United States Postal Services

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE United States Postal Service and Denver Bulk Mail Center Local, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO. Case 27-CA-5846(P) January 26, 1981 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND TRUESDALE On July 11, 1979, Administrative Law Judge James S. Jenson issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Charging Party and the Respondent filed exceptions and supporting briefs and the General Counsel filed a brief in answer to the Respondent's exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find- ings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. The Charging Party excepts to the Administra- tive Law Judge's failure to provide affirmative relief for John Crooks, whose Weingarten' rights were violated during an unlawful investigatory in- terview in connection with a theft which occurred at the Respondent's facility. On the facts and for the reasons set forth below, we agree with the Administrative Law Judge that it would be inappropriate to require reinstatement and backpay in the circumstances of this case. On January 19, 1978, Postal Inspector Hale transmitted to the Respondent an "Investigative Memorandum and Exhibits" concerning the con- duct of employee Crooks, for "consideration and decision as to whether disciplinary action is war- ranted." Based thereon, Crooks was subsequently discharged. The investigation was initiated upon receipt of a telephone report that custodial laborer Crooks had been observed in the act of taking money without proper authority from a coin bag in the office used by a vending machine service contractor. The in- vestigative memorandum summarizes the several interviews held in the course of this investigation including those with eyewitnesses as well as one with the principal, which was undertaken in viola- tion of Weingarten. All individuals were interviewed on January 17, the date of the alleged theft. Betty Markey, the first employee interviewed, gave the following in- formation: NL.R.B. v. J Weingarten, Inc., 420 U S 251 (1975) 254 NLRB No. 50 At about 3:00 p.m. today I was cleaning up and had some trash to dump. I left the office and asked Mary [Sump] to watch the door for a few minutes. When I returned, I saw John [Crooks] in the office with both hands in the money bag. I called Mary and he took over, telling John to put the money back. I heard John say "if you turn me in I'll get you!" I'm afraid of him. Once he traded me $20.00 in quarters, nickels, and dimes for a $20.00 bill. I think he has been doing it [taking the money] for some time because we have been short for three or four months. John has a violent temper and is strong enough to break a man in two. Employee Sump was the second individual inter- viewed. He related the following: [Markey] asked me to watch the door while she dumped some trash. When Betty returned she said "John [Crooks] is in the money bag!" I asked John if he had taken Betty's money and he mumbled "yeah, I'll put it back." I told him to put it back and watched him return it, more than a big handful, his pocket bulged with coins. I think he needs medical help- mental. I never saw him take anything before. There followed another interview with the only other employee who implicated Crooks. He stated: I was on break . . . when I heard Betty [Markey) call Mary [Sump]. I had seen John [Crooks] come in and walk right past me toward the back of the room. I heard Mary say to John "if you put it back I won't report you." John answered "I don't care if you report me, I don't like working in this dump. You better report me now because I'll get her." The last individual interviewed was Crooks him- self. During this interview, which concededly vio- lated his Weingarten rights, Crooks confessed to this theft as well as to several others which he had perpetrated in the past. However, it is evident that the investigation leading to Crooks' discharge was undertaken as a result of information received from eyewitnesses to the misconduct in question and that the investiga- tion report itself was comprised principally of the corroborative statements of all the eyewitnesses, whose accounts were alone sufficient to justify the disciplinary action taken. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the Respondent's decision to discharge Crooks was not based on information ob- tained during the latter's unlawful interview and, 703 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD therefore, that reinstatement and backpay are not warranted in this case.2 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, United States Postal Service, Denver, Colorado, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. MEMBER JENKINS, dissenting in part: A agree with my colleagues that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by directing the requested union representative to remain silent at the investigatory interview of employee John Crooks.3 I also agree with their refusal to defer to an arbitrator's decision finding that Crooks was dis- charged for cause, inasmuch as the arbitator reached this determination without considering the alleged statutory violation presented in this pro- ceeding.4 However, in determining the appropriate remedy for this violation of the Act, the majority has ignored critical facts and has undermined its own criteria for determining the appropriate remedy as recently stated in Kraft Foods, Inc.5 As stated by the majority in Kraft Foods: The General Counsel can make [a prima facie showing that a make-whole remedy is warrant- ed] by proving that respondent conducted an investigatory interview in violation of Wein- garten and that the employee whose rights were violated was subsequently disciplined for z Our dissenting colleague points to the Respondent's letter, notifying Crooks of his impending removal from the Postal Service, as evidence compelling a different conclusion In his view, this letter reveals that the Respondent placed specific reliance on Crooks' admission of similar nis- conduct in the past, in deciding to discharge him, because "tlhe present record definitively shows that the Respondent had no source for this in- formation other than the unlawful interview." Our colleague errs. As pre- viously set forth herein, Betty Markey, the first eyewitness interviewed having reported catching Crooks in delico, also stated: "Once he traded me $20 in quarters, nickels, and dimes for a $20 bill. I think he has been doing it taking the money] for some time because we have been short for three or four months" Indeed, a subsequent search of Crooks' as- signed locker, which is not alleged to have violated Weingarten, revealed a paper cup containing change, giving credence to Markey's earlier voiced suspicion. Moreover, we are not prepared to conclude, as our col- league has, that, even absent Crooks' admission of past theft, the Respon- dent would not have meted out the same discipline to him based on the theft for which he was caught red-handed and implicated by the state- ments of others. Thus, the most that can be said in the circumstances of this case is that nothing which transpired during the interview, herein found unlawful, apparently deterred the Respondent from taking disci- plinary action against Crooks. a See Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, 251 NLRB 612 (1980); and Texaco. Inc., 251 NLRB 633 (1980). 4See Suburban Moror Freight, Inc., 247 NLRB No. 2 (1980), and Gen- eral Warehouse Corp., 247 NLRB No. 142 (1980). b 251 NLRB 598 (1980). the conduct which was the subject of the un- lawful interview. In the face of such a showing, the burden shifts to the respondent. Thus, in order to negate the prima facie showing of the appro- priateness of a make-whole remedy, the re- spondent must demonstrate that its decision to discipline the employee in question was not based on information obtained at the unlawful interview. Under this standard, it is beyond dispute that the General Counsel has established the prima facie showing for a full remedy and that it is incumbent upon the Respondent to demonstrate affirmatively that it did not rely on the information gained from Crooks' interview. The majority finds that this burden has been met by citing the summaries of in- formation concerning Crooks given by employees to a postal inspector. The majority, however, ig- nores that the Respondent thereafter found it nec- essary to interview Crooks and discharged him only after receiving additional information from him. The compelling inference is that the Respon- dent relied on the unlawful interview of Crooks when it decided to discharge him, as Chairman Fanning and Member Penello stated in their con- curring opinion in Texaco, supra: It is extremely difficult to discern how an employer could (1) decide to continue its in- vestigation of employee misconduct through an interview of the accused employee, (2) af- firmatively solicit from the employee informa- tion relating to the misconduct, and (3) in fact succeed in obtaining perhaps the most telling information available to merit a decision to dis- cipline and yet be found not to have based its disciplinary decision, in any way, on the infor- mation it was so successful in securing. Further, the information provided by the three other employees related to a single allegation of misconduct by Crooks occurring on January 17, 1978. However, the Respondent's letter to Crooks informing him of the decision to discharge him spe- cifically relies on his admission of similar miscon- duct occurring on several occasions over a 4- month period. The present record definitively shows that the Respondent had no source for this information other than the unlawful interview.6 T6 The majority asserts that the Respondent had information, not tainted by any Weingurten violation, which independently evidenced Crooks' misconduct, sufficient to show that the Respondent did not rely on Crooks' admission This evidence is comprised of information that Crooks once had $20 in change, had a cup of change in his locker at work, ad that Betty Markey thought Crooks had been taking money. I disagree that such information shows misconduct on Crooks' part In any Continued 704 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE Accordingly, there can be no doubt as to the con- nection between the Respondent's unlawful con- duct and its decision to discharge Crooks. What the Respondent might have done absent this unlaw- ful conduct is pure speculation, and is an inappro- priate basis for a limitation of the remedy. As fully stated in my dissent in Kraft Foods, I have previously noted the difficulty in administer- ing the majority's test for limiting the remedy for Weingarten violations. In response to this expres- sion of concern, the majority replied: Although we recognize that application of this remedial test will require close and careful analysis, we are unwilling to adopt a per se rule merely to promote decisional simplicity. The majority's decision here stands in complete contrast to this statement. event, I do not understand how such meager evidence outweighs the pro- bity of Crooks' explicit (and unlawfully obtained) confession. I under- stand only that the majority's analysis undermines the criteria eslablished in Kraft, supra DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES S. JENSON, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard before me in Denver, Colorado, on March 1, 1979. The charge initiating this proceeding was filed on May 30, 1978,' and was dismissed by the Re- gional Director on July 3; an appeal was taken from the dismissal which was denied by the General Counsel on August 14; the charge was reinstated by the Regional Director on November 27 on the ground the Charging Party had submitted newly discovered evidence adduced at an arbitration hearing held subsequent to the dismissal of the charge; and the complaint was issued on Novem- ber 27, amended on January 23, 1979, and alleges Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, herein called the Act, by "denying union representation to John Crooks [an em- ployee] by refusing to allow the Union steward to par- ticipate in a disciplinary interview." Respondent filed di- rectly with the National Labor Relations Board a "Motion to Stay Proceedings, for Summary Judgment, and to Dismiss the Complaint" on the ground that the evidence on which the dismissed charge was reinstated was not in fact newly discovered and that reinstatement of the charge was barred by Section 10(b) of the Act. The General Counsel opposed the motion and by tele- graphic order dated February 28, 1979, the Board denied the motion "without prejudice to renewal at the hear- ing." The motion was renewed by Respondent at the hearing and denied by me. I have reconsidered my ruling in the light of the entire record and hereby reaffirm it for the following reasons. I All dates hereafter are in 1978 unless otherwise stated Section 10(b) provides that no complaint shall issue based on any unfair labor practice occurring more than 6 months prior to the filing of a charge with the Board. The Board has clearly stated that Section 10(b) relates only to the actual filing of the charge, and once it has been timely filed the control over and disposition of it is vested exclusively with the General Counsel who has virtually unlimited discretion to reinstate and proceed on it even though the initial dismissal may have been sus- tained on appeal, provided the General Counsel has not abused his discretion. Whether the failure to timely elicit the missing link in the evidence necessary to proceed in this matter rests with the Charging Party or the Board agent who investigated the charge, there can be no doubt but that because of the thorough investigation and report made by the postal inspectors employed by Re- spondent, and the record made in the arbitration pro- ceeding following the filing of a grievance over Crooks' termination, "documents were preserved, witnesses were available, and recollections kept fresh." Accordingly, I conclude that the Regional Director, as the agent of the General Counsel, did not abuse his discretion in reinstat- ing the charge, nor has Respondent shown that it was surprised by the evidence or prejudiced because of his action. Hamilton Avnet Electronics, 240 NLRB 781 (1979); California Pacific Signs, Inc., 233 NLRB 450 (1977); Silver Bakery Inc. of ANewton, 150 NLRB 421 (1964). All parties were afforded full opportunity to appear, to introduce evidence, to examine and cross-examine wit- nesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Respondent, Charging Party, and the General Counsel filed post-hear- ing briefs, all of which have been carefully considered. Upon the entire record in the case, and from my ob- servation of the witnesses and their demeanor, and having considered the post-hearing briefs, I make the fol- lowing: FINDINGS OI FACT I. JURISDICTION The Board has jurisdiction over this proceeding by virtue of Section 1209 of the Postal Reorganization Act. 1. THE L.ABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Respondent admits and it is found that Denver Bulk Mail Center Local, American Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 111. ISSUE Whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act when its postal inspectors refused to allow a union steward to participate in an investigatory interview which led to disciplinary action against an employee. IV. FACTS At all times material herein, John Crooks was em- ployed as a custodian at Respondent's Denver Bulk Mail Center, herein called BMC, and was represented for col- 705 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD lective-bargaining purposes by the Union. He was initial- ly employed under a mentally handicapped program. On January 17, Crooks was observed taking money from the office of an independent business which operated vend- ing machines in the BMC cafeteria. Security personnel were called and Crooks was taken to the maintenance su- pervisor's office where he was asked a few questions before it was determined that United States postal in- spectors should be called to conduct an investigation. It was also determined that Crooks' shop steward should be called. Accordingly, Shop Steward Stanley Hill was summoned to the maintenance supervisor's office where he stayed with Crooks while the postal inspectors inter- rogated other witnesses in another location. As there were others in the maintenance supervisor's office wait- ing to be interviewed, Hill told Crooks not to say any- thing in front of the other people. After about 45 minutes of waiting, Crooks was taken upstairs to the inspection service office for interrogation. Hill, however, did not accompany Crooks, nor was he advised where Crooks was being taken. The postal inspectors conducting the in- vestigation were J. W. Hale and W. F. Chaney. Before the interrogation began, Crooks read and signed a form entitled, "United States Inspection Service Warning and Waiver of Rights," herein called Miranda rights, which is utilized by the service in criminal investigations.2 While Crooks did not remember doing so during the in- vestigation of the instant charge by the Board's agent, Hale's report on the investigation reveals that after sign- ing the Miranda rights form, Crooks stated that he could not answer any questions until a union representative was present. Hale then requested a security officer to summon a union steward. In the meantime Hill, who had remained in the maintenance supervisor's office, made his way to the inspection service office where the interroga- tion of Crooks was to take place. Hale informed Hill that "we were conducting a criminal investigation, that we intended to interview Mr. Crooks, and that his function there as a union steward or union representative was to protect the employment rights of the employee, but that he was not an attorney, he could not give legal advice, and his function at the interview was as a witness." Hill testified he was further told that he could not say any- thing during the interrogation. Following the interview, Hale prepared an investigative memorandum dated Janu- ary 19, attached to which were memorandums of inter- views with the various witnesses. A copy of the report was sent to Robert H. Chirgwin, the BMC manager. On January 20, the Union's president, Ted L. Swiader, re- quested a copy of the investigative memorandum, and a copy was given to him on the same day. The second paragraph of the Crooks memorandum of interview states, that "Before proceeding with the interview, Mr. Crooks requested the presence of a union representative. Mr. Stanley Hill was summoned for that purpose." On January 23, Crooks was notified by letter of Respon- dent's proposal to terminate him after 30 days. On Feb- ruary 4, Swiader filed a written grievance protesting the proposed discharge. By letter dated February 23, Re- spondent notified Crooks that he was discharged effec- 2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S 436 (1966). tive February 27. On March 15, Crooks, who was repre- sented by an attorney, entered a plea of guilty to crimi- nal charges stemming from the theft incident which were brought against him in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. On May 30, the charge leading to the instant complaint was filed. On July 3, the Regional Director for Region 27 dismissed the charge on the ground that "at no time during the investigatory in- terview did Mr. John Crooks request that a union repre- sentative be present. Nor did the steward, after being summoned by management, request that he be given the opportunity to talk with Crooks prior to the interview." By letter dated August 14, the office of the General Counsel denied the Union's appeal of the Regional Di- rector's dismissal. On July 28, the matter of Crooks' dis- charge was arbitrated. The record of the arbitration dis- closes, consistent with the investigative memorandum of January 19, which had been delivered to Swiader on January 20, that Crooks told the postal inspectors on January 18 that he would not talk to them without the presence of a union representative, and that one was sent for. Following receipt of the transcript of the arbitration hearing on August 21, Swiader filed a new charge in Case 27-CA-5939(P) alleging in identical wording the al- legation contained in the dismissed charge. On Septem- ber 28, the arbitrator issued his decision finding that Crooks had been terminated for "just cause" and denied the grievance. On November 27, the Regional Director issued an order reinstating the charge in the instant case which he had earlier dismissed and which the office of the General Counsel sustained, on the basis of "newly discovered evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing held subsequent to the dismissal .... " Analysis and Conclusions In addition to claiming the charge was barred by Sec- tion 10(b) of the Act, an issue which I earlier found ad- verse to Respondent, Respondent contends "that where employees are given their Miranda rights during criminal investigations conducted by the Postal Inspection Ser- vice inspectors, they are given a greater measure of due process than employees enjoy under Section 7 of the Act. Thus, the Postal Service contends further that the Miranda rights supercede the rights sanction in Weingar- ten." 3 In United States Postal Service, 241 NLRB 141 (1979), the Board concluded that Weingarten rights are unaffected by "rights . . . possessed or . . . accorded under Miranda," and that signing the Miranda waiver at the outset of an interview is completely irrelevant to the subsequent assertion of Weingarten rights. Thus, while Crooks executed the Miranda waiver, he subsequently asserted his Weingarten rights by refusing to answer questions unless his union representative was present. At no time did he express a willingness to waive his Wein- garten rights after asserting them. And, while the union steward was permitted to be present during the interro- gation which ultimately led to Crooks' discipline, he was :See N.. L RR v. J Weingarten Inc., 420 US 251 (1975) 706 UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE not permitted to consult with nor counsel Crooks in any way or to make any utterance during the questioning.4 An employee in the performance of his duties as a union steward or representative is engaged in a protected concerted activity. See, for example, Quality Manufactur- ing Company, 195 NLRB 197, 199 (1972). Hence, Hill was engaged in a protected concerted activity when he appeared at Crooks' investigatory interview conducted by Hale and Chaney. Nor can there be any question but that Crooks enjoyed the Section 7 statutory right to the presence of a union representative at an interview which he reasonably feared might result in discipline, which it indeed did. As the Supreme Court stated in Weingarten: The action of an employee in seeking to have the assistance of his union representative at a confronta- tion with his employer clearly falls within the literal wording of §7 that "[e]mployees shall have the right . . . to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of. . . mutual aid or protection." Mobil Oil Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 482 F.2d 842, 846 (CA7 1973) . . . . The representative's presence is an as- surance to other employees in the bargaining unit that they, too, can obtain his aid and protection if called upon to attend a like interview.. [Empha- sis supplied.] It is implicit in reading Weingarten that, once an employ- ee has asserted his Section 7 right to the presence of his union representative, he is entitled to assistance, aid, and protection by that representative.s To deny the union representative the right, as was Hill, to participate in the investigation, at least to the extent of conversing with and asking questions of Crooks, was to deny Crooks the representation which Weingarten contemplates. In Wein- garten, the Supreme Court specifically recognized that the union representative could serve a useful purpose by giving assistance to an employee who might be "too fearful or inarticulate to relate accurately the incident being investigated, or too ignorant to raise extenuating factors." 420 U.S. 262-263. I have no doubt that Crooks, hired under a mentally handicapped program, falls spe- cifically within the Court's intendment. Accordingly, I find that by refusing to allow Hill to participate in the investigatory interview which resulted in Crooks' dis- charge, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as alleged in the complaint. CoNct.usioNs OF LAw 1. Board has jurisdiction over this matter by virtue of Section 1209 of the Postal Reorganization Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 4 It could he argued hal Respondent, by refusing ill his reprsentra- tive roll during the inlerrogaltion of Crooks, perhaps placed him ill the position of being a witness for Respondent agaiins the idli idual lie s as there to represent. s In Clrnax . olybdenun (omrpany a Division oJ /d u.a. Inc , 227 NL.RI 1189 (1977), enforcement denied 584 F2d 36) (10lh Cir 1978), the Board found that the conipan3.'s denial of an advance discussion be- tween employees and their uni on reprecsenr t;lie "lhwa;rl[ed] Ione if Ihe purposes approved il He'lurtcn " 3. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act on January 17, 1978, by refusing to allow a union represen- tative to participate in an investigatory interview with employee John Crooks, where such representation had been requested by Crooks, in circumstances where he reasonably feared the interview might result in disciplin- ary action against him. THE REMEDY Having found that the Postal Service has violated the Act in certain respects, I shall recommend that it be re- quired to cease and desist therefrom and from like or re- lated conduct, and to post appropriate notices. The ques- tion remains whether affirmative relief should be pro- vided to Crooks individually. The Union contends that Respondent should restore the status quo ante by requiring Respondent to offer rein- statement to Crooks, to make him whole for any loss of earnings he suffered, and to remove from its personnel files and records all references to his discharge. Rein- statement and backpay have been specifically disavowed by the General Counsel, who seeks a remedy limited to the posting of an appropriate notice. Respondent con- tends reinstatement and backpay are not warranted in view of the General Counsel's position, and in light of the arbitration decision upholding the discharge, which it contends meets the Board's Spielberg requirements." Al- though the lawfulness of Crooks' termination was not made an issue in the complaint, it is clear from all the evidence that he was discharged for theft and for threat- ening an employee of another company, and not for en- gaging in activities protected by Section 7 of the Act. Upon a plea of guilty entered by Crooks at a time when he was represented by an attorney, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado determined that Crooks engaged in the criminal conduct for which he was discharged. The issue of Crooks' discharge was submitted to an arbitrator for "final and binding determi- nation." The arbitrator, on much the same evidence elic- ited at the instant hearing, concluded that Crooks' sus- pension and termination were for just cause. There has been no contention that the arbitrator's decision failed to meet the Board's Spielberg standards. To the contrary, the record herein shows that Crooks was adequately rep- resented at the arbitration hearing, that the parties had agreed to be bound by the decision of the arbitrator, and that the proceedings were fair and regular. In these cir- cumstances, I conclude it would not effectuate the poli- cies of the Act to order the remedy sought by the Union. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: 6.Sp'wlhcr ptwln/icurnig ( 'mpancr, 112 Nl R I 100 (1I1 9I'55) 707 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDER7 The Respondent, United States Postal Service, Denver, Colorado, its officers, agents, succcessors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to allow a union representative to partici- pate in an interview with an employee, if such represen- tation has been requested by the employee and he rea- sonably fears that the interview will lead to disciplinary action against him. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. ? In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board. the find- ings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided im Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is nec- essary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Post at its Bulk Mail Center in Denver, Colorado, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."8 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 27, after being duly signed by Re- spondent's representative, shall be posted by it immedi- ately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, in- cluding all places where notices to employees are cus- tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Re- spondent to insure that said notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. (b) Notify the Regional Director for Region 27, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. I In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu- ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 708