Griffin Inns

GRIFFIN INNS Griffin Inns, Owner and Operator of Sheraton Motor Inn (Woodhaven, Michigan) and Local No. 24, Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees, Cooks and Bartenders Union, AFL-CIO. Case 7-CA-12254 April 22, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND WALTHER On July 16, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Michael O. Miller issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Charging Party, the Union in this proceeding, filed exceptions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclu- sions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein. The Administrative Law Judge dismissed the refusal-to-bargain allegation of the complaint. The Union contends that in November 1975 Respondent conditioned collective bargaining on the Union's dropping unfair labor practice charges against it, and that this conduct constituted a refusal to bargain. We agree. The Administrative Law Judge found that, at a meeting between Respondent and union representa- tives on November 3, 1975, Respondent's representa- tive, Gehl, told Union Negotiator Panos, "If you I The Administrative Law Judge, discrediting Union Negotiator Panos, found that Respondent's manager, Rogula, did not put off bargaining with Panos by telling him to await the outcome of a decertification petition filed with the Board. No exceptions were filed to this finding and we adopt itpro forma. We do not agree, however, with the Administrative Law Judge's alternative theory that, even if Panos were credited, no violation could be found in Rogula's statement. Sec. II, C, 3, par. 3. In view of our pro forma adoption of the principal finding, the Administrative Law Judge's alterna- tive holding is gratuitous. 2 Star Manufacturing Company, Division of Star Forge, Inc., 220 NLRB 582, 587 (1975). 3 Our dissenting colleague's view of both the facts of this case and of the relevant law is askew. In the first place, the complaint alleges, inter alia, that Respondent violated Sec. 8(aX5) of the Act both by assisting employees in the preparation and circulation of a decertification petition and by its overall failure and refusal to bargain with the Union on and after August 5, 1975. As recounted by the Administrative Law Judge, Union Representative Panos testified, without contradiction, that on November 3, 1975, Respon- dent expressly conditioned negotiations on the Union's withdrawal of unfair labor practice charges. It cannot be doubted that the then pending charges were a matter of concern to Respondent. In fact, the Administrative Law Judge found a violation of Sec. 8(aXI) of the Act predicated on Respondent's earlier threat directed to the employee who had initiated the charges. Thereafter, although our colleague intimates otherwise, Respon- dent failed to respond to Panos' requests for a meeting. We are puzzled by our colleague's reading of the record in this case. Clearly. Respondent was on notice that its course of dealings with the Union 229 NLRB No. 26 drop those charges, we'll start to negotiate," and that Panos refused. This was Panos' uncontradicted testimony. Re- spondent does not deny Panos' account. General Manager Rogula, who was present at the November 3 meeting, testified only that he could not remember any discussion to that effect. Respondent did not call Gehl to refute Panos' testimony. Accordingly, we see no reason to reject it. The Administrative Law Judge, in finding that Respondent had not refused to bargain with the Union, failed to consider Panos' unrefuted testimo- ny. When considered together with Manager Rogu- la's own testimony that Panos called him thereafter to set up negotiations, we conclude that Respon- dent's conditioning bargaining on withdrawal of the unfair labor practice charges constituted an unlawful refusal to bargain. The Board has held that an employer may not lawfully condition negotiations on a waiver of unfair labor practice charges.2 As the Union represented a majority of Respon- dent's employees in an appropriate unit and, having found that Respondent refused to bargain collective- ly with the Union, we will order that Respondent bargain with the Union upon request.3 ADDITIONAL CONCLUSION OF LAW Insert the following as Conclusion of Law 3 and renumber the remaining Conclusions of Law: "3. By refusing to bargain with the Union on and after November 3, 1975, Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act." on and after August 5 was in issue and might give rise to the finding of a violation of its duty to bargain. As our colleague concedes, General Manager Rogula, who was present at the critical November 3 meeting, was cross-examined concerning Panos' direct testimony as to what took place at that meeting. Although our colleague apparently labors under the miscon- ception that Rogula controverted Panos' testimony, the record is otherwise. Thus when Rogula was asked whether he recalled any discussion during the November 3 meeting about resumption of bargaining in exchange for withdrawal of charges, he responded: "Well, there possibly could have been but I can't recall what it was pertaining to." Thereafter, as noted above, Respondent also failed to call Gehl to deny Panos' testimony concerning the November 3 session. Hence. Panos' testimony with respect to this incident stands unrebutted on the record. In the circumstances of this case, our colleague's forebodings seem unwarranted. The question of Respondent's conduct at the November 3 meeting was fully litigated as part and parcel of the examination into Respondent's alleged refusal to bargain. In our view, our colleague cannot successfully maintain either that such conduct is not intimately related to the subject matter of the complaint, or that Respondent lacked ample opportunity to rebut any and all adverse testimony arising at the hearing. Accordingly, and although our colleague would have it otherwise, this Respondent's failure to rebut Panos' damaging testimony concerning the November 3 meeting raises no due-process issue. In these circumstances and in conformity with well-established precedent, we are fully warranted in finding and remedying Respondent's unlawful conduct. See, in this regard, Crown Zellerbach Corporation, 225 NLRB 911 (1976), and cases cited therein. 199 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified below and hereby orders that the Respon- dent, Griffin Inns, Owner and Operator of Sheraton Motor Inn (Woodhaven, Michigan), its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: 1. Insert the following as paragraph l(e) of the Administrative Law Judge's recommended Order and reletter the subsequent paragraph accordingly: "(e) Refusing to bargain with Local No. 24, Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees, Cooks and Bartenders Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the following appropriate unit: "All employees employed by Respondent at its facility located at 21700 West Road, Woodhaven, Michigan, but excluding guards and supervisors as defined in the Act." 2. Insert the following as paragraph 2(b) and reletter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly: "(b) Upon request, bargain with Local No. 24, Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees, Cooks and Bartenders Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of its employees in the unit found appropriate and embody any understanding reached in a signed agreement." 3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. MEMBER WALTHER, dissenting in part: I would affirm the Administrative Law Judge's dismissal of the 8(a)(5) allegation. The General Counsel based his case on his complaint allegation that Respondent assisted in the preparation and circulation of a decertification petition. The Admin- istrative Law Judge found that the evidence did not establish that allegation and dismissed it. The majority affirms that dismissal. The majority finds, however, on the basis of Union Negotiator Panos' testimony, which the Administra- tive Law Judge discredited in other respects, that Respondent hinged negotiations on the Union's dropping its unfair labor practice charges filed with the Board. Whatever was said in Panos' questionable account, there was no reason for Respondent to attempt to discredit that testimony since there was no allegation or theory of violation being put forward related thereto. Further, the record clearly shows that Respondent did not refuse to meet with the Union for the purpose of negotiation. The Union had been the collective-bargaining representative of Respondent's employees since June 1971 and had executed a collective-bargaining agreement with Respondent which had a July 1975 termination date. As found by the Administrative Law Judge, negotiations looking toward a new agreement began in early spring and continued through July. Whether the parties met again in August or September is unclear. They did meet on November 3 for contract negotiations and Respon- dent's representatives maintained a willingness to bargain toward a contract. It was at this meeting that the assertedly unlawful statement by Respondent's representative was made. After November 3, Respondent's attorney called Panos to set a meeting date, but Panos told him that he could not meet because of the deer hunting season. Panos testified that he told the attorney that he would call him after the deer season. Panos, however, did not carry through on that. After the deer season, he called Respondent's general manag- er, Rogula, but no meeting was arranged. Rogula advised Panos to call his attorney, but Panos did not. The Administrative Law Judge found that there had been no contact between the parties since December 1975. He further found that Panos did not press Respondent for meetings; that the calls he made were to Rogula rather than to the attorney, whom he knew to be primarily involved in negotia- tions; and that Panos delayed one meeting for his personal convenience. On the facts as found by the Administrative Law Judge, I would not find that Respondent refused to meet or to bargain in violation of the Act. My colleagues seem to have found their facts in the proverbial "Looking Glass." First, the complaint does not allege a violation of Section 8(a)(5) in an "overall" failure and refusal to bargain with the Union. The complaint, by paragraph 15, alleged an 8(a)(5) violation "by the acts described above in paragraph 12 and its subparagraphs, and by each of said acts, Respondent did refuse . . . ." Paragraph 12 of said complaint states that since August 5, 1975, Respondent has refused to bargain with the Charging Union by the following acts and conduct; specifical- ly by: (a) assisting its employees in preparing and circulating a decertification petition, and (b) "[a]t all times since the filing of the petition referred to in subparagraph (a) above, and by virtue of same [emphasis supplied], Respondent has failed and refused . . ." There are no other 8(aX)(5) allegations in the complaint. Second, my colleagues themselves seem to suffer from myopia, inasmuch as their reliance on Panos' testimony must assume its credibility. However, the fact is that the Administrative Law Judge did not 200 GRIFFIN INNS credit Panos' testimony. Furthermore, the record establishes that Respondent's witness denied that Respondent conditioned bargaining upon the with- drawal of the charges. Third, my colleagues supply no rationale for their apparent assertion that Respondent's violation of Section 8(a)(1), by its threat to the employee who supplied an affidavit in support of the Union's charges, aids their finding that Respondent refused to meet with Panos. Fourth, the Board has always followed the Federal theory of notice pleading, and I agree that Respon- dent was on notice that it was alleged to have violated Section 8(a)(5) as alleged in the complaint. However, the complaint specifically alleges that Respondent refused to bargain with the Union by virtue of its initiation of the decertification petition- it does not allege that Respondent refused to bargain because of the pending unfair labor practice charges. A further reading of the record, which my colleagues might find instructive, reveals that the majority's idea of "fully litigated" in this case consists of no more than a one-time response by Panos to a General Counsel's question in passing on direct examination concerning what was discussed at the November 3 bargaining session. (I must assume, from the context, that my colleagues concede that the parties did meet?!) In response to the General Counsel's question on cross-examination, Respondent's witness denied that such was the case. That was the extent of any litigation of this issue. Notice, as contemplated by the doctrine of due process, seems to me to require a more formal assertion by the prosecutor of the defendant's wrongdoing. The General Counsel has made no such claim prior to the close of the hearing in this case. Accordingly, to the extent that the majority predi- cates a violation of Section 8(a)(5) upon this uncredited part of Panos' testimony I believe the majority has violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the precepts of due process. As stated by the court in Rodale Press, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commis- sion, 407 F.2d 1252, 1256 (C.A.D.C., 1968): The Administrative Procedure Act, in 5 U.S.C. §554(b) (1964) provides in pertinent part: "Per- sons entitled to notice of an agency hearing shall be timely informed of . . . (3) the matters offact and law asserted." ... Hence it is well settled that an agency may not change theories in midstream without giving respondents reasonable notice of the change. N.LR.B. v. Johnson, 322 F.2d 216, 219-200 (C.A. 6, 1963); N.L.R.B. v. H. E. Fletcher Co., 298 F.2d 594 (C.A. 1, 1962). [Emphasis in the original.] Accordingly, I believe that this case must be decided on the basis of the theory upon which it was litigated, unless and until Respondent is given notice of the majority's theory and an opportunity to present relevant evidence thereto and argue its merits. Otherwise, to all those charged before this Agency, beware! For, until you read the Board's decision, you may never know of what it is that you have been accused! APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT threaten employees with dis- charge or other reprisals, or promise them benefits in order to discourage union activity, membership, and support. WE WILL NOT encourage our employees to sign petitions to decertify the Union. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in or activities on behalf of Local No. 24, Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees, Cooks and Bartenders Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organiza- tion, by discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees in any manner with regard to their rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, hire, tenure of employment, or any terms or conditions of employment. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the above-named Union, as the exclusive repre- sentative of the employees in the unit herein found to be appropriate. The appropriate unit is: All employees employed by us at our facility located at 21700 West Road, Woodhaven, Michigan, excluding guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, to form labor organizations, to join or assist the above- named Union, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any or all such activity. WE WILL offer Donna Ball immediate and full reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent posi- tion, without loss of seniority or other rights or privileges, and WE WILL make her whole for any 201 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against her, with interest thereon at 6 percent per annum. WE WILL, upon request, bargain with Local No. 24, Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees, Cooks and Bartenders Union, AFL-CIO, as the exclu- sive representative of our employees in the appropriate unit described above and embody any understanding reached in a signed agreement. GRIFFIN INNS, OWNER AND OPERATOR OF SHERATON MOTOR INN (WOODHAVEN MICHIGAN) DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE MICHAEL O. MILLER, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard in Detroit, Michigan, on March 29, 30, and 31, 1976, based upon a charge by Local No. 24, Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees, Cooks and Bartenders Union, AFL-CIO, herein the Union, filed on August 14, and amended on September 9 and October 3, 1975 (all dates hereinafter are 1975 unless otherwise specified). The original complaint was issued by the Regional Director for Region 7 of the National Labor Relations Board on September 30 and was amended on October 16. The complaint, as amended, alleges that Griffin Inns, Owner and Operator of Sheraton Motor Inn (Woodhaven, Michigan), herein Respondent, has violated Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the Act by threats and promises of benefits to discourage continued union affiliation, assis- tance in the preparation and circulation of a decertification petition, the discharge of an employee because of her union activities and support, and its refusal to bargain with the Union. Respondent's timely filed answer denies the substantive allegations of the complaint. All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and to cross- examine witnesses. Briefs, which have been carefully considered, were filed by the General Counsel and Respondent. Upon the entire record, including my careful observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: I The certification ran to the Detroit Local Joint Executive Board, Hotel & Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union, AFL-CIO. The contract was executed by Respondent and that organization on behalf of various locals representing different classifications of employees within FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. THE RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS AND THE UNION'S LABOR OROANIZATION STATUS Respondent is a Minnesota corporation engaged in Woodhaven, Michigan, in the operation of a motel and restaurant. Jurisdiction is not in issue. Based upon the admitted allegations of the complaint I find and conclude that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. I find and conclude that the Union is a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. H. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background In June 1971, pursuant to an election conducted by the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, the Union was certified to represent Respondent's employees. The parties entered into a collective-bargaining agreement, effective July 1, 1972, through July 1, 1975.1 The admitted- ly appropriate unit was: All employees employed by the Employer at its facility located at 21700 West Road, Woodhaven, Michigan, but excluding guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. While the certification specifically included "Front Office employees" and the initial contract provided a wage rate for clerks and clerk trainees, the parties did not consider the front desk clerks to be within the Union's jurisdiction during the term of that contract. Prior to the advent of the Union, Respondent had provided its employees with health insurance coverage, pursuant to a contract with Blue Cross/Blue Shield. The Union maintained a separate health and welfare program and the 1972-75 collective-bargaining agreement permitted Respondent to discontinue Blue Cross/Blue Shield cover- age for employees coming under the union plan, which Respondent did. According to the undisputed testimony of Michael Rogula, Respondent's general manager (and former own- er), between 1972 and 1974 contacts between management and the Union were few. No grievances were brought to the attention of management. B. Relevant Current Facts While it is not altogether clear from the record, it appears that negotiations toward a new collective-bargaining agreement opened about March or April. The Union sought, and Respondent agreed to, the inclusion of the the industry. At the outset of the current negotiations, the Union requested that the contract be amended to reflect a name change to that shown on the caption herein. 202 GRIFFIN INNS front desk clerks within the bargaining unit. This was apparently implemented immediately. Also included in the Union's proposals was a request for the resumption of health coverage under Blue Cross/Blue Shield.2 Rogula contacted a representative of the insurance company and, at that representative's request, delegated to Kay Roshnow, the banquet manager (and wife of George Roshnow, the food and beverage manager), the task of determining how many employees would require coverage under the Union's proposal. Kay Roshnow surveyed the employees. 3 According to Donna Ball, a cook (and the alleged discriminatee herein), Kay Roshnow approached her in late March and asked her whether she or her husband had Blue Cross. Ball replied that she would want coverage. Kay Roshnow then stated: Well, we're not getting Blue Cross right now, ... but possibly if we vote out the union we might be getting Blue Cross back.... Somebody will be coming around with a - a paper, and if you signed the paper, that meant you wanted to vote on - to vote to keep the union in or out. At this time, Ball had heard that Respondent and the Union were in negotiations and she understood from Kay Roshnow that Blue Cross insurance was a union demand.4 Sometime during April, according to the testimony of Linda Ehrlich, a waitress (subsequently laid off and not presently employed by Respondent), a conversation she had with Rogula drifted onto the subject of the Union. Ehrlich testified that Rogula told her "that there was a chance we could get our Blue Cross back if we didn't have the union, but he said he wasn't promising, but there was a chance." Rogula denied making the foregoing statement to Ehrlich. He claimed that there were occasions when employees asked him about resumption of the Blue Cross coverage, at which times, he claimed, he referred them to their union representatives. Relying on their comparative demeanors, and noting particularly that the statement attributed to Rogula by Ehrlich is consistent with other statements attributed to him and other management representatives, I credit Ehrlich. About April 13, James Fetzer, union business representa- tive, met with 12 of Respondent's employees. Discussions with these employees gave him evidence of violations of the collective-bargaining agreement. He prepared a "blanket grievance" concerning these alleged violations in the form of a letter dated April 17, and sent it to Respondent's management in Minneapolis, Minnesota. He did not give it 2 The Union's written proposal contained the following: HEALTH AND WELFARE - Cover all employees who work three (3) days per week or more (and are not covered as a dependent on a comparable group plan, fully paid for by another employer) with individual coverage of group Comprehensive Blue Cross with "D-45 rider and Blue Shield MVF-I without any cost to the employees." The record does not establish when Respondent received this proposal. However, the proposal concludes with the inscnption in lower case, in the bottom left-hand corner of the last page "mh opeiu 10 afl-cio 62675" from which I infer that it was not typed until June 26. 1975. 1 The record reflects that Kay Roshnow interviewed and hired employ- ees and responsibly directed their work. Based upon this evidence and her relationship to George Roshnow, I conclude that she was a supervisor and agent within the Act's intendment. to either Rogula or Roshnow. Rogula, however, became aware of the grievance sometime within the month of April. The letter listed 11 items whereby named employees were receiving less money per hour or fewer hours than that to which they were entitled by contract. Included in these items were: 3. Donna Ball, cook, scheduled for 9-1/2 hours every Friday and Saturday and not getting overtime pay after 8 hours.5 4. Donna Ball, cook, has been scheduled for three days a week since last July. The contract calls for her to be paid at the rate of $4.50 per hour as an extra rather than the $4.00 per hour rate of a steady. 6 At this same meeting, Donna Ball was elected union steward, a position previously unfilled at Respondent's place of business. Neither the Union nor Ball notified Respondent of Ball's new role. Ball never functioned as a steward; she participated in neither grievance meetings nor negotiations. Rogula denied that he ever learned that she had become a union steward. George Roshnow 7 acknowl- edged that he had heard that Ball was elected steward. He testified that he greeted the news with incredulity because of Ball's prior lack of interest in the Union. Prior to May, Ball had been scheduled to work from approximately 2 to 10 p.m. on Thursdays and 2 to I I p.m. on Fridays and Saturdays. She testified that in late April, around 2 weeks after the union meeting, Mr. Roshnow came to her as she was working and told her: Donna, I can't afford to pay anybody time and a half and I'm going to have to cut your hours from nine and a half hours a day to eight ... She protested that it would be difficult to complete her work with short hours and Roshnow allegedly replied: Well, the only way you could get your hours back would be to get rid of the union . . . I can't afford to pay anybody time and a half. Roshnow admitted that after he learned of Ball's entitle- ment to overtime after 8 hours per day he changed her work schedule so that on Fridays and Saturdays, rather than coming in at 2 p.m. she would start at 3 p.m. He I Kay Roshnow, no longer employed by Respondent, was not called to rebut Ball's credibly tendered testimony. Art. III, sec. 3 of the agreement provided: Except as otherwise herein provided, time and one-half shall be paid for all hours worked in excess of eight (8) in any one day ... 6 Art. 11, sec. 12 of the agreement defined an "extra employee . . .as any employee working three (3) days per week or less." Schedule "A" of that agreement, the wage provisions, set forth a $4.50 per hour wage rate for "extra" cooks. It also provided for time and one-half for all hours in excess of 8 per day. 7 The supervisory status of George Roshnow, as food and beverage manager, was admitted. 203 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD denied telling her that she could only get her hours back, or time and one-half, if they got rid of the Union.8 Shortly after the above conversation with Roshnow, according to Ball, Rogula told her: "You know, Donna, I can't afford to pay any cook four-fifty an hour." She protested that he was "looking at it from management's point of view," and he replied, "You know, you might lose your job over it. I can't afford to pay anybody four-fifty an hour." Rogula denied discussing this matter with Ball. On an afternoon about the third week in May, according to Ball, Roshnow initiated a conversation by commenting that she should slow down in the manner in which she was cutting vegetables. She said that she was in a hurry because she didn't have much time since her hours were cut. Roshnow told her: Well, there's one way to remedy that: Get rid of your union . . . You know, your unions aren't any good in restaurants . . . I know you have the union in the factory; all they do is take your money and don't do anything for you . . . It's none of my business but in my opinion, being union steward was an unwise thing to do. He repeated: The only way you could get your hours back would be to get rid of the union. . . . This company really wants to go by the union. . . . You'll all be in white uniforms and hairnets, you'll only be able to have anything to drink on your break and you won't be able to smoke in between. See what the union did for you, Donna?. . . All you got was your hours cut. Roshnow denied the essence of the foregoing statement. As noted, he admitted reducing Ball's hours as a result of the grievance. He also admitted soliciting employees to withdraw their grievances against him. These actions indicate an antipathy toward the grievance procedure and enforcement of contract rights and are consistent with the types of statements attributed to him by Ball. Based upon these actions and upon my evaluation of the testimonial demeanors of both witnesses, I credit Ball. For the same reasons, I credit Ball over Rogula in regard to the statement attributed to him. In early June, Ball approached Kay Roshnow with a written vacation request. She told Mrs. Roshnow "that I would need July, the week of the 7th and the 14th off, which were 10th, 1 Ith, and 12th; 17th, 18th and 19th," and that she wanted that period to coincide with the shutdown of the plant at which her husband was employed. 9 Respondent's scheduling of its cooks was informal; its I An analysis of Ball's timecards reveals that on a majority of Fridays and Saturdays from the beginning ofJanuary until the payroll period ending May 22, Ball worked 9 or more hours. Subsequent to May 22, on those Fridays and Saturdays on which she worked, Ball started work I hour later and earned only 8 hours' pay. General Counsel disclaimed any intention of alleging the reduction in hours as an independent violation. 9 The record in not clear whether Ball specifically mentioned these dates or only inferred them by reference to the weeks in which they fell. Her pretrial affidavit made no mention of the specific dates. I conclude, based upon her testimony and affidavit, that Ball told Roshnow the weeks she concern was that the duties be covered. Kay Roshnow told Ball to clear her plans with another cook, Tim Kinsey. She did so and was assured that he could cover for her during her vacation.10 She then told George Roshnow that she had cleared her vacation with Kinsey and he would cover the dates for her. She requested a letter from Respondent entitling her to discounts at Sheraton Inns while she traveled. Ball worked on Thursday, July 3. The restaurant was scheduled to be closed on the holiday, July 4, and, since he was scheduled to work on that day anyway, Kinsey volunteered to cover for Ball on July 5, giving her an extra couple of days to prepare for her vacation. She agreed and both Ball and Kinsey notified Roshnow of the schedule change. Roshnow had no objection and testified that this extra day off was a 'bonus" for Ball. On the evening of July 3, Kay Roshnow brought Ball the discount letter, signed by her husband. The letter stated, inter alia: "Mrs. Ball will be traveling with her family . . . the second week in July, 1975." Ball told Mrs. Roshnow that there was a mistake in the letter, that she would be traveling the second and third weeks in July and that she would be gone for 2 weeks. Mrs. Roshnow assured her that the dates were not important as long as the other motels saw that she was an employee in good standing." Ball further recalled overhearing a conversation between George Roshnow and Bunny Thiv- ierge, a salad girl who was capable of filling in as a cook, wherein Thivierge was asked if she could work 3 days for Ball if Kinsey had to leave early on his vacation. Thivierge allegedly agreed to do so. George Roshnow had no recollection of this conversation. Thivierge was called by neither party. Ball returned to the city from her vacation on Saturday, July 19. Respondent, however, had expected her to return to work on Thursday, July 17 and was unprepared for her absence. Kinsey had already left on his vacation and various makeshift arrangements were made to provide cooking services. Roshnow, himself, cooked for a banquet on the night of July 17. Ball learned that she had been expected back and went to the Inn on Monday, July 21. She spoke with Roshnow who told her that when she did not come in on July 17 or 18, they thought she had quit and hired a replacement for her. She was terminated at that time. 12 Between July 15 and August 1, a petition seeking support for the decertification of the Union was circulated among Respondent's employees. Bettye Binkley, Respondent's afternoon shift front desk clerk (3 to 11 p.m.) was the circulator and initial signatory. (Her signature is dated July 15.) Respondent's role in that petition is at issue herein. Binkley testified that she determined to seek support for decertification when, after a year in which she was excluded from the unit, Rogula told her that she would wanted to take off, which would include the dates set forth above, but did not specifically mention the dates. 10 Neither General Counsel nor Respondent called Kinsey to corrobo- rate its contentions. " The foregoing testimony was credibly offered and stands uncontra- dicted. 12 Roshnow testified that he told her that they were in the process of hiring someone else. Rogula testified that they had hired someone. The record, however, does not establish that anyone was hired to replace Ball. I credit Ball's recollection of her discharge interview. 204 GRIFFIN INNS have to join the Union. She had previously dealt with the Union as proprietress of a bar and, in that capacity, had experience with Labor Board representation proceedings. Binkley denied that she was instructed to engage in the decertification activity by Roshnow or Rogula. She testified that she was assisted in preparation of the petition by her own attorney. There was no direct evidence to contradict Binkley's testimony. Binkley further testified that she had only one conversa- tion with Rogula regarding the petition: . . . He asked me if I had a petition going, and I said yes. And he said that there were some problems with the union people and maybe I should think about what I was doing. She told him that she knew what she was doing and would continue. Rogula denied having such a conversation with Binkley. Morning shift (7 a.m. to 3 p.m.) desk clerk Robin Kamin' 3 testified to certain events which would indicate management's support or assistance for Binkley's petition. Thus, she testified that around July 12 or 14 (before even Binkley's name was placed on the petition) Rogula had a conversation with her, as follows: He asked me if I had signed a petition that was going around, and I had not answered him, and he went on, saying that if I didn't I'd better because ... as far as he was concerned, the union was on its way out. Rogula denied involvement in this conversation. Kamin testified that at that point she had not yet seen the petition but was shown it a couple of days later, by Binkley. She did not sign it then. However, on the following day, she observed Binkley come in around 9 a.m., punch the timeclock, and spend the morning circulating around the motel with the petition. It was on that day, around 2:30 p.m. that Binkley once again gave Kamin the petition, asked her to sign it and Kamin did so. Her signature is the eleventh in order of signing; it is the first one bearing the date of July 16. Kamin's testimony in the foregoing regard does not withstand scrutiny. Even if Rogula had knowledge of, and involvement in, the circulation of the petition, he would not likely have asked Kamin if she had signed a petition which was not yet to be circulated for another I to 3 days. Had Binkley been soliciting signatures on the petition all during the morning and early afternoon of July 16, Kamin's would not likely have been the first signature added to that petition on that date. Had Binkley clocked in during the morning, as Kamin was sure she did, her timecard would so reflect. It does not. Binkley's timecard for the payroll period ending July 31 reflects that on the first day of that period, Wednesday, July 16, Binkley clocked in at 2:54 p.m. She clocked in at approximately that same time each day that week. In the following week, she worked the morning shift, apparently substituting the Kamin. Based 13 At the time these events occurred, Kamin was using her mamed name, Ganfi. 14 George Roshnow suggested that what he asked Ehrlich to sign was a release of the grievances filed against him. He also admitted that, upon her upon the foregoing inconsistencies, and my unfavorable impression of Kamin as a witness during this phase of her testimony, I am constrained to discredit her. I was, on the other hand, favorably impressed with Binkley as a witness. She was candid and presented reasonable explanations for her actions. Her personal attitude toward union representa- tion does not warrant a conclusion that her actions were suggested or controlled by management. I credit her testimony. On July 25, Linda Ehrlich, a waitress who had been laid off, in May, came to the restaurant to visit friends still employed there. During the course of the afternoon, Mrs. Roshnow told her that George Roshnow wanted to talk to her in the office. She went to the office, anticipating a conversation regarding her return to work. However, Roshnow told Ehrlich: . . . that there was some kind of petition at the front desk, if I would like to sign it I could. I didn't have to, it was up to me but it was at the front desk. 4 Ehrlich went to the front desk, sometime before 3 p.m., was shown the petition by Binkley, and signed it. Prior to the inclusion of the desk clerks in the unit, Robin Kamin had received Blue Cross insurance from Respon- dent. According to Kamin, Rogula spoke to her in the office in early August. She alleged: Mr. Rogula had asked me if I was going to sign an affidavit with Blue Cross against him, and I knew nothing about any Blue Cross affidavit, and I told him I would be honest with him, that I did sign an affidavit against him but it was with the union, and I told him what the affidavit was. . . about the certification. And he said he was disappointed in me and - 'cause he thought I was a loyal employee to him, and he threatened to take away my Blue Cross if I didn't drop the charges, and I says I wouldn't drop the charges because I believed in what I signed. She added, at a later point in her testimony, that Rogula also threatened to deprive her of the daily free meal. The affidavit to which Kamin referred was one she had given to the Union on August 13. It concerned Binkley's circulation of the decertification petition and Rogula's alleged state- ments to her. Rogula testified that in May or June he questioned Kamin, as follows: I . .. asked her if she'd signed any type of affidavit with Blue Cross, stating that she did not have any other form of insurance, because Blue Cross had specifically asked me to make sure that nobody had other coverage besides their Blue Cross program, and this was my question to her, and her answer to me was that - that she started in on something of a decertification notice, or something, that the union had her to sign. question, he might have told her that there was a petition at the front desk. Ehrlich impressed me as a candid witness endeavoring to accurately recall the truth. I was less convinced of George Roshnow's recollective abilities and candor. I therefore credit Ehrlich's recollection of the conversation. 205 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Rogula stated that her reply was completely unrelated to his question. He testified that he told her to do whatever she thought was fair. In regard to the Blue Cross coverage, he told her that once she joined the Union, she would receive the Union's health insurance and lose Blue Cross. Kamin further testified that a couple of days after the above conversation, Rogula called her to ask her if she had dropped the charges. She said no. He then allegedly spoke to her at the front desk: . .. again he asked if I had dropped the charges, and I said no, and he said that you know, that if you don't drop the charges you're going to have to go to court and face my lawyer and that I will take your Blue Cross away. And I said that I still wasn't going to drop the charges. And he said that he would take the money out of my paycheck for what he paid on my Blue Cross It was Rogula's recollection that he did have some subsequent conversations with Kamin, not in regard to any affidavit or charges, but about the requirement that front desk employees join the Union, the deduction of union dues and the loss of her Blue Cross coverage because of coverage under the Union's insurance plan. As is frequently the case, the truth lies somewhere between the versions related by the witnesses. Based upon the comparative demeanors of the witnesses and the inherent probabilities I conclude that Rogula's version comes closer to what actually transpired. He intended to question Kamin about assurances she might have given Blue Cross concerning duplicated health insurance cover- age. Based upon her reply, referring to the affidavit she gave in August, this inquiry must have taken place in that month.15 As the substitution of the Union's insurance for Blue Cross followed from the inclusion of the desk clerks in the Union (at least until and unless the parties negotiated Blue Cross coverage) I find it difficult to believe that Rogula threatened to take away such coverage. It is most probable that his statement concerning the loss of Blue Cross insurance was misunderstood by Kamin to be a threat. I do not credit Kamin's assertion that Rogula threatened to deprive her of the free meal. The sequence of events, from Kamin's furnishing of an affidavit to the Union through the filing and service of the initial charge herein (August 14 and 16, respectively) and the subsequent conversations, leads me to conclude that in those subsequent conversations, Rogula was asking Kamin about her affidavit in relation to the unfair labor practice charges which by this time, he would have received. I therefore credit the testimony of Kamin to the extent that she stated that Rogula asked her whether she had dropped the charges and told that she would have to go to court and face his lawyer if she did not. As noted, negotiations for a new collective-bargaining agreement began in early spring. James Panos became the Union's negotiator in July and participated in three or four sessions during that month.16 15 Rogula admitted that his recollections of dates and places during this period was confused due to family and financial problems he was then facing. Panos claimed to have made a number of telephone calls to Rogula, attempting to set up bargaining meetings in August and September and testified that he did not believe that there were any meetings held in those months. He could give details of only one such conversation. He testified: I talked to Mr. Rogula to set up a meeting for bargaining, and he said he would have to contact Mr. Kovaleski [his attorney], and the petition was going around at that point, and he says, why don't we wait to see what happens with the petition. Rogula subsequently informed him that the petition had been dismissed. It was Panos' general testimony that in his telephonic conversations with Rogula, Rogula repeated that he had to contact his attorney, but no meetings were set up. In October, according to Panos, the Union allegedly sought the assistance of the State Mediation Agency. Panos went to an intended mediation meeting on October 14. Respondent did not show up. Rogula denied telling Panos that they would wait to see what happened with the petition before bargaining. He also denied knowledge of any meeting scheduled in October with a mediator. While he was not very specific in regard to times and dates of events occuring in late summer and fall, due to his preoccupation with the terminal illness of his brother, he believed that the last bargaining meeting before November was in August or September. He also testified to a number of substantial contract proposals made by Respondent, which were rejected by the Union. On November 3, the Union met with Respondent, including corporate representatives from Minneapolis, in order to get negotiations moving. The Union's grievances were discussed and, according to Panos, Mr. Gehl told the Union, "If you drop those charges, we'll start to negotiate." The Union refused. The record does not disclose what further discussions were held except that no bargaining took place. Subsequent to November 3, Panos called Rogula to set up another meeting. Kovaleski returned his call and Panos told Kovaleski that he could not meet until after the deer hunting season. After the deer season, he called Rogula again but no meetings were set up. There have been no contacts or attempted contacts in regard to contract negotiations since December. C. Analysis and Conclusions I. The 8(a)(1) violations It is well settled that an employer who promises or grants benefits in order to discourage employees from engaging in union activities violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. N.LRB. v. Exchange Parts Company, 375 U.S. 405, 409-410 (1964); Medo Photo Supply Corporation v. N.L.RB., 321 U.S. 678, 685-686 (1944). The promise, to be unlawful, need be neither express nor ever fulfilled. N.L.R.B. v. Drives, Inc., 16 Panos was unfamiliar with the course of negotiations prior to July. He claimed to have no notes or files regarding any of the bargaining. 206 GRIFFIN INNS 440 F.2d 354 (C.A. 7, 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 912 (1971), enfg. 172 NLRB 969 (1968). It is in this category of implied promises of benefits that I consider Kay Roshnow's statement to Ball, in March, and Rogula's statement to Ehrlich, in April, to the effect that they might resume Blue Cross insurance coverage if they voted the Union out, and George Roshnow's statements to Ball, in April and May, that she could only get her hours restored if the Union were eliminated. Accordingly, I find that these statements by Respondent's supervisors and agents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Similarly unlawful are threats of discharge or other reprisals which are intended to discourage union activity or support. See, for example, United Aircraft Corporation v. N.LR.B., 440 F.2d 85 (C.A. 2, 1971), enfg. 179 NLRB 935 (1969); Santa Fe Drilling Company v. N.LR.B., 416 F.2d 725 (C.A. 9, 1969), enfg. 171 NLRB 161 (1968). I have found that Rogula told Ball that she might lose her job if she continued to press for the higher hourly rate of pay due her under the contract as an "extra" cook. Pursuing contractual grievances is union activity protected by the Act, and a threat to discharge an employee in order to discourage such activity violates Section 8(a)(1). See, for example, Merlyn Bunney and Clarence Bunney, partners, d/b/a Bunney Bros. Construction Company, 139 NLRB 1516 (1962). Additionally, in crediting Ball over George Rosh- now I have found that Roshnow told Ball that, in his "opinion, being union steward was an unwise thing to do." Such a statement is but a thinly veiled threat of discharge or other reprisal and is violative of Section 8(a)(1). United Aircraft Corporation v. N.LR.B., supra, 440 F.2d at 93, and 179 NLRB at 958. A more difficult question is framed by Rogula's state- ment to Kamin, telling her that she would have to go to court and face his lawyer if she did not drop her charges against him. Giving testimony is at times inconvenient, expensive in terms of lost time and earnings, psychological- ly threatening and worrisome. The willingness of witnesses to initially come forward with evidence and thereafter appear at hearings and testify is essential to the administra- tion of justice. Conduct which impinges on that willingness should not lightly be tolerated. Moreover, while it is true that in the instant case the witnesses, in fact, "went to court" and "faced" Respondent's lawyer, the great majori- ty of Board cases are settled or otherwise closed without litigation. It therefore does not necessarily follow that all witnesses who give statements will be required to give testimony in formal proceedings. Accordingly, I find that Rogula's statement to Kamin constituted a threat violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. General Counsel contended that the evidence established that Respondent assisted in the preparation and circulation of the decertification petition. I do not so find. The evidence which I have credited established that in March, Kay Roshnow predicted that one day a petition would be circulated; in July, Rogula asked Binkley whether she was circulating a petition and told to think about what she was doing; and, in the same month, George Roshnow told Ehrlich that there was a petition at the front desk which she could sign if she wanted to. Kay Roshnow's statement was too remote to establish managerial assistance in the petition's preparation. Rogula's statement, if anything, tended to discourage rather than encourage Binkley's actions. Only George Roshnow's statement encouraged employee support of that petition. Moreover, I have credited the testimony of Binkley. She had independent reasons to prepare and circulate the petition. She also had advice, independent of Respondent, necessary for the preparation of that petition. The evidence, while suggesting that Respondent may have been lenient in permitting worktime to be used in the circulation of the petition, fails to establish that Respondent assisted in the petition's preparation or put Binkley on the clock at other than her normal hours for the purpose of encourag- ing that circulation. In the absence of evidence of disparate treatment, such as the enforcement of a no-solicitation rule against prounion employees, Respondent's leniency does not violated the Act. However, as noted, George Roshnow's statement to Ehrlich, a laid off employee desirous of returning to work, encouraged that employee to sign in order to secure the favor that might mean reemployment. That it was couched in terms of a freedom of choice does not substantially detract from the fact that her direct supervisor suggested she sign by calling her to his office specifically to tell her about the petition and where she might find it. His suggestion, I find, constitutes an independent violation of Section 8(aXl). State Radiator Company, 202 NLRB 335 (1973). 2. The discharge of Ball - Section 8(a)(3) General Counsel contends that Respondent's assigned reason for discharging Donna Ball, her absence from work on July 17, 18, and 19, was a pretext and that the real reason was her union activity. Respondent, of course, controverts this contention and asserts that her absence was the actual reason for discharge. The problem is to ascertain Respondent's true, underlying motive. N.L.R.B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45-60 (1937). "A justifiable ground for dismissal is no defense if it is a pretext and not the moving cause." N.LRB. v. Solo Cup Company, 237 F.2d 521, 525 (C.A. 8, 1956). Ball was elected as union steward but apparently neither received nor performed any duties in that role. She was also among those employees for whom the Union sought to enforce the contract. It could be said that this was minimal union activity. However, the significance of such activity is relative to what preceded it and is measured by the employer's response to it. In this case, prior to Ball's election, there had been no steward and prior to this grievance, grievance activity had been essentially nonexist- ent. Moreover, both aspects of Ball's activity aroused employer consternation. As previously noted, both Rosh- now and Rogula commented on and directed remarks violative of Section 8(aXI) toward her activity. She was directly advised that pressing for the additional 50 cents per hour could lead to her discharge and it was implied that adverse consequences would follow from being steward. On the other hand, Respondent had expected Ball to return from her vacation on July 17, and was unprepared for her absence on that weekend. This I find, was an honest mistake. Ball had requested, and been granted 2 weeks, 207 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD July 7 and 14. These weeks would have included July 17 through July 19. However, either because of the error in the discount letter prepared for her by Kay Roshnow or because of the extra days in the July 4 weekend, given as a "bonus" when Kinsey volunteered to cover for her, the misunderstanding arose. The misunderstanding, unques- tionably, inconvenienced Respondent. It did not, however, cause Respondent to hire a replacement for Ball at any time prior to her return. Additionally, the misunderstand- ing was at least as much Respondent's fault as Ball's, if indeed it was not entirely Respondent's mistake. Viewing the foregoing facts in juxtaposition, and noting particularly Respondent's knowledge and animus toward Ball's union activity, I conclude that Respondent seized upon Ball's absence to discharge her but that the real or substantial motivating reason was her union activity. 17 Since even a discharge unlawfully motivated only in part violates the Act, I conclude that by discharging Donna Ball on July 21, Respondent has violated Section 8(aX3) of the Act. Detroit Forming, supra; N.LR.B. v. West Side Carpet Cleaning Co., 329 F.2d 758, 761 (C.A. 6, 1964); N.LR.B. v. Whitin Machine Works, 204 F.2d 883, 885 (C.A. 1, 1953). 3. The alleged refusal to bargain - Section 8(a)(5) General Counsel has asserted a two pronged theory of violation of Section 8(a)(5). First, it is contended that Respondent's assistance in regard to the preparation and circulation of the decertification petition independently constitutes a refusal to bargain. General Counsel's second contention is that Respondent has refused to meet and bargain with the Union since the filing of that petition and in reliance upon that petition. The evidence, I find, fails to support either contention. As to the preparation and circulation of the petition, I have found this to be an independent action of employee Bettye Binkley. Respondent may not have been displeased with this activity but the evidence was not sufficient to establish that it caused it. Moreover, I am not inclined to credit the testimony of Panos in regard to the negotiations. I find it difficult to believe that an experienced union negotiator (such as he claimed to be) would enter negotiations at their mid-point without determining the state of those negotiations up to that time or would continue negotiations without maintain- ing some record of the offers, counteroffers, and progress, or lack of it, being made. I further find it difficult to believe that such an agent, after a refusal-to-bargain charge had been filed by his organization, would fail to record and document the alleged attempts to meet. I also note that his recollections of details was very poor. Even crediting Panos, I would find that the statement attributed to Rogula concerning waiting to see what would happen with the petition, was ambiguous and not an outright refusal to meet. And, if it were, it would have delayed bargaining not more than a couple of weeks as the decertification was quickly dismissed. Finally, I note that even according to 1i In so concluding, it is not necessary to find that Respondent conspired to be left without a cook on that weekend in order to have a reason for discharging Ball, as Respondent implies upon brief. It is sufficient to establish a pretext to show that an otherwise justifiable reason was not the Panos' testimony, he did not press Respondent for meetings; the calls he made were to Rogula rather than Kovaleski, who he knew to be primarily involved in the negotiations, and he delayed at least one meeting for his personal convenience. Accordingly, I conclude that General Counsel has failed to sustain his burden of proof in regard to the alleged refusal to bargain. FURTHER CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By threatening employees with discharge or other reprisals, by promising benefits to employees and by encouraging employees to sign a decertification petition in order to discourage union activity, membership and support, Respondent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them under Section 7 of the Act, thereby violating Section 8(aX I) of the Act. 2. By discharging Donna Ball in order to discourage union activity, membership, and support, Respondent had discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of her employment, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 3. The unfair labor practices enumerated above are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. Respondent has not engaged in any unfair labor practices not specifically found herein. THE REMEDY It having been found that Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(aX)( I) and (3) of the Act, it will be recommended that Respondent cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It having been found that Respondent discriminatorily discharged Donna Ball, Respondent shall offer her imme- diate and full reinstatement to her former or substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and shall make her whole for any loss she may have suffered by reason of the discrimina- tion against her. Any backpay found to be due shall be computed in accordance with the formula set forth in F. W. Woolworth Company, 92 NLRB 289 (1950), and Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). "A violation of Section 8(aX3) goes to the very heart of the Act." It therefore warrants that Respondent be further required to cease and desist from infringing in any other manner upon the rights guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act. Pan American Exterminating Co., Inc., 206 NLRB 298, fn. 1 (1973); Entwistle Manufacturing Company, 23 NLRB 1058 (1940), enfd. as modified 120 F.2d 532 (C.A. 4, 1941). Upon the basis of the entire record, the findings of fact, and the conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: moving or sole cause of the discharge. Detroit Forming Inc., 204 NLRB 205 (1973); N.LR.B. v. Symons Manufacturing Co., 328 F.2d 835, 837 (C.A. 7, 1964). 208 GRIFFIN INNS ORDER 18 The Respondent, Griffin Inns, Owner and Operator of Sheraton Motor Inn (Woodhaven, Michigan), its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: I. Cease and desist from: (a) Threatening employees with discharge or other reprisals in order to discourage union activity, member- ship, and support. (b) Promising benefits to employees to discourage union activity, membership, and support. (c) Encouraging employees to sign petitions to decertify the Union in order to discourage union activity, member- ship, and support. (d) Discouraging membership in or activities on behalf of Local No. 24, Hotel, Motel, Restaurant Employees, Cooks and Bartenders Union, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees in any manner with regard to their rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, hire, tenure of employment or any term or condition of their employment. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of their rights to self- organization, to form, join, or assist the above-named labor organization, or any other labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, or to refrain from any and all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: "s In the event no exceptions are filed as provided in Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings. conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. (a) Offer Donna Ball immediate and full reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or other rights and privileges, and make her whole for any loss of earnings she may have suffered by reason of the discrimination against her in the manner set forth in the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other documents necessary and relevant to analyze and compute the amount of backpay due under this Order. (c) Post at its Woodhaven, Michigan, facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 19 Copies of said notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed in all other respects. 19 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 209