Craftool Mfg. Co.

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Craftool Manufacturing Company and Craftool Com- pany, Subsidiaries of Tandy Corporation and Tandy Craftool Mfg. Co. and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. Cases 16-CA-6416 and 16-CA-6502 May 12, 1977 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND MURPHY On October 18, 1976, Administrative Law Judge Robert A. Giannasi issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed excep- tions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Craftool Manu- facturing Company and Craftool Company, Subsidi- aries of Tandy Corporation and Tandy Craftool Mfg. Co., Fort Worth, Texas, its officers, agents, succes- sors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. I Respondent has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an Administrative Law Judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (C.A. 3, 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ROBERT A. GIANNASI, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard on June 8 and 9 and July 9, 1976, in Fort Worth, Texas, on a consolidated complaint issued on April 30, 1976, as amended thereafter.' The original consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent - the two named I Charges and amended charges in Case 16-CA6416 were resolved by an informal settlement agreement approved by the Regional Director on February 24, 1976. Because of subsequent alleged misconduct which resulted in charges being filed in Case 16-CA-6502, the Regional Director 229 NLRB No. 109 Respondents are admittedly joint employers and shall be referred to in the singular - violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by giving employees the impression that bargaining with the Union 2 would be futile; promising benefits for not supporting the Union and threatening more arduous work if they supported the Union; and soliciting and encourag- ing employees to circulate a petition to reject the Union as bargaining representative. The amendment alleges that the Respondent unlawfully withdrew recognition from the Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (I) of the Act. Respondent denied the critical allegations in the com- plaint. Both Respondent and General Counsel have filed briefs. Upon the entire record, and my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION Respondent, whose parent company is a Delaware corporation, maintains office facilities and principal places of business in Fort Worth, Texas, where it is engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of leatherworking tools. Respondent, during the year before the issuance of the complaint, shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 from Fort Worth directly to States other than Texas. Accordingly, I find, as Respondent admits, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts After the employees selected the Union in a Board- conducted election, the Union was certified on June 5, 1975, as the exclusive bargaining representative in the following admittedly appropriate unit of Respondent's employees: All production and maintenance employees employed by the Employer at its 1001 Foch Street, Fort Worth, Texas, location, excluding office clerical employees, professional and technical employees, guards, watch- men and supervisors as defined in the Act. Bargaining began shortly thereafter. In late August 1975, Plant Foreman Bill Sanders approached employee Pauline Frazier, a member of the Union's negotiating team, at her work station. He asked about her family and how the Union was doing. She said "OK." He said that the employees were wasting their time and that the Union would never get a contract signed. She disagreed, saying it "might not be a good one, but we'll get one." He replied that "this Company won't sign a contract" and said if she set aside the settlement agreement and issued the original consolidated complaint covering all charges. No question is presented by Respondent concerning the propriety of setting aside the settlement agreement. 2 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO. 634 CRAFTOOL MFG. COMPANY repeated his remarks he would deny them. Frazier mentioned the remarks to a number of other employees. In January 1976, the parties reached an agreement and an employee ratification vote was scheduled on January 20 to approve the contract. On January 19, Supervisor Linda Dixon approached employee Kathy Easterwood and told her it would be too bad if the union contract were voted in because the employees would be getting a 20-cent raise and she knew they were worth 20 cents "right then." The next day, Dixon approached Easterwood and employee Debbie Hightower and said she hoped the contract was voted in because it would mean more money for her "because the company would have more money to pay her." Dixon also approached employee Billy Lytle3 and told him that the employees "could make more money if the Union was not there" and that it would be difficult to keep anyone working for only a 20-cent increase in pay. The contract was ratified by the employees on January 20. The next next day, General Manager Fred Absher approached Lytle and said he wanted to talk to him. He said he noticed that Lytle was displeased with the Union and read from notes telling Lytle how an antiunion petition could be circulated. His instructions were as follows: You and many others have told me or other members of management that you do not desire to be represented by the Union and would like to do something about it. I have talked with our attorney and he has advised me to tell you that you have the following rights: 1. If you desire to circulate a petition opposing the union, you are free to do so. 2. The law prevents our company from assisting you in circulating a petition. 3. If you do intend to circulate a petition opposing the union it should be done on your own time. 4. The petition should state as follows: Employees of Craftool do not want to be represented by the Carpenters Union. Interested employees should sign name and date. These petitions should be given to me. He also read this statement to other employees. It was read to employees Karen Donahew and Billy Smith on their worktime. Lytle went to Supervisor Dixon's desk and borrowed paper and pencil and circulated a petition with the language indicated by Absher. He removed Respondent's letterhead from the paper. He circulated one petition on January 22 during the night shift and apparently on nonworking time. On January 22, Supervisor Dixon came to Lytle and said that Absher suggested it would be a "good idea" if he got a female employee, Karen Donahew, to circulate a petition because the women employees would identify more readily with her. Lytle did so and Donahew circulated the petition and turned it in the next day, January 23. These three petitions were turned into Night Foreman Uriah Cleaver and eventually to Absher. Absher told Cleaver that employees would be passing around the petitions and that they were to be turned in to him. About 3 Lytle had recently been reemployed by Respondent in December 1975 as an employee. He served an earlier stint with Respondent 2 years before as a supervisor. He had supervised Dixon when she was a rank-and-file employee, 4 The above findings of fact are based primarily on the testimony of this time, Lytle saw Absher in the restroom and asked him whether, since the contract had been ratified, the petitions were too late; Absher replied they "would help." Also at this time, other petitions were circulated at the plant including some on the day shift. Some were circulated during working hours and working time. They were also turned into Absher within a week and all the petitions were mailed to Respondent's counsel. On or about January 27, Dixon approached Lytle and told him that because of the union contract the employees' breaks would be shortened. The next day, Dixon came back to Lytle and said that Kathy Easterwood had gone to the Union and reported the incident about the breaks and the old policy on breaks was being reinstituted. Dixon continued by saying that she was not going to be as "nice" to Easterwood from there on by allowing her to do "a lot of the easy work which comes into the back of the shop." In February, Lytle had a change of heart and joined the Union. He began circulating prounion petitions at the plant in support of a union meeting to be held on March 8. He and Easterwood received a warning on this date for excessive conversation during worktime several days before. On February 19, the parties entered into a collective- bargaining agreement, effective February 23, 1976, and to expire on June 5, 1976, one year after the date of the Union's certification. Article II of the contract accorded the Union exclusive recognition in the unit found appropri- ate by the Board. On March 8, 1976, the Respondent filed an election petition with the Board's Regional Director in Case 16- RM-533 asserting that the petitions circulated in late January showed that more than a majority of its employees did not wish to be represented by the Union. On March 8, Respondent notified the Union of this action and stated that it intended to terminate the existing agreement upon its expiration. On April 30, 1976, the Regional Director dismissed the petition because a complaint had issued alleging that the Respondent had unlawfully participated in the circulation of the petitions. Respondent filed a request for review of the Regional Director's decision and it was denied on May 18, 1976. The Board concluded that "insufficient grounds have been alleged for reversing the Regional Director" and the dismissal of the petition was affirmed. On June 7, 1976, by letter from Respondent's counsel, Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union. The letter was a response to the Union's letter requesting bargaining on a new agreement to replace that which expired on June 5. Respondent relied upon its previously filed election petition and stated that it had a good-faith doubt of the Unions' majority status. By letter dated June 22 the Union again requested bargaining and there has been no response by Respon- dent.4 employees Frazier, Lytle, Easterwood, and Hinds who I found to be candid and reliable witnesses. In many instances their testimony was not controverted. For example, Sanders could not recall the conversation with Frazier, and Absher could not recall the restroom conversation with Lytle. To the extent there are conflicts, I reject the testimony that is contrary to (Continued) 635 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD B. Discussion I. Statements by Supervisor Dixon General Counsel asserts that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by virtue of Supervisor Dixon's statements on January 19 and 20 to the effect that she knew the employees were worth more than the 20-cent increase they were getting in the union contract right then; that she hoped the contract was voted in because Respondent would have more money for her; and that Respondent could pay employees more than the Union could get for them. General Counsel urges that these statements constitute promises of benefit in order to encourage employees not to support the Union. I disagree. The statements contain nothing which a reasonable person could regard as a believable promise of benefit; they are opinions of a low level supervisor as to the economic package obtained by the Union, an opinion which naturally enough reflects management's views. Such opinions are not unlawful, particularly when, as here, they come from a supervisor who had no apparent authority to grant or recommend general wage increases and whose words I cannot conclude were interpreted as reflecting a promise by Respondent's management to reward nonsup- port of the Union by granting economic benefits. Other assertions of 8(a)(1) misconduct are more signifi- cant. It is alleged that Dixon threatened to assign employee Easterwood more arduous work because she went to the Union to protest a reduction in breaktime which was later rescinded. Although the indication not to be nice to Easterwood hardly warrants Federal intervention, Dixon went on and clearly threatened she would not allow Easterwood to do "a lot of the easy work" in the shop. There is no doubt that the reason for this threat was to punish Easterwood for having utilized her union represen- tative as she was entitled to do under Section 7 of the Act. Moreover, unlike the other statements of Dixon discussed above, she had the power to effectuate this threat. She did have the authority to assign work to employees. Such remarks could well make employees feel that Respondent, through Dixon, would retaliate against them for going to or supporting the Union as Easterwood did. This contitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. Another allegation involves the statement by Production Foreman Sanders in August 1975 that the Company would not sign an agreement. This statement was made by a high- ranking responsible management official; it was repeated to a number of employees; and it was made during obviously hard and tough bargaining. The law requires an employer to make a good-faith effort to reach agreement and to execute any agreement reached (Section 8(d) of the Act). The impact of Sanders' statement was clearly that, because of management's resistance to collective bargain- that I have credited. Dixon, for example, testified that she told Lytle to get Karen Donahew to help in circulating the petitions; Lytle said she mentioned that Absher had suggested this. I credit Lytle's account of the conversation. Dixon seemed to have considerable difficulty recalling the relevant events with precision, and Absher, who had suggested circulating petitions in the first place, did not deny that he suggested Donahew to Dixon. I The testimony on this point is rather imprecise. Karen Donahew ing, utilization of the Union for this purpose would be futile. The statement interfered with employee rights to bargain collectively through their representative and is violative of the Act. 2. Circulation of the petitions The most significant issue in this case is whether, as General Counsel asserts, Respondent unlawfully assisted in the circulation of the antiunion petitions in late January 1976. If so, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act which prohibits interference with employee rights under Section 7 to select or reject a bargaining representative. Respondent urges that there was no violation and, although it does not contend that the antiunion petitions were the result of a spontaneous movement, it suggests that its own involvement was benign since General Manager Absher simply told the employees their legal rights in response to employee remarks of displeasure with the Union. I find that the Respondent's assistance and involvement in the circulation and collection of the petitions was unlawful, that its conduct suggested Respon- dent's sanction, support, and sponsorship of the petitions and thus was violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. First of all, it must be kept in mind that the petitions were circulated and collected well within the Union's certification year. The petitions stated that the signers did not wish to have the Union represent them. But some 8 months before, the employees voted in a secret ballot election to have the Union represent them and the Board certified the results. It is settled law that a union's majority status is irrebuttably presumed to continue for I year, absent special circumstances not alleged or present here. Ray Brooks v. N.LR.B., 348 U.S. 96 (1954). Secondly, the employees had just ratified a collective- bargaining agreement entered into by the Union. It appears that not all employees were pleased at the results; it was the Union's first contract, its term was short and it came after months of bargaining despite a management official's remark that Respondent would never sign a contract. There is testimony that some employees spoke against the Union and the bargain it struck during the period of the ratification vote. Absher had conversations with some employees who expressed opposition to the Union.5 Absher's response to this situation was to read a prepared statement to those employees who had expressed opposition to the Union, suggesting the desirability of circulating a petition rejecting the Union. Thus, Respon- dent, through a high management official, initiated the suggestion of circulating a petition. Absher also suggested how the petition should read, i.e., that the employees did not wish to be represented by the Union. He then advised that the petitions should be turned in to him. I find that this conduct constituted unlawful interference. Absher testified that she had asked Absher "what the people that didn't want to be in the Union could do about it"; Billy Smith testified she asked "was there anything we could do." Absher testified that the employees wanted to know how they could get rid of the Union, but he failed to describe with particularity what was said in those conversations. Lytle admitted he expressed dissatisfaction with the Union, but, again, his testimony does not describe with particularity how his dissatisfaction was expressed. 636 CRAFTOOL MFG. COMPANY suggested a precise course of action which clearly indicated Respondent's sponsorship and support despite its admoni- tion that it could not "assist" employees. His suggestion also converted employee dissatisfaction into the formal and legally significant consequence of having employees peti- tion to reject the Union as bargaining representative. Furthermore, Absher himself initiated the conversation which prompted Lytle to circulate the first petitions, using Respondent's stationery to prepare the petitions. Supervi- sor Dixon readily helped and transmitted the suggestion from Absher that a female employee be used to help circulate the petitions. Absher himself told Lytle that the petitions "would help" even though a contract had been ratified. Moreover, Lytle, who later switched and support- ed the Union, was a former supervisor who had just returned to work for Respondent. Other petitions were circulated on the day shift on working time and Absher's instructions were read to some employees on their worktime. Respondent's officials knew that the petitions were being circulated, and they were turned in to Respondent, as Absher directed, mailed to Respondent's counsel, and used to attempt to remove the Union as bargaining representative on a petition filed by Respon- dent. In these circumstances, Respondent clearly gave the impression that it sanctioned and indeed was sponsoring the circulation of the petition. As I have indicated above, the evidence shows that the Respondent went beyond simply advising employees of their legal rights or responding to employee dissatisfaction. Respondent's assistance included the suggestion of a specific course of action and other aid. Significantly, nowhere in the instructions, which purported to tell employees their legal rights, was there any statement about the legal requirement which flowed from the Union's certification, i.e., that the Union's majority status was presumed for I year. This omission highlights the danger to employee rights when an employer suggests a specific course of action in rejecting an incumbent union to employees not fully versed in the law. The risk of misunderstanding inherent in such a situation renders suspect suggestions of support by an employer in this sensitive area, which is a matter for employees alone to resolve. As the Board stated in Texas Electric Coop, Inc.,- Treating Division 197 NLRB 10, 15 (1972): [W]hether or not Respondent was privileged in advis- ing employees, pursuant to their request, of the manner in which they could withdraw from the Union, such a privilege avails it nothing here. As the Board stated in River Togs, Inc., 160 NLRB 58, 60-61, "by assisting in the preparation of the petition and by permitting its circulation in part on working time, in the presence of and with the knowledge of supervisors, Respondent gave employees the impression that the petition was being circulated with its approval and thus restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of their rights under Section 7, in violation of Section 8(a)(1).30 30 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to enforce the Board's decision in this respect (382 F 2d 198). This was occasioned, however, not because the court was of the opinion that the principle enunciated by the Board was wrong. but because it thought that the evidence did not support the Board's conclusion. For all of the above reasons, I conclude that Respon- dent's suggestion of and participation in the circulation and collection of the antiunion petitions was unlawful. See also Edward Fields, Inc. v. N.LR.B., 325 F.2d 754, 760 (C.A. 2, 1963). 3. The withdrawal of recognition As indicated, Respondent withdrew recognition at the expiration of the bargaining agreement and the Union's certification year on June 7, 1976. The only stated reason for the withdrawal and conceded refusal to bargain was the assertion that a majority of the employees had signed petitions stating they did not wish to be represented by the Union in late January 1976. Those petitions had been submitted by Respondent to the Board in March 1976 in support of its petition to secure a new election. The petition was dismissed by the Regional Director and the Board affirmed. Because of my findings that the relied-upon petitions were secured through unlawful assistance by Respondent and because they were secured in the context of unfair labor practices, I find that Respondent could not properly rely in good faith on those petitions in withdraw- ing recognition from the incumbent union and I therefore find that Respondent violated Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act. To insure the stability of established bargaining relation- ships and to prevent recurring interference with industrial peace, the Board and the courts have circumscribed the conditions under which an employer may lawfully with- draw recognition from a duly recognized bargaining agent. These well-settled principles are as follows: Absent special circumstances, a union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority status for one year after its certification. Thereafter, the presumption is rebuttable, and an employer who has a reasonable basis in fact to doubt an incumbent union's majority status and who asserts that doubt in good faith may refuse to recognize and bargain with the union. N.LR.B. v. Gulfmont Hotel Company, 362 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1966); Celanese Corp., 95 NLRB 664 (1951). See Brooks v. N.LR.B., 348 U.S. 96, [98-104] (1954). [Bally Case & Cooler, Inc. of Delaware v. N.L R.B., 416 F.2d 902, 904- 905 (C.A. 6, 1969), cert. denied 399 U.S. 910 (1970).] To rebut that presumption, the employer must show either that "the union, in fact, no longer enjoyed majority support on the date of refusal to bargain, or that the refusal to bargain was predicated upon a reasonably grounded good faith doubt of majority support." Terrell Machine Company v. N.LR.B., 427 F.2d 1088, 1090 (C.A. 4, 1970), cert. denied 398 U.S. 929. However, as the Board has stated: "Once a union has established its majority through certification, as here, its majority is presumed to continue [beyond the certification year] unless rebut- ted. But, an employer may without violating the Act withhold further bargaining and insist that a union reestablish its majority if it can establish a good-faith doubt of continued majority. . .This showing must, of course, be made in an atmosphere free of employer 637 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD conduct aimed at causing disaffection." [Texas Electric Coop, Inc., 197 NLRB 10, 15-16, quoting Firestone Synthetic Rubber & Latex Company, Division of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, 173 NLRB 1179, 1180 (1968). See also Medo Photo Supply Corporation v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678, 687 (1944).] Applying these principles, I find that Respondent's refusal to bargain was unlawful. As I have found, Respondent was unlawfully involved in the circulation of the antiunion petitions. I have also found that Respondent engaged in other coercive and unlawful conduct including a suggestion that it would never sign a contract and that recourse to the Union would subject employees to more arduous work assignments. Thus, in showing lack of union majority or a good-faith doubt of such majority, Respon- dent seeks to rely on evidence - the antiunion petitions - tainted by its own misconduct and secured in a context of unfair labor practices. Accordingly, I find that Respondent has not shown the requisite lack of union majority or good- faith doubt of such majority on June 7, 1976, when it withdrew recognition from the Union. 6 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW I. By suggesting that its employees circulate petitions repudiating the Union and by assisting its employees in the circulation and collection of the petitions, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 2. By threatening assignment of more arduous work to employees for utilizing or filing grievances with their union representative and by suggesting that it would never sign a contract with the Union, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 3. By withdrawing recognition from and refusing to bargain with the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees in the unit described in section II, A, above, Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 4. These unfair labor practices found above affect interstate commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 5. Respondent has not otherwise violated the Act. THE REMEDY Since I have found that Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, my recommended Order will require Respondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take such affirmative action as will effectuate the purposes of the Act, 6 Although I do not reach the issue, I would have considerable difficulty in accepting Respondent's reliance, in withdrawing recognition, on the antiunion petitions as evidence of lack of majority or good-faith doubt of majority as of June 5, 1976, even if they were untainted by Respondent's unfair labor practices. The petitions were 5 months old and there was no evidence submitted by Respondent as to the status of the Union on the date of the refusal to bargain or any reasonably related time frame. Indeed, the record evidence suggests that Union strengthened its hand after circulation of the petitions. The leading antiunion employee, Lytle, changed horses and including the immediate resumption of bargaining with the Union. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER 7 The Respondent, Craftool Manufacturing Company and Craftool Company, Subsidiaries of Tandy Corporation and Tandy Craftool Mfg. Co., Fort Worth, Texas, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) In any manner or by any means, including orders, directions, instructions, requests, suggestions, or appeals or by permitting any such to remain in existence or effect, causing, inducing, urging, encouraging, or assisting em- ployees to repudiate United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, or to rescind the authority of the foregoing named labor organization to represent them for purposes of collective bargaining. (b) Threatening to assign more arduous work to employees for filing grievances with or supporting United Brotherhood of Carpenters or stating that Respondent would not sign a collective-bargaining agreement with United Brotherhood of Carpenters, or any other labor organization. (c) Failing or refusing to bargain with United Brother- hood of Carpenters as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit: All production and maintenance employees employed by the Employer at its 1001 Foch Street, Fort Worth, Texas, location, excluding office clerical employees, professional and technical employees, guards, watch- men and supervisors as defined in the Act. (d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choosing, or to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, or to refrain from any or all such activities. 2. Take the following affirmative action which, it is found, will effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended: (a) Upon request, recognize and bargain with United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL- CIO, as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative became an active union supporter who passed out prounion leaflets at the plant. And the Union secured an agreement, albeit one of short duration, which it actively administered. I In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order. and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 638 CRAFTOOL MFG. COMPANY of the employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit respect- ing rate of pay, wages, hours, or other terms or conditions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its premises in Fort Worth, Texas, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 8 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 16, after being duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, includ- ing all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 16, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS ALSO ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor practices not found herein. s In the event the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government After a hearing at which all parties had the opportunity to present their evidence, the National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the law and has ordered us to post this notice. The law gives you the rights: To form, join, or help unions To choose a union to represent you in bargaining with us To act together for your common interest or protection To refuse to participate in any or all of these things. WE WILL NOT threaten you with more difficult work if you try to get the United Brotherhood of Carpenters to help you with a grievance. WE WILL NOT do or say anything to persuade you or help you to stop the United Brotherhood of Carpenters from being your representative in dealing with us about your wages and about the conditions under which you work. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights. WE WILL recognize the United Brotherhood of Carpenters as your representative in dealing with us about your wages and about the conditions under which you work. WE WILL bargain and deal with the United Brother- hood of Caprenters, about your wages, working hours, and any other condition under which you work. If we come to an agreement about any of these things with the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, WE WILL put that agreement in writing and sign it. WE WILL respect your right to deal with us through the United Brotherhood of Carpenters. CRAFTOOL MANUFACTURING COMPANY AND CRAFTOOL COMPANY, SUBSIDIARIES OF TANDY CORPORATION AND TANDY CRAFTOOL MFG. Co. 639