Harris Woolen Mills Co.

In the Matter of HYMAN S. LEVY, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE STYLE AND TRADE NAME OF HARRIS WOOLEN MILLS Co. and LOCAL No. 15 OF THE TEXTILE WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, AFFILIATED WITH THE C. I. O. Case No. C-905.-Decided March 7,1939 Woolen Cloth Manufacturing Industry-Interference, Restraint, and Coer- cion: objections to union's interference with "happy family" of employees- Discrimination: discharges for union membership and activity-Unit Appro- priate for Collective Bargaining : production employees , exclusive of supervisory and clerical workers ; stipulation as to-Representatives : proof of choice : comparison union records with pay roll-Collective Bargaining : refusal to enter into any contract with union-Reinstatement Ordered: discharged em- ployees-Back Pay: ordered to discharged employees. Mr. Benjamin E. Gordon, for the Board. Mr. Hyman S. Levy and Mrs. Amelia S. Levy, of Worcester, Mass., for the respondent. Mr. Sumner Marcus, of counsel to the Board. DECISION AND ORDER STATEMENT OF THE CASE Upon charges and amended charges duly filed by Local No. 15 of the Textile Workers Organizing Committee, herein called the Union, the National Labor Relations Board, herein called the Board, by A. Howard Myers, Regional Director for the First Region (Boston, Massachusetts), issued its complaint dated July 20, 1938, against Hyman S. Levy, doing business under the style and trade name of Harris Woolen Mills Co., Worcester, Massachusetts, herein called the respondent. The complaint and notice of hearing thereon were duly served upon the respondent and the Union. The complaint al- leged that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8 (1), (3), and (5) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, herein called the Act. Thereafter the 11 N. L. R. B., No. 80. 964 HYMAN S. LEVY ET AL. 965 respondent filed his answer to the complaint, denying that he caused a substantial part of his raw materials and of his manufactured goods to be transported in interstate commerce and that he had engaged in the alleged unfair labor practices. Pursuant to notice, a hearing was held in Worcester, Massachu- setts, on July 28, 29, and 30, 1938, before Waldo C. Holden, the Trial Examiner duly designated by the Board. The Board was repre- sented by counsel and the respondent was represented by himself and his wife. Both parties participated in the hearing. Full op- portunity to be heard, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues was afforded to the parties. During the course of the hearing the Trial Examiner made several rulings on motions and on objections to the admission of evidence. The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner and finds that no prejudicial errors were committed. The rulings are hereby affirmed. On September 6,1938, the Trial Examiner duly filed his Intermedi- ate Report, in which he found that the respondent had engaged in and was engaging in the unfair labor practices alleged in the com- plaint. He recommended that the respondent cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, or coercing his employees in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, from discour- aging membership in the Union or any other labor organization of his employees by discriminating in regard to their hire and tenure of employment, from refusing to bargain collectively with the Union, the representative of his production employees; and that he offer to 22 named persons immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, that he make whole these persons for any losses they might have suffered by reason of the respondent's discrimination, and that, upon request, he bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of his production employees in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment. The Trial Examiner also recommended that the respondent post notices indicating his compliance with the recom- mendations. Thereafter the respondent filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report. Although the Trial Examiner notified the respondent and the Union of their right to apply for oral argument or permission to file briefs, neither party has availed itself of its right. The Board has considered the respondent's exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Inter- mediate Report and finds them to be without merit. 164275-39-vol xi-62 966 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following : FINDINGS OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT Hyman S. Levy, the respondent, does business under the style and trade name of Harris Woolen Mills Co. at Worcester, Massachusetts. He is engaged in the manufacture of woolen cloth. In the manu- facture of this product during 1937 the respondent caused to be shipped to his plant 250,000 pounds of woolen rags, 15,000 pounds of cotton, 200,000 yards of cotton warp, and various dyes, chemicals, wool oil, fuel, and other machinery supplies. Approximately 10 per cent of these raw materials were shipped to the respondent from States other than Massachusetts. The respondent manufactures approximately 200,000 yards of cloth annually. During the year 1937 his total volume of business was approximately $90,000. Approximately 75 per cent of the re- spondent's total output is sold and transported to States other than Massachusetts. At the time of the hearing the respondent employed approximately 55 persons. II. THE ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local No. 15 of the Textile Workers Organizing Committee is a labor organization affiliated with the Committee for Industrial Or- ganization, admitting to its membership all textile workers employed in Worcester, Massachusetts, and its vicinity, except persons engaged in a supervisory or confidential capacity. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The chronology of events The Textile Workers Organizing Committee began to organize the respondent's employees in April 1937. On April 10, 1937, it nego- tiated a contract with the respondent, in which the respondent agreed to recognize the T. W. O. C. or its successor as the sole bargaining agency for his employees, and in which certain provisions with re- spect to hours, wages, and other working conditions were included. The agreement was to remain in effect until April 9, 1938. In January 1938 and thereafter conferences were held between the respondent and the Union concerning the method employed by the respondent in allocating work during slack periods. At a number of these conferences, the respondent asked Ellis, an organizer repre- senting the Union, why he was continually bothering the respondent and why he was interfering with the "happy family" of employees which had existed prior to the advent of the Union. HYMAN S. LEVY ET AL. 967 On March 21, 1938, Ellis submitted on behalf of the Union a proposed agreement for the ensuing year. A conference between the Union and the respondent was held on March 31 to discuss the ques- tion of signing the agreement. At this conference Levy informed the representatives of the Union that he was not interested in sign- ing any new agreement, stating as his reasons that the previous agree- ment had injured his business and that some of his employees had asked him not to sign a new agreement. At a further conference on April 6, Levy reiterated that he was not interested in signing any agreement with the Union, refused to accede to the request of the Union that the proposed agreement be discussed section by section, and protested against what he termed continued interference by the Union with his "happy family" of employees. On April 12 the Union filed with the Regional Director a charge alleging that the respondent had refused to bargain collectively with it. The Regional Director on May 16 called a meeting to determine the merit of the charge. At this meeting which was attended by representatives of the Board, the respondent, and the Union, Levy asserted that the respondent's refusal to bargain was predicated upon a lack of majority representation on the part of the Union. The Regional Director thereupon suggested that the question of ma- jority be settled by a check of the union membership records and the respondent's pay-roll records. Levy refused to agree to such a check. Levy asserted as the grounds for his refusal that the union membership records were inaccurate and that the representative of the Board whom the Regional Director suggested to make the check was biased. On May 20, the Regional Director wrote to Levy, asking whether he would consent to the Board's making a check of the type pre- viously proposed and whether the respondent would bargain with the Union if such check disclosed that the Union represented a majority of the respondent's employees. Levy did not reply to this letter. On June 2 the Union again met with Levy and requested him to sign the agreement which the Union had proposed. Levy replied that he was not interested in signing any agreement and that he doubted whether the Union represented a majority of the respond- ent's employees. He again refused to consent to a check of the union membership records with the pay-roll records of the respond- ent. At this time, Levy agreed to a further conference on June 6. Although the respondent did not normally operate his mill on Sat- urday, Levy notified the employees on June 3 that the mill would be operated on June 4, a Saturday. On the afternoon of the day of such notice, various supervisory officials inquired of employees as to whether they intended to work on June 4 and stated to a number 968 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of employees that if they chose not to work they would be replaced for the day by other persons.,, The president of the Union protested to Levy and Superintendent Hanlon against the bringing in of new employees, but Levy replied that he had a right to bring in whom he wanted. The respondent had not in the past brought in new employees on Saturday and the Union felt that the threat of the respondent to do so was an attempt to force the Union to rescind its rule against mem- bers of the Union working on Saturday. Accordingly, officials and a number of the Union's members gathered outside the mill on June 4 for the purpose of inducing other employees not to work. The places of those employees who did not work were filled, in part, by persons previously in the respondent's employ and, in part, by new employees. On the afternoon of June 4, Levy conferred with Hanlon, superin- tendent, and Mrs. Levy regarding what action should be taken. They concluded that those persons not at work on that day should not be permitted to return to work on the following workday, June 6. On the morning of June 6, many of the employees who had not worked on June 4 attempted to enter the mill, but Levy refused to permit them to do so. A number of these employees testified that Levy informed them that they "were through" because they had failed to work on the previous Saturday. Certain of the employees testified that Levy notified them that he would call them when needed. On the afternoon of June 6, Ellis, the T. W. O. C. organizer, and a representative of the Regional Director, attempted to confer with Levy. The latter refused to admit Ellis to his office. At the hearing, Levy testified in this connection that, in view of the occurrences on June 4 and 6, he considered his appointment with the representatives of the Union to have been broken. On June 16 the Union requested the Conciliation Service of the United States Department of Labor to settle its dispute with Levy. The representative of this agency was, however, unable to reach any settlement. On July 5 the Union's representatives met with Levy at the offices of the Massachusetts State Board of Conciliation and Arbitration. No settlement was reached at this meeting. As far as the record discloses, this was the last attempt by the Union to conciliate its differences with Levy. Levy testified at the hearing that he would be willing to bargain collectively with the Union if "they were fair and listened to reason," and that the only reason he had failed to bargain in the past was that they had not been "fair" and had not "listened to reason." i As pointed out in subsection B below, it was the established practice at the plant that on those occasions when the mill was operated on Saturday the individual employees had the option as to whether or not they would work. HYMAN S. LEVY ET AL. 969 B. The discharges The complaint names 22 persons 2 as having been discriminatorily discharged by the respondent. At the hearing, Levy conceded that on June 4, 1938, he discharged all but two of these employees, Eva McNamara and Irene Jogas.3 Eva McNamara went to the factory in order to work on June 4, but changed her mind when she arrived at the plant and discovered that many fellow employees were not going to work. When she ar- rived at the plant on June 6, Levy would not permit her to enter. Levy testified at the hearing that he had been informed on Saturday that she had desired to come to work on that day and that she wasi not, therefore, automatically discharged like the others. He testified further, however, that he did not permit her to come to work on June 6 because he desired to investigate further whether she had really been prevented from coming to work on June 4, and whether a job was available for her. Eva McNamara did not testify at the hearing, but it was stipulated that if she had testified she would have stated that on June 6 Levy had told her that anyone who had not worked on June 4 was discharged, and that she was, therefore, discharged. The record does not disclose why there was any question concerning the availability of her job. It is apparent that McNamara was denied her job on Julie 6 for the same reason that the other employees were denied their jobs on that day. We find that Eva McNamara was discharged on June 4 in the same manner as the other employees who were discharged on that day. Irene Jogas did not work on June 4, but instead left Worcester for the day. Levy testified that he was informed of this fact on June 4, and that, therefore, he did not include Jogas among those who were discharged on that day. Jogas came to the plant on June 6 to go to work, but did not go in. Jogas did not testify at the hearing, but it was stipulated that if she had testified she would have stated that she was told by Levy on June 6 that she was discharged because she had not come to work on June 4. Although Levy stated on direct examination that Jogas would have been permitted to work on June 6 if she had entered the factory on that day, he evaded on cross-examination any direct reply to the question whether Jogas was "automatically through." The following 2 These are the persons listed in Appendix A. 8Included in this group is Christopher Rukewicz . Rukewlcz did not work at the respondent's plant during the week ending June 4 and he testified at the hearing that he would not have worked on June 6 even if Levy had asked him to do so. The record shows, however, that he appeared at the plant on June 6 and did not attempt to enter the plant because of the respondent's action in refusing work to the employees who failed to work on June 4. As noted, the respondent conceded , moreover, that Rukewicz was properly included among those discharged on June 4. 970 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD testimony on cross-examination by counsel for the Board indicates the inconclusive nature of Levy's testimony upon this point : A. . . . I was told Monday morning, instead of coming down to the mill, she [Jogas] walked to Mr. Ellis, the organizer, and joined the crowd there. Q. Was she automatically through then? A. She was 4 She never reported for work. I can say that. Q. Can you tell whether or not she was automatically through? A. She never reported for work. In view of the inconclusiveness of Levy's testimony and of the entire circumstances surrounding Jogas' employment status with the re- spondent, we conclude that Jogas was among those persons who were discharged on June 4. As stated in subsection A above, the respondent did not customar- ily operate his plant on Saturday. On those occasions when he did, the individual employees had the option as to whether or not they would work. It is clear that the failure of the employees to work on June 4 constituted no violation of the respondent's rules and did not constitute a quitting of employment. The respondent contends, however, that the act of the employees in assembling outside the plant on June 4 and in attempting to prevent other employees from going to work violated the respondent's rules. It was upon this basis that the respondent attempted at the hearing to justify the dis- charges in question. It is significant with regard to the respondent's contention that the reason which he gave the employees on June 6 for their dis- charges was that they had not worked on the previous Saturday, and that he did not state at that time that the discharges were based on a violation of the respondent's rules. Indeed, there is no evidence that such a rule existed, apart from the mere statement of Levy. It is also significant that, although the respondent contended at the hearing that he discharged the employees on June 4 because they assembled outside the plant and attempted to prevent other employ- ees from going to work, in violation of the respondent's rules, it was stipulated that a large number of employees would have testified that they did not come near the plant on June 4 and that the evidence does not disclose any investigation by the respondent as to which employees were in fact outside the plant on June 4, and as to whether each of the employees named in the complaint actually engaged in an attempt to prevent other employees from com- ing to work on that day. It is to be noted, moreover, that it was not the practice of the respondent to bring in employees on Saturdays on 4 Italics supplied. HYMAN S. LEVY ET AL. 971 which the plant operated to fill the places of employees who chose not to work. This procedure was followed for the first time on June 4. This fact takes on a particular significance when considered to- gether with the fact that the Union was at this time attempting to carry on bargaining negotiations with the respondent. The fair conclusion is that the new employees were taken on as a threat to the Union. In view of the foregoing circumstances and in view of the fact that all the employees discharged on June 4 were, with one possible exception,5 members of the Union on that day, we conclude that the discharges on June 4 were for the purpose of discouraging member- ship in the Union. We find that the respondent has discriminated in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of the persons listed in Appendix A to discourage membership in the Union, and has thereby inter- fered with, restrained, and coerced his employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. All the persons listed in Appendix A testified that they had been unemployed from the date of their discharge to the date of the hearing and that they desired to be reinstated to their former posi- tions. Prior to their discharge the persons listed in Appendix A, with the exception of Bernard Dolan and Louis Snow, were earning an average of $17.78 weekly. The average weekly earnings of Dolan and Snow were $24. C. The refusal to bargain collectively 1. The appropriate unit The parties stipulated at the hearing that the unit appropriate for the, purposes of collective bargaining consists of the production employees of the respondent, exclusive of supervisory and clerical workers. There is nothing in the record to indicate that this unit is not appropriate. We find that the production employees of the respondent, ex- cluding supervisory and clerical workers, constitute a unit appro- priate for the purposes of collective bargaining and that said unit will insure to employees of the respondent the full benefit of their right to self-organization and collective bargaining and otherwise effectuate the policies of the Act. 5It was stipulated that Eva McNamara would have testified that she became a member of the Union "on or about June 4, 1938." 972 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2. Representation by the Union of a majority in the appropriate unit The parties stipulated at the hearing that there were 55 persons in the unit we have found to be appropriate for the purposes of col- lective bargaining throughout the period from March 21, the date on which the respondent is first alleged to have refused to bargain collectively, to the date of the hearing. It was also stipulated that the names of 46 of the respondent's employees within the appro- priate unit appeared on the Union's records as members of the Union at all material dates from March 21, 1938, to June 4, 1938. The re- spondent contends, however, that many such employees did not on the dates in question desire the Union to represent them and that the Union did not on such dates represent a majority of the em- ployees within the appropriate unit. Six of the 46 employees whose names appeared on the union records as members of the Union testified that they had not con- sidered themselves as members since 1937. A seventh employee tes- tified that he had belonged to the Union for 6 months, but that he was no longer a member. Another employee stated that he with- drew from the Union in 1937, but that he was reinstated in April 1938. It was stipulated that 11 other employees whose names ap- peared on the records of the Union as members would testify, if called, that they had not paid dues for "some time" and that they did not at the time of the hearing consider themselves to be mem- bers of the Union. The record is silent, however, as to the precise date or dates on which these 11 employees considered that their membership in the Union terminated. We conclude that no sufficient showing has been made that any considerable number of the 46 employees in question ceased to con- sider themselves as members of the Union prior to the time the Union began its attempts to bargain collectively with the respondent. We have seen in subsection A above that prior to and in the course of such attempted negotiations the respondent frequently charged that the Union was interfering with the "happy family" of em- ployees which had existed prior to the advent of the Union. We find that such action on the part of the respondent interfered with, restrained, and coerced the employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. We cannot give weight to an asserted change in the desires of employees regarding membership in the Union when such change followed upon such unfair labor practice on the part of the respondent .6 It is to be noted, moreover, 6 Matter of Arthur L. Cotten and A J. Colman, co-partners, doing business as Kiddie Kover Manufacturing Company and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 6 N. L. R. B. 355; Matter of Bradford Dyeing Association (U. S. A.) (a Corporation) and Tes,tile Workers' Organizing Committee of the C. I. 0., 4 N. L. R. B. 604. HYMAN S. LEVY ET AL. 973 that those employees who testified at the hearing concerning a change in their desires did so when called as witnesses by a respondent whose anti-union feelings had been clearly demonstrated. The testi- mony of the employees given under such circumstances can be given little weight in determining the real desires of the employees regard- ing representation. We find that on March 21, 1938, and at all times thereafter, the Union represented a majority of the employees of the respondent within the appropriate unit. 3. The refusal to bargain collectively We have set forth in detail in subsection A above the facts con- cerning the attempts of the Union to bargain collectively with the respondent. On March 31, 1938, and on numerous occasions there- after, the respondent stated definitely that he was not interested in signing any agreement with the Union. On many of these occa- sions the respondent asked the Union not to interfere with his employees, whom he described as constituting a "happy family." During the course of the conferences, the respondent assigned several reasons for his failure to discuss an agreement with the Union. At one time he stated that he would not sign an agreement with the Union because the agreement which he had signed the previous year had injured his business. He also stated that some of his employees had asked him not to sign an agreement with the Union. On several occasions he raised the question whether the Union represented a majority of persons in the appropriate unit. When the Union expressed its willingness to determine this question by permitting its membership records to be checked against the re- spondent's pay-roll records, Levy refused to make this check. He gave as one of the reasons for his refusal that the Union's member- ship records were not trustworthy. It is significant, however, that despite this asserted reason, he stated at the hearing that the only reason he had not bargained with the Union was that it had not been "fair" and had not "listened to reason." It is evident both from Levy's statements on various occasions to the Union's representatives, requesting them not to interfere with his employees, as well as from the inconsistencies in the reasons which he gave at various times for his refusal to bargain with the Union, that he never intended to bargain with the Union and would not have bargained under any circumstances. We find that the respondent on March 31, 1938, and on various occasions thereafter, refused to bargain collectively with the Union as the representative of his employees in the appropriate unit with respect to wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment. 974 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the respondent set forth in Section III above, occurring in connection with the operations of the respondent de- scribed in Section I above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and have led and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstruct- ing commerce and the free flow of commerce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that the respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we shall order him to cease and desist from further engaging in such practices. We shall also order the respondent to take certain affirmative action which we deem necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. We have found that the respondent discriminatorily discharged on June 4, 1938, the persons whose names are set forth in Appendix A. We shall order the respondent to offer these persons reinstatement to their former positions without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges, and to make them whole for any loss of pay they have suffered by reason of their discharges by payment to each of them of a sum equal to the amount which he would nor- mally have earned as wages from the date of his discharge to the date of the offer of reinstatement, less his net earnings 7 during said period. We shall further order the respondent, upon request, to bargain collectively with the Union as the exclusive representative of his pro- duction employees, exclusive of supervisory and clerical workers. Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and upon the entire record in the case, the Board makes the following : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Local No. 15 of the Textile Workers Organizing Committee is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act. 2. By discriminating in regard to the hire and tenure of employment of the persons listed in Appendix A, thereby discouraging member- ship in Local No. 15 of the Textile Workers Organizing Committee, 4 By "net earnings" is meant earnings less expenses , such as for transportation, room, and board , incurred by an employee in connection with obtaining work and working else- where than for the respondent , which would not have been incurred but for his unlawful discharge and the consequent necessity of his seeking employment elsewhere See Matter of Crossett Lumber Company and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Lumber and Sawmill Workers Caton, Local 2590, 8 N L R B 440 Monies received for work performed upon Federal , State, county, municipal , or other work-relief projects are not considered as earnings, but, as provided below in the Order , shall be deducted from the sum due the employee , and the amount thereof shall be paid over to the appropriate fiscal agency of the Federal, State, county, municipal , or other government or govern- ments which supplied the funds for said work-relief projects. HYMAN S. LEVY ET AL. 975 the respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor prac- tices within the meaning of Section 8 (3) of the Act. 3. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing his employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act, the re- spondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (1) of the Act. 4. The production employees of Hyman S. Levy, doing business un- der the style and trade name of Harris Woolen Mills Company, ex- cluding supervisory and clerical workers, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Sec- tion 9 (b) of the Act. 5. Local No. 15 of the Textile Workers Organizing Committee was on March 21 , 1938, and has been at all times thereafter , the exclusive representative of all such employees for the purposes of collective bar- gaining within the meaning of Section 9 (a) of the Act. 6. By refusing to bargain collectively with Local No. 15 of the Textile Workers Organizing Committee as the exclusive representa- tive of his employees in the appropriate unit, the respondent has en- gaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (5) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 ( 6) and (7) of the Act. ORDER Upon the basis of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, and pursuant to Section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the respond- ent, Hyman S. Levy, doing business under the style and trade name of Harris Woolen Mills Company, Worcester, Massachusetts, and his agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from : (a) Discouraging membership in Local No. 15 of the Textile Work- ers Organizing Committee or any other labor organization of his employees by discharging any of his employees or in any other man- ner discriminating in regard to their hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of their employment; (b) Refusing to bargain collectively with Local No. 15 of the Tex- tile Workers Organizing Committee as the exclusive representative of all his production employees, excluding supervisory and clerical work- ers, in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment; (c) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing his employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through rep- resentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activi- 976 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ties for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act : (a) Offer to the employees listed in Appendix A immediate and full reinstatement to their former positions without prejudice to their seniority and other rights and privileges; (b) Make whole the employees listed in Appendix A for any losses of pay they have suffered by their discharge by payment to each of them of a sum of money equal to that which he would normally have earned as wages from June 4, 1938, to the date of the offer of rein- statement, less his net earnings during said period, deducting, however, from the amount otherwise due to each of the said employees monies received by said employee during said period for work performed on Federal, State, county, municipal, or other work-relief projects, and pay over the amount so deducted to the, appropriate fiscal- agency of the Federal, State, county, municipal, or other government or govern- ments which supplied the funds for said work-relief projects; (c) Upon request, bargain collectively with Local No. 15 of the Textile Workers Organizing Committee as the exclusive represent- ative of all his production employees, exclusive of supervisory and clerical workers, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em- ployment, and other conditions of employment; (d) Post immediately in conspicuous places throughout his plant notices stating that he, Hyman S. Levy, doing business under the style and trade name of Harris Woolen Mills Company, will cease and desist in the manner aforesaid, and maintain such notices for a period of sixty (60) consecutive days from the date of posting; (e) Notify the Regional Director for the First Region in writing within ten (10) days from the date of this Order what steps the respondent has taken to comply herewith. Allard, Ora Brothers, Rose Cahill, Mary Connor, Sarah Delaney, John Devine, Anna Dolan, Bernard 8 Grady, John Griffin, George Jogas, Irene Jolly, Louise APPENDIX A Kelly, Elizabeth Kennington, Catherine Masky, Joseph McCurn, Catherine McNamara, Eva McNamara, Hilda Noel, Alma Robillard, Esther Rukewicz, Christop] ier Snow, Louis Wren, John 9 Incorrectly named in the complaint as Benjamin Dolan