Electrical Workers Local 98 (TRI-M Group, LLC)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 350 NLRB No. 83 1104 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 98 and TRI-M Group, LLC. Case 4–CB–9713 August 31, 2007 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS KIRSANOW AND WALSH On April 10, 2007, Administrative Law Judge Paul Buxbaum issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions, a supporting brief, and a reply brief, and the General Counsel and the Charging Party filed an- swering briefs. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order.2 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec- ommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 98, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order. Bruce G. Conley, Esq., for the General Counsel. William T. Josem, Esq., of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the Respondent. Stephen J. Sundheim, Esq., of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE PAUL BUXBAUM, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on January 25, 2007. The 1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis- trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder- ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. 2 In affirming the judge’s granting of a broad cease-and-desist order, we do not rely on his conclusion that conduct occurring 4 or more years prior to the violation at issue cannot be considered in determining whether a party is a recidivist offender of the Act. Rather, we will assess the totality of the circumstances in each case, including the ap- plicable dates of misconduct and prior Board and court orders, to de- termine whether a broad order is warranted. See generally Five Star Mfg., 348 NLRB 1301 (2006). Under these circumstances, we find that the record sufficiently establishes that the Respondent has a proclivity to violate the Act, and thus warrants our adoption of the judge’s broad order. charge was filed June 20, 2006,1 and the complaint was issued October 17. 2 The complaint alleges that the Union, through the actions of its agents, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by blocking an employee of the Company from entering a jobsite in order to perform a work task. In addition, the complaint provides notice that the General Counsel seeks imposition of a broad remedial order requiring the Union to cease and desist from blocking employees’ ingress and egress from worksites or impeding employees from performing work duties, or in any other man- ner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. The Union filed an answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. As described in detail in the decision that follows, I find that on June 16 the Union, through its agents, Raymond Della Vella, Craig Cummings, and Mike Quinn, blocked an employee of the Company, Sean Muth, from accessing a portion of a worksite and prevented that employee from performing a work task. The Union’s conduct violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. I fur- ther conclude that the totality of circumstances demonstrates that the Union’s agents have a proclivity to violate the Act to the extent that an extraordinary remedial measure is required. As a result, I concur in the General Counsel’s request for relief and recommend imposition of a broad cease-and-desist order. On the entire record,3 including my observation of the de- meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, the Company, and the Union, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION The Charging Party, a Pennsylvania limited liability com- pany, with offices in Kennett Square, Pennsylvania, is engaged as an electrical contractor in the construction industry. It annu- ally performs services valued in excess of $50,000 outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Union admits4 and I find that the Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 1 All dates are in 2006, unless otherwise indicated. 2 At trial, counsel for the General Counsel moved to amend the com- plaint to reflect the Charging Party’s correct name and form of organi- zation under Pennsylvania law. This motion was unopposed, and I granted it. 3 Counsel for the General Counsel has filed a motion to correct the transcript. His page reference numbers differ from those in the official transcript furnished to the Board by the reporting service. As a result, I am unable to verify his suggested corrections. Fortunately, as is appar- ent from the brevity of his motion, there are very few transcription errors. Having performed my own examination of the transcript, I determine that those errors that do exist are neither significant nor material. 4 See the Union’s answer to the complaint, pars. 2 and 3. (GC Exh. 1(e).) ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL 98 (TRI-M GROUP, LLC) 1105 II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts This case involves an incident occurring at the Genesis Health Care facility, a nursing home located on Edison Avenue in Philadelphia. Starting in January 2006, Genesis underwent major renovation, including installation of a new electrical distribution system. The general contractor for this project was Delran Builders Company, Inc. Their project superintendent was Steve Herman. The electrical subcontracting work was performed by the Company. Their foreman at this location was Joseph Prego. The Company’s work force is not represented by any labor organization. Beginning in early April, the Union picketed the Genesis worksite, contending, in the words of its placards, that the Company was “Destroying Building Industry Standards” by “Not Observing Our Wage and Benefit Standards.” (GC Exh. 6.) At the commencement, picketing was conducted on a daily basis. Once other unions began similar activities at the site, the Union generally restricted its own activities to Fridays. Picket- ing was conducted on approximately 20 Fridays, from 7 a.m. until 2 p.m. The person responsible for directing this activity was Raymond Della Vella. He has been a business representa- tive and organizer for the Union since 1998. Della Vella con- firmed that, in the words of counsel for the General Counsel, he was “the official designated by Local 98 to be in charge of the picketing” at the Genesis Health Care construction project site.5 (Tr. 23.) Because it is important to an assessment of one of the key is- sues in this case, it is necessary to describe the location, man- ner, and purpose of the Union’s picketing activities. The Gene- sis facility has a parking lot with two entrances. Since the nurs- ing home continued to operate during the renovations, a variety of people entered and left the property through those entrances, including employees of Genesis, delivery persons, and employ- ees of the various contractors engaged in the construction ac- tivities.6 Of the two entrances to the facility, it is the eastern one that is involved in this case. That entrance has a wide section of concrete connecting Edison Avenue to the Genesis parking lot. This concrete entryway crosses the pedestrian sidewalk. The sidewalk continues past the entrance for a short distance. It comes to an end at a wooded area traversed by a creek. At this place, Delran stationed dumpsters for storage of construction debris. The outer dumpster is located parallel to the sidewalk and its end is adjacent to the woods. All of this is well illus- trated in the photographic record that forms a large part of the documentary evidence in this case. In particular, Herman testi- fied that he took a series of photos during the incident at issue. These pictures constitute General Counsel’s Exhibits 6, 7, and 5 The Union concedes that Della Vella was its agent within the meaning of the Act. See the Union’s answer to the complaint, par. 4. (GC Exh. 1(e).) In addition, counsel for the Union agreed that, on the day in question, Della Vella “was supervising the pickets” at the Gene- sis site. (R. Br. at p. 2.) 6 While there was no testimony on this point, it is reasonable to as- sume that other members of the public also accessed the facility, in- cluding visitors to the residents. 9–15.7 Of these photos, General Counsel’s Exhibit 12 contains the best view of the geography that is involved in the parties’ controversy. In the foreground of the photo, one can see a por- tion of the wide piece of concrete that forms the eastern en- trance to the facility. Beyond that, the sidewalk extends to the wooded area, where it terminates. Parallel to the sidewalk is the outermost of the dumpsters. Della Vella testified about the manner and purpose of the Union’s picketing. He reported that the Union located pickets at each of the entrances to the facility. Typically, two pickets would be placed at each of those entrances. Significantly, Della Vella explained that the reason for the picketing activity was to publicize the Union’s dispute with the Company by enabling persons who were driving onto the facility’s property to read the placards carried by the pickets. Thus, the evidence demonstrated that the Union’s pattern of conduct was to station a set of two pickets at the eastern entrance to the facility in order to bring to the attention of the interested public the nature of its dispute with the Company. On Friday, June 16, the Union engaged in this customary picketing activity. As was its practice, the Union had notified the Civil Affairs Division of the Philadelphia Police Depart- ment that it would be picketing on that day. The department assigned officers Edward Braceland and Ira Watterson to ob- serve the situation. They parked their vehicle in the facility’s lot, adjacent to the dumpsters.8 Della Vella testified that pickets were placed “at both en- trances” to the Genesis facility. (Tr. 111.) The two pickets at the east entrance were union members Cummings and Quinn. Della Vella was stationed across the street. As he described it, “I was keeping an eye on both picket signs and I was taking care of . . . general things I had to do.” (Tr. 111.) Sean Muth testified that he is a longtime employee of the Company. He is not a supervisor, nor is he a member of any labor organization. He works as an electrician and sometimes operates a backhoe. At approximately 1 p.m. on June 16, Muth placed a load of construction debris in the bucket of a backhoe. He planned to drive the backhoe out onto Edison Avenue so that he could approach the dumpster and drop his load into it. He testified that he was required to use this route because it afforded the only practical access to the dumpster that would permit him to properly dispose of his load. Muth testified that he had a coworker stop traffic on Edison Avenue so that he could “swing out.” (Tr. 92.) As he ex- plained, he “went to swing out and pulled up towards the dumpster and the pickets walked in front of me.” (Tr. 92.) Because the movements of the pickets are a key aspect of this case, it is important to note that Muth was repeatedly ques- tioned on this point. He clearly testified that, prior to the com- mencement of the incident, the pickets had been stationed “to- wards the driveway” leading into the parking lot. (Tr. 101.) As 7 The Union also introduced photos showing the area question. R. Exh. 1 is a satellite photo showing the east entrance to the facility. R. Exh. 2 shows the placement of the dumpsters parallel to the sidewalk and adjacent to the woods. 8 The location of the unmarked police vehicle is shown in R. Exh. 2, a photo taken shortly after the incident had concluded. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1106 he phrased it, “[t]hey walked down in front of the dumpster when I got turned towards it.” (Tr. 94.) The following addi- tional discussion precisely illustrates Muth’s contention regard- ing the pickets’ movements: COUNSEL: Before the incident started when you got in the backhoe with the debris, where were the pickets stand- ing and perhaps you can show us on the General Counsel’s Exhibit GC-8? MUTH: More towards this end of the dumpster. COUNSEL: In other words[,] towards the driveway? MUTH: Yes. JUDGE: So[,] as we’re looking at it, that’s towards the right of the dumpster? MUTH: Yes. COUNSEL: [T]hen a[s] you went into the street to ap- proach the dumpster to make the dump, did the pickets then move in front of the backhoe so that they were be- tween—so that they were now between the backhoe and the dumpster? MUTH: Yes, they walked down from there to that point. COUNSEL: They walked from the original position which was to the right of the dumpster so that they were no[w] positioned directly in front of the dumpsters so that you could not make the dump? MUTH: That’s correct, in front of the machine. [Tr. 101–102.] On this point, Della Vella’s testimony stands in sharp con- trast to that of Muth. I asked him, “[w]hat about immediately prior to when the backhoe first came out onto the street, where were [the pickets] then?” He responded that, “[t]hey were in front of the dumpster.” (Tr. 126.) This assertion forms the basis for Della Vella’s explanation for what occurred next. He concedes that he instructed the pickets to maintain a position in front of the dumpster. He described his reasoning as follows: I felt that the backhoe was interfering with us. We had been on that sidewalk standing in that very position for months and we thought we were being interfered with, that we weren’t in- terfering with anybody, we just thought we were being har- assed. [Tr. 116.] In other words, the Union’s contention is that its pickets had been standing in front of the dumpster when Muth first drove out onto the street. According to this version, Muth’s actions would have had the effect of dislodging the pickets from their preexisting station in front of the dumpster. There are a number of reasons why I credit Muth’s account and discredit that of Della Vella. First and foremost, Muth testified in an impressively calm, dispassionate manner that left me with a sense of his fundamental neutrality in this dispute. Second, although Della Vella claims that the pickets were standing in front of the dumpster when Muth arrived, he earlier testified that, in the phrasing of counsel, the two pickets were “picketing at that east entrance.” (Tr. 111.) In other words, they would have been standing at some distance from the dumpster. Furthermore, the placement of the pickets at the entrance comports with logic and common sense. The purpose of the picketing was to alert the public about the terms of the Union’s dispute with the Company, particularly those members of the public with a potential interest in the matter, such as employees of the firms performing the construction work and persons having business with the nursing home. Picketing at the entrance is designed to facilitate this purpose. Picketing at the dumpster would be comparatively ineffective at accom- plishing this objective. That locale is at the edge of the prop- erty, adjacent to woods and a creek. It simply defies logic to believe that the Union would choose the dumpster as a primary locus for its pickets.9 I also note that the precise location of the two pickets as of the commencement of this incident is key to the Union’s de- fense in this case. Despite this, the Union did not call as wit- nesses either of the pickets themselves. Cummings and Quinn are members of the Union and no explanation was offered as to why their testimony was not presented.10 Because one would have reasonably expected that their testimony would have sup- ported Della Vella’s contentions, the unexplained failure to produce them as witnesses leads me to draw an adverse infer- ence. See Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB 622 (2001), enf. 56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (adverse inference drawn against employer who failed to produce testimony from the only man- agement official present at a key meeting), and NLRB v. Iron Workers, 124 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1997) (Board’s “well established” use of adverse inference for failure to produce testimony was properly applied to a respondent labor organiza- tion). In sum, my finding that Muth’s account is credible is based on my assessment of his demeanor and motivation as reinforced by the contradiction in Della Vella’s testimony, the unexplained absence of other pertinent testimony, and the inherent logic of the situation. I conclude that, on observing Muth’s approach in the backhoe, the pickets moved from their prior station at the east entrance and assumed a new position directly in front of the dumpster. General Counsel’s Exhibits 7 and 12 clearly illustrate the situation as it existed once the pickets moved into place in front of the dumpster. In these photos, union members Cummings and Quinn, accompanied by Della Vella, are shown standing 9 I recognize that Prego testified that the Union’s pickets sometimes stood in front of the dumpster. However, he also reported that this was not their typical behavior. Della Vella testified that “[m]ost of the time” his pickets were placed in front of the dumpster. (Tr. 126.) As I have indicated, this would make little sense and I do not credit it. As counsel for the Charging Party observed, “If they were actually picket- ing at this out-of-the-way location, this would have been a considerable distance from the entrance and would have defeated the Union’s aim of getting its message to those entering and exiting.” (Footnote omitted.) (CP Br. at p. 6.) 10 Interestingly, counsel for the Charging Party cross-examined Della Vella regarding the failure to produce the testimony of the pickets. Despite this, the Union presented no explanation for its failure to call them as witnesses. ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL 98 (TRI-M GROUP, LLC) 1107 directly between the backhoe’s bucket and the dumpster.11 There is no dispute regarding the remaining events. Muth testi- fied that he waited in his machine. After 5 to 10 minutes, his foreman, Prego, arrived. Prego instructed him to return the backhoe to the facility’s parking lot. He complied. At this juncture, Herman also arrived on the scene. He told the police officers that Muth needed to dump the debris. Officer Watter- son told him to proceed. He instructed Muth to start the back- hoe. Prego stopped the traffic on Edison Avenue. Muth moved the backhoe into position. At that point, Cummings and Quinn were still posted in front of the dumpster. Della Vella had moved away and was standing on a bridge over the creek talk- ing on his cell phone. Herman asked the pickets to move. Cummings told him “to go talk to the boss and he pointed down to the picketer that was over at the bridge talking on his cell phone.”12 (Tr. 69.) According to Herman, at this point Della Vella approached and told the police to instruct Herman to “shut up.” (Tr. 69.) He then joined the other pickets in front of the dumpster. Offi- cer Watterson told Herman he was going to instruct the pickets to move. He had a conversation with Della Vella that lasted “a few minutes.” (Tr. 71.) Watterson directed Muth to move the backhoe forward. Muth complied, but was again required to stop because the pickets did not step out of the way. The offi- cer again instructed Muth to move forward. Muth inched an- other foot or so closer to the dumpster. After some minutes, Della Vella “directed his guys to move away.” (Tr. 73.) Wat- terson instructed Muth to make his dump and Muth complied. There were no further problems at the site on that day. As may be anticipated whenever multiple witnesses provide estimates of elapsed time, there was some variance in the de- scription of how long the incident lasted. Prego estimated that 15 to 20 minutes elapsed between the time he first observed the pickets blocking the dumpster and the end of the episode. Herman reported that “about 20 minutes elapsed.” (Tr. 80.) Muth testified that it was between 30 to 35 minutes from his first attempt to dump until he was able to accomplish his mis- sion. Della Vella estimated that the entire incident took “no more than ten minutes.” (Tr. 119.) Under questioning by counsel for the Company, Della Vella was asked whether “you and the other two pickets refused to move from your position in front of the dumpster for at least, you said five to ten minutes, so that the dumpster could not be reached or gotten to by the backhoe, correct?” He responded, “[t]hat’s correct.” (Tr. 127.) Ultimately, it must be recalled that only two individuals who testified were present throughout the events, Della Vella and Muth. For reasons already discussed, I credit Muth’s account 11 The other individuals shown in GC Exh. 7 are officers Braceland and Watterson. Officer Watterson is also shown in GC Exh. 12. 12 Della Vella was conversing with one of the Union’s attorneys. Counsel for the Union cites this behavior as evidence that Della Vella was acting in good faith and “with the utmost attempt to comply with the law.” (Footnote omitted.) (R. Br. at p. 6.) The Union did not offer testimony regarding the substance of this conversation. Naturally, I draw no adverse inference from the failure to present testimony regard- ing privileged communications. By the same token, I decline to specu- late as to the possible relevance of the conversation to any issues in this case. and find that the incident, in its entirety, last approximately one-half hour. To summarize, I have found that an employee of the Com- pany, Muth, was engaged in a work task requiring that he bring his backhoe into position to dump debris into a dumpster. The Union’s pickets observed Muth maneuvering into place. They moved from their prior station at the parking lot entrance to a new location designed to block Muth’s access to the dumpster. They remained in that blocking position for a period of ap- proximately 30 minutes before stepping aside to allow Muth to complete his task. B. Legal Analysis The General Counsel contends that the Union violated Sec- tion 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when its pickets, in the words of counsel’s opening statement, “moved and stationed themselves on the public sidewalk running parallel to the dumpster directly in front of the path of the backhoe.” (Tr. 11.) The pertinent portion of the statute makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents “to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7.”13 The Board’s venerable test for application of this standard is whether the conduct in question is “reasonably calculated to coerce anti-union or non-union [employees] in the exercise of their right, under the amended Act, to refrain from joining the Union.” Ladies Garment Workers (Seamprufe, Inc.), 82 NLRB 892, 894 (1949), enf. 186 F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. de- nied 342 U.S. 813 (1951). See also Randell Warehouse of Ari- zona, 347 NLRB 591, 596 (2006) (describing the standard as “reasonable tendency to coerce employees”). Over the years, the Board has consistently found that the blocking of access to an employee’s workplace constitutes unlawful restraint and coercion. Early on, it held that pickets who placed themselves in the path of employees’ vehicles at- tempting to enter an employer’s plant violated Section 8(b)(1)(A). Longshoremen ILWU Local 6 (Sunset Line & Twine Co.), 79 NLRB 1487, 1506 (1948). Similarly, blocking the door of a facility so as to prevent an employee from enter- ing was also found to violate that Section. Metal Polishers Local 67, 200 NLRB 335 (1972). Much more recently, this principle was again upheld by the Board while affirming a judge’s observation that “efforts to prevent employees from reporting to work by impeding access to an employer’s facility [are] proscribed by this Section.” Service Employees Local 525, 329 NLRB 638, 685 (1999), affd. 52 Fed. Appx. 357 (9th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the prohibition against blocking ac- cess is not limited to conduct directed against employees who are arriving for, or departing from, work. The Board has also found it unlawful for pickets to block “employees from entering the [employer’s] facility to perform assigned tasks.” Mine Workers District 17 (Dehue Coal), 275 NLRB 715 (1985). In applying these principles, the Board has been clear that the mere absence of violence is not a defense. Thus, in Car- penters (Society Hill Towers Owners’ Assn.), 335 NLRB 814, 815 (2001), the Board reversed a judge’s finding of no violation 13 There are certain provisos that limit coverage of this section in ways that are not material to this case. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1108 premised on the fact that there was “no hint of violence” in the union’s conduct. In a case involving conduct similar to that at issue here, the Board (Metal Polisher Local 67, supra at fn. 10) held that: The absence of physical violence does not lessen the restrain- ing effect of Respondent’s conduct. Here . . . [t]he car drivers were faced with the choice of running down the pickets, at the risk of inflicting serious injury, or driving away. This interpo- sition of passive force to prevent employees from going to work is, we believe, a form of restraint proscribed by Section 8(b)(1)(A). Metal Polishers, Local 67, 200 NLRB 335 fn. 10 (1972). See also Service Employees Local 525, supra at 685 (nonviolent conduct that includes prevention of access to employer’s facil- ity violates the Act). The Board has also held that the short duration of prohibited conduct of the type at issue in this case is not a defense. See Longshoremen ILWU Local 6 (Sunset Line & Twine Co.), supra at 1506 (preventing nonstriker’s cars from entering parking lot “for only a short period of time” constituted restraint and coer- cion within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A)). Indeed, the Board has reversed a conclusion that “a delay of one to five minutes under peaceful circumstances hardly constitutes block- ing or barring ingress so as to constitute a violation of the Act.” Instead, the Board held that, “[s]uch a construction is at vari- ance with established Board law.” Metal Polishers, supra at 336. Counsel for the Union argues that the short duration and nature of the conduct in this case rendered it “de minimis.” (R. Br. at p. 5.) This is premised on his acceptance of Della Vella’s testimony that the incident lasted no more than 10 minutes.14 Having found that the entire blocking episode had a duration of approximately 30 minutes, it cannot be seriously contended that it was of too short a duration to be legally cognizable as an unfair labor practice. Finally, the Board has declined to withhold administrative action simply because the conduct at issue implicated the inter- ests of state or local law enforcement. In Service Employees District 1199 (Staten Island University Hospital), 339 NLRB 1059, 1062 (2003), the Board rejected a contention that the employer should have “looked to a state court lawsuit or to the police for assistance, rather than to the Board.” As a result, the fact that the Philadelphia police successfully defused the situa- tion in this case is immaterial. With this background in mind, it is readily apparent that the Union’s conduct in moving from a position by the entrance to the Genesis facility to a location clearly intended to preclude Muth from accessing his worksite to complete a job task and in maintaining that blocking position for approximately 30 min- utes constituted the sort of restraint and coercion made unlaw- 14 Counsel for the Union also suggests that the reference in the police officer’s report of the incident to a 5-minute delay in making the dump supports Della Vella’s estimate. I agree with counsel for the General Counsel’s contrary view. The police officers did not testify. Consider- ing the credible evidence of what transpired and how long it took, I conclude that the police report’s terse mention of a 5-minute period refers to Muth’s final attempt to make his dump under police supervi- sion, not to the duration of the entire incident. ful by Section 8(b)(1)(A). Muth was presented with precisely the type of situation discussed by the Board in Sunset Line & Twine Co., supra. He could either take the risk of inflicting serious bodily injury on the pickets or refrain from accessing the dumpster to complete his task. The imposition of such a dilemma on a nonunion employee is the sort of restraint and coercion prohibited by the Act.15 CONCLUSION OF LAW By moving its pickets into a position designed to preclude an employee of the Company from accessing his worksite in order to complete a work assignment and by maintaining that blocking position for approximately 30 minutes, the Union has engaged in an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. REMEDY Having found that the Union has engaged in an unfair labor practice, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the poli- cies of the Act. The appropriate relief includes the imposition of a cease-and-desist order and the requirement for the posting of a notice. In his complaint, the General Counsel served notice that he would be seeking a broad order requiring the Union to cease and desist from blocking employees’ ingress and egress to job- sites, impeding employees from performing services at their jobsites, or, in any other manner restraining or coercing em- ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. Because it both broadens the types of misconduct enjoined and the scope of coverage to include employees of all employers, this proposed remedy goes beyond the relief that is typically granted. The Board’s power to impose a remedy for unfair labor prac- tices stems from the language of Section 10(c) of the Act, which provides that, upon a finding that a respondent has com- mitted an unfair labor practice, it shall issue “an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of this Act.” The Supreme Court has observed that this is a Congressional grant of authority that is broad and yet rather vague. The Court held that, “at a minimum it encompasses the requirement that a proposed remedy be tailored to the unfair labor practice it is intended to redress.” Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 900 (1984). Put another way, the Court has in- structed that the validity of any remedial measure imposed by the Board must be “examined in light of the appropriateness in the circumstances of [the] case.” NLRB v. Mine Worker Dis- trict 50, 355 U.S. 453, 458 (1958). The Supreme Court has also addressed the standards for im- position of the precise type of relief being sought in this pro- ceeding. In NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 15 Indeed, as I will discuss in another context later in this decision, the Board has determined that a virtually identical blocking episode committed by another official of the Union violated the Act. The inci- dent is described by the Board and the administrative law judge at Electrical Workers Local 98 (MCF Services), 342 NLRB 740, 741, and 751 (2004). ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL 98 (TRI-M GROUP, LLC) 1109 437 (1941), it held that the justification for a broad order must be that its provisions “bear some resemblance to that which the [respondent] has committed or that danger of their commission in the future is to be anticipated from the course of his conduct in the past.” Applying the Court’s teachings, the Board has developed a test for gauging the appropriateness of any request for a broad order. In Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979), a case in- volving violations of the same section of the Act as found here, the Board held that: [A broad] order is warranted only when a respondent is shown to have a proclivity to violate the Act or has engaged in such egregious or widespread misconduct as to demon- strate a general disregard for the employees’ fundamental statutory rights. Accordingly, each case will be analyzed to determine the nature and extent of the violations committed by a respondent so that the Board may tailor an appropriate order. [Footnote omitted.] [Id. at 1357.] It concisely summarized its test by noting that “repeat of- fenders and egregious violators” would be subject to imposition of a broad cease-and-desist order. 242 NLRB at 1357. Very recently, the Board has provided an additional commentary on its Hickmott Foods standard. In Five Star Mfg., 348 NLRB 1301 (2006), it noted that, while considering imposition of a broad order under Hickmott, “the totality of circumstances” must be examined to determine whether the respondent’s be- havior manifests, “an attitude of opposition to the purposes of the Act to protect the rights of employees generally, which would provide an objective basis for enjoining a reasonably anticipated future threat to any of those Section 7 rights.” (In- ternal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Turning to the application of these principles, I begin by not- ing that the General Counsel and the Company do not contend, and the evidence does not establish, that the violation commit- ted in this case, standing alone, was of such an egregious nature as to justify imposition of a broad order. In fact, the violation, while clearly implicating important Section 7 rights, was con- fined to a single episode and employed passive force rather than any form of overt threat or violence. Furthermore, follow- ing intervention by local law enforcement authorities, the Un- ion terminated its unlawful behavior. Thus, imposition of broad relief must be justified, if at all, by an overall determina- tion of whether the Union is a recidivist offender of such mag- nitude as to require an extraordinary response. In order to make this assessment, it is necessary to provide a detailed ac- count of the Union’s past behavior. The record contains the following undisputed documentation regarding the Union’s past misconduct and Della Vella’s unlawful activities on its behalf, with specific focus on those incidents involving behavior similar to that which occurred in this case.16 In 1996, the General Counsel filed a series of com- 16 In his brief, counsel for the Union argues that consideration of prior unlawful acts must be limited to those involving violations of the same section of the Act. (R. Br. at fn. 6.) He cites Teamsters Local 166 (Shank/Balfour Beatty), 327 NLRB 449 (1999). In that case, the Board affirmed a judge’s observation that, “[i]n general,” proclivity must be based on prior adjudications of “similar unlawful conduct in plaints alleging that the Union had engaged in a variety of un- fair labor practices, including the blocking of employees’ in- gress to a facility of Bell Atlantic-Pennsylvania, Inc., and blocking employees’ ingress to two separate construction sites of Lucent Technologies, Inc. (GC Exh. 2(a).) On July 18, 1997, the Board entered an Order premised on a settlement stipulation providing that the Union cease and desist from “[b]locking or impeding the ingress of employees to facilities” of the two employers. The order also directed the Union to cease and desist from threatening employees in various man- ners, videotaping them, or “[p]ushing, surrounding, bumping or spitting on employees.” It also prohibited any like or related violations of the Act directed against employees of Bell or Lu- cent.17 (GC Exh. 2.) On November 25, 1997, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit entered a judgment en- forcing the Board‘s Order. (GC Exh. 3.) On July 7, 1998, an administrative law judge issued a deci- sion finding that, in March 1997, the Union, through its agents, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by physically assaulting employers and destroying their property in the presence of em- ployees and by pushing an employee against a wall. The judge also found other violations of Section 8(b) involving threats and inducements to an employer to cease doing business with an- other entity and unlawful picketing activities designed to ac- complish the same objective. Many of these additional unlaw- ful acts were found to have occurred in October 1997, just 3 months after the Board had entered its order in the previously cited case. In her decision, the judge also granted the General Counsel’s request for a recommendation of a broad cease-and- desist order as to future violations of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(B) and (ii)(B). She explained her reasoning as follows, Electrical Workers Local 98 (Telephone Man), 327 NLRB 593, 602 (1999): the past.” 327 NLRB at 455. In my view, it is important not to confuse “similar” with “identical.” I will consider past adjudications for unlaw- ful picketing activities under any portion of Sec. 8(b). It is the Union’s picketing behavior that is the proper focus of scrutiny. To confine examination only to adjudications under the precise subsection of the statute alleged in this case would be to exalt form over substance and to ignore the Board’s instruction to consider the totality of the relevant circumstances when fashioning an appropriate remedy. See Five Star Mfg., supra. 17 Counsel for the General Counsel submitted copies of portions of the record from this case as an appendix to his brief. The submission was unopposed and I accept it into the record as GC Exh. 2(a). I note that the settlement stipulation contains the following provision: “Re- spondent agrees that for the purpose of determining the proper scope of an order to be entered against it in any future proceeding before the Board or a Court in which the Board or its General Counsel is a party, the Board Order and Court Judgment issued pursuant to this stipulation shall have the same force and effect as a litigated adjudication of the Board enforced by a United States Court that Respondent engaged in the conduct alleged in Complaints One through Three.” (GC Exh. 2(a), settlement stipulation, p. 7.) This provision of the settlement stipula- tion is also cited at Electrical Workers Local 98 (Telephone Man), above at 602. A provision containing this language renders the conduct underlying the settlement agreement cognizable when considering the question of a proclivity to violate the Act. See Teamsters Local 70, 261 NLRB 496, 503 (1982), and Carpenters Local 1622, 262 NLRB 1211 (1982), enf. 786 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1986). DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1110 Respondent’s unlawful actions toward 10 separate neutral employers in a 19-month period, involving picketing, threats to picket, and work stoppages at six locations in the Philadel- phia area, demonstrates Respondent’s proclivity for violating the Act and its general disregard for the fundamental rights of employees and neutral employers. A narrow order, confined to the instant case, would not sufficiently deter further mis- conduct. I therefore recommend that the Board issue a broad order requiring the Respondent to cease and desist from in- fringing in any other manner on rights guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act. [Citations omitted.] The judge’s proposed broad order enjoined the Union from restraining or coercing employees of any employer by engaging in various specified forms of misconduct.18 On February 12, 1999, the Board affirmed the judge’s findings and conclusions and adopted her recommendations, including the broad cease- and-desist provisions. Id. at 593. On September 29, 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued a judgment enforcing the Board’s broad order. (GC Exh. 4.) Just months after the Board issued its decision in Electrical Workers Local 98 (Telephone Man), above, the Union engaged in a series of unlawful acts of the same nature as those alleged in this case.19 In May 1999, it prevented employees of Wohl- son Construction Company from entering or leaving a jobsite. In the following month, Della Vella, on behalf of the Union, threatened to block ingress and egress of a facility of the United Parcel Service. Consistent with these threats, union pickets prevented vehicles from entering and leaving that facility. Two months later, in conduct virtually indistinguishable from the unlawful act committed by the Union in this case, an official of the Union drove his automobile into a position so as to block an employee of MCF Services, Inc., from using a forklift to dump waste into a dumpster. In January 2000, the Union, through Della Vella, engaged in unlawful blocking activity at a worksite of Swartley Brothers Engineers, Inc. Shortly thereafter, in February 2000, Della Vella, again acting as the Union’s agent, gained unauthorized access to a secure worksite of Swartley Brothers. The worksite was at a facility of Verizon Wireless Corp. When asked to leave by a Verizon employee, Della Vella “struck the Verizon employee in the face.” Electrical Workers Local 98 (Swartley Bros. Engineers), 337 NLRB 1270, 1271, and 1273 (2002). On September 12, 2002, the Board issued a decision in this Section 10(k) case involving the Union. Although this involves a dif- ferent sort of proceeding against the Union, it is relevant here for a number of reasons. In Swartley, the Board issued a broad order based on its determination that, “Local 98 has a proclivity to engage in wrongful conduct in order to obtain work similar to the work in dispute in this case.” Id. at 1273. In reaching this conclusion, the Board observed: 18 The judge reported that the General Counsel did not seek a broad remedial order with respect to conduct prohibited by Sec. 8(b)(1)(A). Id. at fn. 6. 19 The unfair labor practices about to be described are all taken from the judge’s findings in Electrical Workers Local 98 (MCF Services), 342 NLRB 740, 757–761 (2004). In this regard, we note not only that the record in this case supports the conclusion that Local 98 has a proclivity to engage in wrongful conduct in order to obtain disputed work, but also that the record in other recent cases before the Board underscores this as well. See, e.g., Electrical Workers Local 98 (Total Cabling Specialists), 337 NLRB 1275 (2002); Electrical Workers Local 98 (NFF Construc- tion, Inc.), 332 NLRB 1262 (2000); Electrical Workers Local 98 (Honeywell, Inc.), 332 NLRB 526 (2000); Elec- trical Workers Local 98 (AIMM, Inc.), 331 NLRB 1075 (2000); Electrical Workers Local 98 (Kastle Security), 324 NLRB 728 (1997); Electrical Workers Local 98 (LaSalle University), 324 NLRB 540 (1997); Electrical Workers Local 98 (Lucent Technologies), 324 NLRB 226 (1997) (Board issues broad areawide award against Local 98 be- cause of likelihood of dispute’s recurrence and union’s proclivity to violate the Act); and Electrical Workers Lo- cal 98 (Lucent Technologies), 324 NLRB 230 (1997) (Board issues broad areawide award against Local 98 be- cause of likelihood of dispute’s recurrence and union’s proclivity to violate the Act). [Id. at fn. 7.] This case is also significant because the Union’s misconduct was committed by Della Vella. Finally, it is noteworthy be- cause the Board took pains to report that, based on its conclu- sion that the misconduct also violated the broad order that it had issued in Electrical Workers Local 98 (Telephone Man), supra, it was pursuing civil contempt proceedings against “both Local 98 and Della Vella.” 337 NLRB at 1273 fn. 7. It con- cluded by emphasizing that, “[t]he Board has now determined that Local 98’s conduct underlying the instant case is in direct contempt of the Third Circuit’s 2001 consent order.” Id. Approximately a year later, on September 16, 2003, the Third Circuit entered a consent order implementing the parties’ stipulation resolving the contempt proceedings against Local 98 and Della Vella. As part of that order, Della Vella was required to pay to the Board the sum of $5000 “representing a compro- mised amount of fines, compensatory damages and/or attor- neys’ fees caused by Della Vella’s failure to comply with the picketing and other provisions of the Court’s prior order.” (CP Exh. 1, consent order, p. 1.) The court further directed that the amount paid by Della Vella could not be reimbursed to him by the Union. It also required the posting of a notice to be “signed by appropriate officers on behalf of Local 98, and by Raymond Della Vella individually.” (CP Exh. 1, consent order, p. 3.) Furthermore, it required that the Union convene a “special meeting of business agents, organizers and officers” at which the notice was to be read aloud. (CP Exh. 1, consent order, p. 3.) Lastly, it established certain procedures designed to provide assurance that any future picketing activity by the Union would be lawful. While all this litigation was underway, the General Counsel was also prosecuting another highly relevant case against Local 98. On June 23, 2000, an administrative law judge issued a decision in Electrical Workers Local 98 (MCF Services), 342 NLRB 740 (2004). The judge’s detailed description of the Union’s conduct is significant for two reasons. First, some of that conduct mirrors the Union’s behavior in the case before ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL 98 (TRI-M GROUP, LLC) 1111 me. For example, as I indicated earlier, the judge reported that an employee: [He] testified that as he drove his forklift to the dumpster [Lo- cal 98 Organizer] Browne drove his vehicle, a black Lincoln Continental, between the forklift and the dumpster . . . Browne kept his car in the same blocking position for about 15–30 minutes, thus preventing him from completing his chore, after which he drove away. [Id. at 751.] The judge credited this testimony and found a violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A).20 He also found additional violations based on misconduct that was similar in nature to the events that tran- spired here, including blocking activity by pickets that pre- vented an employee from “reentering the jobsite after he had exited momentarily to retrieve something from his truck” and preventing employees from driving their vehicles into the en- trance to a worksite. 342 NLRB at 757 and 758. The second reason that MCF Services is of significance to the issue under consideration by me is that, once again, one of the Local 98 officials involved in unlawful picketing activities was Della Vella. As the judge described an employer’s repre- sentative: McGlure asked if Della Vella was going to let any of UPS’ vehicles in or out of the Oregon [Pennsylvania] facility, the latter replied, “No way, no f–king thing’s coming in and out of this building.” . . . . Consistent with Della Vella’s remarks, certain vehicles seeking to enter and leave the Oregon facility were in fact prevented from doing so by Local 98 pickets. [342 NLRB at 760.] The judge found this conduct to be unlawful and formally concluded that, “Local 98 has further violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by blocking the egress and ingress of employees and vehicles at the UPS and PPH jobsites.” Id. at 762. As in Telephone Man, the General Counsel requested that the judge recommend a broad order directed at potential future violations of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act, but did not seek such relief as to possible misconduct in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). The judge, citing the Union’s past history, granted the request, noting that: As evident by its conduct here, Local 98 has not changed its ways. Indeed, Local 98 has, by its conduct herein, demon- strated a deliberate and near contemptuous disregard for the Board’s processes and remedial orders, and has again shown its proclivity to violate the Act a well as a general disregard for the fundamental rights of employees and neutral employ- ers. In these circumstances, a broad order is both appropriate and necessary. [Footnote omitted.] [342 NLRB at 763.] 20 It is worthwhile to note that the judge’s detailed and persuasive reasoning and citation to numerous pertinent authorities regarding the unlawfulness of the Union’s blocking tactics applies equally to the misconduct involved in this case. See Id. at 752. On July 30, 2004, the Board affirmed, in pertinent part, the judge’s findings and conclusions, including the finding that “Browne used his vehicle to block [an employee] from operat- ing a forklift for about 15–30 minutes.” [Footnote omitted.] 342 NLRB at 741. In addition, the Board adopted the judge’s proposed order. That order required that Local 98 cease and desist from: Interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees of em- ployers performing work at the Cheltenham, PPH, and UPS jobsites, or of any other employer, by threatening them with physical harm, photographing them as they enter and leave their workplace, and blocking them and their vehicles from entering or leaving their jobsites or, in any other manner inter- fering with the rights guaranteed to employees by Section 7 of the Act. [342 NLRB at 763.] On September 14, 2006, the Board petitioned the Third Cir- cuit for enforcement of this order. (GC Exh. 5.) That matter is pending.21 With this dismal record of misconduct as background, I must now determine whether the Union has manifested a proclivity to violate the Act because of an attitude among its officials of opposition to the purposes of the Act and a hostility to the Sec- tion 7 rights of nonunion or antiunion employees. See Hick- mott Foods and Five Star Mfg., supra. The Board has repeat- edly found that the Union’s officials have a proclivity to violate a range of provisions of the Act, including participation in con- duct that is essentially identical to the misconduct proven in this case. In decisions upheld by the Board, two judges found that the Union had a “general disregard for the fundamental rights of employees.” See Telephone Man, supra, 327 NLRB at 602, and MCF Services, supra, 342 NLRB at 763, both employ- ing identical language. In addition, the judge in MCF Services noted that the Union had “a deliberate and near contemptuous disregard for the Board’s processes and remedial orders.” 342 NLRB at 763. In response, counsel for the Union cites significant Board precedents establishing the Board’s general unwillingness to impose broad relief based on prior acts of misconduct that oc- curred many years earlier. See Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 243 NLRB 425 (1979) (misconduct committed 6 to 14 years earlier is too remote to warrant broad order); Operating Engi- neers Local 12 (Hensel Phelps), 284 NLRB 246 fn. 2 (1987) (similar); Service Merchandise Co., 299 NLRB 1125 fn. 7 (1990) (similar); Teamsters Local 456 (Peckham Materials), 307 NLRB 612 fn. 4 (1992) (similar). While it has not articu- lated a precise time limit, the Board appears to draw the appro- priate demarcation at the passage of approximately 4 years without evidence of misconduct. Thus, in Plumbers Local 388 21 The fact that this order has not yet been enforced is of some sig- nificance. In Postal Service, 345 NLRB 409 (2005), enf. in pertinent part denied 477 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2007), the Board’s majority rejected an argument that the Board should have initiated contempt proceedings against a violator rather than imposing a broad order. It noted that, “proceeding in contempt was not an option inasmuch as the acts alleged as unfair labor practices here took place prior to the court’s enforce- ment of the order in the prior case.” 345 NLRB 409 at fn. 9. The same would be true here. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1112 (Daily Heating), 280 NLRB 1260, 1280 (1986), it affirmed a judge’s conclusion that a union’s “hiatus in engagement of any illegal activity for 4 to 5 years . . . is a significant intervening period of indicated compliance with the statutory scheme.” Similarly, the Board declined to impose a broad order in Sheet Metal Workers Local 19 (Delcard Associates), 328 NLRB 80 (1999), noting that, although the union had demonstrated a past proclivity to violate the Act, “the Respondent apparently has not violated the Act in any similar respect in the intervening four years.” (Footnote omitted.) In the case before me, the misconduct occurred on June 16, 2006. The most recent related prior misconduct by both the Union in general and Della Vella in particular was found to have taken place on January 4, 2002. Electrical Workers Local 98 (Swartley Bros.), supra at 1271. This represents a period of 4-1/2 years of apparent compliance with the Act. While repre- senting a close question, I conclude that the passage of this period of time insulates the Union from a finding of proclivity based solely on a history of prior misconduct.22 I, nevertheless, conclude that it is necessary and appropriate to recommend the imposition of a broad order in the unique circumstances of this case. I do so for two reasons. First, I take note that labor organizations, just as corporations, are not inde- pendent actors possessed of their own free will. Rather, they operate in the world through the decisions of the human beings who hold the power to direct and control them.23 I have con- sidered this reality in assessing the proper remedy for this vio- lation. I recognize that it would be unfair to overemphasize the meaning of old violations by such an organization in the ab- sence of indications that the attitudes underlying such viola- tions persist among the persons who currently manage their affairs. The converse of such a recognition also applies with equal force. It is particularly appropriate to hold such an or- ganization to account for the harmful attitudes of its officials where the evidence shows continuity of tenure and behavior by those same individuals. Thus, it is of particular probative weight that the “boss” of the pickets who directed and con- trolled the activities that prevented Muth from performing his job was the same person who has a substantial prior history of violations of the Act. (Tr. 69.) The record demonstrates that the Board’s remedial measures have not led to a change of atti- tude on the part of Della Vella. Nor have they resulted in a change in the Union’s decision to entrust Della Vella with the authority and responsibility to supervise its picketing activities. This is a powerful argument for imposition of the strongest 22 In this regard, I recognize that the appropriate standard for assess- ing this issue is a policy concern of the type uniquely entrusted by Congress to the Board. I also note that a period of 4 years is a quantum of time that possesses considerable significance in our society. It repre- sents the customary time during which students are expected to enter and complete both high school and college and is the term fixed for service in various government positions including the presidency of the United States. It is clearly a substantial period in the lifespan of indi- viduals and institutions. 23 See Longshoremen ILWU Local 6 (Sunset Line & Twine Co.), 79 NLRB 1487, 1507–1508 (1948) (“we are to treat labor organizations as legal entities, like corporations, which act, and can only act, through their duly appointed agents”). measures that can reasonably be calculated to deter any further related misconduct by the Union and protect the Section 7 rights of employees. In addition, I find it highly significant that Della Vella’s re- cidivist conduct occurred less than 3 years after the Third Cir- cuit’s entry of a consent order against him. That judgment provided a broad range of rather inventive remedies designed to achieve future compliance with the law. In addition to the pu- nitive sanction, it included strong remedial measures intended to educate the Union’s leaders regarding the manner in which picketing activities must be conducted so as to protect the fun- damental rights of employees under the Act. As counsel for the General Counsel observes: Respondent and Della Vella were also on notice as a result of the Consent Order issued in 2003, even though the conduct underlying that matter did not involve issues of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, that they still [had] to take precautions in conducting any future picketing. (GC Br. at p. 20.) Alas, these measures appear to have been less than fully effective. As I have noted earlier, the Board has very recently stressed the need for a comprehensive assessment of the totality of cir- cumstances when deciding whether a respondent’s attitude of hostility to the purposes of the Act provides a proper basis for imposition of broad relief. Five Star Mfg., supra. In my view, the passage of less than 3 years since the imposition of a con- tempt judgment against the Union, and against Della Vella personally, before the commission of further picketing miscon- duct by them constitutes a compelling circumstance requiring broad relief. In this regard, I agree with counsel for the General Counsel, who cites Electrical Workers Local 3 (Teknion, Inc.), 329 NLRB 337 (1999). In that case, the Board relied “particu- larly” on the fact that the respondent union had consented to entry of judgment against it by the court of appeals and, yet, had committed another related violation “just a little more than 2 years later.” Id. at fn. 2. Standing alone, this history was found to “sufficiently demonstrate[ ] that the Respondent has a proclivity for violating the Act, and thus warrants our adoption of the judge’s recommended broad order.” Id. In concluding that the broadest form of relief consistent with the Act’s remedial purposes is necessary and appropriate in this case, I have placed particular emphasis on the Union’s demon- strated conduct and attitude as manifested through its response to the Third Circuit’s Consent Order and its continued assign- ment of Della Vella to a position of responsibility for picketing activities. In my view, the situation is similar to that presented in Iron Workers Local 378 (N.E. Carlson Construction), 302 NLRB 200 (1991). In Carlson, a case involving picketing con- duct found to be unlawful under Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the Act, the Board modified the judge’s order by substituting broad cease-and-desist language. It noted that the case in- volved the second adjudicated episode of such misconduct. Beyond this, it took special cognizance that the business agent who directed the misconduct in both cases was the same indi- vidual, one Trujillo. In delineating its reasons for imposing a broad order, the Board held that (302 NLRB at 201): ELECTRICAL WORKERS LOCAL 98 (TRI-M GROUP, LLC) 1113 We further find that the Respondent’s violations in this case, considered against the background of similar events in [the prior case] and giving particular emphasis to the behavior of the Respondent’s business agent Trujillo, are so egregious as to manifest a general disregard for the rights of neutral em- ployees and employers. This unlawful conduct convinces us that, without proper restraint, the Respondent is likely to en- gage in similar conduct in the future against employers other than those involved here. Accordingly, a broad remedial or- der is appropriate. [Footnote omitted.] In my view, it is equally likely that Local 98 and its agent, Della Vella, may engage in various types of misconduct against employees of this employer and other employers in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act and in contravention of the Sec- tion 7 rights of employees of this employer and other employ- ers. Finally, in reaching this conclusion, I have weighed the lim- ited nature of the violation in this case and the evidence show- ing that the conduct, standing alone, was not violent or other- wise egregious. While significant, this cannot override the compelling weight of the evidence demonstrating an extensive history of misconduct, an ingrained hostility to the Act’s pur- poses, and a persistent disregard of the remedial measures pre- viously imposed by the Board and the court of appeals. It is those considerations which impel me to recommend imposition of the relief requested by the General Counsel. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended24 ORDER The Respondent, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 98, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Restraining or coercing employees of TRI-M Group, LLC, or any other employer, by blocking them from entering a jobsite or performing a work task. (b) In any other manner restraining or coercing employees of TRI-M Group, LLC, or any other employer, in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act. (a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its un- ion office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached 24. If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom- mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. notice marked “Appendix.”25 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al- tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient copies of the notice for posting by TRI-M Group, LLC, if willing, at all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. (c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. APPENDIX NOTICE TO MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi- ties. WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees of TRI-M Group, LLC, or any other employer, by blocking them from entering a jobsite or performing a work task. WE WILL NOT in any other manner, restrain, or coerce em- ployees of TRI-M Group, LLC, or any other employer, in the exercise of the rights guaranteed to them by Federal labor law. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 98 25 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.”