Crystal Springs Shirt Corp.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Crystal Springs Shirt Corporation and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 15-CA-5961 April 18, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND MURPHY On September 28, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Henry L. Jalette issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief, and the Charging Party filed cross-exceptions and a supporting brief, to which the Respondent filed a brief in reply. The General Counsel filed a brief in support of the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.1 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Crystal Springs Shirt Corporation, Crystal Springs, Mississippi, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. i Member Murphy would find merit in the Charging Party's exceptions to the failure of the Administrative Law Judge to order that it be reimbursed for expenses incurred as a result of the Respondent's unfair labor practices and would grant that remedy. Chairman Fanning and Member Jenkins, while adhering to the principle expressed in Tiidee Products, Inc., 194 NLRB 1234, 1236 (1972), that in the appropriate circumstances the Board is capable of providing other than the usual remedial relief in order to fully rectify particular unfair labor practices, do not view the circumstances of this case as warranting any of the extraordinary remedies requested by the Charging Party and therefore adopt the remedy recommended by the Administrative Law Judge. Respondent's conduct, while ultimately determined herein to have been in bad faith, nevertheless cannot be fairly characterized as so egregious, nor its defenses before us as so frivolous, that the usual remedies provided by the Administrative Law Judge should be deemed inadequate, and we see no reason to believe that the relief thus given will not entirely remedy the unfair labor practices found. DECISION STATEMENT' OF THE CASE HENRY L. JALETrE, Administrative Law Judge: This proceeding involves allegations that the above-named Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by engaging in surface bargaining and by unilaterally instituting a wage increase. The proceeding was initiated by a charge filed by the above-named Union on January 2, 1976. Pursuant thereto, a complaint issued on February 27, 1976. Hearing was held on May 13, 1976, in Jackson, Mississippi. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the briefs of the parties, I hereby make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE FACTS Respondent is a Mississippi corporation with its princi- pal office and place of business in Crystal Springs, Mississippi, where it is engaged in the manufacture of garments.1 On June 24, 1974, the Union was certified as the bargaining representative of Respondent's employees in a production and maintenance unit and, on September 6, the parties held their first negotiation session. They were to meet thereafter on 19 other occasions, the last meeting occurring on December 18, 1975. Throughout the negotia- tions, the Respondent's only negotiator was Attorney James Moore. The union negotiating committee consisted of five employees and a varying number of union officials, principal of which were Assistant Southern Director Carl Fisher and James Jackson, manager of the Union's Mississippi joint board. The Union submitted written contract proposals on September 6, 1974, and Respondent submitted written contract proposals on September 18, 1974. By the time of the 20th negotiating session, the parties had agreed on many contract provisions. (In September 1975, the Union advised the employees that agreement had been reached on 80 percent of the total contract.) However, a number of items, economic and noneconomic, were still unresolved. Economic issues included the Union's proposal for its insurance and pension plan, holidays, vacations, and wages. On noneconomic items, the parties were in disagreement over Respondent's proposals for a manage- ment rights clause and a zipper clause, and the Union's proposals for dues checkoff and binding arbitration. Although the Union had offered to pay the cost of Jurisdiction is not in issue. Respondent admits that it meets the Board's direct outflow standard for the assertion ofjurisdiction. 229 NLRB No. 10 4 CRYSTAL SPRINGS SHIRT CORP. deducting union dues, Respondent had refused to agree, offering only to permit union representatives access to the plant during break periods to collect dues. Respondent had a practice, however, of checking off Christmas club payments and insurance payments. At the sixth meeting, January 8, 1975, the Union raised the question of Respondent's failure to give the employees a turkey at Christmas. According to Attorney Moore, whose testimony is corroborated by Union Negotiator Fisher, he told the Union that the Company considered a turkey bonus a discretionary matter not subject to bargaining. He explained, according to Jackson, that the turkeys had not been given because of the poor quality of the production at the plant. In the spring of 1975, the Union learned of rate changes on three jobs (collar run, collar gauge, and tack shoulders). At the April 10 meeting, the Union raised the issue with Moore who said, according to Jackson, that his client did not understand the niceties of the law and he had advised them not to do this any more. At the April 10 meeting, the Union also raised a question respecting a rule that employees arriving I minute late for work were not permitted to start work for 15 minutes and were docked that period. Moore promised to check about any work rules and, if any existed, to provide the Union with a copy. Apparently there were no written rules as none was submitted to the Union. In late 1974 or early 1975, the Union learned that the plant manager had passed out a paper among the employees asking them to agree to change their working hours. According to Jackson's uncontradicted testimony, he advised Moore this was a subject of bargaining and the plant manager's conduct was direct dealing to which they objected. Moore, after checking, assured the Union it would not happen again. At one bargaining session, the Union raised the issue of testing employees returning from layoff. Moore checked with the Company and, according to Jackson, reported that tests had been given in the past, then discontinued, then reinstated in December 1974. Respondent operates another garment plant in Utica, Mississippi, about 15 miles from Crystal Springs. It had applied to the wage and hour division of the Department of Labor for a special permit to hire learners at less than the minimum wage, on the ground that experienced employees were unavailable. The Union had opposed the application and submitted information to the Labor Department respecting the number of unemployed individuals with experience in the Utica and Crystal Springs area. At a meeting in late summer or early fall, Moore told the Union that if the learner's permit was not granted "he thought we had problems." At the October I negotiating session, the Union request- ed wage information. By letter dated October 17, Respon- dent furnished wage information which is in the record as General Counsel's Exhibit 2. On November 5, Union Negotiator Jackson advised Moore that the Respondent had furnished the wage information in different form from prior information which had been supplied and that it was hardly useable because the information did not describe the job that people were performing on which they were being paid piecework. Jackson also complained that the information only listed the employee's name and rate per hour earned with no indication of how many hours had been worked or if overtime was involved. At this November 5 session, Moore asked the Union for a wage proposal and the Union proposed a 50-cent-per- hour across-the-board increase. Moore described the proposal as ridiculous and rejected it and counteroffered 10 cents per hour above the existing minimum wage. The Union rejected this, and counterproposed a 30-cent across- the-board wage package. Moore said he would take it under advisement, that he did not know if it was possible, but at least they would look at it. The next meeting was on December 18. After some preliminary discussions about holiday pay for three individuals, the parties turned to a discussion of wages, with Moore insisting that the Union make another counteroffer. Jackson explained that the Union felt 30 cents an hour was a realistic wage offer based on the fact that the minimum wage was going to increase by 20 cents an hour on January 1, only 2 or 3 weeks from that time. Jackson also explained that he believed it was a realistic proposal in light of the information contained in what Respondent had submitted to it on October 17. Several times Moore asked the Union if they did not have a wage offer and they said they did not. Moore then produced a five-page document listing the names of nearly all the unit employees setting forth each employee's present rate of pay and the new base rate of pay. After the Union had looked at this document, Moore asked if the Union would accept it and Jackson replied that they needed further time to analyze it. Jackson remarked that it looked as though Respondent was offering several different base rates. (As it turned out, there were nine different base rates in the proposal.) Moore asked if the Union could give him a yes or no answer that day and Jackson replied that the Union needed more time. In the process of the discussion, the Union discovered that the shipping department had not been listed on the wage offer and called this to Moore's attention. The union negotiators left the room with the understanding that Moore would call the plant. They returned some 20 or 30 minutes later at which time Moore gave them the rates of pay for each of the shipping department employees by name. According to this offer, some of the shipping department employees who were hourly rated would not get any increase at all. The Union asked Moore if the Respondent's proposal included bid rights permitting employees to bid from one job level to another paying a higher base rate. Moore said no. In the discussion of variable base rates, Jackson told Moore that the Union did not reject the concept of variable base rates. To the contrary, he testified that Moore asked the union negotiators if, after they had time to go over and analyze Respondent's proposal, they would come back with a counterproposal that included variable base rates, and that he replied that until he could analyze what Moore had given them a little further he could not respond sensibly, but that the Union certainly was not rejecting the concept. During the discussion, Moore accused the union negotia- tors of stalling, stating that they had had enough time to 5 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD analyze the proposal. Moore also had told the Union when he made the offer that it was tied to everything else that was open in the contract; namely, that in order to get this wage increase and conclude a contract the Union would have to accept Respondent's management rights clause as written, its zipper clause, and abandon its position on checkoff and binding arbitration. Jackson asked Moore if he was saying take it or leave it and Moore's reply was that this was his final offer. After further discussion, Moore told the Union that the Company was going to put the wage increase into effect and that it was going to announce it the following day whether the Union agreed or not. During the meeting, the Union asked Moore whether he was willing to set future meetings and he had replied that there was no point in calling him about a meeting unless the Union was willing to accept what he had offered. The meeting ended at 3:30 p.m.2 At 3:55 p.m. that day, the Company made an announcement to the employees of the wage increase which they had proposed to the Union. According to Jackson, several times during the negotia- tions the Union raised the question of Moore's being the only negotiator and asked for someone from the plant to participate in the negotiations who would better under- stand some of the problems that arose. Moreover, Moore had advised the Union that once the contract was concluded he did not anticipate participating in the matter any further and the Union pointed out to him that this would make it difficult in the day-to-day implementation of the contract. On one occasion, the Union requested the presence of a company engineer for a better explanation of rates. In nearly all instances Mr. Moore's reply to the Union's request was that he had full authority to negotiate and that the plant personnel were too busy. The Union requested mediation and Respondent re- fused. II. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS The foregoing presents two issues for consideration: (1) did Respondent bargain in bad faith with no intention of entering into a collective-bargaining agreement; and (2) did Respondent fail in its obligation to bargain in good faith by putting into effect the wage proposal of December 18, 1975. 1 find that Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act in both respects. The second issue is less difficult to analyze than the first, and, for that reason, is treated first. It is well settled that an employer who takes unilateral action regarding terms and conditions of employment then in the process of being negotiated with the exclusive collective-bargaining repre- sentative of his employees violates his collective-bargaining obligation under Section 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the Act unless the parties have reached an impasse in the negotiations. N.LR.B. v. Benne Katz etc., d/b/a Williamsburg Steel Products Company, 369 U.S. 736, 741-742 (1962). Respon- dent does not dispute this legal proposition, but contends that the record in this case justifies the conclusion that an impasse had been reached at the time it announced and put into effect the wage proposal of December 18. 2 I base this finding on Attorney Moore's notes which I believe have more probative value than Jackson's recollection that the meeting ended at 4:10 p.m. An employer who has not bargained in good faith may not rely on an asserted impasse in defense of unilateral conduct and Respondent is here charged with, and found guilty of, failure to bargain in good faith. However, without relying on that finding, I conclude that all the surrounding circumstances support a finding that there was no impasse on December 18. I base this finding on the undisputed facts that, except for discussions of interim wage increases in late 1974 and mid- 1975, the issue of wage increases, their amount and nature, was not discussed until November 5, and at that meeting the discussion was in terms of an across-the-board increase by both parties. Then, on December 18, without any advance notice of its intention, Respondent submitted a five-page wage proposal listing nearly all unit employees by name, specifying the operation on which they were employed, their present base rate, and the new base rate. This proposal used nine different base rates as against an existing system of a single base rate. Respondent had the right to propose variable base rates, but, aware as it was of the Union's opposition to variable bases rates, it could not in good faith expect the Union to accept the proposal without some study. With the differ- ences in base rates, based on degree of difficulty of the operation, it is evident that the rate for each operation can require some lengthy discussions. Respondent offered no rationale for the different base rates it proposed except difficulty of the work. Obviously, the degree of difficulty for certain types of work is a matter about which opinions will differ and the Union could not reasonably be expected to assimilate the data on Respondent's proposal on presentation and then engage in meaningful discussions. As it was, the Union detected an omission relative to hourly rated employees and was offered wage increases on an individual basis, again without explanation. In my judgment, the contention that an impasse existed in light of the foregoing facts cannot be taken seriously. Respondent defends its action on the ground that it was necessary to raise rates to comply with new minimum wage rates going into effect at the beginning of the year. There is no merit to such a defense. It is essentially a claim of good faith but, as N.LRB. v. Katz, supra, teaches, good faith is no defense for unilateral conduct. I am not holding that Respondent could not raise rates to meet the new minimum rates; obviously, it was required to do that. But Respondent went beyond that and established rates in excess of the minimum required by law. I find that it thereby violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act. The remaining issue in this case, Respondent's good faith in bargaining, is, as stated earlier, a difficult issue. As the court stated in N.LRB. v. Herman Sausage Company, Inc., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (C.A. 5, 1960), "Probably in few other instances is the task of judging so difficult." One reason for the difficulty as the court further pointed out is that objective standards are generally either unavailable or unavailing, and the trier of the facts must weigh the entire set of circumstances surrounding the bargaining. In this case, evaluation of all the circumstances compels a finding that Respondent did not enter into discussions with a sincere purpose to find a basis for agreement. 6 CRYSTAL SPRINGS SHIRT CORP. One circumstance indicative of bad faith is conduct wherein the employer undertakes to make changes in wages, hours, or other conditions of employment without consulting with the Union. As the court stated in N.L.RB. v. Katz, supra at 747, "unilateral conduct often discloses an unwillingness to agree with the union." I have already described and found that Respondent engaged in unlawful unilateral conduct by putting into effect the wage proposal of December 18. Prior thereto, Respondent had engaged in other unilateral acts. Thus, it had instituted a new tardiness rule and made piece rate adjustments on three operations.3 As to the changes in piece rates, the principal defense is not that they did not constitute unilateral changes, but rather that the changes occurred outside the 10(b) period. That, of course, is not the point. The evidence of such changes was not offered to support a finding that Respondent violated the Act by making the changes, but as background evidence of Respondent's attitude towards its bargaining obligation and its good faith at the bargaining table. As to the Union's complaint concerning a tardiness rule, Respondent asserts that there is no evidence that the rule complained of represented a change in past practice. I agree there is no direct evidence to such effect. It is noteworthy, however, that when the Union complained of the rule Respondent did not defend its action on the ground of past practice. The inference is warranted that the rule was new and it is clear it was unilaterally adopted. In late 1974, Respondent's plant manager circulated a paper -among the employees asking them if they would agree to a change in starting times. In late February 1975, employees in quality control were called into the company office and offered a new quality pay program. Such direct dealing is clearly unlawful (N.LR.B. v. Medo Photo Supply Corporation, 321 U.S. 678 (1944)), and could have been the basis of an 8(a)(5) finding had a timely charge been filed. Respondent's only defense to its conduct is the absence of a timely charge but, again, the conduct is adverted to as background evidence for consideration of Respondent's state of mind relative to negotiating a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union. Returning to the December 18 wage proposal of Respondent, I find several aspects of the proposal supportive of a finding of bad faith apart from its unilateral aspect. First, there is the timing of the proposal. In 1974, in anticipation of an increase in the minimum wage in January 1975, Respondent proposed a wage increase in September, discussed it in October, and agreed to an interim wage increase in November. Although Respondent was well aware of the increase in minimum wage scheduled for January 1976, it did not make a wage proposal until December 18. True, there had been discussions of a wage increase on November 5, but those discussions were in the context of an across-the-board increase. In presenting its proposal on December 18, Respondent timed the proposal to preclude meaningful discussion. Simultaneously, Re- spondent's negotiator accused the union negotiators of 3 General Counsel and the Union contend that the discontinuance of the turkey bonus in Christmas 1974 and the institution of dexterity tests in 1975 were unlawful unilateral acts. The record does not indicate how long it had been a practice to give turkeys at Christmas so that it cannot be determined whether it was a condition of employment and a mandatory subject of "stalling" and exhibited clearly a desire to contrive a deadlock to relieve Respondent of any further obligation to meet. Second, there is the circumstance that the proposal represented a change from a single base rate system to nine base rates. While Respondent had the right to propose such a change in measuring the value of various operations, it could not reasonably expect the Union to agree to the change without being afforded an opportunity to analyze the proposal and discuss with Respondent the base rates proposed for the various operations. Third, there is the circumstance of Respondent's rejec- tion out of hand of the possibility of including bidding rights in the contract. Thus, under Respondent's proposal, an employee engaged in the operation of hemming fronts at a base rate of $2.45 would be precluded from transfer- ring to the operation of hemming bands at a base rate of $2.55, except at the unfettered discretion of Respondent under its retained rights proposals. Respondent offered no explanation for rejecting the concept of bidding rights. Fourth, there is the circumstance that the proposal was in reality a proposal of individual wage increases with some individuals getting no increases and with no proffered explanation for the increases proposed. Moreover, the wage rates proposed were personal to each employee with the result that the issue of wage rates was always open when new employees were hired. In that connection, according to Attorney Moore's notes, Respondent reserved the right to set the rate of new employees at between $2.30 per hour and the rate of the employee on the job with the only qualification that Respondent would discuss and negotiate the rate it set for the employee with the Union before putting it into effect. Fifth, there is the circumstance that Respondent's proposal was linked to the Union's acceptance of Respon- dent's proposals on all open items. Included among those items was an extremely detailed management rights clause which required the Union, in effect, to waive practically all of its rights and which exempted from the grievance and arbitration provisions any disputes arising thereunder. Such a proposal in the context of all the circumstances of the case supports a finding of bad faith.4 As noted earlier, among the open items on noneconomic issues was the Union's proposal for a checkoff. Although Respondent made deductions from employees' wages on other matters, and although the Union offered to reim- burse Respondent for any cost of administering a checkoff, Respondent rejected the proposal. In the circumstances, including the other indicia of bad faith, I am persuaded that Respondent's position was intended to frustrate agreement with the Union. H. K Porter Company, Inc., Disston Division-Danville Works, 153 NLRB 1370 (1965), enfd. sub nom. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO [H.K Porter Company] v. N.LR.B., 363 F.2d 272 (C.A.D.C., 1966), cert. denied 385 U.S. 851. Upon consideration of all the foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that Respondent had no intention of reaching bargaining. As to dexterity tests, the record is insufficient to support a finding that in administering the tests Respondent was instituting a new policy. 4 East Texas Steel Castings Company, Inc., 154 NLRB 1080(1965). 7 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD an agreement with the Union. Respondent argues that it negotiated in good faith as manifested by its willingness to meet at agreed-upon regular intervals,5 by presenting counterproposals, by offering reasonable compromise language, and by making numerous concessions. Upon an examination of the contract provisions agreed upon prior to December 18, I am unable to find any concessions by Respondent of any significance and Respondent adverts to none in its brief. In any event, "to sit at a bargaining table, or to sit almost forever, or to make concessions here and there, could be the very means by which to conceal a purposeful strategy to make bargaining futile or fail." N.LR.B. v. Herman Sausage Co., supra at 232. In this connection, it is noteworthy that Respondent, which purported not to understand the "niceties" of the law, had shown a disregard of the law in other proceedings. I have taken official notice of the Board's decisions in Shaw Industries, Division of Crystal Springs Shirt Corp., 218 NLRB 1196 (1975), enfd. 529 F.2d 1350 (C.A. 5, 1976), and Hamburg Shirt Corporation, 175 NLRB 284 (1969), enfd. 419 F.2d 1275 (C.A. 8, 1969). As the title of the first case indicates, the case involved a division of Respondent. As to Hamburg Shirt Corporation, at one point in this proceeding Attorney Moore admitted it was a division of Respondent, but later stated that he did not know "that they are related." Nevertheless, Moore admitted that one Paul Bernstein is president of Respondent and owns stock in Respondent and in Hamburg Shirt Corporation. The decision in Hamburg Shirt Corporation, 156 NLRB 511, 513, fn. 2 (1965), indicates the relationship between Hamburg Shirt and Respondent. I am persuaded that the principal is the same in both cases and the conduct described in those cases lends further support to the finding herein made that Respondent did not engage in good-faith bargaining. III111. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth in section 1, above, occurring in connection with its operations de- scribed therein, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. IV. THE REMEDY Having found the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, it will be recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Specifically, it having been found that Respondent has refused to bargain collectively in good faith with the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the appropri- ate unit described herein, it will be recommended that 5 The Union contends that the facts that Attorney Moore was Respondent's sole negotiator and that he was unwilling to meet more often than he did obstructed bargaining. I am not persuaded that the evidence supports a finding that the fact Moore was the sole negotiator interfered significantly with the negotiations, nor am I persuaded that the Union really pressed for more frequent meetings. To the contrary, it appears that the union negotiators' own commitments contributed to some delay. Respondent bargain collectively, upon request, with the Union as the exclusive representatives of the employees in the appropriate unit, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. Crystal Springs Shirt Corporation is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL- CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees, exclud- ing office clerical employees, watchmen/guards and super- visors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL- CIO, is, and at all times material herein has been, the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit described above, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By unilaterally putting into effect new rates of pay for unit employees, and by engaging in bargaining with the Union in bad faith with no intention of entering into any final binding collective-bargaining agreement, Respondent has engaged, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sections 8(aX5) and (1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record in this case, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommend- ed: ORDER6 The Respondent, Crystal Springs Shirt Corporation, Crystal Springs, Mississippi, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Refusing to bargain with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargain- ing representative of its employees in the unit described above, by unilaterally changing the rates of pay of said employees. (b) Refusing to bargain with Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the unit described above, by negotiating in bad faith with no intention of entering into a collective-bargaining agreement. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: 6 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 8 CRYSTAL SPRINGS SHIRT CORP. (a) Upon request, bargain collectively with Amalga- mated Clothing Workers of America, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit described above, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its plant in Crystal Springs, Mississippi, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 7 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 15, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith. ? In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL- CIO, as the exclusive representative of all our employ- ees in the appropriate unit described below, by unilaterally changing rates of pay. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL- CIO, as the exclusive representative of all our employ- ees in the appropriate unit described below, by negotiating in bad faith with no intention to enter into a final agreement with the Union. WE WILL NOT in any like manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL upon request, bargain collectively with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, AFL- CIO, as the exclusive representative of all our employ- ees in the appropriate unit described below, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other terms and conditions of employment, and, if an agreement is reached, embody such understanding in a signed contract. The appropriate bargaining unit is: All production and maintenance employees, excluding office clerical employees, watch- men/guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. CRYSTAL SPRINGS SHIRT CORPORATION 9