S.D.I. Operating Partners, L.P.

111 321 NLRB No. 24 S.D.I. OPERATING PARTNERS, L.P. 1 In agreeing with the hearing officer that Michael D. Williams is an employee, we rely on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, 116 S.Ct. 450 (1995), vacating 34 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1994). No exceptions were filed concerning the ballots of John S. Vasconcellos and Darryl Fakhreich, and we adopt pro forma the hearing officer’s recommendation to overrule the challenge to Vasconcellos’ ballot and to sustain the challenge to Fakhreich’s ballot. S.D.I. Operating Partners, L.P., Harding Glass Di- vision and Glaziers, Architectural Metal & Glass Workers Local Union No. 558, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, AFL–CIO, Petitioner. Case 17– RC–11262 April 30, 1996 DECISION, DIRECTION, AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS BROWNING AND COHEN The National Labor Relations Board, by a three- member panel, has considered determinative challenges in an election held August 11, 1995, and the hearing officer’s report recommending disposition of them. The election was conducted pursuant to a Stipulated Elec- tion Agreement. The tally of ballots shows 5 for and 4 against the Petitioner, with 4 challenged ballots, a number sufficient to affect the results. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has reviewed the record in light of the exceptions and brief and has adopted the hearing offi- cer’s findings and recommendations only to the extent consistent with this decision.1 Contrary to the hearing officer, we find that David W. Decamp is not a super- visor under Section 2(11) of the Act, and that the chal- lenge to his ballot should thus be overruled. Decamp is a leadman glazier who has worked on field projects and at the time of the hearing was as- signed to the Employer’s auto glass shop. Before the start of a new field project, Decamp would meet with Facility Manager Gary Schamberger and Contract Manager Shane Riggs to discuss the Employer’s staff- ing needs for the project. Schamberger testified that he made the ultimate determination regarding staffing, but relied on Decamp’s input concerning the number of employees needed to accomplish the tasks involved in a particular project. As the highest ranking individual present at field locations, Decamp gave the other gla- ziers their assignments, distributing the work based in part on his past observations concerning the employ- ees’ qualifications. Decamp also instructed other em- ployees as needed in accomplishing the work, relying on his own experience and expertise, as well as the in- struction manuals provided by the suppliers of the products being installed. Decamp lacks the authority to grant overtime without consulting Schamberger, to re- quire an employee to work overtime, which is vol- untary, or generally to grant time off, although he did so on one occasion when an employee’s wife called to report that the sheriff was at their home. Contrary to the hearing officer, we find that the re- sponsibilities carried out by Decamp with respect to the assignment and direction of employees do not dem- onstrate the exercise of independent judgment, but rather involve routine decisions typical of leadman po- sitions that are found by the Board not to be statutory supervisors. See, e.g., Hydro Conduit Corp., 254 NLRB 433 (1981); Jordan Marsh Stores, 317 NLRB 460, 467 (1995); North Shores Weeklies, 317 NLRB 1128 (1995); and Brown & Root, Inc., 314 NLRB 19, 21–22 (1994). As a leadman, Decamp provides direc- tion and guidance to other employees involved in a project based on his experience and craft skill. He di- rects employees to perform various necessary tasks ac- cording to the skills they have previously dem- onstrated, inquiring of the employees, as needed, whether a particular job is within their expertise. These responsibilities involve no real managerial discretion that would require the exercise of independent judg- ment. We particularly find that Decamp’s participation with conceded supervisors in determining the Employ- er’s staffing needs for a project does not render De- camp a supervisor. Responsibility for planning or de- signing a project, which may involve determining such matters as the appropriate staffing, materials, and schedule, must be distinguished from the exercise of authority and independent judgment in the role of as- signing and directing employees in the accomplishment of the work. Decamp’s input to Schamberger and Riggs regarding staffing does not alter the routine na- ture of his role in assigning and directing employees. Similarly, we find that Decamp does not possess au- thority to discipline employees. The record shows that, as the leadman on field projects and in the auto glass shop, Decamp informs employees of the Employer’s work rules regarding such matters as safety, breaks, and smoking, and corrects employees who fail to com- ply with those rules. Schamberger testified as follows concerning Decamp’s authority in disciplinary matters, in response to questions from the counsel for the Gen- eral Counsel: Q. Has Mr. Decamp ever issued a disciplinary action against an employee? A. He may have. Q. Do you know specifically of an incident where he has disciplined someone or issued some sort of disciplinary warning? A. No, I don’t, but I’m not saying there isn’t because I think there is a time or two in the past where Dave has done that. Q. Okay. And in your—your best recollection of those time or two incidents in the past, did he 112 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2 We find it unnecessary to consider the secondary indicia relied on by the hearing officer, such as Decamp’s pay differential, his not being required to punch a timeclock, his status as the most senior employee at the project site, and the lack of an onsite statutory su- pervisor if Decamp were not found to be one. In the absence of pri- mary indicia as enumerated in Sec. 2(11), these secondary indicia are insufficient to establish supervisory status. See, e.g., J. C. Brock Corp., 314 NLRB 157, 159 (1994); Billows Electric Supply, 311 NLRB 878 fn. 2 (1993); Hydro Conduit, supra at 441; and Windemuller Electric, 306 NLRB 664, 666–667 (1992), modified on other grounds 34 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. Sept. 14, 1994). 1 See my dissenting opinions in Providence Hospital, 320 NLRB 717 (1996), and Ten Broeck Commons, 320 NLRB 806 (1996). 2 Unlike the majority, I would not dismiss Schamberger’s testi- mony in this regard as a ‘‘vague recollection.’’ As a representative of the party opposing supervisory status, Schamberger’s statement represents an admission of Decamp’s authority. 3 See, e.g., DST Industries, 310 NLRB 957, 958 (1993), and Opelika Foundry, 281 NLRB 897, 899 (1986), and cases cited there. actually fill out a form saying, you know, ‘‘Em- ployee Joe Blow did X or failed to do X.’’ He would fill out some sort of documentation to that effect? A. I think it’s something he made up, yes. Q. Did he—what would he do with it? What do you recall him doing with this document that he prepared? A. Confront the employee. Q. And — A. Probably have him sign it. Q. Okay. And then what, if anything, would he do with it at that point? Would he give it to you? A. Yes. . . . . Q. Those instances when he has written up some sort of disciplinary form or action against an employee, what did you do about that situation, if anything? A. I don’t think anything was done with it. Decamp testified that he has never completed a com- pany disciplinary form, but has provided written and oral reports of incidents to Schamberger. Instructing employees concerning the Employer’s rules, even in their breach, demonstrates neither au- thority over the employees nor the exercise of inde- pendent judgment as required by Section 2(11). More- over, Schamberger’s vague recollection does not estab- lish that Decamp has in fact disciplined any employee, or that whatever possible action he may have taken had any effect, immediate or long term, on the em- ployee involved. The evidence thus fails to show that Decamp has authority to discipline employees. See Hydro Conduit, supra at 437–438; Jordan Marsh, supra at 467; and North Shore Weeklies, supra at 1130.2 DIRECTION IT IS DIRECTED that the Regional Director for Re- gion 17 shall within 10 days from the date of this di- rection open and count the ballots of David W. De- camp, John S. Vasconcellos, and Michael D. Williams, and thereafter prepare and cause to be served on the parties a revised tally of ballots, upon which he shall issue the appropriate certification. ORDER It is ordered that the above-entitled matter be, and is, remanded to the Regional Director for Region 17 for further processing consistent with this decision. MEMBER COHEN, dissenting in part. Contrary to my colleagues, I would adopt the hear- ing officer’s finding that Lead Glazier David W. De- camp is a supervisor. As my colleagues concede, before the start of a new field project, the Employer’s managers and Decamp meet to discuss staffing needs for the upcoming project. The Employer relies on Decamp’s rec- ommendations in determining that staffing. In addition, on field projects, Decamp is the highest ranking individual present. He gives other glaziers their assignments, and these assignments are based, in substantial part, on his independent view of the em- ployees’ qualifications. Decamp also instructs employ- ees concerning the methods for accomplishing their work, relying in this regard on his own expertise and experience. In sum, Decamp uses independent judgment in di- recting and assigning employees. He also uses such judgment in making recommendations regarding staff- ing. As I have said elsewhere, the essence of an inde- pendent judgment is that it is based on one’s personal experiences and expertise, rather than on some outside source.1 That is the case with respect to Decamp’s judgments here. Further, the Employer (the party opposing a finding that Decamp is a supervisor) acknowledged that De- camp has exercised authority to discipline employees by issuing written reprimands to them.2 Similarly, the Employer admitted that Decamp has the authority to decide, on his own, to let someone go home from the jobsite. I recognize that these exercises of supervisory authority have not been frequent. However, as the Board has often stated, individuals with statutory su- pervisory authority do not lose their status simply be- cause they exercise that authority infrequently.3 Finally, as the hearing officer found, secondary indi- cia also suggest that Decamp is a supervisor. He is paid more than other glaziers and he does not use a timeclock. Further, if Decamp is not a supervisor, then glaziers working on field projects would generally be unsupervised. For all of these reasons, I would adopt the hearing officer’s finding of supervisory status.