Joseph F. Whelan Co., Inc.

340 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Joseph F. Whelan Company, Inc. and Charles T. Wiltse. Case 29-CA-10004 14 December 1984 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS ZIMMERMAN AND DENNIS On 30 June 1983 Administrative Law Judge Steven Davis issued the attached decision. The Re- spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order. The judge found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging employee Wiltse for refusing to participate in a disciplinary interview without a union representative. Contrary to the judge and for the reasons set forth below, we find that the Respondent acted lawfully when it discharged Wiltse for refusing to obey an order to go to the manager's office without a union repre- sentative. During Wiltse's 6 years of employment as a truckdriver for the Respondent, he had received eight written warnings. He received four of these warnings in the 10 months before his discharge on 10 June 1982, two of which stated that the Re- spondent would take other action against him if his poor work performance continued and the third stated that the Respondent was asking for a hearing at which it would request permission to discharge him for poor work performance. After the fourth warning, there were two hearing sessions in April and May 1982 about the Respondent's request to discharge Wiltse, and a third session was scheduled for late June. On 9 June 1982 a customer where Wiltse was supposed to be making a delivery called Respond- ent Manager Cotter to complain that Wiltse was not with his truck so it could not be unloaded. Cotter asked the customer to have Wiltse call when he returned. When Wiltse called about 15 minutes later, he told Cotter that he had taken his lunch break from 1 to 1:30 p.m., even though the customer's employees took their lunch breaks from 12:30 to 1 p.m., because he believed he was not al- lowed to stop for lunch until that time under the contract. Cotter said that Wiltse was wrong about the lunch hour provisions of the contract and that he should have called the office when he took a different lunch period from the customer's employ- ees. Wiltse said he did not know that rule. Cotter said it had always been the rule that you should call because "you just don't walk away from the truck when the warehouse is operating." Cotter ended the conversation by telling Wiltse to get back to his truck, unload it, and "I'll show you to- morrow, you're wrong about this lunch hour." On 10 June 1982, at the morning "shape" where drivers' work assignments were made, Cotter handed Wiltse his work assignment book and told him to come into the office next to the drivers' room. Wiltse asked if shop steward Sorensen was there. Cotter said he was not. Wiltse said he would not go into Cotter's private office for a talk with- out Sorensen being present. Cotter said that if Wiltse did not come into the office he could not work. Wiltse again refused to enter the office. Cotter then took Wiltse's work book, and Wiltse left the Respondent's terminal. That day, Cotter sent Wiltse a letter stating he was discharged be- cause of his actions on 9 June at Krasdale Foods and on 10 June at the Respondent's facility, "when you refused an order to come into the office to co- operate with the company in straightening out the previously mentioned incident at Krasdale." The judge found that, on most of the other occa- sions when Wiltse received written warnings, Cotter had asked Wiltse during the morning "shape" to come into the office for a talk. Each time Wiltse went into Cotter's office, where the shop steward was waiting, and discussed the inci- dent with Cotter and the steward. Then Cotter handed Wiltse a written warning a few days later. Based on this past practice and on the scheduled hearing about the Respondent's request to dis- charge Wiltse, the judge found that Wiltse reason- ably believed the 10 June interview might result in disciplinary action against him. Relying on the Su- preme Court's Weingarten decision,' the judge con- cluded Wiltse was entitled to have a union repre- sentative present at this interview, and, therefore, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act when it discharged Wiltse for refusing to partici- pate in the interview without a union representa- tive. Significantly, the judge found that the Respond- ent fired Wiltse "only for his refusal to enter the office." 2 We agree. Based on this finding, we con- clude that the Respondent acted lawfully under Roadway Express. 3 In Roadway Express, we stated NLRB v J Weingarten, 420 U S 251 (1975) 2 JD, sec II,B, par 12 Roadway Express, 246 NLRB 1127 (1979) 273 NLRB No. 51 JOSEPH F WHELAN CO 341 that an employer does not first have to assure an employee that his representative will be present at a meeting in order to induce the employee to leave the -plant floor. Thus, if the employer, as here, asks the employee to leave the work area to go to an- other location where further discussion can occur in private, the employee acts at his peril if he de- clines to do sb. 4 In this case, Wiltse's refusal to report to the office as directed by Cotter clearly undermined the Respondent's right to maintain dis- cipline and order, especially as it occurred in the drivers' room while Cotter was making work as- signments. Although Wiltse was entitled to refuse to participate in an interview in the absence of the requested representation, he was not privileged to ignore the Respondent's order, to report to the office . in an attempt to compel the Respondent to conduct its business in the work area. Accordingly, we find that the Respondent did not violate the Act when it discharged Wiltse for refusing to obey an order to go to the office, and we shall dismiss the complaint. ORDER The complaint is dismissed. 4 United States Steel Corp, 253 NLRB 593 (1980) DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE STEVEN DAVIS, Administrative Law Judge. Pursuant to a charge filed on October 6, 1982, by Charles T Wiltse, a complaint 'was issued by Region 29 of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board on November 30 against Joseph F. Whelan Company, Inc (Respondent). The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging Wiltse on June 10 be- cause he requested that a union representative be present for a disciplinary interview, and because he refused to participate in such interview without a union representa- tive. On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after due consideration of the brief filed by Respondent, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Respondent, a New York corporation, having its prin- cipal office and place of business at 439 West 54th Street, New York, New York, and a truck depot at 400 Western Avenue, Staten Island, New York, is engaged in provid- ing transportation and related services. During the year ending December 1981, it derived gross revenues in excess of $50,000 from services performed for Proctor & I All dates are in 1982 unless otherwise stated Gamble Company, Inc., located in New York, which company annually produces goods valued in excess of $50,000 which it ships directly out of the State in which it is located Respondent admits and I find that it is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and that Truckdriv- ers Local Union No. 807, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (the Union), is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A Facts 1. Background Wiltse, hired by Respondent on April 19; 1976, as a truckdriver, has been a member of the Union during his employment there Wiltse has had a very poor work record. During his 6 years of employment he has received 8 written warning notices which set forth the details of such alleged infrac- tions as having several traffic accidents which caused damage to the truck and failing to orally report an acci- dent; taking excessive time while unloading the vehicle at certain stops and also between such delivery stops; writing false, later times of deliveries on his worksheet in order to make it appear that it took longer to make cer- tain deliveries than it actually took; taking excessive overtime; stopping for coffee during work hours; failure to note on a receipt why all the items scheduled for de- livery to a customer were not delivered, failure to travel by the most direct route between deliveries; failure to call the office if delayed at a delivery stop; driving with the brakes on, causing damage to two tires, inability to properly park the truck, ignoring the instructions of a mechanic, thereby causing the truck to stall which result- ed in a mechanic being sent to fix the truck.2 Robert Cotter, Respondent's manager of the Staten Island facility, handed Wiltse the warning notices at the terminal 3 About 1 to 3 days prior to the delivery of each warning notice, Cotter, during the morning shape, on handing Wiltse his assignment book for the day's work, asked him to come into the office because he wanted to talk to him. 4 On each occasion, Wiltse entered Cotter's office where he spoke with Cotter and the shop steward concerning the incident. About 1 to 3 days after the meeting, a warning notice concerning the incident discussed was delivered to Wiltse It should be noted that the warning letters of Septem- ber 1 and October 2, 1981, contained the following ad- monition. 2 The notices are dated September 15, 1976. February 17, 1978, March 26 and September 25, 1980. September 1 and October 2, 1981, and Janu- ary 15 and March 23, 1982 3 The parties' Collective-bargaining agreement provides that the warn- ing letter must be issued within 7 days of the incident involved 4 However, on one or two occasions, ,the shop steward told Wiltse that Cotter wanted to speak with him and, on another occasion. Cotter began talking to Wiltse alone but then stopped the conversation and he (Cotter) called the steward in so that he could be a party to the conversation 342 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD If this poor work performance continues or if there are any other violations" of the labor agreement by you we will take other action against you. _ 2. The events of 1982 The warning letter of January 15 specified incidents involving excessive time in unloading the truck at Re- spondent's terminal: failure to call the office when de- layed at a customer; ignoring a mechanic's instructions, and causing the truck to stall, which resulted in Re- spondent incurring the time and expense of having a me- chanic service the broken truck in the field. The letter ended with the following: Your work performance has not improved as you have been warned in the past. Your attitude seems to be that the company will just have to go along with whatever you do or say you have done, that whatever amount of time you take will have to be accepted, that whatever the costs are none of your concern. We are therefore asking for a hearing for permission to discharge you for poor work perform- ance The parties' collective-bargaining agreement contains a provision whereby the Company may ask for an arbitra- tion hearing at which permission is requested to dis- charge an employee. Generally, the employee continues working until the arbitrator issues a decision as to wheth- er the employer may properly discharge the grievant 5 On March 23, a warning letter was given to Wiltse. The letter related an incident in which his trailer hit a bridge, causing a hole in the trailer's roof. The letter criticized his carelessness in striking the bridge; his fail- ure to examine the damage to determine whether the roof was torn, thereby exposing the cargo to possible precipitation; and failing to immediately orally ieport the damage. A hearing on Respondent's request for permission to discharge Wiltse was held on three separate dates, the last session being held on June 24 The General Counsel claims that, at the April 8 hearing, the arbitrator directed Respondent to. retain Wiltse during the pendency of the hearing. "Respondent disputes this. The transcript of the hearing is unclear on this issue. 6 I need not resolve this dispute inasmuch as I do not believe that it affects my ultimate resolution of this case. It is fact, in 'any event, that Wiltse was discharged on June 10, prior to the .last arbitration hearing date which took place on June.24. On June 9, Wiltse was assignethto make a delivery to Krasdale Foods. About 1:20 p.m. that day the receiving manager at Krasdale called Cotter, complaining that the 5 By retaining the employee until the decision, the employer avoids li- ability for backpay .which it would have incurred if it had first fired the employee and then later received a decision that the discharge was not justified 6 The arbitrator said the following at different parts of the hearing MR CHAIRMAN Leave [sic] him work until I hear the case I mean that is my ruling You request to discharge the mail Now, somebody has been postponing this, but I don't know what side MR CHAIRMAN Either you discharge him, or I am going to let him work Because he has go to work until you request for dis- charge driver was not with his truck. She said she 'would not be responsible for any detention charges Cotter asked the manager to have Wiltse call him. About _1:35 p.m Wilte called and told Cotter that the Krasdale employees took their lunch period from 12:30 to 1 p.m. but he could not stop for lunch then because, inasmuch, as he started work at 9 a.m. that day, he believed that he could take a lunchbreak only between the fourth and sixth hour, so that the earliest he could take lunch would be 1 p.m. Wiltse accordingly took his lunch period from 1 to 1:30 p.m. Cotter replied that Wiltse was Wrong about his lunch period being between the fourth and sixth hour, and was also wrong in not calling the office when he took a lunch period different from that which the cus- tomer's employees take. Wiltse responded that he did not know that that was the rule and asked which rule number he was referring to. Cotter said that it had always been a rule. "Everybody calls in. You just don't walk away from the truck when the warehouse is operat- ing." The conversation continued for a few_ minutes and Cotter finally told Wiltse: "Look, they're irate up there. Get back to the truck, and we'll straighten [this] out to- morrow. Just get that load off now, and I'll show you tomorrow, you're wrong about this lunch hour." The following day, June 10, at the morning shape, Cotter gave Wiltse his work assignment and book and told him to come into the office. 'Wiltse asked if Eddie Sorensen, the shop steward, was there. Cotter said he was not. 7 Wiltse refused to go into Cotter's office.8 Cotter told Wiltse that if he did not come into the office he could not work Wiltse again refused to enter, Cotter took the wOrk book from Wiltse and Wiltse left That day Cotter sent a letter of discharge to Wiltse which stated. . . This is to inform you that you are hereby dis- charged because of your actions of June 9, 1982 at Krasdale Foods and June 10, 1982 at Staten Island when you refused an order to come into the office to cooperate with the company in straightening out the previously mentioned incident at Krasdale • On June 24 the final arbitration hearing was held, and on July 20 the arbitrator issued his decision in which he found that Respondent had just cause to discharge Wiltse on June 10. The arbitrator's conclusion is as follows: After hearing all- of the testimony offered at this hearing, the undersigned is persuaded that the grievant wants to do everything his way regardless of what his way is going to do to the Company, the labor agreement, promulgated rules of operation or the Union By several of his self-willed acts he was •posited just- cause for his own discharge by the Company. 7 Sorensen was not at work that day Wiltse claims he told Cotter that he would not go into Cotter's pri- vate office for a talk without Sorenson being present I credit his state- ment JOSEPH F. WHELAN CO 343 Therefore, I rule that the discharge of the griev- ant by the Company was for just cause and is hereby sustained. B. Analysis and Discussion The General Counsel alleges that Wiltse was dis- charged on June 10 because he requested that a union representative be present for a disciplinary interview and because he refused to participate in the interview 'with- out a union representative being present, in violation of his rights as set forth in NLRB v. J. Weingarten. 9 Re- spondent contends that the requested June 10 meeting was only for the purpose of explaining the contractual provision concerning lunch hours to Wiltse, and was a routine and informal meeting not requiring the presence of a union representative Respondent argues that Wiltse was not discharged for refusing to attend the meeting without a steward, but rather was discharged for refus- ing to participate in the meeting in which he was to be shown that he was mistaken as to his understanding of the contract relating to lunch . periods. In Weingarten, the Supreme Court held, in agreement with the Board, that employee insistence on union repre- sentation at an investigatory interview, which the em- ployee reasonably believes might result in disciplinary action against him, constitutes protected concerted ach y -ity.Io I believe that the evidence is clear that Wiltste reason- ably believed that the interview that Cotter requested on June 10 might result in disciplinary action." On June 9, when the dispute arose" over Wiltse's fail- ure to take the proper lunch period, and his failure to call Respondent when he took a lunchbreak different from that which the customer's employees took, it was clear, as Cotter conceded, that Wiltse was taking exces- sive time because he stopped work between 12 30 and 1 p m., and also took his 30-minute lunchbreak between 1 and 1 .30 p.m." In the past, Wiltse had been accused of taking excessive time, for which he was called into Cot- ter's office, discussed the matter with him in the presence of the shop steward, and had also, shortly after the meet- ing, received a warning letter regarding his taking exces- sive time. Moreover, the collective-bargaining agreement states that theft of time "is recognized as an offense for which severe disciplinary measures may be invoked." 9 420 U S 251 (1975) 10 The complaint alleges that the unlawful discharge occurred because of Wiltse's request for a union representative at a "disciplinary" inter- view The distinction between disciplinary and investigatory interviews is of no moment since the Board has held that "the full purview of protec- tions accorded employees under Weingarten apply to both 'investigatory' and 'disciplinary interviews, save only those conducted for the exclusive purpose of notifying an employee of previously determined disciplinary action " Baton Rouge Water Works Co, 246 NLRB 995, 997 (1979) " The test for determining whether an employee reasonably believes the interview might result in disciplinary action is measured by objective standards under all the circumstances of the case rather than by an em- ployee's subjective motivations, Weingarten, supra at 257 fn 5 I accord- ingly sustain Respondent's objection to a question asked of Wiltse as to why he asked for the presence of steward Sorensen on June 10 I have therefore not considered nor relied on Wiltse's subjective answer to the question in making my findings and conclusions herein 12 Vv'iltse was only entitled to take 30 minutes for lunch Two of the prior warning letters" which involved ex- cessive time cautioned that "if this poor work perform- ance continues or if there. are any other violations of the labor agreement by you we will take other action against you" Wiltse apparently believed that it was necessary to answer , three of the warning letters concerning excessive time, and he did so by writing responses with attached documentary evidence on April 3 and .October 7, 1980, and September 9, 1981. Wiltse therefore took these warn- ing notices seriously enough to attempt to rebut their al- legations which is an indication that on June 9, when Cotter told him he would speak with him the following day, Wiltse reasonably believed that discipline might result from the interview. It should' be noted that Wiltse had also received a warning letter in the past regarding his failure to call the office when there was a delay at a customer. On. June 9, Cotter accused Wiltse of a similar offense failing to call in when he took a different lunch hour from the custom- er's employees, thereby causing a delay Cotter conceded that he would have spoken to Wiltse about that issue on June 10 also. Furthermore, when Cotter requested his presence at a: meeting on June 10, Wiltse was "at risk" Respondent had already requested permission to discharge him and two arbitration hearing sessions had already been held on his discharge, the last one only 3 weeks earlier, and the final hearing to be held only 2 weeks later, on June 24.'4 In addition, the June 10 request for a meeting with Wiltse followed the past pattern of such interviews. The request occurred at the morning shape; the steward was present at the interview which took place in Cotter's office; the interview related to some wrongdoing by Wiltse immediately prior to the meeting; and the session was followed by the issuance of a warning letter 1 to 3 days later incorporating the matters discussed at the interview. Respondent argues that there have been occa- sions in the past where Cotter spoke alone with Wiltse. However, such occasions, as testified by Cotter, all in- volved incidents of alleged malfeasance by Wiltse, and as to which he could have requested the presence of 'a steward but apparently did not do so as was his right. Thus, objectively viewing the circumstances which Wiltse confronted when requested to meet with Cotter - on June 10, we see that (a) he was accused on June 9 of theft of time, an offense recognized in the contract pun- ishable by "severe disciplinary measures," and for failing to report a delay at a customer, as to both of which he had received warning letters in the past, (b) he was told on June 9 that he was to talk to Cotter the following day about these matters, (c) the past practice had been that 13 The warning letters are dated September l 'and October 2, 1981 14 Respondent argues that the fact that Wiltse was given the right by the arbitrator to remain at work until a decision was issued leads to the conclusion that he could not have reasonably believed that he would be discharged until such time However. Weingarten requires only that the employee reasonably believe that the interview might result-In discipline As set forth above, Wiltse reasonably believed that the interview might result in discipline and it did—his discharge that day Moreover, he was discharged in part as set forth in the letter of June 10, for the June 9 incident for which the interview was sought—prior to the Issuance of the arbitrator's decision 344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD when a request for -interview was made in the circum- stances in which it was made on June 10, the interview had been with the steward present, was concerned with his alleged incompetence, and was followed by the issu- ance of a warning letter, and (d) he was "at risk" in that a request had already been made for his discharge and two arbitration sessions had already been held. • Under these circumstances, the evidence is- over- whelming that on June 10, Wiltse reasonably . believed that the interview might result in disciplinary action, and he therefore had a right to have a steward present at the interview.i5 On June 10, when Cotter asked Wiltse to come into the office, Wiltse asked if Sorensen, the shop "steward, was there. Cotter said he was not." Wiltse refused to go into Cotter's office without Sorensen present 17 Cotter told Wiltse that if he did not come into the, office he. could not work. When Wiltse again refused, Cotter took the assignment book from him - In this circumstance, the Employer had the choice of giving the employee time or a postponement to obtain the representation or, as the Supreme Court pointed out: in J. Weingarten, 420 U.S. -at 258-259 (adopting the Board's statement in -Mobil Oil, supra, 196 NLRB at 1052), of "advis[ing] the employee that it will not pro- ceed with the interview unless the employee is to enter the interview accompanied by his representative. The employee may then refrain from participating in the interview, thereby protecting his right to representation, but at the same time relinquishing any benefit which might be derived from the interview. The employer would then be free to act on' the basis of information ob- tained from other sources." Respondent did none of these things." In its letter of June 10 to Wiltse, Respondent stated that he was discharged: "because of your actions of June 9, 1982 at Krasdale Foods and June 10, 1982 . . . when', you refused an order to come into the office to cooper- ate with the Company in straightening out the Previously " I reject Respondent's argument that the June 10 interview was only for the purpose of explaining the contractual provisions, relating to lunch' period to Wiltse, to correct his misunderstanding of the contract, and 'to. prevent further similar incidents Wiltse was not advised of this-when Cotter requested that he go into the office on June 10 Moreover, the extreme form of discipline—discharge—was Imposed on Wiltse in part according to the June 10 letter for the June 9 incident Northwest Engi- neering Co. 265 NLRB 190 (1982), relied on by Respondent, is inappo- site That case involved a "general shop meeting, informational in. nature," to review work rules,- at which all the employees were present The purpose of the meeting was stated at the outset, "it did not relate to any one specific employee or to any single instance of purported miscon- duct or deficiency in performance," and no discipline was Imposed In contrast, the Instant case involved a situation where only Wiltse was asked to go Into the office for a private meeting with Cotter He was not told that the purpose of the meeting was to explain the contractual provi- sions relating to the lunch period The purpose of the meeting clearly was to discuss his wrongdoing of the previous day, and discipline was imposed 18 Sorensen was not at work that day There was no evidence as to whether alternate shop steward Freddie O'Neal was available 17 Cotter agrees that Wiltse refused to come into the office I credit Wiltse's statement that he refused to speak to Cotter without union repre- sentation In view of Wiltse's reasonable belief that the interview would result in discipline, it is manifest that he would have expressly refused to enter unless Sorensen was present 18 Super Valu Xenia, 235 NLRB 1581, 1591 (1978) mentioned incident at Krasdale." At the, hearing, when asked by the General Counsel why he discharged Wiltse, Cotter replied: "Because he refused to come in and let me show him that he was wrong in his interpretation of this lunch hour." Indeed, the circumstances of the dis- charge lead me to agree that Wiltse was fired only for his refusal to enter the office." Inasmuch as Wiltse had a right to have a union representative present at the interview, his refusal to engage in the meeting without a representative present, and his discharge for doing so is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.2° CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent Joseph F. Whelan Company, Inc. is, and at all times material herein, has been, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. 'Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by discharging Charles T. Wiltse on June 10, 1982, because Wiltse requested that a union representative be present at an interview which he reasonably believed might result in disciplinary action against him and because Wiltse re- fused to participate in said interview without a union representative. 3 The aforesaid unfair -labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY In cases where an employee has been discharged for refusing to participate in an interview conducted in dero- gation of his Section 7 right to a representative, a make- whole remedy is appropriate. 21 However, in this case, the General Counsel states that he does not claim that Wiltse's later discharge, as found by the arbitrator in his decision issued on July 20, 1982, was violative of the Act. Accordingly, the General Counsel does not seek re- instatement for Wiltse, and seeks backpay only for the period from June 10 to July 20, 1982 22 I therefore recommend that Respondent be ordered to make Wiltse whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a result of the discrimination against him from June 10 to July 20, 1982. 22 The amount of backpay 12 Respondent could not have immediately discharged Wiltse for'theft of time since the contract states that such an offense is not a ground for immediate discharge Moreover, Wiltse had been similarly accused of such wrongdoing in the past but had not been fired on the spot for that reason before 20 Ladies Garment Workers Union v Quality Mfg Co. 420 U S 276 (1975) 21 Salt River Valley Water Users' Assn, 262 NLRB 970 (1982) - 22 The complaint allegations are consistent with these contentions of the General Counsel I need not therefore reach the question of whether the arbitrator's award meets the criteria set forth in Spielberg Mfg Co. 112 NLRB 1080 (1955)' 23 I reject Respondent's contention that the backpay period should be reduced because of Wiltse's failure to provide the arbitrator with a tran- script of the hearing in a timely manner Wiltse requested that his attor- ney engage a court reporter to record and transcribe the June 24 arbitra- tion hearing The arbitrator required that a copy of the transcript be sent to him On July 14, 1982, Wiltse's attorney advised the arbitrator that the transcript "would not be forthcoming and the Impartial Chairman should not wait any longer before rendering his award" The arbitrator issued Continued JOSEPH F WHELAN CO 345 shall be computed in' the manner set forth in E W. Wool- worth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950); With interest thereon to his decision on July 20 In the absence of proof that any delay in the arbi- trator's Issuance of his decision was caused by Wiltse's .failure to provide a copy of the transcript as promised, I cannot find that the backpay period should be limited There was no evidence that *there was any be -computed ,in the manner prescribed in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).24 [Recommended' Order omitted from publication.] delay in the issuance of the award Thus, the arbitrator was advised on July 14 that he would not receive the transcript and it was mit until July 20 that the award was issued 24 See generally Isis Plumbing Co, 138 NLRB 716 (1962)