J. P. Stevens & Co.

. P. STEVENS & CO. J. P. Stevens and Co., Inc. and Amalgamated Cloth- ing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC. Cases 1 i-CA-8067 and 11-CA-8465 20 October 1983 DECISION AND ORDER On 5 March 1982 Administrative Law Judge James M. Fitzpatrick of the National Labor Rela- tions Board issued his Decision in the above-enti- tled proceeding and, on the same date, the pro- ceeding was transferred to and continued before the Board in Washington, D.C. Thereafter, all par- ties filed exceptions and/or cross-exceptions to all or part of the Administrative Law Judge's Deci- sion. On 13 October 1983 J. P. Stevens and Company, Inc., herein called the Respondent; Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, herein called the Union; and the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board en- tered into a Settlement Stipulation, subject to the Board's approval, providing for the entry of a con- sent order based upon the Order set forth in the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. The parties withdrew all exceptions and cross-exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge's Decision filed with the Board. Having considered the matter, the Board ap- proves the Settlement Stipulation and the excep- tions and cross-exceptions filed by the parties are withdrawn. As no exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge's Decision remain, The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified in the Settlement Stipulation, and orders that the Respondent, J. P. Stevens and Co., Inc., Wallace, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to bargain in good faith with Amal- gamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, as the exclusive collective-bar- gaining representatives of employees in the unit found appropriate below for purposes of collective bargaining. The bargaining unit is All production and maintenance employees employed at the Employer's Carter plant, Holly plant, and warehouses at Wallace, North Carolina, including plant clerical employees, watchmen, computer programmer in the dye house, electrical technician, and plant driver; excluding office clerical employees, profession- al employees, cloth store clerk, managerial em- 268 NLRB No. 25 ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) Refusing to bargain in good faith by unilater- ally, and without prior notification and bargaining with the Union, changing terms and conditions of employment of employees within said unit, includ- ing, but not limited to, unilateral publication or im- plementation of personnel policies and procedures, or unilateral granting of general wage increases. However, nothing herein shall be construed as re- quiring Respondent to vary or abandon any eco- nomic benefit or term and condition of employ- ment which its employees at its Wallace facilities, or any other facilities, would otherwise be entitled to receive. (c) Disciplining or discharging employees pursu- ant to personnel policies and procedures unilateral- ly publicized or implemented as aforesaid. (d) In any other manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the aforesaid Union, or any other labor orga- nization, to bargain collectively through represent- atives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec- tive bargaining or mutual aid or protection, and to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Upon request, bargain with the aforesaid Union, as the exclusive representative of all em- ployees in the appropriate unit described above, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em- ployment, or other conditions of employment, and with respect to the personnel policies and proce- dures publicized at Wallace, North Carolina, I Oc- tober 1978, 1 December 1978, and I February 1979, and the general wage increase at Wallace, North Carolina, of 9 July 1979, and, if an under- standing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Offer to Gloria Jacobs immediate and full re- instatement to her former position, or, if that posi- tion is not available, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of earnings in the manner set forth in the section entitled "The Remedy." (c) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copy- ing all personnel records and memoranda regarding Gloria Jacobs and all records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms hereof. 89 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (d) Expunge from the personnel files of Gloria Jacobs and all other employees of Respondent at Wallace, North Carolina, all adverse entries made pursuant to personnel policies and procedures not negotiated with the Union. (e) Post in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees customarily are posted at Respondent's Wallace, North Carolina plants copies of the attached notice marked "Ap- pendix."' Copies of the notice will be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 11 and, after being signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted immediately upon receipt thereof and maintained by Respondent for 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re- spondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply here- with. I If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Act gives you, as employees, certain rights, including the right: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through a represent- ative of your choosing To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from any or all of these things. Accordingly, we give you these assurances The Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC, is the recognized collec- tive-bargaining representative of our hourly em- ployees at Wallace, North Carolina. WE WILL NOT take action affecting wages, hours, and working conditions of such employees, including publicizing personnel policies and proce- dures and general wage increases, without negotiat- ing first with the Union. However, nothing herein shall be construed as requiring us to vary or aban- don any economic benefit or term and condition of employment which our employees would other- wise be entitled to receive. WE WILL NOT discipline or discharge employees pursuant to personnel policies and procedures which have not been negotiated with the Union. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exer- cise of their rights under the National Labor Rela- tions Act. WE WILL offer Gloria Jacobs her old job at Wal- lace and pay her for loss of earnings with interest; WE WILL remove from her personnel file and the personnel files of all Wallace employees any ad- verse notations made pursuant to personnel policies and procedures which we should have negotiated with the Union. J. P. STEVENS & CO., INC. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES M. FITZPATRICK, Administrative Law Judge: This Employer refuses to recognize or bargain with the Union, although the Union made continuing demands for such recognition, and persists in this refusal pending ap- pellate review of a Board decision and order that its duty to bargain arose at an earlier date (February 19, 1975). In the meantime, between the time the duty to bargain arose and the Board's decision and order, the Employer publicized employee work rules, discharged an employee for violating a work rule, and gave employees a general pay increase. I find herein that the publicized rules and the pay raise were additional aspects of a continuing un- lawful refusal to bargain and that the discharge also was an unfair labor practice. These cases involve J. P. Stevens & Co., Inc. (the Re- spondent, the Employer, or Company) and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO, CLC (the Union). In the earlier case (J. P. Stevens & Co., 244 NLRB 407 (1979), enfd. 668 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1982), the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) found that, even though the Union had obtained valid authorization cards from a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit at the Employer's facilities in Wallace, North Carolina, it lost out in a subsequent Board-con- ducted election because of the Employer's unfair labor practices prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (the Act). The Board set aside the elec- tion for those reasons and, pursuant to the standards set forth in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), found the Union to be the majority representative of the employees as of February 19, 1975, and ordered the Company to bargain with the Union upon request effec- tive that date. The Company sought review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Board filed a cross-application with the same court for enforcement of its order, and the Union intervened seeking additional remedies. The court granted enforce- 90 J. P. STEVENS & CO. ment of the Board order and remanded the case to the Board for implementation of the remedies it had ordered. The present proceedings were initiated on December 29, 1978, when the Union filed additional unfair labor practice charges against the Respondent in Case I -CA- 8067. These charges were amended June 7, 1979. On July 10, 1979, the Union filed separate charges against the Respondent in Case 1-CA-8465. Then on Septem- ber 10, 1979, the charges in Case I l-CA-8067 were again amended. On January 11, 1980, a Board complaint issued in Case 11-CA-8465. This complaint was amend- ed on January 15, 1980, and on January 31, 1980, the two cases (Cases 11-CA-8067 and 11-CA-8465) were consolidated and a consolidated complaint issued. On May 2, 1980, an amended consolidated complaint issued in the two cases. The Respondent duly answered each complaint including the final one which it answered on May 12, 1980. The issues presented by the pleadings are whether the Respondent committed unfair labor practices prohibited by Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by various unilater- al changes in terms and conditions of employment, in- cluding a general wage increase, for employees at its Wallace, North Carolina, facilities without bargaining with the Union respecting them. An additional issue is whether the discharge of employee Gloria Jacobs for violating a work rule violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because, as is alleged, institution of the rule was among the unilateral changes which the Company should have, but admittedly did not, bargain about with the Union. These issues were heard before me at Clinton, North Carolina, on May 19 and 20, 1980, and at Wilimington, North Carolina, on July 8 and 9, 1980. Based on the entire record, including my observation of the witnesses, and consideration of the briefs of the parties, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION It is undisputed that the Respondent, a Delaware cor- poration, operates approximately 74 textile plants in vari- ous States, including plants (the Carter plant, the Holly plant, and warehouses) at Wallace, North Carolina, the only facilities directly involved in these proceedings, where it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of textile products. During the calendar year preceding issuance of the complaint, a period representative of its operations, the Respondent received at its Wallace plants directly from points outside North Carolina goods and raw mate- rials valued over $50,000 and shipped from those plants directly to points outside North Carolina products valued over $50,000. The Respondent is an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. It is also undisputed that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Established Facts The complaint alleges, inter alia, and the answer denies, that the production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Wallace, North Carolina facilities constitute an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.' Similarly, it is alleged and denied that a majority of the employees in that unit designated the Union as their collective-bargaining representative about February 19, 1975, and since then the Union has been the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees in that unit with respect to wages, hours, and working condi- tions and other terms and conditions of employment by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act. It is similarly alleged and denied that the Union has had a continuing request to the Company to bargain collectively. None of these issues are litigable in the present proceeding, the Board, with Court approval, already having determined them in the earlier proceeding referred to above. Thus, the Board found the bargaining unit to be appropriate, found the Union enjoyed majority representative status therein as of February 19, 1975, and found the Union made con- tinuing demands for recognition and bargaining. These demands in effect have been reiterated through the charges in the present matter as well as by the Union's continuing participation in this litigation in support of its right to bargain. In addition, with respect to the 1979 annual general wage increase, which is at issue here as an alleged unilateral change, the Union on June 19, 1979, made a specific written request to the Company to bar- gain. B. Issues for Litigation The General Counsel and the Union contend that the Respondent engaged in the additional unlawful refusals to bargain by unilaterally instituting three groups of changes in working conditions and by the general wage increase, and further violated Section 8(a)(1) by dis- charging Gloria Jacobs for violating a rule which was one of the unilateral changes. The alleged changes in working conditions occurred on three dates, October 1, 1978, December 1, 1978, and February 1, 1979. Jacobs was discharged March 12, 1979. The general wage in- crease was given July 9, 1979. In its answer the Respondent asserts generally that the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. With respect to all alleged unilateral changes and the general wage increase, the Respondent admits it has not bargained with the Union and asserts it had no duty to do so and that it has a good-faith doubt that the Union represents an uncoerced majority of employees in the unit.2 The Respondent admittedly discharged Jacobs for violating a work rule alleged in the complaint as a unilateral change, but the Respondent contends this was sufficient cause for discharge and that the work rule in- ' The complaint describes the bargaining unit as follows: All production and maintenance employees employed at the Em- ployer's Carter plant, Holly plant, and warehouses at Wallace. North Carolina, including plant clerical employees, watchmen, computer programmer in the dye house, electrical technician, and plant driver; excluding office clerical employees, professional employees, cloth store clerk, managerial employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act .... 2 As to the good-faith doubt issue there is no evidence to support such defense other than the results of the election which was set aside. 91 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD volved did not constitute a change in working condi- tions. C. The Duty to Bargain Since 1974 the Respondent has followed a practice of announcing new benefits for employees simultaneously in all nonunion plants. Between 1974 and 1979 this method was used on 10 occasions. It was also used to publicize the working conditions which the General Counsel al- leges here to be unilateral changes. The Respondent refers to these matters as personnel policies and proce- dures. These were arranged into three groups to be pub- licized on three different dates by means of employee meetings at which tape slide presentations were shown followed by question and answer periods. Summaries of each group were then posted on bulletin boards subse- quent to each meeting. In this manner personnel policies and procedures in Group 1, which included those deal- ing with probationary period, attendance policy, perfect attendance awards, leaves of absence, employee sugges- tions and complaints, and disciplinary procedure and rules of conduct, were publicized on October 1, 1978. Group 2, which included those dealing with bulletin boards, seniority, jury duty, personnel files, employment and induction, and Christmas gifts, were publicized on December 1, 1978. And Group 3, which included those dealing with call-in pay, reporting pay, funeral pay, exit interviews, nondiscrimination, and educational courses, were publicized on February 1, 1979. For purposes of these publicizings the Respondent considered the Wal- lace plants as nonunion. Without at this point particular- izing these various rules, it may be noted that the Re- spondent contends that none of them was entirely new, although some were modifications of existing policies, and it contends that some involved no change whatso- ever. In granting the general wage increase on July 9, 1979, the Respondent again applied it in all nonunion plants, considering the Wallace plants as nonunion, but exclud- ing the Roanoke Rapids plants where it recognized the Union. The Respondent contends that in giving the in- crease it acted in accordance with its past practice of fol- lowing the industry trend in which the large textile mills of various companies generally announce wage increases at about the same time. The Respondent's defense with respect to the person- nel policies and procedures as well as the general wage increase is that they involved no real change from the status quo ante and therefore required no bargaining with the Union. The difficulty with this defense is that with respect to the Wallace employees the Board has al- ready ordered the Company to bargain with the Union effective February 19, 1975, and its duty to bargain about all mandatory subjects of bargaining carries for- ward from that date. There is no contention here that the subjects included in the personnel policies and proce- dures and the matter of wages were not mandatory sub- jects of bargaining, and I find that they were. Although the Union has a continuing request to bargain, the Com- pany has still not recognized it or bargained on any mat- ters respecting Wallace employees. Each day that passes is a further failure to fulfill this duty. The fact that the Board's decision announcing this obligation was until re- cently pending appeal did not relieve the Respondent from that obligation. J. P. Stevens & Co., 186 NLRB 180 (1970), enfd. 78 LRRM 3116 (5th Cir. 1971); Quaker Tool & Die, Inc., 169 NLRB 1148 (1968). It is true that the Board decision issued on August 20, 1979, after the events which are the basis for the complaint in this case. But the Respondent had long been on notice of the possi- bility of a Board finding which might impose a duty to bargain as of an earlier date. The original charges of vio- lations of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act were filed April 14, 1975, the complaint alleging a failure by the Respondent to meet its bargaining obligations issued Jan- uary 20, 1977, and after a hearing Administrative Law Judge Joel Harmatz issued his decision on the matter on March 22, 1978. Thus, the Company was litigating its duty to bargain, which ultimately was found by the Board, at the very time it was publicizing the personnel policies and procedures and granting the general wage increases involved here. In J. P. Stevens & Co., supra, 186 NLRB at 183, the Board said: Respondent has misconceived the nature of the decision and order of the Board and mistaken an en- forcement proceeding for the original decision. Where a Respondent will not abide either the Trial Examiner's decision or the Board decision, it be- comes necessary for the Board to secure enforce- ment of its decision and order through action of an appropriate circuit court of appeals and such en- forcement is granted by the court on a showing of substantial evidence. The operable matter is the facts as found by the Trial Examiner and the Board and the facts determine under the law whether a violation has occurred. In a refusal-to-bargain case, the facts determine when the duty to bargain was present and when the refutaltdccurred. The viola- tion takes place at that time, not later when a Trial Examiner spells out the facts and the violation or when the Board affirms or makes such a finding. The Board decision is an affirmance that the duty existed at the prior instant and that Respondent vio- lated the Act by negating its duty. Where the duty exists whether or not such has been articulated by a Trial Examiner, the Board, or a court, Respondent acts at its peril if it does not meet that duty. On occasion the Section 10(b) limi- tation might pass canceling that peril, but otherwise Respondent must act in accordance with the duty imposed by the Act. Inasmuch as the Company's duty to bargain dates from February 19, 1975, it should have bargained all along about mandatory subjects of bargaining. This is not a case where the parties are already negotiating and some event or action occurs which arguably should have been negotiated, or arguably formed part of the status quo ante. Here the Respondent refuses to bargain about all bargainable topics. It is immaterial whether change oc- curred. The Respondent is bound to bargain about them whether or not there is change. In this sense the present proceeding is in some measure redundant to the previous 92 J. P. STEVENS & CO. one. Nevertheless, the General Counsel and the Charg- ing Party are entitled to whatever redress is available where, as here, unfair labor practices are continuing. The Respondent's defense erroneously assumes that absent a change in the status quo with respect to the personnel policies and procedures or as to wages, it does not vio- late the Act. See Master Slack, 230 NLRB 1054 (1977), enfd. 618 F.2d 6 (6th Cir. 1980). D. The Specific Personnel Policies and Procedures Involved Although it may not be strictly necessary to analyze the extent to which changes were made in working con- ditions and wages, such analysis does assist in determin- ing the extent to which employee collective rights have been impeded and in determining an appropriate remedy. The General Counsel and the Union urge that all of the alleged unilateral changes set forth in the complaint in- volve some measure of change which has significance under the Act. The Respondent's overall defense is that virtually no significant changes occurred. However, in the taped presentation which prefaced publication of the personnel policies and procedures, the Respondent de- scribed them as being "updated," thus suggesting some change, and then described them as for the most part not new to the employees and only reworded for clarity. The evidence shows that some matters were substantially changed while others were not. I. Changed policies and procedures a. Perfect attendance awards Prior to October 1, 1978, the Respondent maintained a policy of encouraging perfect attendance of employees at the Wallace plants with a program called "Wally Wal- lace" by which weekly, monthly, quarterly, and yearly awards were given to employees for perfect attendance. Although not explicated in the record, it is implicit in the position of the parties that these awards were a form of recognition which did not involve material benefit for the employee other than a soft drink or an item of food. As of October 1, 1978, the Respondent modified the ex- isting perfect attendance policy by granting employees with 1-year perfect attendance a gift or a day off, and for additional years of perfect attendance granting additional gifts and days off. The explanatory presentation which preceded implementation of the rules posted October 1, 1978, explained this new policy to the employees in the following language: After I full year of Continuous Perfect Attend- ance, you can select an appropriate valuable gift or receive I day off with pay. For 2 thru 4 years of Perfect Attendance, a more valuable gift or 2 days off may be selected each year. For 5 thru 9 years an even more valuable gift or 3 days off will be offered each year. And for 10 years or more Perfect At- tendance, you can choose an expensive gift or 5 days off. I find the new policy on perfect attendance was a signifi- cant change from the old one. b. Discharge for failure to report Prior to October 1, 1978, the company policy as to at- tendance provided in part as follows, "Employees who are absent without sending word for 7 consecutive calen- dar days will be automatically dropped from the payroll and will be considered as having resigned." The parties stipulate that under the new rule, "Employees who are absent for any reason without sending word for 3 con- secutive days . . . will be discharged." Assuming that this stipulation means 3 consecutive working days and considering that the plant operates on a schedule of 5 or 6 workdays in a week, it is obvious that the Respondent altered the rule applicable to employees who are absent and do not report in and that this was a significant change in the employees' terms and conditions of em- ployment. Finally, the new attendance policy, in contrast to the old, provides that employees who are "excessively absent, even for excused reasons" may suffer disciplinary action including discharge. This is plainly a stricter policy than the earlier one. c. Excused and unexcused absences The Respondent's previous absentee policy was set forth in its supervisors' manual in general terms without specifying which absences were excused or which unex- cused and without specifying the penalty for either type. Broad discretion was allowed supervisors in administer- ing the policy and no firm limit was set on the number of absences an employee could accumulate. In practice the most important requirement was that the employee give advance notice to the supervisor of an expected absence together with the reason for the absence. Almost any excuse was acceptable. The new rule publicized October 1, 1978, was more explicit in that it defined excused and unexcused absences and indicated penalties for unexcused absences accrued within a 6-month period. It also re- duced the number of consecutive days of allowable ab- sences from seven to three. Excessive absences, whether excused or not, subjected the employee to discipline, in- cluding discharge. Supervisors no longer could exercise broad discretion in excusing absences. The new rule per- mitted excused absences in only four categories, personal illness, death in the family, serious illness in the immedi- ate family, and transportation problems. All other ab- sences were unexcused unless they were on designated holidays, during scheduled vacations, for jury duty, for approved leaves of absence, or for funeral leave. In sum, the new policy was more rigid and less flexible than the one it replaced. d. Progressive disciplinary procedure Although in the past the Respondent used a discipli- nary procedure, the policies and procedures publicized October 1, 1978, included a disciplinary procedure which differed from the old in a number of ways. Under the new procedures supervisors exercised considerably less discretion than under the old system. Although both listed reasons for which employees could be disciplined, the old identified 14 reasons for which an employee 93 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD could be disciplined and 10 for which the employee would be discharged. Under the new procedures an em- ployee could incur discipline for 24 reasons and dis- charge for 15 reasons. One of these new reasons which could result in discipline or discharge was the use of pro- fane, abusive, indecent, or threatening language. The new procedure provided supervisors with guidelines for the imposition of discipline or discharge. Thus, for cer- tain specific types of infractions such as drinking on the job, fighting, or stealing, discharge following investiga- tion was mandatory. For certain lesser infractions a writ- ten warning was imposed. And for even more minor in- fractions a verbal warning was imposed and if the infrac- tion was repeated a written warning, and if repeated a third time within 6 months discharge resulted. The sever- ity of the penalty and in some cases the progression of heavier penalties for repeated infractions depended on the type of the infraction. For purposes of this progres- sive discipline, warnings became unusable after 6 months. Prior to October 1, 1978, the supervisors' manual listed certain specific grounds for immediate discharge. The newly publicized procedures also listed the identical or similarly worded grounds and in addition listed the fol- lowing grounds which had not previously been listed: Failure to report to work for 3 consecutive working days without notifying the Company of the circumstances. Failure to report to work on the first working day following the expiration date of a leave of ab- sence. Immoral or indecent conduct on company prop- erty. Unauthorized leaving of company premises during working time. Gross negligence resulting in serious injury to an- other employee or damage to company property. Working for another employer while on a leave of absence will normally result in immediate dis- charge. There may, however, be circumstances in which exceptions are justified, such as an employee doing limited work temporarily in a family owned business, while recuperating from a personal illness. Therefore, an employee who works for another em- ployer while on a leave of absence is subject to im- mediate discharge, depending upon the circum- stances. Similarly, although the newly publicized list of infrac- tions which could lead to discipline less than immediate discharge in some respects tracks the old list in the su- pervisors' manual, certain of this type of infraction are newly listed, as follows: Unauthorized operation of machines, tools or equipment. Unauthorized posting of material or defacing ma- terials on company bulletin boards. Excessive time on breaks or taking unauthorized breaks. Trading shifts without permission. Violation of no-solicitation-distribution rule. Poor housekeeping, creating or contributing to unsanitary conditions. Excessive waste of materials or supplies. Unauthorized starting or stopping work early. Failure to wear required or protection equip- ment. Insubordination to company supervisors. Sleeping on the job. Use of profane, abusive, indecent or threatening language. In certain other ways also the new procedures publi- cized disciplinary policies not previously announced. These include a prohibition of an employee having an- other employee present or participating in a warning meeting on the ground that such an event is confidential. This particular item, however, is not specifically covered in the complaint. Although even prior to October 1, 1978, employees were required to report to their supervisors all accidents however slight, there was no announced policy imposing discipline for excessive accidents. By contrast, under the newly publicized procedures, employees with excessive accident records could be subjected to discipline and even discharge. e. Suggestions and complaints The complaint alleges that on October 1, 1978, the Company implemented a formal grievance procedure. The policies and procedures publicized at that time in- cluded a category designated employee suggestions and complaints which, according to Personnel Director Cottle, was merely a statement of what already existed. But, as shown by the evidence, what was new about the publicized procedures was the formalization of set chan- nels for complaints as well as suggestions which now were coupled in the same system. Employee testimony indicates lack of uniformity if not confusion respecting the earlier channels available for employee complaints. Thus, B. J. Jenkins and Royce Williams testified credibly that previously complaints could not be pressed beyond the complaining employee's immediate supervisor. Gloria Jacobs, on the other hand, recalled that at one time de- partment heads held gripe sessions with groups of em- ployees and, although that practice had fallen into disuse, she felt free to discuss job problems with anyone in man- agement up to and including the plant manager. The new procedure set the channels for pursuing complaints and suggestions with the caveat, however, that if an employ- ee felt a matter could not be discussed in the normal pro- gression of management, the employee was free to take it up with a higher level of management. Thus, while the newly publicized procedure does not appear to confer greater rights or impose greater obligations than previ- ously, an institutionalization resulted which amounted to a change. f. Employee access to personnel file Previously company practice was to allow employees access to their own personnel files on a limited basis, al- though there apparently was no general announcement 94 J. P. STEVENS & CO. or general knowledge among employees that such a right existed. Under that practice an employee could request from the personnel office and would be allowed to see such specific items in the personnel file as the employee requested. The policies and procedures publicized on De- cember 1, 1978, conferred on employees the right to re- quest and see their entire personnel file. This was a change which enlarged employee rights. g. Seniority In the policies and procedures publicized on December 1, 1978, the Company altered its seniority system by adding restrictions to the established procedures for fill- ing job vacancies. Under this system vacancies were filled by a bidding procedure under which the job went to the bidding employee with the most seniority with the single limitation that an employee could not bid for a va- cancy in the employee's current classification on the same shift. To this limitation the procedures publicized on December 1, 1978, added the limitation that a bidding employee had to have served at least 90 days in the bid- ding employee's current job classification and an employ- ee who had transferred from one classification to an equal or lower job classification could not bid on a va- cancy in the employee's old classification until a year after the transfer from that job. In these specific ways the existing seniority system was changed. h. Funeral pay The policies and procedures publicized on February 1, 1979, included a modification of the existing funeral pay policy. The existing policy limited employee's right to paid leave for attending funerals to funerals of certain listed members of the employee's family. The new policy enlarged this list of relatives to include the funerals of grandparents and grandchildren. i. Reporting pay The new procedures publicized February 1, 1979, also increased the employee benefit known as reporting pay by guaranteeing employees at least 4 hours' pay on occa- sions that they reported for work and were assigned to a job other than their own. This was a change in that the guarantee of such pay was enlarged from 2 hours to 4 hours' pay. 2. Unchanged policies and procedures Although the complaint alleges that all the policies and procedures mentioned therein were changes from the status quo ante, the General Counsel's brief concedes that the wording of certain ones was not substantially changed. These include the rule against working for an- other employer while on leave of absence, the employee suggestions and complaints procedures, the verbal warn- ing policy, the ban against obtaining and conveying con- fidential information (all publicized October 1, 1978), the policy disqualifying employees laid off before September 25 from receiving company Christmas gifts that year (publicized December 1, 1978), and the rules on call-in pay and on reimbursement for educational courses (both publicized on February I, 1979). Prior to October 1, 1978, these rules appeared in the supervisors' handbook. Even though they remained substantially unchanged, the General Counsel contends that this publicizing was in legal effect a change and in derogation of the Respond- ent's obligation to bargain with the Union. Counsel relies on Hedstrom Co., 235 NLRB 1193, 1208 (1978); Wilkin- son Mfg. Co., 187 NLRB 791, 796 (1971); and Southland Paint Co., 157 NLRB 795, 796 (1966), modified 394 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1968).3 With regard to the rule against working on another job while on leave, the General Counsel and the Union contend that prior to October 1, 1978, the rule was gen- erally unknown among the employees. In support of this contention they rely on the testimony of one time em- ployee Gloria Jacobs that in 1976 Plant Manager James Wellons gave her a leave of absence so she could go to the hospital for an operation. Counsel for the General Counsel then asked her this question, "Did he [Wellons] inform you of any restrictions concerning the leave of absence?" She replied as follows, "Well, he just told me, you know, however much time that I be sick, as long as I was under doctor's care, to let him know that I had come back." Counsel then asked her, "Did you ever learn that there were restrictions on employees when there were restrictions on taking leaves of absence?" to which she replied, "No, I didn't, he didn't tell me about it, you know; he just told me." It is not at all certain that Jacobs' testimony relates to the prohibition on working another job during a leave of absence. On the other hand, Personnel Manager Jack Cottle, who was a rank- and-file employee at Wallace before becoming personnel manager, testified credibly that prior to October 1, 1978, a general announcement of the rule had not been made, so far as he knew, and that he did not know whether or not it had been posted. But he said the employees knew of the rule, that he knew of it when he was an hourly employee, and that as personnel director he discussed it probably a dozen times when employees asked for leaves of absences. Considering the totality of the evidence on this rule I find that the General Counsel has failed to carry the burden of his contention that prior to October 1, 1978, the rule was not generally known among the employees. The testimony of Jacobs does not so establish and, even though there is an annual turnover rate of 25 to 30 percent in the approximately 900 employees at Wallace, that evidence alone does not warrant the infer- ence that employees generally were ignorant of the rule. In so finding, I do not hold that no violation of Section 8(a)(5) was involved because, as already noted, the Re- spondent was already obligated to bargain with the Union. Master Slack, supra. The authorities cited by the General Counsel are per- suasive for finding that mere publication without change of preexisting rules circumvents and undermines the Union. I so find even though certain special circum- stances relied on by the Board in those cases do not appear here. In the Hedstrom case there were "obvious and substantial differences" between the old and new rules and the timing of the promulgation of the new rules 3 Enforcement granted as to the 8(aXI) and (3) violations found, but denied on other grounds as to the 8(aX5) violation found. 95 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD indicated they were designed to circumvent and under- mine the union as bargaining agent. A similarly persua- sive element of timing is not present in the fact situation of the present case. In Wilkinson there was a real differ- ence between the old and the new rule. And in South- land the Board keyed its finding to the circumstances therein, specifically the timing of the publication of the rules soon after the union demanded recognition. In Southland the Board stated (157 NLRB at 796): With respect to the alleged failure to bargain con- cerning plant work rules, the Respondent admitted that, on January 27, 1965, it published among its employees such rules without giving prior notice to, or bargaining with, the Union. Respondent contend- ed, however, inter alia, that it merely reduced to writing and, to avoid misunderstanding, published existing rules. Although the record does not estab- lish the prior existence of each of the rules, we find it unnecessary, in the circumstances herein, to seg- regate the old from the new or revised rules and to determine whether the latter, or any of them, con- stituted mandatory subjects for collective bargain- ing. Suffice it to say that the timing of Respondent's writing and publication of the rules, which admit- tedly had not theretofore been reduced to writing, soon after the Union demanded recognition and bar- gaining, coincided with, and became a part of, Re- spondent's overall and continuing conduct aimed at undermining the Union's strength and of retaliating against its employees for selecting the Union. In these circumstances, and in view of its admitted re- fusal to recognize and bargain with the Union since March 24, 1964, we find that Respondent's unilater- al promulgation and publication of plant work rules was in derogation of its obligation to bargain and, therefore, violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. Although the court of appeals denied enforcement of the Board's 8(a)(5) finding for other reasons, the Board's lan- guage is persuasive for the instant case. As in Southland, there is no question here but that mere publication of the policies and procedures was part of "Respondent's over- all and continuing conduct" of not bargaining with the Union. In this sense, and in spite of some factual differ- ences between the present matter and Southland, publi- cation here was a specific manifestation of that refusal to bargain and a further derogation of the Union's repre- sentative status. E. The Discharge of Gloria Jacobs As noted above, one of the work rules included in the policies and procedures publicized October 1, 1978, pro- vided for the discharge of employees accumulating four or more unexcused absences within a 6-month period. It is undisputed that on March 12, 1979, employee Gloria Jacobs was discharged for violating that rule and that she has not since been reinstated. As found elsewhere herein, the publicizing and subsequent implementation of the rule violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. That being so, the discharge of Jacobs and the subsequent fail- ure to reinstate her also violate Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act because they constitute a further extension of the unlawful refusal to bargain and thereby threaten, coerce, and restrain employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7 of the Act. Wellman Industries, 248 NLRB 325, 340 (1980); Boland Marine & Mfg. Co., 225 NLRB 824 (1976); Master Slack, supra. F. Company Defense of the Personnel Policies and Procedures The Respondent defends its publication of the person- nel policies and procedures on grounds of fairness and legal necessity. It points out that in an industrial concern such as Stevens, employing in excess of 40,000 employ- ees, a publicized system of rules and regulations affecting the employees is important to assure evenhanded treat- ment of employees throughout the enterprise system. Under the preexisting system in which no generally pub- licized personnel policies and procedures existed, super- visors enjoyed broad discretion in dealing with employ- ees. Supervisory exercise of this authority precipitated the filing of numerous unfair labor practice charges. The Respondent's corporate director of employee relations, H. E. Greene, testified, ". . . for a long time prior to October 1, 1978 this Company had been inundated with unfair labor practice charges having their genesis in su- pervisory discretion." Some of the Board proceedings which followed these charges led to court decisions criti- cal of the Company's lack of written rules governing em- ployee conduct. In NLRB v. J. P Stevens & Co., 563 F.2d 8, 15-17, 19, 21, and 23-24 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1064 (1978), the court, in holding the Respondent in civil contempt, was pointedly critical of the Respondent's lack of such rules, including the situa- tion at the Wallace plants presently involved, and direct- ed the Company to formulate appropriate written rules for its employees. According to the Respondent's brief in the present matter, the court's order called for a $100,000 fine to the Respondent and up to $5,000 fine to an indi- vidual supervisor, and this precipitated a corporate deci- sion by the Respondent to adopt new policies and proce- dures for its entire system which would eliminate much of the broad discretion of supervisors. The personnel policies and procedures at issue here resulted. Although the record does not indicate precisely when this corporate decision was made, it apparently was be- tween February 21, 1978, when the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Second Circuit case and October 1, 1978, when the publicizing of the personnel policies and procedures began. In its brief the Respondent notes that at the time the corporate decision was made to in- stall these new policies, the Board had not yet issued its decision in the underlying case which is the predicate to the present proceedings (244 NLRB 407) and which issued August 20, 1979. Of course the Respondent was on notice of the possible result in that case because the Administrative Law Judge's decision had issued March 22, 1978, as a result of a complaint issued January 20, 1977, initiated by unfair labor practice charges filed April 14, 1975. According to the Respondent's counsel, the Respondent was faced with a dilemma whether to 96 J. P. STEVENS & CO. treat its Wallace facilities as a union or a nonunion plant. According to the Respondent's brief, "Respondent con- cluded that it had no alternative but to implement the policies at Wallace the same as it did at its other plants." Counsel claims this was a good-faith response to the di- rectives of the Second Circuit and was in line with the Company's longstanding past practice of making benefit changes at all plants at the same time. Counsel for the Union points out in his brief that this is a disingenuous position because the policies and proce- dures were not implemented at the Roanoke Rapids plant where the Respondent recognizes the Union. In fact the Respondent by ignoring the Union at Wallace and implementing the policies and procedures there, treated those plants as nonunion plants which was a con- tinuation of its historical opposition to the Union. It is true the Respondent was faced with a dilemma, but the Respondent's brief misstates it. The real dilemma was not whether it should or should not implement per- sonnel policies and procedures in any particular plant. The dilemma was whether it should or should not recog- nize the Union. Nothing in the Second Circuit's decision referred to above required the Respondent to continue its refusal to recognize the Union at Wallace. The grava- men of the present complaint is not that the Respondent publicized its personnel policies and procedures but rather that it did so unilaterally thereby undercutting fur- ther the Union's position as bargaining representative. The Respondent took the risk that ultimately it would not prevail in the prior proceeding and that the Union would ultimately be held entitled to recognition as repre- sentative of the employees. Now the Respondent has lost this gamble and, as found by the Board, it should have been recognizing the Union at Wallace since February 19, 1975. With respect to the personnel policies and pro- cedures publicized in October and December 1978 and in February 1979, it should also have recognized the Union, notified it respecting the policies and procedures, and bargained with it on request. J. P. Stevens & Co., 186 NLRB 180, supra; Quaker Tool & Die, Inc.. supra. G. The Wage Increase As already noted, the Respondent's duty to recognize and bargain with the Union antedates the events of this case, including the wage increase of July 9, 1979. Section 8(d) of the Act contemplates that bargaining shall in- clude "wages." The Respondent's contention that in effect it fulfilled its bargaining obligations respecting the wage increase is dealt with hereinafter. Apart from that contention, it is undisputed that the Respondent did not bargain with the Union about the wage increase. The main issue here is whether the July 9, 1979 increase was an additional manifestation of the Respondent's ongoing refusal to bargain. I find that it was and that it tended to further undercut the Union's representative status. In this regard the Respondent argues firstly that the wage increase was not a change in the status quo ante which could trigger a duty to bargain. It offered evi- dence that in granting the increase it adhered to its past practice of following the textile industry trend regarding annual wage increases and its own practice of announc- ing such increases system wide. The difficulty with this defense is that the conclusion to be drawn from these facts already has been decided adversely to the Respond- ent with respect to similar increases in 1975 and 1976 in a case involving its Roanoke Rapids plant. J. P. Stevens & Co., 239 NLRB 738, 754-757, 770 (1978), enfd. in per- tinent part 623 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1980). There, on facts similar to those in the present case, the Board found the granting of general wage increases violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. Relying on that precedent I find here that the general wage increase of July 9, 1979, at Wallace violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. Additional circumstances support this finding. As shown by the testimony of the Respondent's witness Greene, its corporate policy does not require that it follow the in- dustry lead in wage increases, it being free to follow the industry or not as it sees fit. Nor, when other employers in the industry grant a raise, is the Respondent bound by the amounts of its competitors' increases. According to Greene, although it is of importance to follow the indus- try trend in wages, the Respondent's decisions in this regard are also affected by what "the economy of our particular company will permit." It is also clear from the record that there is no certainty that an increase by the Respondent in any particular year will match what it gave in prior years. And, as shown by the fact that in the past the Respondent has granted increases at differ- ent times of the year, there is no certainty that increases will be given at the same time each year. Thus, in spite of the industry wage pattern, the Respondent's increases are not "purely automatic and pursuant to definite guide- lines" as indicated by the court's rationale in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 601 F.2d 870, 875 (5th Cir. 1979). The present situation is similar to that in Mosher Steel Co., 220 NLRB 336 (1975), enfd. 532 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1976), where the Board found that a pay increase violat- ed Section 8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act. In Mosher, the Board (at 338) found that the "yearly general increase was neither 'guaranteed' nor fixed either in terms of amount or in timing but rather depended on a vote of the board of directors and of the Company's overall eco- nomic posture. Consistent with a finding that the grant of a general wage increase involved the exercise of a large measure of business judgment and discretion is the record evidence that over the past several years general increases have been granted in months other than June or July, having been granted twice in a single year, and having varied in amount." In its brief the Respondent contends that it is not obli- gated to bargain respecting the wage increase at Wallace because through laches and waiver the Union has lost the right to bargain on that subject. The Respondent bases its argument on the undisputed facts that in its on going negotiations with the Union for employees at its Roanoke Rapids plants it kept the Union advised of what it was doing in its nonunion plants (which included the Wallace facilities) respecting a general wage increase pursuant to the industry trend in the spring and summer of 1979. In keeping the Union informed the Respondent was following the order of the Board on December 12, 1978 (239 NLRB 738, 739), respecting the bargaining at Roanoke Rapids to 97 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (c) Give prompt notice to the Union of Respond- ent's decision to announce or institute system wide changes in employee benefits; produce upon request all information relevant thereto for purposes of col- lective bargaining, prior to announcement or imple- mentation of such changes in benefits on a company wide basis; and afford the Union an opportunity ef- fectively to negotiate regarding similar or identical contemplated changes in such employee benefits for the bargaining unit at the Roanoke Rapids plant. Evidence in the present record indicates the Company provided the Union with such information at negotiating sessions in Roanoke Rapids on March 16, April 18, and May 8, 1979, in letters to the Union on May 30 and 31, 1979, and at negotiating sessions on June 5, 6, and 7, 1979. It is apparent from these communications, as it is from the Board's order quoted in part above, that the furnishing of this information was for use in the negotia- tions at Roanoke Rapids with respect to the terms and conditions of those employees only. There is no basis for inferring, nor does the Respondent contend, that at any time it recognized and bargained with the Union respect- ing employees at the Wallace facilities. On the contrary, the Respondent has consistently refused to bargain with the Union respecting those employees even though the Union has had an outstanding and continuing demand to bargain on their behalf. There was nothing in the cir- cumstances under which the information was supplied to the Roanoke Rapids negotiations to suggest that the Company was retreating from this position or in any way recognizing the Union beyond Roanoke Rapids. The standoff between the Union and the Company in which the one maintained a continuing demand for bar- gaining and the other maintained its adamant refusal to bargain remained unimpaired. Nothing had occurred which required the Union to reiterate its demand. On June 15, the Respondent announced the general systemwide increase in wages would take place on July 9. On July 14 the Union requested the Respondent to bargain about the increase at Wallace in a telegram read- ing as follows: Re: Wallace Plant, Wallace, N.C. As the majority representative of your employees in the above named plant we request that you meet and bargain with us regarding the 1979 Annual General Wage Increase. The Respondent contends this demand was untimely be- cause it came after the Company's decision to grant the general wage increase and because the Union had been kept informed by the Company as the decision devel- oped. According to the Respondent, the Union had a duty to "timely request bargaining on the subject" and, according to the Respondent, did not do so. The Re- spondent relies on the Board's decision in Citizens Na- tional Bank of Willmar, 245 NLRB 389, 389-390 (1979), where the Board said, It is well established that it is incumbent upon a union which has notice of an employer's proposed change in terms and conditions of employment to timely request bargaining in order to preserve its right to bargain on that subject. The union cannot be content with merely protesting the action or filing an unfair labor practice over the matter. .... We therefore conclude that, having failed to exercise its right to demand bargaining over the issue, the Union may not now effectively claim that Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain... [Footnote omitted.] Willmar, however, is not persuasive precedent for the proposition for which the Respondent cites the case be- cause there the employer and the union were engaged in bargaining at the time the employer took unilateral action about which the union was fully informed and the union made no real effort to bring the matter into the bargaining. The Board found that the uaion there "did not have any discussion with Respondent concerning such change, did not request that Respondent rescind the change, and did not request that Respondent bargain with the Charging Party (the Union) concerning this matter." The circumstances in the present case are alto- gether different because the Respondent consistently re- jected any bargaining relationship with the Union re- specting Wallace employees and nothing in its conduct could reasonably be construed as alerting the Union to a change whereby the Respondent would participate in such bargaining. I find that the Union's June 19 request to bargain about the wage increase at Wallace was a timely request, albeit unnecessary in view of its existing continuing request to bargain. By making such additional request, the Union did not waive or wipe out the validity of its prior request. The Respondent also argues in effect that the Union waived its right to bargain over the wage increase at Wallace because knowing of the intended increase in the nonunion plants of the Respondent, "it used that knowl- edge for propaganda purposes," and in a union publica- tion claimed credit for the increase in the nonunion plants. This contention is without merit because the evi- dence does not establish a waiver. The July 1979 issue of The Stevens Worker, a union publication, contained a news story to the effect that in the bargaining at Roa- noke Rapids the Company's offer of a 7-1/2-percent wage increase was not accepted by the union negotiating committee, with the result that the Company increased its offer to 8-1/2 percent. The story went on to say that, "The Company announced that Stevens workers in other mills would also benefit from the increased offer made to the ACTWU committee in Roanoke Rapids." The Re- spondent contends that by this story the Union claimed credit for the increase in the nonunion plants and there- fore the Union is not entitled to bargain about that matter. But for the Union to claim that its bargaining in Roanoke Rapids had some impact in other plants is nei- ther a waiver of its right to bargain at other locations and in other bargaining units nor an assertion that it in fact has bargained for those other units on the matter. The evidence here shows beyond doubt that there in fact was no bargaining respecting the Wallace plants, neither the Company nor the Union understood it was bargain- ing with respect to Wallace, and neither the Company 9B J. P. STEVENS & CO. nor the Union understood that the other was waiving its historical position respecting representation and bargain- ing at Wallace. Ill. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The unfair labor practices of the Respondent set forth in section II, above, occurring in connection with the op- erations described in section I, above, have a close and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor dis- putes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW i. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The following employees constitute a unit appropri- ate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All production and maintenance employees em- ployed at Respondent's Carter Plant, Holly Plant and warehouses at Wallace, North Carolina, includ- ing plant clerical employees, watchmen, computer programmer in the dye house, electrical technician, and plant driver; excluding office clerical employ- ees, professional employees, cloth store clerk, mana- gerial employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. On or about February 19, 1975, a majority of the employees of the Respondent in the unit described above designated and selected the Union as their representative for the purposes of collective bargaining with the Re- spondent. 5. At all times since February 19, 1975, and continuing to date, the Union has been the representative for the purposes of collective bargaining of the employees in the unit described above, and by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, has been, and is now, the exclusive representative of the employees in said unit for the purposes of collective bargaining with respect to wages, hours and working conditions, and other terms and conditions of employ- ment. 6. Commencing on or about February 19, 1975, and continuing to date, the Union has requested, and is re- questing, the Respondent to bargain collectively with re- spect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment as the exclu- sive bargaining representative of all employees of the Re- spondent in the unit described above. 7. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally implementing personnel policies and procedures for employees in the above unit on Octo- ber 1 and December 1, 1978, and February 1, 1979, with- out prior notification to or consultation with the Union. 8. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by unilaterally granting a general wage increase to employees in the above unit on July 9, 1979, without consultation with the Union about the increase and while continuing its general refusal to recognize or bargain with the Union as the representative of employees in that unit. 9. The unfair labor practices found above affect com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, I recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act. Inasmuch as the unfair labor practices found herein are a continuation of the Re- spondent's established policy respecting employee rights protected by the Act, a broad cease-and-desist order pre- cluding the Respondent from "in any other manner" interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization is warrant- ed. As to affirmative action, the Respondent should, on re- quest, bargain with the Union about terms and conditions of employment at Wallace and specifically about the per- sonnel policies and procedures and the wage increase in- volved in this case. The General Counsel urges addition- ally that the personnel policies and procedures be re- scinded, but makes no similar request respecting the wage increase. The Union asks that those personnel poli- cies and procedures which benefit employees be left in place and only those which do not benefit employees be rescinded, and further asks that the wage increase be left untouched. The Board traditionally orders that unlawful unilateral actions by an employer be rescinded, except for those which benefit employees, and further orders bargaining with the Union. In the present matter, bar- gaining appears to be the best available vehicle for achieving the remedial goal. The main thrust of the com- plaint is aimed at the unilateral manner in which the Re- spondent acted rather than at the substance of the actions taken. None of the parties wants the wage increase upset because all agree it is an employee benefit. Many of the personnel policies and procedures also are arguably bene- ficial in some way to employees. This record, however, does not adequately demonstrate the beneficial or non- beneficial attributes of these numerous rules and to leave such determination to the compliance stage of this pro- ceeding might delay resolution of a subject uniquely suit- able for bargaining. In the particular circumstances of this case, including the impact of the Second Circuit's contempt decision on the publication of personnel poli- cies and procedures, it seems preferable to use that vehi- cle. For these reasons I do not recommend that the Re- spondent be ordered to rescind the personnel policies and procedures or the wage increase. Even though, as the Respondent argues, it may have in part implemented and publicized them in response to the directions of the Second Circuit, it is clear the court did not intend that the Respondent do so in violation of its bargaining obli- gations. Therefore, bargaining respecting those policies 99 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD and procedures should not be barred by the court's man- date. As to Gloria Jacobs, I recommend that she be offered immediate and full reinstatement to her former position or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other benefits and privileges, and that she be made whole for any loss of earnings incurred as a result of being dis- charged on March 12, 1979, with backpay to be comput- ed as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and with interest as set forth in Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962), and Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977). I further recommend that the Re- spondent be required to preserve and make available to Board agents, on request, all pertinent records and data necessary in analyzing and determining whatever back- pay may be due. I also recommend that the Respondent be ordered to expunge from the personnel files of all Wallace employees, including Jacobs, all adverse entries made pursuant to the personnel policies and procedures involved herein. The Union asks that all disciplinary ac- tions taken in enforcement of the personnel policies and procedures involved be ordered revoked and the em- ployees involved be made whole. This relief is not rec- ommended. It seems substantially beyond the scope of the complaint. Other than Jacobs, no employee so ad- versely affected was named in the complaint. The Gener- al Counsel does not seek such relief. Moreover, such questions are susceptible to resolution in bargaining. Further, since this case is in significant measure a con- tinuation of the prior proceeding, J. P. Stevens & Co., 244 NLRB 407 (1979), enfd. 668 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1982), the Respondent should, for the reasons set forth by the Board and the court in that matter and also because the Respondent's policy toward the Union is systemwide, take in the present matter the additional affirmative ac- tions found appropriate there. These include reimburse- ment to the Union for reasonable and necessary organi- zational expenses, 4 reimbursement to the Board and the Union for reasonable costs and expenses in the present litigation, the posting of an appropriate notice with a copy mailed to each employee in all plants and given to each supervisor at Wallace, the reading of the notice at all plants, union access to bulletin boards at all plants, equal time for union representatives to address employ- ees, access to plants where Board elections are scheduled for union representatives to address employees, periodi- cally furnishing the Union with current lists of employee names, addresses and classifications at each plant, union access to plant nonwork areas, and notice to the Board's Regional Director respecting compliance. The Union seeks other additional remedies, including the ordered extension of bargaining at Wallace for 2 years and the establishment of interim grievance and ar- bitration procedures there during bargaining. The Union argues that its past bargaining experience with the Re- spondent at Roanoke Rapids and Statesboro, where the Respondent engaged in unlawful bargaining, demon- strates that bargaining at Wallace will consume more than a year and additional time should be ordered. I con- clude, however, that, as a matter of policy, it would be imprudent to announce in advance a time measure for bargaining or at this juncture to anticipate that the Wal- lace bargaining necessarily will be attenuated. As to the requested order for grievance and arbitration procedures, the mechanism suggested would require an order codify- ing the sum of the Union's collective-bargaining rights, a technique which risks inadvertent and troublesome omis- sions. Further, the remedy sought would necessarily in- volve the Board in an unwarranted intervention in the bargaining process and is rejected on that ground as well. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970). For these reasons I do not recommend these additional reme- dies sought by the Union. [Recommended Order omitted from publication.] 4 With interest as prescribed in Florida Steel Corporation, supra. 100