Global Door, Inc.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Global Door, Inc. and Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO. Case 8-CA-10191 April 26, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS JENKINS, PENELLO, AND WALTHER On February 16, 1977, Administrative Law Judge Joel A. Harmatz issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,1 and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order, as modified herein.2 ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as modified below and hereby orders that the Respon- dent, Global Door, Inc., Upper Sandusky, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so modified: I. Substitute the following for paragraph l(a): "(a) Informing its employees that it will revise its layoff selection procedure under conditions implying that said revision is a result of their union activity." 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the Administrative Law Judge. The Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. In agreeing with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)3) of the Act by discharging Douglas Schmuck, Member Walther places no reliance on the Administrative Law Judge's comments at fn. 13 of his Decision. 2 The language of par. I(a) of the recommended Order is modified to parallel that used in the Administrative Law Judge's Conclusions of Law 3. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all parties had the opportunity to present evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we have violated the law and has ordered us to post this notice. The National Labor Relations Act gives you, as employees, certain rights, including the right: To engage in self-organization To form, join, or help a union To bargain collectively through a repre- sentative of your own choosing To act together for collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection To refrain from any or all of these things. Accordingly, we give you these assurances: WE WILL NOT inform employees that we have changed our policy in selecting employees for an economic layoff under conditions implying that this change resulted from their union activity. WE WILL NOT discourage membership in Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, by discriminatorily discharging, or otherwise discriminating against, employees in any manner with regard to their hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL offer Douglas Schmuck immediate reinstatement to his former position or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and reimburse him for any loss of earnings he incurred as a result of our discriminatory discharge of him. GLOBAL DOOR, INC. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JOEL A. HARMATZ, Administrative Law Judge: This proceeding was heard in Findlay, Ohio, on October 5 and 6, 1976, upon a charge filed on June 8, 1976, and a complaint issued on June 30, 1976, alleging that Respon- dent independently violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by 229 NLRB No. 36 266 GLOBAL DOOR, INC. creating the impression that the union activity of employ- ees was subject to surveillance, by telling employees that layoff procedures would be altered because of union activity, by telling employees that the Union had given false information relative to the Employer, and by advising an employee that a terminated worker had been a union protagonist. The complaint further alleged that Respon- dent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging, and refusing to reinstate, Douglas E. Schmuck because of his union activity. In its duly filed answer, Respondent denied that any unfair labor practices were committed. After close of the hearing, a brief was filed on behalf of Respondent. Upon the entire record in this proceeding, including my observation of the witnesses while testifying and their demeanor, and consideration of the posthearing brief, I find as follows: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER Respondent is an Ohio corporation, with a principal place of business in Upper Sandusky, Ohio, from which it is engaged in the manufacture of truck doors. Annually, in the course and conduct of its business, Respondent ships goods valued in excess of $50,000, from the aforesaid location, directly to points located outside the State of Ohio, and receives at said location goods valued in excess of $50,000 shipped directly from points located outside the State of Ohio. The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Respondent is now, and has been at all times material herein, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Allied Industrial Workers of America, AFL-CIO, is now and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II1. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Issues This case is concerned essentially with Respondent's discharge of Douglas Schmuck, which according to the General Counsel was motivated by the latter's union activity, but which, according to Respondent, was prompt- ed by insubordinate and temperamental behavior directed I Unless otherwise indicated, all dates refer to 1976. 2 Although there is no direct evidence that this was the case, Greg Case testified that he received a report from an unidentified source that Sharon Schmuck solicited signatures to union cards. From the record it appears that only Bob Burton and Douglas Schmuck were involved in such activity. I There is neither allegation nor claim that this layoff was predicated upon unlawful considerations. Although there was some probing of witnesses as to the motivating factors the issue, from my perspective, could not be described as the subject of conclusive litigation. 4 Binns testified that he altered the layoff selection method on this occasion because he was "running scared" as a result of the union activity, and while convinced that a layoff was necessary, he felt that he would not get into trouble by laying off the more junior employees. at John Binns, Respondent's owner and president, on the day before the termination. As indicated, also involved are allegations to the effect that Respondent in various respects independently violated Section 8(aX 1) of the Act. B, Concluding Findings Respondent is a manufacturer of truck doors. Its employees, prior to the events here in issue, were not represented by a labor organization. On April 28,1 an organizational meeting was held at a local restaurant and was attended by seven to eight employees. All in attendance signed union authorization cards. At the meeting, two employees, Bob Burton and Douglas Schmuck, were given blank authorization cards to distribute to other employees. The next day, Burton and Schmuck began soliciting signatures to the authorization cards at the plant. During the last week in April, John Binns was away from the plant on a trip. On Friday, April 30, in a telephone conversation with Greg Case, who was the son-in-law of John Binns and the plant superintendent, Binns was admittedly informed that employees at the plant were signing union cards. Binns' own description of his personal reaction to this report, was as follows: "if someone had said my wife was murdered, I would not have been more shocked." Binns testified that he could not recall whether Case identified employees who instigated the card signing, explaining that his recollection was blurred because he was "shocked and stunned." As of Monday, May 3, Respondent's work force consisted of about 20 to 25 employees. That morning, a number of employees, including Sharon Schmuck, the sister-in-law of the alleged discriminatee, 2 and Bob Burton, the other employee primarily responsible for inplant organization activity, were laid off. In announcing the layoff, Binns informed the employees that the layoff was due to a lack of orders, that they would be recalled when sufficient work became available, and that he would try to find other employment for those affected, if they so desired.3 On past occasions when a layoff was necessary, employ- ees were selected on a discretionary basis by Binns, depending upon his assessment of their productivity and value. In announcing the layoff of May 3, Binns indicated that this former procedure would not be followed, advising employees "you know what you did," and therefore indicating that this time layoff selection would be governed by seniority. 4 With the layoff of Bob Burton, Doug Schmuck as of May 4, remained the only inplant organizer on active payroll The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Sec. 8(aXI) by Binns' action in informing employees of this alteration in Respondent's layoff procedure. This allegation is substantiated by the record. Binns, in announcing the change, implicitly suggested that union activity prompted the adjustment. Although the new selection procedure involved greater objectivity and might be viewed as more equitable than that employed in the past, its implementation could conceivably shift the burden of the layoff to employees, who under the old procedure would have been retained. By linking the change with union activity, Respondent's action not only would tend to foster a division amongst employees with respect to the organization drive then in progress, but, indeed, might well have been taken as foreboding other union related changes in conditions of work. Accordingly, I find that Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)( I) by the action of Binns, in telling (Continued) 267 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD status. Schmuck had been hired on October 26, 1975. According to Binns, Schmuck was one of the "promising young men" to be introduced to management through an award of limited supervisory authority and leadman status. 5 At the time of his discharge, on May 5, Schmuck was the head of Respondent's packing department. Schmuck was discharged on the second working day after Binns' return from his trip, and within a week after Schmuck began to solicit authorization cards on behalf of the Union. According to Binns, a confrontation on May 4, between himself and Schmuck, considered against a background of past difficulties with Schmuck's perfor- mance, prompted the discharge decision. Thus, on May 4, Schmuck was working alone in the packing area when Binns instructed him to cut rubber seals for assemblers engaged in production of "bottom panels." Schmuck went to the assembly area and, according to his testimony, cut 30 pieces for Reuben Caceres and 10 pieces for assembler Charlene Ekleberry. 6 According to Schmuck, it took him about 30 to 40 minutes to cut the 40 pieces, after completion of which he returned to the packing department. After doing some work in the packing department, Schmuck lit up a cigarette. At that time, Binns approached, yelling at Schmuck. Binns inquired as to why Schmuck was in the packing department and not cutting rubber. Schmuck indicated that he had cut enough rubber to take care of the assemblers for the balance of the day, and that he returned to pack doors. Binns started to curse, indicating that he told Schmuck to cut rubber, and was not paying him for standing around. Binns then grabbed Schmuck's arm and started shaking it. At this point, Schmuck stated to Binns, "Back off or I'll zap ya." 7 Binns claims that he did not discharge Schmuck that day out of "fear of doing something wrong." After assertedly spending a sleepless night, Binn's decided to effect the discharge. employees that he would follow a different selection procedure in designating those to be laid off because of what the employees "went and did." I It was stipulated that Schmuck did not possess indicia of supervisory authority while a leadman. 6 John Binns testified that he initially instructed Schmuck to cut 100 pieces. Reuben Caceres, an assembler, was offered by Respondent in an effort to corroborate Binns in this respect. Caceres was an obviously biased witness, willing to give whatever testimony was necessary to favor the Respondent. It should be apparent from the face of this testimony that he was not in a position to overhear interchanges between Schmuck and Binns which occurred in the shipping department, and that much of his testimony was not based on direct knowledge. Binns also was an unpersuasive witness. Considering the incredulous testimony offered by Respondent on this point, and the probabilities as well, it is deemed unlikely that Binns specifically instructed Schmuck to cut 100 pieces at the time of their first encounter. I Binns testified that after checking with Caceres as to how much rubber had been cut by Schmuck, they counted it and it was only 10 pieces. Caceres testified that Schmuck cut 20 pieces before leaving the assembly area. The version of the May 4 confrontation set forth in the above text conforms, in essential respects, with a composite of the testimony of Binns and Schmuck. Conflicts in their accounts are resolved in favor of Schmuck, a more reliable witness. For example, Schmuck denied that, in the course of the argument, he told Binns that cutting rubber was not his job, and that he would not do it. Binns testified that in their second encounter, Schmuck said that cutting rubber was not his job and that if he had to do it he would quit. Although Caceres gave testimony tending to support Binns, for reasons already indicated this testimony is not worthy of credence. Although On Tuesday May 5, after Schmuck reported for work, he was called to Binns' office. Present in the office, were Greg Case, Ron Krischan, a brother-in-law of Binns who was recently hired and reported for work the day before, and Jim Schroeder, a newly hired engineer. At this time, Binns informed Schmuck that he was sorry that things did not work out, but that Schmuck possessed an uncontrollable temper, which Binns no longer could tolerate. Binns informed Schmuck that he was fired in consequence of the incident of the day before, and referred to Schmuck's past involvement in fights, stating that he didn't want anything like that to happen in his plant. Binns went on to warn Schmuck that his fighting might result in his going to jail someday.8 Although there was no specific reference to union activity in the course of the discharge interview, Schmuck credibly, and without contradiction, testified that in the course of the discussion, Binns referred to the fact that he and Schmuck had been the best of friends before Binns took his vacation, but when the latter returned someone had given Schmuck "a bum steer about him," Binns acknowledges that after he came back from a trip, he noticed that Schmuck held a different attitude and that there was something wrong. On one occasion, Binns claims to have asked Schmuck what he had done to deserve Schmuck's treatment, with Schmuck responding, "Plenty . . . $2.65 an hour for instance." 9 The issue with respect to the lawfulness of the discharge, turns critically upon the credibility of John Binns. It was his decision alone to effect the termination, and he acted without consulting anyone. The General Counsel has met his initial burden. Binns himself avowed his emotionally charged and negative response towards reports of union organization. His interest in maintaining a union free operation is also established by other credible evidence. I am also satisfied that Binns, at the time of the discharge, Schmuck may have indicated to Binns that cutting rubber was not his job. in the light of ensuing events, it is considered unlikely that he indicated that he would not perform that task. In this respect, again I prefer Schmuck's testimony to that of Binns. 8 The foregoing is based upon a composite of the credited testimony of Binns, Ron Krischan, and Greg Case. In adopting this mutually corrobora- tive testimony, in this instance, I am unwilling to accept Schmuck's denials that he was informed as to the reason for his discharge, and his further denial that there was any discussion about fighting. Although I regarded Schmuck as a basically honest witness, this phase of his testimony struck me as attributable to faulty recollection. 9 This testimony appeared on the record at a time when the only trip known to have been taken by Binns was that during the last week in April. After further examination by me, Binns attempted to associate this conversation with some other trip, taken during an earlier time frame. In my opinion this was an unbelievable attempt on the part of Binns to diminish the natural import from a slip in his testimony, otherwise disclosing that the change in Schmuck's attitude actually became manifest between April 30 and May 5. This conclusion is enforced by Sharon Schmuck, who, without contradiction, credibly testified to a conversation with Binns in June. wherein Binns indicated that he could not figure out what had happened to Doug Schmuck, in that before Binns went on vacation they were good friends and got along well, but that when he returned it was as if someone had given Schmuck "a bum steer." Both Doug and Sharon Schmuck relate that the April 30 trip was a vacation trip. Binns claims that it was a business trip. Greg Case, though asked, could not confirm that the April trip was a business trip. I am convinced that Binns was in Florida on vacation at the end of April. 268 GLOBAL DOOR, INC. was fully mindful that Doug Schmuck had been soliciting cards on behalf of the Union.'1 These elements together with the discharge of Schmuck, timed shortly after his union activity became manifest, sufficed to establish a primafacie case of discrimination. Unquestionably, the conduct of Schmuck on May 4, if the real reason for his termination, would constitute legitimate cause. However, the question here is whether Binns invoked that incident as a pretext for a reprisal based upon Schmuck's involvement in the Union. The record preponderates in favor of finding that this was the case. May 4 was not the first occasion on which Schmuck had displayed temperament. In the past, however, such out- breaks were condoned because Schmuck was a good worker." Neither these incidents nor Schmuck's some- times difficult interaction with certain employees led Binns to consider Schmuck's removal as a leadman or as aborting the latter's inclusion in the group of employees whom Binns was considering for management positions. Contrary to Binns' explanation for the discharge, I am persuaded that following his return from a vacation trip to Florida during the last week in April, Binns harbored strong resentment towards Schmuck and considered him to be part of the group that had "turned against him," by bringing the Union into the plant. Testimony by Binns that the attitude of Schmuck changed after his return stemmed directly, in my opinion, from Schmuck's actions on behalf of the Union.'2 The conclusion is inescapable that Schmuck's continued employment and potential for ad- vancement to a management position would not have been prejudiced by the May 4 incidents' were it not for Binns' resenting Schmuck's having shattered Binns' own concep- tion of the good relationship he held with employees, by bringing in the Union. I am satisfied that Binns was not a truthful witness and, contrary to his testimony, I find that the incident of May 4 was a pretext seized upon to create an aura of legitimacy to an outright act of union-related discrimination. Accordingly, I find that by discharging Douglas Schmuck, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 1' Binns afforded less than candid responses to inquiries concerning his knowledge of Schmuck's role as a union protagonist. In my opinion, he deliberately invoked a lack of recollection to conceal knowledge gained, in this respect, during a phone conversation with Greg Case on Friday, April 30. Case admits to a conversation sometime in April with employee Reuben Caceres, in which the latter informed Case that Schmuck asked him to sign a card. Though denied by Krischan, Case indicates that in a telephone conversation on or about April 30, he informed Krischan that Bob Burton and Doug Schmuck were distributing union cards. Case indicates that he is sure that at "one time or another" he communicated his knowledge in this respect to Binns and thought this occurred prior to the discharge. Case impresssed me as a reluctant witness. Yet, it is my opinion that his laboring, under oath, with knowledge of facts prejudicial to Respondent's cause, allowed the truth to emerge. I find that he informed Binns of Schmuck's role in the union campaign on Friday, April 30. " It is noteworthy that, prior to his discharge, Schmuck quit work after a run-in with a female employee. At that time after learning of this incident, Binns sent Harold Hill to get Schmuck to return, because "he was a good man." Binns' explained that he took this action because the fact that Schmuck had "a little spirit" wasn't a sufficient ground for allowing him to leave Respondent's employ. li Binns did not specifically define the nature of Schmuck's conduct which reflected this change in attitude. On the other hand, other testimony discloses that Binns regarded Schmuck as having been turned against him In addition to the foregoing, the complaint includes allegations that Respondent independently violated Sec- tion 8(a)(1) by (1) creating the impression that union activity was subject to surveillance, (2) informing employ- ees that a discharged employee had been an instigator in support of the Union, and (3) informing employees that the Union had given the Respondent false information concerning the Respondent. As to (3), the statements imputed to Binns concerning Schmuck's having been given "a bum steer" entailed neither threat of reprisal nor promise of benefit and constituted communication protect- ed by Section 8(c) of the Act. As to (1), testimony adduced from witnesses for the General Counsel merely indicated that Binns conveyed to employees his awareness of union activity in general. Although this occurred during the period when organizational activity was not a matter of common knowledge, the identity of employee organizers was not revealed, and in my opinion the evidence offered by the General Counsel with respect to this allegation is too vague to substantiate an 8(aXl) violation. Finally, with respect to (2) above, after canvassing the record, I find no evidence that such a statement was made under conditions violating the Act. Accordingly, while I have heretofore found that Respondent violated Section 8(aXl) by telling employees that layoff procedures would be altered because of the Union, I shall dismiss the remaining allegations that Respondent in any other respects violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Charging Party is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent independently violated Section 8(aXI) of the Act by informing employees that it would revise its layoff selection procedure, under conditions implying that said change was provoked by their union activity. 4. Respondent violated Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act by discharging Douglas Schmuck on May 5, in reprisal for his union activity. by some outside force; i.e., the Union. This is evident from a charge made to Schmuck during the termination interview, that he had been given "a bum steer" about Binns. Indeed, that this feeling on the part of Binns was deeply held, and a continuous one, is evident from the subsequent conversation in June with Sharon Schmuck in which credited, uncontradicted testimony, establishes that Binns stated that Doug's attitude changed after his return from vacation, as if he had been given a "bum steer," I am convinced that the references on the part of Binns to "a bum steer," to a change in attitude, and to Schmuck's turning against Binns. were not related to any misconduct on the part of Schmuck, but stemmed directly and exclusively from his role in bringing the Union into the plant. 13 While not necessary to the result, the May 4 outburst by Schmuck might well have been deliberately provoked by Binns. As of May 4, Schmuck, who, before the layoff, had employees working under him, was the only rank-and-file employee assigned to the packing department. His only assistance was that available through Superintendent Case and foreman Hill. Binns could not have been insensitive to Schmuck's concern about the layoff of the previous day. Binns clearly knew that Schmuck did not get along with employee Caceres, the two having been involved in a previous disagreement, and that the cutting of rubber was normally the responsibility of Caceres. From Binns' point of view, that Schmuck would react adversely to being called out of his department to perform work for another employee whom he disliked, was perfectly predictable. 269 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 5. The unfair labor practices found above are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirma- tive action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. It having found that Respondent discriminatorily dis- charged Douglas Schmuck, it shall be recommended that Respondent offer him immediate reinstatement to his former position or, if not available, to a substantially equivalent position, without loss of seniority or other benefits, and make him whole for any loss of pay resulting from the discriminatory action against him, by payment of a sum of money equal to the amount he normally would have earned as wages from the date of his discharge to the date of a bonafide offer of reinstatement. Backpay shall be computed on a quarterly basis in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950), and shall include interest at 6 percent as provided in Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). Finally, as the unfair labor practices, particularly the act of discrimination against Schmuck, strike at the heart of the Act, a broad cease-and-desist order shall be recom- mended, precluding Respondent from "in any other manner" interfering with, coercing, or restraining employ- ees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon the entire record in this proceeding, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 14 Respondent Global Door, Inc., Upper Sandusky, Ohio, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: " In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. (a) Coercing and restraining employees by advising them that its practice in selecting employees for layoff would be altered because of their union activity. (b) Discouraging membership in labor organization by discharging, refusing to reinstate, or in any other manner discriminating against employees because they have en- gaged in union activity. (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaran- teed by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Offer Douglas Schmuck immediate reinstatement to his former position or, if no longer available, to a substantial equivalent position, without loss of seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole for any loss of earnings sustained by reason of the discrimination against him, in accordance with the section of this Decision entitled "The Remedy." (b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for examination and copying, payroll and all other records necessary to determine backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at its plant in Upper Sandusky, Ohio, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 15 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 8, after being duly signed by Respondent's representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immedi- ately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 8, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed as to any alleged violations of the Act not found herein. 15 In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 270