Selkirk Metalbestos

44 321 NLRB No. 9 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1 The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is de- nied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties. 2 In adopting the judge’s dismissal of the allegation that the Re- spondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) by unilaterally restricting the Union’s access to the plant lunchroom, we emphasize that the record fails to show any factual basis to support a finding that the Union’s access to employees was less restrictive or more confidential before the change. Thus, the General Counsel failed to show that the change was a substantial and material one about which the Respondent was required to bargain. Given our adoption of the judge’s finding that the Respondent vio- lated Sec. 8(a)(1) by threatening dire consequences if the Union won the decertification election, we believe it would be cumulative to find that the Respondent also threatened plant closure. We therefore find it unnecessary to pass on the General Counsel’s exception to the judge’s dismissal of the plant closure allegation. Consequently, we shall deny as moot the Respondent’s motion to reopen the record to introduce further evidence concerning such an allegation. The Charging Party has excepted to the judge’s failure to find that the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) by failing to meet and bargain with the Union. We find it unnecessary to pass on the issue the Charging Party’s exception raises because the finding of such an ad- ditional 8(a)(5) violation would be cumulative and would not affect the Order. 3 Member Cohen agrees with his colleagues that the withdrawal of recognition on April 29, 1993, was unlawful. Respondent could not rely on the election results of April 15. Although the Union lost that election, the election was later set aside as invalid. However, Mem- ber Cohen finds it unnecessary to rely on W. A. Krueger, 299 NLRB 914 (1990). In that case, the union lost the election, and that result was upheld. Selkirk Metalbestos, North America, Eljer Manu- facturing, Inc. and Sheet Metal Workers Local #213, AFL–CIO. Cases 27–CA–12556–2, 27– CA–12633, and 27–CA–12821 April 26, 1996 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS BROWNING AND COHEN On February 28, 1995, Administrative Law Judge Burton Litvack issued the attached decision. The Re- spondent, the General Counsel, and the Charging Party filed exceptions and supporting briefs, and the Re- spondent and the Charging Party filed answering briefs and reply briefs to the answering briefs. The Respond- ent also filed a motion to reopen the record, and the General Counsel filed a response opposing the motion. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs1 and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,2 and conclusions3 and to adopt the recommended Order as modified. The General Counsel has excepted to the judge’s failure to find that the Respondent violated the Act by promising employees a plan for handling complaints if they did not select the Union as their bargaining rep- resentative. We find merit to this exception. In April 1993, during the decertification election campaign, the Respondent’s plant manager, Walter Crew, read and posted a list of questions and answers about the election. In response to a question about whether there would be a procedure for handling griev- ances, Crew stated, ‘‘If the Union is voted out, I will sit down with all employees to devise a plan for the handling of complaints.’’ The judge found that Crew’s statement made no commitment with regard to a grievance procedure and therefore was not unlawful. We disagree. There can be no doubt that the statement ‘‘I will sit down with all employees to devise a plan for the han- dling of complaints’’ is a promise that there will be a complaint procedure if the Union loses the election. A complaint procedure is a benefit. Thus, the statement is an explicit promise of a benefit. The statement ex- plicitly links the benefit to the election results. Concededly, Crew made no commitment as to the specifics of the promised complaint procedure. But, the fact that the details of a promised benefit are not speci- fied does not mean no promise has been made. What is critical is whether the statement is a promise. We see no other way of interpreting the statement. See Pincus Elevator & Electric Co., 308 NLRB 684, 692 (1992), enfd. 998 F.2d 1004 (3d Cir. 1993) (statement that respondent was considering a pension plan con- tained implied promise of benefit). We conclude, in agreement with the General Coun- sel’s exception, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) by promising employees a plan for handling complaints if they did not select the Union as their bargaining representative. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec- ommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Respondent, Sel- kirk Metalbestos, North America, Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., Nampa, Idaho, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified. 1. Insert the following as paragraph 1(f) and reletter the subsequent paragraphs. ‘‘(f) Promising employees a plan for handling com- plaints if they did not select the Union as their bar- gaining representative.’’ 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the ad- ministrative law judge. 45 SELKIRK METALBESTOS APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to provide to Sheet Metal Workers Local #213, AFL–CIO information per- taining to the costs, attendant to its bargaining unit em- ployees’ health insurance plan, to itself and to the em- ployees, which information is necessary and relevant for the purpose of collective bargaining. WE WILL NOT impliedly promise that our employees will receive a wage increase for voting against the Union in the decertification election by stating to them that the Union has prevented them from receiving a wage increase. WE WILL NOT impliedly promise that each of our employees will be given a 401(k) savings plan if they vote against the Union in the decertification election by informing them that all of our unrepresented em- ployees have such a benefit. WE WILL NOT promise our employees retroactive pay raises in order to induce them to vote against the Union in the decertification election. WE WILL NOT threaten our employees with sinister consequences if the Union prevails in the decertifica- tion election. WE WILL NOT withdraw recognition from the Union as the exclusive representative for purposes of collec- tive bargaining of our bargaining unit employees. WE WILL NOT promise employees a plan for han- dling complaints if they do not select the Union in the decertification election. WE WILL NOT unilaterally, and without bargaining with the Union, implement changes in the contractual grievance-and-arbitration procedure. WE WILL NOT unilaterally, without the consent of the Union and in the absence of a bargaining impasse, implement a requirement that our bargaining unit em- ployees contribute a monthly copayment to the cost of their health insurance coverage. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union as the exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargaining of our employees in the follow- ing appropriate unit and WE WILL, if the bargaining re- sults in an agreed-on collective-bargaining agreement, embody such in writing: All production and maintenance employees in- cluding shipping and receiving employees, em- ployed at our Nampa Idaho plant; excluding all office clerical employees, professional guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL, on request, provide updated information to the Union pertaining to our health insurance costs. WE WILL rescind any changes in our employees’ contractual grievance-and-arbitration procedure and the requirement that our employees contribute a monthly copayment toward the cost of their health insurance coverage and WE WILL reimburse our employees for any deductions we have made from their monthly wages for the copayment of the cost of their health in- surance, with interest. SELKIRK METALBESTORS, NORTH AMERICA, ELJER MANUFACTURING, INC. Chet Blue Sky, Esq. and Gene Chavez, Esq., for the General Counsel. Frank Parker, Esq. (Meier & Parker, L. C.), of Bedford, Texas, for the Respondent. Alan Herzfeld, Esq. (Nevin, Kofoed, & Herzfeld), of Boise, Idaho, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE BURTON LITVACK, Administrative Law Judge. The unfair labor practice charge in Case 27–CA–12556–2 was filed by Sheet Metal Workers Local #213, AFL–CIO (the Union), on April 21, 1993; the original and first amended unfair labor practice charges in Case 27–CA–12633 were filed by the Union on May 10 and 24, 1993, respectively; and the origi- nal and first amended unfair labor practice charges in Case 27–CA–12821 were filed by the Union on September 27 and October 12, 1993, respectively. On October 19, 1993, the Regional Director for Region 27 of the National Labor Rela- tions Board (the Board) issued an order consolidating the aforementioned unfair labor practice charges and an amended consolidated complaint, alleging that Selkirk Metalbestos, North America, Eljer Manufacturing, Inc. (Respondent) had engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). Subse- quently, Respondent timely filed an answer, denying the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices. Pursuant to a notice of hearing, this proceeding came to trial before me on April 14 and 15, 1994, in Boise, Idaho. At the trial, all parties were afforded the opportunity to offer into the record all relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine all wit- nesses, to argue their legal positions orally, and to file posthearing briefs. The latter documents were filed by coun- sel for each of the parties, and the briefs have been carefully considered by me. Accordingly, based on the entire record here, including the posthearing briefs and my observations of the testimonial demeanor of the several witnesses, I make the following 46 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1 Respondent admits that it is now, and has been at all times mate- rial, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec. 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is now, and has been at all times material, a labor organization within the meaning of Sec. 2(5) of the Act. 2 While the amended consolidated complaint seemingly alleges that Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to bargain with Respondent, counsel for the General Counsel stated, at the hearing, that the General Counsel would offer no proof of such a violation of the Act and, in their posthearing brief, counsel limit their contentions as set forth infra. FINDINGS OF FACT1 I. THE ISSUES The amended consolidated complaint alleges that, prior to the holding of a decertification election, Respondent engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, by threatening its employees with bad consequences and un- specified harm if they selected the Union as their representa- tive for purposes of collective bargaining; by threatening its employees with plant closure if they selected the Union as their bargaining representative; by promising its employees a retroactive wage increase, a pension plan, and a plan for han- dling complaints if they did not select the Union as their bar- gaining representative; and by stating to employees that the Union had prevented them from receiving a pay raise. Fur- ther, the amended consolidated complaint alleges that Re- spondent failed and refused to bargain in good faith with the Union in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act,2 by, prior to the holding of a decertification election, failing and refusing to provide to the Union information, which is nec- essary and relevant to the Union’s performance of its duties as the collective-bargaining representative of certain of Re- spondent’s employees, and by unilaterally restricting the Union’s plant visitation rights, which were established by the parties’ most recent collective-bargaining agreement; by withdrawing recognition from the Union as the collective- bargaining representative of certain of its employees; by uni- laterally discontinuing the grievance procedure, set forth in the parties’ most recent collective-bargaining agreement; and by unilaterally implementing a health insurance copay obli- gation for bargaining unit employees. Respondent denies the commission of any of the aforementioned unfair labor prac- tice allegations. Specifically, Respondent contends that it withdrew recognition from the Union based on objective considerations that it no longer represented a majority of bar- gaining unit employees and that, therefore, it lawfully dis- continued utilizing the contractual grievance procedure and lawfully implemented the aforementioned insurance copay obligation. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background Significant facts are not in dispute here. Thus, the record establishes that Respondent is a multinational corporation with plants in the United States and Canada; that Respondent is engaged in the business of manufacturing heating, ventila- tion, and air-conditioning equipment for commercial, remod- eling, repair, and industrial markets; that it maintains an of- fice and plant facility located in Nampa, Idaho; that, at the facility, Respondent manufactures sheet metal venting sys- tems for heating and cooling systems; that Jon Crilly, whose office is in Dallas, Texas, is Respondent’s vice president of operations; and that Walter J. Crew is the plant manager of Respondent’s Nampa facility. The record further establishes that, since approximately 1977, Respondent has recognized the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of its production and maintenance employees, including shipping and receiving employees; that there are approximately 150 employees in the bargaining unit; that Respondent’s recogni- tion of the Union has been memorialized in successive col- lective-bargaining agreements between the parties, the most recent of which was effective from July 8, 1988, through July 8, 1991; that, commencing on or about June 4, 1991, and prior to its expiration, the parties held approximately 12 bargaining sessions on a successor to their most recent agree- ment; that, subsequent to the contract’s expiration, the parties engaged in bargaining on six occasions, with their final bar- gaining session held on February 24, 1993; and that, as of the date, the unresolved major issues were wages, the retro- activity of any wage increase, a personal holiday, the retire- ment income benefits plan for the bargaining unit employees, and Respondent’s demand that each employee make a monthly contribution toward the cost of his or her health in- surance coverage, the so-called health insurance copayment. On February 9, 1993, a decertification petition, in Case 27– RD–948, was filed with Region 27, seeking to decertify the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of Respond- ent’s employees in the above-described unit, and on April 15, 1993, the decertification election was conducted, with 68 votes cast in favor of the Union and 73 votes cast against representation by the Union. Thereafter, on April 20, the Union filed objections to Respondent’s conduct, allegedly af- fecting the results of the decertification election, and on May 26, 1993, the Regional Director for Region 27 issued a sup- plemental decision, finding merit to certain of the Union’s objections and ordering that the decertification election, which was conducted on April 15, be set aside and that a rerun election be conducted. Respondent filed a request for review of the Regional Director’s supplemental decision and orders, and on March 23, 1994, the Board denied Respond- ent’s request for review. B. Respondent’s Alleged Failure and Refusal to Provide Information Pertaining to Health Insurance Costs 1. The facts There is no dispute that, on January 5, 1993, Frank Raimondi, who is the Regional Director of Region 4 of the Sheet Metal Workers’ International Association and who par- ticipated in the contract bargaining between Respondent and the Union, sent a letter to Jon Crilly, which among other points, stated that ‘‘the company demand for an employee copayment toward the company health care program remains a major roadblock. The union must have all pertinent infor- mation with respect to present and projected cost to both the company and the employees. This information must include data either supporting the inability of the company to con- tinue coverage under the present system, or whatever other reasons may exist.’’ There is no record evidence that Re- spondent ever sought clarification from Raimondi as to the information sought or that it ever provided the requested in- formation to the Union. Walter Crew testified that Respond- 47 SELKIRK METALBESTOS 3 Raimondi hedged on this point during cross-examination. Thus, when asked by Respondent’s counsel whether the Union had, in fact, received health care cost information beyond the booklet, Raimondi replied, ‘‘I received some information, but specifically, I do not re- call anything other than the employee booklet.’’ 4 The information is contained in the final five pages of R. Exh. 3. 5 He recalled looking at R. Exh. 3 because ‘‘the insurance was the main topic,’’ and ‘‘that’s the reason why I went.’’ ent felt that Raimondi’s request constituted harassment and that ‘‘we felt we had already given them the information. They were asking for the same thing.’’ In this regard, on January 15, 1993, Crilly wrote to Raimondi that Respondent was ‘‘under no legal obligation to open confidential company records to you and we will not do so.’’ As to prior requests for health insurance cost information and whatever may have been provided to the Union in that regard, Raimondi testified that he made an oral request for health care cost information on June 18, 1991, and a written request 13 days later and that, other than ‘‘the booklet that they had made available to all the employees,’’ which was provided to the Union at the start of bargaining, the Union received no information from Respondent regarding health care costs prior to January 5, 1993.3 Raimondi further testi- fied that he made ‘‘numerous’’ other requests for health care cost information during the course of the bargaining, but, later, when asked specifically if he had made any other such requests, he averred, ‘‘[N]ot to my recollection.’’ Contrary to Raimondi, Walter Crew testified that, on or about July 1, 1991, the Union submitted a 22-page information request, in- cluding a request for a summary description of Respondent’s health insurance plan and ‘‘a cost breakdown of the plan’’ to Respondent, and in response, on July 12, Respondent pro- vided information to the Union, including a copy of its insur- ance booklet. At the next bargaining session between the par- ties, referring to the insurance booklet, ‘‘[Raimondi] said that was not what he was asking for, he needed financial infor- mation on the health plan’’ in order to compare Respond- ent’s health insurance plan to a union health insurance plan, and, on July 16, by facsimile transmission, Raimondi sent Crilly a copy of a letter from a health benefits coordinator of the Sheet Metal Workers’ National Health Fund, together with an attached health insurance financial information re- quest. In response, according to Crew, at the parties’ August 1, 1991 bargaining session, Respondent provided the Union with a five-page document, setting forth financial information pertaining to Respondent’s health insurance plan for the bar- gaining unit employees.4 While Raimondi and Floyd Reichert, the Union’s business manager, each denied ever viewing or receiving this health insurance information, employee Thomas Smith, who served on the Union’s negotiating committee during the bargaining for the successor to the agreement, which expired in 1991, testified, on behalf of Respondent, that he saw the disputed insurance financial information in Reichert’s office in Boise, Idaho, sometime in 1991 when ‘‘we were trying to figure out a plan on insurance which would be feasible, and we were thinking about dumping the Company’s insurance and going with [the Union’s plan], and we compared the both of them.’’5 Further, Walter Crew was unable to recall any com- plaints by the Union, between August 1, 1991, and January 5, 1993, that it was unable to bargain over the health insur- ance copayment issue due to a lack of financial information and denied that, at the February 24, 1993 bargaining session, the Union renewed its request for the health insurance infor- mation, which is the subject of the instant unfair labor prac- tice allegation. Finally, asked if, between August 1991 and January 1993, the projected cost of Respondent’s health in- surance plan had changed, Crew testified, ‘‘I just know that health care costs have been going up every year for the last several years.’’ 2. Analysis It has long been established that, generally, an employer is under a statutory obligation to, on request, provide a labor organization, which is the collective-bargaining representative of the employer’s employees, with information, which is nec- essary and relevant for the proper performance of the labor organization’s duties in representing the bargaining unit em- ployees. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); and Aero- space Corp., 314 NLRB 100 (1994). This duty to provide in- formation encompasses not only material necessary and rel- evant for the purpose of contract negotiations but also infor- mation necessary for administration of a collective-bargain- ing agreement, including information required by the labor organization to process a grievance. NLRB v. Acme Indus- trial, supra; Bacardi Corp., 296 NLRB 1220, 1222–1223 (1989); Howard University, 290 NLRB 1006 (1988). The standard for relevancy is a ‘‘liberal discovery-type standard,’’ with the sought-after information not having to be nec- essarily dispositive of the issue between the parties but only of some bearing on it and of probable use to the labor orga- nization in carrying out its statutory responsibilities. Aero- space Corp., supra; Bacardi Corp., supra; Pfizer, Inc., 268 NLRB 916 (1984). ‘‘[N]ecessity is not a separate and unique guideline, but is directly related to the relevance of the re- quested data.’’ Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1965); Bacardi Corp., supra. Moreover, informa- tion, which concerns the terms and conditions of employment of the bargaining unit employees, is deemed ‘‘so intrinsic to the core of the employer-employee relationship’’ so as to be presumptively relevant. York International Corp., 290 NLRB 438 (1988), quoting Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 173 NLRB 172 (1968); Buffalo Concrete, 276 NLRB 839 (1985). Information pertaining to employees’ health insurance has long been deemed to be of this type and, accordingly, must be furnished on request. Deadline Express, 313 NLRB 1244 (1994). In light of the foregoing, turning to the instant unfair labor practice allegation, the record establishes that Respond- ent’s demand for an employee health insurance monthly co- payment was a major issue during the contract bargaining be- tween Respondent and the Union; that, in view of the de- mand, on January 5, 1993, the Union requested information, pertaining to the cost of Respondent’s health insurance plan to the Company and to the employees; and that Respondent failed to comply with the Union’s request. Also, contrary to the contention of Respondent, the Union had a legitimate need for the information sought. Thus, while I believe that Respondent did, in fact, provide health insurance cost infor- 48 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 6 On this point, I specifically rely on the forthright testimony of employee Thomas Smith over that of Frank Raimondi and Floyd Reichert, neither of whom was a particularly impressive witness. 7 Reichert explained that meetings in the lunchroom were required as ‘‘I need to keep it confidential when I talk to [employees].’’ mation to the Union in August 1991,6 by January 1993, the information was, at least, 18 months old, and Walter Crew conceded that the costs attendant to health insurance increase each year. Finally, I note that, if Respondent believed the Union’s information request was overly broad or ambiguous, rather than refusing to comply, its obligation was to seek clarification and that no such clarification request was made. National Electrical Contractors Assn., Birmingham Chapter, 313 NLRB 770, 771 (1994). Based on the foregoing and the record as a whole, I believe that Respondent engaged in con- duct, violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, by fail- ing to comply with the Union’s January 5, 1993 information request. Deadline Express, supra. C. Respondent’s Alleged Unilateral Restriction of the Union’s Contractual Plant Visitation Rights 1. The facts The facts pertaining to this alleged violation of the Act are not in dispute. Thus, article 18 of the parties’ most recent collective-bargaining agreement provides: A representative of the Union shall be permitted to visit the office or plants of the Company for the pur- pose of investigating any matter arising out of this Agreement after notifying a representative of the Com- pany of his intention to do so. The Union representative shall not unreasonably interfere with the normal work duties of employees or the operation of the plant. Floyd Reichert, the business manager of the Union, testi- fied that the parties’ standard procedure for his plant visita- tions was that he would announce his presence to the recep- tionist; that Walter Crew would come out to the reception area and escort him to the employee lunchroom; and that he would then be allowed to conduct his business. Asked, dur- ing cross-examination, if he was required to be investigating a grievance or if he was permitted to speak to employees generally, Reichert replied, ‘‘That was open . . . . I could go in and talk to two or three [employees] during the lunch period’’ as long as Crew was in the plant. Reichert testified that Respondent abruptly changed this practice in late February or early March 1993 without notice to the Union and without any explanation. According to him, he visited the plant on that occasion in order to investigate a possible grievance and was taken by Crew to a conference room and was told to confer with the shop stewards in that room. Thereafter, in order to continue to investigate the grievance allegations, Reichert requested permission to meet with the employees, who were involved, in their lunchroom,7 but Crew refused to permit him to do so. Reichert objected to this change in practice and asked why; Crew responded, ‘‘You just can’t go.’’ Reichert also testified with regard to a subsequent incident, which occurred on March 22. On that occasion, he arrived at the plant during the bargaining unit employees’ lunch period. He was accompanied by two new union organizers, one of whom spoke Spanish, and intended to introduce them to the employees in the lunchroom. He re- quested permission to address the employees there; however, Crew again denied him access to the lunchroom. Crew, who testified that ‘‘I can’t recall [Reichert] coming [to the plant] when it wasn’t to deal with a grievance’’ and that ‘‘we would normally arrange it that the lunchroom would be free for that,’’ conceded that ‘‘there was a period of time . . . where I had them meet in the conference room. Once or twice, Floyd had wanted to go to the lunchroom, but the tensions were just getting too high, and I thought it better if they meet in the conference room.’’ Crew added that Reichert was provided with everyone with whom he desired to meet and that, while the union official asked why, he did not object. With regard to the March 22 incident, Crew testi- fied that Reichert and the two other union officials arrived at the plant and that, after Reichert mentioned some griev- ances and a need to speak to the shop stewards, ‘‘I took them into the conference room and called for the stewards.’’ A short while later, the Spanish-speaking official said that he wanted to address the employees in the lunchroom during their lunch hour. Crew added that such had never previously occurred; that he asked the three men to wait while he con- ferred with Respondent’s attorney; and that he returned and informed the union officials ‘‘that they were not to be per- mitted to address the employees in the lunchroom.’’ 2. Analysis Counsel for the General Counsel and counsel for the Charging Party are correct that a contractual provision, which permits a union access to an employer’s facility, survives the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement. Laverdiere’s Enterprises, 297 NLRB 826, 833 (1990), enfd. in relevant part 933 F.2d 1045 (1st Cir. 1991). Contrary to both counsel, however, I do not believe that, in the above-described cir- cumstances, Respondent engaged in acts and conduct viola- tive of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. Thus, while the expired collective-bargaining agreement here permitted union access in order to investigate matters arising under the terms of the agreement, while the parties’ past practice seems to have been that Business Manager Reichert was permitted to discuss grievances with employees and shop stewards in the lunchroom, and while, on an occasion in late February or early March, he was denied permission to discuss a griev- ance with the involved employees in that area of Respond- ent’s facility, the record establishes that, on the occasion at issue, Reichert was permitted to speak to whomever he de- sired in a conference room and that he did so. Moreover, there is no record evidence that Respondent’s conduct dis- rupted Reichert’s ability to investigate the grievance, which necessitated his visit to the plant. Therefore, in my view, the mere fact that Reichert was unable to speak to the employees where he desired to do so was not of sufficient moment so as to arise to the level of an unfair labor practice, and I so find. With regard to the March 22 incident, it appears that, rather than for the purpose of investigating a contractual grievance, Reichert requested permission to use the lunch- room in order to facilitate a Spanish-speaking organizer’s ef- forts to address the bargaining unit employees. Inasmuch as the expired collective-bargaining agreement permitted access for the limited purpose of investigating contractual griev- ances and as there is no record evidence that union officials previously had been permitted access to the lunchroom in 49 SELKIRK METALBESTOS 8 The record contains Respondent’s written responses to, at least, 48 employee questions during the preelection period. 9 With regard to the matter of a wage increase, the record estab- lishes that, in the summer of 1991, as part of its successor contract proposal, Respondent had offered a 10-percent raise over the pro- posed effective period of the contract (35 cents per hour the first year, 30 cents the second year, and 30 cents the third year); that the offer remained in effect during bargaining in 1992; and that such was contained in Respondent’s contract offer on February 24, 1993. 10 Notwithstanding Crew’s attempt to negate the alleged unlawful effect of his comment, Respondent continued to insist that the Union was the cause of its failure to give employees a wage increase, post- ing a notice ‘‘sometime in the first part of April,’’ which again blamed the Union for having denied employees a wage increase for nearly 2 years. order to make speeches to groups of employees, Respond- ent’s refusal of access to the lunchroom on that occasion did not violate the terms of the expired contractual access provi- sion. Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent’s denial of ac- cess to its plant lunchroom on the above two occasions was not violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act and shall recommend dismissal of paragraph 11(c) of the amended consolidated complaint. D. Respondent’s Allegedly Unlawful Statements During the Period Immediately Preceding the April 15, 1993 Election 1. The facts The record reveals that Respondent engaged in a campaign against the Union during the period preceding the April 15, 1993 decertification election and that the campaign consisted of notices, which were posted on the three plant bulletin boards, speeches to employees by Walter Crew and Jon Crilly, correspondence to employees and their families, and written responses to employee questions, pertaining to cam- paign issues. The latter were read to employees and posted on the plant bulletin boards.8 Crew testified that General Counsel’s Exhibit 17 was a notice, which was posted on the plant bulletin boards on March 22. The first paragraph of the notice, which was addressed to all employees and signed by Crew, poses the question, ‘‘Is this Union good or bad for employees,’’ and the second paragraph reads as follows: Employees will answer the question on election day—it is likely an NLRB election will be held in mid- April. The Company is now strongly opposed to em- ployees being represented by the [Union]. This Union does not act in the best interest of employees. This Union does not deserve employee support. Should em- ployees vote for the Union in the election, the con- sequences will be bad. It is not the Company’s intent to discredit all Unions or to say that all Companies can be trusted. We do believe this Union is bad and Com- pany intends to prove we can be trusted. We will be dedicated to working with all employees to improve wages, hours and conditions for all. Crew next testified that General Counsel’s Exhibit 18 is the text of a speech, which he gave to assembled groups of bargaining unit employees on March 25 and 26. The fourth paragraph of the speech reads as follows: For over two years, this Union has denied you a pay raise while they tried to force the Company to give your pension money to the Union. At first we refused to do this because we were afraid of our liability for the under funded pensions of employees of other com- panies that were in the plan. This could have been many millions of dollars and would have broken Eljer. Since that time, we have found another reason to not accept their proposal—you might never have gotten a pension from this Union. They waste the money and use it for their own personal benefits.9 In a written response to employee questions on March 25 and 26, which was posted on the plant bulletin boards on April 1, Crew replied to a question, regarding Respondent’s contention that the Union had been stopping Respondent from giving employees a raise. He stated, ‘‘First of all, any attempt to implement the Company’s contract offer prior to the NLRB election would be a violation of [the Act]. Sec- ondly, since the [Union] is recognized as the [employees’ bargaining representative], any attempt to pass on the wage increase could be construed as directly dealing with the em- ployees in violation of the law.’’ Then, in response to an- other question, Crew bluntly stated, ‘‘With this union out, the Company can put its proposal into effect which means more money for every employee.’’10 Crew identified General Counsel’s Exhibit 19 as ‘‘my an- swers to questions that I got from employees from the plant meetings we had . . . . These particular questions were re- ceived at the April 1st and 2nd plant meetings.’’ He added that the questions were both written and oral; that he orally responded to them at the conclusion of each meeting; and that he gave his written responses on April 7 in the above document, copies of which were posted on the three plant bulletin boards. The document consists of answers to 30 questions. The first question was, ‘‘What is the possibility of a 401(k) plan if the decertification is successful?’’ Crew re- plied as follows: ‘‘I cannot promise that there will be a 401(k) plan in this plant if the Union is voted out. It would be illegal for me to promise that, however, I can tell you that every Eljer employee, not represented by a union, has a 401(k) plan.’’ The second stated question was, ‘‘Do you have an [sic] pension booklet for any non-union Eljer plant and can the employees see it?’’ Crew responded, ‘‘I don’t have any booklet but I can again confirm that the employees in those plants have 401(k) plans.’’ The third stated question was, ‘‘If the Union is decertified, are there any plans for an employee committee to review grievances? If not, how will grievances be handled?’’ Crew replied as follows: It would be illegal for me to promise that there will be an employee committee to review grievances. I can tell you that I will review every one of them and any Supervisor who does not take a grievance seriously is going to find himself in my office. If the Union is voted out, I will sit down with all employees to devise a plan for the handling of complaints. Everyone needs to be involved in making policy in the plant. All of you have ideas that will make this a better place to work. 50 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 11 Echoing Walter Crew’s written comment of the same day, Crilly said, during the speech, that ‘‘a non-union Nampa plant will have an open door policy. A non-union Nampa plant will have supervisors and managers who spend their time doing what a Union steward cannot do; solving the problems of individuals for the benefit of ev- eryone.’’ 12 While, in its contract offers during 1991 and 1992, Respondent had offered to make its wage increase offers retroactive, by letter dated February 3, 1993, Jon Crilly wrote to Frank Raimondi that, if the Union did not accept Respondent’s final offer by February 28, the offer of wage increase retroactivity would be withdrawn effective that date. The bargaining on February 24 produced no contract agreement, and there is no dispute that Respondent’s offer of retro- activity was withdrawn from Respondent’s offer. Crilly ended his speech to the bargaining unit employees with the comment, ‘‘During this year, we will do our dead level best to show that a union is unnecessary in this plant. Please give consideration to a No Vote next week.’’ 13 There is no record evidence that Pillsbury is involved in mana- gerial decisions or in the setting of corporate policy. 14 Counsel for Respondent asserts that, in his April 7 answers to employee questions (G.C. Exh. 19), Walter Crew vitiated the effect of any comments, attributed to lower level supervisors, unequivo- cally stating that ‘‘the company has no plans to close or relocate the Nampa plant.’’ However, close scrutiny of Crew’s 30 responses to questions failed to disclose the quoted language. Moreover, review of G.C. Exhs. 17, 18, and 20 and of R. Exh. 16 fails to reveal the quoted language. 15 Thomas Smith testified that he was present at a meeting at the Union’s office subsequent to the filing of the decertification petition during which Floyd Reichert distributed a document, describing ‘‘what [management] could do and what shouldn’t say or what they couldn’t do,’’ and the discussion concerned trapping Respondent’s supervisors ‘‘into saying stuff they shouldn’t be saying on what was going to happen and stuff like that.’’ Smith recalled that Pillsbury’s name was mentioned, and that Reichert said, ‘‘[T]o go after him and try to get him to say something he shouldn’t say.’’ While admitting that he distributed a document to employees, which detailed what su- pervisors could and couldn’t do under the Act, Floyd Reichert spe- cifically denied instructing employees to entrap their supervisors. Complaints are nothing more than upward communica- tions and dealing with the complaints requires nothing more than good communications. People can speak for themselves if manager’s [sic] will listen. We will listen because it is just good business. Finally, with regard to this document, the 23d-stated ques- tion was, ‘‘As stated in your previous posting, what kind of ‘consequences’ await the Nampa employees if the Union pre- vails in the secret ballot election?’’ Crew replied: I cannot tell you for sure what will happen if the Union wins the election except that we will all be in the same spot we have been for the past two years. It is illegal to threaten employees and I can’t guess what the Union might do. It will be serious. Crew next testified that General Counsel’s Exhibit 20 is the text of a speech, which Jon Crilly gave to assembled bar- gaining unit employees on April 7, and that Crilly read ver- batim from the document. According to the exhibit,11 at one point, after stating that some supporters of the Union will say or do anything to win, including defacing government docu- ments and violating company policy, Crilly stated: You don’t need this. There are limitations on what I can say legally, but I can promise this. I will guaran- tee to you in writing that your wages, benefits and working conditions will not be less than what they would be if the Union wins. Without the Union, there will be no strikes or lockouts. If you have raises com- ing, you will get them. If you have retroactive pay coming, you will get it.12 With regard to Jon Crilly’s above-quoted comments, dur- ing the preelection period, Walter Crew had comments on the same subject matter. Thus, in his document, which was posted on the plant bulletin boards on April 1 and which contained his written answers to bargaining unit employee questions, posed on March 25 and 26, Crew stated, in re- sponse to three separate questions, that ‘‘the Company will guarantee you the same wages, benefits, seniority, etc. whether there is a Union here or not.’’ Moreover, on April 7, in response to an employee question (‘‘Why don’t you put your promises in writing and give all employees a copy?’’), Crew wrote, ‘‘The Company has not made any promises that were not already in writing. It is illegal for us to make prom- ises of benefits.’’ Further, notwithstanding what Crilly said, on the subject, during his speech on the same date, in re- sponse to a question regarding Respondent’s withdrawal of its wage increase retroactivity offer on February 28, Crew stated, ‘‘I cannot promise any retroactivity if the Union is voted out. We wanted to implement pay increases in the summer of 1991 but were unable to do so.’’ Finally, as to allegedly unlawful preelection statements by Respondent’s managerial employees, Paul Renon testified that he has been employed by Respondent for 11 years; that he is an assembler in the PS department; and that he is su- pervised by William Pillsbury, who, Respondent admits, is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act.13 According to Renon, he had a conversation with Pillsbury one day, shortly after the initial morning break at approximately 9 a.m., in late March or early April ‘‘at my work station where I was working at the time.’’ Renon, who wore a union T-shirt at the time, continued, stating that Pillsbury ‘‘came up to me and just out of the blue he said, ‘Boy, I’ll be glad when this is over.’ And . . . I asked him . . . ‘Bill, what will happen if the Union is recertified?’ And he told me, ‘In my opinion . . . they’ll shut the doors, because they can make the resi- dential pipe in Logan . . . and they can do the bulk of the PS work in Logan.’’’ Renon asked what this would mean to the Union in Logan, and Pillsbury replied that such would ‘‘increase their bargaining power.’’ Pillsbury concluded, say- ing that ‘‘he was scared and that he was too old to look for a new job and start over.’’14 Pillsbury did not testify at the hearing in order to admit or deny the conversation, and Re- spondent failed to explain his absence.15 2. Analysis I initially discuss the amended consolidated complaint alle- gation that Walter Crew’s comment, in his speeches to bar- gaining unit employees on March 25 and 26, that, for 2 years, the Union has denied them a wage increase, was viola- tive of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I agree. In Highland Yarn Mills, 313 NLRB 193, 207 (1993), the Board concluded that a similar comment, made in the presence of a supervisor and not disavowed by him, constituted an unlawful implied promise that, if the Union were to be removed from the 51 SELKIRK METALBESTOS plant, employees would be given a raise. Here, for a 2-year period, Respondent had proposed wage increases as part of a comprehensive contract proposal, which the Union had re- jected. While in his April 1 written response to a question about his comment, Crew seemingly negated the unlawful imputation of his comment, his accompanying remark (‘‘With this union out, the Company can put its proposal into effect . . . .’’) and the posting of another campaign letter, which reiterated Crew’s remark during his speech, clearly es- tablish that, on March 25 and 26, Crew was impliedly prom- ising to implement Respondent’s proposed wage increases if the employees voted to decertify the Union. In these cir- cumstances, I find that, by Crew’s statement, Respondent acted in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Highland Yarn Mills, supra. The amended consolidated complaint next alleges that, during his speech to bargaining unit employees on April 7, Jon Crilly acted in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by stating, ‘‘If you have retroactive pay coming, you will get it’’ and that, on the same day, in his written responses to em- ployee questions of April 1 and 2, Walter Crew also acted in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by stating that ‘‘every Eljer employee, not represented by a union, has a 401(k) plan’’ and that ‘‘if the Union is voted out, I will sit down with all employees to devise a plan for the handling of complaints.’’ In support, counsel for the General Counsel argues that ‘‘implicit in these statements . . . is the obvious condition that the employees would receive the enumerated improvements and benefits if they abandoned their support of the Union.’’ With regard to the Crilly statement, I initially note that, notwithstanding having prefaced his statement with ‘‘If you have retroactive pay coming,’’ Crilly had to be aware that, at that point, the bargaining unit employees had no expectation of receiving a retroactive wage increase as, acting on behalf of Respondent, he himself had previously withdrawn the benefit from Respondent’s comprehensive contract proposal, a fact known by the bargaining unit em- ployees. Moreover, that same day and on the same subject, Walter Crew had informed the bargaining unit employees that he could not promise any retroactive pay increase. In these circumstances, it is obvious that what Crilly promised constituted an unexpected and a significant monetary benefit to the bargaining unit employees and, given Crilly’s senior position to that of Crew in Respondent’s corporate hierarchy, the employees most certainly could infer that, in order to re- ceive the retroactive wage increase, they had but to reject the Union. Crilly, of course, emphasized the point of his prom- ised benefit when he concluded his speech by promising to show employees during the next year why a union was un- necessary and by asking for them to vote against the Union in the decertification election. In these circumstances, espe- cially noting Crew’s April 1 response to a question (‘‘With this Union out, the Company can put its proposal into effect which means more money for every employee’’), I find that Jon Crilly’s statement, regarding retroactive pay, during his April 7 speech, constituted an unlawful promise of benefits in order to induce employees to vote against the Union and that Respondent thereby acted in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. NLRB v. Del Ray Tortilleria, 787 F.2d 1118, 1122–1123 (7th Cir. 1986); Yale New Haven Hospital, 309 NLRB 363, 369 (1992); and Michigan Products, 236 NLRB 1143, 1146 (1978). Turning to the legality of Crew’s written question re- sponses, ‘‘I cannot promise that there will be a 401(k) plan . . . if the Union is voted out. It would be illegal . . . . however I can tell you that every Eljer employee, not rep- resented by a Union, has a 401(k) plan’’ and ‘‘If the Union is voted out, I will sit down with all employees to devise a plan for the handling of complaints,’’ counsel for the General Counsel argues that the responses were unlawful as they con- tain the ‘‘obvious condition’’ that employees would receive the benefit if they reject the Union in the decertification elec- tion. In contrast, counsel for Respondent argues that Crew’s comments were mere statements of fact, privileged by Sec- tion 8(c) of the Act and that Crew specifically told the em- ployees that it would be illegal for him to promise such ben- efits. I agree with counsel for the General Counsel that, not- withstanding his disingenuous disclaimer, the clear implica- tion of Crew’s initial written response was that each bargain- ing unit employee would have a 401(k) savings plan, which represents an obvious financial benefit, established in his name if the Nampa plant employees rejected the Union and became unrepresented. That Crew intended that employees should construe his statements as a promise of an obvious employee benefit is clear from his explicit reiteration of the existence of the 401(k) retirement savings plans in his an- swer to the very next question. The Board has consistently found that employer promises or implied promises of new or changed wages, benefits, or conditions of employment imme- diately prior to an election, which is intended to determine employees’ union desires, are violative of the Act. Such is particularly egregious when, as here, the employer advises the bargaining unit employees that the new benefit is avail- able only to its unrepresented employees. Gardner Engineer- ing, 313 NLRB 755, 765 (1994). Accordingly, I find that Crew’s comment to the bargaining unit employees, shortly before the decertification election, that all of Respondent’s unrepresented employees have 401(k) plans constituted an implied promise of benefits and that, thereby, Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Pincus Elevator & Electric Co., 308 NLRB 684, 692 (1992). As to Crew’s response, regarding meeting with the bargain- ing unit employees in order to devise a complaint procedure if they rejected the Union, he set forth no specific grievance procedure and did not promise or imply that his discussions with employees would be successful. In short, unlike Crilly’s specific promise of retroactive pay and Crew’s implied promise of a 401(k) plan for each employee if the employees rejected the Union, beyond expressing a willingness to dis- cuss the matter, Crew made no commitment with regard to a grievance procedure if the employees rejected the Union; accordingly, I find nothing unlawful regarding his statement. In these circumstances, I shall recommend dismissal of para- graph 5(f) of the amended consolidated complaint. Regarding the alleged unlawful threats uttered by Walter Crew and by William Pillsbury, counsel for the General Counsel alleges that Crew’s comment in Respondent’s March 22 employee notice, ‘‘Should employees vote for the Union in the election, the consequences will be bad’’ and his writ- ten April 7 response to a question regarding his March 22 statement, ‘‘I cannot tell you for sure what will happen if the Union wins the election . . . . I can’t guess what the Union might do.’’ It will be serious, were ‘‘reasonably calculated’’ to coerce or restrain the employees in the exercise of their 52 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 16 At this point, Crew denied discussing the ‘‘particulars’’ of either petition with employees, who submitted the petitions, and denied any involvement in the gathering of signatures. 17 The exhibit reads as follows: We, as employees and members of the collective bargaining unit of Selkirk Metalbestos respectfully request resumption of nego- tiations between the Company and our negotiating committee hopefully prior to May 14, 1993 or at the Company’s earliest convenience. It is with great sincerity that we make this effort. 18 Employee Paul Schmillen testified that G.C. Exh. 8 was given to Respondent as ‘‘Floyd Reichert asked us to try to get [the bar- gaining] going . . . .’’ statutory right ‘‘to vote for the Union’’ and were, therefore, violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I agree. Thus, while the Board has found that similar statements, setting forth an employer’s view on the disadvantages of a union, constituted mere expressions of opinion, privileged by Section 8(c) of the Act (Howard Johnson Co., 242 NLRB 386 (1979)), such were in a context free of simultaneous unfair labor practices. Here, I have concluded that, while Crew was setting forth his view of the consequences of voting in favor of the Union, Respondent was, simultaneously, unlawfully directly and impliedly promising economic benefits to employees in order to induce them to vote against the Union in the pending de- certification election. As all of the instant acts and conduct occurred within the same brief period of time, it is reason- able to conclude, as I do, that a direct link exits between Re- spondent’s unlawful direct and implied promises and Crew’s ‘‘the consequences will be bad’’ and ‘‘it will be serious’’ comments and that, therefore, the two latter comments had ‘‘sinister’’ connotations. Bay State Ambulance Rental, 280 NLRB 1079 fn. 3 (1986); Keister Coal Co., 247 NLRB 375, 385 (1980); and Ohmite Mfg. Co., 217 NLRB 435 fn. 2 (1975). In this regard, I note that Crew’s March 22 comment came only three sentences after he stated Respondent’s strong opposition to the Union. Accordingly, I find that Crew’s above statements were coercive and that Respondent thereby engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Finally, turning to William Pillsbury’s allegedly unlawful threat of plant closure, I initially note that Paul Renon’s testi- mony was uncontroverted, and, given Pillsbury’s unexplained failure to testify, I rely on Renon’s account of their conversa- tion. Nevertheless, contrary to counsel for the General Coun- sel and counsel for the Union, I do not believe that his com- ments constituted an unfair labor practice. In this regard, I note that, while the supervisor initiated the conversation, Renon’s question, ‘‘[W]hat will happen if the Union is recer- tified,’’ precipitated Pillsbury’s allegedly unlawful comment. Moreover, Pillsbury labeled his comment as his personal opinion, and there is no record evidence that Pillsbury is in- volved in the setting of corporate policy; that he was stating Respondent’s policy; or that Respondent, in fact, harbored any intent to close the facility. Accordingly, while, generally, an employer may not lawfully predict a plant shutdown as a consequence of unionization unless such is ‘‘carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to convey [his] belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his con- trol’’ (Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618–619 (1969)), the record evidence suggests that Pillsbury is a low level su- pervisor, who is not privy to corporate policy, and that his remark to Renon was merely a ‘‘noncoercive [expression] of personal opinion.’’ Wendt-Sonis Co., 138 NLRB 855, 856, and 867 (1962). In these circumstances, I conclude that Pillsbury’s comment to Renon did not violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and shall recommend that paragraph 5(c) of the amended consolidated complaint be dismissed. Cf. American Wire Products, 313 NLRB 989, 993 (1994). E. Respondent’s Allegedly Unlawful Withdrawal of Recognition from the Union 1. The facts There is no dispute, and Respondent concedes that, subse- quent to the April 15 decertification election, in which a ma- jority of the bargaining unit employees voted against rep- resentation by the Union and, on April 20, to which the Union filed objections over Respondent’s conduct, it with- drew recognition from the Union as the representative for purposes of collective bargaining of the production and main- tenance and shipping and receiving employees at its Nampa, Idaho plant. What is at issue here are the timing and basis for Respondent’s conduct. In this regard, at the outset of his direct examination by counsel for the General Counsel, Wal- ter Crew testified that the bases for Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition were a ‘‘combination of the election results and several other petitions that were filed by the employ- ees.’’ Asked to identify the petitions, after stating that ‘‘we’ve had so many, its tough to remember them all,’’ Crew explained that the initial petition was ‘‘this decertification petition. After that, there was a . . . petition . . . for the company to implement a pay raise, there was another petition to . . . certify the election and get on with it.’’ He added that the latter was submitted to him after the election and that the wage increase petition was submitted later in the year.16 At this point, Crew was presented with General Counsel’s Exhibit 9, a letter, dated April 29, from himself to Wes Edmondson, a shipping department employee and the president of the Union. The document which, according to Crew was written in response to General Counsel’s Exhibit 8, a request for the resumption of bargaining, dated that same day,17 signed by Edmondson and several other employees, who were members of the employees’ negotiating committee and who were acting on the behest of Floyd Reichert,18 reads as follows: I will be happy to meet with you individually as an em- ployee of Selkirk. However, there is no recognized bar- gaining agent for the employees and I cannot meet with you as a negotiating committee. Just because I cannot meet with you in any capacity where you represent oth- ers does not mean I would not like to hear your ideas, suggestions and criticisms. Please feel free to talk to me 53 SELKIRK METALBESTOS 19 Employee Schmillen testified that, a week to 10 days after the decertification election, he and Wes Edmondson met with Crew in the latter’s office, and ‘‘We asked . . . him . . . about the Union . . . where we stood at, and Walt said that we are no longer rep- resentatives within the company as far as the Union goes.’’ Crew failed to deny this conversation. 20 Employee Schmillen testified, without contradiction, that, shortly after the decertification election, he and Wes Edmondson had a con- versation with Colin Cortney, the production manager at the plant, as the three were walking down a stairway after a retirement lunch. The employees had noticed that all union literature had been re- moved from Respondent’s bulletin boards and asked why. Cortney, whom Respondent admitted is a supervisor within the meaning of the Act, replied that Crew was the individual who should respond to them. Thereafter, the three went to Crew’s office, and the latter said, ‘‘[T]hat the Union is no longer a representative at the Com- pany. We could be a member of the [Union], but we weren’t to rep- resent the employees.’’ 21 Crew was able to identify just three. 22 While stating that he recognized some of the signatures, Crew conceded that he never attempted to verify that each signature was that of a bargaining unit employee. as a fellow employee at Selkirk on any matter at any time.19 Asked why he wrote that there was no recognized bargain- ing agent for Respondent’s employees, Crew admitted that such was Respondent’s view as of the date of his letter. In- deed, if Respondent’s position was unclear, on that same day, April 29, with regard to the matter of bulletin board postings on behalf of the Union,20 Crew sent the following memorandum to Edmondson: As you are aware, the union contract expired almost two years ago and, recently, the employees voted to de- certify the Union. The Company believes that a major- ity of the employees do not wish to be represented by this Union. Thus, the Company does not recognize the Union and cannot honor grievances filed on the Union’s behalf. The Company policy with regard to bulletin board postings is stated in the Employee hand- book on page 15. As soon as the NLRB election is cer- tified, we expect to re-write the employee handbook to make it more detailed with regard to employee rights and that will include the subject of bulletin boards and solicitations. As things currently stand, if we allow those who support the Union use of the bulletin boards, we would have to give the same privilege to those who do not support the Union. I think that would create con- flicts and controversy that are not necessary at this time. I would suggest you communicate the notice of any Union meeting in some other manner until the NLRB investigation is completed, which should be no more than a few weeks. On May 27, 1993, the day after the Regional Director for Region 27 issued his decision finding merit to the Union’s objections to the decertification election, the Union’s attorney wrote to Crew, reiterating the Union’s request for informa- tion pertaining to the projected cost of Respondent’s health insurance plan to the Company and to the bargaining unit employees. Thereafter, on June 7, Respondent’s attorney wrote the following letter to the Union’s attorney: In answer to your letter of May 27, 1993, [Respondent] has a good faith doubt that the [Union] represents a ma- jority of our employees in an appropriate unit. This good faith doubt is based upon results of the National Labor Relations Board election and documents subse- quently signed by a majority of employees indicating that they do not wish to be represented by this Union. Therefore, the Company has no choice but to deny your request for information . . . . Asked if anything other than the decertification petition, the petition to certify the results of the election, and the peti- tion for a wage increase constituted Respondent’s objective considerations underlying its withdrawal of recognition from the Union, Crew replied, ‘‘That’s all that I really recall.’’ Testifying on behalf of Respondent, Crew changed his tes- timony, increasing the factors on which Respondent relied for withdrawing recognition. Thus, he stated, ‘‘Besides the election, there were the tensions in the shop; the elation of those who were on one side, on the company side, in the election; the animosity from some of the prounion people; the objections that were filed to the election . . . . It was just turning into a boiling pit.’’ He added that ‘‘several’’ em- ployees voiced their desire not to be represented by the Union any longer; however, ‘‘I can’t name you an actual in- dividual.’’ Then, after testifying that, during the 2-week pe- riod April 15 through 29 some employees spoke to him re- garding having the decertification election result certified,21 Crew identified Respondent’s Exhibit 18, a four-page exhibit, with each page bearing the identical heading and, beneath the heading, having signatures and dates next to each name. The page headings read as follows: TO THE NLRB We the undersigned feel the employees of [Respond- ent] have made a decision, cast a vote, and the vote has been tallied as to what the feelings of the employees at Selkirk are. It was stated that a simple majority was needed to decide the outcome of the vote. We see no need to change the rules now. We feel the vote should stand, if not how many more times will we vote. This indecision is causing stress and animosity among the employees. We the undersigned do not want [the Union] to represent us. With regard to the document, which contains the asserted signatures of 85 bargaining unit employees,22 Crew testified that it was submitted to him by employee Jim Burrow, the individual who filed the decertification petition, on May 25 and that, on giving him the four-page petition, Burrow said, ‘‘[T]hat hopefully this would help speed things along, and get this whole process over with.’’ Crew maintained that the petition was a complete document at the time he received it; however, when confronted with the fact that, of the five sig- natures on the last page, four are dated May 26 and one is dated June 1, he had no explanation, averring, ‘‘I can’t an- swer that. I don’t know. . . . I believe I received them all at the same time.’’ Finally, conceding that, a month prior to receiving Respondent’s Exhibit 18, on April 29, he had writ- ten two documents, with each announcing that Respondent had withdrawn recognition from the Union, Crew stated that 54 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 23 The final asserted bargaining unit employee petition received by Respondent, R. Exh. 19, is a six-page document, with each page bearing the identical heading (‘‘This survey/petition is to find the wishes of the employees of Selkirk Metalbestos. Do you want the company to implement its last wage and benefit proposal and the union to agree not to file NLRB charges against the company if they do so.’’) and having signatures beneath the heading. According to Crew, it was submitted to him by employee Burrow on September 15. 24 Accordingly, other than obvious concessions, I place no reliance on the testimony of Crew with regard to the rationale underlying Re- spondent’s withdrawal of recognition from the Union. his bases for doing so ‘‘must have been just the election and the people asking when it would be certified.’’23 2. Analysis The amended consolidated complaint alleges that Respond- ent’s withdrawal of recognition from the Union as the collec- tive-bargaining representative of its Nampa, Idaho bargaining unit employees was violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. In this regard, the basic legal principles are well set- tled. Absent unusual circumstances, an incumbent labor orga- nization is irrebuttably presumed to enjoy majority status within an appropriate unit during the effective period of a collective-bargaining agreement. On expiration of the agree- ment, while the presumption of majority status continues, such becomes rebuttable. In these circumstances, an em- ployer, which wishes to withdraw recognition from an in- cumbent labor organization, may rebut the presumption of majority status by demonstrating, at an appropriate time, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the labor organization in fact no longer enjoys majority support or that the em- ployer has a good-faith and reasonably grounded doubt of the labor organization’s majority status. Brown & Root U.S.A., 308 NLRB 1206 (1992); Laidlaw Waste Systems, 307 NLRB 1211 (1992); and Radison Plaza of Minneapolis, 307 NLRB 94 (1992). However, it is equally well settled that an em- ployer’s withdrawal of recognition from an incumbent labor organization must occur in a context free of unfair labor practices. Gardner Engineering, 313 NLRB 755, 756 (1994); Radison Plaza Minneapolis, supra at 96; and Celanese Corp. of America, 95 NLRB 664, 673 (1951). In the instant cir- cumstances, I agree with counsel for the General Counsel and counsel for the Union that Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition from the Union was unlawful. Initially, in this regard, notwithstanding counsel for Re- spondent’s June 7, 1993 letter to the Union’s counsel, assert- ing Respondent’s good-faith doubt, based on the result of the decertification election and the petition, submitted to Re- spondent on May 25, that the Union continued to represent a majority of the bargaining unit employees, I believe that Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union on or about April 29, 1993, and that such was based solely on the result of the decertification election. Thus, on no two occa- sions during the 2-week period following the April 15 decer- tification election, Walter Crew, Respondent’s Nampa, Idaho plant manager, informed employees Paul Schmillen and Wes Edmondson, the president of the Union, that the Union was no longer considered to be the employees’ bargaining rep- resentative, and on April 29 Crew wrote two letters to Wes Edmondson, stating, ‘‘[T]here is no recognized bargaining agent for the employees’’ and that ‘‘the company believes that a majority of the employees do not wish to be rep- resented by this Union. Thus, the Company does not recog- nize the Union . . . .’’ Moreover, given Crew’s demon- strably, utterly inconsistent and contradictory testimony as to the factors underlying Respondent’s asserted ‘‘good faith doubt’’ of the Union’s continued majority status24 and the fact that the employee petition, requesting certification of the decertification election result, was not submitted to Crew until a month after recognition was withdrawn, it is clear, and I find, that the only factor, on which Respondent relied for its withdrawal of recognition from the Union, was the tally of ballots from the decertification election, which showed that a majority had voted against representation by the Union. While the issue there was whether the employer violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by making unilateral changes in employees’ terms and conditions of employment in the period between a decertification election, in which the majority voted against the Union, and the Board’s final order, overruling the Union’s objections and certifying the election results, in W. A. Krueger Co., 299 NLRB 914 (1990), the Board concluded that, notwithstanding that the tally of ballots shows that a majority were cast against the labor organization, ‘‘in the decertification context the change in the basic relationship between the parties and in the par- ties’ obligations to bargain should not be effective until the date the certification issues’’ and, bearing directly on the issues here, that: If objections to an election are timely filed, whether the tally of ballots reflects uncoerced employee sentiment requires an application of representation case law. If the Board sustains an objection to an election, that election is set aside and becomes a nullity. As long as an elec- tion objection is unresolved or one could be timely filed, the tally of ballots cannot be considered reliable evidence of employee sentiment. Id. at 915–916. Here, the tally of ballots, in the April 15 de- certification election, showed that a majority of the votes were cast against the Union, and the Union filed timely ob- jections to the decertification election. In light of W. A. Krueger Co., supra, inasmuch as the Union’s objections were pending at the time Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union, as I believe that the result of the election was the sole underlying rationale for Respondent’s asserted good- faith doubt of the Union’s continued majority status, and as such cannot be considered reliable evidence of employee sen- timent, I believe that Respondent failed to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, objective factors sufficient to support a good-faith doubt of the Union’s majority such as to justify withdrawal of recognition from the Union. Moreover, this is especially true here as the Board ultimately sustained the Union’s objections, which were based on acts and conduct, in part, identical to that herein involved, and or- dered a rerun election. Decorel Corp., 163 NLRB 146 (1967). Accordingly, I find that Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition was violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. Laidlaw Waste Systems, supra. Equally as significant to a finding that Respondent’s above conduct was violative of the Act is the fact that its with- drawal of recognition from the Union was accomplished in 55 SELKIRK METALBESTOS 25 I note that, despite Crew’s insistence that he received the entire document at the same time, the last page contains signatures, which are dated subsequent to May 25, a fact for which Crew had no ex- planation, and that Respondent made no effort to validate the em- ployee signatures on the petition. 26 Likewise, I believe Respondent may not have justified a with- drawal of recognition on the bargaining unit employees’ petition, which it received on or about September 19. Thus, without regard to anything else, the petition indicates employee support for a wage increase and does not speak to loss of majority support for the Union as their bargaining representative. In these circumstances, it may not support a doubt as to the Union’s majority support. Pic Way Shoe Mart, 308 NLRB 84 (1992). Moreover, while not clearly on point, the Board’s recent decision in Underground Service Alert, 315 NLRB 958 (1994), adds addi- tional support for my view that Respondent may not rely on the May 25 employee petition to withdraw recognition from the Union. a context rife with unfair labor practices sufficiently serious to significantly undercut employee support for the Union and, thus, cast doubt on the validity of the election results. Thus, I have found that, in the 2 or 3 weeks prior to the de- certification election, Respondent engaged in acts and con- duct blatantly violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by in- forming employees that the Union was responsible for deny- ing them wage increases for 2 years and, thereby, impliedly promising a wage increase if they voted to decertify the Union; by promising retroactive wage increases to employees if they voted to decertify the Union; by impliedly promising employees that each would be given a 401(k) retirement sav- ings plan if employees voted to decertify the Union; and by coercing employees with sinister warnings that, if the Union won the decertification election, ‘‘the consequences will be bad’’ and ‘‘it will be serious.’’ In my view, Respondent’s unfair labor practices not only undermined the decertification election result, which forms the basis of its asserted good- faith doubt, but also were sufficiently flagrant and egregious in themselves so as to undermine the Union’s majority status and, thereby, taint a withdrawal of recognition. Accordingly, on this basis, Respondent’s April 29 withdrawal of recogni- tion from the Union was likewise violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. St. Agnes Medical Center, 304 NLRB 146, 147 (1991), affg. 287 NLRB 242 (1987); and Guerdon Industries, 218 NLRB 658, 661–662 (1975). Finally, while it may be argued that the bargaining unit employees’ petition, which Respondent received on or about May 25 and in which 85 employees stated their support for certification of the decertification election result and opposi- tion to representation by the Union, justified Respondent’s withdrawal of recognition from the Union at the time of its receipt, without regard to the validity of the petition itself, about which I harbor serious doubt,25 such is not a legally viable position. Thus, as set forth above, any analysis of Re- spondent’s withdrawal of recognition from the Union during the spring of 1993 must be viewed in the context of the Em- ployer’s own prior unfair labor practices, in particular, in light of Respondent’s unlawful conduct on or about April 29. Thus, I have concluded that Respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition from the Union on or about the latter date. As I believe that the conduct directly and obviously affected the bargaining relationship between Respondent and the Union, thereby tending to undermine and erode majority support, the effect of the conduct would clearly negate the legality of a subsequent asserted good-faith doubt of majority status based withdrawal of recognition. Guerdon Industries, supra. More- over, of course, between mid-April and late May 1993, Re- spondent engaged in no conduct designed to expurgate the effects of its above-described serious and pernicious unfair labor practices, which it committed during the preelection pe- riod, and I do not believe that, by mid-May, the coercive ef- fect of the acts on the bargaining unit employees had dis- sipated so as to justify Respondent’s reliance on the signa- tures on the May 25 petition as evidencing the Union’s loss of majority support. In these circumstances, any contention that Respondent may have been justified in withdrawing rec- ognition from the Union on or after May 25 would, in my view, be specious.26 F. Respondent’s Alleged Unlawful Unilateral Changes 1. The facts The record reveals that article 17 of the most recent col- lective-bargaining agreement, between Respondent and the Union, established a grievance-and-arbitration procedure, which provided for a ‘‘joint Company-Union grievance board,’’ consisting of six individuals, with each party select- ing three participants. The board was responsible for adjust- ing all grievances, which had not been resolved in the pre- ceding three steps of the grievance procedure. General Coun- sel’s Exhibit 14 is an employee grievance form, on which is set forth a grievance dated October 16, 1993. While it is un- clear in the record exactly when such was implemented, it is certain that the grievance-and-arbitration procedure, set forth in the exhibit, is not consistent with the above-de- scribed contractual grievance procedure. In this regard, under questioning by counsel for the General Counsel, Walter Crew admitted that, ‘‘since we had no Union at this time’’ Re- spondent implemented a different grievance-and-arbitration procedure whereby either the production manager or ‘‘a panel of . . . . hourly people from the shop floor’’ issue final decisions on the merits of bargaining unit employee grievances. The latter group of employees, who, Crew stated, act as jurors, is known as the peer grievance review panel; it is unclear in the record as to what types of grievances are resolved by the production manager and what types are heard by this peer review panel. There is no dispute, and Crew ad- mitted, that the Union was not notified of this change in the bargaining unit employees terms and conditions of employ- ment. The record further reveals that, during the effective period of the parties’ most recent collective-bargaining agreement, the entire cost of bargaining unit employees’ health insurance coverage was borne by Respondent and that, during the bar- gaining for a successor agreement, Respondent consistently proposed that the employees contribute to the cost of the in- surance. On July 18, 1993, Respondent’s attorney wrote to the Union’s attorney that Respondent desired to implement a wage increase for bargaining unit employees and the health insurance changes, set forth in its final contract offer to the Union, including the employee copayment provision. In the letter, Respondent’s counsel specified that the letter should not be construed as recognition of the Union as the employ- ees’ bargaining representative and that, if the Union at- tempted to bargain over changes in Respondent’s offers, nei- 56 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 27 I am not unmindful of the fact that, with the approval of the Board, the Regional Director for Region 27 has ordered that a rerun decertification election be conducted. Given the fact, however, that Respondent’s own conduct tainted the results of the April 15, 1993 election, until a rerun election occurs and the results of the rerun election are certified by the Regional Director, Respondent is clearly obligated to continue to recognize and, on request, to bargain in good faith with the Union. ther would be implemented. Notwithstanding that the Union’s attorney specifically objected to Respondent’s unilat- eral implementation of the health insurance changes, includ- ing the employee copayment plan, according to Walter Crew, on or about October 1, 1993, Respondent implemented its stated changes in its employee health insurance plan, includ- ing a requirement that each bargaining unit employee make a monthly contribution toward the cost of his or her health insurance coverage. 2. Analysis The amended consolidated complaint alleges that both the change in the bargaining unit employees’ grievance and arbi- tration procedure and the implementation of the new health insurance copayment obligation were accomplished unilater- ally by Respondent without bargaining with the Union and, therefore, were violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. In this regard, there is no dispute that each act rep- resented a change in the bargaining unit employees’ terms and conditions of employment and that Respondent accom- plished each change without bargaining with the Union. Pre- sumably, Respondent defends against the amended consoli- dated complaint allegations on grounds that, having with- drawn recognition from the Union, it was no longer under any obligation to bargain with the Union prior to implement- ing the above changes in the bargaining unit employees’ terms and conditions of employment. I have previously con- cluded, however, that Respondent’s withdrawal of recogni- tion from the Union, as the majority representative of its em- ployees, was unlawful and itself violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. Accordingly, at all times material, Re- spondent remained obligated to implement no changes in the bargaining unit employees’ terms and conditions of employ- ment without the consent of the Union or until the parties reached a bona fide impasse in bargaining. Laverdiere’s En- terprises, supra. Here, there is no evidence that the Union consented to the above-described changes and no contention that the parties’ were at an impasse in bargaining. In the cir- cumstances, the conclusions are mandated that Respondent engaged in conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, by unilaterally, without the consent of the Union, chang- ing the bargaining unit employees’ terms and conditions of employment by implementing changes in the contractual grievance and arbitration procedure and a new health insur- ance copayment obligation for employees. Gardner Engi- neering, supra; R. T. Jones Lumber Co., 313 NLRB 726 (1994); Alexander Linn Hospital Assn., 288 NLRB 103 (1988); Conoco, Inc., 287 NLRB 548 (1987); and Litton Business Systems, 286 NLRB 817 (1987). CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Union is the majority representative for purposes of collective bargaining of the following appropriate unit of Respondent’s employees: All production and maintenance employees including shipping and receiving employees employed by Re- spondent at its Nampa, Idaho plant; excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. Since on or about January 15, 1993, by failing and re- fusing to provide the Union with updated information per- taining to the projected costs, attendant to health insurance for its bargaining unit employees, to itself and to the employ- ees, which information was necessary and relevant for pur- poses of collective bargaining, Respondent engaged in con- duct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 5. In or about March and April 1993, by stating to em- ployees that the Union had prevented them from getting a wage increase, by impliedly promising employees that each would be given a 401(k) retirement savings plan if they voted to decertify the Union; by promising employees they would receive a retroactive pay increase if they decertified the Union; and by threatening employees with sinister con- sequences if the Union were victorious in a decertification election, Respondent engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. On or about April 29, 1993, by withdrawing recognition from the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of its bargaining unit employees, Respondent engaged in con- duct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 7. In or about October 1993, by unilaterally, without bar- gaining with the Union as the collective-bargaining rep- resentative of its bargaining unit employees, adopting changes in the contractual grievance-and-arbitration proce- dure, and by unilaterally, without the consent of the Union and without an impasse in bargaining, implementing a monthly health insurance copayment obligation for bargain- ing unit employees, Respondent engaged in acts and conduct violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 8. The unfair labor practices of Respondent described above affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 9. Respondent engaged in no unfair labor practices other than specified above. REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in serious un- fair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist from its unlawful conduct and to take certain af- firmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Thus, inasmuch as Respondent unlawfully withdrew rec- ognition from the Union as the exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargaining of its bargaining unit em- ployees, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union and, if an agreement is reached on a successor agreement, embody such in a new collective-bargaining agreement. Alexander Linn Hospital, supra at 111–112.27 In addition, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to, on request, provide the Union 57 SELKIRK METALBESTOS 28 The interest rate shall be as computed in the manner set forth in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). 29 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec- ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 30 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.’’ with all updated information pertaining to the costs, attendant to its bargaining unit employees’ health insurance plan, to itself and to the employees. Further, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to rescind its above-described unlaw- ful unilateral changes, specifically the new grievance-and-ar- bitration procedure and the new monthly health insurance co- payment policy for bargaining unit employees, which terms and conditions of employment were implemented subsequent to Respondent’s unlawful withdrawal of recognition from the Union. With regard to the unlawfully imposed health insur- ance monthly copayment, I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to reimburse all bargaining unit employees for any amounts deducted from their monthly wages, as copay- ment amounts for the cost of their health insurance, from on or about October 1, 1993, to the present, with interest.28 Fi- nally, Respondent shall be ordered to post a notice, setting forth all its obligations herein. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended29 ORDER The Respondent, Selkirk Metalbestos, North America, Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., Nampa, Idaho, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Failing and refusing to provide the Union with updated information pertaining to the projected costs, attendant to health insurance coverage for its bargaining unit employees, to itself and to the employees, which information is nec- essary and relevant for purposes of collective bargaining. (b) Stating to bargaining unit employees that the Union had prevented them from receiving a wage increase and, thereby, impliedly promising wage increases to employees in order to induce them to vote against the Union in the decerti- fication election. (c) Informing employees that each unrepresented employee is given a 401(k) retirement savings plan and, thereby, impliedly promising that such a benefit will be provided to each employee if employees vote against the Union in the decertification election. (d) Promising employees that they will receive a retro- active pay increase if they decertify the Union. (e) Threatening employees with sinister consequences if the Union is victorious in the decertification election. (f) Withdrawing recognition from the Union as the exclu- sive representative for purposes of collective bargaining of its employees in the following appropriate unit: All production and maintenance employees including shipping and receiving employees employed by Re- spondent at its Nampa, Idaho plant; excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. (g) Unilaterally, without bargaining with the Union, adopt- ing changes in the bargaining unit employees’ contractual grievance and arbitration procedure. (h) Unilaterally, without the consent of the Union or an impasse in bargaining, imposing a monthly health insurance copayment obligation on bargaining unit employees. (i) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar- anteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Recognize and, on request, bargain with the Union, which is the exclusive representative for purposes of collec- tive bargaining of its employees in an appropriate unit of all production and maintenance employees including shipping and receiving employees employed by Respondent at its Nampa, Idaho plant; excluding all office clerical employees, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined by the Act and, if agreement is reached on a successor con- tract, embody the agreement in a written agreement. (b) On request, provide updated information to the Union pertaining to the costs, attendant to Respondent’s bargaining unit employees’ health insurance plan, to itself and to the employees. (c) Rescind any changes in the bargaining unit employees’ grievance and arbitration procedure, which were implemented subequent to April 29, 1993, and implementation of the bar- gaining unit employees’ monthly health insurance copayment obligation, which was imposed on or about October 1, 1993. (d) Reimburse each bargaining unit employee for his or her monthly health insurance plan contributions, which amounts Respondent deducted from employees’ paychecks since October 1, 1993, with interest as set forth in the rem- edy section. (e) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (f) Post at Respondent’s facility in Nampa, Idaho, copies of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’30 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re- gion 27, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent imme- diately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (g) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, insofar as the amended con- solidated complaint alleges unfair labor practices not specifi- cally found here, the amended consolidated complaint is dis- missed.