Perrella Gloves

489 304 NLRB No. 61 PERRELLA GLOVES 1 The Respondent has filed exceptions limited to the effects bargaining vio- lation and the limited backpay remedy, as provided in Transmarine Corp., 170 NLRB 389 (1968), that was ordered by the judge. 2 We have modified the judge’s remedy and recommended Order to reflect the language customarily used by the Board in cases involving the Transmarine remedy. Perrella Gloves/Jay Ruckel, Inc., d/b/a Perrella Gloves and Gloves Cities Area Joint Board, Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Local 2486. Case 3–CA–15747 August 27, 1991 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS CRACRAFT, DEVANEY, AND OVIATT On March 27, 1991, Administrative Law Judge Joel P. Biblowitz issued the attached decision. The Re- spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and brief and has de- cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con- clusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2 AMENDED REMEDY Insert the following at the end of the second para- graph of the judge’s remedy. ‘‘In no event shall the sum paid to any of these em- ployees exceed the amount the affected employee would have earned as wages from the date on which employment ceased to the time the employee was re- called, or secured equivalent employment elsewhere, or on the date that the Respondent shall have offered to bargain, whichever occurred sooner; provided, how- ever, that in no event shall this sum be less than what these employees would have earned for a 2-week pe- riod at the rate of their normal wages when last in the Respondent’s employ. Interest on all such sums shall be paid in the manner prescribed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).’’ ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec- ommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Respondent, Perrella Gloves/Jay Ruckel, Inc., d/b/a Perrella Gloves, Gloversville, New York, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified. 1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(c). ‘‘(c) On request, bargain with the Union as the ex- clusive representative of its employees in the above-de- scribed unit about the effects of its decision to close its facility and pay limited backpay to the unit employ- ees in the manner set forth in the amended remedy section of this decision.’’ 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the ad- ministrative law judge. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with Gloves Cities Area Joint Board, Amalgamated Cloth- ing and Textile Workers Union, and Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Local 2486 (the Union) as the exclusive representative of our employ- ees in the following appropriate unit: All cutters, shavers, layers-off, operators and days hands, excluding all other employees, executives and supervisors as defined in the Act who are em- ployed by the employer-members of Fulton Coun- ty Glove Manufacturers, Inc. (the Association). WE WILL NOT withdraw from the multiemployer bargaining unit except upon adequate written notice given prior to the date set by the contract for modifica- tion, or to the agreed-upon date to begin the multiem- ployer negotiations, or at such other time we may law- fully withdraw. WE WILL NOT refuse to sign and acknowledge that we are bound by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement between the Association and the Union, ef- fective May 1, 1990. WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to bargain with the Union regarding the effects of the termination of our Gloversville, New York operation. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL sign and acknowledge that we are bound by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement be- tween the Union and the Association effective May 1, 1990, and comply with the terms and conditions there- of, both retroactively and for the balance of its term, including making required payments to the Union. WE WILL reimburse our employees for any loss of wages and benefits they may have suffered as a result of our failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the above-described agreement with interest. WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union with respect to the effects of our decision to terminate our Gloversville, New York facility on the employees em- 490 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1 Unless indicated otherwise, all dates referred to relate to the year 1990. ployed there, and reduce to writing any agreement reached as a result of such bargaining. WE WILL pay to our unit employees who were em- ployed at our Gloversville, New York facility limited backpay, plus interest, as required by the National Labor Relations Board. PERRELLA GLOVES/JAY RUCKEL, INC., D/B/A PERRELLA GLOVES Alfred M. Norek, Esq., for the General Counsel. Lloyd Sokolow, Esq., for the Respondent. William Pozefsky, Esq. (Pozefsky, Bramley & Murphy), for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JOEL P. BIBLOWITZ, Administrative Law Judge. This case was heard by me on December 17, 19901 in Albany, New York. The amended complaint and notice of hearing, which issued on November 28 and was based on an unfair labor practice charge and amended charges filed on July 5, August 13, and October 1 by Gloves Cities Area Joint Board, Amal- gamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, and Amal- gamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Local 2486 (the Union), alleges that Perrella Gloves, Inc. (the Respond- ent), violated Section 8(a)(1)and (5) of the Act by an un- timely withdrawal from Fulton County Glove Manufacturers, Inc. (the Association), and by failing and refusing to bargain with the Union over the effects of its decision to terminate unit operations at its facility in Gloversville, New York (the facility). Respondent defends that its withdrawal from the Association should be excused by its ‘‘unusual cir- cumstances’’—its serious economic difficulties. On the entire record, including the briefs filed and my ob- servation of the witnesses, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION The Respondent, a New York corporation with its prin- cipal office located in Gloversville, New York, is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of gloves. During the 12- month period prior to August Respondent, in the operation of its business, derived gross revenue in excess of $50,000, of which an amount in excess of $50,000 was derived from providing services to other enterprises directly engaged in interstate commerce, and during the same period Respondent purchased and received at the facility goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 which were shipped directly from points located outside the State of New York. Respond- ent admits, and I find, that it is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. LABOR ORGANIZATION STATUS Respondent admits, and I find, that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE FACTS The Association is composed of employers engaged in the manufacture and/or sale of gloves. For approximately 20 years the Union has had collective-bargaining agreements with the Association covering all cutters, shavers, layers-off, operators and day hands, excluding all other employees, ex- ecutives and supervisors as defined in the Act. Prior to the events involved, the last such agreement was effective for the period May 1987 through April 30. On August 15, 1987 Jay Ruckel and Lacrasia Duchein purchased Respondent from one of the members of the Association. By letter dated October 2, 1987 Ruckel, as president, wrote to William Towne, the Union’s manager: A new operation has been formed under the name of Jay Ruckel, Inc. d/b/a Perrella Gloves, Inc., 39 Union Street, Gloversville, New York 12078 and this new cor- porate entity purchased the Perrella Gloves, Inc. com- pany at 39 Union Street, Gloversville, New York on August 17, 1987. Jay Ruckel, Inc., d/b/a Perrella Gloves, Inc. is rec- ognizing [the Union] in honoring the collective bargain- ing agreement dated May 1, 1987 through April 30, 1990, between [the Association] and [the Union], which Perella Gloves is a signatory to. Jay Ruckel, Inc., d/b/a Perrella Gloves, Inc., the new entity, will continue the benefits, terms and conditions of employment under the collective bargaining agree- ment, and will credit employees with all seniority accu- mulated as Perrella Gloves, Inc. employees. This letter was written on the stationary of Perrella Gloves, Inc. Towne testified simply that Ruckel sent him this letter. Ruckel testified that when he arrived at the facility on Octo- ber 2, 1987, he was handed this letter by his plant manager, Vi Peake, who told him that it had been prepared by the Union and that he had better sign it because there might be a strike if he refused to do so. He signed it even though the name on the letterhead, Perrella Gloves, Inc. was incorrect. Towne testified that from October 2, 1987, to the present time nobody from Respondent ever told him that this was an incorrect name or claimed that the agreement had been exe- cuted under fraud or duress. Between October 2, 1987, and about April 30, Respondent abided by the terms of the agreement with the exception of the fact that while Respondent was deducting union dues from the pay of its employees, it was often not transmitting these amounts to the Union. By letter dated February 12 to the Association and each of its members, including Respond- ent, Towne wrote that the Union wished to meet to negotiate a new collective-bargaining agreement to replace the agree- ment which was to expire on April 30. Prior to sending this letter, the Union received notification from one of these As- sociation’s members that it had been bought out and was withdrawing from the Association and would bargain indi- vidually. After it sent the letter, but prior to the commence- ment of negotiations, it received notification from two other members of the Association that they were withdrawing from the Association and would bargain together. That left five employers in the Association, including Respondent. The first negotiating session took place on April 5; Towne, a business agent and some officers were present on behalf of 491 PERRELLA GLOVES 2 This accounting information contains a disclaimer that it is based upon ‘‘information that is a representation of management.’’ We have not audited or reviewed the accompanying financial statements and supplementary infor- mation and, accordingly, do not express an opinion or any other form of assur- ance on them. the Union. Robert Gray, the attorney for the Association was present together with a representative from each of the five employer members; Peake was the representative present for Respondent. At this meeting the parties simply exchanged first proposals. The second bargaining session took place on April 11 with the same parties present. At this session, in ad- dition to some preliminary negotiations, Towne asked Gray: ‘‘Are any of these companies losing money?’’ He answered: ‘‘No they are not.’’ Peake, who was sitting next to Gray did not say anything in answer to this question. The third meet- ing took place on April 23 and was attended by the same individuals except for the absence of the representative of one of the Associations’ members. The final session occurred on April 30; Peake did not attend this session. At this session a new collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and the Association was entered into and ratified by the union membership that evening. On May 4 the Union received a letter dated April 27 from Respondent. The letter is addressed to the Association, with copies to be sent to the Union as well as the remaining mem- bers of the Association. The letter states: We are writing this letter to inform, you that effec- tive 5:00 p.m. on April 27, 1990, Jay Ruckel, Inc., d/b/a PERRELLA GLOVES has ceased all business op- erations and terminated its employees. Therefore, PERRELLA GLOVES will no longer be a member of [the Association]. We will no longer par- ticipate in labor contract negotiations, nor will we be a party to any contract resulting therefrom. Towne testified that prior to the receipt of this letter he had never been informed either that Respondent was ceasing its operations, that it did not intend to be bound by the bar- gaining between the Union and the Association, or that it was withdrawing from the Association. Prior to the receipt of this letter Respondent never informed the Union that its difficult financial situation justified its withdrawal from the Association nor did it request economic concessions or other relief from the Union. The Union never consented to Re- spondent’s attempted withdrawal from the Association. In fact, by letter dated May 7, Towne wrote to Ruckel, inter alia: We reject your untimely notice to withdraw from the association and from multi-employer bargaining. It is our position that you will be bound by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement negotiated between [the Association] and this Union. Additionally, we demand that you bargain with us over the effects of your decision to terminate oper- ations, including, but not limited to, severance pay, va- cations, Christmas bonuses and all other matters relat- ing to the severance or termination of employment of those of your employees who are members of our col- lective-bargaining unit. Please contact me promptly to arrange for mutually agreeable dates for negotiation. The Union has received no response from Respondent to this letter and Respondent has never offered to bargain with it over the effects of its ceasing operations. Towne was aware, however, that Respondent was then employing sub- stantially fewer employees than it did 2 and 3 years earlier. In fact, he knew that at the time of the negotiations they em- ployed only ‘‘a handful’’ of employees. Towne testified that on or about May 1 he informed a reporter for a local news- paper that Respondent was not a ‘‘viable’’ company and that Respondent and one other of the Association members ‘‘were on their way out.’’ That he knew ‘‘from day one that we were talking to only three companies,’’ and he referred to Respondent and the other company as ‘‘two dead horses.’’ Towne testified that he knew that Respondent owed the Union a considerable amount for back dues deducted and merchants told him that Respondent was not paying its bills, and that is why he asked Gray on April 11 if any of the members were losing money. If Respondent said that they were losing money he would have had the right to look at their books. However Gray said that nobody was losing money. His reference to the ‘‘two dead horses’’ (Respondent and another company whose president was indicted and sub- sequently convicted of price fixing, causing the loss of jobs) was meant to warn his members that the Association was using these two companies to attempt to coerce them into voting for a wage freeze. Respondent defends that its ‘‘extreme financial hardship’’ constituted unusual circumstances permitting what would otherwise be an untimely withdrawal from the Association. In support of this defense Ruckel testified to a plethora of debts and unfavorable business situations for Respondent. When he and Duchein purchased Perrella Gloves, Inc. it em- ployed approximately 65 employees. Due to the unexpected loss of customers and the resulting lack of orders, by April he had no employees and he and Duchein were doing the lit- tle that had to be done at the facility; all invoices are en- dorsed to the Internal Revenue Service. In addition, by April, Respondent owed large sums of money. Accounting records2 and letters sent to Respondent establish that, as of April, Re- spondent was indebted to the following organizations in the following approximate amounts: Small Business Administration—$260,000 Internal Revenue Service—$140,000 New York State—$33,000 Fulton County Economic Development Corp.— $73,000 Amsterdam Bank—$33,000 Suppliers—$140,000 The Union (dues)—$2,200 Ruckel testified that Respondent’s accounts receivable, at that time, were about $7000. In 1988 and 1989, Ruckel’s yearly salary from Respondent was about $20,000. In 1990 he received no salary from Respondent and no dividends were paid by Respondent to either he or Duchein. Ruckel testified that Respondent was ‘‘still viable right up to April 26, before I wrote that letter.’’ Even though he had not obtained the orders he had hoped to get, in April he was still negotiating with other firms who ‘‘were talking about supporting us and taking over the full year’s production of 492 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the factory . . . .’’ When those negotiations were unsuccess- ful, he wrote the April 27 letter: ‘‘when those negotiations had finally fallen through, we couldn’t see our way through to signing a three year agreement when we had no viable or- ders in the house.’’ Ruckel never disclosed the above de- scribed accounting records, liens, or notices to the Union prior to this hearing and never asked the Union for assistance or concessions prior to writing the April 27 letter: ‘‘I didn’t, frankly, know that they could help us or I might have ap- proached them.’’ The only testimony to rebut Ruckel’s testi- mony regarding Respondent’s desperate financial condition is Towne’s testimony that: ‘‘I believed and still believe that the principals of this company have a lot of money and bled Perrella and hid a lot of money.’’ IV. ANALYSIS There are two distinct violations alleged herein: the un- timely withdrawal from the Association on about May 4, with the resulting refusal to abide by the terms of the agree- ment reached by the Union and the Association on April 30, and the refusal to negotiate with the Union about the effects of its ceasing operations. Respondent’s defense to the initial allegation is that the ‘‘unusual circumstances’’ of its dire fi- nancial situation should excuse what would otherwise be an untimely withdrawal from the Association. Respondent, ap- parently, has no defense to the remaining allegation. In Bonnano Linen Service v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404 (1982), the Supreme Court cited with approval the guidelines set out by the Board in Retail Associates, 121 NLRB 388, 395 (1958) for withdrawal from multiemployer units. There the Board stated: We would accordingly refuse to permit the with- drawal of an employer or a union from a duly estab- lished multiemployer bargaining unit, except upon ade- quate written notice given prior to the date set by the contract for modification, or to the agreed-upon date to begin the multiemployer negotiations. Where actual bar- gaining negotiations based on the existing multiem- ployer unit have begun, we would not permit, except on mutual consent, an abandonment of the unit upon which each side has committed itself to the other, absent un- usual circumstances. In Bonnano, supra, the Supreme Court stated that ‘‘un- usual circumstances will be found where an employer is sub- ject to extreme financial pressures or where a bargaining unit has been substantially fragmented.’’ It is the former situation we are involved with in the instant matter. Admittedly, Re- spondent did not withdraw from the Association until after negotiations had begun; in fact the letter was not received by the Union until after the new agreement had been entered into. The issue therefore is whether Respondent’s financial condition warrants it to be excused from this late exit from the Association based upon its ‘‘unusual circumstances,’’ as defined in Retail Associates, Bonnano, and later cases. In Hi-Way Billboards, 206 NLRB 22, 23 (1973), the Board limited the application of the term ‘‘unusual cir- cumstances’’ to those cases in which the withdrawing employer has been faced with dire economic circumstances, i.e., cir- cumstances in which the very existence of an employer as a viable business entity has ceased or is about to cease. Thus, the Board has held that an employer may withdraw from a multiemployer bargaining association after negotiations with the union have begun where the employer is subject to extreme economic difficulties which result in an arrangement under the bankruptcy laws; where the employer is faced with the imminent prospect of such adverse economic conditions as would require it to close its plant . . . . [Citations omitted.] Western Pacific Roofing Corp., 244 NLRB 501, 507 (1979), citing Serv-All Co., 199 NLRB 1131 (1972), stated: Thus, the critical question is whether the very existence of the employer has ceased or such cessation is immi- nent. Mere business inconvenience or economic hard- ship, or apprehension that bargaining is progressing to- ward an agreement which would be economically budensome, inability to maintain a competitive position or other business exigencies will not justify an untimely withdrawal from group bargaining. I find that Respondent’s operation in April qualifies under these definitions of ‘‘unusual circumstances.’’ There were no longer any employees and Ruckel and Duchein were per- forming whatever work they could on existing inventory while endorsing the invoices to the Internal Revenue Service. They had no income and were taking no salary. They had debts of in excess of $800,000 (principally to governmental, or quasi-governmental agencies) at the same time that Re- spondent’s accounts receivables were $7000. If this does not constitute ‘‘dire economic circumstances’’ or ‘‘extreme fi- nancial pressures’’ I don’t know what does. I therefore find that Respondent’s financial situation comes within the Board’s application of unusual circumstances, but the inquiry does not end there. I know of no Board decision where an employer’s untimely withdrawal from multiemployer bar- gaining was excused for financial reasons under unusual cir- cumstances, where the employer had not previously re- quested assistance or concessions from the union. For exam- ple, in U.S. Lingerie Corp., 170 NLRB 750 (1968), where the Board excused the employer’s late withdrawal due to its poor financial condition, the employer had unsuccessfully sought the union’s help in its effort to solve its financial dif- ficulty. However, in Western Pacific, supra, the Board stated: Furthermore, the legitimacy of Respondent’s economic defense is placed in serious doubt by its failure to no- tify the union of any financial difficulties prior to or during the course of the negotiations, or to inform the union that its refusal to sign the agreement was based on financial difficulties. Not only did Respondent fail to inform the Union of its dif- ficult financial situation prior to withdrawing from the Asso- ciation, but when asked if any of the Association’s members were losing money Peake, did not respond, and this was 2 weeks before Ruckel’s letter of withdrawal. I therefore find that by failing to request assistance or concessions from the Union prior to its untimely withdrawal from the Association, Respondent forfeited its right to be excused from this late withdrawal for financial reasons. 493 PERRELLA GLOVES 3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objec- tions to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. Finally, Ruckel’s letter dated April 27 is time-stamped May 4 and that is the date that Towne testified he received the letter. The new collective-bargaining agreement was rati- fied and entered into by the Association and the Union 4 days earlier. As Administrative Law Judge Davidson stated in Co-Ed Garment Co., 231 NLRB 848, 854 (1977): Here, assuming the economic circumstances Co-Ed was faced with and which existed before the start of bar- gaining were dire and doomed its continued existence, Co-Ed did not attempt to withdraw from multiemployer bargaining until after the new agreement had been reached and became effective. ‘‘Unusual cir- cumstances’’ may justify withdrawal from bargaining for a multiemployer agreement but not from an agree- ment already reached. For, once an agreement is reached, the employer who refuses to sign or abide by the multi-employer contract is in no different position from any individual employer who has bargained to a contact and later seeks to renounce its terms. Respondent’s renunciation of its membership in the Associa- tion was similarly late and, therefore, ineffective. I therefore find that by attempting to withdraw from the Association after it and the Union had reached agreement on a new con- tract, and then refusing to abide by the terms of that contract, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. As to the remaining allegation, it is undisputed that when Respondent ceased operating it did so without offering to bargain with the Union over the effects of its decision, and when Towne wrote to Respondent on May 7 demanding such bargaining, Respondent never responded. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981), requires such bargaining. I therefore find that by failing and refusing to bargain over the effects of its closing, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent, Perrella Gloves/Jay Ruckel, Inc., d/b/a Perrella Gloves, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The following employees of the employer-members of the Association constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All cutters, shavers, layers-off, operators and day hands, excluding all other employees, executives and supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. At all times material, the Union has been the exclusive representative of these employees for the purposes of collec- tive bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By attempting to withdraw from the Association after the commencement of negotiations for a new collective-bar- gaining agreement, without the consent of the Union, Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 6. By failing and refusing to bargain with the Union over the effects of its decision to terminate unit operations at its facility, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid are unfair labor practices affecting com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. Having found that Re- spondent’s attempted withdrawal from the Association was untimely (and unlawful) I shall recommend that Respondent recognize and bargain with the Union as the exclusive bar- gaining representative of its employees in the multiemployer bargaining unit found appropriate, that, upon request by the Union, it signs the new agreement and comply with its terms and conditions both retroactively and for the balance of its term, and make whole the employees in the appropriate unit for any loss of wages or other benefits they may have suf- fered as a result of Respondent’s unlawful refusal to bargain and make whole the Union for payments it failed to make due to its failure to comply with the terms of the new agree- ment. In addition, I shall recommend that Respondent bargain with the Union, on request, about the effects on its shut- down, and to pay its employees at the time amounts at the rate of their normal wages when last in the Respondent’s em- ploy from 5 days after the date of the Board’s Order until the occurrence of the earliest of the following conditions: (1) the date the Respondent bargains for agreement with the Union on those subjects pertaining to the effects of the clos- ing on its employees; (2) a bonfa fide impasse in bargaining; (3) the failure of the Union to request bargaining within 5 days of the Board’s Order, or to commence negotiations within 5 days of the Respondent’s notice of its desire to bar- gain with the Union, or (4) the subsequent failure of the Union to bargain in good faith. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended3 ORDER The Respondent, Perrella Gloves, Jay Ruckel, Inc., d/b/a Perrella Gloves, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of the following employees of the employer-members of Fulton County Glove Manufacturers, Inc. (the Association): All cutters, shavers, layers off, opera- tors and day hands, excluding all other employees, execu- tives and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Rela- tions Act. (b) Withdrawing from the multiemployer bargaining unit except upon adequate written notice given prior to the date set by the contract for modification, or to the agreed-upon date to begin the multiemployer negotiations; or except at such other time as it may lawfully withdraw. 494 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the National Labor Rela- tions Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.’’ (c) Refusing to sign, and acknowledge that it is bound by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and the Association effective May 1, 1990. (d) Refusing to bargain with the Union regarding the ef- fects of its terminating its Gloversville, New York operation. (e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain- ing, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Forthwith sign, and acknowledge that it is bound by the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement between the Union and the Association effective May 1, 1990, and com- ply with the terms and conditions thereof, both retroactively and for the balance of its term. (b) Make its employees and the Union whole for any loss of wages and benefits they may have suffered as a result of its failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the above-described agreement in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision. (c) Pay the employees whom it employed on April 27 their normal wages for the period as set forth above in the remedy section of this decision. (d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board and its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, and reports and all other records required to ascer- tain the amounts, if any, of any backpay due under the terms of this recommended Order. (e) Post at its place of business in Gloversville, New York, copies of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appendix.’’4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 3, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent imme- diately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply.