Marsh Furiture Co., Inc.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Marsh Furniture Company, Inc. and Upholsterers' International Union, AFL-CIO. Cases I1-CA- 6410 and I l-CA-6389 June 28, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND MURPHY On February 9, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Peter E. Donnelly issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed an answering brief and cross- exceptions and a brief in support thereof. Pursuant to the provisions of the Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find- ings,1 and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order,2 as modified herein. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified below and hereby orders that the Respon- dent, Marsh Furniture Company, Inc., High Point, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: i. Insert the following as paragraphs 1(d) and (e) and reletter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly: "(d) Threatening employees to close the plant if unionization occurred. "(e) Illegally interrogating employees concerning union matters." 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge on the basis that he did not rely on the demeanor of the witnesses. We find the General Counsel's exceptions without merit since the Administrative Law Judge specifically stated that, in evaluating the testimony of each witness, demeanor was a consideration (fn. 2 of his Decision). The Respondent has also excepted to certain of the Administrative Law Judge's credibility resolutions. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 230 NLRB No. 86 2 The Administrative Law Judge made findings which were inadvertently omitted from his recommended Order and notice and we shall modify his recommended Order accordingly. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT create impressions of surveillance or interrogate employees in order to discourage membership in Upholsterers' International Union, AFL-CIO. WE WILL NOT solicit employees to report on the union activities of other employees on behalf of Upholsterers' International Union, AFL-CIO. WE WILL NOT solicit employees to repudiate Upholsterers' International Union, AFL-CIO. WE WILL NOT threaten employees to close the plant if the plant is unionized. WE WILL NOT illegally interrogate employees concerning union matters. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. MARSH FURNITURE COMPANY, INC. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE PETER E. DONNELLY, Administrative Law Judge: The original charge in Case 11-CA-6410 was filed by the Upholsterers' International Union, AFL-CIO, herein called Union or Charging Party, on January 19, 1976, and amended on February 17, 1976. A complaint thereon was issued on February 27, 1976. The charge in Case I 11-CA- 6389 was filed by the Union on December 31, 1975. The amended consolidated complaint herein, was issued on May 19, 1976, alleging that Marsh Furniture Company, Inc., herein called Respondent or Employer, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging Charles Bullard, Jr., and by engaging in certain other misconduct as detailed herein. Answers were timely filed by Respon- dent. Pursuant to notice, the hearing was held before me at High Point, North Carolina, on August 23, 24, and September 10, 1976. Briefs have been timely filed by the General Counsel and Respondent which have been duly considered. 580 MARSH FURNITURE COMPANY FINDINGS OF FACT 1. EMPLOYER'S BUSINESS Employer is a North Carolina corporation with a plant at High Point, North Carolina, where it is engaged in the manufacture of kitchen and bathroom furniture. During the past 12 months, Employer purchased materials valued in excess of $50,000 from points directly outside the State of North Carolina and during the same period, Employer shipped from its plants to points directly outside the State of North Carolina, products valued in excess of $50,000. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the Employer is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 1. LABOR ORGANIZATION The complaint alleges that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. The answer admits this allegation and I so find. III. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The complaint alleges that on or about December 19, 1975, Respondent discharged Bullard in violation of Section 8(aX3) of the Act. Further, the complaint alleges that certain supervisors and officers of Respondent engaged in coercive misconduct within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, including interrogation, threats, impressions of surveillance of union activity, solicitation of employees to repudiate the Union and to report on the union activities of other employees. A. Facts2 1. Allegations of coercion Respondent employs some 250 production employees. In April 1975, the Union made initial efforts to organize these employees and a petition for an election was filed on December I (Case I -RC-4114). In September, George Marsh, president of Respondent after consultation with labor counsel for Respondent, met and spoke to some 12 groups of employees consisting of from 18 to 30 employees per group. George Bullard, the alleged discriminatee herein, testified that at the September meeting of the shipping department employees George Marsh stated, inler alia, that he would close the plant before he would let a union come in. Another shipping department employee, Jesse Clinton, testified that Marsh told them that if a union got in they would close the doors. Carl Adams, another shipping department employee, testified that Marsh told them that the Company would not operate with a union. I All dates refer to 1975 unless otherwise indicated. 2 There is conflicting testimony regarding some of the 8(a)( I) allegations of the complaint and relevant incidents surrounding Bullard's discharge. In resolving these conflicts I have taken into consideration the apparent interests of the witness. In this connection, in crediting the testimony of the General Counsel's employee-witnesses, the fact that they were still employed by Respondent against whom they testified was a factor supporting their credibility particularly when weighed against the obvious interest of the Employer. In addition I have considered the inherent According to Marsh, he spoke to these employees from handwritten notes which he had reduced from a speech he had drafted based on conversation with counsel. Marsh testified that while he did not read the speech verbatim he used his notes with each of these groups to "hit each point with each group." Marsh specifically denied having made statements concerning the closing of the plant. While the notes may not as written be coercive, indeed some are without meaning except perhaps to the writer thereof, Respondent concedes that the notes were not followed verbatim and, based on the corroborated testimony of Bullard, Clinton, and Adams, I conclude that these statements were made. On or about November 19, Bullard testified to a conversation with Micky Carter, shipping department foreman, outside of the shipping clerk's office wherein, according to Bullard, he was asked by Carter what he thought about a union, to which Bullard answered that he was for it "all the way." During this same conversation Carter told him that Everett Marsh, chairman of Respon- dent's board of directors wanted to see him. Bullard went to Marsh's office where a conversation ensued during which Marsh observed that there were rumors circulating about a union and Marsh expressed his unqualified opposition to it. According to Bullard he said that before he would let a union come in he would shut the door. Further that the Company would not have anything else to do with any employee who participated in "this union stuff," and told Bullard he wanted him to talk to the other employees about not supporting the Union. When Marsh asked if he was getting through to Bullard, he responded in the negative. Marsh concedes that he asked Bullard to come to his office because he was an "influential" person in the shipping department. Marsh denied having made the specific statements attributed to him in the conversation, but as to these incidents I credit Bullard, noting particular- ly that Marsh was equivocal. As to the Carter incident, I note that Carter did not testify about it. Further, Marsh was somewhat vague, particularly in response to questions about why he had called Bullard to his office. Bullard also testified that from the time the Union's organizational campaign began in April or May until he was discharged on December 19, Bill Coleman, plant supervisor, asked him from time to time if he was still a unionman and Bullard replied, "Yes, all the way." Coleman denies having so questioned Bullard, however, for the reasons noted above I credit Bullard and conclude that he was so questioned. Clinton testified that, about a week after George Marsh's September speech to the shipping department employees, he was asked by Carter in the shipping office about a union, to wit, had Clinton attended union meetings? Clinton answered affirmatively. Carter told him that he probabilities; the probabilities in light of other events; corroboration or lack of it; and consistencies or inconsistencies within the testimony of each witness and between the testimony of each and that of other witnesses with similar or apparent interests. In evaluating the testimony of each witness, I relied specifically on his demeanor and have made my findings accordingly and while apart from considerations of demeanor I have taken into account inconsistencies and conflicting evidence, my failure to detail each of these is not to be deemed a failure on my part to have fully considered it. Bishop and Malco, Inc., 159 NLRB 1159, 1161 (1966). 581 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD knew of two times that they had been down there, but he did not identify "they." Carter also stated that Respondent would close the doors if the Union came in. Noting that Carter did not testify as to this incident, I credit Clinton and conclude that the statement was made. Clinton also testified that in December, about 2 weeks before Christmas, he went to see James Marsh, Respon- dent's vice president, to borrow money. During the course of the conversation Marsh asked him if he had heard anything about the Union? Upon receiving an affirmative reply Marsh asked who was the leader. When Clinton responded that he did not know, Marsh asked him to let him (Marsh) know if he found out and Clinton agreed. When asked how he would vote Clinton said he did not know. Marsh denied having asked who the union leader was and was not questioned as to the rest of the conversation. For the reasons noted above, and because his version was more complete, detailed, and, for the most part, unrebutted, I credit Clinton. Clinton further testified that on January 2, 1976, he told Bill Coleman, upon inquiry, about the Union; that he did not know how he would vote. Coleman also told him that if he was asked by Everett Marsh if he were a company man he should say that he was. Coleman denied that he made these statements to Clinton. However, based on the above credibility factors Clinton's version of the conversation appears to me to be the more plausible and I credit it. Employee James Bell testified that, in December, during a conversation with Everett Marsh, he was told by Everett Marsh that he (Marsh) knew that he was working hard for the Union and asked what he knew about the Union. Marsh also asked if they had enough union cards signed for an election. Bell said he did not know. Everett Marsh recalled the conversation with Bell, during which the matter of the Union was discussed but denies making the above statements attributed to him by Bell. Based on the factors noted above, I credit Bell as to this conversation. Bell also testified that on January 5 or 6, 1976, while working at his machine, Coleman approached him and told him that the "old man," meaning Everett Marsh, wanted to know how he was going to vote. Bell replied that he did not know. On the following day Bell was invited by Coleman to his office where there ensued a conversation. Coleman made the same inquiry and Bell replied that he had not made up his mind how he was going to vote. Coleman recalls the conversation with Bell concerning the union election but maintains that it consisted of Bell volunteering the information that he had 21 votes he could control and Coleman opining that Marsh would do more for the employees without a union than with a union. Bell's version is more convincing and I credit him. Employee Jimmy Morrison testified that, in early October, he was called to the office of Everett Marsh where he was asked "What is this I hear that you all are trying to form a union here?" Marsh told him that he understood that he was one of the main leaders and asked him what he thought about a union. Morrison admitted that he had been to union meetings but had not made up his mind about it. When asked why the employees were forming a union, Morrison told him that they wanted to better their wages and working conditions. On or about January 12, 1976, according to Morrison, he was asked by Coleman to go to Everett Marsh's office. In Marsh's office he was accused of taking employees' names off timecards at lunchtime and giving them to Ted Davis, the union organizer. He was asked by Coleman how he felt about the Union and Marsh told him he was trying to help himself, to make more money, and to get better working conditions. Everett Marsh denied in general terms that he ever questioned employees about what they were doing, only gave them his opinions. He did not testify specifically regarding the October conversation set out above, and he denied having any conversation with Morrison about taking names off timecards. However, for the reasons noted above, I credit Morrison's version of these two conversations. Employee Emmett Moorefield testified that, on Septem- ber 10, at or about 3:15 p.m., he was summoned to Everett Marsh's office where Marsh told him he wanted to talk about the Union. Asked how he felt about the Union, Moorefield said he did not know; that he did not know that much about unions. He inquired of Moorefield how strong the Union was; how many people really favored it, and Moorefield said he did not know. He told Moorefield not to sign union cards or have anything to do with union people when they came around. Marsh asked him how to keep the Union out and Moorefield said he had no idea. On October 30, at or about 11:15 a.m., Moorefield was again called to Everett Marsh's office. Marsh charged him with helping to destroy what he had spent a lifetime building. He stated that he would not deal with the Union and asked Moorefield to help him fight the Union. Morefield further testified that, on November II 1, Marsh came to him while he was working at his grinding machine, tapped him on his shoulder, and asked him if he was "working on the union." Moorefield said he was not. Marsh told him that he had heard that Moorefield was soliciting for the Union. Moorefield denied it and Marsh told him that he did not want him working "on this other thing on my time." Everett Marsh testified that he had only one conversa- tion with Moorefield in his office but that he frequently had to talk to him on the floor to get him to stop soliciting for the Union and to go to work. Marsh concedes that he did not actually hear any of the "soliciting" but got his information in hearsay fashion from other employees. Marsh did not testify concerning the content of any of the alleged conversations except as to one conversation in his office which he described as a "pleasant talk." Moorefield's testimony is essentially unrebutted as to these conversa- tions and I credit his version. 2. Bullard's discharge Bullard was first hired by Respondent in 1965. He quit his employment and was rehired several times until his last period of employment which began in July 1974. As noted earlier the Union's organizational effort began about April 1975. Bullard was a member of the in-plant organizing committee. During the union campaign, Bullard solicited some 50 employees to join the Union and sign union authorization cards. About 20 employees signed cards which were given to Davis. 582 MARSH FURNITURE COMPANY At the time he was hired one of Bullard's duties was to pull empty trailers across a public street to loading docks where they were loaded and to pull them out and park them after they were loaded. This trailer moving was done with a tractor known as a "yard dog" and required a chauffeur's license since the movements involved crossing a public thoroughfare. At the time of Bullard's employment in July 1974, he was taken by Respondent to obtain a chauffeur's license which was paid for by Respondent. In addition to the work of moving trailers which consumed an hour to an hour and a half each day Bullard was assigned work of pulling freight from the inventory for loading and also the actual loading of trailers. Bullard became dissatisfied both with the difficulty of his work and the pay that he received for it. He expressed his dissatisfac- tion to Carter about a month after he was hired and Carter promised him some help. About a month later, in January 1975, he complained to Carter again and was told he was doing a good job and that he would get some help for him. This was the last time Bullard complained to management about his job until the time of his discharge. It appears that Bullard as well as others in the shipping department were given raises. For Bullard, the amount of his raise was 15 cents per hour which he received in about October 1975. Concerning the events immediately preceeding Bullard's discharge it appears that on December 18, at or about 3:15 p.m., Kenneth Watts, leadman in the shipping department, upon instructions from Carter, asked Bullard to back two trailers up to the dock for loading. Bullard was pulling freight at the time. Watts routinely made such requests on a daily basis upon instructions from Carter since he had more frequent contact with Bullard. At the time of this particular request, Carter was attending a meeting with the traffic manager at another location. Bullard responded that he was tired of getting the "flunky jobs" and that he was not going to back the trailers any more. Upon Carter's return about 4 p.m., Watts reported to him that Bullard was refusing to back in the trailers. Carter told Watts to forget about it; that he would take care of it in the morning. On the following morning, December 19, about 8 a.m., Carter met Bullard and asked him to back in two trailers when he got a chance.3 Bullard told Carter that he was not going to do it any more. When questioned about it Bullard told him that he was tired of it and that Respondent was taking advantage of him. When asked what he meant, Bullard tojd Carter that he would just have to figure that out for himself. After this, Carter went to the main office and told George Marsh about the incident. George Marsh told him to take it up with Jimmy Marsh and Coleman. Thereupon, Carter went to Coleman and told him about Bullard's refusal to back in the trailers and explained that he needed a man to back in the trailers. Coleman said that he would get someone, and shortly thereafter, an employee named Ron Kenley from the paneling department moved the two trailers and returned to his own department. Kenley had 3 Since two trailers had been backed into the loading dock by truckdrivers of Respondent during the night, there was no need for more empty trailers until about 9 or 9:30 a.m. 4 Bullard testified that he never refused to do any job he was asked to do previously done the job of moving trailers and had a chauffeur's license. As Carter and Coleman were walking back to the plant they met Jimmy Marsh. Coleman told Marsh what he had been told by Carter and Marsh told him to go handle it and also to talk to Bullard. At or about 10 or 10:30 a.m. Coleman sent for Bullard to come to his office. Coleman testified that in this conversa- tion Bullard conceded that he had been asked by Carter to back in the trailers. When asked by Coleman why he refused Bullard said that the work was too hard and the pay too low. When asked if he was still refusing to back in the trailers Bullard replied, "Yes" and reiterated that he was not going to move any more trailers. Coleman told Bullard that he would have to report what Bullard had told him to George Marsh and a decision would have to be made on it.4 At or about 11 a.m. Coleman reported the problem to George Marsh. David Irwin, an attorney retained by Respondent in connection with the above-noted represen- tation case, was also present. Coleman explained what had transpired, including Bullard's contention that the work was too hard and the pay too low. Coleman reviewed Bullard's wages and the fact of his recent 15-cent wage hike was discussed and a consensus reached that his wages were in line with his duties. As to the difficulty of his work, the matter was discussed and included comment to the effect that he was hired to move trailers and that when he was so employed it was the only duty he was performing. Coleman and Marsh agreed that Bullard was a good employee, capable of doing anything he wanted to do. Coleman recommended that Bullard be discharged but no decision was made at this meeting to fire him. Coleman and Marsh conceded that as a matter of company policy employees are free to discuss their problems with any level of management and that every effort would be made to adjust the matter. Further that no employee is discharged without a thorough investigation. The substance of this company policy appears in Respondent's handbook entitled "Per- sonnel Policies" (G. C. Exh. 2). Coleman also testified that while they discussed the possibility of moving someone from another department to move the trailers, the idea was rejected as unwarranted for a job requiring only about I to 1-1/2 hours per day as part of Bullard's duties. When asked why Bullard was not brought into the meeting in an attempt to adjust the problem Coleman replied, "Well, we didn't feel like it was necessary, I had already talked to Charles and he had flatly refused to move the trailers. This was the big issue." Subsequent to having reviewed Bullard's personnel folder and going over the circumstances of the problem with Irwin, George Marsh decided to discharge Bullard. Irwin advised Marsh that the discharge was justified but that in view of the pending union election, Respondent would probably draw an unfair labor practice if Bullard was discharged. At or about 3:40 p.m., George Marsh called Bullard to his office for the purpose of discharging him. Marsh on either December 18 or 19: however, while I have credited Bullard as to certain allegations of coercion, I do not credit this testimony, particularly in view of the mutually corroborating testimony of Watts, Carter, and Coleman, all to the contrary. 583 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD concedes that he had made the decision without first speaking to Bullard. Inasmuch as three people had already spoken to him and having discussed and investigated the matter he felt it was a proper decision. Marsh told Bullard that he was being discharged for refusing to move the trailers. Bullard made no effort to defend his position and responded negatively when asked if he had anything to say. Marsh also testified that other employees had been discharged in the past for refusing to perform assigned work and he named three who had been discharged since 1973. B. Discussion and Analysis I. The 8(a)(1) allegations Having credited the General Counsel's witnesses as to those conversations containing the substance of the 8(a)(1) allegations herein, I conclude that the General Counsel's allegations of coercion have been established and that Respondent thereby, with the exception noted below, engaged in misconduct proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Respondent engaged in the illegal interrogation of employees concerning union matters; created an impres- sion of Respondent's surveillance of these employees' union activities; threatened to close the plant if it were organized; solicited employees to report to Respondent on the union activity of other employees; and solicited employees to repudiate the Union. However, even crediting Moorefield, I cannot conclude that the evidence establishes that Everett Marsh threatened him for supporting the Union, and no inference of such a threat is warranted on the facts herein. 2. Bullard's discharge It is the position of the General Counsel that Bullard was discharged because he was a leading union adherent. Respondent contends that Bullard was discharged because he refused to perform ajob for which he had been hired. In my opinion, the evidence supports Respondent's position. It is undisputed that at the time Bullard was hired, one of his jobs was to move trailers. The Company arranged for him to obtain the necessary chauffeur's license and paid for it. When Bullard became unhappy with his pay and duties, he simply refused to perform one of them, that of moving the trailers to the dock for loading. The testimony of three Respondent witnesses supports the conclusion that he flatly refused to perform the work, which therefore had to be done by another employee from another department. The General Counsel, however, contends that the discharge was a "classic case of a company's officials and supervisors combining and conspiring to rid the company of a known leading union adherent." General Counsel argues that Respondent did not follow its own personnel rules in discharging Bullard, since no effort was made to investigate the matter or to adjust it with him prior to discharge. However, it appears that the matter of Bullard's pay and the difficulties of the work assigned to him was the subject of discussion by Respondent's management and counsel before the decision to discharge him was made. This decision also recognized the good quality of Bullard's work but was not controlling as to the question of termination. The General Counsel argues that George Marsh failed to counsel with Bullard before discharging him or giving him another chance, and that this was extraordinary so as to indicate that he was discharged because of his union sentiments. However, since Bullard had already refused three times to three different people to move the trailers and his pay and duties had already been examined, further management consultation was not a prerequisite to termination for such flagrant insubordination. General Counsel also points out as a factor suggesting Respondent's connivance that there was no immediate need for the trailers to be loaded at the time that the alleged request was made. While it is true that there was loading work to be done, and that the trailers would not be needed for loading for an hour or so, I cannot conclude that making the request was other than a legitimate exercise of business judgment in order to have trailers available for loading as they became needed. In summary, the evidence discloses that Bullard was a union sympathizer and had engaged in activity on behalf of the Union. Further, I am convinced that Respondent was aware of Bullard's sentiments. It is apparent that Respon- dent was strongly opposed to being organized. The coercion engaged in by Respondent shows unmistakable union animus. However, in order to establish that Bullard was discharged for antiunion reasons, another element must be established; to wit, that Bullard was discharged because of his union sentiments or activities. It is the latter element which is lacking. I cannot conclude that Bullard was discharged because of his union activity where the record reflects that he flatly refused on three different occasions, to three different representatives of manage- ment, to perform work assigned to him which he had been hired to perform. While it may be that Respondent welcomed the opportunity to fire a known union adherent, the General Counsel has not met its burden of establishing that the discharge was for antiunion considerations rather than for cause. Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) of the Act in discharging Bullard. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth in section III, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and from infringing in any like or related manner on its employees' Section 7 rights, and that it take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. 584 MARSH FURNITURE COMPANY Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and the entire record in this proceeding, I make the following: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing em- ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. Employer did not otherwise violate the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER5 The Respondent, Marsh Furniture Company, Inc., High Point, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Creating impressions of surveillance or interrogating or threatening employees in order to discourage member- ' In the event no exceptions are filed, as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings. conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. ship in and activities on behalf of Upholsterers' Interna- tional Union, AFL-CIO. (b) Soliciting employees to report on the activities of other employees on behalf of Upholsterers' International Union, AFL-CIO. (c) Soliciting employees to repudiate Upholsterers' International Union, AFL-CIO. (d) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its plant in High Point, North Carolina, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 6 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 11, after being duly signed by the Employer's authorized representatives, shall be posted by it immediate- ly upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Company to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region II 1, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Company has taken to comply herewith. 6 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 585