333 NLRB 655
FleetBoston Pavilion
FLEETBOSTON PAVILION
655
DLC Corp. d/b/a FleetBoston Pavilion and Interna-
tional Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees
and Moving Picture Technicians and Allied
Crafts of the United States and its Territories
and Canada, Petitioner. Case 1–RC–21210
March 16, 2001
DECISION AND CERTIFICATION OF
REPRESENTATIVE
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN AND WALSH
The National Labor Relations Board, by a three-
member panel, has considered objections to an election
held on August 28, 2000, and the hearing officer’s report
recommending disposition of them. The election was
conducted pursuant to a Decision and Direction of Elec-
tion issued by the Regional Director on July 24, 2000.
The tally of ballots shows 29 for and 0 against the Peti-
tioner, with 1 challenged ballot, which was insufficient to
affect the results.
The Board has reviewed the record in light of the ex-
ceptions and briefs, and adopts the hearing officer’s rec-
ommendations1 only to the extent consistent with this
Decision and Certification of Representative.
1. The Employer operates an outdoor entertainment
venue in Boston, Massachusetts, known as the FleetBos-
ton Pavilion (Pavilion). The Employer and the Peti-
tioner’s Local 11 are parties to a collective-bargaining
agreement covering half the stagehands working at any
given time at the Pavilion. The election was held in a
unit of all the Employer’s stagehands.
In Objection 1, the Employer contends that it was ob-
jectionable conduct for the Petitioner to promise during
its campaign, to negotiate a collective-bargaining agree-
ment that would base entitlement to work on the amount
of time the employee had worked for the Employer at the
Pavilion. We agree with the hearing officer that the Peti-
tioner’s conduct was not objectionable and that the Em-
ployer’s reliance on Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., 261
NLRB 125 (1982), to support its argument that Objection
1 be sustained, is misplaced. However, we do not agree
with his distinguishing of Alyeska from this case on the
basis that Alyeska involved “intra-unit discrimination.”
The Board has held that
Employees are generally able to understand that a un-
ion cannot obtain benefits automatically by winning an
election but must seek to achieve them through collec-
tive bargaining. Union promises . . . are easily recog-
nized by employees to be dependent on contingencies
beyond the Union’s control and do not carry with them
the same degree of finality as if uttered by an employer
who has it within his power to implement promises or
benefits. [Smith Co., 192 NLRB 1098, 1101 (1971).]
1 In the absence of exceptions, we adopt pro forma the hearing offi-
cer’s recommendation to overrule the Employer’s Objections 2 and 4.
Alyeska represents a limited exception to this general
rule. In Alyeska, the union controlled “all access to con-
struction jobs in Alaska” for the employees participating
in the election.2 Therefore, when the union suggested
that the only way employees could obtain a union card
was by voting for the union in the upcoming election,
and that “those fortunate enough to possess a Local 1547
membership card would be in an extremely favorable
priority position [when it came to hiring] compared with
those lacking a card,”3 it was clear not only that the union
was promising to grant members an advantage over
nonmembers in obtaining jobs, but also that the union
had the power to effectuate that promise. In Station Op-
erators, Inc., 307 NLRB 263 fn. 1 (1992), the Board
made clear that the holding in Alyeska was tied to its
special facts:
In Alyeska Pipeline, the Board found that a union en-
gaged in objectionable conduct by suggesting during an
election campaign that members would have an advan-
tage over nonmembers in obtaining jobs through the
union’s exclusive hiring hall. The situation here is not
akin to the hiring hall context[] in [Alyeska], where the
union controlled access to jobs. In addition, the Peti-
tioner’s letter does not promise to represent or treat
members differently from nonmembers, but rather sets
forth the benefits that allegedly could be obtained from
collective bargaining and union membership. Such
statements do not exceed the bounds of privileged
campaign propaganda.
Here, unlike Alyeska, the Union does not maintain ex-
clusive control of staffing and referrals. Rather, hiring
procedures for the Pavilion would be subject to the col-
lective-bargaining process. In addition, the Union’s
promise was made to all employees without reference to
union membership or support. Under these circum-
stances, we agree with the hearing officer that Objection
1 should be overruled.
2. Objection 3 alleges that the Petitioner’s designation
of Local 11 President Robert P. Volosevich as the Peti-
tioner’s election observer was objectionable because he
was (1) not an employee of the Employer and (2) respon-
sible for referring eligible voters for work at FleetBoston
Pavilion and other venues where Local 11 supplies em-
ployees.
2 261 NLRB at 127.
3 Id. at 126.
333 NLRB No. 79
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
656
We agree with the hearing officer that Volosevich’s
serving as the Petitioner’s observer during the election
did not constitute objectionable conduct.4 First, Vo-
losevich had worked frequently for the Employer until
about 4 years ago when he sustained a back injury on the
job. Indeed, Volosevich is scheduled to undergo surgery
in the near future which, if successful, will allow him to
resume the work he had performed for the Employer. In
view of Volosevich’s employment history with the Em-
ployer, he was capable, as election observers must be, of
properly identifying the employees who came to vote.
Further, contrary to the Employer’s contention, the
evidence established that Volosevich played no role in
the hiring hall’s referral of employees for work and that
there was no opportunity for him to exert potential or
actual coercion over the voting preferences of the em-
ployees in the unit. It is the duty of Local 11’s business
manager, not its president, to operate the hiring hall and
to assign work. The only evidence the Employer could
offer to show that Volosevich had any control over the
hiring hall or assignment of work was a vague statement
in the Local’s constitution that the president is obligated
to “see that all officers perform their respective duties.”
From this single statement, the Employer asserts that
because Volosevich was responsible to see that other
officers, including the business manager, performed their
duties he was ultimately responsible for the business
manager’s assignment of work. This falls far short of
establishing that Volosevich controlled the assignment of
work to unit employees.
Finally, there is no contention that Volosevich engaged
in any misconduct or electioneering during his tenure as
the Petitioner’s election observer, and there is no evi-
dence that Volosevich’s participation as an observer re-
sulted in any prejudice to the fairness of the election. For
all these reasons, we agree with the hearing officer that
Objection 3 should be overruled.
3. The hearing officer found, in agreement with the
Regional Director in her Decision and Direction of Elec-
tion, that the Employer’s contract with Local 11 was an
unlawful members-only agreement.5 On that basis alone,
he recommended that the election be set aside and a new
election directed. We reverse. Contrary to the hearing
officer, we find that the Employer’s contract with Local
4 In agreeing with the hearing officer that Objection 3 should be
overruled, we do not rely on fn. 11 of the hearing officer’s report.
5 The Regional Director found that the contract between Local 11
and the Employer was an “unlawful ‘members only’ agreement” and as
such was not a bar to an election where the International is the Peti-
tioner. In denying the Employer’s request for review of the Regional
Director’s decision, the Board found it unnecessary to decide if the
“members only” contract was an unlawful agreement because “in either
event it does not constitute a bar to the instant petition.”
11 is not a proper basis on which to set this election
aside.
First, The Employer did not object to the election
based on the hiring hall relationship between Local 11
and the Employer. Therefore, the issue was not before
the hearing officer. As the Board stated in Precision
Products Group, 319 NLRB 640, 641 (1995), a hearing
officer lacks authority to “consider issues that are not
reasonably encompassed within the scope of the objec-
tions that the Regional Director set for hearing.” In Iowa
Lamb Corp., 275 NLRB 185 (1985), the hearing officer
asserted that “the absence of a specific objection did not
foreclose considering the conduct as objectionable,” and
the Board responded as follows:
The Petitioner did not allege that the statement was ob-
jectionable, the Regional Director did not identify it as
an issue in his order directing hearing, and at the hear-
ing the hearing officer did not inform the parties he
would consider it in his report. Further, based on our
review of the record, we find that the issue was not
fully litigated. We therefore conclude that the hearing
officer erred in considering an issue that was not liti-
gated and was wholly unrelated to the issues set for
hearing.
As in Iowa Lamb, the Employer did not allege the hir-
ing hall arrangement between Local 11 and the Employer
as an objection and, in fact, maintained throughout the
hearing and in its briefs that its historic bargaining rela-
tionship with Local 11 was lawful.6 In her order direct-
ing hearing, the Regional Director did not identify the
hiring hall relationship as an issue to be addressed at the
hearing. The hearing officer did not inform the parties at
the hearing that he intended to consider the hiring hall
relationship in his report.
We further find that the lawfulness or unlawfulness of
the Employer’s historic bargaining relationship with Lo-
cal 11 is unrelated to the issues set for hearing by the
Regional Director. The fact that some evidence admitted
in support of Objection 1 (the International’s promises on
job referral) and Objection 3 (the International’s ob-
server) may have peripherally touched on the hiring hall
arrangement does not mean that the historic hiring hall
relationship is “sufficiently related to the objections set
for hearing,” as the hearing officer found. To the con-
trary, we find that the legality of the arrangement is not
reasonably encompassed within the scope of the objec-
tions set by the Regional Director for hearing.
6 Further, in its exceptions to the hearing officer’s report, the Em-
ployer admits that “the hearing officer’s decision to set aside the elec-
tion [because of the hiring hall relationship between the Employer and
Local 11] was seriously flawed.”
FLEETBOSTON PAVILION
657
In addition, as in Iowa Lamb, the issue on which the
hearing officer recommended setting aside the election
was not fully litigated. In fact, the hearing officer limited
the evidence on the hiring hall to that which would aid in
a determination of whether the then-current hiring hall
system was different from the system “promised” by the
International in its campaign literature, and whether Lo-
cal 11 President Volosevich had any role in assigning
work through the hall. The hearing officer did not admit
evidence on whether the hiring hall arrangement was
lawful or unlawful. The matter, therefore, cannot serve
as the basis for setting the election aside. The hearing
officer’s reliance on American Safety Equipment Corp.,
234 NLRB 501 (1978), is misplaced. That case involves
the duty of a Regional Director to consider evidence pre-
sented to him during the administrative investigation of
the objections. As the Board made clear in its subse-
quent decisions in Iowa Lamb and Precision Products,
once the objections are at the hearing stage, the parties
are entitled to fair notice of the matters that can serve as
the basis for setting the election aside. Accordingly, we
shall issue a certification of representative.
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE
IT IS CERTIFIED that a majority of the valid ballots
have been cast for the International Alliance of Theatri-
cal Stage Employees and Moving Picture Technicians
and Allied Crafts of the United States and its Territories
and Canada, and that it is the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees in the follow-
ing appropriate unit:
All full-time, regular part-time, and on-call stage hands,
stage electricians, stage carpenters, dimmer board per-
sons, stage riggers, property persons, loaders and
unloaders, spotlight operators, cue persons, and sound
persons employed by the Employer at its FleetBoston
Pavilion in Boston, Massachusetts, but excluding all
other employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in
the Act.