334 NLRB 43
Butera Finer Foods
BUTERA FINER FOODS
43
Butera Finer Foods, Inc.1 and Sam Pizzo and United
Food And Commercial Workers Union, Local
546 & Local 15402 Union. Case 13–RD–2301
May 21, 2001
DECISION AND DIRECTION OF
SECOND ELECTION
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
TRUESDALE AND WALSH
The National Labor Relations Board, by a three-
member panel, has considered objections to a decertifica-
tion election held May 25, 2000, and the hearing offi-
cer’s report recommending disposition of them. Pursuant
to a Stipulated Election Agreement (Stipulation), the
election was conducted at nine Chicago-area polling
sites, including those at Elgin and Schaumburg, Illinois.
The tally of ballots shows 25 for and 18 against the Un-
ion, with 3 challenged ballots, an insufficient number to
affect the results.
The Board has reviewed the record in light of the ex-
ceptions and brief, and has decided to adopt the hearing
officer’s findings and recommendations only to the ex-
tent consistent with this decision and to set aside the
election.
The Employer objected to the use of Business Agent
Ken Swanson as the Union’s election observer. Swanson
was not an employee of the Employer. Relying on exist-
ing precedent,3 the hearing officer recommended the
Employer’s objections be overruled as Swanson had en-
gaged in no misconduct and his presence as an observer
had not prejudiced the other parties.4
In its exceptions,5 the Employer asserts that the prece-
dent cited by the hearing officer is inapplicable to decer-
tification (RD) elections because those decisions only
concern initial representation (RC) cases. Instead, the
Employer argues that because an RD election involves
the participation of an incumbent union, such situation is
significantly different from an RC case and, therefore,
warrants a different result. We find merit to this conten-
tion.
1 The Employer’s name is corrected to conform with the name listed
in the Stipulation.
2 The Union’s name is corrected to reflect the Stipulation. In addi-
tion, the caption reflects the fact that Locals 546 and 1540 jointly repre-
sent the involved 10-facility unit.
3 Black Bull Carting, 310 NLRB No. 188 (1993) (not reported in
Board volumes), enfd. 29 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1994); New England Lumber
Division, 252 NLRB 95 (1980), enfd. 646 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1981);
Standby One Associates, 274 NLRB 952 (1985); E-Z Davies Chevrolet,
161 NLRB 1380 (1966), enfd. 395 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1968); Carl
Simpson Buick, 161 NLRB 1389 (1966), enfd. 395 F.2d 191 (9th Cir.
1968).
4 Although not central to the hearing officer’s recommendations, he
also noted the testimony of Joseph Butera, the Employer’s witness, that
during the preelection conference the Board Agent present advised the
Union that use of business agents as observers would be objectionable.
5 No exceptions were filed concerning the hearing officer’s finding
that the record is unclear as to whether Swanson “was asked if he was
the observer or was told to be the observer by the Board agent.” As a
result, we hereby adopt the hearing officer’s finding in this regard.
Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees the basic
right to choose whether or not they wish to be repre-
sented by a labor organization for collective bargaining
purposes. Board conducted elections support such right
by providing a forum where employees may express their
representation choices via secret ballot. Due to the im-
portance of such process, we seek an election environ-
ment in which employees may freely and fairly cast
votes reflecting their desires. In particular, we strive to
ensure that the neutrality of the election process is pre-
served and that ideal “laboratory” conditions are ap-
proached as nearly as possible. General Shoe Corp., 77
NLRB 124, 127 (1948).
In order to maintain the desired neutrality and integrity
of our elections, we have established guidelines on who
may properly serve as election observers. Thus, for ex-
ample, we have long held that supervisors as well as
other employees closely associated with management
may not serve as observers. Paragon Rubber Co., 7
NLRB 965 (1938); International Stamping Co., 97
NLRB 921 (1951); Mid-Continent Spring Co. of Ken-
tucky, 273 NLRB 884 (1984). Similarly, nonemployees
may be used as observers only if “reasonable under the
circumstances.” Browning-Ferris Industries of Califor-
nia, 327 NLRB 704 (1999); Kelley & Hueber, 309
NLRB 578 (1992). Although not controlling, we have
also established written guidelines concerning the use of
union officials as election observers.6
The primary question raised by the exceptions is
whether nonemployee agents of an incumbent union
should be allowed to serve as observers in a decertification
election. The Employer argues that decertification elec-
tions substantially differ from other representation cases
and, as a result, warrant separate and stricter limitations
as to when nonemployee union agents may serve as ob-
servers. After careful consideration, we conclude that
the neutrality of the election process in a decertification
context is best fostered by a bright-line rule prohibiting
incumbent labor organizations from using their nonem-
ployee agents as election observers.7
6 CHM, Sec. 11310.2 provides in pertinent part: “A union official
may serve as an observer if he/she is also an employee of the em-
ployer.”
7 The issue of what standard best applies in nondecertification situa-
tions is not before us, and we decline to express an opinion on such
question.
334 NLRB No. 11
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
44
A key factor in our holding is that in a decertification
election employees have accumulated experience with
their union’s operations and can be expected to view
both it and the employer as established collective-
bargaining forces. As a result, employees may be unduly
influenced by the actual physical presence of nonem-
ployee agents of the incumbent union at the polling site.
The holding in this case is consistent with our re-
quirement that during election hours neither employer
nor union agents are permitted in the polling area, and
may not electioneer at or near the polling site during
hours of voting. See NLRB Casehandling Manual
(CHM) Section 11326. See also Milchem, Inc., 170
NLRB 362 (1968). Finally, although CHM Section
11310.2 is admittedly not controlling, our decision here
is in harmony with its provisions providing that a union
agent may serve as an observer if he/she is an employee
of the Employer.
Our colleague would not draw a distinction between
certification elections and decertification elections. We
disagree. In our view, it is more likely that an employee
would be influenced by the presence of a person who is
an agent of a union that is his bargaining representative
than by a person who is an agent of a union that wishes
to become the bargaining representative.8 A bargaining
representative is the exclusive representative of employ-
ees in dealing with an employer over terms and condi-
tions of employment. At the decertification election, the
employees are being asked whether to oust that represen-
tative. Clearly, it is best to avoid the situation where that
vote is cast under the watchful eye of someone who is an
agent of that extant representative.9
Our colleague argues that having a union/agent as ob-
server poses only potential problems because, if the un-
ion loses the election, it will have no influence over the
employees. This argument has no merit. At the critical
time of the election, the employees obviously do not
know how the election will come out. An employee who
is inclined to vote against the union could reasonably be
concerned that the union will win. Thus, the employee
would be tempting fate if he votes against the union
whose representative is watching the election process.
We also note that, under Board law, the incumbent union
remains the representative, even if it loses, until all chal-
lenges and objections are resolved.10
8 This is not to say that there would be no influence in a certification
election. As noted at fn. 7, we do not pass herein on certification elec-
tions.
9 The problem also exists where the agent is an employee of the em-
ployer. However, that employee of the employer has a right to partici-
pate in the election. In view of this factor, we would, on balance, per-
mit his participation as an observer.
10 W. A. Krueger Co., 299 NLRB 914 (1990).
Our colleague seeks to make much of the fact that Lo-
cal 1540 Business Agent Swanson was not present at the
preelection conference at which the Board agent clearly
stated that union agents not be observers. However, an
agent of Local 546 (the corepresentative) was there and
heard the instructions. In addition, Swanson had a right
to be there and, for reasons unknown, chose not to at-
tend.
Our colleague notes that Swanson’s serving as ob-
server was the result of an “innocent mixup” by Swanson
and the Board Agent. That is, Swanson did not know of
the Board Agent’s admonition about union agents serv-
ing as observers, and the Board Agent did not know of
Swanson’s status. However, the purpose of the Board’s
rule is not to punish parties for improper conduct, but
rather to protect the integrity of the election process.
Accordingly, the “innocence” of Swanson (and the Board
Agent) is not the relevant point.
Accordingly, we find that as a nonemployee business
agent, Swanson’s serving as the Union’s election ob-
server in the decertification election in this case consti-
tuted objectionable conduct.11 We therefore direct that
the election be set aside12 and a new election con-
ducted.13
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the election held on May 25,
2000, is set aside and that this matter is remanded to the
Regional Director for Region 13 for the purpose of con-
ducting a new election.
[Direction of Second Election omitted from publica-
tion.]
MEMBER WALSH, dissenting.
Contrary to my colleagues, I would adopt the hearing
officer’s recommendation to overrule the Employer’s
objections to the election and to issue a certification of
representative. I believe that my colleagues have erred in
(a) broadly holding that service by a nonemployee agent
of an incumbent union as an observer in a decertification
election is, in itself, objectionable conduct warranting the
setting aside of such an election, and in (b) promulgating
11 We would reach the same result even assuming Swanson served as
the Union’s observer pursuant to the Board Agent’s request. This is so
because the more important factor in our analysis is not how Swanson
came to be an observer, but, rather, that he actually participated in the
election process in such capacity.
12 Swanson’s presence at only two of the nine election sites does not
call for a different result. Proof that a particular individual’s service as
an observer prejudiced other parties is “beside the point” where use of
such individual fundamentally deviates from the Board’s rules. Sun-
ward Materials, 304 NLRB 780 (1991).
13 Applying the new rule in the case in which it is announced is con-
sistent with our precedent. North Macon Health Care Facility, 315
NLRB 359, 361 (1994).
BUTERA FINER FOODS
45
an unjustified and overbroad per se rule prohibiting non-
employee agents of incumbent unions from serving as
observers at decertification elections.
The material facts are undisputed. United Food and
Commercial Workers Union Locals 546 and 1540 jointly
represent the Employer’s meat department employees in
a 10-store multilocation unit. The decertification elec-
tion was conducted on May 25, 2000, with polling at
nine stores (there was no polling at the Bartlett store).
The overall tally was 25–18 in favor of the Union, with 3
nondeterminative challenged ballots.
At the preelection conference held the day before the
election, the Board agent said that it would be considered
objectionable for the Employer to use managers, or for
the Union to use business agents, as election observers.
However, although representatives of the Employer and
Local 546 attended the conference, there was no repre-
sentative of Local 1540 in attendance.
Voting was conducted at, inter alia, the Employer’s
Elgin and Schaumburg stores. Local 1540 Business
Agent Ken Swanson, who was not an employee of the
Employer, arrived at the Elgin store about 15 minutes
before the start of the scheduled 10–10:30 a.m. polling
session. Although Swanson had not intended to serve as
an election observer,1 the Board agent either asked him
to serve as an observer or asked him if he was there to
serve as an observer.2 In either event, Swanson served as
the Union’s observer at the Elgin store and later at the
Schaumburg store (where voting was from 12:30–1
p.m.). While serving as observer at both locations,
Swanson did not speak to any voter, and he obscured the
union insignia on his shirt by folding it over, and by then
further covering the fold with the election observer badge
provided to him by the Board agent. Nothing identified
him as a representative of Local 1540 during the voting
at either location.
In Objection 1, the Employer alleged that (1) the Un-
ion interfered with the election by using Swanson as its
observer; (2) Swanson engaged in misconduct while
1 He had been instructed by his superior to stop in at the Elgin store
on the morning of the election to see if everything was all right.
2 The record is unclear on this point. Swanson first testified that
“[t]he Board Agent asked me to [be an observer.]” The transcript re-
flects that he next testified “[The Board Agent] asked me if I’m, be an
observer.” [sic]. Next, Swanson was asked in cross examination “And
you had been requested to be the observer and you, in fact, opportunity
as observer?” [sic]. Swanson replied “Correct.” Finally on this point,
Swanson was asked “Was it the Board Agent that requested you be an
observer at the Schaumburg store as well?” Swanson replied “Yes.”
The hearing officer found that “Swanson’s testimony was unclear as to
whether he was asked if he was the observer or was told to be the ob-
server by the Board agent.” The hearing officer found it “incredible to
believe that the Board agent would have told Swanson to be the ob-
server.” The Board agent did not testify.
serving as observer; and (3) the Union’s use of Swanson
as observer prejudiced the Employer and breached the
parties’ stipulated election agreement. In Objection 2,
the Employer alleged that the Board interfered with the
election and prejudiced the Employer by permitting the
Union to use Swanson as its observer.
The hearing officer recommended that the Employer’s
objections be overruled, on the grounds, inter alia, that:
1. There was no evidence that Swanson engaged in any
misconduct (there are no exceptions to this finding); and
2. Swanson’s mere presence as an observer, as a non-
employee of the Employer and as a business agent of the
Union, without more, did not warrant setting aside the
election.
In recommending that the Employer’s objections be
overruled, the hearing officer applied the well-
established principle that the mere use of a nonemployee
union official as an election observer does not warrant
overturning the results of an election where the observer
has not engaged in electioneering or other misconduct.3
In NLRB v. Black Bull Carting, the court stated that:
As a general matter, the conduct of a representation
election is a purely administrative function with which
the court should not interfere absent the most glaring
discrimination or abuse. . . . A party seeking to overturn
an election on the ground of a procedural irregularity
has a heavy burden. The presence of such an irregular-
ity is not itself sufficient to overturn an election. Nor is
it sufficient for a party to show merely a “possibility”
that the election was unfair. Rather, the challenger
must come forward with evidence of actual prejudice
resulting from the challenged circumstances. The
Board has consistently held, with court approval, that
the designation of a union official as observer does not
warrant overturning an election unless there is evidence
that the official engaged in improper conduct while act-
ing in that capacity. [29 F.3d at 46; citations omitted.]
3 NLRB v. Black Bull Carting, 29 F.3d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1994), enfg.
310 NLRB No. 188 (1993) (not reported in Board volumes) (having
nonemployee union official serve as observer, while procedurally ir-
regular, did not warrant setting aside election; no allegation that ob-
server engaged in any misconduct and no evidence of actual prejudice
to fairness of election or to employer resulting from nonemployee
union official serving as observer); New England Lumber Division v.
NLRB, 646 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1981), enfg. 252 NLRB 95 (1980) (hav-
ing nonemployee union president serve as observer, even if in breach of
election stipulation, did not warrant setting aside election; any such
breach was immaterial, and designation of union official as observer
does not warrant overturning election absent evidence that observer
engaged in improper conduct); NLRB v. E-Z Davies Chevrolet, 395
F.2d 191, 193 (9th Cir. 1968), enfg., inter alia, 161 NLRB 1380, 1383
(1966). See also Standby One Associates, 274 NLRB 952, 953 (1985).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
46
Similarly, in NLRB v. E-Z Davies Chevrolet, the court
found that having a nonemployee union vice president
serve as an election observer did not warrant setting
aside election. There was no allegation or evidence that
the observer engaged in any misconduct, and the court
rejected, as lacking in merit, the employer’s contention
that the mere presence of the nonemployee union vice
president as an observer ipso facto interfered with the
election. See also Standby One Associates, 274 NLRB
952, 953 (1985), where the Board found that having a
nonemployee union official serve as election observer
did not warrant setting aside the state labor board
representation election in that case. The Board found
that although it is preferable to avoid using nonemployee
union representatives as observers, such use did not in-
validate the election in that case, where the observer did
not engage in electioneering interfering with the election
under Milchem, Inc., 170 NLRB 362, 363 (1968).
My colleagues, however, find these precedents and
principles to be inapplicable to decertification elections, as
in this case. They find that decertification elections are
significantly different from representation elections be-
cause decertification elections involve the participation
of incumbent unions. They ultimately find that the mere
presence of a nonemployee union agent as an election
observer, without more, might unduly influence voters to
vote for the union. In my view, however, it is not sig-
nificantly more likely that employees would view an
incumbent union representative as having more influence
over them than a representative of a union who is seeking
to become their bargaining agent. And I fail to see how
an incumbent union representative’s perceived influence
over employees’ terms and conditions of employment
would be likely to inhibit employees who are so inclined
from voting against the Union, because if they do so in
sufficient numbers, the union representative will no
longer have any influence over their terms and conditions
of employment. And, to the extent that, as my col-
leagues contend, an employee might “reasonably be con-
cerned that the union will win,” it seems to me that that
employee could have the same reasonable concern about
a nonincumbent union. I am simply not convinced that,
absent misconduct by the union agent, a reasonable em-
ployee who is inclined to vote against a union, whether it
is an incumbent or not, is going to be influenced by the
presence of that agent simply because of the possibility
that the vote might go the other way.
In any event, my colleagues perceive the primary issue
before the Board in this case to be whether nonemployee
agents of an incumbent union should be allowed to serve
as observers in a decertification election. My colleagues
move from that statement of a broad issue to the promul-
gation of their broad new rule. But I disagree with their
characterization of the issue before us in this case. The
real issue before us is—or at least ought to be—whether
nonemployee Union Business Agent Ken Swanson’s
service as an observer interfered with the election in this
case. The answer is clearly no. It is undisputed that
Swanson engaged in no misconduct whatsoever. Beyond
that, my colleagues do not explain—indeed, in light of
their new per se rule, they do not have to—how or why
the voters in this case were reasonably unduly influenced
in their voting by the mere fact that Swanson was a Un-
ion business representative but not a coworker.
I find that the straightforward analysis of the facts in
this case, set forth above, in which there has been no
conduct interfering with the election, but in which my
colleagues would nevertheless set the election aside, am-
ply demonstrates the impropriety of establishing a broad
per se prohibition against nonemployee agents of incum-
bent unions serving as observers at decertification elec-
tions. Indeed, these facts show that a union official
could, in the course of unusual circumstances, legiti-
mately be called upon to serve as an election observer.
Here, Local 1540 was not represented at the preelection
conference the day before the election. Thus, Swanson
was not cautioned, much less prohibited, from being an
observer. On election morning, Swanson, with no ad-
vance intention of serving as an observer, arrived at the
polling site and was confronted with the fact there was
no union observer present. In what appears to be an in-
nocent mixup, the Board agent apparently assumed that
Swanson was the Union’s assigned observer, and did not
ask him if he was an employee of the Employer. Swan-
son, for his part, did not mention that he was a nonem-
ployee union business agent. Swanson, however, did not
seek to take any advantage from his service as observer.
Indeed, he took pains to hide the fact that he was a union
representative, he spoke not a word to any voter, and he
engaged in no improper conduct at all.4
This odd, but not devious, set of circumstances shows
why, in my view, my colleagues have gone too far in
instituting a per se rule requiring that decertification elec-
tions must be set aside when, for whatever reason, and
with whatever actual consequences, a nonemployee offi-
cial of the incumbent union has served as an election
observer—even where, as here, the alternative would be
that the Union would have had no observer at all.
4 I agree with my colleagues that the innocence of the circumstances
leading up to Swanson’s service as an observer is not dispositive of the
Employer’s objections. What is dispositive is that, regardless of how
Swanson became an observer, he engaged in no objectionable conduct
while serving as one.
BUTERA FINER FOODS
47
I would certainly agree that the use of nonemployee
union officials as decertification election observers
should be discouraged. There is clearly potential for
trouble in such circumstances.5 But a union has a right to
5 Thus, my colleagues overstate my position as arguing that having a
nonemployee agent of the incumbent union act as an observer at a
decertification election poses no problem. I recognize that it poses
potential problems. But in my view, we should simply follow our
established procedure for addressing situations where a party proposes
to use an observer who is alleged to be ineligible. Instead of applying a
per se rule and informing the party that use of a nonemployee union
representative will always be objectionable, the Board Agent should
simply notify the party that use of the nonemployee union representa-
tive may result in the setting aside of the election, and allow the elec-
tion to proceed with that understanding. See Browning-Ferris Indus-
tries of California, 327 NLRB 704 (1999); NLRB Casehandling Man-
ual (Representation Proceedings), § 11310.2.
have an observer present during polling, both for the
purpose of identifying eligible voters and for the purpose
of insuring that the voting is conducted properly. It may
be, as it was here, that the only way to perfect that right,
is to have a nonemployee union official pressed into
emergency service in that role. Steps like those taken by
Swanson here, under such unforeseen circumstances,
may be both unavoidable in the preservation of a union’s
right to have an observer, and unobjectionable in the ab-
sence of any misconduct on the part of the observer.
Thus, in the absence of any showing of objectionable
conduct or of how Swanson’s service as observer inter-
fered with the election, I would adopt the hearing offi-
cer’s recommendations to overrule the Employer’s objec-
tions and to issue a certification of representative.