Carpenters (Adams-Bickel Associates)

CARPENTERS (ADAMS-BICKEL ASSOCIATES) 351 NLRB No. 51 1007 Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters, South- eastern Pennsylvania, State of Delaware and Eastern Shore of Maryland, United Brother- hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America and Adams-Bickel Associates, Inc. and Penn Valley Constructors, Inc. Cases 4–CC–2463 and 4–CC– 2482 October 18, 2007 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS SCHAUMBER AND WALSH On June 1, 2007, Administrative Law Judge Paul Bux- baum issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Charging Par- ties filed an answering brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec- ommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpenters, Southeastern Pennsylvania, State of Delaware and Eastern Shore of Maryland, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, and rep- resentatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order. Donna D. Brown, Esq., for the General Counsel. Stephen J. Holroyd, Esq., of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the Respondent. Stephen J. Sundheim, Esq., of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the Charging Parties. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE PAUL BUXBAUM, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on March 15, 2007. The charge in Case 4–CC–2463, was filed by Adams-Bickel Asso- ciates, Inc. (Adams-Bickel) on May 5, 2006,1 and a complaint was issued on June 19. That complaint was amended on De- cember 6. The charge in Case 4–CC–2482, was filed by Penn 1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis- trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder- ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. 1 All dates are in 2006, unless otherwise indicated. Valley Constructors, Inc. (Penn Valley) on December 7, and a complaint was issued on December 26. The Regional Director issued an order consolidating the cases on January 29, 2007. The first complaint alleges that the Union, through its agent, threatened a representative of 421 Chestnut Partners LP (CPLP) that the Union would cause protests, work stoppages, and prob- lems with deliveries at the site of CPLP’s construction project. It further alleges that an object of this conduct was to force CPLP to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or other- wise dealing in the products of Adams-Bickel and to cease doing business with Adams-Bickel. The complaint also alleges that another object of the Union’s conduct was to force or re- quire Adams-Bickel to cease using, selling, handling, transport- ing, or otherwise dealing in the products of unspecified subcon- tractors deemed by the Union to be “unfair,” and to cease doing business with those subcontractors. The Union’s conduct is alleged to violate Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. The Union filed an answer denying the material allegations of the com- plaint. The second complaint alleges that the Union, through its agent, threatened a representative of Penn Valley by telling him that the Union would cause those of its members who are em- ployed by a subcontractor, P.A. Fly Contracting, Inc. (PA Fly), at the site of one of Penn Valley’s projects to refuse to unload and install cabinetry manufactured by American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc. (American Millwork) that was to be delivered to that site unless American Millwork and the Union reached an agreement prior to the delivery. It is further alleged that an object of the Union’s conduct was to force Penn Valley to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of American Millwork and to force Penn Valley to cease doing business with American Millwork. It is also al- leged that an object of the Union was to force PA Fly to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of American Millwork and to force PA Fly to cease doing business with American Millwork. Finally, it is alleged that an additional object of the Union was to force American Millwork to recognize and bargain with the Union as the representative of its employees although the Union had not been certified as such representative under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. This conduct was alleged to violate Sec- tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. The Union filed an answer deny- ing the material allegations of the complaint. In both complaints, the General Counsel served notice that it would be seeking the imposition of a broad cease-and-desist order against the Union.2 The requested relief would enjoin the Union from engaging in any form of conduct that would violate Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act where such conduct is directed at any person and is designed to force such person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other person or to cease doing business with any other person. As described in detail in the decision that follows, I find that the Union, through its agent, Bruce Jones, did threaten a repre- 2 The original complaint in the Adams-Bickel case did not contain this notification. It was added by amendment on December 6. (GC Exh. 1(j).) DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1008 sentative of CPLP, Todd Strine, in the manner described by the General Counsel and with the unlawful objectives alleged in the complaint. I further find that the Union, also through its agent, Bruce Jones, threatened a representative of Penn Valley, George McCardle, in the manner described by the General Counsel and with the unlawful objectives alleged in that com- plaint. I conclude that, in both instances, the conduct was in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. Finally, I deter- mine that the totality of circumstances demonstrates that the Union has a proclivity to violate the Act to the extent that an extraordinary remedial measure is required. As a result, I con- cur in the General Counsel’s request for relief and recommend imposition of a broad cease-and-desist order. On the entire record,3 including my observation of the de- meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed by the General Counsel, the Companies, and the Union, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION The Charging Party, Adams-Bickel, a Pennsylvania corpora- tion, has been engaged as a general contractor in the construc- tion industry with an office and principal place of business in Collegeville, Pennsylvania, where it annually provides services valued in excess of $50,000 outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Charging Party, Penn Valley, a Pennsyl- vania corporation, has been engaged as a general contractor in the construction industry with an office and principal place of business in Morrisville, Pennsylvania, where it annually pur- chases and receives goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Union admits4 and I find that Adams-Bickel and Penn Valley are employers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that the Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts Involving Adams-Bickel The General Counsel alleges that, on May 3, an agent of the Union, Bruce Jones, threatened a representative of CPLP, Todd Strine, and that the threats were made with a number of unlaw- ful objectives.5 In support of this allegation, counsel for the General Counsel presented the testimony of Strine. Strine, an attorney, has been a principal of CPLP since 2004, and has been involved in the Company’s development project at 421 Chestnut Street in Philadelphia. He testified in a clear and persuasive manner and his testimony was corroborated by notes that he took during the conversation that forms the heart of the 3 Counsel for the General Counsel has filed a motion to correct the transcript. This is unopposed, and I grant it. Certain correction in the transcript have been noted and corrected. 4 See the Union’s answers to both complaints as amplified by coun- sel during the trial. (GC Exh. 1(e), pars. 2 and 3 and GC Exh. 1(s), pars. 2 and 3; and Tr. 7.) 5 The Union concedes that Jones was acting as its agent. See the Un- ion’s answer to the complaint and the additional representations of counsel at trial. (GC Exh. 1(e), par. 4; Tr. 8.) allegation against the Union. Most significantly, Strine’s testi- mony was uncontroverted since the Union did not call Jones as a witness.6 I fully credit Strine’s account of the events under consideration. Strine reported that the Chestnut Street project involves the conversion of an old bank building. The upper floors are being developed as residential condominium units. CPLP delivers “raw space” to the owners of the individual units. (Tr. 20.) Those owners may choose any company they wish to perform the transformation of the raw space into living quarters. CPLP hired two firms to perform the work on the infrastructure, Cyma Builders (Cyma) and Aloia Construction (Aloia). Cyma was responsible for the major building systems such as electri- cal, plumbing, elevators, and heating. Aloia did certain work on a stair tower and the fifth and sixth floors. According to Strine, Cyma and Aloia employed “98 percent . . . union labor.” (Tr. 26.) By 2006, development of the building had progressed to the point that individual condominium owners were completing the work on their units. Adams-Bickel had been hired to perform this work for two of those units. In late April, members of a union representing employees involved in the field of elevator construction picketed the Chestnut Street jobsite. It was within this general context that the crucial conversation between Jones and Strine took place. Strine testified that he had received several telephone mes- sages from Jones. On May 3, he returned the calls. Strine asked the reason for the contact and Jones informed him that he was an official of the Union and wished to discuss the Chestnut Street project. He began by noting the presence of the elevator union’s pickets and the impact of the picketing on the ability of Aloia to complete its work on the project. Jones then made an abrupt switch of topics, stating, “What if[,] out of the blue, Adams-Bickel is going to be my [Jones’] problem regard- less[?]” (Tr. 23.) Strine asked why this would be a problem. Jones responded that the reason was Adams-Bickel’s use of “unfair contractors” who did not pay “the prevailing wages.” (Tr. 23.) After some discussion about the concept of unfair wages, Jones told Strine that he had formed the impression that Ad- ams-Bickel was using unfair contractors and added, “If that’s the way that it’s going to go[,] the building is going to have a problem.” (Tr. 24.) This caused Strine to inquire as to the meaning of “problem.” Jones explained that this meant, “[p]rotests, work stoppages and problems with deliveries.” (Tr. 24.) Strine asked what could be done to avoid such problems. Jones appeared to sidestep a direct response, instead making reference to other potential difficulties involving other labor unions. At this point in their conversation, Strine opined that he did not understand why Jones was discussing these issues with him. He noted that CPLP did not have any contractual relationship with Adams-Bickel and suggested that Jones approach Gus 6 Jones was present throughout the trial and sat at the counsel table with the Union’s attorney. Furthermore, counsel for the Union con- cedes that, “[a]t the hearing, all parties had the opportunity to examine and cross-examine witnesses and present evidence.” (R. Br. p. 2.) CARPENTERS (ADAMS-BICKEL ASSOCIATES) 1009 Perea, a principal of that firm. Jones advised that he had talked to Perea. As Strine put it, “[a]nd he added that he wanted to talk to me because he didn’t have to be as careful about what he said, when he talked to Gus Perea he had to watch what he said.”7 (Tr. 25.) The conversation then returned to the situa- tion involving Aloia and the elevator union. Strine testified that Jones, “then turned the subject back to Adams-Bickel and the idea of the unfair contractors.” (Tr. 26.) He warned Strine that, “[l]ook, if Adams-Bickel is in there and there’s going to be a fight, its going to go one way and it’s not going to be a good way.” (Tr. 26.) Strine expressed his puz- zlement over this threat since he had no relationship with Ad- ams-Bickel and his own contractors employed union labor. He noted that he had no control over the choices made by individ- ual unit owners. Jones expressed some sympathy for this ar- gument, agreeing that, “[w]e know that initially you did the right thing.” (Tr. 26.) At this juncture, Jones finally got to his point, explaining that, “we just want you to use some of your juice8 to convince Adams-Bickel to use fair contractors.” (Tr. 26.) Strine expressed surprise that the Union would make a “big deal” about the owners’ choices, given that the vast majority of the work on the project had been performed by union labor and the remaining portion was just “small potatoes.” (Tr. 27.) Jones replied that, “this is what I do. It’s all about upholding the wages in the [C]ity of Philadelphia, which we set . . . as the standard.”9 (Tr. 27.) Expressing frustration, Strine asked Jones to get to the point. He stated, “I don’t understand where we’re going with this conversation or what you want me to do?” (Tr. 27.) Jones reiterated his earlier demand, “I want you to think about using your juice and talking to Adams-Bickel. Why don’t you sleep on it[,] then we’ll talk further.”10 (Tr. 27.) Strine promised to think it over and the conversation termi- nated. The men had no further discussions. Two days later, Adams-Bickel filed the charge alleging that Jones’ statements to Strine were unlawful. B. The Facts Involving Penn Valley Regarding Penn Valley, the General Counsel contends that, on December 5, the Union, acting through its agent, Bruce Jones,11 threatened a field superintendent of Penn Valley, George McCardle, and that those threats were made with unlawful objectives in mind. In support of these allegations, counsel for the General Counsel presented the testimony of 7 In my view, this comment by Jones reflects his consciousness that he was engaged in an enterprise fraught with potential legal difficulties for the Union. 8 Webster defines this slang usage of the term “juice” as meaning, “[p]ower : clout.” Webster’s II New Riverside University Dictionary, The Riverside Publishing Co., 1984, at p. 657. See also Merriam- Webster’s Online Dictionary, http://m-w.com, showing the slang defi- nition as “influence, clout.” 9 Strine indicated that Jones engaged in a “long pause” before com- pleting the sentence with the phrase “as the standard.” (Tr. 27.) 10 Strine’s contemporaneous notes describe Jones as telling Strine, “I mean think about it. You can use some juice.” (GC Exh. 2, p. 2.) 11 Once again, the Union admits that Jones was its agent. See the Union’s answer to the complaint and the representations of counsel at trial. (GC Exh. 1(s), par. 4; Tr. 8.) McCardle and George Reitz. McCardle has been a superinten- dent with Penn Valley for 18 years and has been involved in the Company’s development project at Second and Chestnut Streets in Philadelphia. Reitz is the owner of American Mill- work, a nonunion firm that employs 26 persons. I found that both witnesses provided clear and persuasive testimony. In addition, Reitz’ information provided useful background and corroboration for the more important testimony given by McCardle. Finally, once again, I take note that the descriptions of the events and statements provided by Reitz and McCardle were uncontroverted. Although Jones was present throughout the trial, he was not called to the witness stand by the Union.12 For all these reasons, I find the evidence presented by the Gen- eral Counsel’s witnesses to be fully credible. The testimony revealed that Penn Valley’s Chestnut Street worksite consisted of a four-level brick building that was being converted into a microbrewery and residential condominium units. Although Penn Valley was the general contractor, all the work was being performed by subcontractors. The subcontrac- tors that were working at the actual site employed union labor. However, Penn Valley contracted with a nonunion firm, American Millwork, to manufacture cabinetry, bar tops and fronts, and wall panels for the brewery. While American Mill- work made the woodwork, it hired a subcontractor to perform the delivery and installation. That subcontractor was PA Fly, a company that employed union labor. Reitz presented testimony that serves as background and context for the conversation between Jones and McCardle that is the subject matter of this complaint allegation. He reported that he was first approached by a representative of the Union, Chris Johnson, in late 2005. Johnson’s purpose was to propose that American Millwork enter into a relationship with the Un- ion. Reitz declined to make any such commitment, explaining that the Company’s finances had been adversely affected by a plant fire and other factors. Approximately 1 year later, Reitz received a telephone call from another person acting on behalf of the Union, Ed Coryell Jr. Coryell asked if American Millwork was doing work on the condos at the Chestnut Street project. Reitz explained that the Company was not involved in that work, it was only providing 12 In his brief, counsel for the Union repeatedly argues that Jones’ failure to testify somehow undermines the General Counsel’s case. (R. Br. at 15 and 18.) In my view, this turns the matter upside down. It is true that the Board authorizes factfinders to draw adverse inferences from the failure to produce testimony. See Daikichi Sushi, 335 NLRB 622 (2001), enf. 56 Fed. Appx. 516 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (adverse inference drawn against employer who failed to produce testimony from the only management official present at a key meeting) and NLRB v. Iron Work- ers, 124 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1997) (Board’s “well established” use of adverse inference for failure to produce testimony was properly applied to a respondent labor organization). However, the key to such a finding is the conclusion that the missing testimony would reasonably be assumed to favor the party who chose not to call the witness. Ap- plying this test, it is evident that one would have expected Jones to testify about his conversations in a manner favorable to the Union’s cause. Indeed, at the outset of the trial, counsel for the Union reported that Jones would be testifying. (Tr. 8.) Any inference to be drawn from his unexplained failure to do so would have to be that his account would have been adverse to the Union’s position in this litigation. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1010 woodwork to the microbrewery. Coryell asked if Reitz had a labor agreement and was told that he did not. He then asked who would be performing the installation at Chestnut Street. Reitz explained that he was considering a couple of potential subcontractors, both of whom employed union labor. Reitz was again contacted by the Union on December 5. This time, the telephone call was made by Jones. Jones told Reitz that he had an agreement with the owner of the micro- brewery that employees on the project would be paid “fair wages.” (Tr. 54.) Reitz opined that he did pay his employees fair wages. Reitz reported that, [t]here was also further conversation that basically if—since we were an open shop[,] he was going to instruct his carpen- ters not to unload the custom case work from our truck and he repeated that statement again[,] saying that if it wasn’t made union it was not going to be unloaded. (Tr. 54.) Reitz testified that Jones ended their conversation by asserting that, “if the cabinets were not union made[,] the[y] would not be unloaded.” (Tr. 55.) Under cross-examination, he reiterated that Jones warned him that, “no millwork was going to be unloaded unless it was from a union shop.” (Tr. 59.) I asked Reitz to amplify his explanation of what Jones was telling him in this conversation. He explained that Jones had told him that, “[t]here was going to be a picket line, that cabi- nets would not be—he was going to instruct his—the Carpen- ters, meaning I guess under his jurisdiction, that they were not going to unload any millwork from American Millwork.” (Tr. 63.) Reitz concluded that this would be an effective threat because he inferred that the union members employed by his delivery and installation subcontractor, PA Fly, would refuse to cross such a picket line. Later that same day, Reitz received another telephone call made jointly by Jones and Johnson. The purpose was to dis- cuss, “unionizing my shop.” (Tr. 55.) Reitz explained that, due to the fire and other factors, he was not ready to make any commitments. Jones responded that, “this phone conversa- tion’s not going in the right direction.” (Tr. 55.) With that, Jones’ participation in the call terminated. On the same day that Reitz reported he had the conversations with Jones, McCardle also indicated that Jones approached him. They spoke at the brewery worksite. Jones told McCardle that Reitz was “jerking them around.” (Tr. 69.) McCardle asked what he meant and Jones explained: Let me put it this way, . . . I just want to give you a heads up, . . . and frankly I shouldn’t even be saying this to you13 but if an agreement isn’t worked out between American Millwork and the Union[,] the truck’s not getting unloaded . . . Let me put it this way, if—my men are not going to unload that truck if something’s not worked out between American Millwork and the Union. (Tr. 69–70.) McCardle testified that Jones went on to “ask me to call George Reitz and see if there was something I could do 13 I interpret this remark to mean that Jones knew that what he was saying was in violation of the Act. about it.” (Tr. 70.) McCardle reported that he did make such a call to Reitz. On the next day, Johnson again phoned Reitz to discuss un- ionizing American Millwork. Reitz “laid out a three-point plan” to address the topic and said he would get back to John- son in a couple of weeks. (Tr. 61.) One day later, Penn Valley filed the charge in this case. In order to complete the picture surrounding these events, Reitz and McCardle testified that the millwork was to have been delivered on December 11. This was postponed until early January. McCardle reported that the delay was, [b]ecause of the threats of a picket line. We didn’t want a picket line because everybody was on—union and if there’s a picket line every—we lose everybody. . . . They won’t cross the picket line, all the other trades. (Tr. 70.) In addition, McCardle testified that he knew that PA Fly would not unload American Millwork’s product because the subcontractor’s owner, “didn’t want to jeopardize his stand- ing with the Union.” (Tr. 78.) On December 26, the Regional Director filed the complaint, alleging that Jones’ conversation with McCardle on December 5, constituted unlawful secondary activity. The Union filed its answer to the complaint on December 29. Five days later, PA Fly attempted to make the delivery of American Millwork’s products to the microbrewery. McCardle testified that on that day, January 3, 2007, he was waiting for the delivery truck outside the jobsite early in the morning. After the truck arrived, two men stationed themselves in front of the door to the brewery with picket signs stating that, “American Millwork is unfair to local . . . Carpenters Coun- cil.”14 (Tr. 71.) All of the employees of the other subcontrac- tors on the site refused to cross this picket line. As a result, McCardle sent the delivery truck away. Reitz and McCardle reported that the delivery was accomplished several days later, after Reitz had threatened PA Fly with a breach of contract action. There were no pickets at the site on the day of the suc- cessful delivery. C. Legal Analysis The General Counsel contends that the Union has twice vio- lated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act through statements made by its agent to Strine and McCardle, representatives of CPLP and Penn Valley, respectively. That portion of the statute pro- vides, in pertinent part, that: It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person en- gaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, 14 Counsel for the Union argues that the “MRC representatives pick- eted the truck,” not the brewery building. (R. Br. at p. 8.) It is true that the precise situs of the picketing was largely left implicit in the testi- mony. On the other hand, McCardle did observe that one person em- ployed at the brewery project “had to go to the bathroom so they [the pickets] let him go to the bathroom but he had—he came back out.” (Tr. 72.) I seriously doubt that this employee was attempting to go to the bathroom inside the delivery truck. Based on all of the circum- stances, I find that the situs of the picketing was at the entrance to the brewery project. CARPENTERS (ADAMS-BICKEL ASSOCIATES) 1011 where in either case an object thereof is . . . forcing or requir- ing any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the repre- sentative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of Section 9.15 This language forms a portion of an overall legislative plan designed, with the dual congressional objectives of preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unof- fending employers and others from pressures in controversies not their own. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951). Another administrative law judge has observed that, [t]he two prerequisites for the finding of an 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) vio- lation are: (1) that a labor organization threaten, coerce or re- strain any person; and (2) that an object of this conduct be to force one person to cease doing business with another per- son.” [Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.] Sheet Metal Workers Local 27, 321 NLRB 540, 547 (1996). Another of my colleagues has noted that the definition of coer- cion under the statute is “broad” and “pragmatic” and the Board “has not hesitated to include varied forms of economic pressure within the conceptual ambit.” (Internal quotation marks omit- ted.) Carpenters (Society Hill Towers Owners’ Assn.), 335 NLRB 814, 827–828 (2001), enf. 50 Fed. Appx. 88 (3d Cir. 2002). Long ago, the Board pointed out that, “in any of these secon- dary boycott situations the ultimate determination depends upon the Union’s objective. Often ‘the line is fine,’ and cir- cumstances of the particular case must supply the answer to which way the chips are to fall.” (Italics in the original. Foot- note omitted.) Electrical Workers Local 11 (L. G. Electric Contractors), 154 NLRB 766, 767 (1965). Finally, in laying the foundation for analysis of the issues in this case, it is worth citing the summary provided in a recent treatise on the Act’s secondary boycott provisions, where it was concluded that, [m]ost common in this area are threats to picket, shutdown or strike. The Board has routinely held that unqualified threats16 15 The Act contains various provisos that are not cited above. 16 By noting the “unqualified” nature of the threats found to be unlawful, the commentator recognized that the Board prohibits those predictions of picketing activity that fail to include “assurance that the picketing would comply with the Moore Dry Dock requirements and be restricted to, and directed only at, the primary [employer].” Electrical Workers Local 98 (MCF Services), 342 NLRB 740, 749 (2004), citing Sailors Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 NLRB 547, 549 (1950). In this case, Jones’ threats to picket did not contain any of the necessary assurances. of this nature directed at a secondary or neutral party violate section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Failure to carry through the threat does not provide a defense to the assertion that the threat, itself, rises to the level of section 8(b)(4)(ii) . . . . The Board has also held that threats of economic pressure against neutral persons constitute section 8(b)(4)(ii) conduct. In this regard, even un- specified threats of “trouble” have been found to be violative. Again, as in other areas of Board law, subjective interpreta- tions of the listener are irrelevant to the analysis; instead, the focal point for consideration is the specific language used. The Board assesses those words on a case-by-case basis, tak- ing into account the entire nature of the conversation at issue. [Footnotes omitted.] Richard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB Interpretation of Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, 7 U. Pa. Lab. & Emp. L. 905, 932, summer 2005. With these principles as background, I will now assess the Union’s conduct at issue. On May 3, the Union’s agent, Jones, told a representative of a neutral employer, Strine, that the em- ployment of Adams-Bickel by condominium owners was unfair because that firm did not pay prevailing wages. Jones warned that, as a consequence, “the building is going to have a prob- lem.” (Tr. 24.) When asked to be more specific, Jones ex- plained that the problem would be “[p]rotests, work stoppages and problems with deliveries.” (Tr. 24.) After some digres- sions in their conversation, Jones was pressed to explain what he desired Strine to do. Jones’ response was that, “we just want you to use some of your juice to convince Adams-Bickel to use fair contractors.” (Tr. 26.) The case law is replete with interesting discussions of whether vague threats about future “problems” or “troubles” violate the Act. See, for example, Lafayette Building & Con- struction Trades Council (Southern Construction Corp.), 132 NLRB 673 (1961) (“trouble”); Carpenters (Apollo Dry Wall), 211 NLRB 291 (1974) (“trouble” and “problems”); United Mine Workers District 12 (Old Ben Coal Co.), 239 NLRB 800 (1978) (“problems”); Laborers Local 1030 (Exxon Chemical Co.), 308 NLRB 706 (1992) (“problems”); and Carpenters (Society Hill Towers Owners’ Assn.), supra (“trouble” and “problems”). Fortunately, I do not need to determine where the Board’s proverbial chips would fall regarding Jones’ prediction of a problem in this case. Not being content with such a vague formulation of his intentions, Jones provided a crystal clear warning that what he was predicting and threatening were pro- tests, work stoppages, and interruptions of deliveries. In response to an inquiry from a circuit court, the Board ex- plained that when a union’s promise to refrain from future picketing, is conditioned upon some action to be taken by the neutral general or prime contractor, such conduct constitutes a delib- erate entanglement of a neutral person in a dispute not his own and is violative of the secondary boycott provision of the Act. Electrical Workers Local 441, 222 NLRB 99, 101 (1976), affd. 569 F.2d 160 (DC Cir. 1977). Thus, Jones’ warning of protests and delivery interruptions, coupled with his demand that Strine use his influence against the offending contractor hired by the DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1012 condominium owners, constituted a blatant example of restraint and coercion of a neutral party in a labor dispute. While the Union did not execute the threat by engaging in picketing or other tactics to fulfill its prediction of problems at the worksite, this does not insulate it from responsibility for making the threat. The Board has noted that it is “settled” law that “a threat to picket alone may be coercive, whether or not picketing actually ensues.” [Citation omitted.] Amalgamated Packing- house, 218 NLRB 853 (1975). Furthermore, it is apparent from the words chosen that Jones’ objective was to force CPLP to apply pressure to the condominium owners to cease using Ad- ams-Bickel or other “unfair” contractors to perform construc- tion work on the Chestnut Street project.17 This constitutes an illegal objective rendering the conduct unlawful under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. In his brief, counsel for the Union attempts to place a differ- ent import on Jones’ statements. For example, he notes that Jones conceded that the great majority of the work had been performed by union members. He also observes that Jones never specifically demanded that the remaining portion of the work be similarly assigned. Indeed, he contends that when Jones threatened protests, work stoppages, and disruption of deliveries, he was not speaking for his own union, but instead, “on behalf of the Electricians, Steamfitters, Plumbers and Sheet Metal Workers.” (R. Br. at p. 14.) Apart from the fact that Jones never testified in support of this unusual theory, it simply strains credulity. While Jones did refer to these other labor organizations, in doing so he stated that, “the problems went beyond problems with the Carpenters Union,” because those other unions were also unhappy with Adams-Bickel. (Tr. 24.) This statement clearly demonstrates that Jones was addressing the “problems” of his own union. He was not merely acting as an unsolicited and unpaid advocate for other labor organiza- tions. Such a strained interpretation cannot withstand applica- tion of the Board’s requirement that I examine, “the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the union’s conduct demonstrates an unlawful purpose.” Mine Workers (New Beck- ley Mining Corp.), 304 NLRB 71, 73 (1991), enf. 977 F.2d 1470 (D.C. Cir. 1992). (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) Turning now to the allegation of misconduct directed against Penn Valley, the uncontroverted evidence showed that Jones told the Company’s superintendent at the Chestnut Street work- site that, “if an agreement isn’t worked out between American Millwork and the Union[,] the truck’s not getting unloaded . . . my men are not going to unload that truck.” (Tr. 69–70.) After posing this as the dilemma facing Penn Valley, Jones went on to propose a course of action for McCardle, telling him to call American Millwork’s owner and see if there was something he 17 I recognize that one of Jones’ objectives was the preservation of area wage standards. As the Board has explained, “picketing for a lawful objective, such as to preserve area standards, may be unlawful if there is additionally an unlawful objective as revealed by contempora- neous statements of union agents or other pertinent evidence.” Electri- cal Workers Local 441, supra at 101. Recently, the Board reiterated that, to violate the Act, “the secondary object need only be ‘an ob- ject’—not the sole object” of the union’s activities. Sheet Metal Work- ers Local 7, 345 NLRB 1322, 1323 (2005). “could do about it.” (Tr. 70.) Thus, the evidence clearly estab- lishes that the Union’s agent threatened to prevent the delivery of millwork to Penn Valley’s project and demanded that Penn Valley intercede with its subcontractor to resolve the Carpen- ter’s Union’s issues. The General Counsel presented significant additional evi- dence regarding the context in which Jones’ conversation with McCardle occurred. Reitz testified that, earlier on the same day,18 Jones warned him that, if he did not come to terms with the Union’s demand for a bargaining relationship, “there was going to be a picket line” at the Chestnut Street site, and “that they were not going to unload any millwork from American Millwork.”19 (Tr. 63.) Subsequently, the Union carried out its threat by posting pickets at the entrance to the Chestnut Street worksite. Union employees of Penn Valley’s subcontractors refused to cross that line. As a result, delivery of materials to Penn Valley’s construction project was delayed. The Board’s precedents reveal that a union’s attempt to at- tain a bargaining relationship with a primary employer by ap- plying pressure to a secondary target in order to enlist that firm’s assistance in achieving the desired objective constitutes a violation of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). As the administrative law judge put it in Operating Engineers Local 3 (Westar Marine Services), 340 NLRB 1053, 1056 (2003), “the Act makes clear, a threat to shut down a general contractor’s job in order to pres- sure a subcontractor to sign an agreement with a union covering the uncertified employees of the subcontractor is improper secondary conduct prohibited by the Act.” See also Sheet Metal Workers Local 104 (Losli International), 297 NLRB 1078, 1083 (1990) (union’s threat that it “would not allow equipment to go in” and that the primary “would have no coop- eration from the other trades” at the worksite violated the Act).20 It is clear to me that Jones was threatening McCardle that if he did not either dispense with American Millwork as his sub- contractor or apply pressure to Reitz to reach agreement with the Union, the Union would picket Penn Valley’s jobsite and 18 I infer that the conversation took place before Jones’ discussion with McCardle because Jones told McCardle that Reitz was “jerking them around.” (Tr. 69.) 19 For reasons that are not entirely clear to me, the General Counsel did not allege that Jones’ unqualified threats to Reitz constituted an additional unfair labor practice. The Board’s policy is that an improper threat communicated directly to a union’s primary target without the presence of the secondary employer is still unlawful. As the Board put it in Tri-State Building Trades Council (Backmon Sheet Metal), 272 NLRB 8 fn. 1 (1984), affd. 781 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1986), “the absence of a direct communication of the threat to the neutral . . . is not critical to the finding of unlawful secondary conduct.” See also Wackenhut Corp., 287 NLRB 374, 382 (1987), and Operating Engineers Local 3 (Westar Marine Services), supra at 1053 fn. 1. The General Counsel’s reticence may stem from reservations about this policy expressed by Member Liebman. See, for example, Teamsters Local 247 (Rymco, Inc.), 332 NLRB 1230 fn. 2 (2000), and Elevator Constructors (Otis Elevator Co.), 345 NLRB 925, 925 fn. 4 (2005). As any relief would be cumulative, I will not address this further. 20 Very recently, another administrative law judge has provided a useful compendium of Board precedents on this issue. See Rocket Hill, Inc., 2006 WL 2827110 (Div. of Judges, September 29, 2006). CARPENTERS (ADAMS-BICKEL ASSOCIATES) 1013 that one of the consequences of this activity would be to cause those members of various other unions employed at that jobsite to withhold their services to their respective employers. While Jones may not have spelled out his intent in exactly these terms, I conclude from consideration of the entire context that this was his plain meaning.21 As the Board has noted, “[v]ague or guarded threats” must be given meaning by the “surrounding conduct and events.” Laborers Local 1030 (Exxon Chemical Co.), 308 NLRB 706, 708 (1992). That the objectives of the threat were unlawfully demonstrated by the Union’s subsequent activity that disrupted work activity at the secondary employer’s worksite.22 I find that Jones’ statements to McCardle constituted threats directed against Penn Valley with the objectives of forcing Penn Valley and PA Fly to cease doing business with American Millwork, and of forcing Penn Valley to require American Millwork to recognize and bargain with the Union despite the Union’s lack of certification as representative of American Millwork’s labor force. This conduct violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. The essence of this matter may be highlighted by noting that counsel for the Union correctly observed that the “principle evil Congress sought to avoid in enacting [Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)] is the entanglement of a neutral or secondary employer in a dis- pute between a union and some other employer.” (R. Br. at p. 10.) When Jones made his threats while, at the same time, demanding that Strine use his “juice” with Adams-Bickel and importuning McCardle to “call George Reitz and see if there was something [he] could do,” he was engaged in precisely the types of activity proscribed by the Act. (Tr. 26, 70.) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By threatening to cause protests, work stoppages, and de- livery problems for CPLP with the objective of forcing CPLP to pressure other persons with whom it had contractual relation- ships to cease doing business with Adams-Bickel, the Union has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. By threatening to cause employees that it represents at Penn Valley’s worksite to refuse to unload and install products manufactured by American Millwork with the objectives of forcing Penn Valley and PA Fly to cease doing business with American Millwork and to force Penn Valley to pressure 21 Once again, counsel for the Union proffers a strained parsing of Jones’ language in support of the Union’s defense. He asserts that, “there is no statement from Jones that he (or the MRC) would cause employees it represents to refuse to perform work.” (R. Br. at p. 17.) (Italics in the original. Internal quotation marks omitted.) Counsel omits any acknowledgement that Jones warned McCardle that, “[l]et me put it this way, if—my men are not going to unload that truck if something’s not worked out between American Millwork and the Un- ion.” (Tr. 70.) (Italics added.) Furthermore, this warning followed on the heels of his similar statement to Reitz that, “he was going to instruct his—the Carpenters, meaning I guess under his jurisdiction, that they were not to unload any millwork from American Millwork.” (Tr. 63.) 22 I recognize that the General Counsel does not allege that the pick- eting violated the standards set forth in Moore Dry Dock, supra. Never- theless, the fact that the Union carried out Jones’ threats to Reitz and McCardle sheds light on its intentions and objectives. American Millwork to recognize and bargain with the Union despite the Union’s lack of certification as representative of American Millwork’s labor force, the Union has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un- fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu- ate the policies of the Act. The appropriate relief includes the imposition of a cease-and-desist order and the requirement for the posting of a notice. In each of the complaints filed in this case, the General Counsel served notice that he would be seeking a broad order requiring the Union to, cease and desist from any conduct prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(ii) of the Act where an object is to force or require any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting or oth- erwise dealing in the products of any other person, or to cease doing business with any other person. (GC Exhs. 1(j) and (o).) Because it both broadens the types of misconduct enjoined and the scope of coverage to include all potential secondary parties, this proposed remedy goes beyond the relief that is typically granted. The Board’s power to impose a remedy for unfair labor prac- tices stems from the language of Section 10(c) of the Act, which provides that, upon a finding that a respondent has com- mitted an unfair labor practice, it shall issue “an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of this Act.” The Supreme Court has observed that this is a Congressional grant of authority that is broad and yet rather vague. The Court held that, “at a minimum it encompasses the requirement that a proposed remedy be tailored to the unfair labor practice it is intended to redress.” Sure-Tan v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 900 (1984). Put another way, the Court has in- structed that the validity of any remedial measure imposed by the Board must be “examined in light of the appropriateness in the circumstances of th[e] case.” NLRB v. Mine Workers Dis- trict 50, 355 U.S. 453, 458 (1958). The Supreme Court has also addressed the standards for im- position of the precise type of relief being sought in this pro- ceeding. In NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 437 (1941), it held that the justification for a broad order must be that its provisions “bear some resemblance to that which the [respondent] has committed or that danger of their commission in the future is to be anticipated from the course of his conduct in the past.” Applying the Court’s teachings, the Board has developed a test for gauging the appropriateness of any request for a broad order. In Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979), the Board held that a broad order: is warranted only when a respondent is shown to have a pro- clivity to violate the Act or has engaged in such egregious or widespread misconduct as to demonstrate a general disregard for . . . fundamental statutory rights. Accordingly, each case DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1014 will be analyzed to determine the nature and extent of the vio- lations committed by a respondent so that the Board may tai- lor an appropriate order. [Footnote omitted.] 242 NLRB at 1357. It concisely summarized its test by noting that “repeat offenders and egregious violators” would be sub- ject to imposition of a broad cease-and-desist order. 242 NLRB at 1357. Very recently, the Board has provided an additional commentary on its Hickmott Foods standard. In Five Star Mfg., Inc., 348 NLRB 1301, 1301 (2006), it noted that, while consid- ering imposition of a broad order under Hickmott, “the totality of circumstances” must be examined to determine whether the respondent’s behavior manifests, “an attitude of opposition to the purposes of the Act . . . which would provide an objective basis for enjoining a reasonably anticipated future threat.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.)23 In her opening statement, counsel for the General Counsel explained that the request for a broad order was premised on the Union’s “demonstrated proclivity to violate Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act, its general disregard for the right of [neutral] employe[r]s and blatant disrespect for the Board and its processes.” (Tr. 14.) In order to evaluate the appropriate- ness of this request for relief, the starting point must be an ex- amination of the Union’s history of similar or related miscon- duct. Unfortunately, that history is a rather lengthy one.24 The earliest instances of unlawful activity cited by the Gen- eral Counsel occurred during the summer of 1999. This in- volved secondary activity at the Society Hill Towers Owners’ Association construction project designed to force Society Hill to cease doing business with the Smucker Company. The spe- cific form of misconduct involved the use of a sound amplifica- tion system at excessive volume levels to coerce compliance with the Union’s unlawful objective. During approximately the same period in the summer of 1999, the Union engaged in similar unlawful secondary activity directed at the Carlisle Construction Company and Rittenhouse 23 The preceding general discussion is taken from my recent decision involving a similar remedial issue. See Electrical Workers Local 98 (Tri-M Group, LLC), 2007 WL 1101502 (April 10, 2007). Counsel for the Union also incorporated elements of my background discussion into his brief. See R. Br. at pp. 19–1. 24 In reciting the pertinent history, in addition to reported decisions, I rely on records submitted into evidence by the General Counsel. In each instance, these include complaints filed against the Union and accompanying formal settlements and orders of the Board and the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit enforcing the settlements. Each of the settlements included language providing that, in any future proceeding involving the determination of the scope of an order to be entered against the Union, the conduct alleged in the com- plaints would be given the same force and effect as a litigated adjudica- tion against the Union. A provision containing such language renders the conduct underlying the settlement agreement cognizable when considering the question of a proclivity to violate the Act. See Electri- cal Workers Local 98 (Telephone Man), 327 NLRB 593, 602 (1999), Carpenters Local 1622, 262 NLRB 1211 (1982), enf. 786 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1986), and Teamsters Local 70, 261 NLRB 496, 503 (1982). Put another way, counsel for the Union has recognized that, for purposes of this analysis, the Union’s entry into the formal settlements resulted in the Union having been found “guilty” of the unfair labor practices alleged in those complaints. (R. Br. at p. 22.) Regency Affiliates, joint owners of The Versailles, an apart- ment building. The Union’s objective was to cause these com- panies to cease doing business with Nytech, a firm performing window replacement work on the premises. The Union’s cam- paign began with a telephone call from one of its agents to the property manager of the apartment building. The agent warned that, “if we didn’t use his men there, that he would have 100 of his men show up at the job and there might be trouble.” Car- penters (Society Hill Towers Owners’ Assn.), 335 NLRB 814, 820 (2001), enf. 50 Fed. Appx. 88 (3d Cir. 2002). Subse- quently, the Union embarked on another pattern of employment of a sound amplification system to produce what a United States District Court characterized as “vastly excessive noise levels.” 335 NLRB at 820. On September 14, 1999, the General Counsel issued the complaint in the case arising from the Union’s conduct at Soci- ety Hill Towers and The Versailles. On March 17, 2000, an administrative law judge found that the Union’s conduct at each worksite had violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. He recommended imposition of a cease-and-desist order. 335 NLRB at 829. While the Society Hill Towers litigation was continuing be- fore the Board, the Union engaged in unlawful secondary activ- ity directed at one of the charging parties in the case currently before me. In January 2001, it began picketing at a Commerce Bank jobsite where Adams-Bickel was engaged as a general contractor. The object of the Union’s picketing was to force Adams-Bickel to cease doing business with one of its subcon- tractors, Hi-Tech Interiors, LLC. (Complaint in Case 4–CC– 2308, GC Exh. 3.) On August 27, 2001, the Board issued its decision in Car- penters (Society Hill Towers Owners’ Assn.), supra. It adopted the judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations in pertinent respects and issued a cease-and-desist order. Barely more than 2 months later, on November 2, 2001, an agent of the Union threatened a general contractor, Cutler As- sociates, Inc., that it would picket the company’s jobsite with the objective of forcing Cutler to cease doing business with one of its subcontractors, Vision Contract Flooring, Inc. On the 3d day immediately following this conversation, the Union did picket at the jobsite with the purpose of threatening, coercing, and restraining Cutler, R & S Electric Company, and Adams- Bickel. (Complaint in Case 4–CC–2341-2, GC Exh. 3.) Once again, it is noteworthy that the Union’s unlawful secondary activity was directed against a charging party in the case before me, Adams-Bickel. The complaint involving the Union’s conduct at the Cutler jobsite was issued on November 21, 2001. Just over 6 weeks later, on January 7, 2002, the Union engaged in restraint and coercion of employees of Charles A. Higgins & Sons, Inc., and Mustang Expeditors, at a jobsite in Bensalem, Pennsylvania. This activity was in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.25 (Complaint in Case 4–CB–8807, GC Exh. 3.) 25 Counsel for the Union asserts that the Union’s conduct in violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act is “of no value to the discussion here.” (R. Br. at fn. 21.) I do not agree. While the Board has held that, “[i]n general,” proclivity must be determined from prior findings of “similar CARPENTERS (ADAMS-BICKEL ASSOCIATES) 1015 Just a month after these events, on February 8 and 11, 2002, the Union engaged in secondary picketing at a jobsite involving the renovation of a United States Army Reserve Center with objectives of forcing Harkins & Harkins Mechanical Services, Inc., to cease doing business with USA Environmental Man- agement, Inc., and forcing USA Environmental to cease doing business with Boncouer Construction Company. A complaint alleging this misconduct was issued February 27, 2002. (Com- plaint in Cases 4–CC–2350-1 and 4–CC–2350–2, GC Exh. 3.) A week after the issuance of this complaint, on March 7, 2002, the Union engaged in unlawful secondary picketing at a Burger King restaurant with the objective of forcing the Burger King Corporation to cease doing business with A.E. Manning, Inc. (Complaint in Case 4–CC–2357, GC Exh. 3.) The General Counsel issued complaints against the Union on March 14 and May 17, 2002. These concerned the unlawful activities just described. (Complaints in Cases 4–CB–8807 and 4–CC–2357, GC Exh. 3.) Little more than 6 weeks later, on July 2 and 3, 2002, the Union engaged in unlawful picketing at a building renovation project located at Tenth and Berks Street, blocking ingress to that site. An object of this secondary activ- ity was to force Roosevelt, Inc., d/b/a Philadelphia Manage- ment to cease doing business with Diamond Contract Flooring. (Complaint in Cases 4–CB–8886 and 4–CC–2366, GC Exh. 3.) The flurry of litigation spawned by the Union’s course of il- legal conduct was resolved as follows. On August 20, 2002, the parties entered into a settlement stipulation designed to resolve the allegations in Cases 4–CC–2308, 4–CC–2341–2, 4– CB–8807, 4–CC–2357, 4–CB–8886, and 4–CB–2366. This provided for issuance of narrow cease-and-desist orders and the posting of notices. (Settlement stipulation, GC Exh. 3.) On April 8, 2004, the settlement stipulation was approved by the Board and an appropriate order was issued. (Decision and Or- der, GC Exh. 3.) Finally, on September 30, 2004, the Third Circuit entered a judgment enforcing the Board’s Order.26 (Judgment, GC Exh. 3.) From July 2002 through September 2004, the Union was not found to have engaged in similar or related unlawful activities. However, commencing on October 1, 2004, in what appears to me to be a particularly troubling series of events, the Union engaged in “confrontational conduct” at the Springside School, a school for girls in grades kindergarten through 12. This con- duct included the massing of demonstrators, amplification of loud music, and aggressive handbilling. The purpose of this secondary activity was to force the Springside School to cease doing business with E. Allen Reeves, Inc. (Complaint in Case unlawful conduct in the past,” it has also very recently instructed that “the totality of circumstances” must be considered in analyzing this remedial issue. Teamsters Local 166 (Shank/Balfour Beatty), 327 NLRB 449, 455 (1999), and Five Star Mfg., Inc., 348 NLRB 1301, 1301 (2006). I have cited the Union’s conduct because it forms a mate- rial part of the context that I must consider in recommending an appro- priate remedy. 26 The Third Circuit had earlier enforced the Board’s order in the So- ciety Hill Towers case. See Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpen- ters v. NLRB, 50 Fed. Appx. 88 (3d Cir. 2002). The court found that the record was “replete with evidence supporting” the Board’s findings. 50 Fed. Appx. at 91. 4–CC–2429, GC Exh. 4.) The complaint in this case was filed March 7, 2005. The parties resolved the case by formal settle- ment stipulation on July 5, 2005. The settlement provided for the entry of a narrow cease-and-desist order and the posting of a notice. (Formal settlement stipulation, GC Exh. 4.) The Board issued a Decision and Order effectuating the parties’ settlement on June 9, 2006. This was enforced by judgment of the Third Circuit on October 31, 2006. Approximately 6 months after entering into the formal set- tlement stipulation discussed above, the Union resumed its illegal secondary activities. On January 17 and 20, 2006, the Union engaged in picketing at a jobsite on Kimball Street in Philadelphia and at an office in Sicklerville, New Jersey. Among the objectives of this activity were to force East Coast Construction Services Corporation to cease doing business with Keniko Construction, Inc.; to force D Construction to cease doing business with Ray Marasheski, Jr., t/a Marasheski Con- tractors; and to force Marasheski to cease doing business with East Coast Construction Services. (Complaint in Case 4–CC– 2450, GC Exh. 5.) A complaint containing these allegations was filed February 16, 2006. The parties resolved the case by entering into a formal settlement stipulation on May 11, 2006. This provided for a narrow cease-and-desist order and the post- ing of a notice. (Formal settlement stipulation, GC Exh. 5.) The Board approved the settlement by Decision and Order dated August 1, 2006. It was enforced by judgment of the Third Circuit on October 31, 2006. I certainly realize that this long and melancholy recitation of dates and documents must cause even an interested reader’s eyes to glaze over. Thus, it is particularly important that I urge that reader to take heed of the temporal relationship between this past history and the events of the current case. It will be recalled that the Regional Director filed the complaint in Case 4–CC–2450 on February 16, 2006. While this was pending, Jones unlawfully threatened Strine on May 3. Little more than a week later, the parties’ settlement of the earlier case was signed by the Regional Director. Only slightly more than a month after that, on June 19, the Regional Director issued the charge in this case arising from Jones’ threats to Strine. On October 31, 2006, the Third Circuit entered not one, but two, separate judgments enforcing Board orders against the Union. (GC Exhs. 4, 5.) Yet, shortly thereafter, on December 5, Jones threatened McCardle that if he did not take action regarding American Millwork, the Union would picket the brewery job- site with the result that construction activities would be dis- rupted. On the next day, the Regional Director amended her com- plaint in the Adams-Bickel case to notify the Union that she was seeking imposition of a broad cease-and-desist order. (GC Exh. 1(j).) On the day after that, Penn Valley filed its charge against the Union. (GC Exh. 1(l).) On December 26, the Re- gional Director filed a complaint based on that charge. (GC Exh. 1(o).) The Union filed its answer to that complaint on December 29. (GC Exh. 1(s).) Amazingly (to me, at least), 5 days later, the Union chose to carry out the precise unlawful threat that it had issued to Penn Valley and that had resulted in the filing of the latest complaint against it. It did so by picket- DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1016 ing the brewery jobsite with the result that the delivery of cabi- netry was disrupted. In evaluating the propriety of the General Counsel’s request for broad relief, I have placed great weight on several factors that have supported the issuance of broad orders in prior cases. First and foremost, the extensive scope and nature of the Un- ion’s pattern of secondary activity strongly suggests that an order tailored to protect the statutory rights of all employers in the Philadelphia metropolitan area is a necessary remedial measure. In this regard, the Union’s history of unlawful secon- dary activity shows that its misconduct has affected a total of 30 employers in the Philadelphia area, both primary and secon- dary, since 1999.27 By way of comparison, I note that the Board adopted an administrative law judge’s recommendation of a broad cease-and-desist order enjoining unlawful secondary activity by a union that had been found to have committed mis- conduct against 10 neutral employers at six locations in the Philadelphia area. While that union’s misconduct occurred during a more concentrated period of time, the extent of the impact on the rights of neutral employers and the effect on the regional economy is comparable to that caused by this Respon- dent’s pattern of behavior. See Electrical Workers Local 98 (Telephone Man), 327 NLRB 593, 602 (1999). Furthermore, the extent of the Union’s past misconduct is a strong predictor of the need for broad remedial measures. See Carpenters Local 690 (R. L. (Bob) Moore Construction Co.), 190 NLRB 609 at fn. 2 (1971), and Service Employees Local 77, 264 NLRB 628, 629 (1982). In addition to the extent of the Union’s unlawful activities, I note that it has repeatedly targeted one of the specific charging parties in this case, Adams-Bickel. In 2001, it picketed a job- site where that company was engaged as a general contractor. The object was to force Adams-Bickel to cease doing business with one of its subcontractors. (Complaint in Case 4–CC– 2308, GC Exh. 3.) Later that year, the Union picketed a jobsite of Cutler Associates with an objective of threatening, restrain- ing, and coercing Cutler, R & S Electric, and Adams-Bickel. (Complaint in Case 4–CC–2341–2, GC Exh. 3.) I have now found that the Union has again targeted unlawful secondary activity against Adams-Bickel by threatening CPLP with pro- tests, work stoppages, and disruption of deliveries in order to force CPLP to apply pressure against Adams-Bickel and per- sons who had contractual relationships with Adams-Bickel. In Painters Local 558 (Carroll Day Glass), 317 NLRB 254 (1995), the Board issued a broad order against a union premised on “record evidence of previous unfair labor practice proceed- 27 Those employers were: Society Hill Towers Owners’ Associa- tion; Smucker Company; Carlisle Construction Company; Rittenhouse Regency Affiliates; Nytech; Adams-Bickel; Hi-Tech Interiors; Cutler Associates; Vision Contract Flooring, Inc.; R & S Electric Company; Charles A. Higgins & Sons, Inc.; Mustang Expeditors; Harkins & Har- kins Mechanical Services, Inc.; USA Environmental Management, Inc.; Boncouer Construction Company; Burger King Corporation; A.E. Manning, Inc.; Roosevelt, Inc.; Diamond Contract Flooring; Springside School; E. Allen Reeves, Inc.; East Coast Construction Services Corpo- ration; Keniko Construction, Inc.; D Construction; Ray Marasheski Jr., t/a Marasheski Contractors; CPLP; Penn Valley; PA Fly; and American Millwork. ings finding that the Respondent engaged in similar unlawful conduct against [the same] Charging Party.” The Board char- acterized this pattern of misconduct as demonstrating a procliv- ity to violate the Act within the meaning of Hickmott Foods, supra. The same reasoning applies with equal force here. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I am mindful that the ultimate purpose of any remedial measure is that it be reasona- bly tailored to be effective at deterring future misconduct while avoiding undue impact on the respondent labor organization. Here, the only lesser form of remedy would be a narrow cease- and-desist order such as those the Board has previously issued against this Union as part of formal settlement proceedings. Although these narrow orders have been enforced by judgments of the court of appeals, they have not proven to be effective in protecting the rights of neutral employers generally and Ad- ams-Bickel specifically. In Postal Service, 345 NLRB 409, 410 (2005), enf. of pertinent part denied 477 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2007), the Board ordered broad relief, observing that “the viola- tions in this case took place after the Board issued an uncon- tested narrow cease-and-desist order in the prior case, suggest- ing the inadequacy of this order to deter future violations.” Once again, the same reasoning applies with equal validity in the circumstances of this case. In approving the Board’s issuance of a broad order, the Su- preme Court in Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 US 694, 706 (1951), cited a rather colorful metaphor from one of its antitrust decisions, noting that, “[w]hen the purpose to restrain trade appears from a clear violation of law, it is not necessary that all of the untraveled roads to that end be left open and that only the worn one be closed.”28 The record in this case convinces me that the appropriate remedial recommendation is for the Board to close all of the possible avenues for application of unlawful secondary pressure against neutral parties that may otherwise be chosen as this Union’s route to the achievement of its unlaw- ful objectives. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended29 ORDER The Respondent, Metropolitan Regional Council of Carpen- ters, Southeastern Pennsylvania, State of Delaware and Eastern Shore of Maryland, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Threatening representatives of 421 Chestnut Partners LP, or any other neutral employer, that the Union will cause pro- tests, work stoppages, or problems with deliveries, where an object of such threats is to force or require that employer to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise deal- ing in the products of Adams-Bickel Associates, Inc., and to cease doing business with Adams-Bickel Associates, Inc., or to 28 International Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 US 392, 400 (1947). 29 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom- mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes. CARPENTERS (ADAMS-BICKEL ASSOCIATES) 1017 force or require Adams-Bickel Associates, Inc., to cease using selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the prod- ucts of unspecified “unfair” subcontractors, and to cease doing business with those subcontractors. (b) Threatening representatives of Penn Valley Constructors, Inc., or any other neutral employer, that the Union will cause employees that it represents to refuse to unload and install products of American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc., where an ob- ject of such threats is to force or require Penn Valley Construc- tors, Inc., PA Fly Contracting, Inc., or any other neutral em- ployer, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or other- wise dealing in the products of American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc., or to cease doing business with American Millwork Cabi- netry, Inc., or to force or require American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc., to recognize and bargain with the Union as the representa- tive of American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc.’s employees al- though the Union has not been certified as the representative of those employees under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. (c) In any other manner engage in conduct prohibited by Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act that is directed at neutral em- ployers with the objective of forcing or requiring neutral em- ployers to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or oth- erwise dealing in the products of other employers, or to force or require neutral employers to cease doing business with other employers, or to force or require an employer to recognize and bargain with the Union as the representative of its employees although the Union has not been certified as the representative of those employees under the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act. (a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its un- ion office in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”30 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al- tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient copies of the notice for posting by Adams-Bickel Associates, Inc., and Penn Valley Constructors, Inc., if willing, at all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. (c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. APPENDIX NOTICE TO MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE 30 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no- tice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain on your behalf with your employer Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi- ties. WE WILL NOT threaten representatives of 421 Chestnut Part- ners LP, or any other neutral employer, that the Union will cause protests, work stoppages, or problems with deliveries, where an object of such threats is to force or require that em- ployer to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or other- wise dealing in the products of Adams-Bickel Associates, Inc., and to cease doing business with Adams-Bickel Associates, Inc., or to force or require Adams-Bickel Associates, Inc., to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise deal- ing in the products of unspecified “unfair” subcontractors, and to cease doing business with those subcontractors. WE WILL NOT threaten representatives of Penn Valley Con- structors, Inc., or any other neutral employer, that the Union will cause employees that it represents to refuse to unload and install products of American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc., where an object of such threats is to force or require Penn Valley Con- structors, Inc., PA Fly Contracting, Inc., or any other neutral employer, to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of American Millwork Cabi- netry, Inc., or to cease doing business with American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc., or to force or require American Millwork Cabi- netry, Inc., to recognize and bargain with the Union as the rep- resentative of American Millwork Cabinetry, Inc.’s employees although the Union has not been certified as the representative of those employees under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1018 WE WILL NOT, in any other manner, engage in prohibited ac- tivities directed at persons engaged in commerce, or in an in- dustry affecting commerce, with the objective of forcing or requiring such persons to cease using, selling, handling, trans- porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of other employ- ers, or to force or require such persons to cease doing business with other employers, or to force or require an employer to recognize and bargain with the Union as the representative of its employees although the Union has not been certified as the representative of those employees under the provisions of the Act. METROPOLITAN REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS, SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA, STATE OF DELAWARE AND EASTERN SHORE OF MARYLAND, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMERICA