Vermont Marble Co.

103 301 NLRB No. 13 VERMONT MARBLE CO. 1 In adopting the judge’s finding, we do not rely on Braeburn Alloy Steel, 202 NLRB 1127 (1973), cited in fn. 4 of the judge’s decision. Contrary to the judge, it was agreed in that case that the local union was not a recognized bargaining agent, either individually or jointly with the International. In this case, whether the local unions are bargaining agents of the Respondents’ em- ployees is the principal issue to be decided. In affirming the judge’s finding, we also observe that art. XVII, sec. 3 of the International Union’s constitution states that ‘‘The International Union and the Local Union to which the member belongs shall act exclusively as the member’s agent to represent the member in the presentation, maintenance, ad- justment, and settlement of all grievances and other matters relating to terms and conditions of employment or arising out of the employer-employee rela- tionship.’’ (Emphasis added.) Although that language would be consistent with a finding that the International and the local unions were joint representatives of the Respondents’ employees, it is equally consistent with the judge’s find- ing that the locals here function, in effect, as the International’s agents and not as representatives in their own right. The judge adverted to an incident in which local bargaining committee members clashed with the International representative over a contract proposal. Contrary to the judge’s indication, that episode took place in negotiations with Vermont Marble, not White Pigment. We correct this inconsequential error. 2 As is fully set forth in the judge’s decision, the locals to which the em- ployees formerly belonged were merged into a different local, Local 4, in early 1989. The Respondents contend that the mergers created questions concerning representation. The judge found, however, that the International alone was the bargaining representative, and therefore, in effect, that the mergers effected no change in the identity of the bargaining representative and that no question concerning representation had been raised. 3 The judge stated that the General Counsel had not pursued those allega- tions in his brief. We disagree. Although the General Counsel’s brief to the judge contained virtually nothing in the way of argument or analysis on this point, it specifically stated that the withdrawal of recognition was an issue for the judge to decide. 4 All dates are in 1989. 5 Case 1–RM–1208 (White Pigment) and Case 1–RM–1209 (Vermont Mar- ble). Both petitions have since been dismissed under the Board’s blocking charge rule. 6 Each letter also bears the inscription ‘‘cc: Mr. Francis Farrell.’’ Francis Farrell is the International Union staff representative who attended the most recent negotiations with the Respondents. It thus appears that the International was notified of the Respondents’ positions set forth in their May 31 letters. 7 As they had in their RM petitions filed with the Regional Office. Vermont Marble Company and White Pigment Corporation and United Steelworkers of Amer- ican, AFL–CIO–CLC. Cases 1–CA–26372–1 and 1–CA–26372–2 January 15, 1991 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS CRACRAFT AND DEVANEY On June 18, 1990, Administrative Law Judge Ste- phen J. Gross issued the attached decision. The Gen- eral Counsel and the Respondents filed exceptions and supporting briefs; the Charging Party filed cross-excep- tions and a supporting brief; and the General Counsel filed a brief in reply to the Respondents’ exceptions. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de- cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and con- clusions only to the extent consistent with this Deci- sion and Order. The judge found, and we agree, that the Charging Party (the International Union) is and at all relevant times has been the sole bargaining representative of the Respondents’ bargaining unit employees.1 We there- fore adopt his finding that the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by ceasing to make contractually mandated payments of union dues to the International and, instead, placing those sums in es- crow pending the resolution of the dispute over the identity of the employees’ bargaining representative.2 The judge, however, dismissed the allegations that the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5), on or about April 21, 1989, by withdrawing recognition from the International.3 The General Counsel and the Inter- national have excepted to those dismissals. We find merit to their exceptions. Following the mergers of Locals 22A, 26, and 30A (to which employees of Vermont Marble belonged) and 15306 (to which employees of White Pigment be- longed) into Local 4, the Respondents, by letters dated April 21, 1989,4 informed the International that they declined to recognize Local 4 as their employees’ bar- gaining representative absent a Board-conducted elec- tion. On April 24, the Respondents filed RM petitions with the Regional Office, in which they stated that the original locals were their employees’ bargaining rep- resentatives and that the mergers of those locals into Local 4 created questions concerning representation.5 By letters dated May 5, the International’s attorneys informed the Respondents that ‘‘The bargaining agent and the contracting party for your employees has been, and will continue to be, the International Union and not any of the locals. Please refer to Article One of the agreement. Your company is not requested to recog- nize Local 4.’’ (Emphasis in the original.) By letters dated May 31, however, the Respondents informed of- ficers of Locals 26, 22A, and 153066 that it had al- ways been the Respondents’ position that the locals represented unit employees; that its obligation to check off union dues ended with the locals’ merger into Local 4; and that, because of their dispute with the International (which contended that it was the employ- ees’ sole representative), they would place checked-off dues in escrow pending the resolution of the dispute. We find, contrary to the judge, that by the course of conduct just described, the Respondents unlawfully withdrew recognition from the International Union. Al- though the Respondents only refused, in so many words, to recognize Local 4 in their April 21 letters, they made clear in their letters of May 317 that it was their position that the original locals were the rep- resentatives of unit employees, even though the Inter- national Union had informed them, correctly, that it, and not any of the locals, was the bargaining agent. On that basis alone, the Respondents discontinued making 104 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 8 The judge apparently dismissed the withdrawal of recognition allegations because he found no evidence that the Respondents withdrew recognition on April 21. We think that is an unnecessarily narrow reading of the complaint allegations and the evidence in this case. In the first place, the complaint al- leges that recognition was withdrawn on or about April 21, not on that date, as the judge stated. More important, although the Respondents’ April 21 letters did not, in themselves, state a refusal to recognize the International, they were the first links in a chain of conduct that clearly constituted withdrawal of rec- ognition from the International. That the import of the Respondents’ actions probably did not become clear to the International until later does not mean that the withdrawal of recognition had not been set in train around April 21, as the complaint alleges. In any event, a discrepancy of only a few weeks be- tween the date on which the complaint alleges a violation occurred and the date on which the evidence establishes the violation did occur will not in itself prejudice the Respondent. See Siracusa Moving & Storage, 291 NLRB 143 (1988). Thus, even if we were to find that the withdrawals of recognition did not actually occur until late May, we still would find them comprehended by the language of the complaint. 9 The judge inadvertently excluded from his recommended Order the re- quirement that the Respondents notify the Regional Director of the steps they have taken to comply. We shall include such a provision in our amended Order. 10 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of ap- peals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.’’ the contractually required dues payments to the Inter- national, which, as we have found, was the sole rep- resentative. The Respondents’ insistence that only the original locals, either individually or jointly with the International, were their employees’ bargaining rep- resentatives was tantamount to a refusal to recognize any other entity, including the International, as the ex- clusive representative. The refusal to recognize the International violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1).8 Having found that the Respondents unlawfully with- drew recognition from the International Union, we shall amend the judge’s recommended Order to require the Respondents to cease and desist and, on request, to recognize and bargain with the International Union as the exclusive representative of employees in the appro- priate units.9 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Respondents, Vermont Marble Company, Proctor, Vermont, and White Pigment Corporation, Florence, Vermont, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Unlawfully failing to remit to the United Steel- workers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC (the Inter- national), dues withheld from employees’ pay pursuant to valid dues-checkoff authorizations. (b) Failing and refusing to recognize the Inter- national as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees of the Respondents in the units found appropriate. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Recognize and, on request, bargain with the International as the exclusive representative of the em- ployees in the following appropriate units concerning terms and conditions of employment: (1) All hourly paid production and maintenance employees employed by White Pigment at its Florence, South Wallingford, and New Haven, Vermont plants, including truck drivers, but ex- cluding office clerical employees, technical em- ployees, over-the-road truck drivers under private contract, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. (2) All full-time production, maintenance, and power employees of Vermont Marble Company at its Center Rutland, Danby, Proctor, Weybridge, and New Haven, Vermont facilities, including core drill operators, truck drivers, and automobile repairmen, but excluding chauffeurs, office jani- tors, office clerical employees, guards and super- visors as defined in the Act. (b) In the manner set forth in the remedy section of the judge’s decision, remit to the International, with in- terest, the dues they withheld, or should have withheld, from their employees’ pay, but which they did not remit to the International. (c) Post at each of their facilities in Vermont copies of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix A’’ (in the case of Vermont Marble) or ‘‘Appendix B’’ (in the case of White Pigment).10 Copies of the notices, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 1, after being signed by the Respondents’ authorized rep- resentatives, shall be posted by the Respondents imme- diately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason- able steps shall be taken by the Respondents to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondents have taken to comply. APPENDIX A NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. 105 VERMONT MARBLE CO. 1 The International filed unfair labor practice charges against Vermont Mar- ble in Case 1–CA–26372–1 and against White Pigment in Case 1–CA–26372– 2 on May 11, 1989, and amended its charges on June 22. The complaint dated July 11, 1989, was amended at the hearing. The Respondents admit that they are employers engaged in commerce for purposes of the National Labor Rela- tions Act (the Act) and that the International is a labor organization. I heard the case in Proctor, Vermont, on February 7, 1989. Briefs have been filed by the General Counsel, by the International, and by the Respondents. The Re- spondents have filed an unopposed motion to correct the transcript. I grant the motion. 2 The bargaining unit consists of: Continued WE WILL NOT unlawfully fail to remit to the United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC (the Inter- national), dues that we withheld or should have with- held from employees’ pay pursuant to dues-checkoff authorizations. WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to recognize the Inter- national as the exclusive representative of our bar- gaining unit employees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL remit to the International, with interest, the dues that we withheld, or should have withheld, from our employees’ pay and that we should have, but did not, pay to the International. WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain with the International as the exclusive representative of employ- ees in the following appropriate unit: All hourly paid production and maintenance em- ployees at our Florence, South Wallingford, and New Haven, Vermont plants, including truck driv- ers, but excluding office clerical employees, tech- nical employees, over-the-road truck drivers under private contract, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WHITE PIGMENT COMPANY APPENDIX B NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT unlawfully fail to remit to the United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC (the Inter- national), dues that we withheld or should have with- held from employees’ pay pursuant to dues-checkoff authorizations. WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to recognize the Inter- national as the exclusive representative of our bar- gaining unit employees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL remit to the International, with interest, the dues that we withheld, or should have withheld, from our employees’ pay and that we should have, but did not, pay to the International. WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargain with the International as the exclusive representative of employ- ees in the following appropriate unit: All full-time production, maintenance, and power employees at our Center Rutland, Danby, Proctor, Weybridge, and New Haven, Vermont facilities, including core drill operators, truck drivers, and automobile repairmen, but excluding chauffeurs, office janitors, office clerical employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. VERMONT MARBLE COMPANY Michael Fitzsimrnons, Esq., for the General Counsel. Ellen Kearns, Esq. and David S. Rubin, Esq. (Kearns & As- sociates), of Boston, Massachusetts, for the Respondents. Shailah T. Stewart, Esq. (Angoff, Goldman, Manning, Pyle, Wanger & Hiatt), of Boston, Massachusetts, for the Charg- ing Party. DECISION STEPHEN J. GROSS, Administrative Law Judge. This case presents the issue of whether, as of 1989, the United Steel- workers of America (the Internatonal) alone was the collec- tive-bargaining representative of the bargaining unit employ- ees at Vermont Marble Company and White Pigment Com- pany, or whether the employees at each of those two compa- nies were represented jointly by the International and certain local unions. If the International alone was the collective-bar- gaining representative, then, for reasons that will be dis- cussed below, both Vermont Marble and White Pigment (col- lectively the Respondents) violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). If the Inter- national and the local unions jointly represented the Re- spondents’ employees, neither of the Respondents violated the Act in any respect.1 For the reasons set out in the following pages, my conclu- sion is that the International alone was, and is, the exclusive bargaining representative of the Respondent’s bargaining unit employees. Although the General Counsel’s cases against White Pig- ment and Vermont Marble are remarkably similar, it will make for easier reading to discuss them separately. I accord- ingly first turn to the General Counsel’s claim that White Pigment violated Section 8(a)(5). The General Counsel’s Case Against White Pigment White Pigment is in the business of grinding marble into powder. (The powder is used in the manufacture of paints, plastics, paper, and foodstuffs.) White Pigment has facilities in Florence and New Haven, Vermont. The Company’s bar- gaining unit employees are members of Steelworkers Local 15306.2 106 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD All production and maintenance employees employed at White Pig- ment’s Florence, South Wallingford, and New Haven, Vermont plants, in- cluding truck drivers, but excluding office clerical employees, technical employees, over-the-road truck drivers under private contract, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 3 See, e.g., a case cited by the Respondents, BASF-Wyandotte Corp., 276 NLRB 498, 599 (1985). It involved joint representation by an international union and a local union, and the collective-bargaining agreement specifically referred to both the international union and the local union. 4 See, e.g., Braeburn Alloy Steel, 202 NLRB 1127 (1973), a case involving both the Steelworkers International Union and a Steelworkers local union. The Board there simply assumed that ‘‘the United Steelworkers of America, AFL– CIO,’’ meant only the International. Early in 1989 the International merged Local 15306 into a much larger Steelworkers’ local, Local 4. The International merged the two locals without providing the members of Local 15306 with the procedural safeguards that the Board requires. Further, White Pigment contends, and the General Counsel and the International do not dispute, that there is no substantial continuity between premerger Local 15306 and postmerger Local 4. (See generally NLRB v. Food & Com- mercial Workers Local 1182, 475 U.S. 192 (1986).) There- after White Pigment advised the International that the Com- pany would not recognize Local 4 as a bargaining representa- tive of its employee, and White Pigment began escrowing the union dues it collected from its employees (pursuant to checkoff authorizations) rather than forwarding the moneys to the International. The General Counsel and the International agree that if Local 15306 was a bargaining representative of the White Pigment employees, whether alone or jointly with the Inter- national, at the time of its merger into Local 4, a question concerning representation arose and White Pigment lawfully could refuse to bargain further with either Local 4 or the International. But the General Counsel and the International take the position that the International alone was (and is) the exclusive bargaining representative of the Company’s bar- gaining unit employees. If that is the case, then Local 15306’s merger into Local 4 is beside the point insofar as White Pigment’s obligations are concerned. Contract Provisions Two collective-bargaining contracts covering White Pig- ment’s bargaining unit employees are in evidence. One is for the period 1984–1987 (the 1984 contract) and the other for the period 1987–1990 (the 1987 contract). Both contracts refer to a Board ‘‘certification of representative dated May 8, 1963.’’ Unfortunately, the record tells us nothing about what that certification says. That means that a determination of who represents the White Pigment employees—just the International, or the International jointly with Local 15306—is going to have to be based on: (1) the language of the contracts themselves; and (2) other evidence describing the various relationships between White Pigment, the International, and Local 15306. (The General Counsel contends that the parol evidence rule renders immaterial evidence outside the 1987 contract. I will discuss that contention later in this decision.) The first thing about the 1984 and 1987 contracts is their covers. And the covers of both contracts read: ‘‘Agreement between White Pigment Corporation and United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC.’’ Then, turning to the first page of text (of both contracts), the contacts read: AGREEMENT This Agreement made and entered into this [date] by and between WHITE PIGMENT CORPORATION, hereinafter referred to as ‘‘the Company,’’ and UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA AFL– CIO–CLC, hereinafter referred to as ‘‘the Union.’’ WITNESSETH The Company and the Union hereby agree as fol- lows: ARTICLE I—RECOGNITION Section 1. The Company recognizes the Union as the sole exclusive representative for the purposes of collec- tive bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment, of all [bargaining unit] employees . . . . The Respondents’ arguments in response to that language take two tacks. One is that other language of the White Pig- ment collective-bargaining contracts themselves shows that the words ‘‘United Steelworkers of America AFL–CIO– CLC’’ (and, therefore, the term the Union), as used in those contracts, includes Local 15306, along with the International. The other is that even if the words of the contracts do not so indicate, evidence about collective bargaining and griev- ance processing shows that Local 15306 is in fact a collec- tive-bargaining representative of the bargaining unit employ- ees. What does ‘‘United Steelworkers of America’’ mean, as used in the White Pigment collective-bargaining contract? In my decade or so of hearing cases arising under the Act, I have never come across a collective-bargaining agreement that refers to the ‘‘United Steelworkers of America’’ (or to the United Mine Workers of America, or the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, etc.), and that does not specify a local union, in which the parties intended the reference to be to a local union along with (or instead of) the International union. The Respondents have not pointed to any. And any perusal of Board cases will show that where the parties to a contract want to refer to a local union, they say so, including where they want to refer jointly to an international union and a local union.3 In Industrial America, that is to say ‘‘United Steelworkers of America’’ means the International alone; it does not mean the International and one or more local unions.4 Perhaps I should now simply conclude that the Inter- national was the exclusive collective-bargaining representa- tive of White Pigment’s bargaining unit employees and that, accordingly, White Pigment violated Section 8(a)(5). But in- stead, I am going to assume that the parties to the 1984 and 1987 contracts might conceivably have intended that Local 15306 be a collective-bargaining representation of White Pig- ment’s employees even though the contracts state that White Pigment’s recognizes the ‘‘United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC,’’ as the ‘‘sole exclusive representative’’ of the employees, and even though ‘‘United Steelworkers of 107 VERMONT MARBLE CO. 5 References to the White Pigment contracts will be to both the 1984 and 1987 contracts unless otherwise specified. 6 The International may, of course, properly confer on a local union the au- thority to act as its agent on matters relating to the representation of unit em- ployees. Rath Packing Co., 275 NLRB 255 (1985). 7 The International’s penchant for using the undefined term ‘‘the Inter- national Union’’ as distinguished from ‘‘the Union,’’ in contracts that define ‘‘the Union’’ to mean the International has led to other judicial headscratching. See L. O. Koven & Bro. v. Steelworkers Local 5767, 250 F.Supp. 810, 813 (D.N.J. 1966). America, AFL–CIO–CLC,’’ in all other contexts invariably refers to the International, exclusively. Distinctions in the contracts between ‘‘union and Inter- national Union’’ Given the definition of ‘‘the Union,’’ as quoted earlier, one might expect a contract provision requir- ing the Company to remit checked-off union dues to the International’s treasurer to refer to ‘‘the Treasurer of the Union.’’ Instead the contracts refer to ‘‘the International Treasurer’’ (art. 155). Similarly the contracts provide for the right of visitation to White Pigment’s facilities ‘‘by Inter- national Union representative’’ (art. 16). But it is in reference to grievance processing that the con- tract language is most startling. According to article 9 of the contracts, the second step of the grievance process involves ‘‘the Union representative.’’ But the third step involves ‘‘the Union representative and the International Union representa- tive.’’ Finally, ‘‘If the Company has any grievance or com- plaint it may take it up with the Internatiolnal Union rep- resentative.’’ The references to ‘‘the International Union’’ constitute, to say the least, inelegant drafting, given the earlier definition of ‘‘the Union.’’ And one way to make sense out of the ‘‘Union’’-‘‘International Union’’ phraseology in the quoted passages is to conclude that employees are represented by both the Local and the International. But that interpretation makes nonsensical the contract’s definition of ‘‘the Union.’’ A second approach to interpreting the provisions at issue is to assume that, for some purposes, members of the Local may serve as agents of the International in respect to matters affecting the Local’s members. Once that is assumed, then the reason for the distinctions in the contract between ‘‘Union representative’’ and ‘‘International Union representa- tive’’ becomes obvious. Those distinctions merely represent the contract’s inartistic way of specifying when something must be done by an official of the International rather than by a member of the local whom the International authorized to act on the International’s behalf. The International’s constitution is relevant in this respect. Article XVII of the International’s constitution states that ‘‘the International Union shall be the contracting party in all collective-bargaining agreements.’’ But the constitution (in the same article) also provides that the ‘‘International Union and the Local Union to which the member belongs shall act exclusively as the member’s agent to represent the member in . . . all grievances.’’6 The contract language referring to ‘‘Union’’ and ‘‘International Union’’ representatives obvi- ously stems from the role in grievance processing that the International’s constitution gives to the local.7 I conclude that the references in the 1984 and 1987 con- tracts to ‘‘the International Union,’’ as distinct from ‘‘the Union,’’ do not require me to find that the parties intended the Local to be a joint representative of the employees, along with the International. It is true that those references would be consistent with such an intention. But they are also con- sistent with an intention on the parties’ part that members of Local 15306 from time to time serve as agents of the Inter- national. The Signature Pages of the 1984 and 1987 Contracts The Respondents contend that the signature pages of the 1984 and 1987 contracts show that Local 15306 represented the bargaining unit employees jointly with the International. The 1984 Contract Recall that the first page of text of the 1984 contract specifies that the agreement is between White Pigment and the United Steelworkers of America, that the Company rec- ognizes ‘‘the Union as the sole exclusive representative for the purpose of collective bargaining’’ and ‘‘the Union,’’ in turn, is defined as the United Steelworkers of America. Under these circumstances, if the signature page of the con- tract were to evidence joint representation by the Inter- national and Local 15306, the writing on the page would in the very least have to specify that Local 15306 was a party to the contract and that the officials of the Local signed the contract as such and not as agents of the International. The signature page of the 1984 contract looks like this (with capitalization as in the original): IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement is exe- cuted in duplicate originals on the day above written on behalf of the Company by its duly authorized represent- ative and on behalf of the Union by its duly authorized representatives. United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC United Steelworkers of White Pigment America Corporation AFL–CIO–CLC llllllllll Bylllllllll [name] [name], President International President llllllllll Local Union 15306 [name] Committee International Secretary llllllllll llllllllll [name] [name] International Treasurer llllllllll llllllllll [name] [name] International Vice President (Administration) 108 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 8 That tallies with the testimony of an International representative that the members of the Local 15306 committee who participated in the bargaining ‘‘are duly elected representative[s] of the United Steelworkers of America along with myself.’’ 9 Even had the page not been clear that the committee members were sign- ing as representatives of the Internatinal, and even had those committee mem- bers all been officials of Local 15306 and signed it as such, that still would not be proof that the Local was a joint collective-bargaining representative. See North American Phillips Co., 78 NLRB 666, 668 (1948) (the contract stat- ed that a local union was sole bargaining representative; the Board deemed the International to be ‘‘merely a nominal party’’ to the contract despite the signature on the contract of an International official in his official capacity). 10 Pages are mixed up in the 1987 contract (G.C. Exh. 4). (An attempt was made at the hearing to straighten things out. See Tr. 46. But it was not quite right.) There are two signature pages in the document, pp. 19 and 20. But the signatures on p. 19 relate to the pension plan on pp. 21–22. The signatures that relate to the collective-bargaining contract are on page 20. (that is clear both from an examination of pp. 18–22, and from a comparison of the 1987 contract with the 1984 contract.) 11 The International official who headed the union negotiating team testified at one point that ‘‘the local itself can override my objection and vote to accept the proposals. It’s not unusual.’’ But it turns out that he was referring to the right of the members of the Local to vote on whether to accept a proposed contract. llllllllll llllllllll [name] [name] International Vice President (Human Affairs) llllllllll [name] Director, District One llllllllll [name] Sub-District Director As I read that writing, it specifies that everyone who signed the contract (except for White Pigment’s president) signed it as a ‘‘duly authorized representative’’ of the United Steelworkers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC.8 Further, no one signed the contract as an official of Local 15306. Rather, four persons signed as members of the ‘‘Local Union 15306 Committee,’’ and they did so without indicating their official position in the local. (In contrast, the seven officials of the International who signed the contract did so over their titles.) In sum, the signature page of the ’84 contract amounts to further evidence that only the International was the collec- tive-bargaining representative of White Pigment’s bargaining unit employees.9 The 1987 Contract The signature page of the 1987 contract is set up the same way as the 1984 contract except that there is no ‘‘UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL–CIO–CLC’’ on a line by itself following ‘‘authorized representatives.’’10 Thus, there is this sentence (which is identical to the 1984 con- tract): IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement is exe- cuted in duplicate originals on the day above written on behalf of the Company by its duly authorized represent- ative and on behalf of the Union by its duly authorized representatives. And following that there are signatures under ‘‘United Steel- workers of America, AFL–CIO–CLC,’’ ‘‘White pigment Corporation’’ and ‘‘Local Union 15306 Committee.’’ And again, officials of the International signed over their titles, persons signing as the Local Union 15306 Committee did not show titles. Since ‘‘the Union’’ is defined to mean the International (as discussed earlier), the signature page of the 1987 contract, like that of the 1984 contract, shows that, except for White Pigment’s president, everyone who signed the contract signed it as a ‘‘duly authorized representative’’ of the International. Bargaining Practice The Respondents contend that the joint representative sta- tus of Local 15306 is shown by the way bargaining was con- ducted. That contention starts from the premise that there is a test for joint representation that goes this way, in situations in which the contract means an international union as the employees’ collective-bargaining representative: (1) Look to see to what extent members of the local participated in contract negotiations and to what extent they, rather than any international officials, were re- sponsible for the positions taken on behalf of the em- ployees. (2) If any members of the local were sufficiently ac- tive during the negotiating process, and/or if on some occasions they, not the international official(s), domi- nated that process, that means that the local union rep- resents the employees jointly with the international union. The Respondents’ initial problem is that there is no such test. In fact, where an international union is named as the ex- clusive bargaining representative of unit employees, the inter- national remains as such even if the local conducts all the contract bargaining. Rath Packing Co., 275 NLRB 255 (1985); cf. Appleton Electric Co., 105 NLRB 666, 668 (1953). The Respondents’ other problem is that the participation in the bargaining process by the members of the ‘‘Local Union 15306 Committee’’ is entirely consistent with their being agents of the International for that purpose, as the signature pages of the contracts say they are. The committee members convinced White Pigment to agree to contract terms that ad- dressed issues of local concern and that, clearly, were not on the International’s agenda. In at least one instance, moreover, where the committee members vehemently clashed with an International official about a proposed contract provision, the provision preferred by the committee found its way into the contract. But an International official was at all bargaining sessions, and he clearly headed the union delegation. And there is no evidence that any committee member ever pro- posed any contract provision over the International official’s objection.11 Other Relationships Between White Pigment and Local 15306 As a White Pigment official testified, ‘‘labor relations was out there on the floor with the men. It had to be done every- day. Questions come up, we’d go and settle them then. I never dealt with an International rep on any weekly, month- ly, or quarterly basis. It was done with the local people.’’ 109 VERMONT MARBLE CO. 12 See Kal Kan Foods, 288 NLRB 590, 593 (1988), for a discussion of the use of the parol evidence rule in Board cases. 13 Actually Locals 26 and 30A merged just before the merger into Local 4. But Vermont Marble did not object to the Locals 26–30A merger, and that merger has no bearing on the outcome of this proceeding. 14 The record includes copies of three Vermont Marble collective-bargaining contracts, one for the years 1981–1984, one for 1984–1987, and one for 1987– 1990. 15 The signature page of the current Vermont Marble collective-bargaining contract is set up slightly differently from White Pigment’s and the way it is set up could be interpreted as indicating that the ‘‘Local Union Committee’’ is a party to the contract, along with the Internation and Vermont Marble. But the signature pages of earlier Vermont Marble contracts are set up the way White Pigment’s are. And the record is barren of any evidence that the change was intended to reflect a change in the identity of the parties to the contract. 16 Those employees, in turn, are all members of the same bargaining unit: All full-time production, maintenance and power employees of the Company at Center Rutland, Danby, Proctor, Weybridge and New Haven, Vermont, including core drive operators, truck drivers, and automobile re- pairmen, but excluding chauffeurs, office janitors, office clerical employ- ees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. Thus, for example, on safety matters company officials deal with plant safety representatives selected by the Local—even though article 11 of the 1984 and 987 contracts requires the Company to ‘‘confer with the Union regarding safety.’’ Evidence of that nature would be significant if the contract did not specify that the International was the exclusive bar- gaining representative responsibilities, along with the Inter- national. But given that the contract does specify that the International is the exclusive bargaining representative, that evidence shows only that the International permits members of Local 15306 to act as agents of the International. Other Matters I already touched on the fact that the International’s con- stitution specifies that the International ‘‘shall be the con- tracting party in all collective-bargaining agreements.’’ That, it seems to me, is further evidence that Local 15306 does not jointly represent the Company’s employees. The Parol Evidence Rule The issue in this case involves an alleged ambiguity about who the parties are to a contract. No one has cited me to any authority indicating that the restrictions of the parol evi- dence rule apply where that is the question to be resolved. I decline to broaden the reach of that rule to cover that issue.12 Conclusion—White Pigment Article 15 of White Pigment’s collective-bargaining con- tract with the International refers to union dues deducted by the Company pursuant to employee authorizations. As noted earlier, the provision requires the Company to ‘‘remit all sums so deducted to the International Trasurer.’’ Beginning on or about May 31, 1989, White Pigment has not done that. Instead the Company has placed such sums in an escrow ac- count. The Company has thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1). The complaint alleges that White Pigment also violated the Act on April 21, 1989, in that, on that date, ‘‘Respondent White withdrew its recognition of the union.’’ But the Gen- eral Counsel does not make the same contention on brief— properly, since there is no evidence that the Company with- drew recognition of the International on that date. I accord- ingly will recommend that the allegation be dismissed. The General Counsel’s Case Against Vermont Marble Vermont Marble mines and mills marble and generates and distributes electric power at facilities at various locations in Vermont. As of early 1989 its bargaining unit employees were members of Steelworkers Locals 22A, 26, 30A. But then those locals merged into Steelworkers Local 4.13 As was the case with Local 15306’s merger into Local 4, the mergers were accomplished without providing the members with the procedural safeguards the Board requires, and there was no substantial continuity as between Locals 22A, 26, and 30A, on the one hand, and Local 4, on the other. Vermont Marble’s response to the mergers tracked White Pigment’s. On April 21, 1989, Vermont Marble advised the International that it would not recognize Local 4. And in May Vermont Marble escrowed the union dues it collected from its employees. Vermont Marble’s collective-bargaining contracts, like White Pigment’s, state that they are with the International, define ‘‘the Union’’ to mean the International, and state that Vermont Marble recognizes ‘‘the Union’’ as the exclusive representative for all bargaining unit employees.14 In all other respects too, there is no material difference be- tween Vermont Marble’s contracts and White Pigment’s as far as showing whether the International is the sole collec- tive-bargaining representative.15 That similarly between Vermont Marble’s situation and White Pigment’s further ob- tains in regard to the nature of the relationship between the ‘‘Local Union Committee’’ and the International during bar- gaining over new contracts and in grievance processing. There is one matter that applies to Vermont Marble and not to White Pigment which bears mention. As touched on above, until 1989 Vermont Marble’s bargaining unit employ- ees were divided into three locals unions. Yet as far as the record shows, at all times only one collective-bargaining con- tract covered all those employees.16 Moreover no officer of any local union signed any of the contracts on behalf of his local. Rather, five or six employees, some of whom were of- ficers of the locals and some of whom were not, signed merely as members of the ‘‘Local Union Committee.’’ Thus, if one had to search for one or more entities to represent Vermont Marble’s employees jointly with the International, it would have to be the ‘‘Local Union Committee,’’ rather than the local unions themselves. I accordingly conclude that the International is the exclu- sive collective-bargaining representative of Vermont Mar- ble’s bargaining unit employees and that Vermont Marble therefore violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act when it placed checked-off union dues into an escrow account rather than paying them over to the International in accordance with the terms of its collective-bargaining contract with the Inter- national. REMEDY The recommended Order requires the Respondents to remit to the International the moneys that the Respondents have withheld from their employees’ paychecks, pursuant to dues- checkoff authorizations, since about May 31, 1989, together 110 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD with interest on those moneys, with interest computed as pre- scribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). [Recommended Order omitted from publication.]