Laborers'Local 1445

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Local Union No. 1445, Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO (Badger Plants, Inc.) and Lewis J. Henderson. Case 9- CB-4046 March 7, 1983 DECISION AND ORDER On December 5, 1979, Administrative Law Judge Robert Cohn issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent Union filed exceptions and a supporting brief; the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL- CIO, filed a memorandum and a motion for leave to file the memorandum in support of Respondent Union's position; and the General Counsel filed limited exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge's Decision. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,¹ and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. Respondent Union's trial board issued a decision which imposed a fine upon Lewis J. Henderson for violating legitimate union rules and stated that the fine must be paid before dues would be accepted from Henderson. Respondent Union's contract with Badger Plants contains a union-security clause which allows the discharge of employees who fail to tender the dues required for retaining membership in Respondent Union. We agree with the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that under International Union of Elevator Constructors Local Union No. 8 (San Francisco Elevator Co.)2 Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by stating that the fine must be paid before dues would be accepted. In San Francisco Elevator the Board adopted the Administrative Law Judge's finding that maintenance of a provision of a union constitution and bylaws providing for the payment of all fines and assessments before the acceptance of dues in conjunction with a union-security clause restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights and thereby violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.³ Thereafter, the Board 1 The General Counsel has excepted to certain credibility findings made by the Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy not to overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credibility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence convinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products. Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing his findings. 2 243 NLRB 53 (1979), enfd. 665 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 3 Cf. General Truck Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Union, Local 980, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Neilson Freight Lines, Inc., et al.), 249 NLRB 46 (1980). where the Board refused to find a San Francisco Elevator-type 8(b)(1)(A) violation in the absence of a union-security clause. denied a motion for reconsideration⁴ in that case. It reasoned that a union-security clause which utilizes the continued threat of job loss to exert pressure on an employee to maintain union membership status, coupled with a provision requiring payment of fines before acceptance of dues, constitutes an unlawful threat to an employee's employment relationship. The threat arises because employees knowing that their acceptance of dues is conditioned upon payment of fines can reasonably assume that they must make all of the payments in order to avoid the risk that the union will seek their discharge. Such a risk, the Board concluded, is not required by the Act nor is a union permitted to threaten action indirectly which it cannot threaten directly. In this connection, the Board found that the combination of the fines-payable bylaw with the union-security clause was an unlawful threat even in the absence of an overt threat to cause the discharge of the employee. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit approved this analysis and enforced the Board's Order,⁵ stating, inter alia, "We find it similarly reasonable for the Board to determine that a union security clause conjoined with a fines payable bylaw may induce unsophisticated employees to fear they will lose their jobs if they do not pay their fines."6 Here, as in San Francisco Elevator, the fines-payable-before-dues policy stated in the trial board's decision is coupled with a union-security clause. For the reasons stated in our Order Denying Reconsideration of San Francisco Elevator, we find such a combination is a threat to the employees' employment relationship, and is not the type of internal union affair which Congress sought to insulate from the Board's consideration.⁷ Accordingly, we find that Respondent Union restrained and coerced employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) by its policy requiring that fines must be paid before dues are accepted. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and 4 248 NLRB 951 (1980). 5 665 F.2d 376. 6 Id. at 382. 7 As the Supreme Court stated in N.L.R.B. V. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., et al., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967): "Congress did not propose any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside from barring enforcement of a union's internal regulations to affect a member's employment status." See also Scofield. et al. V. N.L.R.B., 394 U.S. 423 (1969); National Maritime Union of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and Joseph Curran, its Agent (The Texas Company), 78 NLRB 971 (1948), enfd. 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949). 266 NLRB No. 78 LOCAL UNION NO. 1445 hereby orders that the Respondent, Local Union No. 1445, Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Ashland, Kentucky, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE ROBERT COHN, Administrative Law Judge: The matter herein came on for hearing before me in Ashland, Kentucky, on September 27, 1979, pursuant to due notice. The principal issue for resolution is whether certain acts and conduct of officials of Local Union No. 1445, Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO (the Respondent), in July and August 1978, constitute restraint and coercion of the rights of Lewis J. Henderson (the Charging Party) guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Relations Act, as amended (herein the Act), in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.2 At the close of the General Counsel's case-in-chief, I granted a motion of the Respondent to dismiss the complaint on the principal issue in the case; i.e., whether certain acts and conduct of officials of the Respondent at a union meeting on July 18 violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. I reserved ruling on a subsidiary issue in the case; i.e., whether a fine imposed upon the Charging Party by the Respondent also constituted a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, pending review of legal precedent cited by counsel for the General Counsel. 3 I dispose of both issues, with reasons therefor, as set forth, infra. Upon the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses,4 I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION At the time of the occurrence of the events herein which gave rise to the charge of unfair labor practices, the Charging Party was an employee of Badger Plants, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation engaged in the business of industrial construction at various locations throughout the United States, including a coal gasification project in Catlettsburg, Kentucky. The complaint alleges that during the past 12 months, a representative period, Badger Plants, Inc., purchased and received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000, which were shipped to its Catlettsburg, Kentucky, project directly from points outside the State of Kentucky. At the hearmg herein, the parties stipulated that that Company was All dates hereinafter refer to the calendar year 1978, unless otherwise indicated. he charge in the instant matter was filed by the Charging Party on December 5, and served upon the Respondent on December 6; the complaint issued March 30, 1979. I This issue was added to the complaint by counsel for the General minsel by amendment at the hearing. As I stated on the record at the close of the proceeding, I have given favorable inference to the evidence presented by the General Counsel. as the trier of the fact is required to do upon a motion to disat the close of the General Counsel's case-in-chief. an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. I so find.5 II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that at all times material, Local Union No. 1445, Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts The alleged unfair labor practices herein had their genesis in an altercation between two employees (members of the Respondent) of Badger Plants, Inc., at the Catlettsburg, Kentucky, facility, some time prior to July 18. The two employees involved in such altercation were Donald Griffith, a business manager of the Respondent, and Robert Nethercutt. As a consequence of this incident, Griffith filed charges against Nethercutt under the constitution and bylaws of the Respondent, accusing the latter of engaging in conduct unbecoming a member of that Union. The case was set to be heard before a trial board of the Respondent on July 21. The Charging Party herein, Lewis J. Henderson (a member of Respondent), was an employee of Badger Plants, Inc., at the time of the aforesaid incident and was aware of it. For reasons not entirely clear from the record, Henderson was acutely interested in knowing the specific charges which Griffith had leveled against Nethercutt, and he (Henderson), at the next union meeting on July 18, made an intensive effort to ascertain that fact. The July 18 union meeting was a regular monthly meeting of the Respondent which took place at the union hall, located in Ashland, Kentucky. The meeting was chaired by the president of the Union, Willie King. The customary agenda for meetings of the Union was as follows: rollcall of officers, reading of the minutes of the previous meeting, communications and bills, report of the executive board, report of the business manager, report of the delegates and committees, unfinished business, new business, good and welfare, and adjournment. The record reflects that the first time that Henderson sought the floor of the meeting to learn of the specific 5 Although the issue of statutory jurisdiction was not raised by any party, I have strong reservations that jurisdiction should be asserted based on the slender reed of the interstate activities of Badger Plants, Inc. That is to say, the alleged unfair labor practices, as hereinafter set forth, occurred in or near the Respondent's union hall, and the only connection that Badger Plants, Inc., had to the controversy was that, at the time of the occurrences, the Charging Party was an employee of that Company. However, there is no contention or evidence that the employment relationship between the Charging Party (or any other employee) and that Company, or any other company, was affected by the occurrence of the alleged unfair labor practices. Moreover, this is not a case where the Board has asserted jurisdiction based on an alleged deprivation of an individual right to resort to the Board's processes. (Cf. International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, AFL-CIO, Local Union No. 577 (Various Employers in Hannibal, Missouri Area), 199 NLRB 37, fn. 1 (1972); Wood, Wire and Metal Lathers' International Union, Local No. 238, AFL-CIO (Phillip A. Contreras, Jr.), 156 NLRB 997 (1966).) However, since the issue was not raised by any party, 1 do not raise it sua sponte, and will proceed to dispose of the matter upon its merits. DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD charges aforesaid was while the secretary-treasurer of the Respondent was making a report in the "communications and bills" section of the agenda. King advised Henderson that it was not proper to raise that question at that time, and that it should be deferred to the report of the executive board. Henderson sat down. However, after the secretary-treasurer read the report of the executive board, which contained a letter to the executive board pertaining to charges which Nethercutt had filed against the Respondent with the National Labor Relations Board, Henderson again sought the floor to ascertain the nature of the specific charges which Griffith had filed against Nethercutt. At that point, King read to Henderson the section of the Union's constitution under which the charges against Nethercutt were filed, which referred to interference by a member with the conduct of the business of the local union. This did not satisfy Henderson, who insisted that he had a right to know what the specific charges were against Nethercutt. King responded that it would not be proper to explore the matter further at that time because the trial of that issue had been set to be heard before the trial board on July 21, only 3 days hence, and that a full report of the trial board would be made to the membership at the next union meeting in August.⁶ However, this did not satisfy Henderson, who insisted that he had a right under the union constitution, and under the Landrum-Griffin Act, to take the floor and speak on any subject for as long as he wanted. After the chairman, King, ruled Henderson out of order several times and asked that Henderson take his seat (which Henderson refused to do), King asked the sergeant-at-arms, Lucas, to put Henderson out of the meeting, and King appointed two members to assist the sergeant-at-arms in this endeavor. One of the two members who King appointed was Emerson Lewis, a vice president of the Respondent, who was heard (by Henderson) to say, "Let's throw him [Henderson] down the steps."7 At or about this time, several of the members present at the meeting rose in defense of Henderson, and King quickly adjourned the meeting. Immediately thereafter, King asked the members of the executive board to stay while he wrote some charges against Henderson. King then preferred charges against Henderson for interfering with a regular union meeting of the Respondent in violation of article III, section 3, subparagraphs (d), (e), and (f), of the Respondent's constitution.⁸ A copy of the 6 The constitution of the Respondent provided that a report of the trial board be made at the next regular union meeting, and that, after a full discussion by the membership, the decision of the trial board might be overturned by a two-thirds vote of the membership. 7 This threat of violence is alleged in the complaint herein to constitute a violation of Sec. 8(a)(1)(A) of the Act. 8 The paragraphs referred to are quoted as follows: (d) To refrain from interfering with the proper conduct of all the business of the Organization; (e) To observe proper decorum in attending and participating in meetings and functions of the Organization, in accordance with such reasonable rules established by the Organization and generally accepted Parliamentary rules of procedure pertaining to the conduct of meetings and functions; (f) To refrain from attending a meeting or function under the influence of liquor or conducting himself in such a manner as to interfere with the proper and orderly conduct of the business of the Local aforesaid charges were mailed to Henderson the following day by the secretary-treasurer of the Respondent, along with a notice that hearing and trial of the charges would he held at the union hall on Friday, August 4, 1978, at 7 p.m. Following the adjournment of the union meeting on July 18, Henderson left the union hall in the company of two other union members. As he walked down the street, another union member, John McCoy, who happened to be the union steward at the Badger Plants job, motioned to Henderson to "come here." When Henderson approached, McCoy assaulted him.9 Thereafter, Henderson went to a local hospital and was treated for the bruises which he received as a result of the altercation with McCoy, and later sued McCoy in a small claims court for damages, which he recovered. Subsequently, Henderson engaged a local attorney to represent him in connection with his defenses and rights arising out of the foregoing incidents. Among other things, the attorney secured a postponement of the trial board hearing from August 4 to August 11. However, neither Henderson nor his attorney attended the trial, which took place as scheduled, and resulted in a finding by the trial board that Henderson was guilty of the charges filed against him by King. The trial board further agreed to fine Henderson $200, and stated that: "Said fine is to be paid before any more dues are accepted from Brother Lewis Henderson by Laborers' Local Union 1445." Henderson subsequently appealed the decision of the trial board to the International Union; however, that appeal was denied by the International Union in December.¹⁰ The record reflects that in late February 1979, Henderson filed a complaint against the officials of the Respondent in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky under the Landrum-Griffin Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 411-412) in which Henderson accused Union; to comply with and obey all requests or orders by the presiding officer pertaining to the conduct of a meeting or function and at no time use vulgar or profane language nor make any slanderous statements or accusations toward any member or officer of the Local Union, a District Council, or the International Union. 9 It is alleged in the complaint that this conduct of McCoy constituted a violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 10 The text of the decision of the International Union appears as follows: Appeal of Lewis Henderson, Local Union 1445, Ashland, Kentucky By letter received September 18, 1978, appellant appeals from the decision of the Local Union Trial Board. There were no appearances. After considering the documents in the file of this case, the Panel FINDS: 1. Appellant was charged with interfering with the conduct of the Local Union meeting of July 18, 1978, by refusing to abide by the chairman's ruling, which eventually resulted in the premature adjournment of the meeting. 2. After due notice and granting appellant's request for postponement of the Trial Board hearing, the Trial Board convened, received evidence, and decided that the charges were sustained and warranted a $200.00 fine. 3. Appellant has presented no evidence to warrant disturbing the Trial Board's decision. Accordingly, therefore, the Panel RECOMMENDS: That the appeal be denied. LOCAL UNION NO. 1445 the defendants of violating his rights by their conduct on July 18, above described, and by the fine of $200 "to be paid before any more dues are accepted for Lewis Henderson." That case was pending before the court, prior to trial, at the time of the hearing in the instant case. 11 B. Analysis and Concluding Findings In urging that the above-described acts and conduct of the Respondent's officials constituted "restraint and coercion" of the Section 7 rights of the Charging Party, in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, counsel for the General Counsel relies primarily upon the rationale of the Board majority (then Member Fanning dissenting) in Carpenters Local Union No. 22, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, AFL-CIO (William Graziano, d/b/a Graziano Construction Company), 195 NLRB 1 (1972). In that case, the respondent cited and fined the charging party (Shanley) because the latter assertedly violated certain legitimate union rules. 12 However, the Board majority found that the rule violations were utilized by the respondent as a pretext because of Shanley's intraunion activities in opposition to the incumbent union officials." That is to say, it was found that Shanley had opposed the incumbent officials in an election, and that his conduct "was in large part responsible for the fact that the results of the initial election for delegate were nullified and a second election required. The Board majority went on to hold that the respondent in that case: in the guise of enforcing internal discipline, has sought to deprive its members of the right, as guaranteed by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, to participate fully and freely in the internal affairs of his own union. A fine for that purpose not only in our opinion fails to reflect a legitimate union interest but rather in fact impairs a policy that Congress has imbedded in the labor laws. For these reasons, we conclude that the Respondent Union's conduct in fining Shanley because of his intraunion activity violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 14 Although there is evidence in the record in the instant case that in May 1978 the Charging Party filed for a union office, there is absolutely no evidence that the alleged wrongful conduct of the Respondent's officials was in anywise prompted in retaliation for the Charging Party's seeking union office. Rather, all of the evidence respecting the conduct of the Respondent's officials 11 It should be noted that at a preliminary hearing before the district court judge, it was suggested that Henderson pay the fine under protest, pending trial of the matter, which was done. It is not contended that Henderson lost any work, or was not referred to any employment, as a consequence of any of the incidents described above. 12 Specifically, the rules which Shanley was charged with violating had to do with: (1) going to work on a construction job without a referral. and (2) loaning a truck to be used for the purpose of hauling and/or delivering employer's material. 13 195 NLRB 1. 14 195 NLRB at 2. The dissenting member found. in agreement with the trial examiner, "that Shanley was in fact disciplined because of his violations of the union rules, and that such violations were not utilized as a pretext to discipline him for other reasons." (195 NLRB at 3.) against the Charging Party came as a result of the manner and means utilized by the Charging Party at the July 18 union meeting to achieve what he no doubt considered to be his rights under the Union's constitution, and under law. However, as the Board has recently held, a union respondent "has a right to maintain order and discipline in its meetings and the conduct of its affairs."15 Here, it is apparent that the union officials, particularly the president of the Respondent who was acting as chairman of the July 18 meeting, believed that he (King) was following, in a lawful and proper manner, the Union's constitution and its rules and regulations, respecting the proper procedure and conduct to be followed at the July 18 meeting. Moreover, he believed it to be consonant with such procedure to limit discussion of the matters which the Charging Party sought to bring before the meeting in view of the pendency of such matters before a trial board to be conducted within 3 days. This conduct of the chairman obviously did not comport with what the Charging Party viewed as his legitimate rights, and he intentionally and persistently sought to exercise these rights at the meeting with the result of being consistently ruled out of order by the chair and causing much confusion and acrimony at the meeting. The threats of physical violence, and the actual physical assault which followed, were direct consequences of the Charging Party's antagonistic conduct in not following the legitimate procedural rules laid down by the Local Union. The remarks of the Board in the San Francisco Elevator case, supra, 243 NLRB at 54, are equally applicable to the situation here: The General Counsel also argues that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) in that Finney [the Charging Party] has a protected right to freely and fully state his views and opinions as to the manner in which Respondent conducts its business, and that Respondent's discipline of Finney was in part motivated by his exercise of those rights. The difficulty with the General Counsel's position is that Finney was not disciplined because of the views he was expressing but the manner in which he expressed them. In sum, on the basis of all of the foregoing I conclude, and therefore find, that Henderson was, in fact, disciplined for his breach of legitimate and proper union rules respecting procedure to be followed at union meetings, and not as a pretext for his exercise of rights under Section 7 of the Act, or otherwise. As the Board stated in the San Francisco Elevator case, the respondent's "actions are not such that it can be said to have acted outside its legitimate area of interest and in such a way as to impair any overriding policy of labor law. I shall therefore recommend that the complaint, to that extent, be dismissed. 15 International Union of Elevator Constructors Local Union No. 8, AFL-CIO (San Francisco Elevator Co.). 243 NLRB 53 (1979). 16 243 NLRB at 54. There remains to be considered the allegation in the complaint, as amended, that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by conditioning payment (acceptance) of dues upon prior payment of the $200 fine. That allegation is fully supported by evidence in the report of the trial board that: "Said fine is to be paid before any more dues are accepted from Brother Lewis Henderson by Laborers' Local Union 1445. The Board in the San Francisco Elevator case found a similar provision in the constitution of the respondent in that case to constitute a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, particularly where, as here, there is a union-security clause in the collective-bargaining agreement between the Respondent Union and the Employer involved in the case. Here, although as previously noted, it has not been shown that the provision has operated to the detriment of the Charging Party as respects his obtaining or keeping employment, the fact remains that the condition remains outstanding in the report of the Respondent's trial board, which was upheld by the International Union. Accordingly, a cease-and-desist order is warranted. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Badger Plants, Inc., is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Respondent has restrained and coerced employees and members in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, and has thereby engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, by conditioning payment of dues upon prior payment of a fine. 4. The unfair labor practices set forth above affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY It having been found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, I shall recommend that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist from engaging in those unfair labor practices. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recommended: ORDER¹⁸ The Respondent, Local Union No. 1445, Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, Ashland, Kentucky, its officers, agents, successors, and representatives, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Restraining and coercing employees and members in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act by conditioning payment of union dues upon prior payment of fines levied as a result of breach of union rules. 17 G.C. Exh. 9. (b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing members in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which is deemed necessary in order to effectuate the policies of the Act: (a) Revoke and rescind that portion of the report of the Respondent's trial board issued August 11, 1978, which prohibited acceptance of any union dues from Lewis Henderson until he paid the $200 fine levied against him. (b) Post in conspicuous places at its business offices, meeting halls, and all places where notices to members are customarily posted, copies of the attached notice hereto marked, "Appendix." Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 9, after being duly signed by an official representative of the Respondent, shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for 60 consecutive days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Upon request of the said Regional Director, the Respondent shall supply him with a sufficient number of signed copies of said notice for posting by Badger Plants, Inc., if it desires to do so, at its place of business. (d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 9, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint herein be dismissed in all other respects. 20 18 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. 19 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." 20 Inasmuch as it has been found that Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act was not violated by the acts and conduct of the Respondent's officials in the conduct of the union meeting on July 18, for the reasons aforesaid, it necessarily follows that the alleged threats of physical violence and the alleged act of physical violence against the Charging Party following the meeting did not constitute a violation of that section of the Act. Under these circumstances, I do not, of course, reach the issue of whether the Respondent was responsible for the assault by McCoy upon Henderson. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT restrain and coerce employees and members in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act by conditioning payment of union dues upon prior payment of fines levied by us. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce our members in the exercise of LOCAL UNION NO. 1445 rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. WE WILL rescind that portion of the report of the trial board dated August 11, 1978, which prohibited acceptance of any dues from Lewis Henderson conditioned upon his payment of the $200 fine levied against him. LOCAL UNION No. 1445, LABORERS' IN- TERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA, AFL-CIO