was based on contractual provisions.5 Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, upon the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom- mended: 4 The instant case is distinguishable from the case relied on by Re- spondent, i.e., General Fibre Box, supra, where the individual who op- posed the incumbent initially had later actively participated in the negoti- ations and helped present 30 proposals based on the desires of the em- ployees. Clark Equipment Company. supra, also relied on by Respondent, is readily distinguishable factually from the instant case. s See Presbyterian Community Hospital, supra at fn. 1. While that case refers to the contractual violation as one involving Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act, I do not view that specific finding of a violation of Sec. 8(a)(3) as a requirement for the broad remedial order. Rather, it seems clear to me that the Board was referring to the seriousness of the violation itself. ORDER 6 The Respondent, Type Rite Ribbon Mfg. Co., Inc., Long Island City, New York, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Recognizing Local 106, International Production, Service and Sales Employees Union, as the exclusive representative of all production, maintenance, shipping and receiving employees employed by Respondent at its Long Island City, New York, plant for the purpose of dealing with Respondent concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment, unless and until Local 106 shall have demonstrated its exclusive majority status pursuant to a Board-conducted election among those em- ployees. (b) Giving effect to the collective-bargaining agree- ment, dated July 3, 1981, or to any extension, renewal, or modification thereof; provided, however, that nothing herein shall be deemed to require Respondent to vary or abandon any wage, hour, seniority, or other substantive term of employment established under such agreement. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may be affected by an agreement requir- ing membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec- essary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from Local 106 as the exclusive bargaining representative of those employees for the purpose of dealing with Respondent concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or other conditions of em- ployment, unless and until the said labor organization shall have demonstrated its exclusive majority status pur- suant to a Board-conducted election among those em- ployees. (b) Post at its Long Island City plant copies of the at- tached notice marked "Appendix."7 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 29, after being duly signed by its authorized rep- resentative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con- secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to its employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or cov- ered by any other material. 6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the find- ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 7 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu- ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 654 TYPE RITE RIBBON MFG. CO. 655 (c) Reimburse those employees for all moneys deduct- subsection (c) above, and to distributing those moneys to ed since August 1, 1981, from their wages pursuant to them. the checkoff provisions of the contract covering them, (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 29, in together with interest thereon as set forth in the section writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what entitled "The Remedy." steps Respondent has taken to comply therewith. (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the allegations of the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all complaint pertaining to Section 8(a)(3) of the Act be dis- records necessary and relevant to analyze and compute missed. the amounts of moneys to be paid the employees under