350 NLRB 1166
Teamsters Local 579 (Chambers & Owen)
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
350 NLRB No. 87
1166
Teamsters Local Union No. 579 affiliated with the
International
Brotherhood
of
Teamsters1
(Chambers & Owen, Inc.) and Brandon M.
Jones. Case 30–CB–4550-1
September 7, 2007
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN, SCHAUMBER, KIRSANOW, AND WALSH
Introduction
This case involves the issue of whether the duty of fair
representation requires a union to provide Beck objectors
with information sufficient to reasonably evaluate the
propriety of the union’s reduced fee calculation before
the objectors decide whether to challenge that calcula-
tion. As discussed below, we agree with the D.C. Circuit
that relevant Supreme Court precedent establishes that
basic considerations of fairness dictate that objectors
receive such information before being forced to pursue a
challenge. Consequently, we overrule extant Board
precedent to the contrary, and find that the Respondent
Union breached its duty of fair representation and vio-
lated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by failing to provide
the requisite information—here, data relating to union
affiliate expenditures—to the objecting charging party.2
Background
The Supreme Court ruled in Communication Workers
v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), that Section 8(a)(3) of the
National Labor Relations Act does not permit a union to
1 We have amended the caption to reflect the disaffiliation of the In-
ternational Brotherhood of Teamsters from the AFL–CIO effective July
25, 2005.
2 Upon a charge filed by Brandon M. Jones on October 29, 2001, the
General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board issued a com-
plaint on August 28, 2003, against Teamsters Local Union No. 579,
affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (the Union),
alleging that it had violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. The Union filed an answer admitting in part and denying in
part the allegations in the complaint.
On November 24, 2003, the Union filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, asking that the Board dismiss the complaint. On December
22, 2003, Jones filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, asking
that the Board find the violation. On January 21, 2004, the Board is-
sued an order transferring the proceeding to the Board and a Notice to
Show Cause why the motions should not be granted. Thereafter, the
Union and Jones filed briefs in support of their motions, and Jones and
the General Counsel filed responses. (The General Counsel initially
opposed the Union’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that
the motion was filed later than 28 days prior to the originally scheduled
December 1 hearing date. See Sec. 102.24(b) of the Board’s Rules and
Regulations. The General Counsel now concedes that he waived his
timeliness argument when he postponed the hearing indefinitely.)
On Dec. 7, 2006, the Charging Party, pursuant to Reliant Energy,
339 NLRB 66 (2003), filed a citation of supplemental authority to
Tomlison v. Kroger Co., 2006 WL 2850523 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (not
reported in F.Supp.2d).
expend funds collected under a union-security provision
on activities unrelated to collective bargaining, contract
administration, or grievance adjustment over the objec-
tion of dues-paying nonmember employees. In Califor-
nia Saw & Knife Works,3 the Board determined that it
would assess unions’ Beck obligations under the duty of
fair representation owed by a union to all members of a
collective-bargaining unit it represents. 320 NLRB at
229–230 and cases cited therein.4 A union breaches its
duty of fair representation if its actions are arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, or in bad faith. Id.
The Board in California Saw emphasized that the
touchstone for determining the adequacy of a union’s
notice to nonmember employees is the Supreme Court’s
decision in Chicago Teachers Union Local 1 v. Hudson,
475 U.S. 292 (1986), quoting the Court’s statement that
“‘[b]asic considerations of fairness, as well as concern
for the First Amendment rights at stake . . . dictate that
the potential objectors be given sufficient information to
gauge the propriety of the union’s fee.’” 320 NLRB at
232–233 (quoting Hudson, 475 U.S. at 306). Although
Hudson involved public sector nonmember employees,
the Board recognized that Hudson was premised on basic
fairness considerations that also clearly applied to a un-
ion’s statutory obligations under the duty of fair repre-
sentation. 320 NLRB at 232–233.5
Applying the animating principles of Hudson, the
Board in California Saw held that a union acts arbitrarily
and in bad faith, in breach of its duty of fair representa-
tion and in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A), when it fails
to inform employees of their Beck rights before it obli-
gates them to pay union dues. Id. The Board further held
that the union’s notice obligation includes informing
employees that they will be provided sufficient informa-
tion to enable them to intelligently decide whether to
object to paying for union activities not germane to the
union’s statutory duties. The Board added that the duty
3 320 NLRB 224 (1995), enfd. sub nom. Machinists v. NLRB, 133
F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom. Strang v. NLRB, 525
U.S. 813 (1998).
4 The Board in California Saw noted that the Board and courts have
applied the duty of fair representation “as refined in [Air Line Pilots v.
O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991)]” to a variety of circumstances, includ-
ing Beck issues. Id. at 230 fn. 34. In O’Neill, the Court described the
duty of fair representation as akin to the duty owed by other fiduciaries
to their beneficiaries, likening it to the duty a trustee owes to trust bene-
ficiaries, an attorney owes to clients, or a corporate officer and director
owes to shareholders. The Court also analogized the union’s role to that
of a legislature. It cautioned, however, that, although a union’s conduct
is given wide latitude, like a legislature it is subject to review of the
rationality of its actions. 499 U.S. at 74–76 (citations omitted).
5 See also Thomas v. NLRB, 213 F.3d 651, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (cit-
ing Abrams v. Communications Workers of America, 59 F.3d 1373,
1379 fn. 7 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 579 (CHAMBERS & OWEN INC.)
1167
of fair representation compels unions to disclose certain
specific information to employees who have exercised
their right to object: the percentage of the reduction, the
basis for the calculation, and the right to challenge these
figures. 320 NLRB at 233.6
Subsequently, in Teamsters Local 166 (Dyncorp Sup-
port Services), 327 NLRB 950 (1999) (Dyncorp I),7 the
Board directly confronted the issue of whether Hudson
required a union to identify affiliates that received certain
designated “per capita” sums from the union, and to pro-
vide a breakdown of these entities’ expenditures in ad-
vance of a challenge to the union’s reduced dues and fees
calculation. The Board determined that it did not, holding
that the union fulfilled its duty of fair representation by
providing objectors with information regarding the major
categories of its expenditures and the percentages of each
category that the union deemed chargeable. 327 NLRB at
954. Conceding that Hudson could be read to the con-
trary, the Dyncorp I Board sought to distinguish the facts
of that case. Specifically, the Board noted that in Hudson
the union paid more than half its income to its affiliates but
told objectors nothing about how the transferred income
was spent or what percentages were chargeable or non-
chargeable. In contrast, the union in Dyncorp I spent only
about 25 percent of its budget on its affiliates. Id.
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit reversed,
finding Hudson to be dispositive without regard to the
amount the union paid to its affiliates. As the court ex-
plained, “Hudson’s directive is quite simple: unless a
union demonstrates that ‘none of [the amount paid to
affiliates] was used to subsidize activities for which
nonmembers may not be charged,’ then ‘an explanation
of the share that was so used [is] surely required.’” Pen-
rod v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 41, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting
Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307 fn. 18) (alterations in Penrod).
Ruling on Motions for Summary Judgment
I. ADMITTED OR UNDISPUTED FACTS
The undisputed complaint allegations and parties’
submissions establish that since October 25, 1973, the
Union has been the certified exclusive collective-
6 We have used the term “objector” to refer to a nonmember em-
ployee who has objected to a union’s expenditure of dues for purposes
unrelated to bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjust-
ment. We have used the term “challenger” to refer to those objectors
who challenge the union’s figures in calculating the reduction in dues.
A stage one notice is sent to all unit employees informing them, inter
alia, of their right to be nonmembers and to file Beck objections. A
stage two notice is sent to those nonmembers who have filed objec-
tions. A stage three notice is sent to those objectors who challenge a
union’s figures and percentages calculated at the second stage. The
instant case deals with the information to be supplied at stage two.
7 Enforcement denied sub nom. Penrod v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 41 (D.C.
Cir. 2000), decision on remand 333 NLRB 1145 (2001) (Dyncorp II).
bargaining representative of the warehouse employees of
Chambers & Owen, Inc. The Union and the Employer
were parties to a collective-bargaining agreement that
was effective from October 1, 2000, through September
30, 2004. The agreement contained the following union-
security provision:
Section 1. All present employees covered by this
Agreement who are members of the Union on the ef-
fective date of this provision, shall remain members in
good standing as a condition of employment. All pre-
sent employees who are not members of the Union on
the effective date of this provision and all employees
who are hired hereafter, shall become financial core or
full members and remain financial core or full mem-
bers of the Union in good standing as a condition of
employment on and after the 31st day following the
beginning of their employment or on and after the 31st
day following the effective date of this provision,
whichever is the later. Upon receipt of written notice
from the Union that an employee has failed to become
financial core or full members [sic] or remain financial
core or full members [sic] in good standing, the Em-
ployer shall discharge said employee within seven (7)
days, provided such discharge is not contrary to appli-
cable law.
On March 17, 2001, Charging Party Jones, who was
covered by the union-security provision, resigned his
membership in the Union and notified it that he objected
to paying dues and fees for nonrepresentational activities.
On March 30, 2001, the Union, by letter, informed Jones
that it was reducing his fee obligation from $24 to $22.96
per month. The Union also notified Jones of its proce-
dure for objecting to nonchargeable expenses and for
challenging its calculation of chargeable and noncharge-
able expenses, and supplied a copy of its 1999 audit with
the report of its independent auditors.
The 1999 audit provided a schedule of the Union’s ex-
penditures, $426,063 in total, broken down by major
categories and the percentages of each category that the
Union considered chargeable and nonchargeable. One of
the categories was “per capita taxes” paid to affiliates:
the International Brotherhood of Teamsters ($66,541),
Joint Council No. 39 ($20,226), and “Others” ($463).
The expenditure paid to each affiliate was divided into
chargeable and nonchargeable amounts (with the amount
paid to “Others” deemed entirely nonchargeable). In an
explanatory note, the Union’s auditors stated that the
allocation of the International’s expenditures was deter-
mined by percentages provided by the International,
“which were 88% chargeable and 12% nonchargeable.”
As to the payments made to the Joint Council, the audi-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1168
tors noted that “[p]er capita taxes paid to Joint Council
No. 39 were based on an allocation of chargeable ex-
penses and nonchargeable expenses.”
On March 31, 2001, Jones sent the Union a letter reit-
erating his Beck objection and requesting that the Union
charge him only for representational activities. The letter
also requested notification, verified by an independent
certified public accountant, of how the charges were cal-
culated; the Union’s procedure for holding his fees in
escrow; and an opportunity to challenge the Union’s cal-
culations before an impartial decisionmaker. The Union
did not correspond further with Jones on this issue.
II. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES
The complaint alleges that the Union failed to provide
Jones with an adequate explanation as to the breakdown
of the chargeable and nonchargeable expenses of the
affiliated organizations with which the Union shares in-
come from dues and fees.
The Union contends that the complaint should be dis-
missed because it fulfilled its duty of fair representation
by providing Jones with sufficient information to decide
whether to challenge its fee calculation, and, specifically,
because it met the requirements of the Board’s decision
in Dyncorp I, supra, by providing Jones with its major
categories of expenditures and the portions of each cate-
gory that the Union considered representational and non-
representational. The Union contends that, under Dyn-
corp I, it had no legal duty, absent a challenge to its prof-
fered reduced dues and fees calculation, to provide fur-
ther information of its affiliates’ expenditures.
The General Counsel and Jones assert that the Union’s
position is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hudson, supra. They argue that Hudson requires unions
to provide Beck objectors with separate financial disclo-
sures for each affiliate with which they share funds de-
rived from nonmember objectors’ dues and fees. The
General Counsel and Jones urge the Board to overrule
Dyncorp I and follow the District of Columbia Circuit’s
decision in Penrod.8
Analysis
A. Appropriateness of Summary Judgment
The parties agree that there is no dispute as to the rele-
vant facts concerning the communications between the
Union and Jones or the information provided to Jones by
8 In its response to the Board’s Notice to Show Cause, the Union ar-
gues that the Penrod court wrongly applied Hudson to private sector
unions, reiterating that its disclosure to Jones of the percentage reduc-
tion in his dues and fees was sufficient to satisfy its duty of fair repre-
sentation because it was not arbitrary, discriminatory, or irrational. In
the Union’s view, its conduct need only be found reasonable to with-
stand scrutiny under that standard.
the Union. Although the Union initially denied a number
of the complaint allegations in its answer, the parties’
motions and supporting documents clearly indicate that
they do not in fact disagree as to the material facts in this
case. See, e.g., Heritage at Norwood, 322 NLRB 231,
232 (1996); Biewer Wisconsin Sawmill, Inc., 306 NLRB
732 (1992). We therefore find that, in the absence of
genuine issues of material fact requiring a hearing before
an administrative law judge, summary judgment is ap-
propriate. Marble Polishers Local 47-T (Grazzini Bros.),
315 NLRB 520, 522 (1994).
B. Merits
The issue before us, as stated above, is whether the
Union was required to provide Jones, a nonmember Beck
objector, with information concerning its affiliates’ ac-
tivities and the extent to which those activities were
chargeable or nonchargeable prior to Jones’ filing a chal-
lenge to the Union’s reduced dues and fees calculation.
Under current Board law, a union must provide objectors
at the second stage of the Beck objection procedure with
a list of the major categories of its expenditures, the
amount spent in each category, a declaration as to which
expenditures are chargeable and which are not, and the
percentage figures for chargeable versus nonchargeable
expenditures. However, under current Board law, a un-
ion that pays per capita taxes to its affiliates is not re-
quired at the second stage to provide Beck objectors with
information pertaining to how its affiliates determined
the chargeability to the objectors of the per capita taxes
that the affiliates received and spent. The Board’s view
has been that this information need be provided only
after the objector enters the third stage of the Beck objec-
tion procedure by filing a challenge to the information
that he or she received at the second stage. We now hold
that this affiliate information must be furnished to a Beck
objector at the second stage so that he or she can deter-
mine whether to file a challenge.9 Thus, for example, if
the union’s affiliate expended 60 percent of the per-
capita tax money on matters that the affiliate deemed
chargeable, and 40 percent on matters that the affiliate
deemed nonchargeable, the union would be required to
disaggregate the affiliate’s expenditures into major cate-
gories and to break down each category into chargeable
and nonchargeable percentages—just as it must do for its
own expenditures. It would not be sufficient to simply
state that 60 percent of the per-capita tax money was
9 Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, we are not dispensing with the
three-stage process governing disclosure of information under Califor-
nia Saw. See fn. 6, above. We simply hold that the information at issue
here must be provided at the second stage.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 579 (CHAMBERS & OWEN INC.)
1169
spent on chargeable matters and 40 percent on non-
chargeable matters.
Under extant Board law, duty of fair representation
principles govern a union’s obligations in the Beck con-
text.10 It is well settled that a union breaches its duty of
fair representation if its actions are arbitrary, discrimina-
tory, or taken in bad faith. Though a “wide range of rea-
sonableness” may be accorded to a statutory bargaining
representative, that range is not unlimited—a union may
not engage in conduct that is irrational or arbitrary.11 We
find that where, as here, a union procedure purporting to
implement Beck actually impedes a nonmember em-
ployee from exercising his Beck rights and interferes
with the statutory right under Section 7 to refrain from
assisting a union, this conduct is unreasonable and arbi-
trary and, hence, violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) as well
as the union’s duty of fair representation.
We recognize that the Supreme Court in Hudson did
not measure a union’s obligations to nonmember em-
ployees using duty of fair representation principles.
Rather, the Court recognized in the public employment
setting that the agency shop was a significant infringe-
ment on First Amendment rights. However, as the Board
observed in California Saw, 320 NLRB at 233, the Court
also relied on “[b]asic considerations of fairness” in em-
phasizing the fundamental importance of providing ade-
quate information regarding dues and fees reductions to
nonmember objectors:
Basic considerations of fairness, as well as concern for
the First Amendment rights at stake, also dictate that
the potential objectors be given sufficient information
to gauge the propriety of the union’s fee. Leaving the
nonunion employees in the dark about the source of
the figure for the agency fee—and requiring them to
object in order to receive information—does not
adequately protect [the nonunion employees’
rights].12
The Court rejected unequivocally the contention that objec-
tors’ rights could adequately be protected by requiring them
to challenge unions’ reduced fee computations in order to
10 Member Schaumber applies California Saw as extant Board law,
though he questions the appropriateness of assessing union conduct that
may impinge on fundamental Sec. 7 rights under the duty of fair repre-
sentation, which has been broadly defined in some contexts.
11 Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953), quoted in
O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 78.
12 475 U.S. at 306 (emphasis added). As the Board noted in Dyncorp
I, when the Court in Hudson referred to “potential objectors,” it evi-
dently meant nonmember employees who were already paying reduced
dues and fees and who might “object” to the union’s allocations and
dues reductions—i.e., individuals
whom the Board would call poten-
tial challengers. 327 NLRB at 952 fn. 10.
receive detailed information concerning the use of their dues
and fees. As to affiliate expenditures, the Court specifically
held that “either a showing that none of [the money paid to
affiliates] was used to subsidize activities for which non-
members may not be charged, or an explanation of the
share that was so used was surely required.” Id. at 307 fn.
18 (emphasis added).
We agree with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Hud-
son, and find, as the District of Columbia Circuit did in
Penrod, that Hudson is dispositive of the issue before us.
The dissent’s reasoning that an objecting nonmember can
always receive the information he requires by “simply
challenging” the union’s calculations ignores the Hudson
decision and misses the mark. The reason for requiring
adequate disclosure to Beck objectors is so that they can
decide whether to challenge the union’s fee calculations.
As the Supreme Court observed, and contrary to the dis-
sent, that purpose would be thwarted by keeping objec-
tors in the dark and requiring them to challenge the un-
ion’s figures. Although, as the dissent notes, unions gen-
erally enjoy a wide range of reasonableness under the
duty of fair representation standard, that range does not
extend to conduct that contravenes Hudson and denies to
nonmember objectors information essential to the exer-
cise of their Beck and statutory rights. Nor can we agree,
in light of the plain language of Hudson, that it is appro-
priate to engage in the balancing analysis advocated by
the dissent. Accordingly, we find that the Union acted
arbitrarily in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and its duty
of fair representation in failing to provide Jones with the
information he requested as to how the Union’s affiliates
apportioned their funds.13
Although we decline to engage in a balancing analysis,
there is little reason to believe that the administrative
burdens faced by unions in complying with Beck and
Hudson by providing affiliate expenditure data will
prove particularly onerous. Private sector unions have
long known that they may charge nonmember objectors
only for representational activities, and that unions must
account to objectors for the way they spend their dues
money. In turn, advances in computer and internet tech-
nology over the last decade have facilitated compliance
with disclosure requirements under the Board’s Beck
decisions, and other regulatory disclosure requirements
already require unions to publicly report the sort of in-
formation involved here.14 Consequently, there is little
13 The dissent correctly acknowledges that we make no finding that
the Union’s failure to provide the necessary information is either dis-
criminatory or in bad faith.
14 For example, in 2003, the U.S. Department of Labor revised Form
LM-2 (used by unions to fulfill their reporting requirements under the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 401
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1170
reason to believe that the Union and its affiliates cannot
readily assemble information regarding the affiliates’
major categories of expenditures and the percentages of
each category that are considered chargeable and non-
chargeable. Indeed, the Union concedes that its financial
core rate was based in part on an actual audit of the In-
ternational’s expenditures.
The dissent would nevertheless adhere to the Board’s
decision in Dyncorp I that the union was not required, at
the objection stage, to “disaggregate” per capita expendi-
tures by either identifying the specific recipients or pro-
viding a breakdown of those entities’ expenditures. As
noted above, the Board’s decision in Dyncorp I is fun-
damentally inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
Moreover, the Board in that case failed to recognize that
“per capita” is not a specific category of expenditures. It
is instead merely an acknowledgment that not insubstan-
tial sums of money from dues and fees (some 20 percent
of the Union’s income) were transferred to other entities,
with no indication as to how those entities spent the
money. In this respect, “per capita” is categorically dif-
ferent from categories such as “salaries,” which inform
Beck objectors of the nature of the expenditure. Here,
even though the Union disclosed the percentages of af-
filiates’ overall expenditures it deemed to be chargeable
and nonchargeable, Jones knew nothing else about those
expenditures. Just as the Union’s providing Jones with
percentage figures reflecting its determinations of its
own total chargeable and nonchargeable expenditures
would have been insufficient, providing the same general
percentage figures for its affiliates, without providing
supporting information about the purposes for which the
assertedly chargeable amount will be expended, is also
inadequate. Cf. Hudson, 475 U.S. at 307 (“An acknowl-
edgement that nonmembers would not be required to pay
any part of 5% of the [u]nion’s total annual expenditures
was not an adequate disclosure of the reasons why they
were required to pay their share of 95%.”). In sum,
while we do not dispute that, under California Saw, a
union fulfills its duty of fair representation by disclosing
its major categories of expenditures to objectors, we con-
et seq.) to require unions to disclose the amount of their disbursements
for all representational activities (that is, contract negotiations, contract
administration, and organizing). In commenting on its expansion of
reporting requirements, the Department of Labor found that
there have been advances in technology (including its availability and
application) in the last 10 years, as computers and financial manage-
ment programs have become much more widely used.
. . . .
These changes make it possible to provide substantially more informa-
tion to union members and the public with less burden on unions....
68 Fed. Reg. 58,374, 58393 (2003).
clude that this disclosure requirement is not met when a
union fails to “explain how its affiliates used the money.”
Penrod, 203 F.3d at 47.
The dissent contends that Hudson is not controlling au-
thority because it did not arise in a private sector setting,
it was not decided under duty of fair representation prin-
ciples, and it preceded the Board’s view expressed in
California Saw and Dyncorp I. We are unpersuaded by
that argument. As noted above, the Court in Hudson
stressed that its holding was based on “[b]asic consid-
erations of fairness, as well as concern for the First
Amendment rights at stake[.]” 475 U.S. at 306 (empha-
sis added). Although Hudson itself did not apply duty of
fair representation principles, the Board in a number of
cases, pertinently California Saw and Dyncorp I, refer-
enced and relied on the Hudson fairness requirement in
assessing whether a union’s efforts to comply with Beck
met its duty of fair representation. Moreover, the District
of Columbia Circuit in Penrod rejected the Board’s at-
tempt to distinguish Hudson, finding it dispositive in
addressing a union’s requirement under duty of fair rep-
resentation principles to provide information to Beck
objectors. 203 F.3d at 46–47. Where, as here, we are
dealing with an employee’s Section 7 right to refrain
from union activities, we believe that the concept of
“fairness” fits comfortably within the duty of fair repre-
sentation. We therefore agree with the Supreme Court
that Beck objectors need information concerning affili-
ates’ expenditures in order to decide intelligently
whether to challenge unions’ dues reduction computa-
tions. Thus, even if Hudson does not compel Dyncorp
I’s overruling, our holding would be the same.15
Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, we hold that unions must
disclose to Beck objectors, at the objection stage and
prior to receipt of a challenge, the identity of affiliates
with which they share income from dues and fees, the
amounts of income shared, the expenditures of each af-
filiate broken down by major categories, the percentages
of each such category that the unions allocate to charge-
able and nonchargeable expenses, and a detailed explana-
tion of how the affiliates’ expense allocations were cal-
culated.16 We overrule Dyncorp I, supra, and Schreiber
15 Our colleagues speculate that the Supreme Court “might. . . afford
Chevron deference to the Board’s holding [in Dyncorp I].”
In re-
sponse, we note that the D.C. Circuit found that “a portion of [Dyncorp
I was] unsupported by reasoned decisionmaking and the remainder
[was] in conflict with Supreme Court and circuit precedent. . . ” 203
F.3d at 43. In any event, even assuming arguendo that our colleagues’
speculation would prove true, we think that it is at least as likely, if not
more so, that the Supreme Court would accord Chevron deference to
our view expressed herein.
16 See Dyncorp II, 333 NLRB at 1146.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 579 (CHAMBERS & OWEN INC.)
1171
Foods, 329 NLRB 28, 31 fn. 10 (1999), insofar as they
hold to the contrary.
By failing to inform Jones of the major categories of
expenditures of the affiliates with which it shares income
from dues and fees, the percentages of each such cate-
gory of each affiliate that the Union allocates to charge-
able and nonchargeable expenses, and a detailed explana-
tion of how the affiliates’ expense allocations were cal-
culated, the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.
We therefore deny the Union’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and grant Jones’ Cross-Motion for Summary
Judgment.
REMEDY
Having found that the Union violated Section
8(b)(1)(A), we shall order it to cease and desist and to
provide Brandon M. Jones with the following informa-
tion regarding its affiliates’ expenditures for 1999: the
major categories of expenditures of each of the affiliates
with which it shared income from dues and fees, the per-
centages of each such category of each affiliate that it
allocated to chargeable and nonchargeable expenses, and
a detailed explanation of how the affiliates’ expense allo-
cations were calculated.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Teamsters Local Union No. 579, affiliated
with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, its offi-
cers, agents, and representatives, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing to inform objecting nonmembers under
Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988),
from whom it seeks to collect dues and fees, of the fol-
lowing at the objection stage: the major categories of
expenditures of each of its affiliates with which it shares
income from dues and fees, the percentages of each such
category of each affiliate that it allocates to chargeable
and nonchargeable expenses, and a detailed explanation
of how the affiliates’ expense allocations were calcu-
lated.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc-
ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Provide Brandon M. Jones with the following in-
formation for 1999: the major categories of expenditures
of each of its affiliates with which it shared income from
dues and fees, the percentages of each such category of
each affiliate that it allocated to chargeable and non-
chargeable expenses, and a detailed explanation of how
the affiliates’ expense allocations were calculated.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its union hall offices copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”17
Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 30, after
being signed by the Union’s authorized representative,
shall be posted by the Union and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees and members are customar-
ily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Union
to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or cov-
ered by any other material.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Union has taken to comply.
MEMBERS LIEBMAN AND WALSH, dissenting.
In analyzing the duty of fair representation in the Beck1
context, the California Saw Board recognized the fine
line unions must walk in balancing the interests of indi-
vidual members against those of the entire bargaining
unit and explained the Board’s responsibility in cases
like this one:
We view it as our charge to bring the values of reason-
ableness and practicality into our own considerations of
the facts of each case. We are mindful of the tension
between individual, collective, and public policy inter-
ests that lies at the core of the duty of fair representa-
tion. What is required here is a careful balance be-
tween the competing interests involved. “Most fair
representation cases require great sensitivity to the
tradeoffs between the interests of the bargaining unit as
a whole and the rights of individuals.”
California Saw & Knife Works, 320 NLRB 224, 230 (1995)
(footnote omitted; quoting Breininger v. Sheet Metal Work-
ers, 493 U.S. 67, 77 (1989)), enfd. sub nom. Machinists v.
NLRB, 133 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied sub nom.
Strang v. NLRB, 525 U.S. 813 (1998). Applying these prin-
ciples, and consistent with the Board’s unanimous holding
in the first Dyncorp Support Services2 decision, we would
find that a union has no legal duty to inform Beck objectors
of the activities of its affiliates with which it shares income
from dues and fees, or of the percentage of each activity that
it considers chargeable and nonchargeable. Rather, we
17 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
1 Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
2 327 NLRB 950 (1999) (Dyncorp I), review granted sub nom. Pen-
rod v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2000), decision on remand 333
NLRB 1145 (2001) (Dyncorp II).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1172
would require such disclosures only after a challenge has
been filed to the union’s reduced fee calculations. Accord-
ingly, we dissent.
I.
Current Board law reflects the proper balance between
the competing interests implicated in this case.
A.
In California Saw, supra, the Board reviewed a range
of issues concerning the rights and duties under union-
security clauses authorized by Section 8(a)(3) that had
been left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Beck.
The Board decided that it would assess unions’ Beck
obligations under the duty of fair representation owed by
a union to all members of a collective-bargaining unit it
represents. A union breaches this duty only when its
conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Air
Line Pilots v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991); Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967); California Saw, 320
NLRB at 229. Under that standard, a union is granted “a
wide range of reasonableness” in fulfilling its obligations
to the employees it represents. Ford Motor Co. v. Huff-
man, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953).
Applying these principles, the Board in California Saw
established a three-step sequential procedure for union
disclosure of information to employees under Beck:
(1) New employees and financial core payors
(i.e., dues-paying nonmembers) are informed of their
rights under Beck and how to exercise them;
(2) Nonmember employees who object to having
their dues pay for the union’s nonrepresentational
activities (Beck objectors) are told the amount of the
reduced fee calculation, how it was calculated, and
their right to challenge these figures; and
(3) Objectors who challenge the union’s calcula-
tion receive more information.
California Saw, 320 NLRB at 233, 240.
Thus, the employees’ action triggers the unions’ duty
to provide the information. The California Saw regime
efficiently balances the competing interests involved
here, by relating the union’s duty to provide the informa-
tion against the employees’ need for the requested infor-
mation.
B.
The Board in Dyncorp I followed the California Saw
framework, by reiterating that unions must inform Beck
objectors only of their major spending categories and the
percentages of each category that are chargeable and
nonchargeable:
While unions should not aggregate information in gen-
eral categories to such an extent that it would be un-
helpful to objectors who are trying to decide whether to
challenge a union’s calculations, at the same time it is
obvious that unions must be able to aggregate their ex-
penses to some degree if they are to keep their disclo-
sures to a manageable length.
327 NLRB at 954.
Relying on this rationale, the Board found that a union,
at the objection stage, is not required by its duty of fair
representation to identify its affiliates with which it
shares income from dues and fees, provide a breakdown
of the affiliates’ expenditures, or explain how it arrived
at its estimates of chargeable and nonchargeable expendi-
tures. Id.
Under Dyncorp I, then, unions are not burdened with a
duty to disclose detailed information at the objection
stage, while Beck objectors are given sufficient major
spending category information to decide whether to chal-
lenge the union’s calculations. Objecting employees can
always request more detailed information, including the
kind at issue here, by simply challenging the union’s
calculations of chargeability. Indeed, if the Beck objec-
tor here had simply challenged the Union’s figures, he
presumably would have already received the information
concerning affiliates’ expenditures. Once challenged, the
union has the burden to justify all of its claimed expendi-
tures, including those of affiliates, and the percentages of
each that are chargeable and nonchargeable.3
C.
The procedure announced in California Saw and applied
in Dyncorp I appropriately balances unions’ interest in
administrative economy and efficiency and Beck objec-
tors’ need for information concerning the expenditures of
affiliates with which unions share income from dues and
fees. California Saw set up an efficient process that re-
duced unnecessary expense and effort on the part of a un-
ion by imposing a minimal burden on an individual.
Although the administrative burden of retrieving this
information from affiliates may not be overwhelming, it
is still a substantial burden on unions—especially on
local unions, which typically have few resources to de-
vote to such tasks.4 By contrast, the burden on objectors
in obtaining this information—writing a brief challenge
letter—is exceedingly slight. In our view, then, unions
should not be burdened with obtaining and producing the
3 California Saw, 320 NLRB at 240; Dyncorp I, 327 NLRB at 954.
The Dyncorp I analysis also considered whether there was evidence
that the union was attempting to conceal nonchargeable expenses
among chargeable expenses. Id. There is no such allegation here.
4 Cf. California Saw, 320 NLRB at 250 (local unions are independ-
ent entities from affiliated district and international bodies).
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 579 (CHAMBERS & OWEN INC.)
1173
information if objectors do not want it badly enough to
make the minimal effort of asking for it.
Because a union’s interest in administrative economy
and efficiency outweighs the interest of Beck objectors in
obtaining information about union affiliates’ expendi-
tures at the objection stage, we would find here that the
Union’s failure to give that information to objector Jones
was not “arbitrary”—it was not “so far outside a ‘wide
range of reasonableness’. . . that it is wholly irrational”5
—and thus did not violate the duty of fair representation
or Section 8(b)(1)(A).
II.
The majority adopts the view of the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in Penrod6 that the Supreme Court’s decision
in Hudson requires the disclosure of the affiliate informa-
tion at the objection stage. In our view, the majority
commits two major errors.
First, the majority errs in relying so heavily on the Su-
preme Court’s opinion in Hudson. Hudson was a case
involving a public sector union; it was decided under the
First Amendment. True, the Supreme Court held that
“basic considerations of fairness,” as well as First
Amendment concerns, required an explanation of how
payments to affiliates were used. But the Court did not
purport to decide the case under duty of fair representa-
tion principles.7 Nor did it have occasion to interpret the
National Labor Relations Act. Accordingly, we are not
persuaded that the Court meant for the quoted statement
to be an authoritative pronouncement on how the duty of
fair representation or the NLRA applies to these kinds of
disclosures. We disagree, then, with the majority’s con-
clusion that “Hudson’s concept of ‘fairness’ fits com-
fortably within the duty of fair representation.” The
majority simply dispenses with the carefully calibrated
three-step process of California Saw and Dyncorp I in
favor of an ad hoc application of one phrase used in
Hudson.8
5 Air Line Pilots v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. at 78, citing Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, supra.
There is no contention that the Union’s conduct was
discriminatory, and the fact that it actually gave Jones more informa-
tion than it was required to (the names of its affiliates) negates any
possible contention that it acted in bad faith.
6 Penrod v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
7 See Thomas v. NLRB, supra, 213 F.3d at 662 .
8 Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, we think it unlikely that the
Supreme Court would choose to take this step in passing on a case that,
unlike Hudson, arose in a private sector workplace devoid of any state
action implicating the constitutional rights of individual workers. In-
deed, since introducing the duty of fair representation more than 60
years ago in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railway Co., 323 U.S. 192
(1944), the Court has applied the doctrine in subsequent cases only
after thorough analysis (see discussion in California Saw, 320 NLRB at
228–230). We doubt that the Court in Hudson meant to introduce such
an important new application of this doctrine in the offhand manner
Second, even if that is what the Supreme Court meant,
the majority ignores the strong possibility that the Court
might, on considering the Board’s contrary view ex-
pressed in Dyncorp I, afford Chevron deference to the
Board’s holding. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). For exam-
ple, in Machinists v. NLRB, supra, 133 F.3d 1012, the
Seventh Circuit declined to be bound by its own prece-
dents after the Board in California Saw had ruled to the
contrary on one issue. Observing that its earlier decision
had been handed down without input from the Board, the
court in Machinists v. NLRB upheld the Board’s decision
under a Chevron deferral analysis. Id. at 1019–1020,
citing Chevron, supra. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit ob-
served that the job of devising rules to implement Beck is
one for which the Board is uniquely well suited:
All the details necessary to make the rule of Beck op-
erational were left to the Board subject to the very light
review authorized by Chevron. It is hard to think of a
task more suitable for an administrative agency that
specializes in labor relations, and less suitable for a
court of general jurisdiction, than crafting the rules for
translating the generalities of the Beck decision (more
precisely, of the statute as authoritatively construed in
Beck) into a workable system for determining and col-
lecting agency fees.
Id. at 1015. Accord: Thomas v. NLRB, 213 F.3d 651, 657
(D.C. Cir. 2000).
Hudson was decided 2 years before Beck. Thus, when
the Court decided Hudson, it had not even held that un-
ions subject to the NLRA were required to reduce dues
and fees for nonmember objectors, let alone ruled on the
extent of information that those unions must provide to
objectors. Not only did the Court not decide Hudson
under duty of fair representation principles, it rendered
its decision before the Board had even considered the
issues presented in that case. Accordingly, as the Sev-
enth Circuit did in Machinists, supra, the Court might
well alter the view expressed in Hudson, after consider-
ing the Board’s decision in Dyncorp I.
III.
In sum, instead of applying Hudson mechanically, we
would continue to follow Board precedent in California
Saw and Dyncorp I, as establishing a reasonable, worka-
ble approach to the disclosure issue. Under that ap-
proach, we would dismiss the complaint.
ascribed to it by the majority, without even a passing reference to estab-
lished duty of fair representation standards.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1174
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist any union
Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf
with your employer
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.
WE WILL NOT fail to inform objecting nonmembers
under Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735
(1988), from whom we seek to collect dues and fees, of
the following at the objection stage: the major categories
of expenditures of each of our affiliates with which we
share income from dues and fees, the percentages of each
such category of each affiliate that we allocate to charge-
able and nonchargeable expenses, and a detailed explana-
tion of how the affiliates’ expense allocations were cal-
culated.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or
coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above.
WE WILL provide Brandon M. Jones with the following
information for 1999: the major categories of expendi-
tures of each of our affiliates with which we share in-
come from dues and fees, the percentages of each such
category of each affiliate that we allocated to chargeable
and nonchargeable expenses, and a detailed explanation
of how the affiliates’ expense allocations were calcu-
lated.
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 579, AFFILIATED
WITH THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS