East Side Sanitation Service, Inc.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD East Side Sanitation Service, Inc. and International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America, Local 20. Case 8-CA-9780 June 30, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER REMANDING THE PROCEEDING TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS PENELLO AND WALTHER On December 29, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Elbert D. Gadsden issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, General Counsel filed exceptions and Respondent filed cross-exceptions, an answering brief, and a brief in support of the Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge only to the extent consistent herewith. The Administrative Law Judge ordered the com- plaint dismissed on the ground that Respondent's annual inflow across state lines did not meet the Board's discretionary jurisdictional standard of at least $50,000 for a nonretail enterprise, whether such inflow is regarded as direct or indirect.' General Counsel contends that the standard was met and we should assert jurisdiction. We agree with General Counsel's contention and, accordingly, shall remand the proceeding to the Administrative Law Judge for decision on the merits. Although we accord little weight to the stipulated dollar amounts of direct and indirect inflow due to the disagreement by the parties as to the amounts stipulated, it is clear that Respondent's direct and indirect inflow exceeds $5,000. In addition, in 1975, Respondent purchased 13 collection containers for $3,200 and two garbage trucks for $82,527.83. The Administrative Law Judge found that the trucks were not purchased as replacements for original equip- ment but were new purchases to accommodate Respondent's expanding trash collection business and, therefore, should be considered nonrecurring I Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81 (1958). 2 Cf. Magic Mountain, Inc, 123 NLRB 1170 (1959), in which the Board refused to assert jurisdiction on the basis of nonrecurring capital expendi- tures alone. 3 For the reasons cited by the Administrative Law Judge, we agree that the trucks, which were manufactured in Indiana and were purchased by Respondent in Ohio, constitute indirect inflow. 230 NLRB No. 89 capital expenditures. He did not add these figures to the stipulated amount to determine jurisdiction because, in his opinion, to do so "would amount to the Board asserting jurisdiction over the Respon- dent's business almost solely on the basis of its nonrecurring capital expenditures for the trucks and containers." The Board's practice, however, is to include nonrecurring capital expenses if such expenses are not the only items of inflow. Cemetery Service Corporation (Parkview and Springdale Cemeteries), 149 NLRB 604 (1964); Snowshoe Company, 212 NLRB 535 (1974).2 Since the stipulated inflow exceeds $5,000 (not an insubstantial amount), it is clear that the containers and garbage trucks3 do not constitute the only items of inflow. Accordingly, even if these expenses are considered nonrecurring capital expenditures, in accordance with our practice, we shall add the amount attributable to such expenses to the stipulated amount to determine jurisdiction. Since the resulting total of direct and indirect inflow exceeds $50,000, we will assert jurisdiction. 4 The Administrative Law Judge, in dismissing on jurisdictional grounds, did not consider the unfair labor practices alleged. Accordingly, we shall remand this proceeding to the Administrative Law Judge for a full decision on the merits. CONCLUSION OF LAW East Side Sanitation Service, Inc., is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER It is hereby ordered that this proceeding be, and it hereby is, remanded to Administrative Law Judge Elbert D. Gadsden for such further action as is required in light of our decision herein to assert jurisdiction. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ELBERT D. GADSDEN, Administrative Law Judge: Upon an unfair labor practice charge filed on January 29, 1976, a complaint was issued by the Regional Director for Region 8 on March 3, 1976, alleging that the Respondent interfered with, coerced, and restrained its employees by giving them the impression they were under surveillance for their union interest and/or activities, by so interrogat- ' In view of our disposition herein, we find it unnecessary to decide if the purchase of trucks and similar equipment should be considered as nonrecurring capital expenditures or regular operating expenses where the Employer, as here, is engaged in the business of the collection and disposal of solid refuse. 632 EAST SIDE SANITATION SERVICE, INC. ing an employee as to create the impression of surveillance of his union interest or knowledge of union activity, and by threatening an employee with closedown of its operations if the employees designated the Union their collective-bar- gaining representative, all in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act; that the Respondent laid off and/or terminated the employment of several of its employees and thereafter refused to reinstate them because it believed they had assisted the Union and/or engaged in protected concerted activities, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act; and that Respondent unilaterally changed its prior wage policy of its employees and unilaterally offered its truck operators a bonus if they would voluntarily perform their duties without assistance, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. In its answer the Respondent not only denied the allegations set forth above but also denied the Board's jurisdiction to litigate the allegations. This case was held before me in Toledo, Ohio, on June 29 and 30, 1976. Briefs, which have been carefully considered, have been received from counsel for the General Counsel and counsel for the Respondent. Upon the entire record in this case and from my observation of the witnesses, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION The Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, an Ohio corporation with its office and only place of business located in Genoa, Ohio, where it is engaged in the collection and disposal of solid refuse. During the past year, the stipulated and credited evidence of record established that the following purchases of goods were shipped to the Respondent directly from outside the State of Ohio: $69.90-cleaning fluid parts from Elgin, Illinois. $18.02-tailgate lock rod from Detroit, Michigan. $32.00-exit safety signs from Minneapolis, Minnesota. $68.80-mesh net for trucks from Maurray Hill, North Dakota. $141.25-lubricant grease from Atlanta, Georgia. $330.97-total purchases of goods As counsel for the General Counsel contends, these purchases clearly constitute direct inflow as defined by the Board in Siemons Mailing Service, 122 NLRB 81 (1958), and are proper items for consideration in computing jurisdictional amount. The parties stipulated that Respondent purchased the following items from suppliers located in the State of Ohio who in turn had received such goods in an unchanged form from outside the State of Ohio: $448.24-paint from a dealer in Toledo, Ohio, who received paint from dealers in Missouri and Iowa. I credit the testimony of Mr. Robert Leggio because, not only was I persuaded from his demeanor that he was testifying truthfully, but also because he is a disinterested third party in this proceeding and would have no apparent motive to be untruthful and, additionally, because the $737.35-motor oil from dealer in Toledo, Ohio, who received oil from Penns Oil in Oil City, Pennsylvania. $774.18-Truck parts from dealer in Toledo, Ohio, who received parts from dealer in Michigan. $2,250.06-Truck parts from dealer in Toledo, Ohio, who received them from dealer in Michigan. $797.88-Auto springs purchased from dealer in Toledo, Ohio who received them from dealer in Pennsylvania. $5,444.08-total The evidence of record does not show that any of the above items represented a purchase of capital goods. As they stand on the record they appear to be recurring necessary materials and parts used in the operation of Respondent's business and, therefore, constitute a value of $5,444.08 of indirect inflow business as defined by the Board in Siemons, supra, as contended by counsel for the General Counsel. The combined direct inflow and indirect inflow business described above amounts to a grand total of $5,775.05. Although the Respondent was willing to stipulate that $797.88 of the springs it purchased from Ohio Spring Service were in an unchanged form, an executive represen- tative from the Ohio Spring Service, Inc., of Toledo, Ohio, testified that Respondent actually purchased springs for $1,547.35 in 1975. Of that amount, $150 was spent on labor, which when subtracted from the total amount leaves an actual amount of $1,397.35 for springs. Since the Respondent did not dispute or refute the cost of the labor, I credit the testimony of the Ohio Springs Service representa- tive. While the Respondent concedes that the springs pur- chased from Ohio Spring Service in Toledo were received by Ohio Spring Service from a manufacturer in Pennsylva- nia, it nevertheless contends that the springs were altered and therefore ceased to be a part of the flow of commerce. However, Mr. Leggio, owner and operator of Ohio Springs Service, testified that, during the year 1975, he sold and installed on Respondent's trucks without charge several heavy duty suspension springs which he received from Triangle Auto Spring Company in DuBois, Pennsylvania, for $1,203.16. In some instances he said he replaced broken leads in the springs for a total sales price, plus labor, of $1,203.16, including tax, on which he made no changes. The springs on which he had to make lead changes totaled $749.44 plus $33.73 tax; and for the entire year 1975 Respondent's total purchases from him were $1,547.35, less $150 for labor, leaving a total of $1,397.35 spent for springs. ' The credited evidence further established that during 1975 the Respondent purchased two garbage trucks for a total price of $78,974, plus $3,553.83 in sales tax, for a total of $82,527.83. The trucks were manufactured in Fort Wayne, Indiana. According to the credited testimony of John Dooley, president of LaGrange International Trucks, Inc., of Toledo, Ohio, distributor for International Trucks, in 1975 Respondent did not dispute or offer any evidence in opposition to his testimony. Consequently, I find that the Respondent paid $1,397.35 for indirect inflow purchases of springs. 633 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD he arranged for the purchase of the two trucks from International Harvester Motor Truck Branch in Valley View, Ohio; the trucks were in turn sold by LaGrange to the Respondent. It further appears that the trucks were first held by two different dealers for a short while in the Cleveland, Ohio, area before they were transferred to a LaGrange Company owned facility in Toledo. Neither dealer in the Cleveland area ever had an automobile title to the vehicles. International Harvester obtained the trucks from the prior company through a floor plan and all of the financial arrangements were made through its Columbia, Ohio, business office. While displaying the trucks, the prior intermediate dealers paid no interest on the loans it took from International Harvester of Indiana to display the trucks in their shops. Such sales of trucks handled through dealers in Ohio are handled under a manufacturer's statement of origin, Ohio being a title State. The only change LaGrange Harvester of Toledo said it made on the trucks, before transferring them to the Respondent, was the tires on one of the trucks, at a cost of $560, less a setoff for the original tires thereon amounting to $324. The other intermediate transfers of the trucks were simply paper transactions between the intermediate truck dealers. The evidence further shows that, although the chassis of both trucks were manufactured in Fort Wayne, Indiana, they had to have a garbage packer placed on each truck. The packers were ordered by Respondent through another local dealer in Ohio, Fischer Truck & Trailer Equipment Company, who thereafter drove the chassis to Fort Payne, Alabama, for assembly of the packers, and then to Toledo, Ohio, as an agent for the Respondent. The only work performed on the packers by the Fischer Truck Company was to check the installation of the packers. The Respondent contends that the springs purchased from Ohio Spring Company should not be considered items of inflow because the lead work performed upon them by the seller constituted an alteration of the product excluding them as items of inflow; that the one truck on which LaGrange changed the tires also constituted an alteration excluding that truck from inflow for jurisdiction- al purposes; that the two trucks should not be included as indirect inflow because they were not obtained by LaGrange of Toledo directly from the manufacturer in Fort Wayne, Indiana; and that, since the packers were actually obtained by the local dealer from a manufacturer in Fort Payne, Alabama, and their assembly was checked by the Ohio seller, Fischer Truck, such assembly of the trucks removed them from the inclusion of inflow. Findings Based upon the foregoing evidence of record, I conclude and find that the mere deletion of some leads from some springs, and the insertion of new leads in substitution thereof, is at most a minor substitution of a part (which itself was purchased from out of State) and did not constitute a material alteration of the springs rendering them so entirely different from the product shipped from out of State, as to remove them from inflow consideration for jurisdictional purposes. John J. Harris & Scotty Harris, d/b/a Culligan Soft Water Service, 149 NLRB 2 (1964). Likewise, it does not appear plausible that the mere change of tires on one truck could be deemed a material alteration, so significant and different that a reasonable conclusion could be drawn that the truck was essentially no longer a truck. Nor do I conceive the mere assembly of packers on the chassis of trucks or the checking of such installation to constitute a break in the flow or a material alteration in the products so as to exclude them from indirect inflow. Rather, I view the assembly of the packers on the trucks as a necessary addition to the chassis, with neither the chassis nor the packers materially altering the other. In fact, both the packers and the chassis arrived in Ohio in unchanged form and were only assembled on the chassis from which they can be disassembled. It is further observed that the packer dealer in Alabama did not acquire an indebtedness or a dealer's title to the truck chassis, but only authority to assemble its packers thereon pursuant to instructions from the Ohio dealer (Fischer) who was acting as an agent for the Respondent. Hence, it is clear that, as far as direct purchases go, the truck chassis came directly from Fort Wayne to the Toledo, Ohio, dealer, only making an accommodation stop in Fort Payne, Alabama, under the direction of the Ohio dealer (Fischer). Thus, I find neither a material alteration of the subject products nor a break in the flow of the truck chassis and packers. In any event, both were purchased from out of the State. Although Ohio laws might consider a retail sales dealer the owner of a vehicle for the purpose of reselling such vehicle to an ultimate purchaser, it was noted that the two trucks in the instant case were on display at two different dealers in the Cleveland area, and that there was no transfer of title of personal ownership to either dealer as is recognized under the motor vehicle laws of the State of Ohio, or as ownership by a respondent is recognized by the Board for jurisdictional purposes. The Respondent stipulated that it purchased 13 collec- tion containers (dumpers) for $3,200 from an Ohio corporation, which in turn received them in an unchanged form from a corporation in Indiana. The Respondent contends that the purchase of the containers and the trucks should not be included in determining inflow for jurisdic- tional purposes because they represent nonrecurring capital expenses. Specifically, the record further shows that: In 1967 Respondent purchased two open trucks. In January 1968 Respondent purchased a sideload packer. In 1969 Respondent purchased a rearload packer. In 1970 Respondent purchased a packer to accom- modate an increase in business. In 1971 Respondent purchased a Chevy pickup truck to service its other trucks. In 1972 Respondent purchased two packers to keep pace with expanding business. In 1973 Respondent purchased I packer and 30 containers (hook-on and off dumpers) In 1974 Respondent purchased a pickup truck as a backup truck and 23 containers (hook-on and off dumpers). In 1975 Respondent purchased two packers with a larger capacity and 13 containers (hook-on and off 634 EAST SIDE SANITATION SERVICE, INC. dumpers), at which time he traded in an old 1968 and a 1969 trash collection truck. Respondent said there would not be any new purchases of trucks in 1976 because business has declined and it has at the present time one truck which is idle at least 3 days a week. Respondent's gross income for 1975 was $367,929.81. Arguments Counsel for the General Counsel contends that the above purchases show a relatively consistent pattern of trash collection trucks and container purchases and that, as such, they represent recurring expenses necessary to the opera- tion of the Respondent's business. General Counsel further contends that, since the trucks were not the only Itype of expenditures involved, considering Respondent's purchases of oil, springs, exit signs, grease, truck parts and paint, the 1975 purchase of the trucks and containers are proper items for assessing the Respondent's nonretail indirect inflow, citing Cemetery Service Corporation (Parkview and Springdale Cemeteries), 149 NLRB 604 (1964), and Snow- shoe Company, 212 NLRB 535 (1974). However, in this regard, it is noted, as counsel for the Respondent argues, that the total admitted inflow in Cemetery Service is substantial ($43,123) compared with the employer's pur- chases of nonrecurring capital equipment for a total of $11,097, which the Board held, when added to the $43,123 inflow, was sufficient to meet the $50,000 jurisdictional standard. The combined totals were sufficient because the $11,097 in capital equipment also represented material used in the employer's operation. Similarly, the Board held in Snowshoe Company, supra, that, where capital purchases are counted for purposes of applying the Board's nonretail inflow test, such purchases will be counted if they are not the only items of inflow. There, the employer made over $1 million in nonretail capital expenditures and received over $450,000 from the sale of memberships; the combination of these nonretail and retail items of inflow surpassed the Board's jurisdic- tional standard for a nonretail business and thereby justified the Board's asserting jurisdiction for such nonre- tail business; and, in view of the interstate character of the employer's operations and their substantial effect on interstate commerce, the employer was found to be an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act. Counsel for the General Counsel argues alternatively that, since the Respondent made other direct and indirect inflow purchases for $8,975, on my computations $9,398.91 or $10,796.26, the purchases of the trucks and containers in 1975 should be included in assessing Respondent's indirect inflow. However, as counsel for the Respondent points out, past decisions of the Board have included nonrecurring capital expenditures in assessing inflow when a Respon- dent has other recurring capital expenditures of inflow which are substantial, citing Cemetery Service Corporation, supra; and Snowshoe Company, supra. In Magic Mountain, Inc., 123 NLRB 1170 (1959), cited by counsel for Respondent, the employer was engaged in the construction of an amusement park and had received capital goods in connection with such construction valued at more than $100,000 which was shipped directly to it from sources outside of the State. Since the construction was to be completed within a 12-month period and all such purchases of capital goods would then cease, the Board held that it had long since established that it would not assert jurisdiction over an employer's business on the basis of nonrecurring capital expenditures alone and that, since the present employer's operation, aside from its capital expenditures, did not have sufficient impact on interstate commerce to warrant assertion of jurisdiction at that time, jurisdiction was not asserted. Accordingly, I conclude and find that the Respondent's out-of-state purchases of goods and materials used in the maintenance and operation totaling either $8,975.00, $9,398.91, or $10,796.26, demonstrates the intrastate char- acter of the Respondent's business as well as their insubstantial effect on interstate commerce. To add to either one of the above-stated totals Respondent's capital expenditures in the amount of $82,527.83 (for purchase of two trash collection trucks in 1975) would amount to the Board assertingjurisdiction over the Respondent's business almost solely on the basis of its nonrecurring capital expenditures for the trucks and containers. Analysis and Conclusion The priority and possibly the dispositive question presented for determination in this case is whether the Respondent's business operations so affects the flow of commerce as to justify the Board's discretionary assertion of jurisdiction over the dispute herein. An examination of the evidence of record, which is essentially free of conflict, clearly establishes that the Respondent's business opera- tion is primarily local in nature and scope. More specifical- ly, the Respondent is engaged in the business of collecting and disposing of solid waste for about 750 residential and 250 commercial customers. Its sphere of operation covers an area of 50 miles, including the counties of Lucas, Wood, Ottawa, and Sandusky, surrounding Toledo, Ohio. Re- spondent has approximately six collection trucks on which two and, on some occasions three, men are assigned to collect and empty the trash into the trucks. The trash is then compacted in the trucks and transported to a landfill where it is dumped. The record further shows that during the year 1975 Respondent purchased direct and indirect inflow goods and materials used in the maintenance and operation of its trucks for a value of $5,775.05. It also purchased directly or indirectly from out of State 13 trash containers used in conjunction with its trucks for a value of $3,200, bringing the total of such out-of-state purchases to $8,975.05. During the same period, the Respondent also purchased oil from an Ohio dealer, of which $423.86 is estimated to have been paid for oil obtained from out of State, thus possibly bringing its total direct and indirect inflow purchases to $10,796.26. The parties agree that neither the $8,975.05 total nor what would result in the partially disputed $10,796.26 total satisfies the Board's $50,000 jurisdictional standard. Counsel for the General Counsel contends, however, that, when either of the above-described total purchases is added to the Respondent's indirect inflow purchase of two 635 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD trash collection trucks for $82,527.83, the Board's jurisdic- tional standard of $50,000 is more than satisfied and jurisdiction should be asserted herein to effectuate the policies of the Act. On the contrary, counsel for the Respondent argues that jurisdiction should not be asserted herein because the two trash collection trucks purchased by the Respondent were not items of indirect inflow because the seller (LaGrange International Trucks of Toledo) did not receive the trucks directly from out of State but, rather, through two prior intermediate dealers within the State, and therefore the trucks were removed from inflow commerce. In support of its position counsel for the Respondent cites the Board's decision in Kingsbury Electric Cooperative, Inc., 138 NLRB 577 (1962). However, my reading of the Kingsbury case does not reveal any language used by the Board which restricts the meaning of indirect inflow commerce to one intermediate dealer between the original out-of-state source and the ultimate purchaser. Counsel for the Respondent further contends that the two trash collection trucks should not be considered a part of indirect inflow because they constitute a nonrecurring capital expenditure. On direct and cross examination by counsel for the General Counsel with respect to the quantity and frequency of Respondent's purchases or replacements of trucks, the following information was adduced: In 1967 Respondent purchased two open trucks. In January 1968 Respondent purchased a sideload packer. In 1969 Respondent purchased a rearload packer. In 1970 Respondent purchased a packer for increase in business. In 1971 Respondent purchased a Chevy pickup truck to service its other trucks. In 1972 Respondent purchased two packer trucks to keep pace with its business expansion. In 1973 Respondent purchased 1 packer and 30 containers (hook-on dumpers). In 1974 Respondent purchased a backup, pickup truck and 23 containers to remove a greater volume of refuse. It traded in two old trucks, a 1968 and a 1969, to get the larger packer trucks as an economy move to accommodate greater collection. Respondent's president, Elmer F. Asmen, credibly testified that all of the above truck purchases were made to accommodate his expanding business or to carry out its operation more economically, and that only two of his old trucks (1968 and 1969) were traded in to acquire the larger capacity packers. Otherwise, he stated, none of the purchases was a replacement for trucks on hand. He further testified that he would not be making any new purchases in the immediate future (1976) because business has declined and he now has one truck that is idle about 3 days a week. His testimony was not disputed or refuted. Therefore I find, as counsel for the Respondent argues, that since the above-described purchases were not replace- ments of original equipment within each given year, they were in fact new purchases to accommodate the Respon- dent's expanding trash-collecting business. Under these circumstances the purchases were nonrecurring capital expenditures which the Board has traditionally excluded from the computation of direct and indirect inflow. Although the evidence does not itemize the price of each of Respondent's purchases during the years 1967 - 75, it is reasonable to conclude that the purchase of a packer by the Respondent in prior years did not cost more than the price of one of the packers (approximately $41,263.41) which it purchased in 1975. In all probability the price of such packers was several thousand dollars less than one of the packers Respondent purchased in 1975. Such prices probably continued to increase on a graduated basis commensurate with inflation over the years up to 1975. Considering these factors, it is reasonable to conclude that the only year in which the Respondent's truck purchases, combined with his other direct inflow purchas- es, possibly exceeded $50,000 was the year 1972, when it purchased two packers. But even this conclusion is speculative, irrespective of how reasonable. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that Respondent's truck and container purchasers in 1972 exceeded $50,000, that being the only year between 1967 and 1975 that the purchase of two trucks occurred, I cannot thereupon conclude by reason of the fact that Respondent made similar purchases in 1975 that such expenditures are representative of its annual purchases, so as to eliminate such purchases from the real classification of nonrecurring capital expenditures. This conclusion is particularly true when it is observed that the evidence fails to show that any of Respondent's purchases over the years were actually made for the replacement of trash collection equipment. Even the 1968 and 1969 trucks which Respondent traded in were established to have been smaller trucks not having the volume or capacity to accommodate the amount of refuse the two large compactors were purchased to accommodate. Thus, the evidence appears to support the Respondent's explanation that the purchases were made to keep pace with its expanding business and were not an annual recurring expense. This fact is further confirmed by the evidence which shows that many of the Respondent's trucks purchased in prior years have not been replaced. I therefore conclude and find that the Respondent's pur- chase of the 2 packers and probably the 13 containers in 1975 were nonrecurring capital expenditures, since such expenditures were not made annually. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 428, AFL-CIO, et al., (William A. Ralston), 169 NLRB 184 (1968). Certainly it has not been shown that such purchases will be made in the near future (1976). Moreover, it is clearly established by the credited evidence that Respondent's business does not require the purchase or replacement of two compactor trucks each year; that further expansion of business at this time is not foreseeable; that business is on the decline with one collection truck standing idle 3 days a week; and that the record of Respondent's past truck (capital equipment) purchases for a value of more than $50,000 in a given year was not a consistent pattern of purchases. I therefore find the evidence insufficient to conclude and find that Respondent's capital expenditures in 1975 or in other years (retrospectively, or apparently prospectively) constituted a 636 EAST SIDE SANITATION SERVICE, INC. representative period of Respondent's annual purchases. Since Respondent's annual inflow purchases do not total $50,000 or more, I further find that it will not effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction at this time. Accordingly, I find that Respondent is not engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and I shall recommend that the complaint herein be dismissed in its entirety. Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon the record relating to jurisdictional facts in this case, I make the following recommended: ORDER The complaint in this matter is dismissed in its entirety. 637