United States Postal Service

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE United States Postal Service and Central Area Local No. 300, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO. Case 7-CA-18730(P) September 30, 1982 DECISION AND ORDER CHAIRMAN VAN DE WATER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND HUNTER On April 21, 1982, Administrative Law Judge Arlene Pacht issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions 2 of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt her recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, United States Postal Service, Lansing, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi- bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con- vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products. Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing her find- ings. 2 In accordance with his dissent in Olympic Medical Corporation, 250 NLRB 146 (1980), Member Jenkins would award interest on the backpay due based on the formula set forth therein. Respondent's reliance on Tailored Trend. Inc., 126 NLRB 336 (1960), is misplaced. In that case the Board did not pass on the Administrative Law Judge's discussion of whether or not the alleged discriminatees were en- gaged in protected concerted activity because it found there was no dis- charge. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ARLINE PACHT, Administrative Law Judge: Upon a charge filed by Central Michigan Area Local No. 300, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO (hereinafter the Union), a complaint issued on February 11, 1981, al- leging that the Respondent engaged in an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (the Act). Respondent 264 NLRB No. 91 filed a timely answer denying any wrongdoing. A hear- ing was held on January 13 and 14, 1982, in Lansing, Michigan, at which the parties were given full opportu- nity to examine and cross-examine witnesses and to present documentary evidence. Upon the entire record in this case, including my ob- servation of the demeanor of the witnesses and consider- ation of the Respondent's brief and the General Coun- sel's closing arguments, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Respondent is an independent establishment of the ex- ecutive branch of the United States. The Board has juris- diction over this matter pursuant to the Postal Reorgani- zation Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1209. The sole facility in- volved in this proceeding is the U.S. Post Office at 4800 Collins Road, Lansing, Michigan. II. THE I.ABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The Union is, and has been at all material times herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. Ili. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background The sole issue in this case is whether Patricia Ellis, an employee at the Lansing, Michigan, Post Office, was sus- pended because she questioned a work rule regarding the proper wearing of identification badges and asked that a steward be summoned to clarify that rule or, as the Re- spondent contends, because she was insubordinate to her supervisor. Each newly hired employee at the Lansing Post Office receives a photo identification badge; a laminated plastic shield 2-1/2 by 3-1/2 inches which is affixed by means of a metal clip and supposed to be worn during official duty hours. Work Rule 5 of the administrative support manual provides the following guidance as to where the badges are to be worn: All badges . . . are displayed on the outer garment, over the left breast. When this is not practicable, they are worn in plain view on the belt or as pre- scribed by the installation head. The rule is incorporated by reference into the parties' collective-bargaining agreement through article XIX. There is no dispute that prior to December 8, 1980, the enforcement of the policy with respect to wearing the identification badge was lax, if not nonexistent. Many postal workers neglected to wear their badges while others affixed them to the backs of their shirt collars or their pants, without comment from management. Some of the employees testified at the hearing in this matter that the failure to wear the badges arose out of concern that they would be detached and lost as they performed their jobs. This apprehension apparently was prevalent among the manual distribution clerks whose work en- 671 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD tailed reaching into waist-high containers to extract let- ters and parcels, sorting the mail into sacks, and then tying and tossing these sacks, which might weigh as much as 70 pounds, onto shelves. B. The Alleged Concerted Activity Ellis, a manual distribution clerk since 1976, was one of 12 to 15 employees assigned to Tour 3 (the 5 p.m. to 1:30 a.m. shift) on December 8, 1980. That evening, at approximately 6 p.m., Tour 3 Supervisor Elvora John- son, pursuant to instructions from management, men- tioned to a number of employees including Ellis that they would be expected to wear their photo identifica- tion badges. When Ellis asked if she should retrieve her badge immediately from her locker, Johnson suggested that she wait until her break at 7 o'clock to do so. At 7 o'clock, Ellis did get her badge and affixed it to the inside pocket of her overalls bib with only the metal clip protruding. Later that evening, Johnson summoned the employees to a brief meeting on the workroom floor to review office policy with respect to the badges. She stated that the badges were to be worn properly and that those who failed to do so would be disciplined. At this juncture, several employees posed questions. One clerk asked who would pay for the badges if they were lost and was told that the individual employee would be responsible for re- placement costs. ' Ellis asked where the badge was to be worn, to which Johnson replied, "You will wear them properly from here up," and gestured with her hands to an area of her body from the waist upward toward her head. Dissatisfied with this answer, Ellis asked a second time for a specific description of where the badges could be worn. Again, Johnson showed by means of a gesture where the badges could be worn. At this point, Ellis asked that a union steward be summoned so that she might obtain a clarification of the work rule. The meet- ing concluded with Johnson agreeing to call a steward. This was by no means the first time that Ellis had asked to see a steward about various problems arising on the job. Moreover, on a number of past occasions, she had filed grievances charging Johnson with failing to obtain a steward in a sufficiently timely manner. 2 On returning to work after the meeting, Ellis clipped the badge to the outside pocket of her overalls and then transferred it to her hair. A half hour later, Johnson called Ellis to her desk where she was filling out a re- quest form to call a steward. On seeing the badge in Ellis' hair, Johnson demanded that she remove it. Ellis then asked her where she should wear it. Johnson again instructed her to remove the badge from her hair and Ellis repeated her inquiry. She was removing the badge and pinning it to the outside pocket of her overalls when Johnson instructed Ellis to accompany her to the tour superintendent's office for a talk. Ellis responded to this directive by requesting to see her steward but Johnson 'The work rules state that a $1 replacement charge will be imposed for a lost badge. 2 The collective-bargaining agreement requires that a request for a steward shall not be unreasonably denied. This has been interpreted to mean that a steward shall be called no later than 2 hours from the time of request. insisted that they talk first. As they were leaving the work area, Ellis shouted to a nearby employee to serve as her witness that she had called for a steward. Once in the tour superintendent's office, Johnson ad- vised Ellis that she was administering a job discussion for not wearing her badge properly and challenging her au- thority as a supervisor.3 Ellis slapped her hand on the table and in loud and in- dignant tones snapped, "Why make such a big deal over a lousy little piece of plastic" and then promised to "wear the Goddamn badge." After several more minutes, Ellis, obviously irritated, asked whether the job discus- sion was over so that she could go on her break. Ellis left the office and went into the employees' breakroom where she saw another employee, Lilya Waara, also wearing her identification badge in her hair. Several minutes later, as Ellis was reading a newspaper, Johnson, having reviewed what she considered to be Ellis' insolent behavior toward her, entered the break- room and ordered her to "go home and cool down." As Ellis prepared to leave the facility, Steward Wil- liam Walker, arrived. Initially, he attempted to persuade Johnson that the incident did not constitute grounds for an emergency suspension. According to the collective- bargaining agreement, such measures are permitted only where the misconduct involves intoxication, pilferage, failure to observe safety rules, or where the employee may cause damage to property, himself, or others. How- ever, Johnson insisted on an immediate suspension be- cause, as she told Walker, Ellis had "fronted her off" ' 4 on the workroom floor and challenged her authority. In her first written report of this incident, prepared at the steward's request, Johnson stated, "When employee [sic] demonstrate this type of behavior it shows me that . . . Ellis doesn't have any respect for the job or the work rule." That same night, Johnson filed another report entitled "Supervisors Just Cause Fact Sheet" in which she 3 Art. XVI of the parties' collective-bargaining agreement, which deals with disciplinary procedures, describes a job discussion in the following terms: For minor offenses by an employee, management has a responsibility to discuss such matters with the employee. Discussions of this type shall be held in private between the employee and the supervisor Such discussions are not considered discipline and are not grievable Following such discussions there is no prohibition against the super- visor and/or the employee making a personal notation of the day and subject matter for their own personal record(s). However, no notation or other information pertaining to such discussion shall be included in the employee's personnel folder. While such discussions may not be cited as an element of a pnor adverse record in any sub- sequent disciplinary action against an employee, they may be, where relevant and timely, relied upon to establish that employees have been made aware of their obligations and responsibilities. 4 "Fronting off' is a colloquialism which apparently refers to a situa- tion in which an individual creates a confrontation by behaving in a defi- ant or disrespectful manner toward another. 5 On December 6, 1980, Johnson was involved in an incident in which an employee pushed her. Johnson's recommendation for a 14-day suspen- sion was not approved since management determined that she had failed to follow propei procedures in imposing the discipline. However, John- son was advised by memo that emergency suspensions could be imposed if a supervisor was subjected to physical abuse. Based on this memo, she mistakenly assumed that emergency suspensions were warranted when either physical or verbal abuse was involved. 672 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE charged Ellis with the offense of "loud and abusive lan- guage to a supervisor." In justifying the discipline re- quested, Johnson also charged that Ellis had disregarded a work rule despite repeated instructions to wear her badge properly and engaged in abusive behavior. When Ellis was recalled following the 3-day suspension, man- agement acknowledged that emergency discipline was unwarranted and awarded her full backpay. However, based on Johnson's report, Ellis was given notice on Jan- uary 18 of a 7-day suspension. At the hearing in this matter, Johnson offered further insight into the reasons underlying her recommendation for a 7-day suspension as opposed to some lesser form of discipline." Thus, she explained that she found Ellis' be- havior intolerable both because she had shouted her demand for a steward in a loud and angry voice on the shop floor rather than simply making her request in a reasonable manner, and because she cursed and was un- receptive during the job discussion. On cross-examination, Johnson maintained that she did not tolerate profanity. However, each of the employee witnesses, as well as Tour Superintendent Shirlene Eikner, testified that the use of curse words and obsceni- ties in the presence of supervisors was commonplace on the shop floor. Moreover, Ellis related that, on one recent occasion, she heard Johnson mutter, "damn, damn, damn." Johnson also testified that, following the incident with Ellis, she regularly observed employees under her super- vision wearing their badges. The record shows that, for a number of months after Ellis' suspension, employees complied assiduously with the work rule. However, with the lapse of time and the failure of supervisors to make an issue of the matter, failure to wear the badges again became more the rule than the exception. Discussion In determining whether Ellis' suspension was unlawful, a threshold question is presented as to whether her alleg- edly offensive conduct is protected by Section 7 of the Act. As a prelude to resolving this question, it is impor- tant to bear in mind that Ellis was not disciplined for a single wrongful act, but for a course of conduct which occurred at three meetings on the night of December 8. Thus, her purported misconduct began when she ques- tioned Johnson as to the implementation of a work rule and asked to confer with a steward to obtain further clarification; continued during an informal meeting at Johnson's desk when Ellis repeated her questions and again demanded to see a steward; and culminated with Ellis' purportedly abusive behavior during the job discus- sion. The General Counsel argues persuasively that Ellis' conduct throughout these episodes was related to her in- terest in clarifying a poorly observed work rule. Because that rule was incorporated into the collective-bargaining agreement, Ellis, in fact, was questioning a term of that a The collective-bargaining agreement sets forth a series of sanctions which begin with a job discussion for a minor offense. The next step is a letter of warning which must be in writing and must contain an explana- tion of the deficiency or misconduct to be corrected. Suspensions of varying lengths are authorized for more serious infractions. contract as it applied not only to herself, but to her fellow employees as well. Under settled case law, such conduct is "but an extension of the concerted activity giving rise to that [collective bargaining] agreement" and consequently is protected. See Merlyn Bunney and Clar- ence Bunnev, partners d/b/a Bunney Bros. Construction Company, 139 NLRB 1516, 1519 (1962); C& lAir Condi- tioning, Inc., etc., 193 NLRB 911 (1971), enforcement denied 486 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1973). Respondent contends that the work rule at issue here is so unambiguous as to leave no room for uncertainty as to its meaning or application. Accordingly, Respondent argues that Ellis was not genuinely seeking an interpreta- tion of the rule but rather, was attempting to change it. Citing Tailored Trend, Inc., 126 NLRB 336 (1960), and Local Union No. 29, affiliated with the International Chemical Workers Union, 228 NIRB 1101 (1977), Re- spondent submits that conduct which aims at compelling an employer to unilaterally alter a condition of employ- ment in derogation of its duty to deal with the employ- ees' exclusive bargaining representative is unlawful and, hence, unprotected. Respondent's reliance on the above-cited cases is mis- placed. In Tailored Trend, the union and employer had negotiated a new labor contract in which a specific wage rate was established for all crafts within the employer's business operation, expressly terminating a prior agree- ment which permitted varying rates for each craft. Thereafter, employees in one of the crafts attempted to negotiate a separate wage rate for their shop. In these circumstances, the Board concluded that the employees were attempting to force the employer to deal independ- ently with them to the detriment of the exclusive bar- gaining representative. Id. at 33. In Local Union No. 29, a union representative insisted on taping grievance pro- ceedings when, under long-established practice, such re- cordings were not permitted. Ellis' activity cannot be analogized to that of the employees in either of these cases for she was not seeking to alter a fixed and un- equivocal contract term, whether express or implied. Rather, she was simply seeking a clarification of a policy which was rarely observed or enforced. It was not un- reasonable for her to do so, for the work rule was far less clear-cut than Respondent is willing to admit. It is true that the rule provides that the preferred position for the badge is on the left breast area of the shirt. However, the rule also acknowledges that this position may be im- practicable and vests the supervisor with discretion to determine where the badge may be worn. Moreover, given the widespread disregard of the rule, and the vari- ety of places employees chose to wear the badge in the past, without any disapproval from supervisors, it is not difficult to understand why Ellis would press for greater clarification. Johnson's instructions to wear the badge properly, accompanied by a gesture that encompassed the waist to the head, did not provide an exceedingly ex- plicit answer to Ellis' inquiry. Given the nature of the postal workers' tasks, Ellis' concern with the practicali- ties of wearing the badge on her overalls or shirt, where it could be buffeted about and lost, seems altogether le- gitimate. In insisting that Johnson explain the work rule, 673 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD it is apparent that Ellis was not being purposely obtuse or attempting to unnerve or irritate Johnson, but rather, was trying to determine what flexibility the employees had as to where the badge could be worn. Her request to see a steward was made only after Johnson failed to re- spond to her queries. In light of these considerations, Respondent's conten- tion that Ellis' questions were not posed in good faith is not well taken. There is evidence in the record to sug- gest that tensions existed between Johnson and some members of her work force, including Ellis. Thus, Super- intendent Eikner disclosed that some employees who were college educated felt a certain superiority and were occasionally disrespectful toward Johnson who was a high school graduate. At the same time, Eikner acknowl- edged that Johnson had certain difficulties in expressing herself effectively. Although these generalized undercur- rents may have contributed somewhat to the escalating emotional levels on December 8, I find no support for Respondent's contention that Ellis posed questions for disingenuous reasons and sought the aid of a steward simply to irritate Johnson. If Ellis' purpose was not bona fide, then it is difficult to explain why she promptly sought Johnson's purge from her locker so as to comply with the work rule. Moreover, I infer that, when she clipped the badge to the inside of her pocket and then transferred it to her hair, she was acting for her own convenience. There is no reason to believe that she tin- kered with the badge with the expectation that Johnson would observe or be annoyed by such conduct, particu- larly when fellow employee Waara also had fastened the badge in her hair. Further, as noted above, the questions Ellis posed during the group meeting had to do with how the badge might be worn and not with whether it could be cast aside. Her questions reflected a concern with losing the badge and, therefore, were not very dif- ferent in their purpose from those posed by employees who asked about the replacement costs of lost badges. Yet, these employees were not suspended. Of course, they did not persist in questioning Johnson nor did they demand to see a steward. Given these considerations, I conclude that Ellis acted in good faith in attempting to determine what the employees' options were with re- spect to the work rule. The fact that she may have com- mitted improprieties during the course of her Section 7 activities does not necessarily deprive Ellis of the Act's protections. See Firch Baking Company, 232 NLRB 772 (1977). Respondent correctly points out that an employee's right to engage in protected concerted activity is not ab- solute, but must be reconciled with the employer's right to maintain discipline and respect in the workplace. Where the employer's interests run counter to those of the employee, the Board has suggested the following ac- commodation: . . .there is a line beyond with employees may not go with impunity while engaging in protected con- certed activities and that if employees exceed the line the activity loses its protection. That line is drawn between cases where employees engaged in concerted activities exceed the bounds of lawful conduct in a moment of animal exuberance or in a manner not motivated by improper motives and those flagrant cases in which the misconduct is so violent or of such character as to render the em- ployee unfit for further service.7 Thus, the proper test to be applied in evaluating Ellis' conduct is not whether she was sufficiently deferential or whether she complied with conventional standards of propriety, but whether she was so "offensive, defamatory or opprobrious as to remove [her] from the protection of the Act." Ben Pekin Corporation, 181 NLRB 1025 (1970), enfd. 452 F.2d 205 (7th Cir. 1971). Applying these standards to the instant case, I find no basis to conclude that Ellis' conduct on December 8 was so outrageous as to put her beyond the pale of the Act's protections. As discussed above, her questions during the group meeting were not designed to scuttle the work rule or challenge Johnson's authority. They merely were inquiries designed to test the implementation of a seldom- ly involved work rule. Although Johnson testified that Ellis asked for a steward at this meeting in a loud voice and abrupt manner, she did not suggest that Ellis was personally insulting. It was only after Johnson demon- strated a certain rigidity in failing to respond to her ques- tions that Ellis felt compelled to pursue her inquiry a second time and seek clarification from a steward. Whether or not Ellis was correct in her belief that the work rule was subject to interpretation is immaterial for even when an employee's construction of a contractual term is wrong, efforts to enforce that agreement are pro- tected, nonetheless. See Firch Baking Company, supra. The record indicates that Ellis' behavior at Johnson's desk was critical to the supervisor's decision to discipline her. Thus, when asked at the hearing to explain why she felt a suspension was warranted, Johnson stressed how offended she felt when Ellis shouted for a steward. Ellis' conduct was rash and ill-mannered, but not so extraordi- nary as to justify the imposition of a severe sanction. Johnson's reaction may be attributed to her annoyance with Ellis' request for a steward, which in the past had been a prelude to Ellis' filing a grievance against her for failing to act quickly enough on the request. She may well have feared that another such grievance was in the offing. Thus, it is likely that Johnson overreacted not simply because of the loud volume of Ellis' shout for a steward, but because of the demand itself. Whatever Johnson's subjective reactions might have been, they do not justify disciplining an employee whose behavior was impulsive, but certainly not "offensive, defamatory or opprobrious." See Ben Pekin, supra. Further, although Ellis' conduct during the job discus- sion was certainly less than polite and deferential, it was not "so violent or of such serious character as to render the employee unfit for further service." The Bettcher Manufacturing Corporation, 76 NLRB 526, 527 (1948). A single "Goddamn" is hardly a shattering expletive in a workplace and far less offensive than other curse words which Johnson undoubtedly heard as a routine matter. 7 Prescott Industrial Products Company, 205 NLRB 51, 51-52 (1973), en- forcement denied 500 F.2d 6 (8th Cir. 1974). 674 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE Moreover, unlike the situations described in United States Postal Service, 250 NLRB 4 (1980), or New Process Gear, Division of Chrysler Corporation, 249 NLRB 1102, 1108- 09 (1980), the offending language here was not cast as a personal insult to Johnson. Respondent points out that the Board has identified only three labor situations which are so likely to be vola- tile that emotional outbursts may be condoned-during organizing compaigns, grievance hearings, or collective- bargaining negotiations. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Cement Transport, Inc., 490 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1974); Thor Power Tool Company, 148 NLRB 1379 (1964), enfd. 351 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965); Ben Pekin, supra at 165. Respondent insists that a job discussion is not such a situation and, therefore, Ellis' outburst during the job discussion was indefensible. A job discussion as described in the collective-bargain- ing agreement is something less than a grievance hearing. At the same time, it is not the equivalent of an encounter on the workshop floor. It is private, limited to the imme- diate parties, and apparently is designed to provide an at- mosphere in which frank exchanges may occur. Since the job discussion between Ellis and Johnson was off the record, whatever occurred therein should have been privileged and not taken into account in imposing more stringent discipline. Moreover, since the purpose of such discussions is to encourage candid dialog and is the first step in the disciplinary process, the job discussion is far more analogous to a greivance hearing than it is to an exchange on the shop floor. Accordingly, there is no more reason to penalize high emotions or an occasional inflammatory remark during such meetings than there is in a grievance proceeding, organizing campaign, or col- lective-bargaining session." In the final analysis, Supervisor Johnson may have had good cause to regard Ellis' conduct as defiant and brash, but such offensive behavior did not disqualify Ellis from the benefits of the Act. It is well to bear in mind that an employee's intemperate conduct in resisting authority is not committed to an employer's unfettered judgment. If every affront to a super isor's authority could subject an employee to discipline, the guarantees which inhere in Section 7 of the Act would quickly be eroded. The mis- conduct at issue here arose in a context which under Board policy constituted protected concerted activity and was not so egregious as to deny Ellis the protection of Section 7. I conclude, therefore, that by suspending Ellis because of her conduct on the night of December 8, 1980, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. CONCI .ISIONS 01 LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6). and (7) of the Act. I It shou.d be noted that the offensive language at issue in the Ben Pekin case occurred during an exchange on the workroom floor. Re- spondent attempts to distinguish that case on the grounds that a profanity was not involved There. the employee suggested that the employer had bribed the union Respondent urges a distinction without a difference for the employee's comment in Ben Pekin Is as potentiall) insulting as an) obscenity could be See also Ftir(h Baking (Co., supra, where an employee made an inappropriate remark during a meeting with management. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and co- erced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act by suspending its employee, Pa- tricia Ellis, on or about January 18, 1980, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because she engaged in pro- tected concerted activity by challenging the interpreta- tion of a work rule regarding the wearing of photo iden- tification badges and insisting upon calling a steward to clarify that rule. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practice affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent engaged in an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. In finding that Patri- cia Ellis was unlawfully suspended for engaging in pro- tected concerted activities, I also conclude that in order to effectuate the purposes of the Act, Respondent shall be required to make Ellis whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered because of her 7-day suspension which commenced on or about January 18, 1980, by awarding her backpay with interest thereon to be com- puted in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Com- patty. 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). 9 In addition, Respondent will be required to expunge from its records or files any notices and references thereto relating to Ellis' 7-day suspension. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER ° The Respondent, United States Postal Service, Lan- sing, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by suspending its employee, Patricia Ellis, because she engaged in protected concerted activity. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action: (a) Make Patricia Ellis whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered during her 7-day suspension com- mencing on or about January 18, 1980, in a manner set See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co.. 138 NLRB 716 (1962) 0o In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings. conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec 10)2.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes 675 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Expunge and remove from its records any suspen- sion notices and any references thereto relating to the suspension of Patricia Ellis which commenced on or about January 18, 1980. (c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time- cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (d) Post at its Lansing, Michigan, facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 1 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being duly signed by the appropriate rep- resentative of Respondent, shall be posted by Respond- ent immediately upon receipt thereof, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted, and be maintained by Respond- ent for 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other materi- al. (e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. I In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu- ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all parties participated and were afforded the opportunity to present evidence in support of their respective positions it has been found that we have violated the National Labor Relations Act in certain respects and we have been ordered to post this notice and to carry out its terms. WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act by suspending them or taking any other disciplinary action against them for engaging in protected concerted activity. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner in- terfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL make Patricia Ellis whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of her 7-day suspension which commenced on or about January 18, 1980, by awarding her backpay with in- terest. WE WILL expunge from our records and files and notices and any references thereto relating to the 7- day suspension of Patricia Ellis. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE 676