305 NLRB 720
Greater Kansas City Roofing
720
305 NLRB No. 89
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1 The General Counsel has excepted to some of the judge’s credi-
bility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an
administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear
preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are
incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd.
188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record
and find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 There was no exception to this finding.
3 We have applied a Federal standard in determining whether a
person or entity should be liable for a backpay award in an unfair
labor practice case. See NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage, 910
F.2d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1990), and cases there cited; Esmark, Inc.
v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 755 fn. 26 (7th Cir. 1989). We observe that
even under state law the same result might be reached after fol-
lowing a similar approach balancing various factors. See, e.g., Kil-
patrick Bros. v. Poynter, 473 P.2d 33, 41–42 (Kan. 1970) (where
board of directors’ meetings were not held, corporate reporting was
largely disregarded, and corporate undercapitalization had occurred);
Mackey v. Burke, 751 P.2d 322, 327 (1984) (where the corporation
had failed to file an annual report or pay the annual franchise tax
and corporate funds had been used to pay off a personal obligation).
4 The credited evidence shows that when Clarke acquired GKC she
was not aware of the unreported Board Decision and Order (268
NLRB 108) issued on December 2, 1983, finding that GKC violated
Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act and ordering a make-whole remedy.
Greater Kansas City Roofing; and the New GKC
Roofing, Inc., alter ego to or successor of
Greater Kansas City Roofing; and Maude
Clementine Clarke and United Union of Roof-
ers, Waterproofers and Allied Workers Local
No. 20, AFL–CIO. Case 17–CA–11502
November 25, 1991
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN STEPHENS AND MEMBERS
DEVANEY AND OVIATT
On October 23, 1989, Administrative Law Judge
Steven M. Charno issued the attached supplemental de-
cision. The General Counsel filed exceptions and a
supporting brief, and the Respondent filed an answer-
ing brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-
clusions only to the extent consistent with this Supple-
mental Decision and Order.
The judge found that the Respondents Greater Kan-
sas City Roofing (GKC) and the New Greater Kansas
City Roofing (New GKC) are liable, jointly and sever-
ally, for the entire backpay award which represents
certain fringe benefit contributions and membership
fees
owed
to
the
United
Union
of
Roofers,
Waterproofers and Allied Workers Local No. 20,
AFL–CIO2 The judge also found that Maude Clem-
entine (Tina) Clarke, New GKC’s sole owner, should
not be held individually liable for her company’s back-
pay obligation. He, therefore, dismissed the backpay
specification as it pertains to Tina Clarke.
The General Counsel argues that Clarke should be
held personally liable because she failed to observe
corporate formalities so as to insulate her from the
backpay liabilities of New GKC and she so mixed her
personal affairs, principally her escort service, with the
business operations of New GKC that the corporate
veil should be pierced. We find merit in the General
Counsel’s argument.
Section 10(c) of the Act empowers the Board with
broad authority to fashion appropriate remedies to
meet the needs of a particular situation so that ‘‘the
victims of discrimination may be treated fairly.’’
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
As a policy matter, the task for the Board is to deter-
mine the proper balance of the legal rights involved.
When the incentive value of limited liability to cor-
porations and their owners is outweighed by the com-
peting value of basic fairness to parties dealing with a
corporation, the Board should look past that corpora-
tion’s formal existence and hold controlling individuals
liable for ‘‘corporate’’ obligations. Labadie Coal Co.
v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Contrary to the judge’s intimation, the Board is not
limited to piercing the corporate veil only in cases
where the corporate status is used to perpetrate fraud.
See, e.g., Concrete Mfg. Co., 262 NLRB 727, 729
(1982). Among the factors to which the Board tradi-
tionally looks in ordering that the corporate veil be
pierced where intermingling of individual and cor-
porate affairs have occurred are those present in this
case: the apparent undercapitalization of a one-person
corporation; the failure to observe corporate formali-
ties; the nonfunctioning of officers or directors; the ab-
sence of corporate records; and the use of the corpora-
tion as a facade for the operations of the dominant
stockholder3 Indeed, faithfulness to corporate formali-
ties is one of the litmus tests of the extent to which
individuals actually view the corporation as a separate
being. Id. at 97. Moreover, the Board may pierce the
corporate veil, because justice so requires, where the
individual’s personal affairs and the company’s affairs
have been so intermingled that corporate boundaries
have been effectively blurred. See, e.g., Dahl Fish Co.,
299 NLRB 413 (1990).
Tina Clarke had been a substantial creditor of GKC,
a roofing company owned by her sister-in-law, Judy,
and run by her brother, Charlie, and located in Kansas
City, Kansas. Pursuant to a note and security agree-
ment, Tina Clarke took control of the company when
she believed her investment was in jeopardy4 Shortly
thereafter, she decided, on advice of counsel, to run
GKC by setting up a new corporation, later known as
721
GREATER KANSAS CITY ROOFING
5 Clarke maintained critical ties with GKC’s operations hiring her
brother Charlie to run New GKC in the same way he had managed
GKC. In late 1985 she even moved New GKC’s operations to her
brother’s home in Shawnee, Kansas.
6 Cf. Fullerton Transfer, supra at 341 (owner-operators were not
held personally liable where evidence of sufficient capitalization of
their corporation was contained in the record).
7 See Honeycomb Plastics Corp., 304 NLRB 570 (1991) (indi-
vidual owner who consistently commingled corporate and personal
funds and ignored corporate formalities, including arranging informal
personal loans to his companies, held personally liable for the back-
pay owed by his companies). Cf. Fullerton Transfer, supra at 341
(personal liability was not imposed on owner-operators where com-
pany was kept separate and corporate records were maintained).
8 See Metropolitan Teletronics, 303 NLRB 793 (1991) (individual
owner who commingled corporate and personal funds held person-
ally liable for backpay owed by his company). Member Oviatt con-
curred, relying in particular on the obstructive behavior of the
owner-operator and on his failure to produce evidence to rebut finan-
cial records that showed some commingling of personal and cor-
porate funds. See also IMCO/International Measurement & Control
Co., 304 NLRB 738 (1991) (individual Dybels made personal use
of the assets of their corporate entities).
1 See 268 NLRB No. 41 (not published in Board volumes).
New GKC5 Although GKC assets were transferred to
Clarke and she later made loans to New GKC, there
is no evidence that New GKC was capitalized, suffi-
ciently or otherwise.6
Clarke also served as the sole shareholder, officer,
and director of New GKC, the successor of GKC.
While Clarke executed and filed articles of incorpora-
tion for New GKC with the State of Kansas, she never
adopted any bylaws, held any corporate meeting, or
designated or received any paid-in capital. She also
failed to obtain stock or bills of sale for the GKC as-
sets transferred to New GKC. These failures can hard-
ly be characterized as inattention or an oversight on
her part, especially in view of the fact that she had re-
tained counsel to assist her in setting up her new cor-
poration.
After she took over the business, Clarke required
New GKC to assume payments on a personal loan she
had given to New GKC, purportedly to cover New
GKC’s payroll, but she failed to formalize the loan in
a written loan agreement. The absence of this cor-
porate loan record is one obvious example of Clarke’s
failure to view the corporation as a separate entity.7
Clarke also mixed her personal affairs and New
GKC’s operations to disguise her escort service as a
roofing business8 Clarke sometimes used the fictitious
name ‘‘AAC Roofing,’’ a sham entity, to attract cus-
tomers and employees to New GKC. She also used the
AAC Roofing name, however, in order to establish
credit card collection accounts and a checking account
for Affaire d’Amour, her escort service business. In
addition, Clarke, through New GKC, paid Affaire
d’Amour’s monthly telephone bill in July 1987 and
used New GKC’s address and telephone number to ob-
tain another separate checking account for her escort
business. These dealings indicate that New GKC, as a
corporate entity, was, at least in part, a contrived con-
venience repeatedly used for personal purposes by
Clarke.
Under all the above circumstances, we find Clarke
personally liable for the health and welfare, pension
fund, and training contributions and the membership
fees owed by the Respondent Companies to the Union.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondents, Greater Kansas City Roofing and the
New Greater Kansas City Roofing, Kansas City and
Shawnee, Kansas, and Respondent Maude Clementine
Clarke, their officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall make the following payments, including interest
thereon, as required by the Board’s initial Order in this
proceeding. The payments to be made and the
amounts, including interest, are as follows:
Health and Welfare Fund
$48,668.13
Pension Plan
67,341.04
Apprenticeship Training Program
6,473.26
Membership Fees
11,260.04
Total
$133,742.47
Stephen E. Wamser, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Jack L. Campbell, Esq. (Shugart, Thomson & Kilroy), of
Kansas City, Missouri, for the Respondents.
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STEVEN M. CHARNO, Administrative Law Judge. On De-
cember 2, 1983, the National Labor Relations Board (Board)
issued a Decision and Order directing Greater Kansas City
Roofing (GKC), its officers, agents, successors, and assigns
to, inter alia, make its employees whole for any losses they
suffered as a result of its unfair labor practices and bargain
with United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers and Allied
Workers Local No. 20, AFL–CIO (Union).1 On April 23,
1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit entered a judgment enforcing the Board’s Order. On No-
vember 5, 1985, the court entered a contempt adjudication
against GKC and its officers, agents, successors, and assigns.
On November 13, 1985, the contempt adjudication, under a
cover letter from the Board’s Regional Office, was delivered
to GKC.
On October 21, 1988, the General Counsel issued a back-
pay specification and notice of hearing alleging that GKC,
the New Greater Kansas City Roofing (New GKC), and
Maude Clementine (Tina) Clarke (collectively Respondent)
were obliged to make certain fringe benefit contributions and
fee remittances to the Union. By answer dated November 14,
1988, Respondents New GKC and Clarke denied any obliga-
tion to make such contributions and remittances. A hearing
was held before me in Mission, Kansas, on March 1 and 2,
and April 18 and 19, 1989. On April 19, the backpay speci-
fication was amended to increase Respondents’ alleged back-
722
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
2 General Counsel contends that Tina Clarke paid herself certain
sums for reasons other than the reimbursement of expenses during
this period. While this contention may be material to the question
of whether Miss Clarke dealt candidly with her brother and his wife,
I find it to be of little relevance to the issues before me.
3 While this journal contains numerous inaccuracies which render
it useless as an accounting document, it does evidence the intent
with which Tina Clarke disbursed funds on behalf of GKC.
4 I credit Charlie Clarke’s testimony that AAC was merely a ficti-
tious business name used by GKC in order to secure a listing at the
beginning of the ‘‘Roofing Contractors’’ classification in the yellow
pages.
5 While a subsequently prepared ‘‘Financing Statement’’ indicated
that the pledged equipment and vehicles were to be set forth on an
appendix to the security agreement, only the former were so enumer-
ated.
6 White’s statement contained this timeframe, while he testified on
cross-examination that the meeting took place on or ‘‘slightly be-
fore’’ October 10, 1985.
7 The foregoing findings are based on White’s credited statement
and testimony. General Counsel notes on brief that the articles were
filed on October 15, while the financing statement was not filed until
October 31; I do not find that this sequence of events casts doubt
on White’s credibility. Finally, White’s testimony concerning the
possible presence of Charlie Clarke at one of his meetings with Tina
was so speculative (i.e., prefaced ‘‘I can’t really recall’’ and phrased
‘‘I think’’ and ‘‘perhaps’’) as to be without probative value.
8 Tina Clarke so testified.
9 Counsel for the parties so stipulated. There is no evidence as to
whether the New GKC did or did not designate or receive paid-in
capital during the timeframe specified by Kan. Stat. Ann. 17–6402
and 17–6404 (of which administrative notice is taken). Since any
facts concerning paid-in capital serve only as a foundation for Gen-
eral Counsel’s argument that the corporate veil should be pierced,
I must find that General Counsel did not meet the burden of proof
required to establish the factual underpinning for this portion of her
argument.
10 I credit White’s statement concerning his conversations with
Tina Clarke. Charlie Clarke’s June 17, 1986 deposition stated that
Tina did not know of GKC’s involvement with the Board until
‘‘after’’ she had become aware of the Company’s financial problems
because Charlie had not been ‘‘above board’’ about GKC’s ‘‘Labor
Board problems.’’ Given the fact that the New GKC acquired
GKC’s assets shortly after Tina became alarmed over the Company’s
financial problems, I cannot find that Charlie Clarke’s deposition es-
tablishes that Tina had knowledge of the unfair labor practice litiga-
tion at the time of the purchase. Similarly, I find less than conclusive
Tina Clarke’s ‘‘guess’’ that she first became aware of the outstand-
ing judgment in this proceeding ‘‘whenever we filed for the new
pay obligation. At the close of the hearing, counsel for Re-
spondents presented an oral argument and was permitted to
withdraw from the proceeding. A brief was filed by General
Counsel under extended due date of June 2, 1989.
FINDINGS OF FACT
A. Uncontested Matters
Respondent GKC was found by the Board in the under-
lying unfair labor practice proceeding to be an employer
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the National
Labor Relations Act (Act), as amended. During the backpay
proceeding, Respondent New GKC was admitted to be, and
I find is, an employer within the meaning of the same statu-
tory provision.
Uncontested evidence adduced at the backpay hearing es-
tablishes that payment of the following fringe benefits and
fees is required to remedy the unfair labor practices which
the Board previously found to exist:
Health and Welfare Fund
$48,668.13
Pension Plan
67,341.04
Apprenticeship Training Program
6,473.26
Membership Fees
11,260.04
Total
$133,742.47
B. The Old Company
Prior to November 20, 1985, GKC was a roofing company
with a business address of 1725 Southwest Boulevard, Kan-
sas City, Kansas. Located at that address was a feed store
in which GKC maintained a single-room office and a tele-
phone with the listed number 722–2229. At that time, GKC
was owned by Judy Clarke and managed by her husband,
Charlie Clarke. The business employed Jana Graves as a
bookkeeper and clerical employee, and its roofing employees
included Oscar Sutton, Bill Boyle, and Dale Pemberton.
In late 1984, Tina Clarke, Charlie’s sister, began loaning
money to GKC and, on a number of occasions, made pay-
ments directly to the Company’s suppliers and employees.2
Miss Clarke kept a personal journal of the amounts which
she believed were due her from GKC.3 That document shows
an outstanding balance in excess of $48,000 in August 1985.
At that point, Tina Clarke began to require certain changes
in GKC’s operations: timeclocks were installed in the Com-
pany’s trucks and a yellow page advertisement was ordered
under the name of AAC Roofing Co. (AAC).4
Tina Clarke’s journal indicates that the balance GKC owed
her had been reduced to $38,472.16 by September 14, 1985.
At that time, she concluded that GKC would be unable to
make further repayments and she refused to advance addi-
tional moneys on the Company’s behalf. Shortly thereafter,
Tina Clarke consulted Edward White, an attorney, explaining
that she had loaned money to GKC and wished to protect her
investment. White suggested the execution of a note and se-
curity agreement and prepared both documents. These docu-
ments, which were signed by Judy Clarke, recite a principal
sum of $38,000, an October 5, 1985 date of execution and
collateral consisting of ‘‘all equipment and fixtures currently
owned by Judith Clarke, d/b/a Greater Kansas City Roofing
Co., as well as a security interest in all vehicles.5
‘‘Almost immediately after’’ the preparation of these doc-
uments,6 Tina Clarke again met with White, informed him
that GKC was ‘‘not going to make it’’ and asked his advice.
White suggested that she set up a new corporation and at-
tempt to run the business herself. She accepted this advice,
and White prepared Articles of Incorporation in the name of
New GKC, which were executed on October 10, 1985.7 Tina
Clarke was the sole shareholder, officer, and director of the
New GKC,8 which never adopted bylaws or held a corporate
meeting.9
There was no discussion at any of the meetings between
Tina Clarke and White concerning ‘‘the union, the National
Labor Relations Board, an unfair labor practice proceeding,
or any judgments’’ against GKC, and the balance of the
credible evidence does not establish that Tina Clarke was
aware on November 20, 1985, that the Board had found
GKC to be in violation of the Act or that a judgment was
outstanding against GKC.10
723
GREATER KANSAS CITY ROOFING
ownership.’’ The speculative nature of this testimony aside, such an
awareness could have occurred either before or after the transfer of
assets on November 20, 1985. If it had occurred prior to that time,
it would seem overwhelmingly likely that the matter would have
been raised in Tina Clarke’s consultations with her attorney.
11 The document was not executed by Judy Clarke until November
26.
12 Tina Clarke so testified.
13 This finding is based on the relevant records of the two busi-
nesses.
14 This finding is based on the relevant records of the two busi-
nesses.
15 Tina Clarke so testified.
16 This finding is based on the records of the New GKC.
17 Although the New GKC continued to use business forms car-
rying the old Kansas City address, the record appears to be silent
on the question of whether the corporation still maintained an office
at that location. There is, however, no reason to believe that the New
GKC stopped using the Kansas City address as a mail drop.
18 This finding is based on the records of the New GKC and on
the credited testimony of Charlie Clarke to the effect that customers
would sometimes make a check out in the name of the company
which they had originally called for service and that ‘‘you don’t
argue with the check.’’
19 I credit Charlie Clarke’s explanation of the reason that the New
GKC used AAC’s name on this occasion.
20 While Tina Clarke admitted that a New GKC employee had
processed the escort service’s charges in the name of JAC ‘‘during
the daytime,’’ the record does not establish whether this processing
took place before, during or after scheduled working hours or during
the employee’s luncheon or break periods.
21 Given the finding in text, General Counsel’s alternative argu-
ment that GKC and the New GKC are alter egos is moot.
C. The New Corporation
In effectuation of his prior advice, White prepared an
‘‘Acknowledgment of Transfer to Secured Party in Lieu of
Foreclosure’’ which chronicled the November 20, 1985 trans-
fer of the pledged assets.11 With the exception of one truck
later purchased by Tina Clarke, all of the New GKC’s vehi-
cles, equipment, and supplies were transferred from GKC.12
The New GKC used the business address, telephone num-
bers, storage facilities, company logo, and bid format pre-
viously employed hy GKC.13 In addition, the New GKC re-
tained some customers of and honored some bids made by
GKC.14 All the New GKC’s roofers and its sole clerical
worker had been employees of GKC, and Charlie Clarke was
hired by the New GKC ‘‘to go out in the field and run the
business’’ in the same way he had managed the operations
of GKC.15 Tina Clarke remained intermittently active in the
New GKC’s affairs until at least September 1988.16
In early December 1985, Miss Clarke moved the oper-
ations of New GKC to her brother’s home in Shawnee, Kan-
sas.17 At that time, she had a telephone installed at the new
office, using the 722–2229 number, as well as one of the list-
ings which appeared in the yellow page advertisement for
AAC. New GKC paid for both the installation of and subse-
quent service to the Shawnee listings. The yellow page ad-
vertisement for AAC contained a second number which
reached a telephone in Miss Clarke’s residence. There is no
indication in the record that either the AAC advertisement or
the telephone listings appearing therein were employed for
the benefit of any entity other than the New GKC. When
customers called an AAC listing to request service, any ensu-
ing jobs were bid, performed, and invoiced by the New
GKC, although payments were occasionally made to AAC.18
On one occasion, a classified advertisement for roofing em-
ployees was placed in the local newspaper under AAC’s
name and telephone number, at a time when the New GKC’s
account with the newspaper was ‘‘overdue.’’19
The record contains extensive evidence that Miss Clarke
used the AAC name when she established credit card collec-
tion accounts and a checking account in order to operate her
escort service, Affaire d’Amour. Although the escort service
maintained a different telephone listing from those of the
New GKC and AAC, Miss Clarke caused the New GKC to
pay Affaire d’Amour’s monthly telephone bill in July 1987.
In January 1987, Tina Clarke was arrested for operating
her escort service and her credit card collection accounts in
the name of AAC were cancelled. Tina Clarke then opened
a checking account in the name of M.C.C. Enterprises
(MCC), using the New GKC’s telephone number and the ad-
dress of the feed store in Kansas City. When she was unable
to secure credit card collection accounts under the MCC
name, Tina Clarke began using the accounts of JAC Enter-
prises (JAC), a business owned by her brother. There is no
probative evidence that Tina Clarke’s use of JAC involved
the New GKC in any way.20 After the police seized the
MCC checkbook, Tina Clarke opened a checking account
under the further fictitious business name of The Clarke
Company in April 1987, again using the address of the feed
store in Kansas City. There is no evidence that Tina Clarke
ever used the New GKC telephone number or the Kansas
City address in connection with her escort service, other than
to have one or both printed on the checks used by MCC and
The Clarke Company.
D. Discussion
The principal issue in this proceeding turns, not on a de-
termination of the appropriate amount of backpay, but on the
question of which entities should make the payment. General
Counsel contends that GKC, the New GKC, and Tina Clarke
are all individually liable for the entire amount. Respondents
demur.
The legal context for analyzing the issue of liability is well
established. The bona fide purchaser of a business is a suc-
cessor employer if it carries on the business of its prede-
cessor without interruption or substantial change in the meth-
od of operation, the employee complement or the supervisory
personnel. Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168,
171 (1973). Based on the continuity of employees and oper-
ations set out above, I find the New GKC to be the successor
employer of GKC. As a successor employer, the New GKC
may held liable to remedy the unfair labor practices of its
predecessor where management representatives, who had full
knowledge of those practices, moved from the predecessor to
the successor. See Memphis Truck & Trailer, 284 NLRB 900
(1987). Given Charlie Clarke’s movement between the busi-
nesses, I find the New GKC liable for GKC’s backpay obli-
gation.21
General Counsel argues that the corporate veil between
Tina Clarke and the New GKC should be pierced and that
Tina Clarke should be held individually liable for her cor-
poration’s backpay obligation. In support of this argument,
General Counsel correctly notes that ‘‘the corporate veil will
be pierced whenever it is employed to perpetrate fraud,
evade existing obligations or circumvent a statute.’’ Concrete
724
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
22 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
Mfg. Co., 262 NLRB 727, 729 (1982). Citing Edwin R.
O’Neill, 288 NLRB 1354 (1988), and Edwin R. O’Neill, 288
NLRB 1394 (1988), for the proposition that individual liabil-
ity may be found when the affairs of an indlvidual and a cor-
poration have been ‘‘so intermingled that no distinct cor-
porate boundaries existed,’’ General Counsel contends that
five facts demonstrate the existence of such an intermingling
in this case: (1) both Tina Clarke and the New GKC used
the name AAC, although in separate and distinct ways and
to effect wholly different ends, (2) Tina Clarke used the New
GKC telephone number on the MCC checks, (3) she used the
address of the feed store in Kansas City (where the New
GKC had once maintained an office and telephone) on the
MCC and The Clarke Company checks, (4) the New GKC
paid a telephone bill for Tina Clarke’s escort service, and (5)
the New GKC failed ‘‘to observe corporate formalities.’’
I am forced to reject General Counsel’s argument for two
reasons. First, I do not believe that the five facts cit d by
General Counsel constitute th degree or quality of inter-
mingling of affairs which was found to establish the absence
of corporate boundaries in the Edwin R. O’Neill cases. More
significantly, the cases cited on brief in which the Board saw
fit to pierce the corporate veil, including the Edwin R.
O’Neill cases, all involved attempts to fraudulently use the
corporate veil to defeat a finding of liability or to frustrate
a backpay order. See Concrete Mfg. Co., supra; Chef Nathan
Sez Eat Here, Inc., 201 NLRB 343, 344 (1973); Riley Aero-
nautics Corp., 178 NLRB 495, 501 (1969). Here, the record
contains no suggestion that Tina Clarke used the corporate
status of the New GKC in an attempt to ‘‘perpetrate fraud,
evade existing obligations or circumvent a statute.’’ Accord-
ingly, I decline to pierce the corporate veil, and I find that
Tina Clarke is not individually liable for the backpay obliga-
tion which is the subject of this proceeding.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Since on or about November 20, 1985, Respondent New
GKC has been and is now an employer within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. On or about November 20, 1985, Respondent New
GKC foreclosed on and acquired the business of Respondent
GKC and, since that time, has continue to run the business
in basically unchanged form and has been and is the suc-
cessor employer of Respondent GKC.
3. Because management officials with full knowledge of
Respondent GKC’s unfair labor practices moved from the
predecessor to the successor corporation, Respondent New
GKC is charged with actual notice of such liability at the
time it acquired the business of Respondent GKC. Respond-
ent New GKC is charged with actual notice of such liability
at the time it acquired the business of Respondent GK.
4. Respondents GKC and New GKC are each individually
liable for backpay in the amount of $133,742.47.
5. A preponderance of the credible evidence does not es-
tablish that Respondent Tina Clarke is individually liable for
any portion of the backpay obligation found.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended22
ORDER
The Respondents, Greater Kansas City Roofing, Kansas
City, Kansas, and the New Greater Kansas City Roofing,
Inc., Shawnee, Kansas, jointly and severally, their officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall make the payments, to-
gether with interest thereon, as required by the Board’s initial
Order in this proceeding.
Health and Welfare Fund
$48,668.13
Pension Plan
67,341.04
Apprenticeship Training Program
6,473.26
Membership Fees
11,260.04
Total
$133,742.47
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all allegations of the backpay
specification not specifically found are dismissed.