330 NLRB 587
Letter Carriers (Postal Services)
LETTER CARRIERS BRANCH 3126 (POSTAL SERVICE)
587
Branch 3126, National Association of Letter Carri-
ers (NALC), AFL–CIO (United States Postal
Service) and Joe Pitlanish. Cases 7–CB–
11194(P), 7–CB–11485(P), and 7–CB–11722(P)
January 31, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, LIEBMAN, AND HURTGEN
On September 30, 1998, Administrative Law Judge
George Carson II issued the attached bench decision.
The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting
brief. The General Counsel filed cross-exceptions, and
a brief in support of cross-exceptions and in answer to
the Respondent’s exceptions.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this matter to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the re-
cord in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-
clusions as modified below.
1. The General Counsel has excepted to the judge’s
finding that the Respondent did not violate Section
8(b)(2) and (1)(A) of the Act when Union Steward
Greg Swindall demanded that a supervisor never again
give penalty overtime to Joe Pitlanish, a nonmember of
the Union. We find merit in these exceptions.
Swindall was the steward who served as overtime
coordinator, charged with monitoring the Employer’s
assignment of overtime, and representing unit employ-
ees in the resolution of overtime disputes. Pitlanish
was a unit employee who had resigned from the Union
in 1994. Credited testimony shows that Swindall bore
considerable hostility towards Pitlanish because of his
nonmember status. Swindall often referred derisively
to Pitlanish as a “scab” or as “Scab-lanish.” In addi-
tion, the judge found, and we agree, that on January
14, 1997, Swindall unlawfully refused to file and proc-
ess a grievance about overtime for Pitlanish because of
his nonmember status.
Just a few days earlier, on January 8, Swindall had
an encounter with Postal Service Supervisor Lauri
Hunsanger about Pitlanish. Unit employee Steven
Dolmage witnessed this incident. Swindall believed
that Hunsanger was responsible for assigning “penalty
overtime” to Pitlanish on January 7.2 He angrily de-
manded that Hunsanger explain this assignment. Hun-
sanger said that Swindall should talk to the supervisor
who had actually assigned the work. Still, according
to Hunsanger’s uncontradicted testimony, Swindall
“was adamant about making sure that I did not use Joe
Pitlanish for any penalty overtime, at any time in the
future . . . he just kept saying not to use Scab-lanish.”
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an ad-
ministrative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear pre-
ponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are
incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd.
188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the re-
cord and find no basis for reversing the findings.
In accord with the Respondent’s exception, we correct the judge’s
misstatement of testimony about a statement by Union Steward
Ammar. She said that she had been “reamed” in the past for repre-
senting a “nonmember,” not for representing the Charging Party.
This misstatement does not affect the judge’s conclusion that Am-
mar’s statement violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A).
The judge offered several reasons for finding that
Swindall’s conduct did not violate Section 8(b)(2):
Swindall did not follow up his complaint with anyone
else; he did not talk to the supervisor who made the
penalty overtime assignment; he did not direct that
only union members receive penalty overtime; no
other representative of the Respondent took action; and
the assignment of penalty overtime violates the parties’
collective-bargaining agreement. We find that none of
these reasons present a valid defense of Swindall’s
conduct.
Acting in his capacity as the Respondent’s agent
with responsibility for overtime matters, Swindall at-
tempted to cause a management representative of the
Postal Service to discriminate against Pitlanish because
of his nonmember status. Contrary to the judge, there
is no evidence suggesting that Swindall was seeking to
enforce a contract ban on the assignment of penalty
overtime to all unit employees. He clearly objected
only to the assignment of penalty overtime, with the
resulting monetary benefit of double hourly wages, to
a particular nonmember employee, and he indicated
that he was doing so because the employee was not a
member. It is irrelevant to an analysis of this conduct
that neither Swindall nor any other agent for the Re-
spondent took any other action or sought more broadly
to limit overtime assignments to union members. Re-
gardless of whether the Respondent had an unlawful
discriminatory policy on penalty overtime assign-
ments—and there is no allegation that it did—it was a
violation of Section 8(b)(2) and, derivatively, Section
8(b)(1)(A) for one of its agents to attempt to cause
Pitlanish’s employer to discriminate against him be-
cause he was not a union member, thereby encourag-
ing membership in the Respondent. See Letter Carri-
ers Branch 86 (Postal Service), 315 NLRB 1176,
1177–1178 (1994). This discrimination against a
nonmember in the administration of contractual over-
time responsibilities also constituted a breach of the
Respondent’s duty of fair representation and, as such,
was an independent violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A).
2 The parties’ collective-bargaining agreement prohibited the as-
signment of additional overtime to employees who had worked 10
hours on their regular workday or 8 hours on their day off or “non-
scheduled day.” Such assignments did take place, however, result-
ing in “penalty overtime” also referred to as “double time” or “v-
time,” where the affected employee was compensated at twice the
regular hourly pay rate.
330 NLRB No. 85
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
588
Finally, Swindall’s statements to Hunsanger, made in
the presence of a unit employee, would reasonably
tend to convey to unit employees a union steward’s
willingness to retaliate against a nonmember em-
ployee. His statements therefore had the tendency to
restrain and coerce employees in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A). Letter Carriers Branch 47 (Postal Ser-
vices), 327 NLRB 529 (1999); Letter Carriers Branch
86 (Postal Services), supra, 315 NLRB at 1178.
2. As indicated above, the judge found, and we
agree, that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
by failing and refusing to file Pitlanish’s grievance
alleging the failure to take into account “overtime
missed opportunities” for the fourth quarter of 1996
when determining which employees had 14 fewer
hours than the employee with the most overtime hours
on December 30, 1996. However, we shall modify the
judge’s recommended Order for this violation to ac-
cord with Iron Workers Local 377 (California Iron
Workers Employers Council), 326 NLRB 375 (1998).
Therefore, “if the grievance cannot be resolved
through the usual contractual channels and the ques-
tion of how the grievant would have fared must be
resolved in compliance, a make-whole remedy may be
imposed only if the General Counsel shows that [Pit-
lanish] ‘would have won on the merits’ if the griev-
ance had been ‘properly pursued’ by the Union.” Id. at
380. [Citations omitted.] Furthermore, if the General
Counsel makes the required showing, the Respondent
shall only be obligated to make Pitlanish whole for any
increase in damages he suffered as a consequence of
the Respondent’s refusal to process that grievance,
together with interest.3
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent,
Branch 3126, National Association of Letter Carriers
(NALC), AFL–CIO, Royal Oak, Michigan, its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall take the action set
forth in the Order as modified.
1. Insert the following as paragraph 1(e), and relet-
ter the subsequent paragraph.
“(e) Attempting to cause the Employer to discrimi-
nate against an employee, because the employee is not
a union member, by telling a supervisor, in the pres-
ence of a unit employee, not to assign penalty overtime
to a nonmember employee.”
2. Substitute the following for paragraph 2(b) and
reletter subsequent paragraphs.
.
3 We shall also modify the recommended Order and notice to in-
clude a provision that Respondent bear the reasonable costs of an
attorney of Pitlanish’s choosing to represent him at any grievance
proceedings, including arbitration, that may take place.
“(b) Permit Joe Pitlanish to be represented by his
own counsel at any grievance proceedings, including
arbitration or other resolution proceedings, and pay the
reasonable legal fees of such counsel.
“(c) In the event that it is not possible for the Re-
spondent to pursue the grievance, and if the General
Counsel shows in compliance that a timely pursued
grievance would have been successful, make whole
Joe Pitlanish and any other employees for any increase
in damages suffered as a consequence of the Respon-
dent’s failure to process the grievance, together with
interest.”
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
administrative law judge
MEMBER HURTGEN, dissenting in part.
For the reasons fully set forth in my dissenting opin-
ion in Iron Workers Local 377 (California Iron Work-
ers Employers Council), 326 NLRB 375 (1999), I
would not limit the relief due Charging Party Joe Pit-
lanish based on the Respondent’s unlawful failure to
file a grievance on his behalf. As more fully stated in
that dissent, I would adhere to the Board’s established
policy of seeking full relief for victims of unfair labor
practices and not the “half-a-loaf” relief my colleagues
would afford to victims of this type of 8(b)(1)(A) vio-
lation.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or-
dered us to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to file grievances on be-
half of any employee because that employee is not a
member of the Union.
WE WILL NOT tell employees that union members
will be given preferred treatment over nonmembers, or
that stewards will be criticized for representing non-
members.
WE WILL NOT fail to provide Joe Pitlanish, or any
other employee represented by Branch 3126, National
Association of Letter Carriers (NALC), AFL–CIO,
upon request, with copies of grievances that the re-
quester initiated.
WE WILL NOT refuse to sign requests for temporary
schedule change for any employee because that em-
ployee is not a member of the Union.
WE WILL NOT instruct or attempt to cause the United
States Postal Service to refrain from assigning penalty
overtime to any employee because that employee is not
a member of the Union.
LETTER CARRIERS BRANCH 3126 (POSTAL SERVICE)
589
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain
or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL promptly request the United States Postal
Service to consider the grievance of employee Joe
Pitlanish concerning overtime missed opportunities
and, if it agrees to do so, WE WILL process the
grievance with due diligence.
WE WILL permit Joe Pitlanish to be represented by
his own counsel at any grievance proceedings, includ-
ing arbitration or other resolution proceedings that may
follow from our efforts on Pitlanish’s behalf, and WE
WILL pay the reasonable legal fees of such counsel.
WE WILL, in the event that it is not possible to pursue
the grievance, and if the General Counsel of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board shows in compliance
proceedings that a timely pursued grievance would
have been successful, make whole Joe Pitlanish and
any other employees for any increases in damages suf-
fered as a consequence of our refusal to process that
grievance, together with interest.
BRANCH 3126, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF LETTER
CARRIERS (NALC), AFL–CIO
Kristen M. Niemi, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Michelle Dunham Guerra, Esq., for the Respondent.
BENCH DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
GEORGE CARSON II, Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Detroit, Michigan, on August 20 and 21, 1998.
Upon charges filed by Joe Pitlanish, an individual, a consoli-
dated complaint issued on June 8, 1998.1 The complaint al-
leges that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2)
of the National Labor Relations Act. Respondent’s timely
answer, as amended, admits service of the charges, the juris-
diction of the Board, and the status of its officers and stew-
ards as agents. At the conclusion of the hearing, I issued a
Bench Decision pursuant to Section 102.35(a)(10) of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations.
Consistent with the allegations of the complaint, I found
that Respondent failed and refused to file and process a
grievance that Charging Party Joe Pitlanish attempted to file
in January 1997, regarding the calculation of “overtime
missed opportunities” for the fourth quarter of 1996. Pitlan-
ish’s credible testimony established that he was aware of
occasions when employees did not work overtime that was
available to them but did not thereafter have those hours
counted against them on the overtime tracking sheet. Review
of the transcript of my decision reveals that I did not specifi-
cally state that the grievance was “not clearly frivolous;”
however, that finding is implicit in my decision and is hereby
1 The charge in Case 7–CB–11194(P) was filed on January 24,
1997, and was amended on March 24, 1997. The charge in Case 7–
CB–11485(P) was filed on September 12, 1997, and was amended
on November 24, 1997. The charge in Case 7–CB–11722(P) was
filed on May 1, 1998, and was amended on June 10, 1998.
made. The merits of the grievance cannot be determined
without making various calculations. For that reason, the
merits of the grievance were not litigated at the hearing. If
necessary, they may be litigated at the compliance stage of
this proceeding. Letter Carriers Local 233 (Postal Service),
311 NLRB 541, 542 (1993). Although counsel for the Gen-
eral Counsel argued that Respondent failed to file and proc-
ess a similar grievance for the first quarter of 1997, I made
no finding in this regard since this issue was not fully liti-
gated and there is no charge alleging such a failure. The only
charge relating to failure to process a grievance was the
charge in Case 7–CB–11194(P) which was last amended on
March 24, 1997, prior to the end of the first quarter of 1997.
Although the decision states my finding that Respondent
breached its duty of fair representation as to Pitlanish, the
transcript, at page 333, line 11, reads as if I agreed that there
was no discrimination against him. My ineptly phrased re-
mark was intended to refer to my later finding, reflected at
page 339, lines 14 through 25, that, notwithstanding the dis-
crimination against Pitlanish, Respondent does not have a
policy of not representing nonmembers.
Even though Respondent does not have such a policy, I
found that Steward Linda Ammar informed Pitlanish that she
had been criticized for representing him, a nonmember.
I also found that Respondent, notwithstanding the request
of the Charging Party, failed to provide him with a copy of a
class action grievance that he had initiated. In making this
finding, I credited Pitlanish. I noted that Steward Michael
Rock, who admitted that Pitlanish requested a copy of the
grievance, indicated that he did not have it, but did not iden-
tify who did have it. Review of the transcript reveals that
Pitlanish requested a copy of the grievance at the time he
filed it, whereas, Rock’s testimony that he had turned the
grievance in to the “branch,” without identifying an individ-
ual, related to a later time, after the grievance had been set-
tled. The foregoing further confirms my finding that Respon-
dent violated the Act by failing to provide Pitlanish with a
copy of the class action grievance that he filed, and of which
he requested a copy at the time he filed it. Letter Carriers
Branch 529, 319 NLRB 879 (1995).
Finally, I found that Acting Steward Greg Swindall failed
and refused to sign a request for temporary schedule change
for the Charging Party.
I found no merit to the 8(b)(2) allegation since the as-
signment of penalty overtime violates the parties’ collective-
bargaining agreement and there was no demand that such
overtime be assigned to union members. I also found that
there was no evidence of discrimination with regard to the
manner in which Respondent settled three grievances with
the United States Postal Service.
I certify the accuracy of the portion of the transcript that
sets out my decision, attached as Appendix A, page 330, line
1, through page 337, line 11 and page 337, line 22 through
page 342, line 5 and lines 12 through 17.2
2 I have corrected punctuation, capitalization, minor wording mis-
takes, and case-citation errors in the transcript by making obvious
physical inserts and cross-outs. I have inserted the correct citation to
art. 8 of the parties’ collective-bargaining agreement on p. 330, L.
14. I have corrected wording on p. 340, L. 14, and the identification
of the administrative law judge on p. 341, L. 20.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
590
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Board had jurisdiction over the United States
Postal Service pursuant to the Postal Reorganization Act,
Section 1209.
2. Branch 3126, National Association of Letter Carriers
(NALC), AFL–CIO, is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By failing and refusing to file and process the griev-
ance of Joe Pitlanish since January 14, 1997, and by failing
and refusing to sign a request for temporary schedule change
for a nonmember, the Respondent Union breached its duty of
fair representation in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act.
4. By informing employees that a steward had been criti-
cized for representing a nonmember and by failing to re-
spond to a nonmember’s request for a copy of a grievance he
initiated, the Respondent Union has restrained and coerced
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act thereby violating Section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Union has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
Respondent failed to file or pursue the grievance of Joe
Pitlanish regarding the failure to take into account “overtime
missed opportunities” for the fourth quarter of 1996 when
determining which employees had 14 fewer hours than the
employee with the most overtime hours on December 30,
1996. Respondent shall be ordered to request the United
States Postal Service to consider the grievance and, if it
agrees to do so, shall pursue the grievance with due dili-
gence. In the event it is not possible to pursue the grievance,
this matter shall be shall be resolved at the compliance stage
of this proceeding. Respondent shall make whole Pitlanish
and any other employees for loss of earnings as a result of its
failure to file and pursue the grievance by payment to them
for the overtime to which they would have been entitled, if
any, plus interest as computed in New Horizons for the Re-
tarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).3
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended4
ORDER
The Respondent, Branch 3126, National Association of
Letter Carriers (NALC), AFL–CIO, Royal Oak, Michigan,
its officers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
.
3 In order to determine whether all overtime missed opportunities
were properly counted, it will be necessary to review time records
which reflect the hours an employee worked and whether available
overtime hours that the employee could have worked were properly
counted against that employee on the occasions when the employee
did not work the overtime.
4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and rec-
ommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
(a) Failing and refusing to file and process grievances be-
cause the grievants are not members of the Union.
(b) Informing employees that a steward had been criti-
cized for representing a nonmember.
(c) Failing to provide Joe Pitlanish, or any other employee
represented by Branch 3126, National Association of Letter
Carriers (NALC), AFL–CIO, upon request, with copies of
grievances that the requestor initiated.5
(d) Failing and refusing to sign a Request for Temporary
Schedule Change for a nonmember.
(e) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act
(a) Request the United States Postal Service to consider
the grievance of employee Joe Pitlanish concerning overtime
missed opportunities and, if it agrees to do so, process the
grievance with due diligence.
(b) In the event that it is not possible to pursue the griev-
ance, make whole Joe Pitlanish and any other employees for
loss of earnings as a result of its failure to file and pursue the
grievance by payment to them for the overtime to which they
would have been entitled, if any, plus interest.
(c) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
union office in Royal Oak, Michigan, copies of the attached
notice marked “Appendix B.”6 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being
signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall
be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places
including all places where notices to members are customar-
ily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respon-
dent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
(d) Deliver to the Regional Director for Region 7 signed
copies of the notice in sufficient number for posting by the
Employer at its Troy, Michigan, facility, if it wishes, in all
places where notices to employees are customarily posted.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with
the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible
official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the
steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
APPENDIX A
330
This case, of course, arises in the context of life at the
postal service unit in Troy, Michigan. There is history, as is
testified to and as the formal papers reflect, with regard to
prior charges having been brought by the Charging Party,
Mr. Pitlanish.
Overall, I find few credibility resolutions that I must make
in this case. And, therefore, my summarization of the facts
5 Pitlanish obtained a copy of the grievance after filing an unfair
labor practice charge, therefore no affirmative remedy is required.
6 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States
court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of
the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order
of the National Labor Relations Board.”
LETTER CARRIERS BRANCH 3126 (POSTAL SERVICE)
591
and the application of appropriate law shall basically be co-
extensive with my discussion of the alleged violations begin-
ning, actually, with the earliest violation which is the focus
for the 8(b)(2) charge with regard to comments relating to
double time.
I note that Article 8 Sec. 5F indicates that the working of
over 8 hours on a non-scheduled day results in penalty over-
time. That, of course, is a contract violation.
The testimony from Ms. Hunsanger was that Mr. Swindall
indicated that he did not want—I believe one person testified
“SOB” and the other person testified “scab-lantis”—to re-
ceive any more penalty overtime.
And, Ms. Hunsanger indicated that this was not her prob-
lem, that another supervisor, an individual identified, I be-
lieve by the name of Chris, had been the supervisor responsi-
ble that day and that it was the
331
supervisor’s responsibility.
With regard to this, certainly Mr. Swindall’s language,
with regard to his reference to Mr. Pitlanish, was not appro-
priate. He did not, so far as the record shows, have any con-
tact with anyone other than Ms. Hunsanger. He didn’t say
anything to the supervisor who had been responsible at the
time. And there’s no indication that any other representative
of the Union took any action whatsoever.
Going back to the specific comments that Mr. Swindall
made to Ms. Hunsanger, he did not request that penalty pay
be paid only to members. And if, hypothetically, there was a
pattern of management and the postal service assigning pen-
alty overtime to nonmembers then there would be the sug-
gestion of a Section 8(a)(3) violation by the postal service in
favoring nonmembers over union members.
Specifically as a result of the absence of any follow-up,
any contact with the specific supervisor involved and any
institutional action, I find no 8(b)(2) violation.
Chronologically, we now come to the 14th of January.
That is the date where Mr. Swindall referred, indicated, to
Ms. Hunsanger and Mr. Pitlanish that he was not going to
assist “that”—and I believe that the word
332
is “jerky.” In his testimony Mr. Swindall indicated that there
were personal differences between him and Mr. Pitlanish.
Notwithstanding those personal differences, the record
indicates that Mr. Swindall regularly referred to Mr. Pitlanish
in less than flattering terms; referring to him as “scab” and
“scab-lanish.” How Mr. Pitlanish was to decipher and deter-
mine that this refusal was for a personal reason as opposed to
his non-membership, in view of the manner in which Mr.
Swindall referred to him, is somewhat beyond my
comprehension.
ast.
I do concur in Mr. Swindall’s statement that it is not the
prerogative of management to determine which steward will
represent which employee. By the same token, a steward
may not determine which employee he or she will not repre-
sent if the basis for that refusal is the employee’s
non-membership in a labor organization.
Thereafter, and this was according to the record on or
about January the 13th or 14th, he consulted with Ms. Am-
mar. Insofar as there is no specific evidence in the record
with regard to exactly what was conferred about other than
concern of overtime in the 4th quarter, that would be a fail-
ing on the part of Ms. Ammar to take notes and fill out a
grievance form.
The testimony indicates that in the conversation Ms.
333
Ammar indicated, at that time anyway, that she would look
into it or something to that effect.
She also indicated to Mr. Pitlanish that she had been criti-
cized—the testimony, I believe, was “reamed”—for
representing him in the p
Counsel for Respondent argues that I should look upon
this as an isolated instance and further argues that there’s no
proof of specific discrimination or specific discriminatory
intent with regard to the Charging Party.
I agree and that will become clear when I start talking
about the August grievances. By the same token, I can not
treat this as an isolated instance on the basis of the record in
this case and I would note that the failure to include Mr.
Pitlanish in class action grievances of which he—in which he
most certainly was entitled to a portion of the remedy, the
exclusion of him from those, in fact, would establish a spe-
cific discriminatory motive with regard to him.
And therefore, I do not consider the inclusion of him to
obviate the conclusion of discrimination with regard to the
specific grievance that he attempted to file in January.
Relative to that, I note specifically, that the only grievance
in the file in the record in this case
334
relative to overtime 4th quarter 1996 is Respondent’s 1
which on its face shows that it was settled on the 10th of
January three or four days before Mr. Swindall determined
that he wasn’t going to deal with “that jerk” and Ms. Ammar
indicated that she was going to look into it.
Ms. Ammar’s looking into it resulted in a subsequent con-
versation in which she indicated that things had changed, but
she was not sure exactly what the change was.
Finally, with the assistance of steward Nancarrow, in Feb-
ruary, a grievance was filed. The record, however, does not
reflect the disposition of that grievance and Respondent has
offered no evidence with regard to what became of it.
Moving on to August, the complaint alleges that on or
about August 19, Respondent refused to provide the Charg-
ing Party with a copy of a grievance he filed regarding ap-
proximately two hours of overtime, and then, in paragraph
13, indicates that Respondent by Swindall settled the griev-
ance described above in paragraph ten in favor of unit em-
ployees who are members but refused to include the Charg-
ing Party.
The evidence, of course, indicates that paragraph 13 is to-
tally wrong; that Mr. Swindall settled two other
335
grievances, grievances which when Mr. Pitlanish raised the
issue with him, told Mr. Pitlanish just as he told Mr. Esper;
“Those are being taken care of.”
That is, the union member and the non-union member got
the exact same information from the steward. As everyone is
aware, a union is privileged to act within a wide range of
reasonableness with regard to serving the unit that it repre-
sents. Ford v. Hoffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953).
General Counsel has presented no evidence that with re-
gard to non-overtime equalization grievances filed at the end
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
592
of the quarter—that is, General Counsel has presented no
evidence with regard to specific violation grievances, that the
Union historically sought to divvy up the pie among all per-
sons on the overtime list.
There is no question that the remedy for everybody over
14 hours went to all of them and that is what Mr. Pitlanish
was included in with regard to, I believe, it was Respon-
dent’s 5(b).
But there is no evidence that at any time after 1994, when
Mr. Pitlanish ceased to be a member, the Union changed the
manner in which it settled overtime-specific grievances.
The testimony of Mr. Swindall with regard to his settling
on behalf of the single employee who didn’t get
336
the overtime or the two employees who were lowest or eight
employees who were lowest is certainly within the wide
range of reasonableness afforded a collective bargaining
agent in representing its unit.
My review of specifically Respondent’s 7, the tracking
sheet for 8–14–97 indicates that before Mr. Pitlanish would
have been reached there was a T. Jenkens who would have
been reached.
And I note that if, in fact, I were going to assume some
sort of favoritism or non-favoritism, that if it went up to Pit-
lanish and then went one more person, it would have in-
cluded Mr. Swindall, himself.
So with regard to paragraph 13, I find no violation of the
Act with regard to the manner in which the union elected to
settle the grievances.
Going back now to paragraph 10, I found Mr. Rock’s tes-
timony to be relatively truthful, what there was of it. His
recollection was not particularly clear.
The Charging Party, Mr. Pitlanish, credibly testified to re-
questing a copy of the grievance. And Mr. Rock, although
indicating that it was no longer in his custody, did not iden-
tify whose custody it was in, whether he made any attempt to
get it or otherwise.
I am aware of no authority that would prohibit a union
from providing a copy of a class action grievance
337
to the individual who was the moving force behind the filing
of that class action grievance.
And certainly in a situation such as this where the individ-
ual has had extreme difficulty in filing grievances and, as of
August the 19th, still was unaware of what, if anything, had
occurred to the grievance that he had filed though Mr.
Nancarrow in late February, certainly under those
circumstances, I can appreciate his desire to obtain a copy of
the grievance, which he understood had been filed on his
behalf by Mr. Rock. Relative to that, I would cite Letter
Carriers Branch 529, 319 NLRB 879 (1995). I note that
counsel for Respondent argues in her memorandum to me
that the case was wrongly decided. I, of course, am bound by
Board law and find that the violation,
338
particularly, if nothing else, the lack of inquiry by Mr. Rock
with regard to taking the request seriously, constitutes a vio-
lation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
I found the testimony of—off the record. (A brief recess.)
JUDGE CARSON: On the record. I found the testimony of
Mr. Esper, with regard to Mr. Swindall saying something
about paying light duty and employees and not scabs to be
insufficiently clear upon which to base a Section 8(b)(1)(A)
violation. He did not testify that Mr. Swindall made the
statement that Mr. Esper, as an employee, made to Mr. Pit-
lanish.
And in view of his vague testimony, I question the reli-
ability of his recollection. Notwithstanding, what was said,
what he did or did not recall, I do not credit that Mr. Swin-
dall made a statement to him to the effect of scabs not being
paid.
That brings me, I believe, to the final allegation of the
complaint with regard to the arbitrary refusal of an oral re-
quest for a request for a temporary schedule change. I do not
find Mr. Swindall to be incredible; however, I do note from
his testimony that he acknowledges that when Mr. Pitlanish
approached him, he questioned whether he had a 2070.
If he was unwilling to sign the document, why did he
339
ask the question? And, in that regard, I find consistent with
Mr. Pitlanish’s testimony that there were no other stewards
available, that he did have the authority to sign, and in fact
refused to.
If, in fact, other stewards were available, why would he
have played games with Mr. Pitlanish by asking him whether
he had the form necessary to talk to him?
I note Respondent’s argument that Mr. Pitlanish, himself,
may have been playing games by waiting until late in the
day. However, I credit Mr. Pitlanish’s testimony that he got
his mail together and that the logical time to attempt to get
this done was as he was going out the door.
In view of the foregoing, and the entire record, and con-
trary to the argument of General Counsel, I do not find that
there is a policy by Respondent to discriminate against
non-members. However, as this record amply demonstrates,
and as my findings indicate, an action occurred and state-
ments were made which clearly interfered with the rights of
non-members.
In this regard, specifically, I note that Letter Carriers Lo-
cal 233 (Postal Service), 311 NLRB 541 (1993), concluded,
as I am concluding, that notwithstanding the absence of a
policy to discriminate, that a failure to fairly represent in fact
has occurred.
340
With regard to that, I am finding that by refusing to file
and process Charging Party Joe Pitlanish’s early-January
1997 grievance regarding 4th quarter overtime, the union
breached its duty of fair representation in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
By refusing to sign the request for a temporary schedule
change on April 13, 1998, the Respondent breached its duty
of fair representation in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act.
With regard to the latter, there is no remedy. With regard
to the former, the remedy will be that set out in Rubber
Workers Local 250 (Mack-Wayne Closures), 279 NLRB
1074 (1986), as will be described in my order which will
accompany this decision when it is actually issued in hard
copy. I will direct that the union seek to have the grievance
that Mr. Pitlanish attempted to file processed and if there is a
LETTER CARRIERS BRANCH 3126 (POSTAL SERVICE)
593
refusal to process it, then as a matter of compliance the Re-
gion would be charged with the responsibility of determining
what the applicable back pay is.
Please note, with regard to this; the testimony before me
and the documentary evidence indicates that we are dealing
with a somewhat convoluted area. It may well be that there is
not one penny of back pay due.
341
The—Mr. Swindall did not recall when the penalty over-
time gimmick, or game—I’ve forgotten exactly what his
word was—ceased to play. And, General Counsel did not
present Mr. Pitlanish with regard to his recollection on that.
Insofar as the equalization of penalty overtime aspect was
over and done by then, it would seem that there might very
well be no back pay whatsoever.
Even if the penalty back pay is there, we have at this point
no idea what amounts, if any, are involved. And certainly on
the basis of everything that I’ve seen in this record, it may
very well be that even if there is some monetary remedy, Mr.
Pitlanish, the Charging Party, would not be included in it.
COURT REPORTER: Hold on and let me change this tape
please.
JUDGE CARSON: Off the record. (Put in new cassette
tape.)
COURT REPORTER: All right.
JUDGE CARSON: On the record. In view of the foregoing,
and the entire record, I find, in summary that the Respondent
did violate Section 8(b)1(A) of the Act as alleged in para-
graphs 7, 10, and 14 of the complaint. And I shall issue an
order consistent with that finding. I’m sorry. Also paragraph
8.
342
And, the General Counsel has not, by the greater weight of
the evidence, established a violation of the Act with regard to
paragraphs 9, 11, and 13.
There being nothing further, that concludes my decision.
JUDGE CARSON: I note that I did not indicate specifically
that I found that General Counsel had not sustained the bur-
den of proof with regard to paragraph 12 with regard to
statements relating to favoring discriminating and my discus-
sion indicates that I’ve decided that basically on credibility
grounds.