G.Q. Security Parachutes, Inc.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD G. Q. Security Parachutes, Inc. and Warehouse, Mail Order, and Retail Employees Union, Local 853, Af- filiated with International Brotherhood of Team- sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and The Shop Committee, Party In Inter- est. Case 32-CA- 1084 May 24, 1979 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND MURPHY On February 23, 1979, Administrative Law Judge Jerrold H. Shapiro issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed a re- quest for review in the nature of exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the request for review and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and con- clusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela- tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or- der of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby or- ders that the Respondent, G. Q. Security Parachutes, Inc., San Leandro, California, its officers, agents, suc- cessors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, except that the at- tached notice is substituted for that of the Adminis- trative Law Judge. I Respondent requests the Board to review the backpay order as to em- ployee Deborah Ochoa on the ground that she "willfully did not seek em- ployment during the time since her termination." We find that this matter should be left for determination in the compliance stage of this proceeding. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT dominate, assist, or contribute financial or other support to, or interfere with, the administration of the Works Committee or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT establish a committee of em- ployees for the purpose of soliciting and remedy- ing employees' grievances to discourage the em- ployees from supporting an independent union or by otherwise soliciting and remedying em- ployees' grievances to discourage them from sup- porting an independent union. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with the loss of their jobs if they support Warehouse, Mail Or- der, and Retail Employees Union, Local 853, af- filiated with International Brotherhood of Team- sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT discharge, discipline, or other- wise discriminate against employees for support- ing or engaging in activities on behalf of Ware- house, Mail Order, and Retail Employees Union, Local 853, affiliated with International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other labor or- ganization. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL offer Deborah Ochoa full and imme- diate reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights and privileges previously enjoyed, and WE WILL make her whole for loss of earnings suffered because of our discrimination against her, plus interest. WE WILL expunge and physically remove from our records and files the written disciplinary warning we issued to Deborah Ochoa on May 22, 1978, and any reference thereto. WE WILL withdraw and withhold all recogni- tion from, and completely disestablish, the Works Committee, or any successor thereto, as the representative of any of our employees for the purpose of dealing with us concerning griev- ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work. G. Q. SECURITY PARACHUTES, INC. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JERROLD H. SHAPIRO, Administrative Law Judge: The hearing in this case, held November 9, 1978, is based upon an unfair labor practice charge filed by Warehouse, Mail Order, and Retail Employees Union, Local 853, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, herein 508 G. Q. SECURITY PARACHUTES, INC. called the Teamsters Union,' on July 18, 1978, as amended October 24, 1978, and a complaint issued August 31, 1978, as amended October 11, 1978, and October 25, 1978, on behalf of the General Counsel of the National Labor Rela- tions Board, herein called the Board, by the Regional Di- rector for Region 32, alleging that G. Q. Security Para- chutes, Inc.,2 herein called Respondent, has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(l), (2), and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.' Respon- dent filed an answer which, as amended, denied the com- mission of the alleged unfair labor practices. Upon the entire record, from my observation of the de- meanor of the witnesses, and having considered the post- hearing briefs, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues The essential questions presented for decision are five: I. Whether Respondent's president threatened employ- ees he would close Respondent's plant if the Teamsters Union succeeded in organizing them, thus violating Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. Whether Respondent's president promised employees an unspecific employment benefit in order to dissuade them from supporting the Teamsters Union, thus violating Sec- tion 8(a)( ) of the Act. 3. Whether Respondent granted its employees the use of a picnic table to eat their lunch in order to dissuade them from supporting the Teamsters Union, thus violating Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. Whether Respondent disciplined and discharged em- ployee Deborah Ochoa because of her Teamsters Union activities, thus violating Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 5. Whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by creating an employees' Works Committee and granted benefits to the employees through the committee in order to dissuade the employees from supporting the Team- sters Union, and violated Section 8(aX2) and (1) of the Act by dominating or interfering with the formation and admin- istration of the Works Committee and by contributing fi- nancial aid or other support to its existence. B. Background Respondent at its San Leandro, California, plant manu- factures parachutes and employs between 55 to 60 employ- ees. A substantial number of the employees are of foreign extraction, i.e., Chinese, Korean, Filipino, Mexican, and Italian, and have a difficult time understanding and ex- pressing themselves in English. Respondent admits the Teamsters Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec. 2(5) of the National Labor Relations Act. 2 As amended at the hearing. It will effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to assert jurisdic- tion over this case. The record establishes, and Respondent admits, it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act and meets the Board's applicable discre- tionary jurisdictional standard. On approximately April 1, 1978,' Respondent changed management. The new owners, G. Q. Parachutes, Ltd., of England, purchased all of Respondent's stock and took over the management of the Company. During the time material herein Respondent's management hierarchy was as follows: Alan Levinson, Respondent's president, was in charge of the entire business operation. James Bates, the production manager and manufacturing director, was in charge of all personnel matters involving the production workers. Marie Bechnel, the assistant manufacturing direc- tor, was Bates' assistant. The production workers' immedi- ate supervisors were Dorothy Parrish and Louise Small. Ruth Craddick occupied the position of personnel manager and comptroller. On April 1, when the new owners took over the manage- ment of the Company, the employees were represented by Upholsterers Union Local No. 3, herein called the Uphol- sterers Union, which had a collective-bargaining contract with Respondent covering Respondent's production work- ers. On April 4 an employee filed a petition with the Board in Case 32-RD-86 seeking a representation election to decertify the Upholsterers Union as the employees' collec- tive-bargaining representative. On May 10 Respondent, the Upholsterers Union. and the Petitioner entered into an agreement, approved by the Board, to hold a representation election in Case 32-RD-86 on May 31. Since the Teamsters Union, on May 10, intervened in the representation pro- ceeding, the employees had three choices. They could vote for no union, for the Teamsters Union or for the Upholster- ers Union. On May 31 the election was conducted, and the Teamsters Union received a majority of the votes. Respon- dent filed objections to the results of the election and the Teamsters Union withdrew from the proceeding which re- sulted in the election being set aside. C. The Threat To Close the Plant It is undisputed that prior to the May 31 representation election Respondent's President Levinson on two separate occasions spoke to the employees in a group to persuade them to vote against union representation. Levinson told them he was opposed to union representation and thought it would be in the employees' best interest to leave them- selves in the hands of management. He stated that Respon- dent's parent company was an English employer and that most companies in England did not have unions and Re- spondent's parent was known for the benevolent way in which it looked after its workers. Levinson also stated that because of the strict State and Federal laws governing em- ployees' working conditions, Respondent's employees did not need union representation. If, however, the employees believed they needed a union, Levinson urged them to vote for the Upholsterers Union instead of the Teamsters Union. He stated that the Teamsters Union had a reputation for violence, its officials were hoodlums, and it had no experi- ence in representing employees in Respondent's industry. The factual matter which is in dispute herein is whether in expressing his opposition to the Teamsters Union Levin- son threatened to close the plant if the employees voted for that union. Deborah Ochoa, the alleged discriminatee, testi- 4 All dates herein refer to 1978 unless otherwise specified. 509 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD fled that at both meetings Levinson stated that before he would allow the Teamsters Union into the plant he would close it. Similarly, Arlene Mack, who is currently employed by Respondent as a supervisor, testified that when Levinson voiced his opposition to the employees voting for the Team- sters Union, he stated:5 "The Teamsters-or nobody else was going to come in [here] and run [the] company because before [they'd] do that, he'd close it down." Bates and Lev- inson, on the other hand, testified that Levinson did not threaten the employees he would close the plant if they supported the Teamsters Union. On this particular matter Ochoa and Mack impressed me as more sincere and trust- worthy witnesses than either Levinson or Bates. Therefore, based upon the testimony of Ochoa and Mack, I find that Respondent, through Levinson, threatened the employees that if a majority of them voted for the Teamsters Union Respondent would close the plant. This constitutes a bla- tant threat that the employees would be terminated if they supported the Teamsters Union and, as such, violates Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. D. The Promise of Unspecified Benefits As described infra, Respondent on approximately May 17 established an employees' Works Committee. Levinson spoke to the Committee once. General Counsel alleges that on this occasion he promised the Committee that things would be good without a union but that he could not be more specific. In support of this contention General Coun- sel relies upon the testimony of Mack, who was one of two witnesses called by the General Counsel to testify about Levinson's conversation with the Works Committee. The other witness, Ochoa, significantly failed to corroborate Mack's testimony in this respect. In addition, Mack did not impress me as a reliable witness when she attributed the disputed statement to Levinson.6 Initially Mack's descrip- tion of Levinson's remarks omitted any mention of an ex- press or implied promise of benefits. It was only after hav- ing her memory refreshed with an affidavit, submitted to the Board approximately 3 months after the disputed prom- ise was voiced, that she testified Levinson told the Works Committee "he thought we could do better if we did not even have a union." But, after reading her affidavit a sec- ond time, she testified that Levinson said "we could do bet- ter if we did not have a union but he could not make any promises to us of what the betterment could be." Then, after reading the affidavit a third time, Mack testified that Levinson said "if we did not have the union, things would be good for us, but he could not tell what would be good." When asked whether reading the affidavit refreshed her rec- ollection, Mack seemed uncertain. She testified it refreshed her memory only "in a way." I Mack was questioned only about one of the meetings at which Levinson spoke to the employees. 6 Levinson's description of his meeting with the Works Committee in effect denies that he made the alleged promise. However, Levinson in general did not impress me as a reliable or trustworthy witness. In concluding that he did not make the disputed promise of unspecified benefits I have relied upon my observation that Mack was not a reliable witness when she testified about this portion of Levinson's remarks and upon Ochoa's failure to corroborate Mack's testimony. Based upon the foregoing, I shall recommend that this allegation of the complaint be dismissed. E. The Unfair Labor Practices Attributed to Respondent by Virtue of its Creation of the Works Committee7 1. The evidence On approximately May 14 or 15 Respondent, on its own initiative, decided to create a Works Committee comprised of six employee representatives selected by management. On May 17 Respondent posted notices throughout the plant notifying the employees about the formation of the Works Committee and named the six employees who had been appointed to the committee. The notices stated that the Works Committee "has been formed in order to have better communications between employees and manage- ment" and that the committee "will meet once a week to discuss any problems, complaints or suggestions [employ- ees] may have." During May the Committee met on at least two separate occasions with production manager Bates in Bates' office during working time. s Bates appointed em- ployee representative Ochoa to be the head of the commit- tee and informed the members of the committee that their function would be to speak with the employees in order to determine their problems and complaints and to inform Bates about the employees' problems and complaints. He authorized the committee to go out onto the floor of the plant during working time and speak with the employees in order to ascertain their grievances. Also, he asked the com- mittee to determine whether the employees would rather start work at 7:30 a.m., instead of the current 7:45 a.m. starting time, and to ask if the employees would like to take a 4-day weekend, instead of a scheduled 3-day one, and make up the fourth day by working one Saturday. The members of the Works Committee, pursuant to Bates' in- struction, went out into the plant and questioned the em- ployees and solicited their grievances. They reported back to management that the employees complained about a lack of material that was necessary to perform their work, needed more room in which to work, wanted a lunch table as there was no place for them to eat their lunches, re- quested fans because the plant was poorly ventilated and too hot, and wanted a pay raise. Bates admittedly remedied each of these grievances except for the one dealing with wages.9 Finally, Ochoa, who had been appointed by Bates to head the committee, met with Bates on two occasions, at Bates' request, to discuss matters of concern to the employ- ees. I The Works Committee is referred to in the complaint as the "Shop Com- mittee." I have rejected Bates' testimony that the committee never met with him. His testimony was vague, evasive, and contradictory. He testified that he never met with the committee, then admitted there might have been one such meeting, then testified that the only meeting he could recall was one where employee Ochoa gave him a list of "things" which the employees wanted improved. Ochoa and Mack, members of the committee, testified that the Committee met more than once with Bates. They impressed me as more credible witnesses than Bates. Likewise, I reject Bates' testimony that he did not appoint Ochoa to be the head of the committee. 9 Bates instructed the committee that the employees' demand for a pay raise was out of his hands and would have to be dealt with by higher man- agement. 510 G. Q. SECURITY PARACHUTES. INC. Respondent's President Levinson testified that the sole purpose for the Works Committee was to learn from the Company's approximately 47 production workers whether there was anything mechanically wrong with the equipment they were operating and that the idea for the committee came from the chairman of the board of Respondent's par- ent company. In response to Levinson's complaint that the plant was operating way below its efficiency because the equipment was in bad condition and management could not get the workers to tell them what was wrong with their machines since the workers spoke nine different languages, Levinson testified that the chairman of Respondent's parent company suggested that Levinson form a Works Commit- tee comprised of employees who spoke the different lan- guages. The facts belie Levinson's testimony. Levinson failed to explain why, if the committee's purpose was only to speak to the employees about their equipment, the notice announcing the creation of the committee was worded in language which plainly indicated that the committee would communicate to management "any problems, complaints or suggestions [the employees] may have" [emphasis added]. Moreover, production manager Bates testified that the pur- pose of the committee was "to handle employee complaints because the suggestion box was not being used" and further testified that he told the Committee to talk to the employees "about their problems and get suggestions from them" and "to bring the employees' complaints to [Bates]." ° In addi- tion, Bates' testimony reveals that representatives of the Committee brought employees' grievances to Bates' atten- tion, not one of which concerned equipment which was out of tune or otherwise not operating satisfactorily, which Bates remedied." Clearly, contrary to Levinson's testimony, Bates had absolutely no idea that the committee's purpose was to serve as a conduit between management and the employees only on matters involving the maintenance of equipment. I cannot believe that if this was the real purpose for the committee's existence, Levinson would not have told this to Bates, who was his production manager and manu- facturing director." Finally, Levinson's testimony that it 101 note there is no evidence that Bates ever specifically indicated to the committee that their function, even in part, would be to determine whether the employees had complaints about their equipment. I recognize Levinson testified that once when Levinson spoke to the committee he asked its mem- bers to plead with the employees who were having difficulty with their ma- chinery to let the Company know so it could repair the machines. Levinson did not impress me as a trustworthy witness and the facts, as described in the text, belie his testimony. Moreover, Ochoa and Mack credibly testified in substance that at this meeting Levinson told the committee that Respondent was opposed to union representation but if the employees wanted a union they should vote for the Upholsterers Union rather than the Teamsters Union. " The only evidence that the alleged sole purpose for the committee, the repair of employees' equipment so as to increase the plant's productivity, was ever effected is Levinson's testimony that Ochoa's punch machine which did not work was repaired. The record reveals that Ochoa was proficient in English, so obviously there was never any communication problem between Ochoa and management which necessitated reating a committee composed of bilingual employees so Respondent could discover that something was wrong with her machine. XI Bates testified that Levinson and himself"just decided that we'd have a shop committee" composed of employees from the several nationalities em- ployed by the Company so that all of the employees "would know what was going on at the same time." Bates failed to corroborate Levinson's testimony that the idea for the committee originated in the mind of the chairman of Respondent's parent company or that the committee was established for the purpose of remedying the problem of employees failing to inform manage- ment that their equipment was not operating satisfactorily. was necessary to speak to the employees to determine whether their machines were not correctly tuned is suspect in view of his admission that by just walking out onto the production floor he could determine whether an employee's machine was properly tuned without even speaking to the employee." It is for all of the foregoing reasons, including Levinson's insincere demeanor as a witness, that I find the reason Levinson advanced at the hearing for the establish- ment of the Works Committee was a fabrication and not the true reason. 2. Conclusions a. Respondent established the Works Committee to accomplish an illegal purpose The conclusion is warranted, as urged by the General Counsel, that in establishing the Works Committee Respon- dent was motivated by a desire to frustrate its employees' organizational efforts by showing them that union represen- tation was not necessary. This conclusion is based upon the following considerations: (i) As described supra, Respondent, through the Works Committee, solicited its employees' grievances and reme- died them, which plainly had the intended effect of demon- strating to the employees that they did not need the Uphol- sterers Union or the Teamsters Union to obtain redress of their grievances. While the actual changes in the employees' terms and conditions of employment effected as the result of the Works Committee intervention on behalf of the em- ployees may seem modest, these matters were important to the employees and the changes showed the employees that they would not need the Upholsterers Union or the Team- sters Union to remedy their grievances. (ii) Respondent was openly opposed to the employees being represented by the Upholsterers Union or the Team- sters Union. Respondent's President Levinson, as described supra, simultaneously with the establishment of the Works Committee, told the employees he was opposed to union representation and stated that it would be in the employees' best interests not to vote for either the Upholsterers Union or the Teamsters Union but instead to leave themselves in the hands of management. (iii) Respondent established the Works Committee on approximately May 17, immediately after it learned that later that month an election would be conducted in which the employees would have the opportunity to vote for union representation. (iv) As I have discussed supra, the reason Respondent offered for establishing the Works Committee was patently false. These circumstances taken in their entirety persuade me that Respondent's sole motive in establishing the Works Committee and soliciting the employees' grievances through this committee and remedying the grievances was to frustrate and undermine its employees' efforts to secure representation by an independent union. I further find that by engaging in this conduct Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. " Presumably Production Manager Bates also had the same expertise. 511 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD I recognize that the complaint does not specifically al- lege, other than in the case of the employees' lunch table grievance, 4 that Respondent's solicitation of the employees' grievances through the Works Committee and the remedy- ing of the grievances constitute an independent violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. The law however is settled that "when an issue relating to the subject matter of a complaint is fully litigated ... the Board [is] expected to pass upon it even though it is not specifically alleged to be an unfair labor practice in the complaint." Monroe Feed Store, 112 NLRB 1336, 1337 (1955). Here the solicitation of the em- ployees' grievances through the Works Committee and Re- spondent's conduct in remedying the grievances is directly related to the portion of the complaint which alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by establish- ing the Works Committee for the purpose of receiving and remedying employees' grievances. Thus, it is not surprising that Respondent did not object to the testimony regarding the solicitation of grievances through the Works Committee and Respondent's treatment of the grievances and that it fully litigated these issues. b. Respondent dominated and interfered with the formation of the Works Committee which is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act Section 8(a)(2) of the Act makes it an unfair labor prac- tice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the for- mation or administration of any labor organization or con- tribute financial or other support to it...." General Counsel contends that the Works Committee is a domi- nated labor organization. I shall evaluate the evidence per- tinent to the committee's status as a statutory labor organi- zation and then evaluate the evidence pertinent to its status as a dominated organization. (1) The Works Committee's status as a labor organization The statutory definition of a labor organization as set out in Section 2(5) of the Act is very broad and reaches "any organization of any kind ... in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." The statute has been broadly construed with respect to the type of interchange between the parties which may be deemed "dealing with." N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Company and Cabot Shops, Inc., 360 U.S. 203, 213 (1959). In the instant case it is undisputed that the Works Com- mittee is an organization "in which employees partici- 14 In concluding Respondent remedied its employees' grievances in order to discourage them from supporting an independent union, I have consid- ered Levinson's testimony that the lack of a table in the plant on which the employees could eat lunch was an obvious unhealthy and inconvenient situ- ation and that it was because of this that Respondent purchased a picnic table for the employees. Levinson explained: "Any humane benevolent per- son would find it within their heart to spend a few dollars on a picnic table so [the employeesl could have a place to sit down and enjoy their lunch." However, he significantly failed to explain why Respondent waited to rem- edy this obvious inconvenience until it established a Works Committee for the purpose of solciting the employees' grievance to discourage them from supporting an independent union and until the employees had raised this grievance through that committee. pate,"' and I am of the view the Committee "exists for the purpose ... in part, of dealing with [Respondent] concern- ing grievances, labor disputes, hours of employment or con- ditions of work."'6 In reaching this conclusion I considered the declared purpose of the Works Committee as set forth in the notice to the employees announcing the creation of the committee; Production Manager Bates' admissions con- cerning the committee's purpose made to the committee and at the hearing; and the manner in which the committee actually functioned. The purpose of the Works Committee was declared in the notice to the employees announcing its formation. The no- tice states that the committee "has been formed in order to have better communications between employees and man- agement" and that the committee "will meet once a week to discuss any problems, complaints or suggestions [employ- ees] may have." The plain import of this declaration is that the committee will deal with the representatives of manage- ment on behalf of those employees with employment griev- ances which they desire to have remedied. Bates informed the members of the Works Committee that their function was to speak to the employees for the purpose of learning their grievances and to communicate these grievances to Bates. Consistent with this instruction, Bates testified that the purpose for which the Works Com- mittee was formed was "to handle employees' complaints because the suggestion box was not being used." As described in detail supra, the employees transmitted their individual grievances concerning wages, hours of em- ployment, and conditions of work to the Works Commit- tee's members who brought them to management, which took them under consideration and, in several instances, acted favorably upon them, resulting in a change of em- ployees' conditions of employment. In addition, Bates met with the employee who was the head of the committee to discuss matters of concern to the employees. Based upon the foregoing circumstances in their entirety I find that the Works Committee is an organization in which employees participate and which exists for the pur- pose, in part, of dealing with Respondent concerning griev- ances, wages, hours of employment, and conditions of work; thus, it is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. I recognize that the committee is limited to advising management about the existence of em- ployees' grievances and has apparently no authority to ne- gotiate with management what action, if any, should be taken. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that a committee of employees may be "dealing with" an employer, and hence be a labor organization as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act, even though its activities may not be equated with the usual concept of collective bargaining. N.L.R.B. v. Cabot Carbon Company, supra at 210-211, 214, and fn. 15. I am persuaded that the record herein estab- lishes that the Works Committee was created and exists for ' Of course, the fact that the committee was a loosely formed one with no formal organization, bylaws, officers, or dues is immaterial in determining whether it is a laboi organization. See Pacemaker Corporation an Indiana Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 260 F.2d 880, 883 (7th Cir. 1968) and ases cited. J6 I note that it is well settled that since the phrasing of the statutory definition is in the disjunctive, "dealing with" an employer concerning one (or more) of the matters enumerated in Section 2(5) suffices. 512 G. Q. SECURITY PARACHUTES. INC. the purpose, at least in part, of "dealing with" Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. (2) The Works Committee's status as a dominated labor organization I find that Respondent dominated, interfered with, and illegally supported the Works Committee because Respon- dent, on its own initiative, conceived the idea for, estab- lished, and announced the creation of the Works Commit- tee; determined the function of the committee and its method of operation; unilaterally determined the number of employee representatives who comprised the committee and appointed said representatives to the committee; and because the Works Committee conducted its business dur- ing working time and its employee representatives were paid their normal wages for conducting this business. These are the considerations, plus the fact that Respondent estab- lished the Works Committee for the illegal purpose of un- dermining the employees' efforts to secure representation by an independent union, that have persuaded me that Re- spondent dominated and interfered with the formation and administration of the Works Committee and rendered un- lawful assistance and support to it in violation of Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the Act. F. Respondent disciplines and discharges Ochoa'7 1. The evidence Ochoa began work for Respondent on January 19 and, except for a 2-week period in late February and early March, was continuously employed by Respondent until July 14 when, as described infra, she was discharged. Man- agement regarded her as an excellent employee. Ochoa played a leading role in the Teamsters Union's effort to organize the employees. She distributed union au- thorization cards and literature for the Teamsters Union, wore a Teamsters Union button and, on the day of the representation election, was the official observer in the poll- ing area for the Teamsters Union. Respondent's manage- ment knew that Ochoa was pro-Teamsters and was actively campaigning on behalf of the Teamsters. Likewise it is a fair inference that when on the day of the May 31 election Respondent discovered that Ochoa was the Teamsters Union's official observer, it surmised that she was the lead- ing Teamsters Union adherent among the employees. As I have described supra, Respondent opposed its em- ployees' efforts to secure union representation and was par- ticularly opposed to the employees' selecting the Teamsters Union as their bargaining representative. During May Pres- "1 The complaint lacks a specific allegation relating to Ochoa's May 22 disciplinary warning. Nevertheless, "lilt is well established that when an is- sue relating to the subject matter of a complaint is fully litigated at a hearing . . the Board lis expected to pass upon it even though it is not specifically alleged to be an unfair labor practice in the complaint." Monroe Feed Store, 112 NLRB 1336, 1337 (1955). Therefore-inasmuch as the disciplinary warning is related to Ochoa's discharge, which is the central issue alleged in the complaint and the underlying charge; Respondent did not object to tes- timony regarding the disciplinary warning: and the facts pertaining to the warning, including Respondent's motivation in issuing it were fully liti- gated-I have considered its legality. ident Levinson gathered together all of the employees and specifically told them that the Company was opposed to union representation and it was especially opposed to the Teamsters Union representing the employees. In addition, as I have found supra, on approximately May 17, Respon- dent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it created an employees' Works Committee through which it solicited employees' grievances and remedied a substantial number of them for the purpose of discouraging the employees from voting for union representation. Also, to be absolutely sure that the employees would not vote for the Teamsters Union, Levinson, in violation of Section 8(a)(1), on ap- proximately May 30 threatened the employees he would close the plant if they voted for that union. On May 22, Ochoa received a written disciplinary warn- ing from Production Manager Bates which in pertinent part stated that the Company's "pay record indicates a recurring pattern of unexcused absences," informed Ochoa that "this type of attendance record cannot and will not be tolerated" and concluded by warning, "[T]his is your first formal writ- ten warning. After three such warnings you will be termi- nated for cause." This warning was issued after Respondent learned Ochoa was actively campaigning for the Teamsters Union. As indicated in the warning, it was Ochoa's first written warning. Ochoa credibly testified that prior to this warning no one from management, including Bates, had personally spoken to her about her attendance.'" The record reveals that during the 7-week period commencing April 1 and ending May 21, the time period during which Respon- dent's new management operated the Company, employee Lucy Garbin had a substantially poorer attendance record than Ochoa yet did not receive a written disciplinary warn- ing.'9 Between May 22 and July 14, the date Ochoa was dis- charged, she did not receive another written disciplinary warning and, other than on one occasion, Bates did not speak to her about her attendance °Ochoa credibly testi- fied that the only time Bates spoke to her about her attend- ance was shortly prior to July 7, when he called her into his office and spoke to her about the fact that she had informed the Company she would be absent from work July 7 be- cause of a doctor's appointment. Bates indicated he was unhappy about Ochoa's absenteeism and stated that if she 1 I reject Bates' testimony that prior to the May 22 warning he had spo- ken to Ochoa two or three times about her attendance. Ochoa impressed me as the more credible witness. In addition, Bates' testimon' lacked specificity, inasmuch as he failed to describe what was stated during these conversa- tions. 19 During this 7-week period Garbin worked 40 hours a eek for weeks and was absent 16 hours I week, II hours another week, and 8 hours n 3 separate weeks: a total of 50 hours of absences. During this period Ochoa worked 40 hours a week 2 weeks and was absent 14-3/4 hours in I week. 8 hours in 2 separate weeks: 4-1/2 hours in another week; and 3-3 4 hours in another week: a total of 39 hours of absences. 1o I reject Bates' testimony that between the May 22 written warning and Ochoa's discharge he spoke to her two or three times about her attendance. Ochoa impressed me as the more credible witness. In addition. Bates' testi- mony lacked specificity as he failed to descnbe what was allegedly stated during these conversations. I also note that since the May 22 written warning indicated that if Ochoa's attendance continued to be unsatisfactory. she would receive further written warnings, it is difficult to believe that if Bates was concerned about Ochoa's absences and tardiness he would not have issued another written warning rather than merely speaking to Ochoa Bates' testimony explaining his reasons for not issuing a second written warning to Ochoa was not convincing. 513 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD wanted to visit the doctor she should schedule the appoint- ment for a Saturday rather than a workday. Ochoa stated that since the May 22 written warning she had only been absent from work when it was absolutely necessary and that it was impossible for her to schedule a doctor's ap- pointment for Saturday because the doctor was not avail- able that day. Bates concluded the conversation by indicat- ing that if Ochoa went to the doctor as scheduled she would be terminated. Ochoa cancelled the appointment.2 On July 13, after work, Ochoa made an appointment with the City of Oakland Housing Authority for the next morning. On July 14, prior to the start of the workday, she phoned the plant and notified Assistant Manufacturing Di- rector Bechnel she would not get to work until the after- noon and asked her to notify Bates. Bechnel informed Bates, who removed Ochoa's timecard from the rack and notified Ochoa's immediate supervisor, Dorothy Parrish, that he intended to discharge Ochoa because he could no longer tolerate her absences. Later that morning,22 accom- panied by several employees, Supervisor Parrish visited Bates and unsuccessfully urged him not to discharge Ochoa. Parrish told Bates that Ochoa was a good employee who was really needed in the department and asked Bates to give her another chance. Bates emphatically rejected Parrish's plea. He stated that he could no longer tolerate Ochoa's absences, that he was not employing part-time workers, and that he intended to fire her.23 Approximately I hour after Bates had emphatically re- jected the plea of Parrish and the employees that Ochoa not be discharged, Ochoa showed up at the plant for work. When she discovered her timecard was missing she went to Bates' office and asked for her timecard. Bechnel, who was in the office with Bates, stated Ochoa would have to get her timecard from Ruth Craddick, the Company's personnel manager and comptroller. Ochoa went to the front office and asked Craddick for her timecard. Craddick stated she had been discharged. Ochoa returned to Bates' office and asked why she had been discharged. Bates replied she was discharged because of her absenteeism and tardiness. Ochoa stated that since May 22, when she was given the written warning, she was absent only when it was abso- lutely necessary. Ochoa warned Bates that she intended to take her discharge as far as she could and hoped that the Company and Bates would be investigated. Ochoa left Bate's office to get her personal belongings and then went to Craddick's office for her paycheck. The foregoing description of what took place on July 14 when Ochoa came to work is based upon the testimony of Ochoa, whose testimony was that of a sincere and reliable witness. Bates' testimony was in sharp conflict with Ochoa's. He testified that after Supervisor Parrish left his office he reconsidered his decision to fire Ochoa and de- cided to give her another chance nd issue her a written warning rather than discharge her. He also testified that 21 The description of what was stated between Bates and Ochoa is based upon Ochoa's testimony. I have rejected Bates' testimony that he did not indicate Ochoa should not go to the doctor but only asked her why she had so many different doctors. Ochoa impressed me as the more credible witness. 22 Bates places the time as about 11:30 a.m. 13 The description of Parrish's conversation with Bates is based upon a synthesis of Mack's and Bates' testimony which was not inconsistent. when Ochoa came into his office that he told her he could not tolerate her absences and, in reply, Ochoa stated Bates could not fire her because she would "have his ass" and would take him to court and to the Teamsters Union and would cause the Company a bunch of trouble. Bates further testified that he viewed Ochoa's outburst as an act of insub- ordination and that upon hearing her reply, he instanta- neously decided to discharge her for insubordination and, because of this, stated to Ochoa: "I can fire you and you are fired." I reject Bates' testimony for these reasons: (a) Bates' demeanor was not that of a sincere or reliable witness. (b) Bates, only I hour before speaking to Ochoa, had rejected a plea by Ochoa's supervisor that Ochoa not be discharged. Rather Bates had emphatically stated he in- tended to fire Ochoa for absenteeism. I recognize Bates tes- tified that immediately after Supervisor Parrish left his of- fice he changed his mind and decided to give Ochoa a written warning instead of discharging her. This self-serving testimony is completely without corroboration. There is no evidence Bates indicated to Supervisor Parrish that he had changed his mind nor is there evidence that Bates had pre- pared a written warning in anticipation of Ochoa's return to work. (c) Bechnel, Respondent's assistant manufacturing direc- tor, called as a witness by the General Counsel, in signifi- cant respects corroborates Ochoa's description of the dis- charge interview. Bechnel, who impressed me as a sincere witness, testified that Ochoa came into the office for her timecard, at which point Bates complained that she was absent from work too frequently and had not brought a slip from the Housing Authority verifying her absence and told Ochoa she was fired. Bechnel further testified that Ochoa did not swear at Bates nor tell Bates she would "have his ass." In evaluating Bechnel's testimony I have considered that she placed the time of Ochoa's discharge interview as tak- ing place at the start of the work day and testified Ochoa on July 14 entered Bates' office only once. Nevertheless, I do not feel that her failure to accurately testify about these matters impugns her testimony on the critical matters in dispute, which testimony she presented in a convincing manner. Likewise, I have given careful consideration to the fact that Bechnel signed a statement for Bates stating that during the discharge interview Ochoa directed profane lan- guage against Bates and the Company. Bechnel credibly testified that this statement is not true that Bates prepared it for her signature and the only reason she signed it was that Bates threatened her with discharge if she refused.2 ' (d) Bates' description of Ochoa's termination has the ap- pearance of a fabrication inasmuch as it is inconsistent with the description contained in his written report submitted to President Levinson shortly after the discharge. In a memo to Levinson dated July 17 Bates reported about Ochoa's termination. The report did not, as Bates testified, state that Ochoa was discharged because she was insubordinate toward Bates by stating, in reply to his criticism about her absenteeism, that he could not fire her as she would "have 24 I have rejected Bates' testimony that Bechnel was not coerced by him into signing the statement. Bechnel impressed me as the more credible wit- ness 514 G. Q. SECURITY PARACHUTES, INC. his ass" and take him to court and to the Teamsters Union and cause the Company trouble. Rather, the import of Bates' report was that Ochoa had been discharged because she was insubordinate in failing to improve her attendance record despite the fact that she had been warned about the matter. And concerning what took place on July 14, Bates' report to Levinson conflicts with Bates' description pre- sented at the hearing. His report admits that it was only after Bates notified Ochoa that she was discharged that Ochoa replied that Bates could not fire her and intended to speak to the Teamsters Union and cause trouble for the Company. Thus, the report states: I informed her that her services could not and would not be tolerated any more. [Emphasis supplied.] She informed me that I could not fire her. I informed her that she was fired and to please leave the premises. She said she would not leave without a letter of termina- tion. I requested her to do so now and that a letter would be mailed at a later date. Ochoa then stated ... 'I am going to the Union and get you into trouble.' I told her to go ahead. She then stated that she 'would take me to court and cause the company a lot of trou- ble.' In short, the plain import of Bates' report to Levinson is that Ochoa was discharged for too many absences. His tes- timony sharply conflicts with his report. In addition, Bates' testimony that Ochoa threatened to "have his ass" is not included in the report.2 Based upon the foregoing I find that on July 14 Bates informed Ochoa she was discharged because of absenteeism and tardiness. I further find that the reason advanced by Respondent at the hearing for Ochoa's termination-insub- ordination-is patently false. 2. Conclusionary findings a. The disciplinary warning On May 22 Respondent issued Ochoa a written warning for poor attendance. Respondent knew she was actively campaigning for the Teamsters Union and was one of its leading advocates. Respondent was extremely hostile toward this Union, and in a series of speeches Respondent's president made this hostility known to the employees. In addition, Respondent's president formed a committee of employees through which Respondent granted employment benefits to the employees for the illegal purpose of under- mining the Teamsters Union's organizational campaign. Also, to make sure the employees understood his message, Respondent's president warned them that their activity on behalf of the Teamsters Union would lead to the loss of their jobs. This was the context in which Respondent issued Ochoa a written warning. The record establishes that when it issued Ochoa's warn- ing, Respondent departed from its normal practice of issu- 21 Bates' explanation for his failure to include Ochoa's threat to "have his ass" in his report to Levinson was not persuasive. He testified his reason for this omission was he is not accustomed to including such language in reports but then, apparently realizing this explanation was not convincing. testified the reason for the omission was. "I didn't think anything like that would he legal. I'm not a lawyer." ing a written warning only after the disciplined employee had been personally counseled.2 6 And, as described in detail supra, employee Garbin, at the time of Ochoa's warning, had a worse attendance record under the management of Levinson and Bates than Ochoa, yet was not issued a writ- ten disciplinary warning. In summation, the relevant facts surrounding Ochoa's written disciplinary warning-the Company's hostility toward the Teamsters Union's organizational campaign ex- pressed by way of an unlawful threat of job loss if the em- ploees supported that Union and the formation of an em- ployee's committee to remedy the employees' grievances so as to undermine the Teamsters Union's organizational cam- paign, Respondent's knowledge of the leadership role of Ochoa in the Teamsters Union's campaign, the discrimina- tion against Ochoa in the issuance of the warning as evi- denced by Respondent's departure from its normal practice in issuing such warnings and its failure to issue a written warning to another employee with a worse attendance rec- ord combine to establish that but for Ochoa's activities on behalf of the Teamsters Union Respondent would not have issued the May 22 written warning. It is for this reason that I find Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act by issuing the May 22 written warning to Ochoa. b. The discharge Ochoa's disciplinary warning for engaging in activities on behalf of the Teamsters Union and Respondent's threat that the employees would suffer the loss of their jobs if they supported the Teamsters Union were ignored by Ochoa who, on the day of the representation election, served as the Teamsters Union's official election observer, thus making it plain to Respondent that she was the leading Teamsters Union advocate among the employees. Six weeks later Ochoa was discharged, ostensibly for absenteeism and tar- diness. The coalescent factors-- Respondent's extreme anti- Teamsters Union bias as evidenced by its unfair labor prac- tices previously found, its knowledge that Ochoa was the leading adherent for the Teamsters Union and its prior dis- crimination against Ochoa on account of her activities on behalf of the Teamsters Union-establish prima afcie that Ochoa's discharge was attributable to her activities on be- half of the Teamsters Union. Maphis Chapman Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 368 F.2d 298, 304 (4th Cir. 1966) "Hence it became incumbent upon the Company, if it would avoid that result, to come forward with a valid explanation for the discharge. The real reason lay exclusively within its knowl- edge." N. L.R.B. v. Miller Redwood Company, 407 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir. 1969). 1 have considered the evidence presented by Respondent to explain Ochoa's discharge and am of the view that it fails to rebut the General Counsel's prima facie case but instead bolsters the General Counsel's case.2 In reaching this conclusion I was influenced by these considerations: 26 Bates testified he disliked issuing wntten warnings and did so only with great reluctance and only after personally counseling the disciplined em- ployee. As I have found supra, Bates did not counsel Ochoa about her at- tendance prior to the May 22 wntten warning. " The law is settled that "the failure of an employer to establish a justifi- able reason for the layoff gives rise to an adverse inference against him." Malphis (Chapman Corporation v. N R B. 368 F.2d 298. 304 (4th Cir. 1966). 515 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (i) As I have previously found, the evidence does not support the rationale of insubordination advanced by Re- spondent to justify Ochoa's discharge. Rather, the record reveals that this reason was a false one. It is settled that if the stated motive for a discharge is found to be false, it can be inferred that the real motive is an unlawful one which the respondent desires to conceal, at least where, as in the instant case, the surrounding facts tend to reinforce that inference. See, Shattuck Denn Mining Corporation [Iron King Branch] v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 466, 470 (9th Cir. 1966). (ii) Respondent was unable to settle on a reason for the discharge. Respondent informed Ochoa that she was dis- charged for poor attendance, but at the hearing contended that she was discharged for insubordination. "[A]n unfavor- able inference may be drawn against the company for its inability to settle upon an explanation for the discharge. This failure 'in itself lends support to the theory that [Ochoa's] union support was the real explanation.'" N.L.R.B. v. Teknor-Apex Company, 468 F.2d 692, 694 (Ist Cir. 1972). (iii) Although it would seem that a discharge when predicated on bona fide grounds would produce harmoni- ous explanations and a consistent story describing the dis- charge, Respondent's evidence is characterized by contra- dictions and inconsistencies. Thus, (I) As I have found supra, Bates' testimony describing the incident which allegedly resulted in Ochoa's discharge sharply conflicts with his description of this incident which he included in a report about the discharge submitted to his superior. (2) Bates and Levinson, Respondent's president, gave conflicting testimony about significant matters such as the identity of the person who decided to discharge Ochoa and about the description of Ochoa's insubordinate conduct which supposedly resulted in her discharge. Bates testified he made the July 14 discharge decision "on [his] own . . . just on the spot during the termination interview when [Ochoa] was insubordinate." He also testified that his con- versation with Levinson on July 14 consisted of simply re- porting that he had terminated Ochoa for insubordination. On the other hand, Levinson testified, "I made the decision to discharge Ochoa" and, also contrary to Bates, testified there was a detailed conversation between himself and Bates on July 14 about the discharge during which Levin- son told Bates, "[Y]ou tell me right now why you fired Ochoa because I'm not sure you have because I haven't told you whether you can or not."" Bates and Levinson also contradicted one another when they described the al- leged insubordinate conduct which they testified resulted in Ochoa's termination. Ochoa was insubordinate because, ac- cording to Bates, she stated to him: "I can't fire her. I'll have your ass. I'll take you to court. I'll go to the Team- sters. I'll cause the company a bunch of trouble." Levinson considerably embellished upon Bates' description, testifying that Ochoa was terminated because she told Bates: "[D]on't give me any of that shit, you son of a bitch, I'll tell 21 I note that this does not seem plausible inasmuch as the record reveals that Bates normally dealt with all personnel problems, including discharges involving the production employees, without consulting Levinson. you what you can and cannot do to me and tell me. You can't fire me because I'll have your ass." [Emphasis supplied.] I am of the opinion that the aforesaid significant contra- dictions between Bates' and Levinson's testimony and be- tween Bates' testimony and his report submitted to Levin- son indicate that the testimony of Bates and Levinson was a fabrication. Based upon the foregoing, I conclude that the moving cause for Ochoa's discharge was her activity on behalf of the Teamsters Union and that she would not have been discharged but for that activity. It is for this reason that I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)3) and () of the Act by discharging her. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Teamsters Union, the Upholsterers Union, and the Works Committee each is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By dominating and interfering with the formation and administration of the Works Committee and by contribut- ing financial and other support to it, the Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)2) and (1) of the Act. 4. By establishing a committee of employees, the Works Committee, for the purpose of soliciting and remedying em- ployees' grievances to discourage the employees from sup- porting an independent union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. By threatening employees with the loss of their jobs if they supported the Teamsters Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. 6. By issuing a written warning to Deborah Ochoa and discharging her because of her activities on behalf of the Teamsters Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (I) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 8. Respondent has not otherwise violated the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer- tain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action de- signed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Respondent has illegally dominated and interfered with the formation and administration of the Works Committee and has contributed financial and other support to it, I shall recommend that Respondent perma- nently withdraw and withhold all recognition from, and completely disestablish, the Works Committee, or any suc- cessor thereto, as a bargaining representative of any of its employees. Having found that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discriminatorily discharging Ochoa, I shall recommend that Respondent offer to fully and imme- diately reinstate her to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent job. I shall also recommend that Respondent make her whole for any loss 516 G. Q. SECURITY PARACHUTES, INC. of earnings she may have suffered by reason of the discrimi- nation against her. by payment of a sum of money equal to that which she would have earned from the date of her unlawful discharge, less her net earnings, if any, during such period, to be computed in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950). Interest on the backpay shall be computed as set forth in our deci- sion in Florida Steel Corporation, 231 NLRB 651 (1977). See, generally, Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of facts, conclu- sions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER29 The Respondent, G. Q. Parachutes, Inc., San Leandro, California, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Assisting, dominating, contributing financial or other support to, or interfering with the administration of the Works Committee or any other labor organization of its employees. (b) Establishing a committee of employees for the pur- pose of soliciting and remedying employees' grievances to discourage the employees from supporting an independent union or otherwise soliciting and remedying employees' grievances to discourage them from supporting an indepen- dent union. (c) Threatening the employees with the loss of their jobs if they support Warehouse, Mail Order, and Retail Em- ployees Union, Local 853, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, or any other labor organization. (d) Discharging, disciplining, or otherwise discriminating against employees for supporting or engaging in activities on behalf of Warehouse, Mail Order, and Retail Employees Union, Local 853, affiliated with the International Brother- hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help- ers of America, or any other labor organization. (e) In any other manner intefering with or attempting to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 2. Take the following action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Deborah Ochoa full and immediate reinstate- ment to her former position or, if that position no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, with full se- niority, privileges, and benefits, and make her whole for any losses she may have suffered because of the discrimination practiced against her, in accordance with the provisions set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Expunge and physically remove from its records and files the written disciplinary warning issued to Deborah Ochoa on May 22, 1978, and any reference thereto. (c) Withdraw and withhold all recognition from, and completely disestablish, the Works Committee, or any suc- cessor thereto, as the representative of any of its employees for the purpose of dealing with Respondent concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of em- ployment, or conditions of work. (d) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records. timecards. personnel records and reports, and all other records neces- sary to analyze the amount of backpay due and the right of reinstatement under the terms of this Order. (e) Post at its San Leandro, California, facility, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."0 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 32, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 con- secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted." Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered bN any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 32, in writ- ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed as to those allegations not specifically found herein. " In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a Un.. States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted b5 Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board." 1' The record reveals that a substantial number of Respondent's employees are of foreign extraction who have a limited understanding of the English language, accordingly, the notices herein shall be printed in the several lan- guages used for the election notices posted in Case 32-RD-86. 517