Garst-Receveur Construction Co.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Local Union No. 369, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFLCIO and Garst-Receveur Construction Company, Inc. Case 9-CC-847 April 19, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS PENELLO AND WALTHER On November 5, 1976, Administrative Law Judge David S. Davidson issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief, and the Charging Party filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. The Administrative Law Judge found, and we fully agree, that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we agree with the Administrative Law Judge that the statements made by two of Respon- dent's business agents clearly reveal that the picket- ing had an unlawful objective. Respondent picketed Arrow Electric Company (hereinafter Arrow) with whom it had a primary dispute. The picketing took place at a construction site where the Charging Party, Garst-Receveur Construction Company, Inc., was the general con- tractor.' The picketing effectively shut down the construction project as employees of Garst and several of its subcontractors, who were represented by various unions, refused to work. Garst requested that its employees return to work, but in response they requested that their business agents and Respondent's business agent be invited to the jobsite to tell them whether or not they could work and to explain what the problem was. Garst then arranged for the meeting. At the meeting, several of Respondent's business agents made remarks which, in our view, clearly demonstrate that Respondent hoped to cause, as the object of its picketing, the cessation of business between Garst and Arrow. The first remark was that I After a reserved gate was set up for the use of Arrow employees, the picketing was confined to that gate. As completely discussed by the Administrative Law Judge, the picketing at first glance appeared to meet the formal requirements of Sailors' Union of the Pacific. A FL (Moore Dry Dock Company), 92 NLRB 547 (1950), and Local 761, International Union of 229 NLRB No. 17 "a picket line at any gate constitutes an invisible picket line around the entire project." The second remark, made as the meeting was adjourning, was that "[i ]f the job was run 100 percent Union and then if Arrow is off this job, then everything can be cleared up." As correctly stated by the Administrative Law Judge, the totality of a picketing union's conduct in each situation must be examined to determine whether one of its purposes was to enmesh neutrals in the dispute. 2 With respect to the remark that "a picket line at any gate constitutes an invisible picket line around the entire project," our dissenting colleague finds that "[i]t indicates no secondary purpose." In our view nothing could more clearly convey the intention and purpose by Respondent of shutting down the entire project. As the Administra- tive Law Judge stated, the "statement disclosed to those present an intent to expand the inducement of the pickets to all gates and to all entering the jobsite." With respect to the second remark ("[i]f the job was run 100 percent Union and then if Arrow is off this job, then everything can be cleared up") our dissenting colleague states: That the Union would not picket Arrow at the project if it had nothing to protest, does not evidence any purpose to disrupt the relation between Arrow and the General Contractor, only commonsense. Willinghurst [the business agent who made the remark] could as well have again replied that the picket signs said it all, and that the picketing would stop with the reason. In support thereof, he cites the majority opinion in Rollins Communications, Inc., supra, and states that the Board there said that telling a general contractor that picketing would not continue after the primary employer left would only be "notice of intent to comply with the Board's rules." We respectfully disagree with our dissenting colleague, both with respect to his understanding of the majority opinion in Rollins, supra, and with respect to his conclusion concerning the Willinghurst remark herein. The Board stated in Rollins, 222 NLRB at 101: Further, it would not appear to be unlawful for a union representative, upon being informed that the prime contractor intended to remove the offending employer from the jobsite, to inform Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO [General Electric Companyl v. N.L.R.B., 366 U.S. 667 (1961). 2 Local No. 441, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL- CIO (Rollins Communications, Inc.), 222 NLRB 99 (1976), Member Fanning dissenting. 68 LOCAL NO. 369, ELECTRICAL WORKERS the prime contractor that the union would cease its picketing activities. Since the Board's rules for "common-situs" picketing do not permit picket- ing in the absence of the primary employer, such a statement would constitute no more than notice of intent to comply with the Board's rules. However, where, as here, the removal of the picket line by the union is conditioned upon some action to be taken by the neutral general or prime contractor, such conduct constitutes a deliberate entanglement of a neutral person in a dispute not his own and is violative of the secondary boycott provision of the Act. In the first circumstance, the prime contrac- tor elects to remove the offending employer either because of the incidental effects of the union's picketing or out of sympathy with the union's labor dispute. But, in the second, unlawful circum- stance, the union is in effect telling the neutral employer that he, alone, has the power to resolve the underlying dispute by removing the offending employer or byforcing him to make some agreement with the union. [Emphasis supplied.] The Board thus did not state in Rollins what our dissenting colleague now seeks to attribute to that decision. The Board, in fact, took pains to explain that a remark, such as the one made by Willinghurst here, would taint what may ostensibly appear to be lawful picketing. In sum, we find, in agreement with the Administra- tive Law Judge, that the remarks of Respondent's business agents graphically illustrated the true purpose behind its picketing-to enmesh neutral employers such as Garst in the primary dispute Respondent had with Arrow by causing a cessation or disruption of their business relationship-a pur- pose clearly violative of Section 8(b)(4)(1) and (ii)(B). ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Local Union No. 369, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work- ers, AFL-CIO, Louisville, Kentucky, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. CHAIRMAN FANNING, dissenting: The majority finds that the Union unlawfully picketed a construction project in order to disrupt 3 Sailors' Union of the Pacific, AFL (Moore Dry Dock Company), 92 NLRB 547 (1950). ' The message could not have been more straightforward: "A portion of the Electric Work on this project is not being performed under a collective the relation between a nonunion subcontractor on the common jobsite and other employers working there. It reaches that conclusion although the Union, without question, carefully complied with the rules set down in Moore Dry Dock3 for lawful primary picketing in this situation. The majority justifies itself by pointing to a statement by the Union's representa- tive confirming the message its picket signs lawfully proclaimed: that Arrow Electric Company was not operating under a collective-bargaining agreement. But the Union did all that could be expected to confine the dispute, consistent with its duty to its members and their right to engage in primary picketing. There is no evidence that the Union sought to cause anyone to stop dealing with Arrow. The Union's picket signs correctly reported that Arrow was not operating under a collective-bargain- ing agreement. The signs made it clear that the Union's dispute was only with Arrow and that the Union was not suggesting that employees of neutral employers should refuse to work on the project.4 Additionally, the Union's pickets were asked to tell neutral employees that they were not being requested to refuse to work on the project. After the picketing began, the general contractor, Garst-Receveur Construction Company, reserved a special gate for Arrow employees in order to prevent the Union from lawfully picketing Arrow at all the gates and to restrict the Union's right to convey its message as narrowly as possible. The Union prompt- ly limited its picketing to that gate. Nonetheless, some employees of other employers chose to strike to support the Union's protest. No one argues they did not have that right. Because some of their members were refusing to work, the general contractor asked the business agents of all the unions represented on the site to meet with it. At the meeting, the Union's representa- tive, Willinghurst, who was in charge of the picket- ing, explained that its objective was set forth in full on the picket signs. As the meeting was breaking up, the general contractor asked Willinghurst how the matter could be settled. Willinghurst remarked, and thereby supposedly broke the law, that "[i]f the job was run 100 percent Union and then if Arrow is off this job, then everything can be cleared up." That was no surprise. The Union was advertising that a nonunion employer, Arrow, was working on the project. The Union's displeasure was not con- cealed, some guilty secret only furtively to be revealed. It was no mystery that the Union would not picket Arrow for being nonunion if it recognized a Bargaining Agreement .... We are picketing the Arrow Elect. Co. We are not requesting employees of neutral employers to refuse to work on this project. We are picketing the Arrow Elect. Co." 69 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD collective-bargaining representative for its employ- ees. It was no revelation that the Union would not picket Arrow at the site if Arrow were not at the site. There is not one thing to suggest the Union's purpose was anything other than what it purported to be: to engage in primary picketing of Arrow as is its lawful right. That the Union would not picket Arrow at the project if it had nothing to protest does not evidence any purpose to disrupt the relation between Arrow and the general contractor, only commonsense. Willinghurst could as well have again replied that the picket signs said it all, and that the picketing would stop with the reason.5 I do not see anything in Burke's opinion about the moral effect of a picket to alter my view. Burke, a union business agent otherwise uninvolved, went to the meeting called by the general contractor along with Willinghurst only as a witness. While there, Burke commented that a picket at a single gate made an invisible line around an entire project. Even supposing that Burke's comment was unlawful, that is hardly sufficient to make the picketing unlawful, except, perhaps, as a metaphysical violation of the rules for primary picketing. It indicates no secondary purpose; and without that purpose there is no violation here. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in L. G. Electric,6 I would dismiss the complaint. Even granting the majority their interpretation, it is unconscionable that a chance remark by a business agent should be permitted to outweigh painstaking adherence to the rules for primary picketing and make forfeit the right of employees to public protest. 5 The Board has said that telling a general contractor that picketing would not continue after the primary employer left would only be "notice of intent to comply with the Board's rules." There a majority found other reasons for holding that a union representative's reply to an employer's questions made picketing unlawful. I dissented there, too. Local No. 441, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (Rollins Commu- nications, Inc.), 222 NLRB 99 (1976). s International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 11, AFL-CIO (L. G. Electric Contractors, Inc.), 154 NLRB 766 (1965). DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE DAVID S. DAVIDSON, Administrative Law Judge: The charge in this case was filed on April 14, 1976, and the complaint issued on June 30, 1976, alleging that, in furtherance of a dispute with Arrow Electric Company, Respondent induced and encouraged individuals employed by other contractors to refuse to perform services for their respective employers and threatened and coerced other contractors with an object of forcing them to cease doing business with Arrow, to disrupt their business relationship, and/or to force or require Arrow to enter into a contract with Respondent, in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act. Respondent denies the commission of any unfair labor practices. A hearing was held before me on August 12, 1976, at Louisville, Kentucky. At the close of the hearing the parties waived oral argument. All parties have filed briefs. Upon the entire record in the case and from my observation of the witnesses, I make the following: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYERS INVOLVED Garst-Receveur Construction Company, Inc., referred to herein as Garst; James E. Smith & Sons, Inc., referred to herein as Smith; Jesco Sheet Metal Co., Inc., referred to herein as Jesco; and Arrow Electric Company, referred to herein as Arrow, are Kentucky corporations with their principal offices located in Louisville, Kentucky, engaged as contractors in the building and construction industry. Each separately has an annual direct inflow in interstate commerce of goods and products valued in excess of $50,000. I find that each is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction herein. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local Union No. 369, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts I. The work performed by the contractors In September 1975, Garst, a general contractor, started work at the Kentucky State Fair and Expositions Center under contract with the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Garst secured four separate contracts at the site. Garst employed direct labor to perform some of the work on these contracts and subcontracted other work. It subcon- tracted sheet metal fabricating work to Jesco, mechanical work to Smith, and electrical work to Arrow. Garst did not enter into any written subcontract with Arrow until April 23, 1976. However, before that date, Garst had listed Arrow as a subcontractor in a bid to the Commonwealth of Kentucky which was submitted by March 1976, and Garst had received a letter of intent from the Commonwealth indicating that it was the successful bidder. Having listed Arrow as a subcontractor in its bid, Garst was required to use Arrow and had notified Arrow in March that its bid has been accepted. On March 15, 1976, on verbal instruction from Garst, Arrow had entered the premises to remove four utility poles and wiring at the construction site. That job was finished in 1 day. During the week of April 5, and possibly earlier, Arrow also had a truck-mounted auger on the jobsite on a time-and-material basis pursuant to a verbal agreement with Garst to drill footing holes. Initially 70 LOCAL NO. 369, ELECTRICAL WORKERS Arrow's employees operated the auger, but to resolve a dispute with the Operating Engineers Union over the operation of the auger Arrow leased the equipment to Garst which utilized operating engineers to run it from April 7 on. Sometime before April 5, in preparation for the performance of its electrical subcontract with Garst, Arrow moved toolboxes and two 30-foot trailers onto the jobsite which were plainly marked as Arrow's property. In addition to the work which Arrow performed or was preparing to perform for Garst at the fair grounds, from about March 25 through April 10 or 12, Arrow performed work elsewhere on the fair grounds unrelated to any arrangements it had with Garst. In conjunction with a show of the American Retreaders Association which was held at the fair grounds, Arrow set up the show, performed all wiring, and tore it down after it ended. 2. The picketing at the fair grounds For some years before 1976, Respondent had a primary dispute with Arrow. On April 5, 1976, Respondent began to picket at the entrances to the fair grounds. At the start of the picketing, one of the six gates to the fair grounds was locked and unused, and none of the other gates was posted for special use. On April 5, Respondent picketed at all the open gates to the fair grounds with the signs bearing the following legends: A portion of the Electric Work on this project is not being performed under a collective Bargaining Agree- ment with Electrical Workers Union Local No. 369, IBEW. We are picketing the Arrow Elect. Co. We are not requesting employees of neutral employers to refuse to work on this project. We are picketing the Arrow Elect. Co. Respondent gave written instructions to its pickets, telling them, among other things, not to block or obstruct any entrances, not to interfere with persons entering or leaving the entrances to the premises, and not to interfere with, block, or attempt to stop deliveries. The written instruc- tions also stated: 6. DON'T TALK! With the exception as stated under SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS. If persons try to draw you into a conversation about anything except as listed under SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS, refer them to the Union officers for answers to their questions. * * * 8. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Ifwhile on duty as a picket you notice any person including employees of any employer on the job not crossing the picket line you should volunteer the following statement to that person: We are not asking any employee of any employer to quit their job or to cease handling goods. Soon after the picketing began, Garst took steps to reserve Gate 6 for the exclusive use of Arrow, its employees, and suppliers, and to restrict them from using any other gates. As the signs were posted to that effect, Respondent Union withdrew its pickets from Gate I through 4. By midmorning, April 6, all gates had been posted, and from then on Respondent restricted its picketing to Gate 6. When the picketing started, Garst employed carpenters, laborers, ironworkers, operating engineers, and cement masons at the jobsite, and it had collective-bargaining agreements with the craft unions which customarily represent those trades. Smith and Jesco had work sched- uled at the jobsite pursuant to their subcontracts with Garst. Their employees were covered by contracts with Plumbers and Pipefitters locals and a Sheet Metal Workers local. Of the employees scheduled to work for Garst on April 5, four or five operating engineers, three or four laborers, and three or four carpenters worked. Approximately 15 laborers, 15 carpenters, 6 ironworkers, and 5 cement masons who were scheduled to work did not work. Of those who worked that day, other than the operating engineers, most were foremen. None of the employees of Smith and Jesco worked on April 5. On April 6 most of Garst's employees came to the parking lot inside the gates at the jobsite. The ironworkers, laborers, and carpenters started to work, but after their business agents came to the jobsite and spoke with them, they left, with the exception of a few carpenter and laborer foremen and a few other laborers. The cement masons did not report to work at all on April 6, but the operating engineers again reported and worked. On April 6, employ- ees of Smith and Jesco were seen in the parking lot but did not work. Employees of Arrow were at the fair grounds on both days and worked. On April 7, employees again entered the parking lot but did not report for work. At approximately 7:30 a.m. David Holobaugh, project director for Garst, and William Receveur, secretary-treasurer of Garst, called the men together and asked them to go to work. In response the employees requested that their business agents and Re- spondent's business agent be invited to the jobsite to tell them whether or not they could work and to explain what the problem was. Thereafter, Holobaugh arranged for the business agents to come to the jobsite. Between 9:15 and 9:30 that morning, business agents from the Carpenters Union, the Laborers Union, the Sheet Metal Workers Union, and two of Respondent's business agents, Willing- hurst and Burke, arrived at the jobsite. About 20 persons, including the business agents, Holobaugh, Receveur, the job superintendent, timekeeper, carpenter foreman, and others, gathered in Garst's trailer. One of those present was a plumber employed by Smith. Garst's superintendent, carpenter foreman, and Smith's plumber were members of unions and covered by collective-bargaining agreements. Holobaugh opened the meeting and told the business agents that he had called them to the jobsite because the employees wanted to hear from them why they could or could not work and they wanted Respondent to tell them why the job was being picketed. At some point after the meeting opened, Burke stated that in his opinion a picket 71 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD line at any gate constituted an invisible picket line around the entire project.' The Sheet Metal Workers business agent stated that he supported Burke, and the Carpenters and Laborers business agents nodded affirmatively. Holo- baugh asked Willinghurst if the picketing was against Garst or Arrow. Willinghurst asked Holobaugh if he had read the signs, and Holobaugh acknowledged that he had and Willinghurst then said that all Holobaugh had to do was read the signs. At the outset of the meeting, Willinghurst had indicated that he would be glad to tell the workers what the facts were, but later in the meeting he reversed himself and said he did not think that he was obliged to talk to the other trades involved and that the other business agents had that duty. As the meeting was breaking up, Receveur asked Willinghurst what they could do to settle the matter. Willinghurst responded that "If the job was run 100 percent Union and then if Arrow is off this job, then everything can be cleared up." 2 Receveur told Willinghurst that it was impossible to remove Arrow from the job because it was low bidder and had been listed with the State as the electrical subcontractor on the job. After the meeting ended Holobaugh saw the Carpenters business agent talking to job carpenters outside the trailer. Holobaugh approached and heard the business agent say, "Here is the Company man and I have to tell you to go back to work." Holobaugh asked him if there was a picket line on the project, and he replied that as far as he was concerned there was a picket line around the whole site. Somewhat later someone asked the Carpenters business agent if he would work, and he answered that, if it were he, he would not work there. The picketing continued through April 14. Garst crews remained below strength during that period, and the employees of Smith and Jesco did not work. Garst, Smith, and Jesco obtained state court injunctions against the unions with which they had contracts. Brock Electric, another subcontractor at the jobsite which had a contract with Respondent obtained an injunction against Respon- dent Union on April 13. On the following day the pickets were moved.3 B. Concluding Findings The General Counsel and Charging Party concede that the picketing met the formal requirements of Sailors' Union of the Pacific, AFL (Moore Dry Dock Company), 92 NLRB 547 (1950), and Local 761, International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers, AFL-CIO [General Electric Company] v. N.L.R.B., 366 U.S. 667 (1961), and that the picketing, standing alone, was presumptively lawful. However, they contend that the statements of Respon- dent's business agents Burke and Willinghurst at the April 7 meeting disclosed that the object of Respondent's picketing was to enmesh individuals employed by neutral employers and the employers in the Union's primary t Holobaugh and Receveur testified that Willinghurst made the state- ment. Willinghurst identified Burke as the speaker. As Respondent is responsible for the statement in either event and it is more likely that Holobaugh and Receveur may have been uncertain as to the identities of those present, I have credited Willinghurst. I note that there are no conflicts otherwise in the testimony as to any of the other material facts. 2 Receveur so testified. 3 The injunction obtained by Brock against Respondent did not require dispute with Arrow. They contend that the picketing therefore violated Section 8(bX4XB) of the Act. Respon- dent contends that Burke's statement was an innocuous statement of opinion lacking any impact or significance uttered by a business agent who was a stranger to the events and that Willinghurst's statement to Receveur stated only what would be required by law if Arrow left the jobsite. Respondent contends further that the fact that secondary employees may have respected the picket line does not establish that the picketing was intended to induce them to engage in a concerted refusal to work. It is well settled that the fact that picketing meets Moore Dry Dock standards is not conclusive evidence that it constitutes lawful primary activity. Rather the totality of a picketing union's conduct in each situation must be examined to determine whether one of its purposes was to enmesh neutrals in the dispute.4 Burke's statement at the April 7 meeting and Willing- hurst's later statement to Receveur about what it would take to get the pickets removed are evidence of inducement of individuals employed by neutral employers in Respon- dent's dispute with Arrow and of an object to enmesh neutral employers in Respondent's dispute. The April 7 meeting was called by Garst to explain the positions of the various unions and the facts concerning Respondent's dispute with Arrow to employees at the jobsites. Burke's statement was a direct statement of opinion by one authorized to speak for the picketing union which negated the limitation of the picketing to the gate reserved for the Arrow employees. In effect, Burke told those present, including business agents, members of other unions, and individuals employed by Garst, and subcontractors at the jobsite, that regardless of the physical restriction of the pickets to Gate 6, he viewed the picketing as a picket line at all gates at the jobsite. Agreement with that position was signaled by three of the business agents of other unions present at the meeting. Notwithstanding the literal compli- ance with the requirements of the Moore Dry Dock and General Electric cases as to the location of the pickets, Burke's statement disclosed to those present an intent to expand the inducement of the pickets to all gates and to all entering the jobsite. Even if Burke had no responsibility for the picketing at the jobsite,5 his statement is indicative of Respondent's purpose in picketing. Whatever Willin- ghurst's purpose in having Burke accompany him, Burke was an authorized agent of Respondent Union, and Willinghurst, who was responsible for the picketing, did not disavow Burke's statement or seek to limit its impact. Willinghurst's statement to Receveur about what it would take to have the pickets removed also is indicative of an objective to enmesh neutrals in the dispute. While Respondent contends that Willinghurst's statement con- veyed no more than a statement of what would be legally required if Arrow's employees were removed from the job, removal of the pickets but restrained Brock's employees from violating their collective-bargaining agreement. On April 15 the work force on the jobsite returned to full strength. 4 Local No. 441, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL- CIO (Rollins Communications, Inc.), 222 NLRB 99 (1976). 5 Willinghurst testified that Burke, an assistant business representative, had no responsibility for the picketing at the fair grounds and accompanied Willinghurst at the latter's request to serve as a witness. 72 LOCAL NO. 369, ELECTRICAL WORKERS Receveur's uncontradicted version of Willinghurst's state- ment shows clearly that Willinghurst said more, adding the condition that if the job were 100 percent union, as well as if Arrow were off the job, the pickets could be removed. While there is some doubt as to whether Arrow's employ- ees were on the jobsite at that time to perform work for Garst, there is no question that it already was understood that Arrow would perform electrical work as a subcontrac- tor for Garst and Arrow's trailers and tools were on the site for that purpose. Willinghurst's statement to Garst can only be construed as showing as an objective of the picketing by Respondent Union the cessation or disruption of the business relationship between Garst and Arrow. 6 I find from these circumstances that the presumption of validity which attached to the Union's picketing was overcome, that Respondent sought to induce individuals employed by other contractors at the jobsite to refuse to work, that it coerced other contractors, and that an object of its conduct was to cause Garst to remove Arrow from the jobsite or otherwise disrupt its business relationship with Arrow. To be sure the instructions given to the pickets, the signs carried by the pickets, and the prompt confinement of the picketing to Gate 6 after the gates were posted all indicate and are consistent with lawful picketing. However, those measures do not outweigh the inferences to be drawn from the conduct of Respondent Union's business agents at the meeting called because of Garst's concern over the effect of the picketing. If Respondent's business agents at that meeting had followed the instruc- tions which Respondent gave to the pickets, no question would remain as to the legality of the picketing. They did not do so. Both Burke and Willinghurst at the meeting went beyond the narrow statements as to the object of the picketing which appeared in the instructions and on the signs and conveyed to other business agents and employees a broader and unlawful objective. I can only conclude that the instructions and the wording of the signs were designed to avoid obvious violation of Section 8(b)(4XB), but that the object of the picketing nonetheless was violative of the Act. Accordingly, I find that the picketing by Respondent Union at the fair grounds, in conjunction with the statements of Willinghurst and Burke, violated Section 8(bX4XBXi) and (iiXB) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent Union set forth in section 11I, above, occuring in connection with the operations of Garst, Smith, Jesco, and Arrow as described in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow thereof. i Local No. 441, International Brotherhood of Eleclrical Workers, AFL- CIO (Rollins Communications, Inc.), supra International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 11, AFL-CIO) (L G. Electric Contractors, Inc.), 154 NLRB 766 (1965). The dissents of Member Fanning in these cases, on which Respondent relies herein, appear to remain a minority position. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. Garst-Receveur Construction Company, Inc.; James E. Smith & Sons, Inc.; Jesco Sheet Metal Company, Inc.; and Arrow Electric Company are employers engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Local Union No. 369, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By inducing or encouraging individuals employed by persons engaged in commerce, or in an industry affecting commerce, to engage in a strike or refusal to perform services, and by coercing or restraining persons engaged in commerce, or in an industry affecting commerce, with an object of forcing or requiring Garst-Receveur Construction Company, Inc., to cease doing business with Arrow Electric Company, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(bX4Xi) and (ii)(B) of the Act which affects commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law and the entire record in this case and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, I hereby issue the following recommend- ed: ORDER 7 Respondent, Local Union No. 369, International Broth- erhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, its officers, representatives, and agents, shall: 1. Cease and desist from inducing or encouraging any individual employed by Garst-Receveur Construction Company, Inc.; James E. Smith & Sons, Inc.; Jesco Sheet Metal Co., Inc.; or any other person engaged in commerce or in any industry affecting commerce to engage in a strike or refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or to perform any services; or threatening, coercing, or restraining said employers or any other person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce; where in either case an object thereof is to force said employers or persons to cease doing business with Arrow Electric Company. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act: I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings. conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 73 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (a) Post at its business offices and meeting hall copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."8 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 9, after being duly signed by Respondent Union's authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Sign and mail sufficient copies of said notice to said Regional Director for posting by each of the Employers named in the preceding paragraphs, if willing, at all places where notices to their respective employees are customarily posted. (c) Notify said Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps have been taken to comply herewith. I In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NoTIcE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT induce or encourage any individual employed by Garst-Receveur Construction Company, Inc.; James E. Smith & Sons, Inc.; Jesco Sheet Metal Co., Inc.; or any other person engaged in commerce or in any industry affecting commerce to engage in strikes or refusals in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities, or perform any services; and WE WILL NOT threaten, coerce, or restrain the above-named employers or any other person engaged in commerce or in any industry affecting commerce; where in either case an object thereof is to force any of said employers or persons to cease doing business with Arrow Electric Company. LOCAL UNION No. 369, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO 74