328 NLRB 432
Bonham Heating & Air Conditioning
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
432
Bonham Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. and Local
85, United Association of Journeymen and Ap-
prentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Indus-
try of the United States and Canada, AFL–CIO.
Cases 7–CA–39325(1), 7–CA–39325(2), 7–CA–
39325(3), and 7–RC–20978
May 19, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS FOX
AND LIEBMAN
On September 23, 1997, Administrative Law Judge
Richard H. Beddow Jr. issued the attached decision. The
Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions as
modified2 and to adopt the recommended Order as modi-
fied.3
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act by interrogating its employees about
their intentions regarding union representation and by
threatening to close its doors if forced to “go union.”
The judge additionally found that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by discriminatorily abolish-
ing its plumbing business, slowing its bidding on other
work, changing working conditions by changing locks
and failing to reissue keys to some employees, and by
laying off employees James Schneider, Scott, and O’Dell
because of and in retaliation for their engaging in union
or other protected concerted activities. As part of the
remedy for the Respondent’s unfair labor practices, the
judge recommended issuance of a Gissel4 bargaining
order, as he found that the possibility of erasing the ef-
fects of the Respondent’s unfair labor practices was
slight.
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 In his conclusions of law, the judge correctly found that the chal-
lenged ballots of employees Brain O’Dell and Fredrick Scott should be
counted but erroneously stated that the counting of their ballots should
cause the issuance of a certification of results. The latter statement is
contrary to established Board procedure and is inconsistent with the
judge’s recommended remedy, which clearly envisions issuance of a
certification of representative if the Union wins the election. In a case,
such as this one, in which a Gissel bargaining order is issued and chal-
lenged ballots are to be opened and counted, the proper procedure is for
the Regional Director to issue a certification of representative if the
revised tally of ballots following the counting of the challenged ballots
shows that a majority voted in favor of the Union. If, however, the
revised tally of ballots does not show that a majority voted in favor of
the Union, the results of the election should be set aside and the petition
dismissed. In no case should a certification of results issue. Addition-
ally, the Gissel bargaining order is given effect regardless of the out-
come of the vote. See F. L. Smithe Machine Co., 305 NLRB 1082
(1992); Glengarry Contracting Industries, 258 NLRB 1167 (1981). We
have modified the judge’s conclusions of law accordingly.
3 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order in accordance
with our decisions in Indian Hills Care Center, 321 NLRB 144 (1996),
and Excel Container, Inc., 325 NLRB 17 (1997), and also to set forth
the appropriate unit for collective bargaining.
We adopt the judge’s unfair labor practice findings, as
they are amply supported by the record. We further
adopt, for the following reasons, his recommendation
that a bargaining order is appropriate and warranted un-
der NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.5 In Gissel, the Supreme
Court “identified two types of employer misconduct that
may warrant the imposition of a bargaining order: ‘out-
rageous and pervasive unfair labor practices’ (‘category
I’) and ‘less extraordinary cases marked by less perva-
sive practices which nonetheless still have the tendency
to undermine majority strength and impede the election
processes’ (‘category II’).”6 The Court stated that in
fashioning a remedy in the exercise of its discretion in
category II cases, the Board:
can properly take into consideration the extensiveness
of an employer’s unfair [labor] practices in terms of
their past effect on election conditions and the likeli-
hood of their recurrence in the future. If the Board finds
that the possibility of erasing the effects of past prac-
tices and of ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by
the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight
and that employee sentiment once expressed through
cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bar-
gaining order, then such an order should issue.7
In agreeing with the judge that a Gissel bargaining or-
der should issue in this case, we find that the Respon-
dent’s course of misconduct, both before and after the
election, clearly demonstrates that the holding of a fair
rerun election would be unlikely and that the “employ-
ees’ wishes are better gauged by an old card majority
than by a new election.”8 Because this case falls within
Gissel category II, we have, in reaching this finding, ex-
amined the extensiveness of the Respondent’s unfair
labor practices and the likelihood of their recurrence in
the future.
The Respondent’s unfair labor practices in this case
include “hallmark”9 violations such as discriminatorily
terminating or laying off three union supporters in a unit
of seven employees (more than 40 percent of the unit), as
well as coercively threatening to close its doors if forced
4 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
5 Id.
6 Charlotte Amphitheater Corp. v. NLRB, 82 F.3d 1074, 1078 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (quoting Gissel, 395 U.S. at 613–614).
7 395 U.S. at 614–615.
8 Charlotte Amphitheater Corp. v. NLRB, 82 F.3d at 1078.
9 See NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, 632 F.2d 208, 212–213 (2d Cir.
1980).
328 NLRB No. 61
BONHAM HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING
433
to “go union” and actually closing a portion of its busi-
ness. On October 29, 1996,10 five unit employees, at-
tending an organizing meeting at employee O’Dell’s
house, signed union authorization cards and a petition
requesting union representation. Only 3 days later, on
Friday, November 1, the Respondent’s president and
owner, Dave Bonham, who had received a letter from the
Union enclosing the employees’ petition and requesting
recognition, called an employee meeting at the start of
the workday. At the meeting, he displayed the union
petition and repeatedly unlawfully interrogated employ-
ees by asking them “what is this all about” and where
they intended to work “if this happens.” He further
stated that he would close the doors before he would “go
union,” adding “you know how bullheaded I can be.”
After his interrogations and threat, Bonham additionally
unlawfully announced that the Respondent, which per-
formed plumbing, heating, and air-conditioning work,
was going to get out of the plumbing business.
On the following Monday, Bonham followed through
on his announcement and unlawfully discontinued his
plumbing business, refusing to sign a previously bid and
awarded plumbing job. He also unlawfully slowed down
or stopped bidding on all work from November through
December. On November 21, the Union filed an election
petition, and an election was scheduled for December 19.
On December 13, Bonham unlawfully changed the locks
at the Respondent’s facility and on the service van that
Scott and O’Dell used. Bonham then gave new keys to
only three employees, even though previously all em-
ployees had had keys. On the same day, Bonham unlaw-
fully terminated Scott and O’Dell, telling them that there
was no more plumbing work to do.
The December 19 election resulted in two votes for the
Union and three votes against, with two challenged bal-
lots, those of Scott and O’Dell. On the following day,
union supporter Schneider became involved in an argu-
ment about the election results with Mike O’Hare, an
employee who had signed the union petition but had ap-
parently voted against the Union. Bonham intervened
and accused Schneider of harassing O’Hare. Bonham
then unlawfully terminated Schneider, telling him that he
was being laid off for lack of work. Bonham freely ad-
mitted that his stated reason for Schneider’s discharge
was false.
The coercive effect of the Respondent’s unfair labor
practices described above is readily apparent. These seri-
ous violations, which directly affected the entire unit,
began as soon as the Union requested recognition and
continued even after the election. Thus, at a meeting
held shortly after receipt of the Union’s letter, the Re-
spondent’s owner and president embarked on his unlaw-
ful antiunion tactics that peaked with the employee lay-
offs only 6 days before the election. Further, the day
10 All dates are in 1996.
after the election, the Respondent terminated Schneider,
a key union supporter, for an admittedly pretextual rea-
son. Thus, the Respondent’s unlawful terminations in
approximately a 1-week period left employed only two
of the original five employees who had signed the union
petition.
The Respondent’s unlawful termination of three of the
five employees who openly publicized their union sup-
port is conduct that “goes to the heart of the Act”11 and is
not likely to be forgotten. “Such action can only serve to
reinforce employees’ fear that they will lose employment
if they persist in union activity.”12 The impact of this
action was magnified by its proximity to the Union’s
demand for recognition, the filing of the representation
petition, and the election.13 This conduct by the Respon-
dent sent employees “the unequivocal message that it
was willing to go to extraordinary lengths in order to
extinguish the union organizational effort.14 It is reason-
able to infer that such a message will have a lasting effect
on the unit employees’ exercise of their right to organ-
ize.15
The severity of the Respondent’s misconduct is com-
pounded by the direct involvement of its top official,
Dave Bonham, its owner and president. Thus, it was
Bonham himself who interrogated the employees about
the Union’s recognition request, threatened to close the
doors rather than “go union,” announced the discontinu-
ance of the Respondent’s plumbing business, ceased the
Respondent’s plumbing business and slowed down or
stopped bidding on all other work, changed the locks and
refused to issue new keys to certain employees, and ter-
minated three of the five employees who had signed the
union petition. “When the antiunion message is so
clearly communicated by the words and deeds of the
highest levels of management, it is highly coercive and
unlikely to be forgotten.”16
Although the unlawfully laid-off or discharged em-
ployees are entitled to reinstatement and backpay, these
remedies would not, in our view, likely erase the coer-
cive effects of the Respondent’s antiunion conduct. The
reinstated employees would not likely again risk incur-
ring the Respondent’s wrath and another period of un-
employment by resuming their union activities. Their
coworkers likely would be similarly deterred from union
activity, as the Respondent’s unlawful retaliation against
union proponents was, no doubt, known to all the em-
ployees in this small unit. When Schneider arrived at
work after the layoffs of O’Dell and Scott and com-
11 NLRB v. Entwistle Mfg. Co., 120 F.2d 532, 536 (4th Cir. 1941).
12 Consec Security, 325 NLRB 453 (1998).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.; see Electro-Voice, 320 NLRB 1094, 1096 (1996); America’s
Best Quality Coatings Corp., 313 NLRB 470, 472 (1993), enfd. 44 F.3d
516 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 515 U.S. 1158 (1995).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
434
plained that they had unfairly been laid off, Bonham
threatened that Schneider’s job similarly “was in jeop-
ardy.” Employees John Booth, Shane Cornell, and Larry
Decker all were aware of the argument between Schnei-
der and O’Hare immediately preceding Schneider’s dis-
charge. Following Schneider’s discharge, Booth asked
Larry Bonham if Bonham wanted him to leave also.17
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the Respondent’s mis-
conduct continued even after the election, when the Re-
spondent discharged union supporter Schneider, who had
served as the Union’s observer at the election. An em-
ployer’s continuing hostility toward employee rights in
its postelection conduct “evidences a strong likelihood of
a recurrence of unlawful conduct in the event of another
organizing effort.”18
In this case, the Respondent makes no claim that a
Gissel order is not appropriate because of the passage of
time between the Gissel order and the unfair labor prac-
tices that justified it, or because of any purported inter-
vening turnover of employees or management. Thus,
these issues, which have concerned some courts in deny-
ing enforcement of our Gissel orders in other situations,19
have not been timely raised by the Respondent—indeed,
they have not been raised at all—and are simply not pre-
sented by the evidence here.20
In addition, the Respondent has presented no evidence
or argument that would lead us to believe that it is now
prepared to allow employees to freely exercise their Sec-
tion 7 rights. To the contrary, the Respondent’s conduct
indicates that there is reasonable likelihood that the Re-
spondent will continue to unlawfully thwart employee
rights in the future. Thus, as noted above, the Respon-
dent persisted in its unfair labor practices, unlawfully
terminating union supporter Schneider even after the
election was over. Moreover, the depth of the Respon-
dent’s disregard for employee rights is evidenced by the
extreme measures it took to defeat the employees’ organ-
izational efforts. Not only did the Respondent unlaw-
fully interrogate employees, coercively threaten them,
and unlawfully terminate over 40 percent of its work
force in response to the employees’ organizing efforts, it
also discontinued part of its business and slowed or
stopped bidding on work in the remaining areas of busi-
ness. Such drastic steps betray the Respondent’s intense
determination to unlawfully thwart the employees’ exer-
cise of their Section 7 rights. In this connection, particu-
larly illuminating is the Respondent’s president’s state-
17 Booth testified that, as Bonham had let Scott, O’Dell, and Schnei-
der go, Booth felt that he was next in line. He also had signed the
union petition.
18 Garney Morris, Inc., 313 NLRB 101, 103 (1993), enfd. 47 F.3d
1161 (3d Cir. 1995).
19 See, e.g., Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin v. NLRB, 148 F.3d 1166,
1173 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
20 NLRB v. Charlotte Amphitheater, 82 F.3d 1074, 1080 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (Board has no affirmative duty to examine employee turnover or
passage of time if not timely raised).
ment to employees, “You know how bullheaded I can
be,” when he announced that the Respondent would
close its doors before it would “go union.” Bonham’s
own words further demonstrate the tenacity of the Re-
spondent’s antiunion commitment. All these circum-
stances lead us to doubt that the Respondent would con-
form its conduct to the requirements of the law and per-
mit a fair election among employees to be held in the
future if the revised tally of ballots shows that the Union
lost the December 19, 1996 election.
Thus, in concluding that a Gissel order is warranted,
we have fully considered the inadequacy of other reme-
dies.21 Further, as discussed below, we have given due
consideration to the employees’ Section 7 rights, another
concern expressed by some courts.22
In Gissel, the Supreme Court rejected the argument
advanced by the employers that a bargaining order is a
punitive remedy that “needlessly prejudices employees’
Section 7 rights.”23 The Court stated that a bargaining
order not only deters “future misconduct” but also reme-
dies “past election damage.”24 The Court reasoned as
follows:
If an employer has succeeded in undermining a union’s
strength and destroying the laboratory conditions nec-
essary for a fair election, he may see no need to violate
a cease-and-desist order by further unlawful activity.
The damage will have been done, and perhaps the only
fair way to effectuate employee rights is to reestablish
the conditions as they existed before the employer’s
unlawful campaign.33 There is, after all, nothing per-
manent in a bargaining order, and if, after the effects of
the employer’s acts have worn off, the employees
clearly desire to disavow the union, they can do so by
filing a representation petition. For, as we pointed out
long ago, in finding that a bargaining order involved no
“injustice to employees who may wish to substitute for
the particular union some other . . . arrangement,” a
bargaining relationship “once rightfully established
must be permitted to exist and function for a reasonable
period in which it can be given a fair chance to suc-
ceed,” after which the “Board may, . . . upon a proper
showing, take steps in recognition of changed situations
which might make appropriate changed bargaining re-
lationships.” [395 U.S. at 612–613 (quoting Franks
Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 705–706 (1944)).]
33 It has been pointed out that employee rights are affected
whether or not a bargaining order is entered, for those who desire
representation may not be protected by an inadequate rerun elec-
tion, and those who oppose collective bargaining may be preju-
diced by a bargaining order if in fact the union would have lost an
election absent employer coercion. [Citation omitted.] Any effect
21 See, e.g., Flamingo Hilton-Laughlin v. NLRB, 148 F.3d at 1173.
22 Id.
23 395 U.S. at 612.
24 Id.
BONHAM HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING
435
will be minimal at best, however, for there “is every reason for
the union to negotiate a contract that will satisfy the majority, for
the union will surely realize that it must win the support of the
employees, in the face of a hostile employer, in order to survive
the threat of a decertification election after a year has passed.”
Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elec-
tions Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 Harv.L.Rev. 38,
135 (1964).
This passage clearly shows that in approving the
Board’s use of the bargaining order remedy in category I
and II cases, the Gissel Court explicitly took into account
the rights of both employees who favored union repre-
sentation and those who opposed it. The Court stated
that if an employer’s unfair labor practices have the ten-
dency to undermine a union’s majority strength and de-
stroy election conditions, then “perhaps the only fair way
to effectuate employee rights” is to issue a bargaining
order. In these circumstances, the right of those opposing
the union to file a decertification petition pursuant to
Section 9(c)(1) of the Act adequately safeguards their
interests. On the other hand, if the facts of a case fall
within category III, i.e., the employer committed only
“minor or less extensive unfair labor practices” with only
a “minimal impact on the election machinery,” then a
bargaining order may not issue, notwithstanding the fact
that a majority of employees signed authorization cards
in support of the union.25
In sum, the Gissel opinion itself reflects a careful bal-
ancing of employees’ Section 7 rights “to bargain collec-
tively” and “to refrain from” such activity. Therefore, if
a bargaining order has been adequately justified under
the Gissel standards, then we respectfully submit that due
consideration has been given to the employees’ Section 7
rights.
Accordingly, for all these reasons, we agree with the
judge that a Gissel bargaining order remedy is appropri-
ate and warranted in this case.
AMENDED CONCLUSION OF LAW
Delete paragraph 5 of the judge’s conclusions of law
and insert the following.
“5. The challenged ballots of employees Brian O’Dell
and Frederick Scott from the December 19, 1996 election
should be opened and counted and a revised tally of bal-
lots prepared. If the revised tally of ballots shows that
the Petitioner won the election, a certification of repre-
sentative should issue. If the revised tally of ballots
shows that the Petitioner did not win the election, the
results of the election should be set aside, the petition
dismissed, and the proceedings in Case 7–RC–20978
vacated.”
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent, Bonham
25 395 U.S. at 615.
Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., Gladwin, Michigan, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Order, as modified.
1. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(d).
“(d) On request, recognize and bargain with the Union
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
its employees in the following appropriate unit concern-
ing wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of em-
ployment and, if an understanding is reached, embody
the understanding in a signed agreement:
All full-time and regular part-time heating and cooling
employees, plumbers and pipefitters employed by the
Employer at its facility located at 2441 West M-61,
Gladwin, Michigan; but excluding office clerical em-
ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.”
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(f).
“(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Gladwin, Michigan facility copies of the attached no-
tice marked “Appendix.”5 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after
being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respon-
dent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during
the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has
gone out of business or closed the facility involved in
these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since November 1, 1996.”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the admin-
istrative law judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
436
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in
the exercise of your rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the
Act, by interrogating you concerning union sympathies
or threatening to close our doors if forced to go union.
WE WILL NOT lay off or terminate you or otherwise
discriminate against you in retaliation for engaging in
union activities or other protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT abolish our plumbing business, slow
bidding on other work, or otherwise change your work-
ing conditions in retaliation for engaging in union activi-
ties or other protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
reestablish our plumbing business and resume other bid-
ding practices at the level and manner of operation that
previously existed and reestablish or correct any dis-
criminatory changes in conditions of employment and
offer Brian O’Dell, James Schneider, and Frederick Scott
full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, with-
out prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed.
WE WILL make Brian O’Dell, James Schneider, and
Frederick Scott whole for any loss of earnings and other
benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against
them.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of this Order,
remove from our files any reference to the unlawful dis-
charges of Brian O’Dell, James Schneider, and Frederick
Scott, and within 3 days thereafter notify the employees
in writing that this has been done and that the discharges
will not be used against them in any way.
WE WILL, on request, recognize and bargain with the
Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of our employees in the following appropriate unit
concerning wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment, and, if agreement is reached, embody it
in a signed agreement:
All full-time and regular part-time heating and cooling
employees, plumbers and pipefitters employed by the
Employer at its facility located at 2441 West M-61,
Gladwin, Michigan; but excluding office clerical em-
ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
BONHAM HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING, INC.
Dwight R. Kirksey, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Gary D. Patterson, Esq., of Saginaw, Michigan, for the Re-
spondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
RICHARD H. BEDDOW JR., Administrative Law Judge. This
matter was heard is Midland, Michigan, on June 4 and 5, 1997.
The proceeding is based on an initial charge filed December 26,
1996,1 by Local 85, United Association of Journeymen and
Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry of the
United States and Canada, AFL–CIO. The Regional Director’s
consolidated complaint dated March 28, 1997, alleges that Re-
spondent Bonham Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., of Glad-
win, Michigan, violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act (the Act) by coercively interrogate its em-
ployees concerning their union activities, sympathies, and de-
sires and threaten its employees with the closing of its business
if the employees selected union representation; by changing an
employee’s working conditions, partially closing its business
by ceasing to bid any plumbing work and slowing its bidding of
nonplumbing work in retaliation for its employees’ support for
and membership in the Union, and by discharging employees
because they joined and assisted the Union and to discourage
its employees from engaging in union activities.
On a review of the entire record in this case and from my ob-
servation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the fol-
lowing
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is engaged in the installation and service of heat-
ing and air-conditioning systems. It annually purchases and
receives goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 from
other enterprises in Michigan which have received these goods
directly from points outside Michigan. In 1996 it derived gross
revenues in excess of $500,000 and it admits that at all times
material is has been an employer engaged in operations affect-
ing commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7)
of the Act. It also admits that the Union is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
The Respondent performs residential and light commercial
plumbing, heating and air-conditioning installation and mainte-
nance work at locations in central Michigan generally located
within commuting distance (60 miles) from its facilities in
Gladwin. Owner and President Dave Bonham holds certain
building licenses and employs persons who hold other building
licenses. As a result, Respondent is able to obtain work permits
required to perform plumbing, heating and air-conditioning
work. Employee Fred Scott has a master plumbers license
which allows him to “pull permits” in Respondent’s name.
During the fall of 1996, the Respondent had seven employees
(plus clerical staff) and was working at approximately five or
six jobsites, including Boyne City, Michigan, which is more
than 60 miles from Gladwin.
At first, the Respondent was primarily a service-oriented
business and then, as the business grew, expanded into the per-
formance of installation work. Approximately 60 percent of
the work Respondent performs is residential work while the
remaining 40 percent is light commercial work performed pri-
marily when requested to do so by a contractor for whom Re-
spondent regularly sub contracts. While the work performed
primarily involves the service and installation of heating and
air-conditioning equipment, the Respondent began performing
plumbing work approximately 4 years after it hired Scott (it
paid for Scott’s schooling for his Master Plumber’s license).
1 All following dates will be in 1996 unless otherwise indicated.
BONHAM HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING
437
Of the seven employees, three performed service work, two
performed installations and two performed plumbing work.
The service employees were Larry Decker (who was called the
service manager), Shane Cornell and Mike O’Hare, the in-
stallers were John Both and James Schneider and the plumbers
were Brian O’Dell and Scott.
On October 29, 1996, a union organizing meeting was held
at employee Brian O’Dell’s house. In attendance were em-
ployees O’Dell, Schneider, Scott, O’Hare, Booth, and Union
Representative Kris Shangle. All five employees signed union
authorization cards and a “petition” requesting representation
by the Union. A few days later on or on about October 31 the
Respondent received a letter from the Union, which stated that
the employees of the Respondent wanted to be represented by
the Union. The letter attached the “petition” that the five em-
ployees signed.
In response to the letter, Bonham called a meeting of all em-
ployees on November 1, at 8 a.m. The five employees who
signed the petition were in attendance as well as employee
Decker. Bonham showed the employees the “petition” he re-
ceived in the mail, and told the group, “I want to know what is
this all about.” When no one answered Schneider responded
that the document spoke for itself. Bonham persisted and said
he didn’t know what it meant and he wanted he employees to
tell him. Bonham then asked Schneider, “If this happens,
where do you intend to work?” Schneider responded, “I’d like
to stay here, in this job.” O’Dell recalled that Bonham said he
would close the doors before be would go union and then added
“[Y]ou know how bull-headed I can be.” Booth recalled that
Bonham specifically said he would close his door and did not
say he would be “forced to close” and he recalled that when
someone said he could not do that, Bonham said he could and
he then could open up latter under a different name.
Schneider recalled that Bonham said he “would close his
doors if he was forced to go union” and that a small company
would be run into the ground by a union. Someone spoke up
and asked Bonham to keep an open mind and talk to representa-
tive Shangle and see what it really was about.
Bonham turned to the subject of plumbing work and told the
employees that he was going to get out of the plumbing busi-
ness. Scott replied that if that was what Bonham wants to do,
“now would be a good time since there are no permits pulled
right now.” Scott said he was caught off guard by Bonham’s
declaration but felt that if plumbing work was a problem for
Bonham, he would be willing to subcontract the work and buy
some of the plumbing material and he volunteered to do so but
Bonham responded that in his experience subcontracting did
not work out. The meeting ended when the employees handed
Bonham a list, supplied by the Union, of things a company can
not do during an election campaign.
On and after November 4, the Respondent discontinued its
plumbing business and it refused to sign a previously bid and
awarded plumbing job. In addition, Respondent slowed down
or stopped bidding on all work from November through De-
cember 1996. Beginning in January 1997, Bonham, who does
all the job bidding for Respondent, resumed bidding on work
(except plumbing) at its regular labor rates.
Prior to October 31, Booth (who was Respondent’s second
most senior employee), was in charge of every installation job
and, if he was assigned to a one-man job, Bonham and Booth
discussed all details of the job. After the November 1 meeting,
Bonham told Booth only when and where a job was. Before
the “petition” Booth was in charge on every two-man job he
went on, and either Schneider, Cornell, or O’Hare acted as
helper. After the “petition,” a two-man job that Booth was on
was run by Cornell who was trained by Booth when he was
hired. About 8 years ago, Bonham also designated Booth as
shop foreman. Bonham never informed Booth that he lost that
title.
The Union filed the petition in Case 7–RC–20978 on No-
vember 21, 1996. At the time the Union filed the petition, the
proposed unit consisted of seven employees (five heating and
cooling workers and two plumbers). An election was sched-
uled for December 19, in a unit of full-time and regular part-
time heating and cooling employees, plumbers, and pipefitters.
On December 13, Bonham changed the locks on the doors to
Respondent’s facility, as well as the locks on the service van
that Scott and O’Dell used. Bonham gave keys to the locks to
employees Cornell, O’Hare and Decker, but not Schneider,
Scott, O’Dell, or Booth. Booth had a key to the shop since he
began work 11 years ago but he was not given any keys on
December 13 when Bonham changed the locks. Booth testified
that he now must wait for someone to arrive to let him in, and
at night, someone must be there to lock up when Booth leaves.
Six days prior to the election Bonham told Scott and O’Dell
that they were permanently laid off because there was no more
plumbing work to do. O’Dell, who had done a substantial
amount of boiler work, asked Bonham if there was any boiler
work to do. Bonham said that there was not and that O’Dell
could not be kept on to do boiler work because he did not have
a license. A short while later Bonham approached O’Dell and
Scott separately in the parking lot, as they were cleaning out
their van, and told both, individually, that “some day” he would
tell them the real reason why they were laid off.
When Schneider arrived at work and discovered that O’Dell
and Scott were laid off, he approached Bonham and told him it
was unfair and told Bonham that he felt like his own job was in
jeopardy. Bonham responded that it “was in jeopardy,” that he
should start looking for another job, and that he had not bid any
work since he received the “petition” from the Union on Octo-
ber 31.
On December 19, 1996, the election was held; the results
were two ``Yes votes, three No votes, and two challenged bal-
lots. Scott and O’Dell’s ballots were challenged by Respondent
and are determinative of the outcome of the election.
The day after the election, Schneider arrived at work and saw
O’Hare (whose name had been on the “petition” sent to the
Employer on October 31), and accused O’Hare of letting “us”
down. O’Hare then said, “Don’t start no shit with me” and
Schneider walked away. O’Hare followed him and said, “I
never meant to screw you guys in this deal.” Schneider said,
“It’s too late, you already screwed us.” Schneider again walked
away and O’Hare followed him into the shop where their con-
versation escalated into what Schneider called a very “heated”
argument. Schneider told O’Hare that the “union doesn’t want
you.” O’Hare told Schneider that he should not have voted at
all. Schneider responded, “I thought we could count on you for
your vote.” O’Hare told Schneider that he had changed his
mind. “It’s a free country, I can change my mind so don’t give
me your bullshit.” Bonham came into the shop, after being told
by employee Decker that O’Hare and Schneider were hollering
at each other. Schneider testified that Bonham approached him
and said, “Jim you can’t harass my employees.” When Schnei-
der responded, “who am I harassing?” Bonham countered with,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
438
“You’re laid off because I think you’re the instigator in all
this.” Schneider questioned if that was the reason he was being
laid off and Bonham said, “[N]o, I don’t have any work for
you.”
Booth testified that he heard bits and pieces if an argument
about the union vote and saw Bonham approach and say, “Jim,
you’re harassing my employees and I can’t have that.” O’Hare
testified that Bonham asked him if he was being “harassed” and
he shook his head “yes” without saying anything. He said that
when he started walking back to the office he heard Bonham
tell Schneider he was laid off and to grab his tools. Bonham
testified that Cornell told him Mike and Jim were having an
argument and that Decker then told him it was “real serious,”
that he should get out there, and that they were discussing the
way Mike had voted. Bonham said everything went quiet when
he stepped out back and that he turned to Jim and said, “I can-
not harass you because of the way you voted and you cannot
harass other employees.” Bonham then asserted that Schneider
“started swearing and stuff” so he told Schneider to pick up his
tools and go. He further asserts that Schneider then asked why
he [was] being laid off and that he said because if [sic] lack of
work, even though that was not the real reason.. Latter, [sic]
when examined by his own counsel, Bonham also added that
when Schneider was walking out the door “he threatened me”
by saying that “my lawyer will be contacting you.”
III. DISCUSSION
This proceeding involves the reactive behavior of a small
business owner to the unexpected decision of five of its seven
employees to sign a petition requesting union representation.
Rather than contacting the union representative, owner Bonham
immediately met with and asked his employees what was going
on and then made certain statements about the future of his
business. He thereafter stopped or slowed down its bidding of
new work and permanently laid off two employees just 6 days
before a representation election. It allegedly changed the work-
ing condition of another employee that same day and, on the
day after the election it terminated the union election observer.
It also challenged the ballots of the two employees it had laid
off on December 13 thereby creating a situation where the chal-
lenged ballots are determined by the election results.
A. Alleged 8(a)(1) Violations
Witnesses Booth, O’Dell, Schneider, and Scott gave inde-
pendent, consistent, and believable testimony describing owner
Bonham’s reaction and statements to employees after he
learned of their “petition” for union representation. In addition,
Michael O’Hare was called as a witness by the Respondent (he
is still employed as a service technician) and he was asked
about the meeting of November 1 by Respondent’s counsel:
Q . And what did Mr. Bonham say?
A. He just asked where we thought we’d be working.
Q. And what was the response?
A. Everybody said right here at Bonham Heating.
Q. And what did Mr. Bonham say?
A. He said again that you won’t be working in Glad-
win. “There is no commercial work in Gladwin.”
Q. And did he mention that there would be work in
other cities?
A. Yes he did
Q. And what did he say?
A. He said we’d be traveling a lot - a lot of distance to
our jobs.
Q. Do you recall Mr. Bonham saying in that meeting
that he absolutely would not go union?
A. I don’t recall them words, no
JUDGE BEDDOW: What words do you recall?
THE WITNESS: That he would not go union.
Q. BY MR. PATTERSON: Do you recall him saying that
he would close his doors before he went union?
A. No, I don’t recall that either.
Q. Do you recall any words to that effect?
A. I recall him saying that if he was union that he
could be forced to close his doors.
Q. Okay, and did he elaborate on that?
A. No.
Bonham testified that on receiving the union letter on Octo-
ber 31 he was concerned that the intent of the employees identi-
fied in that letter was to leave their employment with Respon-
dent and that if he would not be able to conduct his business.
Bonham also claimed to be confused as the letter indicated that
Union Representative Shangle had spoken with. Bonham in the
past which he asserts was not true2 and he was unsure of what
the letter meant, as he had no prior experience with unions.
Bonham admitted that he asked the employees where they
wanted to work and they answered him. He explained his
thoughts that he asked about locations because unions typically
worked in bigger cities such as Saginaw, Flint, and Muskegon
and because he also concerned that the company would not be
able afford to operate in the Gladwin area which has tradition-
ally lower wages and he explained that if Respondent had to
raise its rates it could possibly lose some business in the area.
Bonham said that he did not see how it would be financially
possible to keep the Respondent’s business operating in the
Gladwin area if Respondent became a union company but he
denied saying that he would close his doors before he went
union.
My evaluation of Bonham’s demeanor and the content and
tenor of his testimony leads me to conclude that many of his
answers are contrived, self serving, and after-the-fact rationali-
zations designed to place his actual words and action in a more
favorable light.
It is well established that “the Board does not consider sub-
jective reactions, but rather whether, under all the circum-
stances, a Respondent’s remarks reasonably tends to restrain,
coerce, or interfere with employees’ right guaranteed under the
Act.” Sunnyside Home Care Project, 308 NLRB 346 fn. 1
(1992). While interrogation of employees is not unlawful per
se in determining whether or not an interrogation violates Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act, the Board looks at all the circumstances,
see Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984), and Sunnyvale
Medical Clinic, 277 NLRB 1217 (1985). Under the circum-
stances here, including Bonham’s demeanor, I cannot credit his
denial of the statement attributed to him by the General Coun-
sel’s witnesses and I find the employees’ overall testimony
about the context of the meeting is the most trustworthy and
credible.
Here, the record shows that the owner of the Company per-
sistently asked its employees to explain the meaning of a letter
from a union representative, without first attempting to com-
2 Respondent’s records appear to show that Shangle twice left mes-
sages that Bonham did not respond to.
BONHAM HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING
439
municate with the author. He then launched into an obtuse
discussion based on his own extremely speculative conclusions
about what the employees request would lead to. This discus-
sion include the clear threat that any success by the employees
in collectively joining together in a union would result in the
Company’s closing its doors. This threat is a clear and serious
violation of the Act and its pronouncement by the owner of the
Company following his initial persistent interrogation of the
employees constitutes conduct that is coercive in nature.
Moreover, it subsequently was shown not to be an ideal threat
as evidenced by the Respondent’s sudden decision to stop or
reduce bidding on new work and the resulting reduction or
closing down of part of its business. Both, the interrogation
and threat interfere with the employees Section 7 rights and I
find that the Respondent’s actions are shown to be unlawful
and in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, as alleged.
B. Alleged Violations of 8(a)(3)
In proceedings involving changes in conditions of employ-
ment and disciplinary action against employees, applicable law
requires that the General Counsel meet an initial burden of
presenting sufficient evidence to support an inference that the
employees union or other protected concerted activities were a
motivating factor in the employer’s decision to change their
conditions of employment or to discipline them. Here, the
record shows that the Respondent clearly was aware of the
employees’ union activity, that it was aware of which employ-
ees supported the Union and that it specifically knew that each
of the alleged discriminatees was a supporter of the Union. It
also engaged in certain unfair labor practices, as discussed
above, which included statements by the owner that clearly
showed antiunion animus. Other indicia of record include the
timing of O’Dell’s and Scott’s permanent layoff just 6 days
before the election, and Schneider’s discharge the morning after
he acted as the Union’s election observer and, under these cir-
cumstances, I find that the General Counsel has met his initial
burden and made a showing sufficient to support an inference
that the employees’ union activities were a motivating factor in
Respondent’s decision to change the conditions of employment
and to discipline or discharge certain of the employees who
were among the active union supporters. Accordingly, the
testimony will be discussed and the record evaluated in keeping
with the criteria set forth in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083
(1980), see NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462
U.S. 393 (1983), to consider Respondent’s defense and whether
the General Counsel has carried his overall burden.
As pointed out by the Court, in Transportation Management
Corp., supra.
an employer cannot simply present a legitimate reason for its
action but must persuade by a preponderance of the evidence
that the same action would have taken place in the absence of
the protected concerted activity.
Here, the Respondent’s owner made a coercive statement to
the effect that the company would close its doors before it
would go union. The Respondent their proceeded to complain
about its plumbing work (usually performed by union support-
ers O’Dell and Scott) and then stated that he intentional, to get
out of the plumbing business.
Bonham admittedly ceased his plumbing business and
slowed down on bidding for work in general, after the “peti-
tion” and the meeting November 1 and I find that he deliber-
ately sought less work for the company until after the election
was over.
Here, the Respondent makes a representation that because of
the Union’s letter Bonham believed that Scott, as master
plumber, was not going to pull any more permits for Respon-
dent and concluded that if Respondent did not have a master
plumber “willing” to pull permits, the Respondent could not
perform any plumbing work and that it was in the best interest
of the Respondent to eliminate the plumbing aspect of its busi-
ness. The decision to discontinue the plumbing aspect of its
business, left it with 5 to 6 weeks of work left to complete on
outstanding plumbing jobs, following which, on December 13,
the Respondent permanently laid off Master Plumber Scott and
Journeyman Plumber O’Dell. Bonham otherwise admits that
Scott never was asked about and never refused or said he would
not pull plumbing permits and I find that Bonham never at-
tempted to exercise his authority as owner and manager of the
Company to affirmatively preserve the Company’s existing
business or to gain regular future contracts and I find that his
explanation that he was powerless in this respect to be incredu-
lous, unbelievable and pretextual.
As noted above, at this stage of the proceeding it is the Re-
spondent’s burden to persuasively show by a preponderance of
the evidence that it would have permanently laid off these two
employees even in the absence of the union activity. Here, the
Respondent’s reasons are not even shown to be legitimate let
alone persuasive and it is clear that its failure to pursue business
in the normal course of events was deliberate and in direct re-
sponse to the employees organizational attempts. The fact that
it also conveniently was timed to coincide with a date shortly
before the Board’s election on December 19, allows an infer-
ence that its layoff and effective discharge of union supporters
O’Dell and Scott also was pretextual.
Here, the records shows that in keeping with its threat to
close its doors before it would go union, the Respondent delib-
erately abolished the plumbing side of its business and termi-
nate two long time employees in an attempt to eliminate two
union supporters from participation in the election. Accord-
ingly, I find that the General Counsel has met his overall bur-
den and I conclude that it is shown that the Respondent’s ac-
tions in abolishing its plumbing business, slowing its bidding of
other work and permanently laying off employees O’Dell and
Scott all are in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act,
as alleged.
On the same day the Respondent ended O’Dell’s and Scott’s
employment, it changed the locks on the door at its facility as
well as those on the van that O’Dell and Scott had used. It gave
new keys to the office secretary and employees Cornell and
Decker (who were known to be against union organization) and
to O’Hare. Although O’Hare initially had signed the union
“petition” and an authorization card, he subsequently changed
his mind, voted against the Union on December 19, and dis-
closed this to other employees. Union supporters Booth and
Schneider were not given new keys even though Booth was a
long time employee and leadman or foreman. Thereafter,
Booth, although never specifically told he was not in charge
when he was an installer on a two-man crew, was effectively
bypassed in that roll on a job with employee Cornell when all
job discussions with owner Bonham and the customer were
handled by Cornell. The record shows that Booth was the Re-
spondent’s primary heating and sheet metal installer and I find
the Respondent explanation that his job with Cornell was a
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
440
boiler job that had been started by Bonham and Cornell and
therefore Cornell was familiar with the job when Bonham left
(to do sales calls) and was replaced by Booth, displays a legiti-
mate reason that is shown to likely have occurred regardless of
Booth’s and the other employees’ union activities. Moreover,
the record fails to show specific loss of authority in Booth’s job
duties and I am not persuaded that the General Counsel has
shown a violation of the Act in this respect.
Otherwise, however, the Respondent clearly explained that
Booth previously had a key to the shop and that he was respon-
sible for fabricating all ductwork. Bonham then asserted that it
was his “policy” to change locks whenever employees are ter-
minated and that he decided only the three employees who
performed service work and were sometimes on 24 hour call
with a need for access when Bonham isn’t available, actually
needed to have keys. This reasons although seemingly legiti-
mate, fails to explain why the long term job foreman and shop
fabricator should suddenly be made dependent on others for
access to his work area and, in view of the timing of the event
just prior to the election (as well as the concurrent more favor-
able treatment to those who were not union supporters), I am
not persuaded that Booth (and most of the other union support-
ers), would have been denied a key under these circumstance
were it not for the employees’ union activities and the Respon-
dent union animus. Accordingly, I find that the Respondent’s
action in changing locks and denying Booth a replacement key
is shown to be a change in working conditions that was made
for discriminatory reasons and in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the Act. as alleged.
The day after the election employee and union observer
Schneider and employee O’Hare had a prework discussion
about the election results which broke off, then escalated into a
continued argument after O’Hare followed Schneider to the
shop area. At this time the Respondent knew that O’Hare al-
though originally a “petition” signer had joined with the two
promanagement employees to provide the three to two vote
against the Union (discounting the two ballots it challenged).
As set forth above, several witnesses described the argument,
Bonham’s arrival on the scene and the discharge.
I credit Schneider’s testimony (as corroborated in major part
by both Booth and O’Hare), that he and O’Hare had stopped
arguing when Bonham entered the shop, that Bonham immedi-
ately approached him and told him he couldn’t harass Bon-
ham’s employees. Bonham sought no information or explana-
tion from Schneider but merely asked O’Hare if he was being
harassed and when O’Hare nodded his head “yes,” Bonham
told Schneider he was laid off and to grab his tools.
When examined by his own Counsel Bonham admitted that
he had called Schneider the instigator of the argument and that
he based his belief on “comments that the guys told me before I
went in the back.” Bonham also admitted that Schneider asked
why he being laid off and that he untruthfully told him that it
was because of lack of work.
Bonham also said he saw no need to reprimand O’Hare for
his involvement in the argument and he otherwise admitted hat
he knew Schneider was the union observer at the election the
previous day. In his trial testimony Bonham offered the gratui-
tous comment that when he told Schneider he couldn’t harass
other employees Schneider responded by “swearing and stuff.”
This is uncorroborated by any of the other witnesses who de-
scribed the occurrence, and the Respondent otherwise did not
tell Schneider he was being dismissed for violating a work rule
that provides for immediate dismissal for “fighting or abusive
language.’’ The Respondent also did not (until mentioned on
brief) tell Schneider that he was terminated for violation of its
harassment policy which provides:
If you feel you are being harassed or discriminated against,
please see any company officer immediately. Should anyone
be found to be using coercion or a company appointed posi-
tion for harassment or discrimination, he or she will be repri-
manded—which could include possible dismissal.
Here, I do not credit Bonham’s belated testimony that Schnei-
der “swore and stuff.” In any event, there was no showing
what actual “words” were abusive of that they constituted abu-
sive language, or that Bonham relied on this at the time he told
Schneider to leave. Moreover, although Bonham was told
Schneider and O’Hare were arguing, the only direct informa-
tion Bonham had about any “harassment” was his question to
O’Hare and O’Hare’s nonverbal “yes” response, a response that
falls far short of showing that Schneider was using “coercion”
or “a company appointed position” to inflict harassment as
required by its rule.
Clearly, Bonham’s additional and various explanations are
false and pretextual, including his admitted false statement that
Schneider was being laid off because of lack of work. Bonham
made no actual investigation of the circumstances of the argu-
ment he heard about but did not observe, and he immediately
seized on the opportunity to accuse Schneider of being the in-
stigator without giving Schneider an opportunity to defend
himself. Otherwise, the record shows that O’Hare, in fact,
resumed and prolonged the argument by following Schneider to
the shop area, yet Bonham saw no need to learn the facts or
possible mitigating circumstance on Schneider’s part and he
saw no need to reprimand O’Hare for any joint responsibility
he might have had for the event.
At the time he terminated O’Dell and Scott prior to the elec-
tion, Bonham had prophetically warned Schneider that his own
job was in jeopardy and it is clear that the Respondent jumped
upon the first opportunity after the election to rid itself of one
more union supporter. Its discriminatory selection of Schneider
(and not O’Hare) for discipline, its pretextual reasoning and its
imposition of discharge rather than some lesser disciplinary
action does not show that it acted for a legitimate reason and it
clearly is not shown that it would have occurred even in the
absence of the employees’ protected union activity. Accord-
ingly, and I conclude that the General Counsel has met his
overall burden and has shown that the Respondent’s discharge
of Schneider was in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
Act, as alleged.
C. The Challenged Ballots
Here, I also find that as employees O’Dell and Scott were il-
legally terminated prior to the election and otherwise were laid
off due to the Respondent’s own illegal conduct in eliminating
its plumbing business. Accordingly, they were eligible to vote
in the election and I conclude that their ballots should be
counted and that the Respondent’s challenge to their ballots
must be overruled.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
BONHAM HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING
441
3. By interrogating its employees about their intentions re-
garding union representation and threatening to close its doors
if it was forced to go union, the Respondent has interfered with,
restrained, and coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, and thereby has en-
gaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act.
4. By discriminatorily abolishing its plumbing business,
slowing its bidding on other work, changing working condi-
tions by changing locks and failing to reissue key to some em-
ployees and by laying off employees James Schneider, Freder-
ick Scott, and Brian O’Dell because of and in retaliation for the
employees’ engaging in union or other protected concerted
activities, the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act.
5. The challenged ballots of employees Brian O’Dell and
Frederick Scott from the election of December 19, 1996, should
be counted, resulting in the issuance of a certification of results
in Case 7–RC–20978.
6. Except as found here, Respondent is not shown to have
engaged in other unfair labor practices as alleged in the com-
plaint.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find it necessary to order it to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act.
Inasmuch as I found that Respondent violated the Act by lay-
ing off three employees, I find it necessary to order that Re-
spondent be required to reinstate these employees in order to
restore the status quo ante existing prior to its commission of
this unfair practice and to make all of them whole.
With respect to the necessary affirmative action, it is rec-
ommended that Respondent be ordered to reinstate the three
named terminated employees to their former jobs or a substan-
tially equivalent positions and to reestablish it plumbing busi-
ness in a manner consistent with a level and manner of opera-
tion that existed on and prior to November 6, 1996, when it
stopped or slowed bidding new jobs, see Rebel Coal Co., 259
NLRB 258 (1981), and Lean Siegler, Inc., 295 NLRB 857
(1989).
The reinstatement of the employees shall be without preju-
dice to their seniority or other rights and privileges previously
enjoyed, and the Respondent shall make them whole for any
loss of earnings they may have suffered because of the dis-
crimination practiced against them by payment to them a sum
of money to that which they normally would have earned from
the date of the discrimination to the date of reinstatement, in
accordance with the method set forth in F. W. Woolworth Co.,
90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest as computed in New Hori-
zons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987),3 and that Re-
spondent remove from its files any reference to their layoff or
termination and notify them in writing that this has been done
and that evidence of the unlawful termination will not be used
as a basis for future personnel action against them.
The record discussed above shows that the Respondent’s
course of misconduct emanated from upper level management,
was swift and severe and persisted after the postelection period,
3 Under New Horizons, interest is computed at the “short-term Fed-
eral rate” for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amend-
ment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621.
and directly affected a substantial proportion of the unit em-
ployees. Accordingly, the possibility of erasing the effects of
the Respondent’s unfair labor practices is slight and I conclude
that a Gissel bargaining order, as requested by the General
Counsel, is appropriate in order to deter future misconduct and
any reluctance to bargain with the Union.
This added remedy is valid even in the event that the Union
wins the election inasmuch as certification alone does not serve
to correct any unilateral changes which the employer may have
instituted between the time when it was obligated to bargain
and the time when a certification is issued and it is otherwise
appropriate to order that both a certification of representative
issue and a bargaining order issue as of the date that the Union
achieved majority status, see Glengarry Contracting Industries,
258 NLRB 1167 (1981).
Because of the serious nature of the violations and because
the Respondent’s egregious misconduct demonstrates a general
disregard for the employees fundamental rights, it is necessary
that a broad order be issued requiring the Respondent to cease
and desist from infringing in any other manner on rights guar-
anteed employees by Section 7 of the Act, Hickmott Foods, 242
NLRB 1357 (1979).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended4
ORDER
The Respondent, Bonham Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc.,
Gladwin, Michigan, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns,
shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, by
interrogating employees concerning their union sympathies,
and threatening to close its doors if forced to go union.
(b) Terminating or laying off any employees or otherwise
discriminating against them in retaliation for engaging in union
activities or other protected concerted activities.
(c) Abolishing its plumbing business, slowing bidding on
other work, and otherwise changing employee working condi-
tions in retaliation for the employees engaging in union activi-
ties or other protected concerted activities.
(d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or co-
ercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them
by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, reestablish
its plumbing business and resume other bidding practices at the
level and manner of operation that previously existed and rees-
tablish or correct any discriminatory changes in conditions of
employment and offer Brian O’Dell, James Schneider, and
Frederick Scott full reinstatement to their former jobs or, if
those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed.
(b) Make Brian O’Dell, James Schneider, and Frederick
Scott whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered
4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be waived for all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
442
as a result of the discrimination against them in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to the unlawful discharges of Brian
O’Dell, James Schneider, and Frederick Scott and within 3 days
thereafter notify them in writing that this has been done and
that the discharges will not be used against them in any way.
(d) On request, recognize and bargain with the Union as the
exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its employees
in the appropriate unit concerning wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is
reached, embody the understanding in a signed agreement.
(e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Or-
der.
(f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at is
Gladwin, Michigan facility copies of the attached noticed
marked “Appendix.”5 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,
or covered by any other material.
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps the
Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case 7–RC–20978 be remanded
to the Regional Director for Region 7 for such further action as
is necessary based on the findings and conclusions here.
5 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”