351 NLRB 1234
Goddard Riverside Community Center, 02-UC-00583
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
351 NLRB No. 84
1234
Goddard Riverside Community Center and Local 74,
SEIU. Case 2–UC–583
December 28, 2007
DECISION ON REVIEW AND ORDER REMANDING
BY MEMBERS LIEBMAN, KIRSANOW, AND WALSH
This case raises the issue of whether the Board will en-
tertain a unit clarification petition to exclude a histori-
cally included classification, now alleged to be supervi-
sory, where the parties had previously entered into a
stipulated election agreement that did not specifically
include or exclude the disputed position. Having care-
fully considered the matter, we find, contrary to the Re-
gional Director, that the petition may be processed. Ac-
cordingly, we reinstate the petition and remand this case
to the Regional Director for further processing.1
Facts
The Employer is a settlement house that provides var-
ied services in New York City, including Headstart, day-
care, and homeless care and prevention. On January 22,
1990, after an election pursuant to a Stipulated Election
Agreement, the Board certified the Union as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of a unit of all
full-time and regular part-time employees employed by
the Employer at Project Reach Out, excluding all part-
time bookkeepers, part-time secretaries, confidential em-
ployees and guards, professional employees and supervi-
sors as defined in the Act. Project Reach Out is an um-
brella program that provides services and advocacy for
the mentally ill and homeless. There was no specific
stipulation in the election agreement as to the status of
the team leader classification at issue here.
Shortly after the Union’s certification in 1990, the par-
ties executed a collective-bargaining agreement. Article
VIII of the agreement provided a list of job classifica-
tions for the purposes of layoff and recall. The classifi-
cation of “outreach worker–team leader” is listed as the
highest-rated classification in the unit. The parties have
since maintained a collective-bargaining relationship,
albeit the Union now represents the employees in Project
Reach Out, the Other Place, the Social Service team at
the Senate, the Social Service team at the Corner House,
and other HUD-funded programs and add-on programs
operated by the Employer at other sites in conjunction
with or as an extension of Project Reach Out or the Other
1 On February 5, 2007, the Regional Director for Region 2 issued a
Decision and Order Dismissing Petition. Thereafter, pursuant to Sec.
102.67 of the National Labor Relations Board’s Rules and Regulations,
the Employer filed a timely request for review. On April 14, 2007, the
Board granted review. The Employer filed a brief on review.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in
this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Place.2
The team leader classification is listed under
Project Reach Out, the Other Place, the Social Services
team at the Senate and the Corner House, and the ACT
Team. The parties’ current agreement expires on June
30, 2008.
During negotiations for the current contract, the Em-
ployer proposed that the team leaders be excluded from
the unit on the basis of their alleged supervisory status.
The Union refused and directed the Employer to file a
unit clarification (UC) petition instead. The Employer
agreed to do so.
On September 21, 2004, 7 days after the current
agreement was signed, the Employer filed the UC peti-
tion at issue here. The Employer asserts that the team
leaders are supervisory employees who must be excluded
from the unit or, in the alternative, professional employ-
ees under the Act who are entitled to vote for or against
inclusion in a unit of nonprofessional employees.
Regional Director’s Decision
In dismissing the petition, the Regional Director pri-
marily relied on Premier Living Center, 331 NLRB 123
(2000). There, the Board found that the employer, who
had specifically stipulated to the inclusion of a certain
classification, could not thereafter litigate the supervisory
status of that job classification through a UC petition
because the employer had failed to raise the issue during
the underlying representation proceeding, and had not
presented any newly discovered and previously unavail-
able evidence or special circumstances. Here, the Re-
gional Director found that it would be inappropriate to
clarify the unit because the team leader classification
existed at the time of the 1990 stipulated election agree-
ment and has been included in the unit since that time. It
is undisputed that the parties had the opportunity to liti-
gate the issue of the team leaders’ inclusion in the unit
during the 1990 representation proceeding, but did not do
so. The Regional Director therefore concluded that the
parties should not be afforded the opportunity to litigate
this issue in a subsequent unit clarification proceeding.
Additionally, the Regional Director found no exception
to the Board’s “relitigation rule” because there was no
evidence that the duties and responsibilities of the team
leaders had changed since the unit was certified in 1990.
With respect to the Employer’s assertion that its peti-
tion was timely filed because it reserved the right to file
such a petition during negotiations for its current con-
tract, the Regional Director found that while the Em-
ployer may have satisfied the timeliness requirements for
filing a UC petition, the Employer had not shown that it
2 The Other Place is a psycho-social club where creative arts activi-
ties are used to engage individuals in their community.
GODDARD RIVERSIDE COMMUNITY CENTER
1235
was exempt from the “relitigation rule” as set forth in
Premier Living Center, supra.3
The Regional Director
noted that timeliness was not an issue in Premier Living
Center, since the petition there was filed within 1 month
of the certification.
For these reasons, the Regional Director dismissed the
petition.
Analysis
Unit clarification is appropriate for resolving ambigui-
ties concerning the unit placement of individuals who,
for example, come within a newly established classifica-
tion of disputed unit placement. Unit clarification is also
appropriate to resolve the placement of an existing classi-
fication—either included or excluded from the unit—that
has undergone recent, substantial changes in duties and
responsibilities of the employees. Union Electric Co.,
217 NLRB 666, 667 (1975). Clarification is not appro-
priate, however, for upsetting an agreement between or
established practice of a union and employer concerning
the unit placement of various individuals, even if the
agreement was entered into by one of the parties for what
it claims to be mistaken reasons or the practice has be-
come established by acquiescence and not express con-
sent. Id.
However, where timely filed, a UC petition seeking to
exclude a classification based on supervisory status may
be processed even though the disputed classification has
been historically included. Washington Post Co., 254
NLRB 168 (1981), supports this proposition. There, a
UC petition to exclude certain classifications was proc-
essed notwithstanding their historical inclusion in the
unit. The Board reasoned that “[t]he Act provides spe-
cifically for the exclusion of ‘supervisors.’ . . . Thus,
except in certain limited and well-defined factual situa-
tions, the Board, when presented with an appropriate
petition or claim, is required to exclude positions from a
bargaining unit where the inclusion of those positions
would violate the principles of the Act.” Id. at 168–169.
Further, the Board held that where the employees sought
to be excluded by a UC petition have long been included
under previous contracts, and the job duties of those po-
sitions have remained unchanged, nonetheless, if it can
be shown that those employees meet the test for supervi-
sory status, the Board is compelled to exclude them. See
also Bethlehem Steel Corp., 329 NLRB 243, 244 fn. 5
(1999) (noting that the Board will clarify a unit to ex-
clude a position that has historically been included where
the petitioner has established a statutory basis for the
3 The Union did not contest the Regional Director’s finding that the
Employer may have satisfied the timeliness requirements under Wal-
lace-Murray, 192 NLRB 1090 (1971).
exclusion); Boston Cutting Die Co., 258 NLRB 771, 772
fn. 2 (1981) (emphasizing that the Board will consider
UC petitions midterm where clarification is necessary to
avoid violation of the Act or Board policy).
A clear exception to this principle exists when a party
has specifically stipulated, in a representation case pro-
ceeding, to the inclusion of a particular classification and
later attempts to file a clarification petition to exclude the
classification on supervisory grounds. Premier Living
Center, supra, and I.O.O.F. Home of Ohio, Inc., 322
NLRB 921 (1997), relied on by the Regional Director,
fall into the category carved out by this exception. The
rationale for this exception is to discourage parties from
entering into a stipulation in a representation proceeding
and then attempting to avoid being held to that stipula-
tion. This rationale simply does not apply to this case.
In both Premier Living Center, supra, and I.O.O.F., su-
pra, the respective employers stipulated to LPN units and
then filed UC petitions claiming the LPNs were supervi-
sors.4 In each of these cases, the Board dismissed the UC
petition because the party attempted to clarify the unit
after a representation case proceeding at which the inclu-
sion of the belatedly-disputed classification was specifi-
cally stipulated to.5 By contrast, the parties here never
stipulated to the inclusion of the team leaders.6
Premier Living Center, supra, and I.O.O.F., supra, do
not specifically address the question presented here of
whether parties are precluded from litigating the disputed
employees’ supervisory status where they did not spe-
cifically stipulate to the status of those particular em-
ployees. We recognize that I.O.O.F. does include lan-
guage stating that parties are precluded from resorting to
UC proceedings if they “could have” litigated supervi-
sory status; and that language would seem, on the sur-
face, to apply here. That language, however, was
broader than necessary to decide I.O.O.F. because there,
the parties not only “could have” but did expressly ad-
dress the status of the disputed employees by stipulating
4 Premier Living Center was before the Board on a UC petition, and
I.O.O.F. was before the Board on the employer’s refusal to bargain
with the union.
5 The Board in Premier Living Center, supra at 125 fn. 5, and earlier
in I.O.O.F., supra at 923 fn. 7, distinguished Washington Post Co.,
supra, by noting that the Regional Director, during the representation
proceeding in that case, expressly authorized the parties to raise the
supervisory issue by filing a UC petition after the certification in ex-
change for the parties’ agreement not to litigate the unit placement
issue prior to the election. In Premier Living Center and I.O.O.F.,
however, the employers had voluntarily abandoned their respective
claims that the disputed positions were supervisory and actually stipu-
lated to their inclusion in the unit.
6 The fact that the team leaders were included in the unit by way of
the contract does not mean that their status had been specifically agreed
upon in the representation proceeding.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
1236
to their inclusion in the unit. Accordingly, that language
was dicta, and we will not rely on it here.7
Rather, we conclude that Washington Post,8 supra,
provides the correct standard for determining whether the
UC petition may be processed in this case. As explained
above, that case specifically held that when presented
with an appropriate petition, the Board is “required” to
exclude positions from a unit where the inclusion of
those positions would violate the basic principles of the
Act. Because the disputed positions here are alleged to
7 See, e.g., U.S. v. One TRW, Model M14, 7.62 Caliber Rifle, 441
F.3d 416, 423 fn. 10 (6th Cir. 2006) (characterizing as dicta decisional
language “the court . . . did not have occasion to apply”); Best Life
Assurance Co. of California v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 281
F.3d 828, 834 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[D]ictum [i]s a statement . . . that is
unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not preceden-
tial.”).
8 At the representation hearing in Washington Post, supra, the Wash-
ington Newspaper Union requested that the hearing on unit placement
issues be postponed so that the employees sought in its petition for
election could exercise their right to vote. After deliberation, the em-
ployer agreed to a proposal of the Regional Director that an election be
held at which the employer would not challenge those it claimed to be
properly excluded from the unit but after which, if necessary, the Re-
gional Director would entertain an appropriate UC petition. Thus, the
Board found that the UC petition was an offshoot of the earlier repre-
sentation hearing. “In light of the earlier representations made by the
Regional Director, we are satisfied that the unit clarification process is
now a proper vehicle for a resolution of the issues presented.”
See
Washington Post, supra at 170.
be supervisory and thus their inclusion in the unit would
violate statutory principles, we need only to examine
whether the petition was filed at an appropriate time.
Based on the record testimony, we agree with the Re-
gional Director that it was. It is undisputed that during
negotiations, the Employer raised the issue of the team
leaders’ exclusion from the bargaining unit, and the Un-
ion directed the Employer to file a UC petition instead.
The Employer agreed to do so. Accordingly, the Em-
ployer’s filing of the petition only 7 days after the con-
tract had been signed is timely because the Employer
specifically reserved its right to do so during negotia-
tions. See Baltimore Sun Co., 296 NLRB 1023 (1989).
Moreover, there is no contention before us now that the
petition was untimely filed during the term of the con-
tract.
In light of all of the above, we find that the processing
of the UC petition is not precluded by the “relitigation
rule” set forth in Premier Living Center, supra, and
I.O.O.F., supra, because the parties did not specifically
address the status of the disputed team leaders in the
prior representation proceeding.
ORDER
The petition is reinstated and the case is remanded for
further appropriate action.