CDA, Inc.

CDA, INC. 349 NLRB No. 58 627 CDA, Inc. and United Government Security Officers of America, International Union and United Government Security Officers of America, Local 401. Case 15–CA–17832 March 26, 2007 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS KIRSANOW AND WALSH On December 27, 2006, Administrative Law Judge George Carson II issued the attached decision. The Re- spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec- ommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, CDA, Inc., Fort Rucker, Alabama, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. Joseph A. Hoffmann Jr., Esq., for the General Counsel. Everett M. Urech, Esq., for the Respondent. Bonnie Pitts, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE GEORGE CARSON II, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried in Ozark, Alabama, on November 13, 2006.1 An order consolidating cases and consolidated complaint in this case and Case 15–CA–17898 issued on October 27, 2006. At the hearing I approved a non-Board settlement of the allega- tions in Case 15–CA–17898, dismissed the complaint with regard to the settled allegations, and severed that case.2 Case 1 The Respondent has not excepted to the judge’s finding that its failure to provide requested information to the Union violated the Act. In addition, no party has excepted to the judge’s dismissals of the alle- gations that the Respondent unlawfully sent or threatened to send the names of employees who filed grievances to the Army’s government contracting officer, told a prospective employer about an employee’s union activity in an attempt to interfere with her job search, and refused to meet and bargain with the Union. 1 All dates are in 2005, unless otherwise indicated. The charge in Case 15–CA–17832 was filed on September 30 and amended on De- cember 13. 2 Counsel for the General Counsel objected to the severance of the cases, but not to the terms of the settlement, which were stated on the record and to which both the Respondent and Charging Party, a differ- ent union representing a different unit, agreed. In view of counsel’s objection, rather than remanding Case 15–CA–17898 to the Region, I 15–CA–17898 has been deleted from the caption. The remain- ing paragraphs of the complaint allege two violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act), the dis- charge of Bonnie Pitts in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, and several violations of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The Respondent’s answer denies all violations. I find that the discharge of Pitts and the failure of the Respondent to provide the Union with requested relevant information violated the Act. On the entire record, including my observation of the de- meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the brief filed by the General Counsel, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION CDA, Inc. (the Respondent or the Company) is a corporation engaged in providing security services at various military in- stallations in the United States, including Fort Rucker, Ala- bama. The Company annually provides services valued in ex- cess of $50,000 to the United States Government. The Respon- dent admits, and I find and conclude, that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The Respondent, at the hearing, admitted that United Gov- ernment Security Officers of America, International Union, and United Government Security Officers of America, Local 401 (jointly the Union) is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Overview The Company provides security services at Fort Rucker, Alabama. The Company assumed the security contract at Fort Rucker from the previous provider of security in October 2003. Clifton Dates, president of the company, is located in Memphis, Tennessee. The onsite project manager is Ronald Head, who worked as a security officer for the predecessor. On April 15, 2002, the Union was certified as the representa- tive of the approximately 150 full-time and regular part-time security officers of the predecessor.3 After the Company assumed the security contract in October 2003, the Union and Company entered into a collective-bargaining agreement effective from March 1, 2004, until March 1, 2008. In August 2004, Bonnie Pitts became president of Local 401. Pitts filed grievances on behalf of herself as well as other unit employees. In October retained jurisdiction and advised the parties that, in the event of a fail- ure to comply with the terms of the non-Board settlement, the alleged failure should be raised pursuant to an appropriate motion to me. Coun- sel stated that his objection was predicated upon a policy of the Region regarding severance. Case 15–CA–17898 involved a different Charging Party and a different unit. I perceived no basis for depriving the parties of an amicable settlement upon terms to which they agreed and to which the General Counsel had no objection. 3 The appropriate unit is: All full-time and regular part-time security officers employed by the Employer to provide security at the Fort Rucker Army Base under the terms of any Federal Government’s Department of Defense contract with the Employer. DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 628 2004, Pitts met President Clifton Dates “to go over grievances.” Dates, referring to the grievances, told Pitts that the “the Union was causing him too much time and money and that, if the Union kept causing him trouble, he would get contracting [the govern- ment contract people] to get rid of it.” He made a similar remark in January 2005. Dates, who testified both before and after Pitts, did not deny making the foregoing statements. Pitts was dis- charged on July 18, thereafter advised that she was only sus- pended, and finally discharged on August 8. Although there are 8(a)(1) and (5) allegations in the com- plaint, the central issue in this case is whether the discharge of Pitts violated the Act. B. Facts In March, the Company’s prescribed uniform required the wearing of long sleeved shirts. In southern Alabama, March can be hot. Project Manager Head made an exception to the uni- form requirement and permitted employees performing guard duties at a facility that had no electricity and, therefore, no fans, to wear short sleeved shirts. Pitts, who was not assigned to that facility, also dressed in a short sleeved shirt. A supervisor rep- rimanded her, apparently verbally, but Pitts, “in protest,” con- tinued to wear a short sleeved shirt. Pitts was then counseled for insubordination, after which she complied with the long sleeved shirt requirement. She filed a grievance on April 1 re- garding the reprimand and counseling. In April, Pitts called in sick about an hour before her shift began. Prior to this, Head had approved leave for a number of employees and had informed the employees scheduled to work that any absence would need to be supported by “some type of documentation.” The contract, article 10, section 10.11A, re- quires employees to call in at least 3 hours before their shift. Pitts called in only an hour before her shift and failed to pro- vide a medical excuse. She explained to Head that she had a headache, that everybody knew she got headaches, and that she did not want to incur the expense of going to a physician who would be unable to do anything for her. Pitts was warned for an attendance violation. She filed a grievance. On June 21, the Union, by Pitts, filed a request for informa- tion “for investigation for a possible grievance.” The request, so far as relevant to this proceeding, seeks a list of employees who requested Father’s Day off and received the day off, a list of employees who requested that day off but were denied the day off, and the “[r]eason for each denial.” On June 22, Project Manager Head responded, in writing, to the foregoing request stating, “I’m not going to be harassed and map out every request for leave every time somebody doesn’t get his or her way.” In late June, the Company was advised that it would be re- quired to provide security for a Freedom Fest celebration at Fort Rucker over the July 4 weekend. Project Manger Head published a memorandum dated June 22 stating that “[t]he fol- lowing personnel will work the stated shift on the day noted.” It acknowledged that the schedule would “involve personnel that would be scheduled off for a holiday . . . and those that work a 32-hour shift.” After Head published the memorandum, Union President Pitts called him and said that the Company needed to “offer overtime and look for volunteers” rather than scheduling the D- shift employees who would be off over the holiday. According to Head, Pitts also stated that he “couldn’t make them work and that they shouldn’t have to work.” Section 4.2 of the collective- bargaining agreement provides that temporary assignments shall be voluntary “unless there are no volunteers, in which case the Employer may require the least senior qualified em- ployee to take the temporary assignment.” Head did not offer overtime or seek volunteers. He believed that Pitts was speaking with employees because, following his conversation with her, he received calls from “some of the in- dividuals that didn’t want to work.” Because of those calls, Head was unsure whether those employees would report. Al- though Head asserted that Pitts was “[t]elling people not to show up for work,” there is no evidence that she did so. Head testified that “several people” refused to work and were terminated. Documentary evidence establishes that two employees, Robert Prueter and John Turner, did not report to work and were terminated. Pitts filed grievances on their be- half. On July 8, Pitts filed a class action grievance that stated the name of the aggrieved as “D shift officers.” The grievance cites several articles of the collective-bargaining agreement includ- ing article 4, section 4.2, which, as already noted, provides that temporary assignments shall be voluntary “unless there are no volunteers, in which case the Employer may require the least senior qualified employee to take the temporary assignment.” The description of the grievance states, “Change in past prac- tice. S/O’s [Security Officers] Dianna Smith, Sandy Adkins, Patricia Sherman, Sabrenia Nath, and Charlene Barry were required to work their regular days off. Some of these Officers had already made plans for those days.” The adjustment sought is “[t]hat this practice cease until negotiated on.” The grievance is signed by Pitts “for ‘D’ Shift officers.” Project Manager Head, by a memorandum dated July 11, re- sponded to the grievance filed by Pitts, citing a document that predates the collective-bargaining agreement, as follows: The contingency plan required me to use my manage- ment right to direct the work force to man all post [sic] and I was supposed to be able to do it without harassment, coercion, or intimidation from the Union. The cover sheet on the rollover bidding dated 25 Nov 2003 states that “Any D-shift will be required to work in another location on holidays or days off if needed.” The name of the individuals that have filed this griev- ance in opposition to the contingency plan have been for- warded to the COR [Contracting Officer Representative]. On July 18, Pitts was discharged. The termination document, dated July 18, and signed by Project Manager Head, states: ON 8 JULY 2005 I RECEIVED GRIEVANCE #54 LISTING 5 DISGRUNTLED EMPLOYEES THAT HAD TO WORK IN SUPPORT OF FREEDOM FEST CONTINGENCY PLAN. ON 14 JULY 2005 I RECEIVED A DA FORM 2823 STATEMENT FROM DIANNA SMITH STATING THAT SHE NEVER FILED OR WAS ASK [sic] TO FILE A GRIEVANCE. SHE STATES THAT SHE CDA, INC. 629 UNDERSTOOD THE REQUIREMENTS OF HER JOB WHEN SHE TOOK IT. THIS GRIEVANCE WAS FILED WITHOUT THE SIGNATURE OF ANY OF THE NAMED AGGRIEVED. THE ONLY SIGNATURE WAS BONNIE PITTS. THIS GRIEVANCE HAD BEEN FALSIFIED AND MISREPRESENTS AT LEAST ONE OF THE PARTIES NAMED. UNDER THE IRP [Individual Reliability Pro- gram] 3–7 DISQUALIFYING FACTORS (8) FALSIFICATION. ANY KNOWING AND WILLFUL FALSIFICATION, COVER-UP, CONCEALMENT, MISREPRESENTATION, OR OMISSION OF MATERIAL USED BY DoD OR ANY OTHER FEDERAL AGENCY. [sic] THIS ACTION HAS CAUSED A DISRUPTION TO THE WORK FORCE. ALSO YOU WERE COUNSELED FOR ATTENDANCE OF 23 APRIL 2005 AND COUNSELED FOR INSUBORDINATION FOR 24 AND 29 MARCH 2005. YOUR EMPLOYMENT WITH CDA SECURITY IS TERMINATED. Following the termination of Pitts on July 18, the Company placed her on suspension on the basis of legal advice while “they looked into it a little closer.” On August 8, Pitts was again informed that she was terminated. No additional reason for the termination was stated. The DA form 2823 from Dianna Smith, to which the dis- charge document refers, was not offered as an exhibit. Al- though the document notes the prior discipline administered to Pitts, the “disruption in the work place” statement refers only to the alleged falsification. Article 5, section 5.5 of the collective-bargaining agreement grants the Union the right to “file a group grievance (class ac- tion).” President Dates, in a letter dated August 15, refers to the July 8 grievance on behalf of the D shift employees as a “group grievance.” The IRP [Individual Reliability Program] sets requirements for the contractor’s employees and, in Chapter 3–7 lists dis- qualifying factors which include disloyalty, criminal miscon- duct, and drug abuse. Disqualifying Factor 8, the factor cited in the discharge document, relates to falsification/refusal to an- swer. It states: Any knowing and willful falsification, cover-up, concealment, misrepresentation, or omission of material used by DoD or any other Federal agency. Failing or refusing to answer or to authorize others to answer questions or provide information required by a Congressional committee, court, or agency in the course of an official inquiry when information is relevant to the evaluation of an individual’s reliability. At the hearing, Contracting Office Specialist Nancy Bledsoe, who is responsible for the security contracts at Fort Rucker, was shown the grievance and testified that it was not a docu- ment that the Department of Defense uses. Pitts had previously filed grievances on behalf of employees, submitting them under her signature, “Bonnie Pitts for” the named employee. The record reflects that such grievances were filed on May 10 on behalf of Tammy Flanagan, on May 10 on behalf of Rachael Faber, on July 5 on behalf of Robert Prueter, and on July 5 on behalf of John Turner. Head, acting on behalf of the Company, denied the foregoing grievances. The denials do not mention or object to the failure of the grievant to sign the grievances signed on their behalf by Pitts. The denials of the grievance of Prueter and Turner are dated July 12. On July 22, 4 days after Pitts’ discharge, Head sent a memorandum to the Union, citing the grievances of Prueter and Turner and stat- ing, “[p]er section 5.3B, this shall be signed by the aggrieved employees and steward.” Project Manager Head testified that he considered Pitt’s con- duct, her uniform protest in March, her failure to provide a medical excuse in April, and her purportedly “[t]elling people not to show up to work,” to be insubordinate. When asked by counsel for the Respondent whether insubordination was the “the main reason” that he terminated her, Head answered, “yes.” When asked by counsel for the General Counsel whether he was testifying that the grievance filed by Pitts on behalf of all D shift employees had nothing to do with her discharge, Head answered that he was “not saying it didn’t have anything to do with it. It did cause part of the disruption . . . it was going to cause a disruption.” When shown the discharge document that uses the term disruption only with regard to the purported falsification of the grievance, Head defensively answered, “I’m here to testify that it was all the actions.” I do not credit Head’s response to his counsel’s question as to whether insubordination was “the main reason” for Pitts discharge or his assertion that it was “all the actions.” The dis- charge document clearly states and establishes that “the main reason” for her discharge was what Head deemed to be falsifi- cation in violation of IRP Chapter 3–7, disqualifying factor 8, by including Dianne Smith in the grievance without her knowl- edge or consent. When recalled by the Respondent, Head again referred to “a disruption to the workforce,” noting the calls that he received from employees which left him unsure as to whether the employ- ees were going to report to work as scheduled. There is no evi- dence that Pitts had any involvement in, or responsibility for, those calls. More significantly, the discharge document does not accuse Pitts of counseling employees not to report to work. President Clifton Dates testified that Pitts was not fired for her grievance activity but for “gross insubordination and not working with our management team.” He felt that her alleged failure to work with management was because Pitts “felt her loyalty [was] to the Union, and that was where most of her problems derived from, loyalty.” He denied having seen the July 8 grievance, but then professed “familiarity with the viola- tions that she were written up for.” Following her termination, Pitts sought work at various loca- tions including a local tavern, the Office Lounge and Package Store, which is owned by Deborah Weaver. Pitts, as a customer at the Lounge, had informed Weaver of her discharge, explain- ing that it was for “filing a grievance.” Counsel for the General Counsel subpoenaed Weaver. She did not appear.4 I permitted 4 I denied a motion to adjourn the hearing for subpoena enforcement. See Ohmite Mfg. Co., 290 NLRB 1036 fn. 5 and 1044 fn. 8 (1988). DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 630 the General Counsel to make an offer of proof, the substance of which follows: Ms. Pitts on September 13, 2005, went there [to the Office Lounge] to apply for a job. Ms. Weaver told Ms. Pitts that she didn’t have anything available but asked for her name and in- formation and for a contact number—for previous employer information. She wrote down Ronald Head’s name and phone number where he could be reached. On September 16, she telephoned Ronald Head. She asked—she told Mr. Head that Bonnie Pitts had applied for a job and asked if she was de- pendable and punctual. Mr. Head said yes. He then said that Ms. Pitts had been suspended at the time, then said that Ms. Pitts had gotten involved in union doings, and the conversa- tion ended. She'll [Weaver would] say that she did not ask Mr. Head if Ms. Pitts was involved in union activity. Pitts did not testify whether she was seeking work as a bar- tender or in some other capacity, and she cited no past qualifi- cations. Project Manager Head, when testifying as an adverse wit- ness, denied knowing anyone named Deborah Weaver. When recalled following the foregoing offer of proof, he testified that he had received a call from a woman regarding Pitts, but he “did not know her to be Ms. Weaver at the time.” He con- sidered the call to be a “set up” because the caller was not asking the type of questions normally asked by a prospective employer. He did not recall being asked about attendance or ability to “get along with others.” The individual questioned whether Pitts was still employed or had any continuing rela- tionship with the Company. He truthfully replied that Pitts had been terminated but remained president of the local un- ion. C. Contentions of the Parties The General Counsel contends that the Company’s own document reflects that Pitts was discharged for an alleged misrepresentation in the course of the protected activity of filing grievances and that the discharge violated both Section 8(a)(1) and Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. The Respondent, through the testimony of Project Manager Head, contends that Pitts was discharged for insubordination and disruption. Project Manager Head acknowledged that Pitts was only counseled for being out of uniform in March. Although he referred to the April incident as “insubordina- tion,” the discharge document refers to that discipline as “at- tendance.” The discharge document simply refers to the prior discipline that Pitts had received for attendance in April and insubordination in March. Head never explained how the July 8 grievance, which sought bargaining, not a monetary rem- edy, “was going to cause a disruption.” D. Analysis and Concluding Findings 1. The 8(a)(1) allegations The complaint alleges that the Respondent, on July 11, “sent, or threatened to send, the name of employees who filed grievance to the United States Army’s Government Contract- ing Officer for possible punitive action.” The memorandum to Local 401 in which Head states that he is sending the names of the employees named in grievance #54 to “COR” does not mention punitive action. There is no evidence that the con- tracting officer representative has any disciplinary authority regarding employees of the contractor. Neither Pitts nor any other union representative testified to the effect, if any, of sending the names of the employees named in the grievance to the COR. There is no evidence that the memorandum con- stituted a threat of punitive action for filing a grievance. I shall recommend that this allegation be dismissed. The complaint alleges that the Respondent, by Project Manager Head, “told a prospective employer about employ- ees’ union activity in an attempt to interfere with their job search.” Although Pitts had informed Weaver that she had been discharged by CDA for “filing a grievance,” the General Counsel points out that the complaint allegation is predicated upon the intent of Project Manager Head. Although Head had disciplined Pitts for insubordination and attendance, accord- ing to the offer of proof, he assured Weaver that Pitts was dependable and punctual. Even if I credited only the state- ment in the offer of proof, Head’s truthful reference to Pitts’ union activity would interfere with her job search only if Weaver, the prospective employer, discriminated on the basis of a prospective employee’s union sympathies. Weaver knew of Pitts’ union activity, and she had no position to fill. Head did not seek to discourage Weaver from hiring Pitts. James Group Services, 219 NLRB 158 (1975), Armstrong Rubber Co., 215 NLRB 620 (1974). Insofar as Weaver had no position to fill, I cannot compre- hend why Weaver would seek to contact Head regarding a nonexistent position other than at Pitts’ request. I credit Head’s testimony that his reference to Pitts’ union activity was a truthful response to Weaver’s questioning him as to whether Pitts had any continuing relationship with the Re- spondent. There was no interference with Pitts’ job search. I shall recommend that this allegation dismissed. 2. The 8(a)(5) allegations The complaint alleges that the Respondent has failed and refused to provide the Union with the information requested on June 21 regarding employees who requested to be off on Father’s Day and either were given or denied the day off, together with an explanation for the denied requests. Project Manager Head’s response refers to harassment and states that he is not going to “map out every request for leave every time somebody doesn’t get his or her way.” The Respondent does not contend that it provided the information or any further response. The decision in A-Plus Roofing, 295 NLRB 967, 970 (1989), confirms that “[a]n employer, pursuant to Section 8(a)(5) of the Act, has an obligation to provide requested information needed by the bargaining representative of its employees for the effective performance of the Respondent’s duties and responsibilities. NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–436 (1967).” Insofar as the information sought relates to bargaining unit employees, it is presumptively rele- vant and “[a]n employer must furnish information that is of even probable or potential relevance to the union’s duties.” Conrock Co., 263 NLRB 1293, 1294 (1982). The Respondent, CDA, INC. 631 by failing to provide the requested information that was rele- vant to the Union “for investigation for a possible grievance,” violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. The complaint alleges that the Respondent, since July 18, has refused to meet and bargain with the Union regarding the “supervision and termination,” actually the suspension and termination, of Pitts; since August 8, has refused to meet and bargain regarding the termination of Pitts; and since July has failed and refused to process a grievance regarding requiring employees to work on their regular day off. On July 19, Pitts filed a grievance regarding her initial discharge, and on Au- gust 17 she filed a grievance regarding her discharge on Au- gust 8. As already noted, on July 11, Project Manager Head responded to the Union regarding the grievance requiring employees to work on their day off stating that he used his “management right to direct the work force to man all post[s].” Thereafter, by letter dated July 22, he informed the Union that “CDA Inc. Memphis and their representatives are handling these cases.” The General Counsel argues that, thereafter, there was no further response. Counsel for the General Counsel’s brief does not address Section 5.3E of the contract which provides that “[i]f either party fails to respond within the above-prescribed [contractual] time limits, the said party’s issue will be deemed a settlement for the last request- ing party.” The Respondent had no obligation to “meet and bargain” other than in the context of the contractual grievance procedure. The foregoing contractual provision obviates a need for any response. I shall recommend that these allega- tions be dismissed. 3. The discharge of Bonnie Pitt The Board, in Exxon Mobil Corp., 343 NLRB 287 (2004), confirmed the protected status of union stewards engaged in grievance filing activity as follows: It is well established that employees, under Section 7 of the Act, have the protected right to file and process grievances, and the discipline or discharge of employees for doing so is a violation of Section 8(a)(1). See, e.g., Prime Time Shuttle International, 314 NLRB 838, 841 (1994); Thor Power Tool Co., 148 NLRB 1379, 1380– 1381 (1964), enfd. 351 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965). The Board has long made clear that the grievance activities of union stewards are especially important to the effective- ness of grievance-arbitration machinery. Union Fork & Hoe Co., 241 NLRB 907, 908 (1979); Clara Barton Ter- race Convalescent Center, 225 NLRB 1028, 1034 (1976). I have not credited the testimony of Project Manager Head regarding the multiple reasons that he cited as being his rea- sons for discharging Pitts. When shifting reasons are given by a Respondent in order to justify a discharge, the Board has often inferred that the shifting reasons were given to hide the true reason for the discharge. In this case, the shifting reasons were given in an incredible attempt to negate the reason for discharge that was clearly stated on the Respondent’s dis- charge document dated July 18. Project Manager Head asserted that he discharged Pitts for insubordination, citing her conduct in March and April cou- pled with his belief that she was causing disruption by coun- seling employees not to report for Freedom Fest, but he did not do so. If, as he claimed in testimony, those were the rea- sons for her termination, Head would have discharged Pitts well before July 18. On July 11, Head responded to the griev- ance relating to the scheduling of D shift employees by citing the management-rights clause in the contract. It was not until the Respondent received the report of Dianna Smith that the Respondent took any action against Pitts. Project Manager Head appears to have been aware that he could not discipline Union President Pitts simply for filing grievances. Notwith- standing that awareness, his refusal to provide information regarding his approving or denying leave over Father’s Day, while asserting that he was being “harassed,” reveals antipa- thy towards the filing of grievances by the Union. The dis- charge document accuses Pitts of having falsified a document in violation of the IRP, an offense that she did not commit. I find that the Respondent seized upon Smith’s report to accuse Pitts of falsification in order to put an end to the disruptive “harassment” of grievances that she filed for the Union. The discharge document refers to the IRP section relating to falsification. That provision relates to falsification of “ma- terial used by DoD.” Contract Specialist Bledsoe testified that the grievance was not a document used by the Department of Defense. The Board, in Roadmaster Corp., 288 NLRB 1195 (1988), held that the union steward therein, although having actually forged the name of the grievant, had not falsified a company document because “grievance forms . . . cannot reasonably be considered company documents within the meaning of the Respondent's rule in this case.” In this case, the grievance was not a DoD document. It was not used by DoD. It was and is a union document. There was no falsifica- tion in violation of the IRP. Furthermore, there was no falsification of any document. The group grievance names the affected D shift employees. Pitts did not forge any signatures. She, as president, signed the grievance on their behalf, “for ‘D’ Shift officers.” The fact that one or more of the affected employees “may not have been aware or may not have directly participated in [the] decision” to file the grievance is immaterial. Brad Snodgrass, Inc., 338 NLRB 917, 923 (2003). The grievance was a griev- ance of the union claiming a change in past practice that was contrary to the contract. As counsel for the General Counsel points out in his brief, the grievance does not claim that any D shift employee was complaining. The grievance requests that that “this practice cease until negotiated on,” an institutional remedy involving the Union rather than an individual remedy such as compen- sation for each employee. I have found no case authority holding that the inclusion of the name of a member of a group affected by an alleged change or contract violation without the consent of that group member constitutes some sort of impropriety. The inclusion of the names of the D shift em- ployees “was part of the res gestae of the grievance proce- dure” and as such was protected concerted activity.” Road- master Corp., supra at 1197. Pitts engaged in no opprobrious DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 632 conduct that removed her from the protection of the Act with regard to her protected grievance filing activity. Atlantic Steel Co., 245 NLRB 814 (1979). The General Counsel argues that Pitts was discharged for her grievance filing and union activity, alleged in the complaint as both an 8(a)(1) and (3) violation. In this case, as in Road- master Corp., supra, there is evidence of animus towards griev- ance filing activity. Project Manager Head’s June 22 response to the Union’s request for information in which he advised that he was “not going to be harassed,” reflects animus. That ani- mus is confirmed by President Dates’ statements to Pitts that “the Union was causing him too much time and money and that, if the Union kept causing him trouble, he would get con- tracting [the government contract people] to get rid of it.” He referred to Pitts’ “loyalty” to the Union, which, by implication, constituted “disloyalty” to the Respondent. See Sea Breeze Health Care Center, 331 NLRB 1131, 1132 (2000). I find that the Respondent discharged Local Union 401 Union President Bonnie Pitts in order to put an end to her grievance filing activ- ity. In doing so, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act, as alleged in the complaint. I am mindful that the Board holds that “where an employer admits that it discharged an employee for engaging in protected activity, a Wright Line analysis is inapplicable. See, e.g., Phoe- nix Transit System, 337 NLRB 510 (2002), enfd. 63 Fed. Appx. 524 (D.C. Cir. 2003).” Allied Aviation Fueling of Dallas LP, 347 NLRB 248 fn. 2 (2006). In this case, as discussed above, the Respondent has not admitted that it discharged Pitts because of her protected grievance filing activity, thus, lest there be any question, I shall address the evidence under the framework of Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982). There is no issue regarding Pitts’ involvement in protected union activity and the Respondent’s knowledge of that activity. Even when an em- ployer does not harbor overall animus towards employee organ- izational activity, animus towards an employee’s “grievance activity and his [her] exercise of rights under the collective bargaining agreement” establishes the requisite animus. New Orleans Cold Storage Co., 326 NLRB 1473 fn. 1 (1998). The termination of Pitts was an adverse action directly affecting her employment. Thus, the General Counsel established that Pitts’ union activity was a motivating factor for the Respondent’s action. Manno Electric, 321 NLRB 278 (1996). The Respondent has not established that Pitts would have been discharged in the absence of her protected conduct. The alleged falsification of the grievance “was part of the res gestae” of her protected grievance filing activity. In fact, there was no falsification. I have not credited Project Head’s testi- mony, unsupported by any probative evidence, that Pitts en- gaged in any misconduct with regard to the work requirements for Freedom Fest. No such misconduct is stated in the discharge memorandum. President Dates’ references to Pitts’ loyalty further confirm the Respondent’s unlawful motivation. I find that the reasons offered by the Respondent at the hearing that vary from the clear language of the discharge document are pretextual. The discharge document cites Pitts for falsification in violation of disqualifying factor 8 in the IRP [Individual Reliability Program]. That provision relates to “material used by DoD.” Pitts did not falsify material used by the Department of Defense. As I have found, she falsified nothing. When the reason given for an adverse employment action is either false, or does not exist, the Respondent has not rebutted General Counsel’s prima facie case. Limestone Apparel Corp., 255 NLRB 722 (1981). Thus, even if a Wright Line analysis were applicable, the record establishes that the Respondent dis- charged Pitts because of her protected grievance filing activities in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. By discharging Bonnie Pitts on July 18, 2005, thereafter converting the discharge to a suspension, and by discharging her on August 8, 2005, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) and (3) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. By failing and refusing to provide the Union with the in- formation it requested regarding requests for the day off on Father’s Day and the granting or denial of such requests and reasons for denials as requested by the Union on June 21, 2005, said information being relevant and necessary to the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees it represents, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor prac- tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un- fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu- ate the policies of the Act. The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged Bonnie Pitts, it must offer her reinstatement and make her whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from August 8, 2005, to date of proper offer of reinstate- ment, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as com- puted in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987). The Respondent having failed and refused to provide the Un- ion with the information it sought regarding requests for the day off on Father’s Day, the granting or denial of such requests, and reasons for denials as requested by the Union on June 21, 2005, it must promptly supply that information. The Respondent must also post an appropriate notice. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommended5 ORDER The Respondent, CDA, Inc., Fort Rucker, Alabama, its offi- cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from 5 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses. CDA, INC. 633 (a) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against any em- ployee for engaging in grievance filing activities for United Government Security Officers of America, International Union, and United Government Security Officers of America, Local 401, or any other union. (b) Failing and refusing to provide the Union with the infor- mation regarding requests for the day off on Father’s Day, the granting or denial of such requests, and the reasons for denials as requested by the Union on June 21, 2005, said information being relevant and necessary to the Union as the collective- bargaining representative of the unit employees it represents in the following appropriate unit: All full-time and regular part-time security officers employed by the Employer to provide security at the Fort Rucker Army Base under the terms of any Federal Government’s Depart- ment of Defense contract with the Employer. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec- tuate the policies of the Act. (a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer Bonnie Pitts full reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed. (b) Make Bonnie Pitts whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against her in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the deci- sion. (c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from its files any reference to the unlawful discharge, and within 3 days thereafter notify Bonnie Pitts in writing that this has been done and that the discharge will not be used against her in any way. (d) Provide the Union with the information it sought regard- ing requests for the day off on Father’s Day and the granting or denial of such requests and reasons for denials as requested by the Union on June 21, 2005. (e) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such addi- tional time as the Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment re- cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (f) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa- cility at Fort Rucker, Alabama, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”6 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 15, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by 6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg- ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board.” the Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con- spicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and former employ- ees employed by the Respondent at any time since June 21, 2005. (g) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed inso- far as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board had found that we violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this notice. FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO Form, join, or assist a union Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against any of you for engaging in grievance filing activities for United Government Security Officers of America, International Union, and United Government Security Officers of America, Local 401, or any other union. WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to provide to the Union infor- mation that it has requested that is relevant and necessary to the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of the unit employees it represents. The appropriate unit is: All full-time and regular part-time security officers employed by the Employer to provide security at the Fort Rucker Army Base under the terms of any Federal Government’s Depart- ment of Defense contract with the Employer. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re- strain, or coerce any of you in the exercise of your rights guar- anteed by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, offer Bonnie Pitts full reinstatement to her former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to her seniority or any other rights or privi- leges previously enjoyed and WE WILL make her whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination against her, less any net interim earnings, plus DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 634 interest, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision. WE WILL, within 14 days from the date of the Board’s Order, remove from our files any reference to the unlawful discharge of Bonnie Pitts and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, notify her in writing that this has been done and that the discharge will not be used against her in any way. WE WILL promptly provide the Union with the information it sought regarding requests for the day off on Father’s Day, the granting or denial of such requests, and reasons for denials as requested by the Union on June 21, 2005. CDA, INC. .