335 NLRB 972
Dobbs International Services
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
972
Dobbs International Services, Inc., Catering Unit No.
233 and District 6, International Union of Indus-
trial, Service, Transport and Health Employees
Dobbs International Services, Inc., Catering Unit No.
233 and Local 69, Hotel Employees and Restau-
rant Employees International Union, AFL–CIO
Local 69, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employ-
ees International Union, AFL–CIO and District
6, International Union of Industrial, Service,
Transport and Health Employees. Cases 22–CA–
21477, 22–CA–21580, 22–CB–8289, and 22–CB–
8386
August 27, 2001
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN HURTGEN AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN AND TRUESDALE
On June 23, 1998, Administrative Law Judge Robert
T. Snyder issued the attached decision. The Respondents,
Dobbs International Services, Inc., and Local 69, Hotel
Employees and Restaurant Employees International Un-
ion, each filed exceptions and supporting briefs, and the
Charging Party, District 6, International Union of Indus-
trial, Service, Transport and Health Employees, filed
cross-exceptions and a supporting brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs, and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order2 as modified.3
This case involves a struggle for employee support be-
tween an incumbent union (Local 69) and a rival outside
union (District 6), and the Employer’s conduct during
that struggle in the spring and summer of 1996. As fully
discussed in his decision, the judge found that Respon-
dent Dobbs International Services, Inc. (Dobbs) violated
Section 8(a)(2) and/or (1) of the Act by at times unlaw-
fully assisting District 6 in its attempt to organize Dobbs’
employees, and by also at times unlawfully assisting the
incumbent Union, Local 69, in repelling District 6’s or-
ganizing drive. He also found that Dobbs violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) and (1) by unlawfully suspending an em-
ployee who supported District 6. Finally, he found that
Local 69 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) in several instances
in its attempts to convince employees not to support Dis-
trict 6. We affirm the judge’s findings.
1 The Respondents and Charging Party District 6 have excepted to
some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy
is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s credibility resolutions
unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us
that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544
(1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined
the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
2 We find it unnecessary to pass on the judge’s remedial recommen-
dations concerning Case 22–RC–11252. That representation case was
not consolidated with the instant unfair labor practice cases and accord-
ingly was not before the judge for consideration. See, e.g., Transit
Service Corp., 312 NLRB 477, 484–485 (1993).
3 We will modify certain paragraphs of the Order to conform with
the Board’s current standards.
We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order in accordance with
our recent decision in Ferguson Electric Co., 335 NLRB 142 ( 2001).
Our dissenting colleague joins in affirming the judge’s
decision, except with respect to the 8(a)(2) allegations
involving Dobbs’ assistance to District 6. We reject our
colleague’s position for the reasons set forth below.
The complaint alleges that Dobbs permitted District 6
to organize on its premises and to conduct meetings in its
cafeteria, thereby rendering assistance and support to
District 6 in violation of Section 8(a)(2).4 The judge
found that organizers for District 6 were present on
Dobbs’ property on multiple occasions for solicitation,
distribution of literature, and the conduct of organizing
meetings. Although General Manager Stuart Manore
testified that he personally was unaware of such conduct,
the judge discredited his testimony. The judge did so in
light of other witnesses’ testimony that Supervisor Ben-
son Yu was present in the cafeteria during a District 6
meeting, Dobbs’ failure to call Supervisor Yu to contra-
dict that testimony, and Dobbs’ earlier admissions in its
position statement that supervisors were present during
the meetings and they neither enforced Dobbs’ no-
trespassing policy nor otherwise interfered. The judge
found that Dobbs possessed “an awareness of, and toler-
ance toward, the presence of District 6 organizer’s (sic)
at various places in the facility, including its lunchroom.”
Accordingly, the judge concluded that Dobbs violated
Section 8(a)(2) by rendering unlawful assistance to Dis-
trict 6 during a time that a rival union was competing for
the employees’ support. See Ryder System, 280 NLRB
1024, 1045–1046 (1986), enfd. mem. 842 F.2d 332 (6th
Cir. 1988); and Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 256 NLRB
612 (1981), enfd. sub nom. National Maritime Union v.
NLRB, 683 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1982).
In rejecting the judge’s 8(a)(2) finding, our dissenting
colleague relies on the testimony of General Manager
Manore to find that Dobbs was unaware of any District 6
organizing activity on its property. However, as indi-
cated above, the judge discredited his testimony in light
of other witnesses’ testimony, Dobbs’ failure to call Su-
4 The complaint also alleged that Supervisor Benson Yu engaged in
conduct supporting District 6, including interrogating and soliciting
employees to support District 6. However, the complaint alleged, and
the judge found, only that this conduct violated Sec. 8(a)(1).
335 NLRB No. 78
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
973
pervisor Yu to rebut that testimony, and Dobbs’ earlier
admissions that its supervisors were present when Dis-
trict 6 was organizing at the facility.
In essence, Manore testified that he personally was un-
aware of such conduct. Whether he had personal knowl-
edge, however, is not determinative given the presence of
Yu and other supervisors during the District 6 organizing
activity, which they did nothing to stop. It is well-
established that a supervisor’s knowledge of union ac-
tivities is imputed to the employer. See, e.g., Dr. Phillip
Megdal, D.D.S., Inc., 267 NLRB 82 (1983). In addition,
an employer is bound by the acts and statements of its
supervisors whether specifically authorized or not. See,
e.g., Dorothy Shamrock Coal Co., 279 NLRB 1298, 1299
(1986), enfd. 833 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1987); Holiday
Inn-Glendale, 277 NLRB 1254, 1261 (1985). Thus, even
if Manore’s testimony were credited, it would not com-
pel a different result.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the
judge’s conclusion that Dobbs rendered assistance to
District 6 in violation of Section 8(a)(2).
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondents, Dobbs International Ser-
vices, Inc., Catering Unit No. 233, Newark, New Jersey,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, and Local
69, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Interna-
tional Union, AFL–CIO its officers, agents, and
representatives, shall take the action set forth in the
Order as modified below.
1. Substitute the following paragraph for paragraphs
A2(b) and (c) and reletter the subsequent paragraphs ac-
cordingly.
“(b) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, re-
move from its files any reference to the unlawful suspen-
sion of Octavio Valencia, and within 3 days thereafter
notify him in writing that this has been done and that the
suspension will not be used against him in any way.”
2. Substitute the following paragraphs for A2(d) and (e).
“(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re-
cords and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic
form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
“(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Newark, New Jersey facility copies of the attached
notice marked Appendix A.10 Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 22,
after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized repre-
sentative, shall be posted by the Respondent and main-
tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are cus-
tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall du-
plicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice
to all current employees and former employees employed
by the Respondent at any time since July 1, 1996.”
3. Substitute the attached notice “Appendix A” for
that of the administrative law judge.
CHAIRMAN HURTGEN, dissenting in part.
I join my colleagues in adopting the judge’s findings
that Respondent Dobbs, the Employer, and Respondent
Local 69, the incumbent Union, respectively violated
Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) and Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the
Act. As to Dobbs, I agree with my colleagues that
Dobbs violated Section 8(a)(1) by threatening employees
with discharge because they supported District 6, by pro-
hibiting employees from wearing District 6 pins, by ad-
vising employees that it would be futile to select a union
other than Local 69, and by prohibiting employees from
distributing District 6 literature during their breaks. I
also agree with my colleagues that Dobbs violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(2) and (1) by rendering unlawful assistance to
Local 69 to win employee ratification of a new contract
between Dobbs and Local 69. I further agree with my
colleagues that Dobbs violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by
suspending an employee because he engaged in union
activities in support of District 6.
Notwithstanding
Respondent’s
unlawful
conduct
against the supporters of District 6, and its unlawful con-
duct in favor of the supporters of Local 69, one of its
supervisors (Yu) engaged in certain conduct, i.e., inter-
rogation and solicitation, in favor of District 6. I agree
with my colleagues that this conduct, threatened, re-
strained or coerced employees, and that Respondent was
legally responsible for this conduct of its supervisor.
Thus, Yu’s conduct violated Section 8(a)(1). The judge
found that this conduct was not unlawful under Section
8(a)(2). There are no exceptions on this point. Further,
in the circumstances of this case, I do not agree that other
conduct of Yu establishes that Respondent “dominated or
interfered with the formation or administration” of Dis-
trict 6 or “contributed financial or other support” to Dis-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
974
trict 6.1 Thus, there was no violation of Section 8(a)(2)
in this respect.
More specifically, the complaint alleged and the judge
found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(2) by
permitting District 6 to hold a meeting on its property
and by permitting District 6 representatives to distribute
literature on its property. In finding that the Respondent
permitted District 6 to hold a meeting at its facility, the
judge inferred from Yu’s presence at the meeting that the
Respondent permitted District 6 to hold the meeting.
The judge further found that the Respondent permitted
District 6 representatives to distribute literature on its
property. For the reasons set out below, I find that the
Respondent did not knowingly permit District 6 to hold
meetings or to distribute literature on its property.
Therefore, I would find that there was no violation of
Section 8(a)(2).
The facts, in brief, are as follows. Since about 1987,
Local 69 has been the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of Dobbs’ production employees. Dobbs
and Local 69 were parties to a collective-bargaining
agreement that ran from August 1, 1993, through July 31,
1996. In mid-July 1996,2 Dobbs and Local 69 reached
agreement on a new contract, subject to ratification. On
July 12, Dobbs compelled employees to remain after
their shifts had ended so that Local 69 officials could
hold a meeting to vote on ratification of the new con-
tract.3 Following the unit employees’ ratification of the
new contract, Dobbs and Local 69 executed the contract.
It ran from August 1, 1996, to July 31, 1999.
Meanwhile, in the late spring and summer, District 6
engaged in an organizing campaign at Dobbs in which it
sought to supplant Local 69 as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the unit employees. During
the District 6 campaign, Supervisor Yu engaged in cer-
tain activity in support of District 6. This activity was
described by two witnesses. The first, Leander King,
who was a Dobbs employee and a member of Local 69’s
negotiating committee, credibly testified that sometime
before July 4, Yu told him he was getting a new union,
District 6, and asked King if he was going to join. King
replied no, that he was represented by Local 69. King
had no further conversations with Yu about District 6.
King further testified that he observed people from
District 6 on Dobbs’ property talking and passing out
leaflets to employees in the yard next to the loading
dock. The yard is enclosed by a fence, which has an
1 See the language of Sec. 8(a)(2).
2 All dates hereafter refer to 1996.
3 As noted above, I agree with my colleagues that Dobbs thereby
violated Sec. 8(a)(2) and (1) by unlawfully rendering assistance to
Local 69.
open gate through which trucks enter and exit Dobbs’
property. Employees also use this gate. There is a guard
booth by the gate, but the guard booth is not staffed.
Finally, King testified that nothing he observed while at
Dobbs during the summer led him to believe that Dobbs
supported District 6.
The second witness, Kevin Bradley, a Dobbs employee
and a Local 69 shop steward, credibly testified that the
District 6 campaign started out with the distribution of
pamphlets outside the facility, and that he later saw a
District 6 representative inside the facility by the time-
clock handing out pamphlets. He also saw a different
District 6 representative inside the cafeteria at a meeting
of about seven employees in July, and that he saw Yu at
a table near the other employees at the meeting. When
Yu saw Bradley, Yu came out of the meeting and asked
Bradley if he was going to sign up, to which Bradley
responded no. Bradley further testified that Yu replied,
“Go ahead, go ahead, because Local 69 is not going to
represent you.” Earlier that day, Yu had tried to get
Bradley to sign a District 6 pamphlet which contained a
form membership authorization card. Later on the same
day, Bradley saw Yu walking around and handing out the
District 6 pamphlet to a couple of employees. Finally,
Bradley testified that there was nothing to indicate that
Dobbs supported Yu’s efforts on behalf of District 6.
As noted above, I agree that Dobbs violated Section
8(a)(1) through, inter alia, Yu’s interrogation of King and
his interrogation and solicitation of Bradley. Since it is
admitted that Yu is a 2(11) supervisor, and since, as the
judge pointed out, the Board “impute[s] a manager’s or
supervisor’s knowledge of an employee’s union activities
to the employer,”4 Yu’s interrogations and solicitations
were coercive of the employees’ Section 7 right to en-
gage in union activity and therefore violated Section
8(a)(1). I agree. As I have said elsewhere, a supervisor,
by definition, holds the power to affect the employment
status of employees, or at least the power to recommend
the same. Thus, where, as here, a supervisor seeks to
persuade an employee to support a union, and awaits a
response (e.g., sign a card), that conduct is unlawful un-
der Section 8(a)(1).5
However, it does not follow that other conduct of Yu,
in fact or as perceived, was the pro-District 6—8(a)(2)
conduct of the Respondent. That conduct is discussed
below.
4 Dr. Phillip Megdal, D.D.S., Inc., 267 NLRB 82, 82 (1983).
5 In my dissent in Millsboro Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, 327
NLRB 879 (1999), a representation case, I set forth my view that a
supervisor’s solicitation of union authorization cards is inherently coer-
cive.
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
975
I turn first to the contention that Dobbs violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(2) by allegedly permitting District 6 officials to
hold a meeting at its facility and to distribute District 6
literature on its property. It is unreasonable to find that
Dobbs permitted District 6 officials to come on its prop-
erty when, in fact, there is no evidence that would indi-
cate, much less establish, that Dobbs was aware that Dis-
trict 6 officials were on the property. In this regard, Stu-
art Manore, the general manager of Dobbs’ facility, testi-
fied that he was unaware that District 6 came onto
Dobbs’ property to organize, and he received no reports
of such activity. Manore further testified that he uni-
formly instructed supervisors to prohibit such entry and
to request outside organizers or strangers to leave the
premises and report the incident to him. Manore’s testi-
mony stands uncontradicted.
The judge found that Manore’s testimony was “un-
dermined” by a position paper submitted to the Region
on November 22 by Dobbs’ counsel. In that position
statement, Dobbs stated that, after conducting an investi-
gation, it appeared that District 6 representatives engaged
in organizing activities at various times on its premises.
From this, the judge concluded that Dobbs was aware of
and tolerated the presence of District 6 organizers on its
premises. Such a finding, however, cannot withstand
scrutiny.
In its position statement, Dobbs’ counsel spoke of an
investigation that occurred after the fact. That is, the
District 6 activity occurred in the spring and summer of
1996. The position paper was submitted on November
22, 1996. There is no evidence to show that, after un-
covering the facts, Respondent continued to allow Dis-
trict 6 onto the property or, if it did, that it refused a simi-
lar request from Local 69. Indeed, Respondent’s opposi-
tion to District 6 makes this most unlikely. Thus, the
position statement is not inconsistent with Manore’s un-
contradicted testimony that he was unaware of District 6
representatives organizing on Dobbs’ premises during
the time in issue, i.e., in spring and summer. Since
Dobbs’ had no knowledge of District 6’s organizing ef-
forts on its property at the time that it occurred, it cannot
be said that Dobbs rendered support to District 6 by per-
mitting District 6 officials to organize on its property.
Thus, a violation of Section 8(a)(2) cannot be based on
Manore’s conduct. Nor can it be based on Yu’s conduct.
Concededly, Yu was present at a District 6 meeting held
on Respondent’s premises. However, it cannot be in-
ferred from this that the Respondent was supporting Dis-
trict 6. Yu’s conduct simply reflected his own preference
for District 6. In the instant case, the Respondent was
vigorously opposed to District 6. Indeed, it engaged in
unlawful conduct in opposition to District 6. In these
circumstances, it is patently unreasonable to view this
conduct of Yu as Respondent’s conduct in unlawful sup-
port of District 6. Nor, in such circumstances, would
employees reasonably perceive it as such. Thus, in fact
and as perceived, Yu’s presence at the meeting was not
tantamount to Respondent conduct in favor of District 6.
Similarly, Yu’s knowledge of District 6 solicitation on
the Respondent’s premises does not establish that the
Respondent knew of, or gave permission for, that solici-
tation. In fact, and as perceived, Yu’s knowledge and
permission would not be viewed as Respondent’s con-
duct in favor of District 6.
For all these reasons, and contrary to my colleagues, I
would reverse the judge and find that Dobbs, by the
above conduct, did not violate Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of
the Act by rendering unlawful assistance to District 6.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees regarding
their union activities and sympathies, solicit employees
to sign a petition against Local 69, Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees International Union, AFL–CIO
and in support of District 6, International Union of Indus-
trial, Service, Transport and Health Employees, threaten
our employees with discharge because they supported
District 6, prohibit our employees from wearing pins
with District 6 insignia, advise employees that it would
be futile to select a union other than Local 69, or prohibit
our employees from distributing literature and parapher-
nalia for District 6 during their breaktime.
WE WILL NOT allow District 6 to organize on our
premises and to conduct meetings in the lunchroom at
our Newark facility or require our employees to attend a
union meeting for Local 69.
WE WILL NOT suspend, or otherwise discriminate
against our employees because they engage in concerted,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
976
protected activities in support of District 6 or any other
labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL make our employee Octavio Valencia
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits he may
have suffered as a result of our discrimination against
him, with interest.
WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s
Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful suspension of Octavio Valencia, and WE WILL,
within 3 days thereafter, notify him, in writing that this
has been done and that the suspension will not be used
against him in any way.
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC.
CATERING UNIT NO. 233
Chevella Brown-Maynor, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Fletcher L. Hudson, Esq. and Mary Jane Palmer, Esq.
(McKnight, Hudson, Lewis, Ford & Harrison, LLP), for the
Respondent Employer.
Joseph E. Gulmi, Esq. (Richards & O’Neil, LLP), for Respon-
dent and Charging Party Local 69.
Jonathan Walters, Esq. (Markowitz & Richman, Esqs.), for
Charging Party District 6.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT T. SNYDER, Administrative Law Judge. These
consolidated cases were heard by me on November 12, 13, and
14, and December 18 and 19, 1997, in Newark, New Jersey. In
Case 22–CA–21580, Dobbs International Services, Inc., Catering
Unit No. 233 (Dobbs), is alleged to have interrogated employees
regarding their union activities and sympathies (in support of
Local 69 Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Interna-
tional Union, AFL–CIO ( Local 69)), and to have solicited em-
ployees to sign a petition against Local 69 and in support of Dis-
trict 6, International Union of Industrial, Service, Transport and
Health Employees (District 6), in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act, and to have rendered assistance and support to District 6
by allowing District 6 to organize on its premises and conduct
meetings in the luncheon at Respondent’s Newark facility, in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act.
In Case 22–CA–21477, Dobbs is alleged to have threatened
employees with discharge because they supported District 6,
prohibited employees from wearing hats or pins with District 6
insignia, advised employees that it would be futile to select
another union (Local 69 being the incumbent union) and pro-
hibited employees from distributing literature for District 6
during their breaktime, all in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. In the same case, Dobbs is also alleged to have suspended
an employee, Octavio Valencia, because he engaged in union
activities (in support of District 6) in violation of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act and to have rendered assistance and
support to Local 69 by requiring employees to attend a union
meeting for Local 69, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of
the Act.
In Cases 22–CB–8289 and 22–CB–8386, Local 69 is alleged
to have threatened bodily harm by hitting an employee in the
stomach with the butt end of a knife, because the employee
supported District 6, a rival union, and to have threatened em-
ployees with loss of employment because they inquired about a
grievance and to have promised employees money and better
employment positions with Dobbs and Local 69 if they sup-
ported Local 69 instead of District 6, a rival union, in violation
of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
Each of the Respondents, Dobbs and Local 69, filed an an-
swer denying commission of any unfair labor practices.
All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to in-
troduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. Each of the parties
has filed posthearing briefs. Each of these briefs has been care-
fully considered. Upon the entire record in these consolidated
cases, including my observation of the witnesses and their de-
meanor, I make the following
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
I. JURISDICTION AND LABOR ORGANIZATION
STATUS
At all material times Dobbs, a corporation, with an office
and place of business in Newark, New Jersey (Dobbs’ facility),
has been engaged in providing inflight food and beverage cater-
ing services for various airlines at Newark International Air-
port. During the 12 months preceding issuance of the consoli-
dated amended complaint on July 7, 1997, Dobbs, in conduct-
ing its business operations, provided services in excess of
$50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of New
Jersey. Respondent admits, and I find, that it is an employer
engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6),
and (7) of the Act.
The consolidated complaint also alleges both Local 69 and
District 6 as labor organizations within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act. While Dobbs, in its answer, admitted the labor
organization status of Local 69, it denied knowledge or infor-
mation sufficient to form a belief as to such status for District 6.
Most recently, in Cedar Grove Manor Convalescent Center,
314 NLRB 642 (1994), the Board adopted my conclusion,
based on District 6’s representation of employer Cedar Grove’s
regular service and maintenance employees for many years in
collective bargaining, that District 6 is a labor organization
within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, I find that both
Local 69 and District 6 are labor organizations within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Since approximately 1987, for the last 10 years, Local 69 has
been the sole collective-bargaining representative of all produc-
tion employees employed by Dobbs, including cooks, food
transporters, finalizers, storeroom helpers, liquor packers,
loader/helpers, porters, utility workers, sanitation, food prepara-
tion employees and lead employees, and excluding all other
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
977
employees. At the time the events in the instant proceeding
began unfolding, Local 69 and Dobbs were parties to a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement, running from August 1, 1993, to
July 31, 1996.
In the late spring and summer of 1996, District 6 engaged in
an organizing campaign among the unit employees seeking to
supplant Local 69 as their bargaining representative. On or
about June 28, 1996, District 6 filed a representation petition in
Case 22–RC–11252. On July 17, 1996, the Regional Director
for Region 22 administratively dismissed the petition on the
grounds of contract bar.
In mid-July 1996, Dobbs and Local 69 concluded negotiations
on a successor collective-bargaining agreement, and, following a
ratification vote conducted among unit members the same day,
July 12, the circumstances surrounding which is alleged in this
proceeding as a rendering of unlawful assistance and support by
Dobbs to Local 69, the parties entered a new agreement covering
the period August 1, 1996, through July 31, 1999.
District 6 filed with the Board on August 12, 1996, a request
for review of the Regional Director’s dismissal of the petition.
Also, at some point in late July 1996, Dobbs employees filed a
union security deauthorization petition in Case 22–UD–373.
While the Region scheduled a hearing on the UD petition for
late September 1996, it was not held and further proceedings on
it were suspended as a result of the charge filed by Local 69 in
Case 22–CA–21580 on September 19, 1996, alleging Dobbs’
interference in support of District 6 and rendering support to
District 6.
On November 6, 1996, the Board granted District 6’s Re-
quest for Review, summarily reversed the Regional Director’s
dismissal, and concluded, as asserted by the petitioner, that the
agreement contained an illegal union-security clause, and held
the agreement not to be a bar to District 6’s petition. Nonethe-
less, the Region continued to block processing of the RC peti-
tion on the basis of its investigation of the instant charge in
Case 22–CA–21580, which since has resulted in issuance of the
complaint, later consolidated with the three other cases for
hearing herein as previously described.
As a consequence, processing of both the RC and UD peti-
tions continue to be blocked pending resolution of the instant
complaint proceeding.1
B. Dobbs’ Alleged Acts of Interference, Assistance, and Sup-
port in Favor of District 6
Counsel for the General Counsel called two witnesses in
support of its case-in-chief in Case 22–CA–21580. The first,
1 District 6 filed an application with the Board on May 9, 1997, seek-
ing review of the Regional Director’s decision contained in a letter of
April 28, 1997, continuing to pend the petition until the violations
alleged in Case 22–CA–21580 are remedied. At close of hearing
herein, that application had not yet been ruled upon. In its submission
District 6 argues that Dobbs and Local 69, the incumbent Union, have
engaged in collusive conduct, seeking to delay the processing of its
petition and the opportunity for the unit employees to express their
preferences in a Board conducted election. The alleged collusion in-
cludes a belated filing of the charge in Case 22–CA–21580 following
the employees’ filing of the UD petition in an effort to frustrate em-
ployee choice.
Leander King, testified that he was a cook employed by Dobbs
for 3-1/2 years up to 1996. His immediate supervisor was Ben-
son Yu, Dobbs’ executive chief, whose status as a supervisor
within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act was admitted by
Dobbs in its answer, while denying his status as its agent under
Section 2(13) of the Act.
King was aware that District 6 was at Dobbs’ facility be-
tween May and July soliciting support among employees.
Sometime before July 4, 1996, Yu told him he was getting a
new Union, District 6, and asked King if he was going to join,
to which King replied, no, he was represented by Local 69.
King later noted that Yu did not have a petition in his hand.
During his cross-examination by Dobbs’ counsel, King, ex-
plained that he was at his workstation in front of a grill, grilling
chicken, when Yu walked up to him and made the comments
noted above. King insisted that Yu did not preface his remarks
with any form of greeting as he had in the past when convers-
ing with King.
When questioned as to whether he ever had any conversa-
tions at all about the Union at any time during his employment
King replied, “Of course. He had written me up.” It turned out
that those write ups were for being late to work and had nothing
to do with the Union. King admitted he never had any other
conversations with Yu about the Union. When asked whether
Yu in any way, by any actions toward him or in his presence,
gave him any reason to believe he was for District 6 and
wanted him to sign a District 6 card, King at first repeated his
testimony that Yu asked if he was going to sign up and then
when the question was repeated started to reply he didn’t know
what his—and was at that point abruptly cut off in his answer at
(Tr. 44, L. 4). Based on these exchanges, it is apparent that
King could not even report Yu’s own union preference, even
apart from whether Yu, in expressing himself, could be rea-
sonably said to represent the view of Dobbs or have his remarks
and conduct imputed to Dobbs. Later King noted nothing he
observed while at Dobbs during the summer of 1996 District 6
organizing period led him to believe that Dobbs supported Dis-
trict 6.
During cross-examination by District 6, King acknowledged
he had been a member of Local 69’s 8 to 15 member negotiat-
ing committee which negotiated between May and July for a
successor labor agreement.
King also became aware that Jose Cardenas was passing out
literature for District 6. When he saw Cardenas doing this it
was at a meeting held among employees in the eating area of
the lunchroom/cafeteria. He saw no Dobbs’ manager or super-
visor in the vicinity while the meeting was in progress.
King did recall observing people from District 6 on Dobbs’
property talking and passing out leaflets to employees probably
on break in the yard abutting the loading dock where Dobbs’
trucks are kept and loaded for delivery of foods to airlines at
nearby Newark Airport. The yard is enclosed by a fence con-
taining an open gate through which the trucks enter and exit.
Employees enter and exit through this yard as well. Although
there is a guard booth near the gate it has not been manned.
King did not see any supervisors or managers in the yard while
the District 6 people were present.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
978
According to King, employees could talk about union mat-
ters while at work but could not stop working while doing so;
he was unaware of any Dobbs’ rule prohibiting such conduct.
King described the workday, which included day and night
shifts, as including a half-hour break for lunch as well as a 15-
minute break period. King, who worked in the kitchen as a cook
explained that he took his break when he didn’t have anything
else, meaning work assignments, and he could get away. King’s
experience and understanding, which I credit, was later echoed
and confirmed by the employee, Octavio Valencia, who is al-
leged to have been discriminatorily disciplined by Dobbs for
supporting District 6 and whose case will shortly be considered.
The second witness to testify about Dobbs’ assistance to Dis-
trict 6 was Kevin Bradley. He had been employed by Dobbs
for 5 years in January 1996 and worked in the storeroom. For
the past 2 years he had been a shop steward for Local 69. Brad-
ley described the District 6 campaign in summer 1996 as start-
ing outside, handing out pamphlets, then he saw a District 6
representative inside the facility by the timeclock handing out
pamphlets to mostly Spanish speaking employees and then he
saw a different District 6 representative inside the cafeteria at a
meeting of employees in July.
The cafeteria is divided into two parts. A first section when
one enters has soda and other food dispensers, and beyond a
partition which is open some 6 to 7 feet, another larger section
contains tables and chairs for eating and socializing.
Bradley looked into the larger lunchroom section while get-
ting a soda and saw a stranger from District 6 holding up a
pamphlet and soliciting support. There were about seven em-
ployees present seated at a few tables. He saw Yu seated at a
table near the other employees. When he looked in Yu saw
him, came out to the food and drink dispenser area and asked
Bradley if he was going to sign up, to which Bradley re-
sponded, no. Earlier that day Yu had tried to get him to sign a
District 6 pamphlet (which contained a form membership or
authorization card). Later that day, Bradley saw Yu walking
around handing out the District 6 pamphlet to a couple of em-
ployees.
Bradley had seen nonemployees in the Dobbs’ facility lots of
times. They came in for job applications or they may be lost,
but he has also seen strangers escorted out by Dobbs’ supervi-
sors. In later testimony Bradley recalled that Dobbs has signs
posted at the plant entrance, visitor’s report to the office and no
soliciting.
Bradley didn’t know if the seven employees he saw in the
cafeteria were on break; the meeting was in the evening. Yu
was seated facing the speaker and not more than 4 feet from a
table at which five employees were seated. Bradley had con-
cluded the speaker was from District 6 because he had pam-
phlets in his hand, and Bradley had never seen him before at the
Dobbs’ facility. He later described him as a dark skinned Span-
ish guy, thin, about 30 years of age. The District 6 representa-
tive in the yard was also Spanish looking, but short and not as
dark, and the one at the timeclock was also Spanish, little taller
than Bradley, who is 5 feet 6 inches, a little stocky and about 28
or 29 years old.
During his cross-examination by Dobbs’ counsel, Bradley
was obliged to acknowledge a conflict between his testimony,
and pretrial affidavit dated September 18, 1996, which he gave
to a Local 69 lawyer, in which he swore that Benson Yu had
come to the door of the storeroom to solicit his signature to a
card in support of District 6. Bradley insisted that his present
testimony, that Yu approached him inside the cafeteria, is true
and that his sworn statement is not. The storeroom is 10 feet
away from the cafeteria. The significance of this conflict is that
Bradley had particularized his testimony about the event, recall-
ing on the stand that Yu approached him while he was getting a
soda at the dispersing machine, after looking and seeing and
being seen by Yu in the inner cafeteria. Bradley agreed his
recollection of the occurrence was better on September 18,
1996, 2 months afterward, rather than at the trial on November
12, 1997.
As to the meeting Bradley briefly witnessed, in his affidavit
Bradley fails to mention at all Yu’s presence in the cafeteria at
a District 6 meeting. Bradley confirmed on the witness stand
that the meeting which Yu attended was the only one he ob-
served, yet in his affidavit he related that, “during July 1996 I
saw District 6 people holding meetings and passing out cards
and literature in the Company cafeteria. I know the supervisors
of Dobbs knew this because I saw several supervisors walk in
and out of the cafeteria while this was going on.” In later tes-
timony, Bradley clarified that the supervisors were only in the
dispensary portion of the cafeteria and not the larger, inner
dining area.
Further testimony by Bradley established that entry into the
Dobbs’ facility through a locked door at the top of the loading
dock normally requires knowledge of an access code which is
punched into a lock attached to the door. Visitors who are seen
through the glass portion of the door may gain access without
knowledge of the code. An inner door past a small vestibule
has the same code barring entry. The timeclock and timecards
are on a wall past the inner door and close to a transportation
office with windows open onto the kitchen area which is occu-
pied at times by transportation managers.
During further examination Bradley now added, for the first
time in conformity with his affidavit and a leading question from
Local 69 counsel, that in Yu’s approach to him, Yu responded to
his refusal to sign for District 6 with the statement, go ahead, go
ahead because Local 69 is not going to represent you.
Just as with respect to King, Bradley similarly testified that he
had no indication of information that would support a conclusion
that Dobbs supported Benson Yu’s support for District 6.
During the presentation of Respondent Dobbs’ defense to the
allegations in Case 22–CA–21580, Stuart Manore, Dobbs’ gen-
eral manager of the Newark facility during all relevant periods
alleged, denied that any Dobbs’ supervisor, including Benson
Yu, to his knowledge, supported District 6. He first learned of
Yu’s alleged expressions of support for District 6 when the
original complaint in Case 22–CA–21580 issued on or shortly
after March 7, 1997.
Manore further testified that other than one instance of his
personal observation of a nonemployee present in the Dobbs’
employee parking lot, a matter as to which he took prompt
responsive action to be later described, he was unaware of any
other occasion when District 6 was allowed to come onto the
property, or into the facility to organize, and he received no
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
979
reports of any such activity. He was also unaware of any Dis-
trict 6 meeting addressed by a District 6 representative held in
the cafeteria in the summer of 1996 and received no report of
any such meeting. Manore uniformly instructed supervisors to
prohibit such entry and to request any outside organizer or
stranger to leave the premises and report the incident to him.
Yet, in a position statement submitted by Dobbs counsel on
November 22, 1996, to the Region’s Board agent assigned to
the investigation of the charges herein, it was Dobbs’ stated
position, based on its own investigation that “it does appear that
District 6 representatives both employees and nonemployees,
were on the Employer’s premises engaging in organizational
activities at various times. . . . Organizational meetings were
held in the cafeteria and to the best of the Employer’s knowl-
edge, supervisors were in the cafeteria and did not say anything
to representatives.” Such statements undermine Manore’s con-
trary denials, and make evident, at the least, an awareness of,
and tolerance toward, the presence of District 6 organizer’s at
various places in the facility, including its lunchroom.
Manore, during later cross-examination by District 6, related
that during the 1996 organizing period he had talked personally
with Yu, as he had with other supervisors, to make clear that
the Company had no interests in favor of either of the two
competing unions, the Company was to remain completely
neutral, that if employees approached him about the campaign
to respond that they had to make their own decision. Manore
also met with Yu in 1997, as well as during the last 2 weeks
preceding the trial in the conference room at the Newark facil-
ity. On this last occasion Respondent’s attorney met with Yu in
preparation for the trial. Attorney-client privilege as well as
attorney-work-product privilege were interposed as objections
to further questioning about this meeting. Yu ceased employ-
ment with Respondent prior to this interview. Nonetheless, as
it involved the period of time when was a managerial or super-
visory representative of Dobbs, I prohibited further questioning
as barred by the attorney client privilege and probably attorney
work product privilege as well. When District 6 president,
William Perry, expressed an intention to testify about a recent
conversation he had held with Yu as to his conduct in issue I
rejected that offer as violating the hearsay rule. District 6 later
withdrew an offer to produce Yu as its witness.
It is evident that Respondent chose not to call Yu as its wit-
ness to contradict the testimony of both King and Bradley.
While no longer an employee, based on his availability to Re-
spondent in the period immediately preceding this hearing, I am
prepared to draw the reasonable inference that if he had testi-
fied his testimony would not have aided or buttressed its de-
fense that Yu did not engage in conduct alleged as interference
in support of District 6 and was not present during a District 6
organizing meeting held on its premises, knowledge of which
may be imputed to Respondent.
While I have some question about King’s reliability as a wit-
ness, based on his lack of responsiveness to questions posed to
him, and while Bradley appears to have changed his testimony
as to the location of his interchange with Yu, I am prepared to
credit both of them regarding King’s exchange with Yu, and
Bradley’s witnessing Yu at the District 6 meeting and their later
conversation, particularly in the absent of any testimony from
Yu. As the exchange between them was first claimed by Brad-
ley to have taken place only 10 feet from his later description of
the sites of their conversation, I conclude the difference is not
significant. Neither is Bradley’s failure to name Yu in his affi-
davit and his apparent exaggeration as to the supervisory wit-
nesses being present at the District 6 meeting in the cafeteria.
Benson Yu’s one man campaign on behalf of District 6 can-
not be dismissed as an isolated act, unworthy of consideration.
Neither can I accept either witnesses’ failure to attribute Yu’s
conduct to Dobbs. While an employer might legitimately be
held not responsible for knowledge of employee union activity
where the supervisor privy to such knowledge denies having
informed the employer, Dr. Medgal, 267 NLRB 82 (1983), here
the supervisor agent failed to deny his conduct, no other wit-
ness denied Yu’s conduct, and the test for determining the im-
pact of Yu’s conduct on employees is not subjective but the
reasonable inference which flows from his activity. Yu’s inter-
rogations and solicitations on behalf of District 6 may be ap-
propriately imputed to Dobbs, based on his status as a Section
2(13) supervisor and agent (contrary to Dobb’s denial), even
though Dobbs had not specifically authorized or, indeed, may
have specifically forbidden Yu’s conduct. Plumbers Local 250
(Murphy Bros.), 311 NLRB 491, 496 (1993); and Longshore-
men Local 6 (Sunset Line), 79 NLRB 1487, 1509 (1948). I
conclude that by questioning, and then suggesting strongly,
through Yu, to at least two employees that they signify in writ-
ing their support for District 6, and that District 6 was replacing
Local 69 as their representative, and by distributing District 6
literature to other employees, and further by permitting a Dis-
trict 6 organizing meeting to be chaired by an apparent District
6 representative to take place on its facility attended by its su-
pervisor, Yu, and a District 6 representative to distribute litera-
ture and solicit at the time/clock and in the yard, Respondent
engaged in acts of unlawful interrogations, solicitation on be-
half of one of two competing unions, and rendered assistance
and support to District 6 in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (2),
respectively, of the Act. See generally Momfort of Colorado,
Inc., 256 NLRB 612 (1981).
C. Dobbs’ Alleged Acts of Interference and Threats, Assistance
and Support in Favor of Local 69, and Suspension of Employee
Octavio Valencia Because of His District 6 Activities
Counsel for the General Counsel called four witnesses in
support of its case-in-chief in Case 22–CA–21477. Pedro Rosa
had been employed for 6 years in the dishroom as a dishwasher.
He worked a shift from 3 to 11:30 a.m. He spoke to other
employees during the summer of 1996 in favor of District 6.
Rosa testified that on July 4, admitted Assistant Manager and
Supervisor Fernando Dantas told him and 13 other employees
present in the dishroom they were going to see a training movie
about food service. Another supervisor in the warehouse,
Sheridan, also told them to see the movie. At the time he and
the other employees were directed to view the movie their
workshift had concluded. They were then directed into the
kitchen and the doors past the kitchen through a vestibule out to
the loading dock were locked. When they arrived in the
kitchen, there were about 200 other employees present as well
as agents from Local 69, including Business Representative
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
980
David Feeback. Neither he nor the other dishwashers saw a
training movie that day. Rosa had entered the kitchen through
a door next to the office which is always open.
Rosa explained that after he arrived in the kitchen he heard
an argument going on about the union contract which had al-
ready been signed. The meeting was being conducted in Eng-
lish and Rosa who testified with the aid of a Spanish interpreter
understood very little. Since he didn’t want to hear this, he
opened the door through which he had entered in order to leave,
but Supervisor Fernando Dantas told him he had to stay there
because of the meeting. Dantas was also present at the meet-
ing. A second union official Rosa identified as being present at
the ratification meeting was Robert Baker, a trustee appointed
by the International Union to oversee the affairs of Local 69
which had been placed under an International Trusteeship.
Later testimony and the parties’ stipulation established this
meeting as a meeting of unit employees to ratify the successor
labor agreement between Dobbs and Local 69 which was made
effective August 1, 1996, for a 3-year term.
During his cross-examination, Rosa explained that the workshift
of the 14 dishroom employees, including himself, at the time of the
July ratification meeting, finished at 11:30 a.m. It was around 10
a.m. when the group was informed that they would be viewing a
training movie and it was around 11 a.m. when they were directed
to the meeting in the kitchen. Rosa earlier noted that the ratifica-
tion meeting lasted about half an hour.
He had seen training movies in the past in a room on the sec-
ond floor of the Newark facility next to the company office
area. On this occasion he did not remember company managers
and supervisors telling him that the movie had been cancelled.
From 11 to 11:30 a.m. Rosa was waiting with many other
employees in the kitchen area while the meeting was being
conducted. He stayed for a half hour and listened as best he
could. Then, at 11:30 a.m., Rosa sought to exit the meeting,
but was stopped by Dantas who was not in the meeting area,
but was standing outside in a hallway on the other side of the
exit door. After being escorted back into the meeting, Rosa
remained there until 12 noon, when Rosa did leave out to the
parking lot without being stopped while the meeting was appar-
ently continuing. This summary and clarification of Rosa’s
testimony while under Respondent Dobbs’ cross-examination
constitutes a piecing together of responses which, to say the
least, were disjointed and lacked clarity. Nonetheless, Rosa’s
narrative, disjointed as it is, does clarify his earlier testimony
on direct, clarifying in particular that the meeting lasted beyond
his workshift, and provides credible evidence of his being re-
quired by a Dobbs’ manager to remain in attendance at the
Local 69 contract ratification meeting held on Dobbs’ facility
beyond his workshift, and his having been initially apparently
mislead as to the purpose of his gathering with other
dishwashers near the end of his shift, when the real purpose
served by Dobbs and Local 69 was to hold him and other work-
ers in order to provide Local 69 with members in sufficient
numbers to ratify the agreement.
Another employee, Octavio Valencia, testified that he was
employed as a driver by Dobbs, having started in December
1993. His supervisors were Carlos Munoz and George
McBride. In the summer of 1996 he was being paid at the rate
of $10.10 an hour for a 40-hour week. He, along with a few
other employees, Pedro Mejia and Jose Cardenas, led the orga-
nizing drive for District 6. He spoke to many coworkers and
solicited many signatures to a petition to persuade District 6 to
seek to represent them. He also solicited employees to sign
District 6 authorization cards which he distributed to them in
the summer of 1996.
On one occasion, after punching out at 2:30 a.m., he had ap-
proached a female coworker at the pantry section, and had spo-
ken four or five words to her about making a change in repre-
sentation, when the pantry supervisor, Kayla Adino, came over
to them and told him you can’t do that here because this may
cost your position, you could lose your job if you solicit and try
to change union representation. Valencia defended what he
was doing to Adino, told the employee he would speak with her
the next day, and then left.
Valencia also described the uniform employees wore to
work. It included dark blue slacks, a white shirt with red lines
with the Dobbs’ logo on the chest, a blue cap with the Dobbs’
name, and a blue jacket to wear in winter. When Valencia
started working for Dobbs he was issued two slacks, four shirts,
a jacket coat for winter, and another overcoat and a cap. Al-
though never informed in writing by Dobbs about its uniform
policy, he was aware that the uniform worn by the employees
was part of the company’s regulations. On two occasions Va-
lencia was disciplined over his failure to wear the regulation
uniform, and it is the circumstances surrounding the second of
these two instances which comprises the Government’s claim
of discrimination by Dobbs against him.
In 1994 after working for Dobbs for some 6 months, Valen-
cia reported for work on a particular day wearing the regular
uniform but without the hat. Valencia was aware that in the
kitchen—working near or with food—an employee could not
be without a hat. Later testimony established that kitchen em-
ployees were issued and wore hairnets, and drivers and other
employees who handled food containers, whether closed or
open, were required to wear the uniform cap. His then supervi-
sor, Jose Rosario, asked why he wasn’t wearing his hat, and
Valencia said he didn’t have it because he wasn’t given one.
After his originally issued hat had deteriorated after repeated
washings, he had asked for a replacement but was told the
Company didn’t have one to give him. After Rosario repeated
his question in what Valencia described as a very rude way, and
Valencia responded he didn’t have one, Rosario told him if you
don’t wear a hat you might as well go home. Valencia left, and
at home he was informed by Rosario by phone that he had been
suspended for 5 days.
Then, in late spring or early summer 1996, Valencia arrived
at work to punch in at 4 p.m., wearing a different pair of pants
not part of the uniform, a pair of light blue jeans. Manore saw
him and said you can’t come here like this. Valencia explained
that the pair of company pants he had was all torn up. Manore
told him not to punch in and sent him home. Valencia stayed
off work that day, without pay. His conversation with Supervi-
sor Kayla Adino earlier described had taken place some time
before this incident.
Valencia related that on this same day he was sent home, be-
fore he left the facility he saw an employee, a fellow driver
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
981
named Chandler, wearing a pair of black colored jeans not
company issued, just as he had all day on past occasions. He
had also seen on other days another employee, Raymond
Cruise, who also works in transportation, wearing all day an
article of clothing not issued by Dobbs, either very blue or
black jeans. On none of these occasions, did he ever see a
Dobbs’ supervisor or manager send the offending employee
home as he was.
During his cross-examination, Valencia explained that the
female employee he had approached on the morning Kayla
spoke to him, was at her workstation but was leaving it for the
cafeteria to take her authorized break from work, and Kayla
Adino did not tell him she did not want him bothering her em-
ployees while they were working but had questioned him about
talking about a change to District 6 for which he could lose his
job. Valencia understood that if the female employee had been
working when he approached her it would have been wrong to
interfere with her work.
On the day following his being sent home for not wearing
proper uniform pants, Valencia returned to work, first reporting
to the employee in charge of payroll, Lenora, who issued him a
pair of uniform pants which were too small in size but which he
wore. Following this day, he purchased two pairs of dark blue
pants out of his own funds. Valencia explained that since hav-
ing been issued the original two pairs of pants when he started
work early in 1994, he had received another two pairs 1-1/2
years later, and by this time they had deteriorated, and one was
torn, as he had described. Valencia also denied that the jeans
he had worn the day he was sent home were cut offs. Also,
when he had asked before the incident for replacement pants
the Company did not have any available and it appeared to take
a longer period for them to be received at the facility. Re-
cently, he had approached Lenora for another pair, she wrote
down his size, and he expects to eventually receive a pair.
Valencia acknowledged receiving workrules, training man-
ual, and taking a training test which, inter alia, included mate-
rial about Dobbs’ employees working on the ramp at the airport
being required to wear a clean Dobbs’ uniform. A page of
Dobbs’ workrules and correction action, provides a series of
progressive disciplines running from a warning through 3- and
then 5-days suspension subject to discharge, for improper dress
or appearance.
While Valencia denied that Benson Yu helped District 6 as
for as he knew, no evidence was submitted through Valencia
that he was either aware or unaware of Yu’s approaches to
employees King and Bradley, Yu’s solicitations on behalf of
District 6 or Yu’s presence at the District 6 meeting in the cafe-
teria led by a District 6 representative.
During his cross-examination by Local 69 counsel, Valencia
explained that when he first saw the female employee he was
going to the cafeteria to get some coffee to take home, and she
was standing at the corner of her worktable fixing some alumi-
num paper, but not working. When he approached her she said
I’m gong over there now, to the cafeteria, and he said I just
have three or four words to speak to you, started to mention the
process of their changing unions, and that’s when Kayla came
over and told him not to speak with anyone.
In a pretrial affidavit which was taken of the witness by a
Board agent, with the use of an interpreter, Valencia swears
regarding this incident, that “. . . Kayla . . . a supervisor told me
that I should not pass out the petition paper stating that the
employees wanted District 6 to be their union, because I could
lose my job. We were in the belt section of the plant, there
were two female employees in the area, but I cannot recall their
names. When the supervisor approached me the female em-
ployees walked away. The union did not tell me I would be
fired because I supported District 6.”
While I received the affidavit in evidence, I find that it does
not undermine Valencia’s credibility and is not inconsistent
with his testimony which provides far more detail as to the
circumstances of his interchange with the female employee.
That Valencia mentions two females in the area, does not con-
flict with his testimony about approaching only one. Neither
does the description of the workarea, the belt section of the
plant, conflict with his ready acknowledgment that the female
worker was still at her worktable when he approached her.
During later cross-examination by Dobbs’ counsel, while be-
ing questioned about his knowledge and understanding of the
Company uniform rule, Valencia responded that while he was
aware of the rule, for the Company to expect the employees to
obey those rules they have to give the uniform to the employees
on time. This goes to the essential issue involved in Valencia’s
alleged 1-day discipline, as to whether the discipline was im-
posed at a time when the employee had attempted to procure
replacement pants from Dobbs but could not because none were
then available and thus, the discipline may have been unfairly
and unreasonably imposed out of pique or concern for his
strong known commitment to replacing the incumbent Union
with District 6, as illustrated most forcefully in his testimony
attributing anti-District 6 animosity to Supervisor Adino. Fur-
thermore, if Respondent had such a strong concern with enforc-
ing its uniform policy, why wasn’t it similarly imposed on Va-
lencia’s fellow workers, as he related it was not. I conclude
that at the completion of the Government’s case on behalf of
Valencia, it has made a prima facie showing of violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (3).
Jose Cardenas, one of the three employee leaders of the Dis-
trict 6 organizing effort, was a driver employed by Dobbs from
December 1993 to October 1997. He had been a Local 69 shop
steward for 2 years, 1995 and 1996. Another was Luis
Vazquez, whose alleged conduct presents another issue to be
discussed infra.
Cardenas, like Valencia, had not received uniform replace-
ments timely when he requested them. On those occasions his
requests were not honored, he reported for work lacking hat,
shirt, or pants, without incident, other than a reminder by a
supervisor to wear his uniform, and a statement that he could be
suspended in the future, unlike the instance when Manager
Manore sent Valencia home.
Cardenas also wore to work a District 6 pin on the front of
his uniform cap as well as a Local 69 pin on the front pocket of
his uniform shirt in the summer of 1996. Each pin made of
metal with a rear pin clasp, is distinctive in color and design.
The District 6 pin is round, roughly the size of a dime and con-
tains two bold eagles set against a royal blue background and
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
982
has lettering “District 6, IUISTHE” on its face. The Local 69
pin, roughly the size of a nickel but perhaps best described as
having a crest design, is predominantly gold with an outline
circle of multiple colors of red, green, blue, yellow and white in
its circular portion containing the words of the unions interna-
tional affiliation abbreviation “H.E.R.E.” in dark print in the
circle’s center, and the words “Local 69,” also in dark print, in
the lower crest portion. The pins, in evidence, cannot be mis-
taken for each other and make distinctive visual impressions.
George McBride, an admitted Dobbs’ supervisor, told
Cardenas to remove the District 6 pin on his hat, but did not tell
him to remove the Local 69 pin affixed to his shirt front.
Cardenas removed the District 6 pin as ordered. McBride did
this on two occasions, once in front of the transportation office
and the other time as he exited the cafeteria. On another occa-
sion, standing in front of the dishwasher, Assistant Manager
Fernando Dantas told him not to wear those pins of District 6.
At the time, Cardenas had both pins affixed to his shirt. He
removed the District 6 pin but left on the Local 69 pin.
So long as Cardenas continued as Local 69 shop steward
through 1996 he continued to wear the Local 69 pin daily, but
never again wore the District 6 one.
Cardenas also reported that other employees who reported to
work out of uniform and worked a full shift, among them
Chandler and a Richard Hampton who worked inside in the
kitchen, were not sent home or suspended.
On one occasion during the summer of 1996, while they
were going up the stairs to the second floor, Manager Manore
told him it was impossible to remove Local 69 from Dobbs
because this local had been born there, and he should stop sup-
porting District 6.
During his cross-examination by Dobbs’ counsel, Cardenas,
acknowledged that he had provided four affidavits in connec-
tion with this case. The first one, provided to the Union on July
24, 1996, asserts, inter alia, that the affiant, Cardenas, heard
Stuart Manore tell groups of employees, including himself, that
every person who votes for District 6 would lose their jobs and
he brought Local 69 in and he would force people to respect
Local 69. It appears that these statements constitute exaggera-
tions which the witness later specifically disavowed in subse-
quent pretrial affidavits provided directly to a Board agent.
Thus, in an affidavit of April 17, 1997, in paragraph 5,
Cardenas specifically denied hearing Manore tell any other
employees they will lose their jobs if they vote for District 6
and in paragraph 6, Cardenas denied hearing Manore tell any
employees that he brought Local 4-692 in and he would force
people to respect Local 4-69. He did relate in paragraph 6 a
Manore response to his own statement critical of Local 69, that
the Union was born over here and you will see “the union here
for a long time,” and in paragraph 8, Manore, on another occa-
sion, after asking him why he wanted to switch unions, and
after Cardenas explained why, informed him that it is going to
be difficult to make the change to another union, both statement
being consistent with Cardenas’ testimony under attack. It is
thus apparent, in light of this April 17, 1997 affidavit, that
2 A reference to the local number used in connection with some Lo-
cal 69 Taft Hartley benefit funds.
Cardenas’ statement in an affidavit taken by the same Board
agent earlier on October 22, 1996, asserting that “Stuart Man-
ore, general manager did not make any statements to me about
District 6 . . .” must be viewed in the context of the paragraph 3
in which it appears which relates primarily to the restrictions
company managers and supervisors had placed on his wearing
District 6 insignia, matters which corroborate Cardenas’ testi-
mony. I am thus, unwilling to find that Cardenas’ testimony
has been impeached upon a complete evaluation of his various
pretrial affidavits, and I credit his testimony relating both to the
restrictions placed on his display of the District 6 pin, while
permitting him to wear and display that of Local 69, as well as
his corroboration of Valencia’s testimony regarding what ap-
pears to have been a disparate treatment relating to Valencia’s
noncompliance with the Dobbs’ uniform policy, and Dobbs’
own inability to provide timely uniform replacements.
While Cardenas mentioned Octavio Valencia as one of two
employees who were sent home by Dobbs to change their uni-
forms and who were allowed to come back to work, in follow
up questioning he was unaware if the other employee, Sergio
Compos, sent home for wearing the wrong color pants, and also
the wrong belt and shirt after District 6 had already delivered its
petition, came back to work the same day. Since Cardenas did
not provide an details as to his witnessing Valencia’s being sent
home, and Cardenas’ minimal reply does not indicate that Va-
lencia was allowed to return the same day (see Tr. 292), with-
out more, I am unwilling to consider Cardenas a reliable wit-
ness to Valencia’s exchange with Manore, in which Valencia
credibly testified to Manore’s direction to him to leave the fa-
cility without punching in.
Pedro Mejia, another driver employed by Dobbs, and one of
the three leading District 6 advocates among employees,3 had
been employed 8 years at the time of his testimony. On July 7,
1996, while seated in the cafeteria, he was called over by Man-
ager Manore who was standing outside the entrance with Assis-
tant Manager Dantas. Manore asked if Mejia wanted to see
him. Mejia said yes, with respect to our rights as employees in
connection with a pamphlet or flyer from the NLRB. Here,
Mejia had reference to an NLRB Form 5492, an official Gov-
ernment notice to employees which the Regional Office pro-
vides to employers to post to inform employees of their rights
under the Act when a petition for representation election has
been filed, as was the petition in Case 22–RC–1125 on June 28,
1996. The single-page notice in this case was printed in both
Spanish and English. Mejia had the Spanish copy and showed
it to Manore. When Manore asked Mejia to interpret it for him,
Dantas, instead, did so. At this point, Manore got very upset.
He saw the National Labor Relations Board label at the bottom
of the form. He told Mejia that he had no authorization to place
and he didn’t want any piece of shit paper placed anywhere in
this Company, and he didn’t want to see him passing out papers
of District 6, or other things you can wear on your uniform,
nothing that would have to do with District 6. If he did, he
would be going to find himself in many problems with the com-
pany especially with himself, and he will fire Mejia. Mejia
3 Mejia signed the UD petition which employees filed on or about
July 31, 1996.
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
983
responded, well, okay, and he never again passed out District 6
papers during his breaks.
Leading up to this conversation, Mejia had sought to post the
Spanish translation of the form Notice, but was advised by
Dantas and Supervisor Jose Rosario that he had to take the
matter up with Manore.
Later in the summer of 1996, on a particular day, after work-
ing through his normal lunchbreak, Mejia took some limited
time, as was the permitted practice, before he was scheduled to
drive to the airport for a food delivery to a scheduled flight, to
go to his car in the parking lot where he had District 6 hats, T-
shirts, and pins stored, to give a coworker a hat and a T-shirt.
Manore came out to the parking lot and told Mejia that he had
no right during working time to pass out anything that had to do
with District 6 to anyone inside the Company. Manore ap-
peared to be very upset when he said this. Mejia responded he
was not passing out anything inside the Company, but outside
the Company. He also was not using worktime, he only took
10 minutes for a break. Manore said the items could be passed
out during Christmas time. Mejia said he would give Manore a
District 6 lot he could wear during Christmas. Manore said that
was fine, but he was not to use working time. He also didn’t
want to see anyone using District 6 pins, shirts, or hats inside
the Company and articles not part of the uniform and if Mejia
distributed these items he would be fired. When Mejia asked
why, Manore did not respond.
Mejia explained that on this occasion he had gone to his car
during a short break he had taken because he had to work
through his lunch and normal breaktime, delivering foods by
truck to an airline for a particular flight. Mejia elaborated on
this during Dobbs’ cross-examination of him. Besides the meal
break of half an hour to an hour, employees had regular work
breaks before and after meal, varying between 5 and 15 min-
utes. Normally, they informed their supervisors when taking a
break. But the times they took breaks and whether they took
them at all depended upon the time they finished with the
flights. When one has the time and the supervisor is too busy
and he’s not in the office, one took the break without informing
the supervisor about half the time. But in taking breaks he was
guided by both his work responsibilities to meet flight delivery
deadlines and supervisory guidance that there was no time to
take them. As Mejia explained, “[T]here is a time when one
can take a break for lunch at the time one is finished with a
flight.” (Tr. 328.)
On this particular occasion, Mejia was assigned a flight
which ran through his normal lunch break between 11:30 and
12:30 p.m. When he returned to the facility it was close to 1
p.m. He then spent time stripping and cleaning a truck and it
was getting close to 2 p.m. when his coworker told him they
had been assigned an extra flight. Since he had previously
promised a District 6 hat and pin to a coworker who was finish-
ing a shift and heading home he took 5 minutes time for him-
self and went to his car to give them to him. He was already
returning to the truck when Manore called to him. He had not
informed his supervisor, but believed he was entitled to take a
short work break in view of having been assigned a flight at his
normal lunch time which he was required to perform at the risk
of discipline for a refusal, and now having an extra flight as-
signed and not having had any prior free time for a work break.
There is no evidence that Mejia did not timely complete his
extra flight assignment that day.
I find Meja’s explanation of the circumstances under which
he took a short period of time from work on the occasion of his
reprimand by Manore to be reasonable and a warranted and
acceptable interpretation of the manner in which driver em-
ployees in particular took break time under the pressures and
exigencies of meeting flight schedules in the course of perform-
ing their daily delivery work assignments.
Mejia also denied that in his discussion with Manore about
posting the Board information notice, Manore either told him
then or later that he did not believe he was legally required to
post it. I credit his denial.
Respondent Dobbs called two witnesses to counter the Gov-
ernments presentation in Case 2–CA–21477.
Stuart Manore testified that he had been the manager at the
Dobbs’ Newark facility for roughly 10 years from 1987 to early
1997. He had been a member of the Company negotiating
committee and was present at the Local 69 headquarters in
Secacus, New Jersey, in early July 1996 when the successor
contract was concluded and a tentative agreement was signed
subject to ratification by the members of Local 69. At that time
the Local 69 negotiators made a request to Dobbs to hold the
employees over until the ratification committee could come to
the unit so they could hold a ratification vote. The employees
to be held included morning shift people who worked in the
dishroom and in food production. The intention ws to hold the
meeting at 10 a.m., but the Local 69 representatives did not
leave Secacus until 11 to 11:15 a.m. and didn’t arrive at the
Newark facility until 20 minutes later.
Manore made arrangements to hold over the morning shift
employees in the following manner. He contacted Assistant
General Manager Fernando Dantas and asked him to help two
Dobbs’ employees from the Memphis office who were then in
Newark doing inspections and related work set up some train-
ing in areas in which employees were weak “ . . . and we could
utilize that time ‘till there’s a decision made as to when the
union verification (sic) committee was to arrive.” (Tr. 334.)
What Manore is really saying here is that the training was a
device to hold employees past their workshift so that when the
Local 69 representatives arrived there would be employees
present to ratify the contract. Indeed, as Pedro Rosa testified,
the training although ordered was never held, because, as
Manore explained “Union committee arrived sooner than we
could set up the training classes.” (Tr. 334.)
Upon the arrival of the Local 69 representatives and em-
ployee bargaining committee members at the Newark facility,
they went through the kitchen collecting the employees and
Manore gathered the management together and told them to go
to the dispatch office and stay off the floor as there was going
to be a union meeting. It was Manore’s understanding that
Dobbs’ managers and supervisors stayed off the work floor, in
this case the large open kitchen workarea, which included gas
ranges, food preparation tables and dishwashing areas.
As concerns Octavio Valencia, Manore testified he did not
suspend him. Around the time of the Local 69 negotiations,
thus, at the time of the District 6 activity, he saw Valencia on
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
984
the stairs wearing a pair of light colored blue jeans, cut off at
the knees, sewn at the knees as shorts. Manore asked him
where his uniform pants were and he said they were at home.
Manore asked if he could go home and get his uniform and
come back to work and Valencia said he was going to go home
to get his uniform. When asked by Dobbs’ counsel if Valencia
gave any explanation about coming back to work, Manore now
added that Valencia said it would be difficult to get back to
work, to which Manore repeated his order.
Manore described the uniform requirements as a pair of dark
blue pants, pin striped shirt, the hat with the Dobbs’ logo, and a
windbreaker with the Dobbs’ logo. There were no shoe re-
quirements. There are exceptions to the uniform requirement.
They include new employees until their uniforms can be or-
dered. Until the completion of probation new employees wear
long blue jeans and a white shirt or are issued a lab coat to wear
over their street clothes. Another exception involved the per-
mitted use of company issued short pants to the knee with long
socks if a driver requested, due to the heat on the ramp, where
food deliveries are made to the airplane. Dobbs also took no
action to discipline an employee if in fact uniforms were on
order for that person and the Company had failed to provide it.
This approximates Valencia’s own claim, that at the time he
was sent home he had sought without success to obtain pants
replacement.
The contract in effect until August 1, 1996, called for the
employer to furnish employees with uniforms without cost to
them, and to review replacement requests and to replace uni-
forms with new ones where appropriate.4
To counter the Government’s claim of disparate treatment
toward Valencia regarding compliance with the uniform re-
quirement, Dobbs introduced two employee corrective actions
in which employees were disciplined for failing to comply with
jewelry and uniform requirements. The first, issued April 10,
1994, to T. Hooks describes the employee’s improper dress or
appearance, having been given a jacket, hat, and pants and
doesn’t wear them. The employee was issued a written warn-
ing and sent home. The second, dated June 25, 1997, was a
written warning issued to a Carmen Claudio, a food worker, for
failing to cooperate with company policy regarding no jewelry
or watches and only removing same after being asked to do so.
Neither of these disciplinary documents come to grips with
Valencia’s claims that he had complied with the contractual
requirement to seek a uniform component replacement prior to
receiving his discipline, and, furthermore, that other employees
who knowingly failed to comply suffered no adverse conse-
quences.
On October 11, 1994, Valencia was given a 5-day suspen-
sion for refusing to put his uniform on when told to do so by
the transportation manager. The warning further notes exces-
sive tardiness of 20 minutes or more every day. It would ap-
pear that this warning relates, at least in part, to the incident in
1994 which Valencia described when he received a 5-day sus-
4 While the contract in evidence (art. XXIV) does not contain any
language regarding replacements, Manore testified that it did (Tr. 344).
If not in writing, it may have been an agreed practice governing uni-
form replacements.
pension for failing to wear the uniform hat which had deterio-
rated and which Dobbs had failed to replace. Absent any con-
trary testimony from Dobbs on this point, and given the similar-
ity in timing and substance of the written discipline, I credit
Valencia’s testimony that this 5-day suspension was occa-
sioned, at least in part, by Dobbs having failed to provide him
with a replacement hat, in accordance with its obligation under
the then existing contract. There is no testimony as to why this
matter was not pursued as a grievance under the parties’
agreement.
In response to Cardenas’ claim that he was directed to re-
move his District 6 pin at work, Dobbs produced, in addition to
the warning regarding Claudio’s failure to promptly remove
jewelry, an excerpt from its quality assurance manual, the pro-
visions of which employees are informed of in their indoctrina-
tion on being hired and thereafter on a regular basis, which
bans all jewelry from being warn while engaged in food or
equipment handling and storage, except for a plain wedding
band. As the excerpt explains, jewelry can act as a hiding place
for bacteria, can fall into foods, and can pose a safety risk while
working around machinery and kitchen equipment. This prohi-
bition applies not only to all kitchen and related personnel but
to all drivers who transport foods in containers to and from the
airport and airlines. Another excerpt relating to uniforms ad-
dresses the necessity of wearing head covering in the form of a
disposable surgical hairnet if handling exposed food or clean
equipment/utensils. The cap issued to drivers suffices as head
covering, on their transport of foods to the airports. While in
the kitchen, the drivers wear a hairnet. A uniform policy form
itemizing the required uniform, and hair covering, and prohibit-
ing the wearing of jewelry, and the like, was provided to each
employee for dating and signing when new or replacement
uniforms were issued. Finally, an extract from a 1995 Federal
Drug Administration food code which Dobbs was obliged to
follow, provides, in Section 2-303.11, “While preparing food,
food employees may not wear jewelry on their arms and
hands.” The section then excludes a plain ring, such as a wed-
ding ban, from its reach. Section 2-303.11 provides the well
reasoned safety rationale for this prohibition.
Manore himself did not knowingly allow supervisors to per-
mit employees to wear Local 69 pins, and the jewelry prohibi-
tion applied across the board to pins of both unions.
Manore also testified that one time he was in his office when
informed by a transportation manager that a stranger from an-
other union was in the parking lot talking to Dobbs’ employees
at a picnic table. Manore went out, confronted the person and
when he identified himself as working for William Perry, the
District 6 president, directed him to leave. Another time, in
early July 1996 he saw another organizer, also apparently from
District 6, pulling shirts and hats from a car in the lot and when
asked to leave, he did so.
When employees approached him with union questions,
Manore testified he had a uniform response of maintaining
neutrality and referring them to bulletin boards where Dobbs
had posted a series of questions and answers regarding the un-
ion. In it, Dobbs explained, inter alia, that it had entered a new
agreement effective to July 31, 1999, with Local 69; employees
who refuse to work or walk out in support of District 6 could
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
985
lose their job; and, in a response apparently made prior to the
Board’s reversal of the Region’s dismissal of District 6’s RC
petition, informed employees that cards signed for District 6
could not be counted and its petition was dismissed because
filed too late.
Manore denied having any conversations with Jose Cardenas
regarding District 6, and did not inform him it was impossible
to remove Local 69, to stop supporting District 6, or he could
be terminated for doing so.
He did talk with Mejia regarding the Board notice form. After
asking if Mejia wanted to talk with him, and Mejia replied it was
about posting the notices at the facility, he looked at the notice
and said I’m sorry, we can’t post these up. He was not mad or
angry. He agreed Dantas who was with him, translated the Span-
ish in the Notice. But prior to this conversation he was given its
basic contents and he had received a phone call from corporate
headquarters advising him not to allow its posting. He did not
threaten Mejia with reprisals for organizing for District 6.
Another time, it was reported to him that their were a group
of employees around a car with a trunk open in an employee
parking lot on Dobbs’ property, which is situated below the
truck lot which abuts the Newark facility. Manore also learned
that a representative of District 6 was present as well. He went
to the area, walked up to Mejia, who had handful of T-shirts
and hats and asked him, aren’t you supposed to be working.
Mejia did not reply. Manore asked him what he was going to
do with these. Mejia said he was going to pass them out to
employees. Manore said, not on worktime, not on company
property. Mejia said what should he do with these and Manore
suggested giving them out as Christmas presents. Mejia re-
turned the items to his vehicle. Manore denied threatening to
fire Mejia for distributing union items at the Company.
During his cross-examination Manore agreed that the Local
69 ratification meeting didn’t start until 11 or 11:30 a.m. when
the day shift ended for dishroom employees. While Manore
himself remained on the second floor, he was aware that the
executive chief, a supervisory employee, was located at the
hood area, ensuring food destined for international flights was
not being burned while the Local 69 meeting proceeded near
him in an open area in the kitchen. This conflicts with his ear-
lier denial that any supervisors remained on the work floor
during the ratification meeting. Other supervisors in the trans-
portation department remained nearby in the transportation
communication office, which has a glass window looking out
on the open kitchen area.
Manore also acknowledged that even though Valencia had told
him his uniform pants at home were dirty, and the company pol-
icy required a clean uniform at work he nonetheless sent him
home to change. He, Manore, was aware that the following day,
Valencia was wearing Dobbs issued pants. Furthermore, al-
though Unit 233, the Newark facility, employs 250 to 300 em-
ployees, Dobbs issued only two corrective actions on improper
dress in all of 1994, none in 1995, none in 1996, and only one
through February 1997, and that involved jewelry, not dress.
During his cross-examination by counsel for General Coun-
sel, Manore repeated his testimony about a report of employees
gathered around an open car trunk, conduct he deemed suspi-
cious and which induced him to the lot, but this time he made
no mention of sighting a District 6 organizer. Indeed, in his
original recital, Manore makes no mention of discovering a
District 6 representative in the lot on his arrival. It is clear that
Manore was concerned and motivated by District 6 activity on
Dobbs’ property whether employees were on their own time or
not. And that once he learned that Mejia was involved and the
paraphernalia was District 6’s, Manore was quick to terminate
the activity, even if the employee Mejia was doing it on his
own time. In this connection, it is curious that Manore fails to
describe the number of employees at the car or what any of
them were doing. It will be recalled that Mejia spoke of meet-
ing or providing shirt and hats to only one employee.
During a further examination by the undersigned Manore
now refers to a few employees standing in the vicinity as well
as a representative from District 6, who was leaving the prop-
erty in another car as he came near Mejia’s car with trunk open.
Still later Manore was obliged to admit that although he as-
serted the individual leaving was a District 6 official, he had no
evidence to support that conclusion. During this conversation
Manore now mentioned that Mejia told him he was getting
ready to load his truck, adding to and modifying his earlier
testimony in which he reported that Mejia stood mute when
asked if he was supposed to be working. In fact, Manore ex-
pressed the view that Mejia was in active work, but he also
agreed that employees can take 5 minutes if they have an op-
portunity to do so before they’re required to go out on the truck,
so long as it’s noted to the supervisor. Manore did not know
who was Mejia’s supervisor between two he named and had not
checked as to Mejia’s taking a break before he confronted him.
Neither did Manore know that Mejia had worked through lunch
and had been assigned a rush delivery when he approached
him. Neither was Manore aware as to whether any of the other
employees in the vicinity were on a permitted break at the time
he came up to Mejia. When he started to talk to Mejia they
walked away and back into the facility.
During Manore’s cross-examination by District 6, he advised
that after he became aware of the commencement of District
6’s organizational drive in late May or early June of 1996, he
informed Local 69 business representative, David Feeback,
while talking by phone on another issue.
Manore recalled personally asking between 5 and 10 em-
ployees to remove Local 69 pins affixed to their clothing but
could not provide any names.
During his redirect examination, Manore described his Com-
pany’s relationship with Local 69 as extremely hostile, and
threatening and intimidating to him personally. There also had
been an 11- to 15-day strike preceding entry of the 1993
agreement. Yet, as summarized earlier, the circumstances un-
der which Local 69 was permitted in early July 1996, to obtain
Dobbs’ assistance in arranging an immediate ratification vote in
its facility with union representative presiding and retaining
with overtime pay the employees whose dayshift was conclud-
ing, under somewhat devious and misleading circumstances,
even with a senior supervisory employee remaining on duty in
their midst, shows a willingness to accommodate Local 69’s
interest beyond the ordinary and a coziness which belies
Manore’s claim of hostility in the Dobbs, Local 69 relationship.
The reasons for the haste in cooperating in arranging the ratifi-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
986
cation vote are not difficult to surmise. Even though two and a
half weeks remained before the contract’s effective date, an
immediate ratification vote to which the effectiveness of the
agreement was subject, would make much more difficult Dis-
trict 6’s attempt to supplant Local 69 as the Dobbs’ employees
bargaining representative, and, in particular, provide a stronger
defense to District 6’s petition just filed on June 28, even if, as
later proved true, the parties’ preexisting contract was found
not to bar the petition because it contained an unlawful union
security clause. It is clear that Local 69 was the Union Dobbs
wished to keep. And the new contract, made effective August
1, 1996, eliminated the unlawful union security language.
During the 1996 negotiations for a successor agreement John
Agothos Sr., the Local 69 president, had accused Manore of
favoring District 6 by permitting its organizers to come on the
facility and hold meetings and of not bargaining in good faith.
Following this complaint, Manore reaffirmed with his manag-
ers to remain neutral in the two union campaign and refer all
employees to the posted question and answer memorandum
previously described. As previously described, that document
strongly endorsed the company’s continued bargaining rela-
tionship with Local 69.
Under further examination by Local 69 counsel, Manore
confirmed the presence of Dobbs’ executive chef at the range,
cooking, while the ratification meeting took place in his vicin-
ity. Other managerial or supervisory employees who were
manning Dobbs’ operations during this ratification meeting
were six supervisors who were in the nearly transportation
communications office, receiving and relaying messages to and
from airline customers and other Dobbs’ management person-
nel as food services to airlines were being implemented and
changed as required. No doors were locked during this time.
No instructions were provided Dobbs’ supervision as to what to
do if employees wanted to leave the ratification meeting. All
employees who remained beyond their shift were paid for wait-
ing around, but if they punched out and did not remain they
were not paid beyond their punch out time.
At a later point in his cross-examination, Manore exhibited
hostility and evasive conduct when pressed about how he
learned employees in the facility supported one union or the
other, going so far at one point to reply “. . . how we got to my
personal opinion is my business.” (Tr. 517.)
It is also apparent that Manore, who speaks and understands
no Spanish (or Portuguese, spoken by other employees), would
have a difficult time communicating with and understanding
Spanish speaking employees Mejia, Valencia, Cardenas, and
Rosa who testified through an interpreter, when he engaged them
in one on one conversations, in spite of his claim, which I dis-
count considerably, that on each occasion, he required a listening
check, i.e., having each employee state back what Manore told or
asked them. I do not credit Manore that he did that on the occa-
sions these employees attributed threatening, and other coercive
statements to him. Manore’s lack of understanding of his Span-
ish speaking employees’ responses to him and their awkwardness
in communicating with him probably contributed in part to
Manore’s unconvincing testimony, which I do not credit, that
Valencia did not inform him about the torn condition of his pants
for example, or that Pedro Mejia did not question the improper
and unlawful limitation being placed on his right to distribute
District 6 materials on his work break in the parking lot and was
not the recipient of an earlier unlawful threat by Manore. While
communication between Manore and these employees was per-
haps primitive I have no doubt that Manore got his points across
to each of these employees whose need for an interpreter was
clear even though they each could understand and express them-
selves in an elementary English form.
Returning to the question of the parties’ rush to ratification,
when closely questioned about Dobbs’ response to Local 69’s
request to hold over employees for an immediate meeting and
vote, Manore could not explain why Dobbs agreed to the pro-
cedure, evading a direct response to the question posed (Tr.
529, L. 5–11). When the question was repeated again and
again, Manore’s response was the same. (Tr. 529–532.) The
fact remains that Dobbs was obliged to require its employees to
attend the ratification meeting on their own time when it re-
lented to Local 69’s request that the precondition to their
agreement of employee approval be immediately satisfied.
Only by requiring sufficient employee attendance could the
parties achieve their objective. No Dobbs’ representative in-
formed the kitchen staff, the dishwashing group, that they were
free to leave when their aborted training film became a union
run meeting at their work place. By retaining at least one key
executive on the work floor and others in a room with a view of
the work floor, by permitting the union to direct them to the
kitchen area, and by restraining employee Pedro Rosa, among
others, from leaving, whether or not doors were locked, it is
clear that Dobbs coerced employees, through psychological and
well as physical means to remain to legitimize the ratification
process and thus achieve an effective contract immune from
third party attack, thereby providing unlawful assistance in the
process.
Assistant General Manager Fernando Dantas confirmed that
he was instructed by his superior, Stuart Manore, by phone
about 20 minutes prior to their arrival at the facility that the
Union was on the way, they wanted to ratify the contract, and
to maintain all the employees in the premises and not let them
go home. He passed the instruction to his supervisor that the
Union was on the way and not to let anybody go home. The
union agents arrived between 12 noon and 12:30 p.m. The first
shift had already ended at 11:30 a.m. and the next ended at
12:30 p.m. John Agothos Jr. and Sr. were among these Local
69 agents. Dantas heard John Jr. tell the Local 69 contract
committee members who arrived with them that he had gotten
all the employees. Dantas himself remained about 25 feet from
the meeting area overlooking the cooking section while the
employees were being gathered together by the union agent and
committee members.
Dantas denied conversing with Pedro Ramos, or stopping
anyone from leaving or directing anyone back into the meeting.
His denial is not credited and Ramos’ more detailed and ulti-
mately clarified recital of Dantas’ role in restraining him is
credited. Ramos’ narrative provides a history of the events
commencing with directions to view a training film which is
consistent with Dobbs’ own except for the business about the
locks, which was somewhat confusing but which Ramos finally
limited to the exit doors to the loading dock.
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
987
Apparently, Dantas, in addition to the executive chef, re-
mained in view of the assembled group of employees, clearly
an intimidating factor in controlling the movement of any em-
ployees who might seek to leave, such as Pedro Rosa. But
Dantas was merely enforcing a directive given to him to retain
all day employees for the union meeting.
Dantas’ reasoned explanation for the planning of a training
session—that Dobbs had scored badly on an inspection con-
ducted by Virgin Atlantic Airways—is inconsistent with
Manore’s own much franker earlier observation that the train-
ing session was a holding device.
The foregoing conduct which I have found took place, in-
cluding the presence of supervisors at the union contract ratifi-
cation meeting, the action taken by Supervisor Dantas to re-
strain and prevent employees from leaving the meeting, and
paying the Local 69 members overtime for their attendance at
the meeting, amply support a conclusion, which I reach that
Dobbs rendered assistance and support to Local 69 in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act. Under the Board’s “total-
ity of circumstances” test, see Electromation v. NLRB, 35 F.3d
1148 (7th Cir. 1994), Dobbs’ conduct clearly warrants this
result. See Caldor, Inc., 319 NLRB 728 (1995); and Keeler
Brass Co., 317 NLRB 1110 (1995).
Dantas also testified that with respect to the enforcement of
the uniform policy, he has had occasion to remind Valencia
periodically about not wearing his cap, or, hairnet if in the
kitchen area, and Valencia invariably complies by putting on
the appropriate hair covering. Dantas has also issued instruc-
tions to his supervision to enforce the uniform policy as earlier
described. On one occasion Dantas sent one employee, Tho-
mas Rosa, home, to get his uniform. He was wearing jeans.
Rosa was not disciplined, received no warning, was not re-
quired to punch out and lost no pay because of the incident.
As for wearing jewelry at work, Dantas confirmed only
wedding bands are allowed, except that transportation employ-
ees may wear a watch to assist them in meeting flight and load-
ing schedules. Another exception permits the shop steward for
maintenance employees, to wear the Local 69 pin. He is not
involved in food production and works in a rear maintenance
room. Dantas never saw Cardenas wearing a pin, either the
Local 69 or District 6 pin, although he was aware that Cardenas
had been a Local 69 shop steward. I cannot credit this denial in
light of Cardenas’ strong testimony and the physical evidence
derived from the pins themselves. As a consequence I further
credit Cardenas that on the occasion of Dantas’ instructions to
him, as well the others to which he testified, he was ordered to
remove, and to not wear District 6 pins and paraphernalia, but
not the Local 69 pin he also openly wore and exhibited. In this
connection, Manore’s’ testimony denying any conversation
with Cardenas regarding District 6, the impossibility or diffi-
culty of Local 69’s removal as bargaining agent and his threat
to Cardenas to stop supporting District 6 or he could be termi-
nated, is not credited. Manore’s evasions and hostility on the
witness stand have been previously described.
As to Dantas’ denial that he ever told any employees that if
they supported District 6 or distributed its literature they could
be in trouble or lose their job, he is not credited. Certainly,
Dantas engaged in conduct which unlawfully assisted Local 69
when he restrained Pedro Rosa from leaving the Local 69 rati-
fication meeting on his own time. Contrary to Dantas’ denial, I
find he was also present and remained mute when Manore in-
formed Mejia he would be fired for distributing District 6 lit-
erature and also denigrating the National Labor Relations
Board notice form. Even Manore agreed Dantas translated the
National Labor Relations Board notice while Mejia waited to
discuss its posting. Finally, Dantas directed Cardenas to re-
move his District 6 pin only and not the Local 69 pin he was
wearing at the same time. Dantas did argue that he informed
Octavio Valencia and another employee, Edgar Parafin, to re-
move their District 6 pins and caps in the summer of 1996 with
the comment that this was not authorized, it was not part of the
uniform. While that comment might very well suffice to shield
Dobbs from liability under the Act with respect to the cap, be-
cause Dobbs, having issued Dobbs’ caps with its own name, is
entitled, on balance, to have its own uniform and identity pre-
sented to the flying public, at the expense of the District 6 or-
ganizational objective, see generally, Eastern Omni Construc-
tors, 324 NLRB 652 (1997), so long as the rule prohibiting
union caps was uniformally applied, which it apparently was,5
orders to remove the District 6 pin does not carry the same
authority, particularly where Dantas had ordered Cardenas
during the same period to remove only one of two pins and
Dantas had already participated, by his presence and conduct,
in coercive conduct toward District 6.
Dobbs’ liability under the Act for ordering the removal of
the District 6 pin is premised here on its disparate treatment
only. It cannot permit Local 69 identification insignia/and thus
Local 69 proselytizing to go on unchecked while at the same
time disarming District 6 adherents from engaging in the same
conduct. This is so, even if the wearing of any pins violates
FDA regulations and Dobbs’ own apparently more stringent
ones. Both union pins could cause health and safety concerns if
legitimately raised, see, e.g., Kendall Co. 267 NLRB 963, 965
(1983), where the Board held that a rule which curtails an em-
ployee right to wear union insignia at work is presumptively
invalid unless special circumstances exist which make the rule
necessary to maintain production or discipline or to ensure
safety (emphasis added), but where one pin is allowed at the
expense of the other, Dobbs’ defense premised on a health and
safety rationale is undermined to the vanishing point and one is
left only with an act of interference violative of Section 8(a)(1)
of the Act.
Dantas also acknowledged during further examination, that,
as testified at one point by Rosa, he was present in the kitchen
workarea while the ratification meeting and vote took place,
and did not closet himself in his office to the rear of meeting
area. There is no question that Dantas was standing within
view of employees who participated in that meeting and vote.
The presence of the assistant general manager adds another
intimidating factor to the allegation, which I have concluded is
meritorious, that Dobbs, by Fernando Dantas, rendered unlaw-
ful assistance to Local 69 by requiring employees to attend a
5 For these reasons, I will recommend dismissal of this allegation in
par. 12 of the consolidated amended complaint.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
988
union contract ratification meeting for Local 69, in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act.
In the absence of any contrary testimony from Supervisor
Kayla Adino, who was not called by Dobbs, and on the basis of
Valencia’s own credited testimony, I conclude that Valencia
was threatened unlawfully by Adino on behalf of Dobbs in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when he approached a
female employee about to go on break to support District 6 and
was told by Adino that his attempt to change union representa-
tion could cost him his job. I further credit Valencia that he
was directed to go home by Manore when wearing a pair of
blue jeans and docked pay for the day under circumstances
which support the conclusion that Manore’s action was moti-
vated by Valencia’s known strong District 6 advocacy. I do not
credit Manore’s version of the events and their conversation, in
particular that Valencia wore cut offs, or was directed to change
and report back to work. I am convinced that Manore, whose
hostility toward District 6 has been separately established on
this record, in his assistance rendered to Local 69, threats to
other employees and denigration of District 6 to Mejia, seized
on Valencia’s failure to wear the regulation pants on the date in
question, to punish him, without regard to the evidence of
Dobbs’ toleration of other employees’ wearing nonuniform
attire on occasion, and without regard to Dobbs’ own tolerance
of employees’ noncompliance when substitute or replacement
uniform components are not available although requested.
Manore did not stop to determine Valencia’s efforts in this
regard and acted even though Valencia informed him the pair at
home was torn. Manore’s directions to punch out appear also
to conflict with the assistant manager’s more tolerant and flexi-
ble response to uniform violations, which resulted in no loss of
pay even when employees may be directed home to change. I
further conclude that under the Board’s Wright Line standard,
Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), affd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), even absent Va-
lencia’s protected concerted activity, the same employment
decision would not have been made.
D. Local 69’s Alleged Threats to Employees of Bodily Harm
and Loss of Employment, and Promises of Increased Pay and
Better Jobs with Dobbs and Local 69, Because They Supported
District 6
The counsel for the General Counsel produced four wit-
nesses to support these allegations.
Andelino Gonzalez testified that he has worked for Dobbs
for 12 years. In 1996 Gonzalez relieved supervisors in the
dishroom in the kitchen. At the time of his testimony, in De-
cember 1997 he relieved in the dishroom, but also worked in
the warehouse 2 days a week.
In the summer of 1996 Gonzalez met with District 6 organ-
izers and decided to support its efforts to become their bargain-
ing agent, replacing Local 69.
On June 6 Gonzalez attended a meeting of employees called
by District 6 and held at the Ramada Inn near the Newark air-
port. Gonzalez arrived at 10:30 a.m. At around 12 noon he
saw Louis Vasquez, a Local 69 shop steward and cook, enter.
Vasquez came up behind his chair and told him, “You are a sell
out.” Gonzalez replied that he was looking for the best for our
employees and better benefits. Vasquez walked away and left
the meeting shortly afterward.
Later the same afternoon, Gonzalez went to work in the
kitchen. As he entered the kitchen area on his way into the
cafeteria, Vasquez, holding a kitchen knife by its handle ap-
proached Gonzalez, and with the dull side of the blade made a
gesture across his stomach, touching Gonzalez, and told him he
was a sell out. Gonzalez said “are you crazy” and kept walking
to the cafeteria.
Gonzalez described the knife as being 15 to 18 inches long,
metal, with a white handle and having a flat blade. When
Vazquez saw Gonzalez enter the kitchen he was cutting some-
thing at a worktable.
Prior to this incident Gonzalez and Vazquez had a cordial
but distant relationship, exchanging greetings. They were not
friends and did not socialize outside work or joke around at
work. After the incident the two have not spoken with each
other. Gonzalez did not report the incident became he did not
want Vazquez to be fired or disciplined. It is clear that taking a
work implement or tool and using it as a weapon or in a threat-
ening manner is prohibited conduct under Dobbs’ rules.
Gonzalez admitted on his cross-examination by Local 69
counsel that he had been paid $50 or $70 by District 6 for his
time and expenses in attending the hearing in New York from
his residence in New Jersey and a similar amount for attending
the hearing in Newark, New Jersey, on an earlier day.
On cross-examination Gonzalez again described the action
which Vazquez took in moving the knife with medium pressure
across his body. Gonzalez again testified that Vazquez had held
the knife by its handle when he touched Gonzalez’ body with it,
running the dull side of the blade across his body. He also agreed
that the handle is also described as the butt end of the knife.
When Gonzalez was then asked to demonstrate Vazquez’s action
by using a knife which was produced for such purpose, in his
demonstration he confirmed his earlier testimony.
In this case, although Gonzalez asserted that he told an agent
of the National Labor Relations Board of the incident with
Vazquez and provided a written statement to that agent, with
the use of an interpreter, Gonzalez was mistaken. The only
statement he provided was to William Perry, the District 6
president. In the affidavit Gonzalez first describes Vasquez
approaching him at the Ramada Inn meeting, saying he was
“bought by District 6” and, then, in pertinent part, stating
“Later, when I went to work . . . he pulled out a knife and hit
me with the butt in my stomach.” The affidavit was read to
Gonzalez in Spanish by the interpreter before he was sworn.
In explaining this apparent discrepancy, Gonzalez demon-
strated Vasquez’s physical act again, showing how Vasquez
first touched him, actually hitting him, pushing him with the
butt end of the knife, before dragging the blade across his
stomach.
The complaint in paragraph 18(a) alleges that Vasquez
threatened bodily harm by hitting an employee in the stomach
with the butt end of a knife, because the employee supported
District 6. The pleading was clearly based on the affidavit
which the Union had submitted. Gonzalez had never seen the
allegation prior to his testimony.
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
989
I am satisfied that the affidavit and Gonzalez’ trial testimony
are not inconsistent. Both describe a physical act which, ac-
companied by the taunt of being a sell our or shortly preceded
by the taunt at the District 6 meeting, describe conduct engaged
in by Local 69 shop steward motivated by a hostility toward
Gonzalez’ District 6 adherence and which is, prima facie, a
violation of the Act. See Cedar Grove Manor Convalescent
Center, 314 NLRB 642, 649 (1994), and cases cited therein.
While Local 69 counsel makes much of the difference in
language appearing, on the one hand in the affidavit and, on the
other hand, in Gonzalez’ initial trial testimony, I am not con-
vinced that those differences reflect an intentional effort to lie
or to deceive. To the contrary, when confronted with the dif-
ferences, Gonzalez was able to reconcile them in a satisfactory
manner. As a consequence, I am satisfied that what was ini-
tially described as a movement of the knife across his body,
actually started as an initial thrust with the butt end and contin-
ued with the movement of the dull side of the blade and that
Gonzalez’ credibility as a witness is not thereby diminished.
An issue remains, however, as to Gonzalez’ status as a rank
and file employee or supervisor under the Act. If a supervisor,
Vasquez’s conduct would not be actionable.
Gonzalez’ testified his rate of pay was $11.75 an hour under
the 1993–1996 contract. He received an increase to $12.05
under the 1996–1999 successor agreement. He would some-
times relieve the dispatch supervisor to check meat. In clarifi-
cation of his earlier testimony, Gonzalez testified he was then a
leadman in the kitchen, and only relieved supervisors on their
day off or when they took a personal day, sometimes at 3 a.m.
On his regular job as leadman, Gonzalez had 12 to 13 people
in the dishroom who would break the inbound flights down,
placing the dirty dishes and silverware on a belt, moving them
into washing machines and then removing and picking them up
from the machine. Gonzalez put these people in their jobs, and
checked them. He puts them wherever he can to get his work
out. Gonzalez reported to either George McBride, an admitted
supervisor, or Carlos Munoz. Any complaints he has about his
workers, he goes to either of these two floor supervisors.
On occasion, Gonzalez had complaints about a worker slow-
ing down, not getting the work out. When he reported this to
Munoz, he was informed to bring the worker to the office.
When Gonzalez did so, Munoz talked to the worker in his pres-
ence and obtained an agreement to work a little faster. In relat-
ing this information, Gonzalez took care to note his limited
function, that as a leadman he could not make reports or any-
thing. Thus, on other occasions when a worker was disciplined
for a violation of a work rule, the supervisor, Munoz or
McBride, issued the written disciplinary warning or suspension,
which could be either for 3 or 5 days. First, Gonzalez brought
the problem to the supervisor’s attention. Then, when a super-
visory talk with the worker did not result in any immediate
improvement, or if the supervisor determined it was appropri-
ate, he would be sent home by the supervisor, and required to
speak to the morning overall supervisor, George Sheridan, the
following day. On occasion, the first supervisor would tell
Gonzalez to send the worker home or tell him to report to
Sheridan. In performing this function, it is clear that Gonzalez
was exercising no discretion and was not involved in determin-
ing the discipline, either directly or by way of a recommenda-
tion or a consultation. But sometimes, Gonzalez was asked to
keep an eye on a worker who had been talked to by the supervi-
sor, and, if he worker continued to engage in the same inappro-
priate conduct, to send the worker in the morning to Sheridan
for discipline. In this function, Gonzalez explained that keep-
ing an eye on the dishroom workers was just his job.
If workers wanted to leave their shift early, they would tell
Gonzalez who would inform the floor supervisor who then
made the decision, without input from Gonzalez.
Gonzalez was hourly paid and punched a timeclock. He did
not attend periodic supervisory meetings called by Dobbs.
As to his assigning work to employees, Gonzalez follows
Dobbs’ instructions he has received from his supervisor or the
manager, to rotate the 12 to 13 employees on his shift. He cre-
ates a work schedule which, on a daily basis, rotates employees
from front job of breaking down the dirty plates and silverware,
to the next series of jobs of separating, throwing out garbage
and stacking the dishwasher to the rear job of removing and
stacking or packing the clean dishes and utensils. Since there
are two machines, roughly six to seven employees are assigned
these jobs for each machine. The employees thus, normally
work at the same jobs, with rotations, day in and day out. Gon-
zalez also works along with the employees performing the vari-
ous functions. Also, while Gonzalez is making his assignments
Supervisor Munoz is also present in the dishroom 3 or 4 times a
day observing the operation and the employees.
Later evidence showed that both Gonzalez and Vasquez
were among a small group of employees in the bargaining unit
who were paid more than the scheduled wage rates under the
contract. In a memorandum dated September 5, 1996, from
Dobbs’ New Jersey corporate headquarters to Manager Man-
ore, these two were on a list of 17 employees who were to re-
ceive the listed monetary difference opposite their names to be
added to the collective bargaining wage rates when annual
monetary increases (under the contract) were given. For Gon-
zalez the difference was $1.90 and for Vasquez it was $.75.
Others on the list received a differential of $2.50 and $5.50.
Most were less than a dollar. It appears that these differentials
for a certain, limited number of unit personnel, represent pre-
mium pay for performing lead work in their departments and
shifts. The $11.75 Gonzalez was being paid in the Summer of
1996 included this $1.90 differential. He also later described
his position as driver’s helper in the transportation department
although obviously he did not work on a truck. Wage rates for
senior positions in the bargaining unit in the year of the 1993–
1996 contract, were as high as $9.95, $10.40, and $10.65 an
hour. In sanitation, food preparation and silverware the rate
was $7.90 and in equipment setup and equipment handler it was
$8.40. Obviously, Gonzalez was being paid a substantial dif-
ferential along with a select group of other employees for the
lead work they performed.
Based on the foregoing facts, I find and conclude that Gon-
zalez in 1996 was an employee and not a supervisor within the
meaning of the Act, and that Local 69’s affirmative defense
first raised at trial, must fail. The evidence adduced fails to
support Local 69’s contention that Gonzalez either exercised
independent judgment in his assignment of work or made effec-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
990
tive recommendations regarding personnel decisions. As to his
assignment of work, it all appears to have been of a routine
nature, made within strictly established guidelines set by
Dobbs’ management and without the exercise of discretion.
See Juniper Industries, 311 NLRB 109, 110 (1993), and cases
cited therein. As to personnel decisions, Gonzalez had little or
no input. He was not asked for his recommendation, and
merely reported infractions, and employee requests for leave
and the like to his supervisors. Insofar as Gonzalez was asked
on occasion to monitor employee compliance and to send em-
ployees to the day supervisor for his disciplinary determination,
that activity alone fails to rise to the level of a true independent
evaluation of employee conduct and cannot in my judgment
support a finding that Gonzalez thereby effectively recom-
mended discipline, since Gonzalez made no recommendation at
all and merely sent the employee to a supervisor who ultimately
made that determination independently.
Gonzalez’ extra compensation alone, is not dispositive of su-
pervisory status, Id. at 110. Particularly where the perpetrator
of the conduct for which Local 69 is being held responsible
here, Vasquez, received a similar wage differential, as did other
lead employees, that extra compensation should not determine
Gonzalez’ status. Based on the evidence of record I find Gon-
zalez to be an employee, whose Section 7 rights could be re-
strained by the alleged threatening conduct of Vasquez. Ac-
cordingly, I conclude the General Counsel has presented prima
facie proof of such a violation.
Epifanio Rosario testified he has worked for Dobbs for 12
years. He washes pots in the kitchen. He supported District 6’s
organizing efforts. In summer 1996 in the kitchen, after his vaca-
tion, Louis Vasquez asked if he knew of any cards. Rosario an-
swered he didn’t know what card he was talking about. Vasquez
now said that if Rosario signed the card, he was going to be fired,
that he was going find any way to fire him, and all of those who
signed the card. Vasquez also called Rosario a son of a bitch and
started laughing. Rosario walked away.
Rosario also heard Vasquez tell other employees that if they
signed cards for District 6 they would be fired. Rosario works
near Vasquez, sometimes even facing him when he handles trays.
When Rosario heard these remarks he was 10 to 15 feet from
Vasquez and the employees to whom the remarks were directed
were passing by on their way to the cafeteria or the stockroom.
The diagram in evidence, from which Rosario could not identify
his work location or that of Vasquez, because he does not speak
or read English, nonetheless shows the “pot washer” location is
just across an open area from the “Hood” where Vasquez is sta-
tioned as cook and abuts and backs on the cafeteria and is close
to an entrance way leading to the cafeteria.
Rosario testified that these comments to employees contin-
ued off and on over the course of the summer during the union
campaign. Rosario also overheard Vasquez tell employee Jose
Cardenas in the cafeteria to stop talking and a lot of shit, that he
was going to break his ass. Vasquez appeared very angry and
spoke in a very high voice.
Under cross-examination, Rosario acknowledged that in his
pretrial affidavit, taken by District 6 on July 24, 1996, and
submitted to the Region, he swore that “Cardenas was told by
Vasquez that, if Cardenas tried to sign up employees for Dis-
trict 6, or tried to sign up with District 6 himself, Vasquez
would break Cardenas’ head. He also told Cardenas that he
would kill Cardenas.” The affidavit was translated for him into
Spanish by a Gloria Perez who works in District 6’s office,
before he swore to it. Rosario denied that he had ever told the
person who took his statement at District 6 that Vasquez had
threatened to kill Cardenas and he didn’t hear that statement
read back to him. Rosario was obviously mistaken about July 2
as the date of this incident since he and Cardenas did not work
common hours on that date. I believe Rosario. I am prepared
to discount the portion of the affidavit which Rosario disclaims
as an exaggeration. It is significant that Rosario strongly re-
affirmed his testimony attributing to Vasquez a threat of physi-
cal harm to Cardenas, but to Cardenas’ backside, not his head,
because of Cardenas’ District 6 activity, and I credit his account
as substantially corroborated in his affidavit.
Jose Cardenas testified that when he served as a Local 69
shop steward in 1995 and through July 1996 he worked a shift
from 4 p.m. to 12 midnight and was steward for that shift. On
one occasion in July 1996, at about 3:45 p.m. after arriving to
start his shift he asked Louis Vasquez, the steward on the morn-
ing shift, why he hadn’t done the grievance6 for Gloria Gonza-
les, who had been fired. Because Vasquez was the union repre-
sentative in the morning he was in charge of that report, i.e.
processing the grievance. Vasquez replied he didn’t have to
make a grievance for anyone. Later on he threw a spoon at
Cardenas. They both went to the cafeteria and Cardenas told
Vasquez to sit down and calm down. Vasquez responded, “I
don’t have any reason to calm down. I’m going to break your
face and if you keep bothering me, I’m going to kill you.”
According to Cardenas, Vasquez was angry, furious and serious
while he was reacting to Cardenas’ query concerning the em-
ployee Gonzales.
Although Cardenas and Vasquez previously had a very
friendly relationship with no problems, everything changed
when Vasquez became aware of Cardenas’ open solicitation of
designation cards from employees at the Newark facility. Their
relationship turned sour. Once, before the incident involving
the employee Gonzales, Cardenas had asked Vasquez what was
the problem, why didn’t he support District 6. Vasquez replied
that Local 4-69 was a good union but you had to work with it
and that everyone who supported District 6 was going to lose
their jobs. Vasquez also said that the Company, Manore, was
not going to like this idea and they were going back to Local 4-
69, as a Company, and the International wasn’t going to let
Local 4-69 leave.
On another occasion, Cardenas was passing to the kitchen and,
being 10 to 15 feet away, heard Vasquez tell some workers, two
he identified, not to go fill out the application nor support District
6 because they were going to be fired by the Company.
On cross-examination, Cardenas explained he did not know
what, if anything, Vasquez did about Gloria Gonzales’ dis-
charge. When pressed as to whether he was aware of any fir-
ings stemming from employee support of District 6, Cardenas
6 The transcript’s reference to “agreement” rather than “grievance” is
hereby ordered corrected at p. 699, L. 21 and thereafter, as noted by the
interpreter at p. 700, L. 14.
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
991
claimed that aside from the persecutions by the bosses against
District 6 supporters, he was singled out for discharge in Octo-
ber 1997, pursuant to a plot between Dobbs and Local 69 just 2
months prior to the instant hearing. Counsel for the General
Counsel represented that an unfair labor practice charge alleg-
ing his discharge as a violation of the Act had been filed and
was under investigation.
Cardenas, like Valencia, received $75 from District 6 to
cover expenses related to his appearance as a witness on the
day he testified, including parking for his car in Manhattan,
tolls, meals and the like. Cardenas noted he had also received
comparable money to distribute flyers for District 6.
Finally, the General Counsel called Pedro Mejia on the CB
cases. He testified that in November 1996 he had been con-
tacted by David Feeback and Alfredo, both business representa-
tives for Local 69, to meet privately with Robert Baker, the
International Trustee then overseeing the operations of Local
69 pursuant to an International imposed Trusteeship of the Lo-
cal. Mejia was at work between 12 noon and 2 p.m. when Al-
fredo saw him and said, “Oh, thank you Mejia. Thank God we
found you because you saved our jobs. Our mission was to find
you and try to convince you to have a private meeting with Mr.
Bobby Baker.” Mejia asked who he was. Alfredo said he was
the president of the Union. Mejia asked what does he want to
talk to me about. Alfredo replied, “Well, you know, the thing
is that we know you have a lot of people with you trying to
change the Union from Local 4-69 to District 6.” Alfredo went
on to explain that 2 weeks ago they had been trying to find
Mejia. A week ago, after two of Dobbs’ functionaries refused
to provide Mejia’s home address they were able, independently,
through Local 69 records, to locate it, but were still unsuccess-
ful in reaching him. They also had been unsuccessful in find-
ing him at work. Alfredo said the meeting could be at a loca-
tion of Mejia’s choosing, including his house or a restaurant,
but Mejia told them to have Baker contact him at work. It was
ultimately agreed that Mejia, who starts work at 7:30 a.m.,
would be at the company cafeteria at 6 a.m. the next morning.
The District 6 agents also told him the meeting would concern
the unpaid medical bills.
Mejia now elaborated that in past discussions with Feeback
and Alfredo he had raised his concerns about the Local 69
health plan’s failure to reimburse or pay the medical bills he
had incurred. Although assured by them that the problems
would be cleared up in 5 or 6 months through the use of cards
and elimination of deductibles, they had still persisted. One
major problem Mejia had was that Mejia had to sue Local 69 to
receive payment of costs he had incurred for an in-hospital
operation on his appendix. Mejia was also aware that other
employees had expressed similar complaints about the
functioning of the Local 69 health plan.
On November 6, 1996, the scheduled date, the meeting pro-
ceeded at 6 a.m. in the inner lunchroom or eating area portion
of the cafeteria. Mejia and Baker met alone, while Feeback and
Alfredo remained in the other section where food is dispensed,
at the entrance to the cafeteria. No one else was in the lunch-
room area. After confirming his identity to the union official,
the official said, “I’m Mr. Bobby Baker and I’m the new trustee
and I have been sent to this unit to join all the work-
ers/employees from here and to try to reorganize this unit. But
I’ve had information about you that you have a lot of people on
your side that are trying to change the union from Local 4-69
for District 6. And Local 4-69 our union is a good union. I
don’t know why you want to change it for other people.”
Mejia answered, “Well, there are many reasons. The main
problems that we’re having here are the medical bills which are
not being paid. What do you tell me about that?” As Mejia
described it, Baker immediately changed the conversation and
told Mejia, “I am a very old person and I need your help. And
for that I will offer you a good position in the Company and in
the Union. And for that you are also going to receive an
amount of money. But he didn’t provide Mejia with a deter-
mined sum. Mejia responded, for that he had to convince each
of one of the employees who have the same problems as I did
because I don’t accept money from anyone for that.” “Because
if I accepted money then I won’t be looking at myself in my
face, I’ll be looking at theirs. What am I doing for them? If I
have problems, I fight for mine. And if others have problems
that they can’t defend themselves, then I give them a little
help.”
Baker them told Mejia, if he changed his mind, he would
leave his business card and Mejia could call him, but these are
good conditions, check it out, look it over. At this point,
Baker’s voice was very low. The meeting lasted close to 30
minutes. Mejia is unaware of any of his coworkers having a
similar meeting with Baker.
Although unlike other Spanish speaking witnesses, Mejia
read his affidavits in English before being sworn, he had earlier
explained and now reaffirmed that he had sought to have a
Spanish speaking interpreter while he testified so he could fully
understand and respond to the other attorney’s questions. Thus,
when providing three affidavits to Board agents, an interpreter
was called in to assist on certain questions he didn’t understand,
and that interpreter remained through the entire interview.
Local 69 called two witnesses to respond to the allegations
of violation in the CB cases. Louis Vasquez testified that he
had gone to the District 6 meeting held at the Ramada Inn near
the Newark Airport in the summer of 1996. He explained he
went to see what they had to offer, in the way of benefits to
employees. He stayed about 15 minutes and saw Andelino
Gonzalez there while he was leaving. He shook Gonzalez’
hand and he told him “traitor but I think it was a joke.” (Tr.
797, L. 3.) Vasquez repeated that he was smiling when he ac-
cused Gonzalez of being a traitor. Gonzalez replied, I’m doing
what I have to do. Although Vasquez claimed he thought Gon-
zalez was joking when he said this, the statement, viewed ob-
jectively, is a serious and sober response to the accusation and,
I would judge, unlikely to be made by someone who took
Vasquez’s accusation as a joke.
After leaving the meeting, Vasquez returned to work at about
12 noon. His work hours were 5 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. He had
taken his lunchbreak to attend the meeting, if only briefly. The
Ramada Inn is a short walk across the parking lot from the
Dobbs’ facility. Back at work, he didn’t see Gonzalez the re-
mainder of that day. Vasquez denied hitting Gonzalez with a
knife and running it across his chest or attempting to strike him.
He claimed he would have been fired on the spot for such con-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
992
duct, but there was no evidence that a supervisor saw him and
Gonzalez refused to inform supervision. He admitted to having
an argument with Joseph Cardenas and swinging at him with
his hands across the table.
After the exchange of words with Gonzalez at the Ramada
Inn Gonzalez turned away when they passed and they did not
talk to each other. Prior to the incident they conversed as
friends. When later asked by Local 69 counsel if Gonzalez
laughed about his accusation at the time, Vasquez agreed, but
he had not given such a reaction by Gonzalez when first ques-
tioned about the incident. I do not credit this afterthought.
Neither do I credit Vasquez’ characterization of his accusation
as a “joke.” When Gonzalez refused to greet or talk with
Vasquez after the incident at the Ramada Inn (and the incident
with the knife later that day, as asserted by Gonzalez) it is ap-
parent that Gonzalez, just as any reasonable person, took
Vasquez’ accusation seriously and sought to avoid any contact
with the perpetrator thereafter.
Vasquez agreed that he worked as a cook around 10 to 15
feet from Epifanio Rosario’s workstation washing pots.
Vasquez denied making any statements in Rosario’s presence
telling employees not to sign District 6 cards. Vasquez ex-
plained he did express to employees his concern that with the
expiration of the Local 69 contract only 1 month away, em-
ployees would lose out in benefits for the period they might
very well be without a union. But he also mentioned to em-
ployees that if they could get somebody in with a better medical
plan, he would be with them. He did not express an opinion
either way that employees should support either Union. He
spoke to employees on either worktime or break time, when-
ever employees asked questions of him. Vasquez, of course,
was a Local 69 shop steward.
Now, Vasquez denied saying anything directly to Rosario
about signing a card on behalf of District 6, adding that at that
time, he, Rosario, was working a different shift. He believed
Rosario’s shift in the summer of 1996 was between 2:30 or 3
p.m. until 10:30 or 11 p.m. Later, in September Rosario was
switched to a shift starting at 7 a.m. As earlier noted, Vasquez
testified his shift ended at 1:30 p.m.
As to his run in with Jose Cardenas, Vasquez testified that on
one occasion, Cardenas, the Local 69 steward on the afternoon
shift, approached him about an employee names Maria
Vasquez, yelling and screaming. Cardenas was complaining
that Maria Vasquez, a member of management, was apparently
performing bargaining unit work, as a coordinator. This was
work that at times was performed by management employees
and at other times by bargaining unit employees. Vasquez
replied to Cardenas that he had raised the issue with manage-
ment, and as a result, he believed that Vasquez, as an exempt
employee had a right to perform that work under the manage-
ment rights clause of the agreement.
Cardenas kept yelling and screaming that if Vasquez
couldn’t do the job (of steward) let somebody else do it.
Vasquez then took a swing at Cardenas across the table at
which they were sitting in the kitchen, but missed him. This
happened before the District 6 organizing campaign. After this
incident, Cardenas, who had previously asked him questions
about the union contract, never came back to him.
As to Gloria Gonzales, Vasquez was familiar as to her dis-
pute with the Company. She had been suspended 5 days after
an accident while driving for Dobbs. She worked on a later
shift but had come to him with her dispute. He had accompa-
nied her to a meeting with supervisors who offered her a job on
the floor in the kitchen, but not driving a truck to the airlines.
Gonzales rejected the offer but also didn’t want a grievance
filed or processed and did not return to work after her suspen-
sion. Cardenas had told him about Gonzales’ suspension but
Vasquez did not describe any dispute between them arising
from his failure to file a grievance for her. Interestingly, al-
though Vasquez acknowledged Cardenas coming to him about
Gonzalez’ suspension, he also had testified that Cardenas never
came back to him after he took a swing at him before the Dis-
trict 6 campaign. Cardenas had set the month of the Gonzales
conversation with Vasquez as July, during the District 6 cam-
paign. Vasquez did not provide a date of this conversation
during his direct examination, so did not dispute Cardenas’
time frame, an internal conflict in Vasquez’s testimony that
was not resolved. While Vasquez denied ever inquiring from
Cardenas about his District 6 affiliation or support, he did not
deny having knowledge of it in July 1996.
During cross-examination by the District 6 President,
Vasquez admitted learning of Cardenas’ and other employees’
support for District 6 at the District 6 meeting at the Ramada
Inn. He also admitted not knowing the meaning of the word
traitor. He had addressed Gonzalez in Spanish at the Ramada,
calling him a bandido, meaning he had sold out. Vasquez also
agreed that when he was cutting something with a knife at work
he would have one in his hand.
During the General Counsel’s later cross-examination of
him, Vasquez clarified that he first learned of Gloria Gonzales’
suspension from Cardenas, who had asked him what he was
going to do about her. This recital is consistent to a point with
Cardenas’ but leaves out Vasquez’ negative, bellicose, and
physically threatening reaction to Cardenas which Cardenas
related. It was after Vasquez contacted Gonzales 3 or 4 days
after her suspension and she came to see him that they attended
the informal meeting with supervision which resulted in the
offer which Gonzales rejected.
Vasquez, who described himself as a cook and leadman, re-
cited his lead duties as helping other less experienced kitchen
employees perform their jobs with meats, vegetables, and other
foods, but that he had no authority to recommend hire, fire,
suspension for any employees, and had never been told that he
had any. His pay of $11.85 in the last year of the old contract
exceeds the first cook’s pay of $10.40 by $1.45 and appears to
represent, just as with Gonzalez and the others listed on the
memorandum previously described, a premium to compensate
them for the performance of their lead duties.
Vasquez also recalled that Local 69 Trustee Baker had
posted a notice to employees that if they had any questions
about Local 69, he would be at the facility at 6 a.m. on a certain
day to answer their questions. No such notice was produced.
Later, on rebuttal Pedro Mejia testified he saw no such notices.
I find no such notice was posted.
In later rebuttal testimony, Rosario testified that although his
regular hours in July 1996 were from 3 p.m. until 11:30 p.m.,
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
993
he had been switched to mornings for some days in his work
week after returning from a week’s vacation in July starting
around July 4. He had heard Vasquez’ threatening comments
when he was working mornings on his return.
On cross-examination, when confronted with his pretrial af-
fidavit which states that he heard Vasquez physically threaten
Cardenas on July 2, 1996, Rosario insisted he heard the threats,
but his testimony about when his work hours would have over-
lapped or been similar to Vasquez’ was confusing. Since the
matter of their work hours had become significant in light of
Vasquez’ assertion that Rosario worked a different shift from
his in July 1996, I ordered the production of Dobbs’ time re-
cords for Vasquez and Rosario for June, July, and August 1996.
These records7 show that contrary to Vasquez’ claim that
Rosario worked a different shift, and therefore their paths could
not have crossed at the facility in the crucial time period, both
employees’ work hours significantly overlapped in the kitchen
on a number of days in June and July 1996, during the height of
the District 6 campaign.
Although Rosario was mistaken as to his recollection of a
change in shifts during the summer of 1996—his hours re-
mained consistent from approximately 1 p.m. until 9:30 p.m.,
on most days in the 3 months—and his vacation was from July
12 or 13 until July 19, not earlier, Vasquez’ work hours signifi-
cantly overlapped those of Rosario from early June through the
end of July 1996. Thus, in the work weeks for Vasquez com-
mencing Monday June 3, Saturday June 8, and Monday June
16, Vasquez consistently accumulated overtime hours of an
hour or more beyond his regular 1:30 p.m. end of shift. Indeed,
on some days during this period Vasquez worked beyond 3
p.m., more than an hour and a half after Rosario started his
workday. During the week of Saturday July 6 to Friday, July
12, Vasquez worked two separate time periods on Wednesday,
July 10, from 4:09 to 7:24 a.m. and 1:02 to 4:54 p.m.; on
Thursday, July 11, from 5:02 a.m. to 4 p.m.; and on Friday,
July 12, from 4:58 a.m. to 5:13 p.m. Vasquez’ overtime hours
of 2 or more continued to the end of July.
By placing reliance on the impossibility of his speaking with
Rosario because they worked different shifts, Vasquez placed
in issue to a significant degree his own credibility. The facts
establish that Vasquez had the opportunity on a good number of
days in June and July to exchange words with Rosario across
the 10 to 15 feet which separated their workstations. I find that
Vasquez deliberately misstated his own work hours in an at-
tempt to avoid having to lie about the threats he made to
Rosario and to other employees in Rosario’s presence. Having
now discredited Vasquez on a major conflict in testimony be-
tween himself and Rosario, I also find that Vasquez’ reliability
for truthfulness has been so undermined as to make his denials
7 I have ordered the record reopened solely to receive these docu-
ments in evidence. ALJ Exh. 1 is Dobbs’ counsel’s letter to the parties
dated December 31, 1997, accompanied by the Vasquez and Rosario
June, July, and August 1996 timerecords; ALJ Exh. 2 is a two-page
letter from Dobbs’ counsel to the parties dated January 7, 1998, ex-
plaining abbreviations/designations used on the timerecords; and ALJ
Exhs. 3(a) and (b) are District 6 and counsel for General Counsel stipu-
lations to the explanations and meanings of the designations. No
stipulation was received from Local 69.
of his alleged threats and physical conduct with Gonzalez, and
his physical threats to Cardenas, unbelievable, apart from the
other bases for discrediting his testimony previously discussed.
Finally, Robert Baker testified as to his private meeting with
Mejia. Prior to his appointment by the International president
as trustee to oversee the operations of Local 69 on October 21,
1996, Baker had been an International organizer, a function be
continued while serving as trustee. His job as trustee was to
run the Local, determining which employees to retain, and to
administer its contracts and to assure continued services were
being provided by the Local. As the Local 69 officers had been
removed under the trusteeship, Baker administered the Local in
their stead. The trusteeship terminated December 6, 1997, and
his role, accordingly, ended at that time.
In early November 1996 Baker met with Pedro Mejia, pursu-
ant to arrangements which had been made by the business
agents. One reason he met Mejia was to see what his legitimate
gripes were about the health and welfare. Another reason was
that Baker knew that Mejia was a strong supporter for District
6, information he had received from his business agents.
He and Mejia met alone in the cafeteria. Baker wanted to
convince Mejia that the Local was in good hands now. He
began the conversation by explaining why he was there as In-
ternational trustee and explaining that there were going to be
alot of changes of the servicing of the Local and they would try
to service the health and welfare better, and that the old ‘gang,’
i.e., leadership, was no longer there.
Baker went on to say that he had been around this business
all his life, that he had serviced Dobbs House (a predecessor
entity) down in Philadelphia for years, helped organize that
location, and so understood its operation, a very tough one. He
was seeking Mejia’s confidence that the Local would do a bet-
ter job for him, the place would be serviced, and he would
bring in another agent who spoke Spanish.
He heard out Mejia’s complaints about failures to pay medi-
cal plan benefits for which he was compelled to sue, failures of
the agents to meet the workers, bypassing them to meet with
management, and a complaint about a particular shop steward
not servicing the people properly.
Baker asked Mejia to contact him personally about future
health and welfare or other complaints and gave Mejia his card.
He never spoke with Mejia again. He denied promising money
if Mejia cooperated with the Local or that he had influence and
could effect Mejia’s job.
Baker acknowledged that Mejia was the only employee he
met privately at the Dobbs’ facility. They spoke for 10 to 15
minutes. He met with other employers, in groups, between 15
and 20 in all, later in the day, as they came into the cafeteria on
work breaks.
Baker denied that he had any authority to promote Mejia.
He further noted Mejia’s wages were established by the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. But, as earlier established, a num-
ber of unit employees had received significant and recognized
pay differentials over the years.
During his cross-examination by counsel for the General
Counsel, Baker denied that he was aware that Local 69 business
agents had previously arranged for Mejia to meet with him at 6
a.m. and he did not ask for the meeting to be set up. As he
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
994
explained it, Pedro was there that morning and they, the busi-
ness agents, pointed Pedro out to him and he said he wanted to
talk to him, alone. Given Baker’s prior understanding of
Mejia’s strong District 6 adherence and leadership role among
employees, and his interest in having Mejia get the word out to
his supporters that Local 69 was changing, his explanation as to
how the meeting was set up does not ring true. Particularly is
this so, in the face of Mejia’s testimony of the business agents’
multiple attempts to reach him, which have not been denied.
Baker believed work breaks commenced at 6:30 a.m., yet he
arrived at 6 a.m. and met an employee whose workday starts at
7:30 a.m., again circumstances which undercut Baker’s expla-
nation of a serendipitous happenstance which allowed him to
meet privately with Mejia for 15 minutes at the facility.
During his later meetings with other employees, Local 69
agent Alfredo was present to translate the Spanish being spoken
by them. But both agents were instructed to remain at the
other, outside portion of the cafeteria when Baker spoke with
Mejia . According to Baker, Mejia’s understanding of English
was quite good.
In further explanation of the origin of the Trusteeship, Baker
related that as a result of a law suit filed by the Federal Gov-
ernment against the International Union, the Court had ap-
pointed a monitor to oversee the affairs of the International
who, in turn, had removed the Local 69 officials and imposed
the Trusteeship on the Local. Baker also explained that the
Local 69 Health and Welfare Fund was self funded, collecting
all contributions, administering and paying out claims. As a
consequence of a Federal raid on the Funds office and records
related to the suit, its ability to adequately service members and
pay claims had been seriously eroded, thus contributing to the
problems in processing and paying claims which Mejia de-
scribed.
Mejia was a responsive, intelligent witness whose detailed
and careful recital of the circumstances surrounding, and lead-
ing up to, and of the details of, his meeting with Baker are
credit worthy and believable. Baker’s awkward and obviously
insincere attempts to distance himself from any prior plan to
meet with the most important dissident employee in the bar-
gaining unit invites incredibility. The full circumstances in
which Baker found himself, seeking to turn Local 69’s fortunes
around, in the face of a strong organizing movement by an
outside union, further support the finding I make, that Baker
sought to buy Mejia’s and his group’s support by offers of a
good position with the Company and the Union, Local 69, and
an unspecified amount of money.
Having found that Local, by Louis Vasquez, threatened bod-
ily harm to employee Andelino Gonzalez, and that he did so,
because Gonzalez openly supported District 6, and, further, that
Vasquez threatened employee Jose Cardenas with physical
harm because he inquired about employee Gloria Gonzales’
suspension and whether a grievance was being persued on her
behalf, under circumstances which established that Vasquez
was well aware of Cardenas’ support of District 6, I conclude
that both incidents constitute violations by Local 69 of Section
(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Such threats made to employees under
such circumstances have consistently been held to violate the
Act. See Nassau Insurance Co., 280 NLRB 878, 880 (1986).
Such conduct reasonably tends to restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise of Section 7 rights, in this case Gonzalez’ right
to continue to support District 6 and Cardenas’ right to discuss
and inquire about grievances as an employee and Local 69 shop
steward.
Vasquez’ multiple threats made to employees that they
would be discharged if they supported District 6 presents a
slightly different issue. The Board’s test applied here to deter-
mine liability on the part of Local 69 for Vasquez’ conduct is
whether the employee recipients of the threats could reasonably
be expected to evaluate these remarks as noncoercive. In
Janler Plastic Mold Corp., 186 NLRB 540 (1970), the Board
dismissed an exception filed to a Regional Director’s report
recommending that it overrule the employer’s objections and
certify the petitioner. The employer argued in the exception
that the petitioner union had threatened that employees would
lose their jobs if they did not vote for petitioner. The Board
concluded that such remarks did not reasonably have a ten-
dency to coerce employees. This was so because the vote was
to be by secret ballot under conditions safeguarded by the
Board and there was no evidence to show employees had rea-
son to believe petitioner could ascertain their vote, and because
there was no evidence to show any employee had reason to
believe the employer favored Petitioner and was disposed to
honor a request to discharge any employee who voted against
Petitioner. Underwriters Laboratories, 323 NLRB 1, 3 (1997),
followed this line of reasoning, in part, in dismissing a similar
objection.
The special facts herein clearly distinguish those two cases.
Vasquez’ threat was not premised on the outcome of a secret
ballot election, but on support for District 6 as manifested by
attendance at its meetings, distribution of and acceptance of its
literature, signing its authorization cards and the like. Such
employee conduct would readily show to Vasquez, and Local
69, an employee’s preference between Local 69 and District 6.
Even more telling, Dobbs’ overt support and assistance which it
provided to Local 69 in arranging the July 12 contract ratifica-
tion meeting, which supervisors attended, and which employees
were prevented from leaving and for which employees received
overtime pay, demonstrated to employees their employer’s
disposition to support Local 69 and honor a Local 69 request to
discharge them. Other conduct showing this preference, in-
clude the posted question and answer notice about the cam-
paign, Manager Manore’s own threats to discharge District 6
supporters, and his later one day suspension of employee Va-
lencia.
Thus, employee awareness of Dobbs’ assistance to Local 69
and its retaliation against District 6 supporters would surely
have led them to reasonably believe that Local 69 could carry
out its threat by asserting its influence with Dobbs. See Com-
mercial Workers Local 56 (Super Fresh Food Markets), 316
NLRB 182 (1995).
Trustee Robert Baker’s promise to employee Pedro Mejias
of money, a good employment position with Dobbs, and with
Local 69 if he supported Local 69 warrants the same analysis
and conclusion. While Baker held no position of authority with
Dobbs, Local 69’s preferred status with Dobbs known to Mejia,
and most significantly, Mejia’s knowledge of Dobbs’ animus
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
995
and hostility toward District 6 as a recipient of Manager
Manore’s threats and denigration of District 6, is convincing
evidence, that Mejia may have reasonably believed that Baker
could influence Dobbs to provide him with the better employ-
ment position Baker promised. There is little question that
Baker and thus Local 69 could fulfill his promise of money and
a good Local 69 position. Each of these promises of benefit
were made to induce Mejia and has followers to support Local
69 to the disadvantage of District 6, and thus constitute prom-
ises of benefit to coerce and restrain Mejia in the exercise of his
rights under Section 7 of the Act, in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Dobbs International Services, Inc., Ca-
tering Unit No. 233, is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Respondent Union, Local 69, Hotel Employees and Res-
taurant Employees International Union, AFL–CIO, and District
6, International Union of Industrial, Service, Transport and
Health Employees, are each a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By interrogating employees regarding their union activi-
ties and sympathies, soliciting employees to sign a petition
against Local 69 and in support of District 6, threatening em-
ployees with discharge because they supported District 6, pro-
hibiting employees from wearing pins with District 6 insignia,
advising employees that it would be futile to select another
union, and by prohibiting employees from distributing literature
for District 6 during their breaktime, Dobbs has been interfer-
ing, restraining, and coercing its employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. By allowing District 6 to organize on its premises and to
conduct meetings in the lunchroom at its Newark facility,
thereby rendering assistance and support to District 6, and by
requiring employees to attend a union meeting for Local 69,
thereby rendering assistance and support to Local 69, Dobbs
has engaged in violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (2) of the Act.
5. By suspending employee Octavio Valencia because he
engaged in union activities in support of District 6, Dobbs has
been discriminating in regard to the hire or tenure or terms or
conditions of employment of its employees, thereby discourag-
ing membership in one labor organization, District 6, and en-
couraging membership in another labor organization, Local 69,
in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
6. By threatening bodily harm by moving a knife across the
body of an employee because the employee supported District
6, a rival union, threatening another employee with physical
harm because he inquired about a grievance, threatening em-
ployees with loss of employment if they supported District 6,
and by promising an employee money and a better employment
position with Dobbs and a position with Local 69 if he sup-
ported Local 69 instead of District 6, Local 69 has been re-
straining and coercing employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section
8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor prac-
tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Dobbs and Local 69 have each engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, respectively, in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) and 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, I shall rec-
ommend that they each cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative actions which are necessary to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
I shall recommended that Dobbs make employee Octavio
Valencia whole for loss of earnings and other benefits he may
have suffered as a result of the Respondent Employer’s unlaw-
ful discrimination against him, consisting of the employer’s 1-
day suspension of him without pay. Such amount shall be
computed in the manner prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90
NLRB 289 (1950), with interest computed in accordance with
New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).8 I
shall also recommend that in accordance with the time re-
straints set forth in Indian Hills Care Center, 321 NLRB 144
(1996), Dobbs remove from its files any references to Valen-
cia’s unlawful suspension.
As to Dobbs’ unlawful assistance rendered to both District 6
and Local 69, such conduct may be appropriately remedied by
undertakings set forth in the Order and notice Dobbs will be
required to post. Neither counsel for the General Counsel nor
District 6 has requested that the more stringent remedy of set-
ting aside the Dobbs/Local 69 collective-bargaining agreement
be imposed. In the absence of an attack on the agreement itself
(apart from the conduct concerning the successor agreement’s
ratification by unit employees) or a finding that the parties’
conduct is of such a character as to affect adversely the union’s
ability to represent the employees in the daily administration of
the contract—surely, not the case here—the Board will not
impose such a remedy. See Ardent Furniture Industries of
Pennsylvania, 164 NLRB 1163 (1967).
With respect to the status of the pending RC petition filed by
District 6, I first note that although Benson Yu’s unlawful inter-
rogation and solicitations for District 6 have been imputed to
Dobbs, there is no evidence that Dobbs’ higher management
was aware of it. Neither is their knowledge by management of
his presence at the meeting held in its cafeteria led by a District
6 representative. As a consequence and because Yu’s conduct
appears to have been limited to a handful of unit employees,
and there is no evidence that his solicitations actually resulted
in card signings for District 6, Yu’s conduct would appear to be
insufficient to have tainted District 6’s designation cards for
purposes of its representation petition. Furthermore, I recom-
mend to the Board and to the Regional Director, in light of my
findings and conclusions herein regarding Dobbs’ and Local
69’s unlawful conduct, and the apparent disparity between the
nature and degree of the assistance it rendered District 6 of a
relatively minor nature, on the one hand, and the active assis-
8 Under New Horizons, interest is computed at the “short-term Fed-
eral rate” for the underpayment of taxes as set out in the 1986 amend-
ment to 26 U.S.C. § 6621.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
996
tance it provided and the related coercive conduct in which it
engaged, in support of Local 69, on the other hand, that the
decision to continue to block the petition be reevaluated. As
will be recalled, District 6’s application to reverse the Direc-
tor’s decision was pending review by the Board at close of
hearing herein. Surely, the Regional Director has the discre-
tion, with the authorization of the Board in this case, to process
the representation petition filed by District 6, notwithstanding
the pendency of the charge in Case 22–CA–21580, see Celeb-
rity, Inc., 284 NLRB 688 (1987), and in my judgment it would
be appropriate to exercise it here.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and upon
the entire record, I issue the following recommended9
ORDER
A. The Respondent, Dobbs International Services, Inc., Ca-
tering Unit No. 233, Newark, New Jersey, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Interrogating employees regarding their union activities
and sympathies, soliciting employees to sign a petition against
Local 69, Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Interna-
tional Union, AFL–CIO and in support of District 6, Interna-
tional Union of Industrial, Service, Transport and Health Em-
ployees, threatening employees with discharge because they
supported District 6, prohibiting employees from wearing pins
with District 6 insignia, advising employees that it would be
futile to select a union other than Local 69, and prohibiting
employees from distributing literature and paraphernalia for
District 6 during their breaktime.
(b) Allowing District 6 to organize on its premises and to
conduct meetings in the lunchroom at its Newark facility, and
requiring employees to attend a union meeting for Local 69.
(c) Suspending, or otherwise discriminating against employ-
ees because they engaged in concerted, protected activities in
support of District 6 or any other labor organization.
(d) In any like or related manner, interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make employee Octavio Valencia whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits he may have suffered as a result of
the discrimination against him, in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of this decision.
(b) Remove from its files any reference to its unlawful 1-day
suspension of Octavio Valencia, and notify him in writing that
this has been done and that its suspension of him will not be
used against him in any way.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any reference to its unlawful one day suspension with-
out pay of Octavio Valencia, and notify him, in writing that this
9 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended
Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the
Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur-
poses.
has been done and that this action will not be used against him
in any way.
(d) Preserve, and, within 14 days of a request, make avail-
able to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary
to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its
Newark, New Jersey facility, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix A.”10 Copies of the notice on forms pro-
vided by the Regional Director for Region 22, after being
signed by the Respondent Employer’s authorized representa-
tive, shall be posted by the Respondent Employer immediately
upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places including all places where notices to employ-
ees, are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
the Respondent Employer to ensure that the notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Within 14 days of service by the Region, post at the same
places and under the same conditions set forth in (d) above,
copies of Respondent Local 69’s notice marked “Appendix B.”
(g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the
Respondent has taken to comply.
B. The Respondent, Local 69, Hotel Employees and Restau-
rant Employees International Union, AFL–CIO its officers,
agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Threatening bodily harm by making aggressive physical
gestures with a knife against the bodies of employees because
they supported District 6, International Union of Industrial,
Service, Transport and Health Employees, a rival union, threat-
ening employees with physical harm because they inquired
about a grievance, threatening employees with loss of employ-
ment if they supported District 6, and promising employees
money and a better employment position with the Respondent
Employer and a position with Local 69 if they supported Local
69 instead of District 6.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing em-
ployees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its of-
fices and meeting halls in Secaucus, New Jersey and elsewhere
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix B.”11 Copies of
the notice on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region
22, after being signed by Respondent Local 69’s representative,
shall be posted by Respondent Local 69, immediately upon re-
10 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
11 See fn. 10, Supra.
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES
997
ceipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days
thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where no-
tices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent Local 69 to insure that said notices are
not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at the
same places and under the same conditions as set forth in (a)
above, as they are forwarded by the Regional Director, copies
of Respondent Employer’s notice marked “Appendix A.”
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
Respondent Local 69 has taken to comply.
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for any mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.
WE WILL NOT interrogate our employees regarding their
union activities and sympathies, solicit employees to sign a
petition against Local 69, Hotel Employees and Restaurant
Employees International Union, AFL–CIO and in support of
District 6, International Union of Industrial, Service, Transport
and Health Employees, threaten our employees with discharge
because they supported District 6, prohibit our employees from
wearing pins with District 6 insignia, advise employees that it
would be futile to select a union other than Local 69, or prohibit
our employees from distributing literature and paraphernalia for
District 6 during their breaktime.
WE WILL NOT allow District 6 to organize on our premises
and to conduct meetings in the lunchroom at our Newark facil-
ity or require our employees to attend a union meeting for Lo-
cal 69.
WE WILL NOT suspend, or otherwise discriminate against
our employees because they engage in concerted, protected
activities in support of District 6 or any other labor organiza-
tion.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner, interfere with,
restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL make our employee Octavio Valencia whole for
any loss of earnings and other benefits he may have suffered as
a result of our discrimination against him, with interest.
WE WILL remove from our files any reference to the unlaw-
ful one-day suspension of Octavio Valencia and notify him in
writing that we have done that and that our suspension of him
will not be used against him in any way.
DOBBS INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC.
CATERING UNIT NO. 233
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.
WE WILL NOT threaten bodily harm by making aggressive
physical gestures with a knife against the body of employees
because they supported District 6, International Union of Indus-
trial, Service, Transport and Health Employees, a rival union,
threaten employees with physical harm because they inquired
about a grievance, threaten employees with loss of employment
if they supported District 6, or promise employees money and a
better employment position with Dobbs International Services,
Inc., Catering Unit No. 233 and a position with our Local 69 if
they supported Local 69 instead of District 6.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or co-
erce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act.
LOCAL
69,
HOTEL
EMPLOYEES
AND
RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL
UNION, AFL–CIO