Washington Street Foundry

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Washington Street Brass & Iron Foundry, Inc. and Eastern Pennsylvania Industrial Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters. Case 4-CA- 13158 2 December 1983 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS HUNTER AND DENNIS On 24 May 1983 Administrative Law Judge Ste- phen J. Gross issued the attached decision. There- after, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed cross-excep- tions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions, cross-exceptions, and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rul- ings,' findings, 2 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Washington Street Brass & Iron Foundry, Lebanon, Pennsylva- nia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. We deny Respondent's motion to remand this proceeding to the judge and to reopen the record to receive allegedly suppressed evidence. We find that the proffered evidence, even if accepted, would not affect the result. See, e.g., Ray Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); Williams Energy Co., 218 NLRB 1080 (1975). We note additionally that, to the extent that Respondent's exceptions assert the existence of facts that are not a part of the formal record, we are unable to consider such evidence absent a showing that such facts were newly discovered or not previous- ly available, See Sec. 102.48(b) and (d)(l) of the Board's Rules and Regu- lations. That showing has not been made here. 2 The judge failed sufficiently to set out findings of fact concerning jurisdiction and labor organization status. The complaint alleges, and the answer admits, that, at all times material herein, Respondent has been a Pennsylvania corporation engaged in the manufacture of sand castings and manhole frames and covers at its Lebanon, Pennsylvania plant. During the past year Respondent, in the course and conduct of its busi- ness operations, sold goods and products valued in excess of $50,000 to York Concrete Septic Tank Co. of York, Pennsylvania. which in turn an- nually sells and ships goods and products valued in excess of $50,000 di- rectly to points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The answer admits, and we find, that Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, The complaint further alleges, Respond- ent admits, and we find that the Union is now, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Sec. 2(5) of the Act. In agreeing with the judge's conclusion that Respondent violated Sec. 8(aX5) and (I) of the Act, we find it unnecessary to rely on fn. 14 of the judge's decision, in which he stated that he would have found an 8(a)(5) violation even if Respondent's agent, Ferko, had called and left the mes- sage for union attorney Weinstock. 268 NLRB No. 40 DECISION STEPHEN J. GROSS, Administrative Law Judge: Gener- al Counsel claims that Respondent Washington Street Brass & Iron Foundry has violated the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (the Act), in two ways: (I) by assisting an employee in his attempt to decertify the Union that represented Respondent's employees-the Eastern Pennsylvania Industrial Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters (the Union); and (2) by refus- ing to recognize and to bargain with the Union. For the reasons discussed below I have concluded that Respondent failed to meet its obligation to bargain in good faith with the Union, but that Respondent has not otherwise been shown to have violated the Act. Respondent's Assistance in Its Employees' Decertification Effort Respondent's sole facility is in Lebanon, Pennsylvania. At the times pertinent to this proceeding Respondent had about 16 employees. Joe Wunderlich owns and manages the operation. The Board conducted an election among Respondent's employees in October 1981. A majority of the employees voted for the Union and, on July 6, 1982, the Board cer- tified the Union as the employees' exclusive bargaining agent. About a week later one of Respondent's employ- ees, Frank C. Wike, Jr., began an effort to decertify the Union. Wike's first task was to draft the language of a petition. To accomplish that he sought the aid of several persons, one of whom was Joseph G. Ferko, Jr. Ferko, a consultant, had been retained by Respondent in its losing effort to block the Union's organizing efforts. After the election Ferko represented Respondent in its dealings with the Union. Respondent does not dispute that Ferko is its agent. Wike presented Ferko with a draft petition and asked for advice about it. Ferko, after commenting that "it was a little bit early" to be able to get rid of the Union, rec- ommended two changes: First, to change "we the em- ployees" to "we, the undersigned"; and second, to in- clude the Union's full name in the petition (which name Ferko provided to Wike).2 Wike thereafter obtained the signatures of 10 (a major- ity) of Respondent's employees. Joe Wunderlich (Re- spondent's owner) was aware of the nature of the peti- tion and knew that it was being passed around. But there is nothing in the record to indicate that he said anything I General Counsel's contentions are embodied in a complaint dated October 18, 1982, and in an amendment to the complaint made orally at the hearing. The complaint stemmed from an unfair labor practice charge filed by the Union on August 20, 1982. Respondent, in an answer dated October 25, 1982, and in an amendment to the answer made orally admit- ted the complaint's jurisdictional allegations but denied any wrongdoing. The case went to hearing on March 9, 1983. 2 The heading to the petition, in its final form, read as follows: WE, THE UNDERSIGNED, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT WE DO NOT WANT THE EASTERN PENNA. INDUSTRIAL COUNCIL, UNITED BROTH- ERHOOD OF CARPENTERS OF ASHLAND, PENNA. TO ACT AS OUR BAR- GAINING REPRESENTATIVE AT WASHINGTON STREET BRASS AND IRON FOUNDRY, INC., AT LEBANON, PENN. WE ASK THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TO ACCEPT OUR REQUEST AND THE UNION TO WITHDRAW ITS REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATION. 338 WASHINGTON STREET FOUNDRY to any of the employees about it or otherwise tried to in- fluence the employees in respect to the petition. Wike obtained the signatures on or about July 14 and determined to travel to Philadelphia to file the petition with the Board. Wike had heard that Ferko was driving to the Board's Regional Office in Philadelphia (in con- nection with a proceeding involving another of Ferko's clients) and, because Wike's own vehicle was broken, asked Ferko for a ride. Ferko agreed. In the course of that conversation Wike offered Ferko a copy of the peti- tion. Ferko accepted it. Wike, after reporting in to work on July 15, did ride with Ferko to Philadelphia that day and did file the peti- tion. (The Regional Director subsequently dismissed the petition, pointing out that "it is well settled that the Board will not entertain a petition within I year follow- ing cetification of a bargaining representative.") The round trip took 6 hours (8:30 a.m. to 2:30 or 3 p.m.). Wike did not clock out for a period he was away. Prior to leaving for Philadelphia Wike had told Wun- derlich that he wanted to leave work for the purpose of filing a decertification petition, and Wunderlich had given Wike permission to do so.3 But Wunderlich re- quired Wike to work at straight time on Saturday, July 17, to make up for his absence on July 15. And that pro- cedure-permitting an employee to take time off for a day or part of a day during the week but requiring makeup time on the following Saturday-is a routine one at Respondent's plant. 4 The Decertification Effort-Conclusion The Board has utilized various tests to determine whether actions by employers that are related to employ- ee decertification efforts violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. These tests include: whether the employer provided "more than mere ministerial aid" in the efforts to oust the union (Consolidated Rebuilders, 171 NLRB 1415, 1417 (1968). Accord: Times-Herald, 153 NLRB 524 (1980); Cummins Component Plant, 259 NLRB 456, 461 (1981)); did the employer "provide the machinery for disaffiliation" (Continental Desk Co., 104 NLRB 912, 920 (1953)); did the employer "lend more than minimal sup- port and approval to the securing of signatures and the filing of the [decertification] petition" Placke Toyota, 215 NLRB 395 (1974)); and did the employer "involve him- self in furthering employee efforts directed toward" re- moving the union as bargaining representative (id). But the ultimate question is whether the particular em- ployer activity at issue had "the tendency . . . to inter- fere with the free exercise of the rights guaranteed to employees under the Act," 5 taking into account the set- 3 That finding is based on Wunderlich's testimony. Wike testified that he tried to "sneak" away on July 15 without telling Wunderlich. I credit Wunderlich's account over Wike's. 4 The Saturday entries on Wike's timecard are handwritten, rather than the markings of Respondent's clocking device. That necessarily raises the question of whether Wike and Wunderlich lied about Wike put- ting in any Saturday makeup time for the hours Wike spent filing the pe- tition on July 15. But Wike's and Wunderlich's testimony is uncontradict- ed. And penciled entries on the timecards of Respondent's employees are not uncommon. 5 Red Rock Ca, 84 NLRB 521, 525 (1949), enfd. as modified 187 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 341 U.S. 950 (1951); KONO-TV-Mission ting in which that activity occurred.6 As I add up the facts here, they do not represent interference by Re- spondent with the free exercise by its employees of their rights. There has been no showing that Respondent instigated the decertification effort. The only part Respondent played in drafting the petition was to provide some in- consequential phrases upon the specific request of an em- ployee.7 Employees then circulated and signed the peti- tion without further manifestation of Respondent's ap- proval. (Wunderlich's mere knowledge that the petition was circulating is beside the point: Hamburg Shirt Corp., 175 NLRB 284, 294 (1969). After the petition had been signed, Respondent gave Wike permission to take the day off (subject to Saturday makeup time) to file it, and Respondent's agent Ferko accepted a copy of the peti- tion offered to him by Wike and gave Wike a ride to the Board's Regional Office. But those acts plainly had no impact on the employees' willingness to sign the petition (since the acts occurred after the employees signed it). Moreover Respondent, in giving Wike the day off, treat- ed Wike in the same manner Respondent would have treated him had he asked for the day off for any other personal reason. Finally, even assuming that Respondent would have violated the Act had it incurred any addi- tional expenses to transport Wike to the Board's office, s in this case Ferko was going there anyway. 9 In sum, Respondent's actions related to Wike's petition did not reasonably tend to coerce, restrain, or interfere with the Section 7 rights of any employee. Respondent's Refusal to Bargain On July 6, 1982, the Board certified the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of Respondent's em- ployees. Twenty days later Ira Weinstock, the Union's attorney, wrote to Ferko asking for "your available dates to begin negotiations." 0 On July 29--about the time Respondent received the letter"--Weinstock and Ferko met on a matter involv- ing another company. In the course of that meeting Weinstock noted that he had sent a letter to Ferko asking for dates for negotiation. Ferko indicated that he Telecasting Corp., 163 NLRB 1005, 1006 (1967) (did "the preparation, cir- culation and signing of the petition [constitute] the free and uncoerced act of the employees concerned"). Red Rock, supra; Holly Manor Nursing Home, 235 NLRB 426-429 (1978). 7 See WTVC, 126 NLRB 1054, 1057 (1960). · See Dayton Blueprint Co., 193 NLRB 1100, 1107 (1971); Cummins Component Plant, supra. a See Hazen & Jaeger Funeral Home, 95 NLRB 1034 (1951); Consolidat- ed Rebuilders, supra. 10 An official of the Union testified that he had orally requested bar- gaining several days earlier-on July 20. But I credit the testimony of Ferko and Wunerlich that the last communication between the official and Respondent occurred in May (several months prior to the Board's certification of the Union). " Respondent claims that it did not learn of the contents ofr the July 26 letter until about August 10 because the letter was addressed to Ferko at Respondent's plant rather than at Ferko's office. I do not credit that claim. In any event, the exact date on which Respondent became aware of the contents of the Union's letter is irrelevant. 339 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD had not received the letter but "would get back to" Weinstock about it.12 Respondent did not reply to Weinstock's letter, and on August 20 the Union filed an unfair labor practice charge alleging that Respondent had "refused to bargain collec- tively." The Board's Philadelphia Regional Office sent a copy of the charge to Respondent on August 24. A few days later Ferko sent the following letter to Weinstock: Please be advised that I have received on or about July 16, 1982, from Mr. Frank Wike, employee of Washington Street Brass & Iron Foundry, Inc., a statement signed by ten (10) employees of the Com- pany, that the Employees, "do not want the Eastern Pennsylvania Industrial Council, United Brother- hood of Carpenters of Ashland, Pa. to act as their Bargaining Representative," at the Foundry. It is my understanding that the employees have taken this matter to the National Labor Relations Board, Region 4, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The letter's content is perplexing in view of the fact that the Regional Director for the Board's Region 4 had dismissed Wike's petition on August 5. But based on the record as a whole, the only conclusion I can draw about the purpose of the letter is that: (1) Respondent wanted to communicate its view that, notwithstanding the dis- missal of the petition, since a majority of its employees had indicated their opposition to the Union, Respondent did not have to bargain with the Union and, indeed, should not do so; and (2) the letter was intended to re- spond to both the Union's July 26 letter and the August 20 unfair labor practice charge. On August 30 Ferko called Weinstock's office and spoke to Weinstock's secretary. Weinstock was out. Ferko testified that he told the secretary to have Wein- stock call Ferko "for the purposes of. . . collective bar- gaining with Washington Street Brass & Iron Foundry." Weinstock testified credibly that he received no message of any call from Ferko. Given Respondent's August 27 letter and the fact that Weinstock received no message about a telephone call from Ferko, I do not credit Ferko's testimony about referring in the course of the call to collective bargaining between Respondent and the Union. The August 30 telephone call was the last communica- tion between Respondent and the Union that anyone claims related to collective bargaining. Refusal To Bargain-Conclusion An employer has the duty under Section 8(d) "to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith" with its employees' union. That includes responding in a reason- ably timely fashion to requests by the union for the es- tablishment of dates on which bargaining is to take place. E.g., Hassett Maintenance Corp., 260 NLRB 121 (1982). Respondent never did offer to meet, even after the is Respondent states on brief (at p. 5) that at that July 29 meeting Ferko responded to Weinstock by saying that he "could see sitting down at the bargaining table no earlier than September 1982, and would con- tact [Respondent] as to exact dates and times." But evidentiary record contains no indication that Ferko ever in fact made such a remark. Union emphasized its intention to bargain by filing an unfair labor practice charge.' 3 That constitutes a viola- tion by Respondent of Section 8(aX5) of the Act.' 4 Respondent's unwillingness to bargain was founded at least in part on its awareness that a majority of its em- ployees had come to oppose representation by the Union. But absent certain limited kinds of circumstances not here present,' s "a union's continued majority status is conclusively presumated to exist for I year following certification." Holly Farms Poultry Industries, 189 NLRB 663, 664-665 (1971), enfd. 460 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1972).s1 Thus "an employer may not justify a refusal to bargain within the certification year . . . on the ground that its employees no longer desire representation." Lee Office Equipment, 226 NLRB 826, 831 (1976), enfd. 572 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1978). Accord: Airport Shuttle-Cincinnati v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 220 (6th Cir. 1983), enfg. 257 NLRB 954 (1981). THE REMEDY Since Respondent refused to bargain collectively, the recommended Order requires Respondent to cease and desist from doing so and to bargain collectively with the Union. In the usual case in which an employer fails to bargain within a certification year, the Board orders that the ini- tial period of certification be construed as beginning on', the date that the employer begins bargaining in good faith. In the leading case on the subject, Mar-Jac Poultry Co.,17 the Board imposed that remedy on the ground that- Is The filing of the charge amounted to "a renewal of the request to bargain." Dardanell Enterprises, 250 NLRB 377, 379 (1980). 14 E.g., A. L French Ca, 145 NLRB 627 (1963), enfd. 342 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1965); Elmira Machine Works, 138 NLRB 1393, 1401-02 (1962); Hassett Maintenance Corp., supra. I would reach the same conclusion even if I thought that Ferko actually had told Weinstock's secretary, on August 30, that Weinstock's should call Ferko about collective bargain- ing. Had Respondent in fact been acting consonant with a good-faith willingness to bargain, when Weinstock failed to return the call Respond- ent would have taken further steps to ensure that the Union was aware of its willingness to bargain. 1' For a listing of such "unusual circumstances" see Brooks v. NLRB, 248 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1954). 's Justice Frankfurther summed up the bases for this presumption this way (in Brooks, supra, 348 U.S. at 99-100): (a) In the political and business spheres, the choice of the voters in an election binds them for a fixed time. This promotes a sense of re- sponsibility in the electorate and needed coherence in administration. These considerations are equally relevant to healthy labor relations. (b) Since an election is a solemn and costly occasion, conducted under safeguards to voluntary choice, revocation of authority should occur by a procedure no less solemn than that of the initial designa- tion. A petition or a public meeting-in which those voting for and against unionism are disclosed to management, and in which the in- fluences of mass psychology are present-is not comparable to the privacy and independence of the voting booth. (c) A union should be given ample time for carrying out its man- date on behalf of its members, and should not be under exigent pres- sure to produce hothouse results or be turned out. (d) It is scarcely conducive to bargaining in good faith for an em- ployer to know that, if he dillydallies or subtly undermines, union strength may erode and thereby relieve him of his statutory duties at any time, while if he works conscientiously toward agreement, the rank and file may, at the last moment, repudiate their agent. (e) In situations, not wholly rare, where unions are competing, raiding and strife will be minimized if elections are not at the hazard informal and short-term recall. 7' 136 NLRB 785, 787 (1962). 340 WASHINGTON STREET FOUNDRY * . . the employer . . . has, largely through its re- fusal to bargain, taken from the Union a substantial part of the period when Unions are generally at their greatest strenght-the I-year period immedi- ately following the certification. Thus to permit the Employer now to obtain an election would be to allow it to take advantage of its own failure to carry out its statutory obligation, contrary to the very reasons for the establishment of the rule that a certification requires bargaining for at least I year. More recently the Board has based its extension of the certification year on the need "to insure that the employ- ees in the approprate unit will be accorded the services of their selected bargaining agent for the period provided by law." E.g., Carter-Glogau Laboratories, 265 NLRB 116 (1982). But here the Union lost majority support among its employees at the start of "period when Unions are gen- erally at their greatest strength" (Mar-Jac Poultry, supra). And Wike's petition made it clear that, as of the time when the Board certified the Union, the bargaining unit members did not want to "be accorded the services of their selected bargaining agent" (Carter-Glogau, supra). These latter considerations point toward not requiring extension of the certification year. Yet elimination of that extension simply because employees have indicated their disenchantment with the union they recently chose would substantially undercut the effectiveness of the pre- sumption of a union's majority support during the certifi- cation year. The Board has resolved these conflicting consider- ations by focusing on whether the union has conducted itself improperly, and, if it has, on the extent to which it has done so. Thus where a majority of the members of a bargaining unit withdrew their support from their certi- fied representative and where, in addition, that represent- ative "engaged in serious misconduct directed toward those employees by inducing them to engage in acts of vandalism against Respondent and by threatening one of those employees," the certification year was not ex- tended for a specific period of time: Lee Office Equip- ment, 226 NLRB at 835. Absent union misconduct of that magnitude, however, the certification year has been extended as usual, notwithstanding the bargaining unit members' renunciation of the union. Lexington Cartage Co., 259 NLRB 55, 58 (1981); see also Airport Shuttle- Cincinnati, supra, 257 NLRB at 957; Cellar Restaurant, 262 NLRB 796 (1982); Williams Energy Co., 218 NLRB 1080 (1975). Since no one contends that the Union here engaged in active misconduct of the kind or magnitude at issue in Lee Office Equipment, the initial period of cer- tification shall be deemed to begin on the date Respond- ent begins bargaining in good faith with the Union as the recognized bargaining representative of Respondent's production and maintenance employees. The Union urges that the Board impose "the addition- al remedy of an award of excess organizational costs and litigating expenses incurred both by the charging party and the General Counsel in the litigation of this proceed- ing."'8 The Union's request is denied: Carbonex-Coal iS Union's br. at p. I. Co., 262 NLRB 1306 (1982); Standard Homes, 249 NLRB 1085 (1980); Eastern Maine Medical Center, 253 NLRB 224 (1980), enfd. 658 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1981). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent Washington Street Brass & Iron Found- ry is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2) and (6) of the Act. 2. The Eastern Pennsylvania Industrial Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters (the Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees, includ- ing truck drivers, employed by Respondent at its Leba- non, Pennsylvania, facility, excluding officer clericals, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act (hereafter bargaining unit employees), constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. Since July 6, 1982, the Union has been and contin- ues to be the certified and exclusive representative of all bargaining unit employees for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing to bargain collectively with the Union, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. 6. By that refusal to bargain Respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act and thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. Respondent has not been shown to have otherwise violated the Act. 8. The unfair labor practices referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6, above, affect commerce within the meaning of Section 10(a) of the Act. ORDER '9 The Respondent Washington Street Brass & Iron Foundry, Lebanon, Pennsylvania, and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em- ployment with the Eastern Pennsylvania Industrial Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the following unit: All production and maintenance employees, includ- ing truck drivers, employed by Respondent at its Lebanon, Pennsylvania, facility, excluding office 19 This recommended Order is being issued pursuant to Sec. 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act. Unless exceptions meeting the require- ments of Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules are filed, the findings, conclu- sions, and recommendations contained in the foregoing Decision and this recommended Order shall become that Decision and Order of the Board. In that event all objections and exceptions to the recommended Order and foregoing Decision shall be deemed waived for all purpose: See Sec. 102.48 the Board's Rules. 341 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD clericals, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec- essary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Recognize and, upon request, bargain in good faith with the above-named labor organization as the exclusive representative of all employees in the above-described unit. (b) Post at its Lebanon, Pennsylvania facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."2 0 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by Respondent's authorized representative shall be posted by Respondent immediate- ly upon receipt and maintained tor 60 days in conspicu- ous places including all places where notices to employ- ees are customarily posted. Respondent shall take reason- able steps to ensure that the notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 4, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dis- missed in all other respects. so If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation. al Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively concern- ing rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and con- ditions of employment with the Eastern Pennsylvania In- dustrial Council of the United Brotherhood of Carpen- ters, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit described below. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the above-named Union, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described below, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. The bargaining unit is: All production and maintenance employees, includ- ing truck drivers, employed by this company at its Lebanon, Pennsylvania, facility, excluding office clericals, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WASHINGTON STREET BRASS & IRON FOUNDRY 342