Stauffer Chemical Co.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Stauffer Chemical Company and Delores Anderson. Case 32-CA-272 (formerly Case 20 CA 13142) May 9, 1979 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS PENEILO. MURPHY, AND TRUESDAL.E On May 16, 1978, Administrative Law Judge Gor- don J. Myatt issued the attached Decision in this pro- ceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, as modified herein, and to adopt his recommended Or- der. The Administrative Law Judge found that Respon- dent had violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by refusing to reinstate economic striker Delores An- derson because of her failure to comply with the terms of a strike settlement agreement which, inter alia, had conditioned reinstatement upon a striker's return to work by June 10, 1977. While we agree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding of a violation in this case, we disagree with his rationale for doing so, and rely instead on the reasons set forth below. The facts here are not complicated. Delores Ander- son was first employed by Respondent in March 1977. During that month, Anderson changed her ad- dress and telephone number, but neglected to so in- form Respondent. She did, however, give her new telephone number to an official of the Union who presumably was engaged in preparing for an impend- ing strike. As a result of a breakdown in contract negotia- tions, the Union called an economic strike on April 1, 1977. On June 6, the parties entered into a strike set- tlement agreement which provided, inter alia, that "Employees failing to report to work by June 10. 1977, without just cause, will be considered as having quit their job and will be permanently terminated I Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Ad- ministrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard DrL' Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (195), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. from employment." The Union requested that Re- spondent notify the employees of the strike's termina- tion and also notify them that the agreed-to recall period would run from June 8 to June 10. Respondent refused, claiming that it was the Union who had pre- cipitated the economic action and therefore that it was the Union's responsibility to notify the striking employees of the procedure governing their return to work. Apparently acquiescing in Respondent's posi- tion, the Union agreed to notify the employees in- volved. This last fact is undisputed. Anderson testified that she first learned from her mother on June 13 that the strike was over. Anderson reported for work the following day at her normal starting time and was informed by two coworkers of the June 10 deadline for reporting. Pursuant to the employees' suggestions, Anderson went directly to the office of Personnel Manager Mike Rice, who, after a series of conversations, informed her that, because of her failure to comply with the June 10 deadline, she was ineligible for reinstatement. 2 In reaching his conclusion that Respondent's re- fusal to reinstate Anderson violated the Act, the Ad- ministrative Law Judge stated that "the obligation to notify and reinstate striking employees rests solely with the Respondent. and cannot be transferred to the Union. By making the Union its agent for this purpose, the Respondent here must also assume re- sponsibility for any failure on the part of the Union to successfully communicate terms of the settlement agreement to all of the striking employees. Cf. Ernst Construction, 217 NLRB 1069 (1975)." While we do not quarrel with the Administrative Law Judge's find- ing that the responsibility for reinstating strikers is exclusively an employer's, we disagree with his fur- ther conclusion that the obligation to notify striking employees of the recall terms of a bargained-for strike settlement agreement, at least under circumstances as here, is also vested immutably in an employer. The Administrative Law Judge had referred to no Board precedent to support his conclusion, aside from a comparison citation to Ernst Construction, supra, a case which is factually inapposite. There, the respon- dent was obligated under a Board order to offer rein- statement to a discriminatee. The respondent elected to utilize the union as its conduit to make the offer. The union failed to make a timely offer, thus resulting in the discriminatee's being denied an opportunity for reinstatement. The Board there found that the re- spondent, who by its prior conduct had violated the Act and had been ordered to offer the discriminatee 2 During an early stage in these conversations. Rice indicated that Ander- son might be rehired, but only as a new employee without any of the senior- ity rights she might have accrued earlier. Anderson agreed to this arrange- ment. but it was ultimately rejected by Respondent 242 NLRB No. 21 98 STAUFFER CHEMI(CAL (COMPANY reinstatement, could not shield itself from that Order by virtue of the union's failure to act in a timely fash- ion. That is not the situation here as there was no outstanding Board order directing Respondent to re- instate Anderson. Rather, here. Respondent and the Union engaged in bargaining that resulted in the termination of the strike and in an agreement on the terms governing the recall of all striking employees. The question of noti- fication arose and, after discussion, the Union ac- cepted the responsibility of notifying unit employees of the termination of the strike and the agreed-to re- call procedure. In the absence of any unlawful coer- cion exerted by Respondent upon the Union, the Union's agreement to accept the responsibility for no- tification appears to have been a natural outgrowth of the collective-bargaining process. Obviously, it was incumbent upon one of the parties to inform the strik- ers of the details of the settlement agreement in order to accord them the opportunity to comply therewith. In the ordinary case, the employer, anxious to resume operations, may prefer to take the lead in recalling employees. Here, however. Respondent rejected that role and the Union agreed to accept that responsibil- ity. As we recognize the intrinsic authority of a union to extend an offer to return to work on behalf of all striking employees, we likewise recognize that a union may also be the proper party: () to receive an em- ployer's acceptance of its offer of the employee's re- turn; and (2) by agreement, to communicate the terms of that acceptance to its principals, the striking employees. In the latter circumstances, which exist here, we would not find that an employer. like Re- spondent, thereby had also made the union its agent for purposes of notifying the employees and had as- sumed responsibility for the union's failure to notify a striker, like Anderson. of the terms of the recall. Ac- cordingly, we reject the Administrative Law Judge's finding of a violation here on such grounds. Nevertheless, we find, based on the facts before us. that Respondent was not justified in its decision to reject Anderson's application to return to work. Pre- sumably, Respondent's concern in negotiating the strike settlement agreement was to enable it to relieve its supervisory personnel by expediting the filling of those vacancies not occupied by returning strikers by June 10. Respondent, for whatever reason, had elected not to replace Anderson by the time of her application on the morning of June 14, the second business day following the termination of the recall period. Thus, Respondent can hardly claim that An- derson's reinstatement would have frustrated its goal, implicit in the settlement agreement. as it had re- frained from hiring anyone to replace her. Accord- ingly, under the limited circumstances of this case, we find that Anderson's reinstatement rights as an unre- placed economic striker were not nullified by the strike settlement agreement. and that. in the absence of a compelling business justification. Respondent's refusal to reinstate her violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.' ORDI)R Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or- der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or- ders that the Respondent, Stauffer Chemical Company, San Jose, California, its officers, agents. successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. ' Moreover. Respondent was. at the 'er) least. ohligated to treat Anderson in a nondiscriminator> fashion in considering her application tr reinstate- ment The record, howeser, indicates hat despite Anderson's %i illignes to forgo the senmoriti rights which she had accrued during her tenure with Respondent, thereb relegating herself to the status of a new emploee, Re- spondent declined io accept her applicalion for reemplo\menl hbecause ot her prior failure to seek rcinstlernenn in alccordance Ulth the tIrll, o the Igree- mnen I his t also w is not prisvileged it do) DECISION SrAIE li\N1 )1F 1 fin CAS I GoRnON J. MvtAr. Administrative l.a Judge: The charge in this case was filed on Jul 12. 1977. h Delorcs Anderson an individual (hereinafter called Anderson or the Charging Parts) against Stauffer Chemical Company (here- inafter called Respondent). On August 30. 1977. the Re- gional Director fr Region 20 issued a complaint and notice of hearing on behalf of the General Counsel, alleging that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and I ) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended (hereinafter called the Act). 29 U.S.C. §151. et seq. Basically, the complaint alleges that Respon- dent's employees, including the Charging Party. were en- gaged in an economic strike which terminated on June 6. 1977.1 Further, that on June 14. the Charging Party made an unconditional offer to return to her former position of employment, and Respondent unlawfully refused to rein- state her. Respondent filed an answer denying certain alle- gations of the complaint and specificall denying the corm- mission of any unfair labor practices.' A hearing was held in this matter on JanuarN 19, 1978 in San Jose. California. All parties were represented b coun- sel and afforded full opportunit to examine and cross-ex- amine witnesses, and to present material and relevant evi- dence on the issues involved. Briefs were submitted b both counsel and have been dulv considered. Upon the entire record in this case, and from my obser- vation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, I make the following: UI nless otherwise indicated. all dales herein referred to are 1977 1 At the hearing he parties entered into a stipulatioln on the record regard- ing certain facts While the stipulation clarified certain responses contained in Respondent's answer. It in no way affected Respondent's posltion that it had not committed any unfair lahor practices. 99 D[ECISIONS OF NATIONAl. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FINDINGS ()F FA(CI I. JURISDI('TION The Respondent. Stauffer Chemical Company, is, and has been at all times material herein, a Delaware corpora- tion with a place of business in San Jose, California, where it is engaged in the manufacture and nonretail sale of food ingredients. During the past calendar year, in the course and conduct of its business operations in San Jose. Respon- dent sold and delivered goods in excess of $50.000 directly to customers located outside the State of California. The pleadings admit, and I find, that Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein, an employer as defined in Section 2(2) of the Act, engaged in commerce and in opera- tions affecting commerce as defined in Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 11. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Chemical Workers Union, Local No. 294 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 111II. THE ALLEGEI) UNFAIR LABOR PRA(CTICES The basic facts of this case are not in serious dispute. Respondent's employees are represented by International Chemical Workers Union, Local No. 294. Commencing sometime in February, the Union and Respondent were engaged in negotiations for a new collective-bargaining agreement. The parties were unable to agree on the terms of a new contract, and the Union called an economic strike on April 1. The strike ended on June 6. While the strike was in progress, Respondent continued to operate its plant with salaried personnel on a 12-hour shift basis, and did not hire strike replacements. At the termination of the strike on June 6, the parties entered into a strike settlement agreement, the partinent parts of which are set forth below: A. Memorandum of Agreement It is agreed by and between Stauffer Chemical Com- pany and the International Chemical Workers Union and its Local Union No. 294 that as a part of cessation of the Union's strike against the Company and final agreement between the Company and the Union, the following conditions will be met: 4. Employees failing to report to work by June 10,1977, without just cause, will be considered as hav- ing quit their job and will be permanently terminated from employment. Other employment commitments will not be considered as just cause. 5. The Union recognizes and accepts the fact that some former employees may be delayed in their return to work or may not return to work following the strike and, therefore, agrees that the Company supervisors or other salaried employees of the Company may perform normal bargaining unit work duties until their return or until their replacements may be hired. The Com- pany agrees that there will be no unnecessary delay in their (sic) attempt to hire replacements. The uncontroverted testimony reveals that the Union asked Respondent to notify the employees that the strike was terminated and that they were to return to work begin- ning June 8, and not later than June 10. Respondent re- fused on the ground that the Union had taken the economic action, and it was the Union's responsibility to notify the employees to return to work. The Union verbally agreed to undertake to discharge this responsibility.' B. The Events Relating to Anderson Anderson worked the day shift in Respondent's house- keeping department. Sometime in March, she moved to a new residence and her home telephone number was changed in the process. Anderson did not inform Respon- dent's personnel office of her new address and telephone number. Shortly before the commencement of the strike, however, Anderson gave her new telephone number to one of the union officials, who was getting the names and tele- phone numbers of the employees presumably,. in prepara- tion for the strike. Anderson testified that during the course of the strike, she was contacted at home on the telephone by union rep- resentatives on two occasions for assignment to picket line duty. She walked the picket line for one one day in response to the Union's first request, but did not show up for picket duty on the second occasion. Anderson further testified that she initially followed the practice of calling the plant office once or twice a week to ascertain if the strike was still in progress. She later limited her calls to once a week. She stated that other than the two calls for picket line duty, she never received any calls from the Union, nor were any mes- sages left with her mother.' Anderson did not engage in any other employment during the time of the strike. Anderson testified she first learned the strike was over on the evening of June 13, when her mother informed her that it was announced on television. She immediately called the plant in an effort to reach her supervisor. Her attempt in this regard was unsuccessful, however, as the day shift had already ended. The next morning (June 14), Anderson re- ported to work in time for her shift. As she was changing clothes she was informed by two coworkers that Respon- dent had given the Union 48 hours to notify the employees to return to work. They advised her to see someone in the personnel office before starting work. Anderson testified she went directly to the office of Mike Rice, Respondent's personnel manager. According to An- derson, when she told Rice she had only learned of the termination of the strike the evening before, he stated that the Company had given the Union 48 hours to notify the employees to report back to work. Anderson testified that Rice suggested she could probably be reinstated, but would 1Several weeks prior to the commencement of the strike, management gave the union representatives a list, taken from the personnel records, con- taining the employees' names, addresses, and telephone numbers. 'Anderson testified that she lived with her mother. I00 STAUJFFER CHEMICAL COMPANY have to lose her seniority and start as a new employee. She agreed to this, and Rice sent her across the hall to wait in the office of one of his assistants until a decision could be made. Anderson stated that approximately 15 minutes later Rice came over and told her he was uncertain whether she could be reinstated. He instructed her to remain there until he could see what he could do about her situation. Accord- ing to Anderson, she spoke with Rice in his office approxi- mately 20 minutes later. He told her that she could not be reinstated and she left the plant. Rice testified that there was only one conversation with Anderson. He stated he saw Anderson sitting in his assis- tant's office, and he went over to ask her why she had not returned to work by June 10. According to Rice, when An- derson stated she had just learned that the strike had ended, he explained about the memorandum of agreement be- tween Respondent and the Union requiring the employees to return to work by June 10. Rice testified that he in- formed Anderson she could not be reinstated, and he ad- vised her to see her union representative. He denies ever telling Anderson that she could probably be reinstated as a new employee. Rice further testified that he made the decision not to reinstate Anderson because he was familiar with the memo- randum of agreement, and Respondent's actions in this re- gard could have an effect on future situations following a strike. He admits that he called Gregory Miller, Respon- dent's regional employee relations representative, and dis- cussed the matter with him. Rice stated, however, that he did so after his conversation with Anderson. Rice further acknowledged that Anderson had not been replaced at the time she applied for reinstatement. Miller's testimony confirms that he received a call from Rice regarding Anderson's request for reinstatement. Miller discussed the matter with his superior as well as with Rice. According to Miller, the decision not to reinstate the em- ployee was a correct one because (I) Respondent had to adhere to the strike settlement agreement, and (2) any devi- ation would have an adverse impact on future strike settle- ment situations, not only covering that plant, but other plants of Respondent where the employees were represent- ed by the Union. On the basis of my observation of the witnesses, I credit the testimony of Anderson regarding her conversation with Rice. Anderson impressed me as being sincere and forth- right in her testimony. In addition, I find it improbable that Rice made the decision not to reinstate the employee with- out first contacting Miller, who was the chief negotiator on behalf of Respondent in working out the strike settlement arrangement. The fact that Rice discussed Anderson's rein- statement with Miller lends credence to her testimony that Rice had her wait until a decision could be made on her request for reinstatement. Accordingly, I find that Ander- son and Rice had more than one conversation on the morn- ing of June 14, and I further find that Rice made the state- ments attributed to him by Anderson during these conversations. C. Concluding Findings The General Counsel argues that the memorandum of agreement is an invalid infringement on the rights of em- ployees to engage in a lawful economic strike, as the period in which the employees were required to return to work was "unreasonably" short. Therefore, the strike settlement agreement violated the criteria set forth in the United Air- craft, supra, and Laher Spring & Electric Car, supra,. cases. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the agree- ment is a valid result of collective bargaining encouraged by the Act to settle labor disputes, and to impose on the parties something other than agreed upon in the bargaining process violates the ruling of the Supreme Court in H.K. Porter Comnpanl., Inc., 397 U.S. 99 (1970). I find neither of these arguments. although ably pre- sented in the briefs, meets the fundamental issue in this case. There is no question that the Act protects the right of employees to engage in an economic strike.' It is equally well settled that a refusal to reinstate unreplaced striking employees, upon an unconditional offer to return, is inher- ently destructive of this protected right. But the right is not an absolute one and can be defeated by a showing of legiti- mate and substantial business justifications. N.L.R.B. v. Fleertwood Trailer Co., Inc., 389 U.S. 375 (1967): VN.L.R.B. v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.. 388 U.S. 26 (1967). It is for the Board to strike the proper balance between the asserted business justifications and the invasion of this important employee right in the light of the Act and its policy. United Aircraft Corporation, supra. at 387.8 However, the facts of the instant case are such I do not find it necessary to determine the validity or invalidity of the strike settlement agreement. Indeed, for purposes of this Decision it is assumed that the agreement is valid and was not discriminatorily applied by Respondent. Nevertheless, I find that the circumstances here require the finding of a violation. Having entered into a strike settlement agreement through the normal bargaining process, Respondent in- sisted on delegating to the Union the responsibility for noti- fying the employees of the terms governing their return to work. But the obligation to notify and reinstate striking employees rests solely with Respondent, and cannot be transferred to the Union. By making the Union its agent for this purpose, Respondent here must also assume responsi- bility for any failure on the part of the Union to successful- ly communicate the terms of the settlement to all of the striking employees. Cf. Ernst Construction, Division of Ernst Steel Corporation 217 NLRB 1069 (1975). The record in the instant case does not contain a scintilla of evidence showing that the Union communicated or at- tempted to communicate the strike settlement terms to An- derson. To the contrary, Anderson's credited testimony that no such communication was ever made stands unrefuted. While it is true that other employees were contacted, this alone is not enough to support an inference that Anderson I United Aircraft Corporation, Pratt and Whitney Division, 192 NLRB 382 (1971). 6 Laher Spring & Electric Car Corp., 192 NLRB 464 11971). ' Sec. 13 of the Act specifically provides: Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right. I N.LR.B. v. Fleetrwood Trailer Co.. supra at 378: The Laidlaw Corporation, 171 NLRB 1366 (1968). 101 DE(CISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD was similarly contacted, nor is it sufficient to destroy her protected status as a striking employee. In these circumstances, Respondent's rigid application of the time limitation to Anderson's request for reinstatement must be considered an impermissible violation of the statu- tory rights of striking employees. The preservation of these important employee rights, in the circumstances presented here, far outweight any adverse effects that a deviation from the time limitation would have on Respondent's fu- ture dealings with the Union in strike situations. This is especially true where, as here, Respondent failed to ade- quately communicate the time limitation for returning to work to the striking employee; the striking employee re- ported to work at the first opportunity after gaining knowl- edge of the termination of the strike-2 working days be- yond the time limitation: and the striking employee had not been replaced at the time she reported for work. To hold otherwise. would penalize the striking employee for exercis- ing statutory rights while allowing Respondent to terminate her status as an employee with less than full satisfaction of its reinstatement obligation. Accordingly, I find that by failing to reinstate Anderson under the circumstances here, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act. CON(C.USI(NS ()I LAoW 1. The Respondent. Stauffer Chemical Company, is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. International Chemical Workers Union, Local No. 294 is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By refusing, on June 14. 1977, to reinstate striking em- ployee Delores Anderson upon an unconditional offer to return to work, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Tlit REMEIY Having found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act, Respondent shall be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It shall be recommended that Respondent offer Delores Anderson immediate and full reinstatement to her former position of employment or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equiv- alent position, without prejudice to her seniority or her other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of the unlawful termination of her employment. Backpay shall be com- puted with interest thereon, in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Companv, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and Flor- ida Steel Corporation. 231 NLRB 651 (1977).' Upon the foregoing findings of fact, contusions of law, and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act. I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER" The Respondent, Stauffer Chemical Company, San Jose, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: I. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to reinstate unreplaced economic strikers who unconditionally offer to return to work and who were never properly informed of the time limitation contained in the strike settlement agreement governing such return. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act, as amended. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Delores Anderson immediate and full reinstate- ment to her former position of employment, or ift' that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, with- out prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole, in the manner set forth above in the section entitled "The Remedy," for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of the unlawful discrimination against her. (b) Preserve and, upon request. make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records neces- sary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its San Jose, California, plant copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."'' Copies of said no- tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 32. after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon re- ceipt thereof, and maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places where notices to employ- ees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 32. in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps has taken to comply herewith. See. generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). 10 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall. as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations. be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 1 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board." 102 STAIIFFER CHEMICAL COMPANY APPENDIX NOICE TO EMPLOYEES POSI ED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board Having Found, After a Hearing in Which All Parties Had an Opportunity to Present Evidence, That We Committed Certain Unfair La- bor Practices in Violation of the National Labor Relations Act, as Amended, We Hereby Notify You That: WE WILL. NOT refuse to reinstate unreplaced eco- nomic strikers who unconditionally offer to return to work, and who are not properly informed of the time limitation for returning to work as contained in the strike settlement agreement with the Union. WE WIL.L NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. WE WIt.I offer Delores Anderson immediate and full reinstatement to her former position of employ ment or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and Vi ii.l make her whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of the unlawful termination of her employ- ment. STAUI:FER CHEMICAL. COMPANY 103