329 NLRB 700
TCI Cablevision of Washington
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
700
TCI Cablevision of Washington, Inc. and Todd Hood,
Petitioner and Communications Workers of
America, Local 7855, AFL–CIO. Case 19–RD–
3297
September 30, 1999
DECISION AND CERTIFICATION OF
RESULTS OF ELECTION
BY MEMBERS FOX, HURTGEN, AND BRAME
The National Labor Relations Board, by a three-
member panel, has considered Objections to an election
held January 22, 1997, and the hearing officer’s report
recommending disposition of them. The election was
conducted pursuant to a Stipulated Election Agreement.
The tally of ballots shows 86 for and 87 against the Peti-
tioner, with no challenged ballots.
The Board has reviewed the record in light of the ex-
ceptions and briefs, has adopted the hearing officer’s
findings1 and recommendations, and finds that a Certifi-
cation of Results of Election should be issued.
We affirm the hearing officer’s recommendation to
overrule the Union’s Objection 3. Objection 3 alleged
that the Employer impliedly made a promise to all its
employees that they would receive a pay raise and a re-
tirement plan if they voted the Union out.
No evidence was presented concerning a pay raise.
The Employer, however, has maintained a 401(k) plan
for many years, which plan was discussed at preelection
meetings with employees. The unit employees here have
been excluded from the plan by the plan’s terms. Spe-
cifically, the plan states:
Employee . . . exclud[es] any employee who is in-
cluded in a unit of employees covered by a collective
bargaining agreement between employee representa-
tives and the company . . . which agreement does not
provide for participation in the plan and provided fur-
ther that retirement benefits were the subject of good
faith bargaining between such employee representa-
tives and the company.
The Employer and the Union had never agreed on cov-
erage for the unit employees under this plan.
The hearing officer found that Employer Managers
Hokonson, Bennett, and Humbert held three preelection
meetings with unit employees. In these meetings, the
401(k) plan was addressed by the managers who spoke
from prepared scripts. During the first or second meet-
ing, employees were advised that the plan was available
to most of TCI’s employees and they were told that “no
union has been able to get the plan on a contract from
TCI.”
1 The Union has excepted to some of the hearing officer’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule a hearing
officer’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the
relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Stretch-Tex Co.,
118 NLRB 1359, 1361 (1957). We find no basis for reversing the
findings.
Immediately following that remark, the employees
were told that “TCI has always negotiated with unions to
include employees in its own benefit plans. The only
exceptions are new systems that TCI acquired that have
unions, where TCI has not yet negotiated new union con-
tracts.”
During each meeting, employees were told that TCI
could not promise what would happen to employees if
the Union were voted out, although the Union was free to
make promises. During the third meeting, employees
were told that the Union had not been able to get the
401(k) plan. There was no further elaboration. The
managers answered questions from employees at the
meetings. When asked if the employees would receive
the 401(k) plan if the Union were voted out, the manag-
ers stated that they would. The employees were further
told at that time, “As I have said from the start, we are
not making any promises about what you would get if the
CWA is decertified. And if you think you’ve heard a
promise, disregard it—no one has the authority to make a
promise to you.”
The hearing officer found that, according to the provi-
sions of the Employer’s 401(k) plan, as well as the provi-
sions of ERISA, the plan must be available to all em-
ployees who are not represented by a collective-
bargaining representative. The Employer is not free to
select which nonrepresented employees will receive the
benefit. Thus, the hearing officer found that the repre-
sentations that the 401(k) plan would be available to unit
employees, if the Union were decertified, were predic-
tions and statements of fact. We agree with the hearing
officer that Objection 3 is without merit.
An employer has the right to compare benefits pres-
ently in effect in its unorganized facilities with those
enjoyed by employees in a similar facility which has
union representation. Walgreen Co., 203 NLRB 177,
181 (1973). In this regard, the instant case is analogous
to Viacom Cablevision, 267 NLRB 1141 (1983). There,
in a decertification context similar to that in this case, the
employer compared the pay and benefits of employees in
its nonunion locations with those received in its union-
ized locations. It stated that employees who decertified
the union in one location had done better than those in
another location who remained unionized. The employer
also disclaimed any promise of what the employees
might receive in the future. The Board found that pro-
viding this information about “historical fact” was not
objectionable. Here, as in Viacom, the Employer in-
formed the employees about a “historical fact,” a benefit
which its unrepresented employees received. And, also
as in Viacom, the Employer advised the employees that it
could not make any promises.
The 401(k) plan excludes represented employees only
if the parties bargained in good faith concerning the plan,
329 NLRB No. 66
TCI CABLEVISION OF WASHINGTON
701
and if the contract did not contain the plan. The exclu-
sion applied in this instance, for the contract covering the
instant unit employees did not contain the 401(k) plan.
The record does not show what transpired during previ-
ous negotiations between the parties, or the reason why
the plan was not included in the contract. However, there
is no allegation of bad-faith bargaining.
Contrary to the dissent, we find that the Employer’s
statements about the 401(k) plan did not include an ob-
jectionable promise of benefit. The Employer empha-
sized that it could make no promises. Critically, the Em-
ployer did not tell employees that the only way to receive
the 401(k) was to oust the Union. The dissent argues that
the Employer “made clear” to employees that decertify-
ing the Union was a “necessary condition” for receiving
the benefit. The Employer did no such thing. Rather, the
Employer accurately reported that its nonrepresented
employees received the benefit and that, in the past, the
Union had not successfully negotiated for this benefit.
The Employer never said that it would never agree with
the Union to have such a plan.
The dissent relies in part on the fact that the Employer
raised the 401(k) plan “on its own initiative.” However,
where, as here, an employer is truthful and makes no
promises or threats, it is immaterial that the Employer
was the one who raised the issue. See Duo-Fast Corp.,
278 NLRB 52 (1986).
The dissent also notes that the Employer stated that the
plan was a significant financial benefit. Indeed, it was
such a benefit, but that does not prevent the Employer
from speaking truthfully about it.
The cases cited by our dissenting colleague are inap-
posite to the facts in this case. In Grede Plastics, 219
NLRB 592 (1975), the employer, 3 days before the elec-
tion, sent a letter to its employees in which it described
its nonunion plants as a “team,” pointed out specific
benefits enjoyed by this “team,” which the employees
represented by the union did not have, and implored the
employees to decertify the union, join the “team,” and
enjoy the increased benefits. The clear implication was
that the increased benefits would necessarily flow from
joining the “team” and decertifying. In Ranco Inc., 241
NLRB 685 (1979), the employer constantly emphasized
in communications to the employees that employees at
its nonunion plants enjoyed better benefits, while its su-
pervisors told employees that they would get the better
benefits if they decertified the union. There were no
such promises in the instant case but rather a disclaimer
of promises. In Hertz Corp., 316 NLRB 672 (1995), the
employer clearly conveyed the message to its employees
that they would lose their 401(K) plan immediately if
they voted for the union. Here, there was no 401(k) for
employees to lose. In Georgia-Pacific Corp., 325 NLRB
No. 165 (1998),2 the employer, at a meeting to announce
the award of some bonuses during the critical period,
stated that the bonus system was developed for nonunion
plants; the Board found this conveyed the impression that
the bonus system would be lost if the employees voted
for union representation. Again, as noted above, in this
case, there was no 401(k) for employees to lose. In sum,
the employers in all of these cases engaged in behavior
that is in marked contrast to that of the Employer here.
The Employer here did nothing but inform its employees
of the existence of a retirement plan presently enjoyed by
its nonunion employees. When asked if the employees
here would get the plan if they were not represented by
the Union, the Employer made it clear that it would make
no promises. It did not tell them that they must decertify
the Union to receive the benefit. The Employer only
recited facts and, in our view, it is not objectionable to
truthfully inform employees of the facts.
Accordingly, we adopt the hearing officer’s recom-
mendations and we will issue a certificate of results.
CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS OF ELECTION
IT IS CERTIFIED that a majority of the valid ballots have
not been cast for Communication Workers of America,
Local 7855, AFL–CIO, and that it is not the exclusive
representative of these bargaining unit employees.
MEMBER FOX, dissenting.
Unlike my colleagues and the hearing officer, I find
merit in the Union’s Objection 3. I would therefore set
aside the election and direct a second election.
The relevant facts are as follows. The Employer has
for many years maintained a 401(k) stock purchase plan
in which the Employer matches employee contributions
up to 10 percent of salary. Since its inception, the Em-
ployer has provided the plan only to its nonunion em-
ployees. However, contrary to the hearing officer, this is
not because the plan rules exclude employees who are
“represented by a union.” As the majority decision
notes, the plan documents merely state that the plan cov-
ers all employees of the employer other than employees
who are covered by a collective-bargaining agreement
which does not provide for participation in the plan.
Thus, although at the time of the election, the collective-
bargaining agreement covering the unit employees did
not provide for their participation in the plan, nothing in
the plan would have precluded the Employer from enter-
ing into an agreement with the Union providing for their
participation.
It is undisputed that the Employer, on its own initia-
tive, raised the subject of its 401(k) plan at three captive
audience meetings before the election. At the first of
those meetings, representatives of the Employer advised
2 Member Hurtgen dissented in Georgia-Pacific, and would not have
found the employer’s activity objectionable. However, he agrees that
the instant case is distinguishable. Member Brame agrees that Geor-
gia-Pacific is distinguishable without passing upon its validity.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
702
the employees of the existence of the plan, which they
described as being “like getting a 10% raise.” The em-
ployees were told that TCI offered the plan to all of its
nonunion employees, but that “no union has been able to
get that plan in a contract from TCI.” (The emphasis is
from the prepared script from which the Employer’s
managers read.) At both of the two subsequent meetings,
representatives of the employer again brought up the plan
as a benefit that was offered to employees at its nonunion
facilities. At the third meeting, they again emphasized to
the employees that “[y]our Union was not able to get you
the 401(k) Stock Purchase Plan, so you don’t have that.”
Later in the same meeting, the employees were expressly
told that if they voted the Union out, they would receive
the plan. Finally, on the morning of the election, one of
the employer’s supervisors told employees how well the
stock was doing.
My colleagues and the hearing officer find that this
was not objectionable conduct because in promising that
the employees would receive the 401(k) plan if they
voted to decertify the Union, the Employer was merely
“stating a fact.” But this conclusion misperceives the
nature of the Petitioner’s objection and ignores what I
regard as dispositive Board precedent regarding cam-
paign tactics of the sort engaged in by the Employer
here. In its Objection 3, the Petitioner complained that
“[t]he company implied a promise to all the employees
that they would receive . . . a retirement plan only if they
voted the union out.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the gra-
vamen of the Union’s objection was not only that the
Employer told employees that they would be covered by
the 401(k) plan if the Union was decertified, but that it
conveyed to the employees the message that it would not
agree to allow them to be covered by the 401(k) plan
unless they voted to decertify the Union. As the Peti-
tioner correctly argues, such conduct has long been held
by the Board to be both unlawful and grounds for setting
aside an election.
Thus, in Grede Plastics, 219 NLRB 592, 593 (1975),
the Board set aside an election because of a letter the
Employer sent to employees prior to a decertification
election in which it urged the employees to “consider the
facts” that employees at its nonunion facilities received
larger and more frequent wage increases, enjoyed a better
fringe benefit package, and had greater job security than
the unionized employees had under their union contract.
The letter invited employees to become “part of this suc-
cessful team” of nonunion employees by voting against
the union. In finding the letter to be objectionable, the
Board explained that [s]ince the employees knew that if
the decertification were unsuccessful the Union would be
bargaining with the Employer over wages, fringe bene-
fits, and job security, the employees also knew that it was
within the Employer’s power to agree or not to agree to
employment terms desired by them. Thus it is clear that
the contents of the letter told employees that if they
joined the Employer’s “team” of nonunion employees,
they as “team” members would enjoy “team” benefits.
At the same time the letter had the effect of warning em-
ployees that if they declined to join the “team” by voting
against decertification, the Employer would take a tough
stand during negotiations and would not agree to terms
and conditions of employment comparable to those en-
joyed by the nonunion employees.
The statements of the Employer here were to the same
effect. In the captive audience meetings, the Employer
both explicitly promised the employees that if they voted
to oust the union, they would receive the 401(k) plan
benefit,3 and warned them that if they voted to keep the
Union, the Employer would oppose giving them the
benefit as it had successfully opposed giving the benefit
to any unionized employees in the past. Through this
combination of promise and threat, the Employer thus
made clear what the necessary condition was to be able
to participate in the 401(k) plan: a vote to decertify the
union.
The Employer defends its statements about “no union”
being able to get the 401(k) benefit for represented em-
ployees on grounds that it was just describing the reali-
ties of collective bargaining. But the Employer’s state-
ments contained no reference to the give-and-take of the
negotiating process. Moreover, the Employer cited no
economic or other objective considerations to explain
why it was willing to provide the benefit to its nonunion
employees, but unwilling to give it to employees who
were union represented. In the absence of any such ex-
planation, the clear import of the Employer’s message
was that union status was the determinative factor.
The Board has repeatedly held that such statements
constitute grounds for setting aside an election. Thus, in
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 325 NLRB 867 (1998), the Board
found that the employer had engaged in objectionable
conduct during preelection meetings when it described
its bonus plan as one that was “developed for nonunion
plants,” thereby suggesting to employees that they would
be foreclosed from continuing to participate in the plan if
they chose union representation. Similarly, in Hertz
Corp., 316 NLRB 672, 693 (1995), the Board found ob-
jectionable an employer’s distribution of a summary of
its 401(k) plan which stated that the plan applied only to
3 My colleagues attempt to minimize the significance of the explicit
statement that the employees would receive the 401(k) plan if the Un-
ion was decertified by noting that at other times during the series of
meetings, employer representatives stated that TCI could not promise
what would happen to employees if the Union were voted out.
However, “[i]t is immaterial that an employer professes that he can-
not make any promises, if in fact he expressly or impliedly indicates
that specific benefits will be granted.” Michigan Products, 236 NLRB
1143, 1146 (1978). As the Board held in Lutheran Retirement Village,
315 NLRB 103, 104 (1994), an employer’s rote disclaimers of the
ability to make promises do not negate the objectionable effects of
statements promising benefits if employees vote to decertify their un-
ion.
TCI CABLEVISION OF WASHINGTON
703
nonunion employees. See also Ranco Inc., 241 NLRB
685 (1979) (finding objectionable conduct where em-
ployer, as part of election campaign, emphasized to em-
ployees that their benefits were less than those received
by employees at its nonunion facility, and told the em-
ployees they would get the same benefits as the nonunion
employees if they voted the union out.)
By emphasizing its disparate treatment of union and
nonunion employees with respect to the application of its
401(k) plan, the Employer interfered with the employees’
ability to freely choose whether or not they wished to
continue to be represented by the Union. Accordingly, I
dissent from the decision to certify the election results.