Consumat Systems, Inc.

410 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Consumat Systems, Inc. and International Brother- hood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Black- smiths, Forgers and Helpers. Cases 5-CA- 14719 and 5-CA-14826 14 December 1984 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS HUNTER AND DENNIS On 10 March 1983 Administrative Law Judge Benjamin Schlesinger issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief in re- sponse to the Respondent's exceptions. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2 As set forth in detail in the judge's decision, on 27 August 1981 the Union was certified by the Board as the collective-bargaining representative of the Respondent's employees and the parties com- menced bargaining. The Union contends that on 26 August 1982 3 it accepted the Respondent's con- tract proposal. Several days later and prior to the execution of the contract, the Respondent refused to sign the agreement and subsequently withdrew recognition of the Union. The Respondent main- tained it was privileged to refuse to sign the agree- ment and to withdraw recognition as, relying on a petition signed by a majority of employees, it had a good-faith belief based on objective considerations that the Union no longer represented a majority of the Respondent's employees. In evaluating the Respondent's contentions, the judge concluded that the Respondent failed ade- quately to demonstrate a reasonably based good- faith doubt of the Union's majority status. The judge based this conclusion on the fact that only one page of a two-page petition proclaiming the signatories no longer wanted the Union to repre- sent them was admitted in evidence. This one page contained signatures of only 18 of the 60 unit em- ployees. In its exceptions and brief, the Respondent I The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Or 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings 2 The remedy section of the judge's decision is amended only to the extent that backpay, if any, shall be computed in accordance with Ogle Protection Service, 183 NLRB 682 (1970), with interest computed in ac- cordance with Florida Steel Corp, 231 NLRB 651 (1977) 3 All dates are 1982 unless otherwise indicated does not contend the judge erred in refusing to admit page two of this petition, but rather 'argues the Respondent's reasonably based good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status existed as evi- denced by both pages of this petition. After closely examining the record, we agree with the judge. During the hearing, the Respond- ent moved that page two of the petition be admit- ted into evidence. The judge refused on the ground that it had not been properly authenticated. The Respondent never again requested that this docu- ment be admitted into evidence. Therefore, the only evidence before us of the Respondent's good- faith doubt of the Union's majority status is the one-page document containing signatures of 18 em- ployees. We thus conclude, in agreement with the judge, that this is insufficient evidence of a reason- ably based good-faith doubt that the Union re- tained majority status. 4 Accordingly, as the Re- spondent was not privileged to refuse to bargain or to withdraw recognition from the Union, those ac- tions constituted violations of Section 8(a)(5). 4 In light of this finding, we find it unnecessary to pass on the issue of whether, as found by the judge, the Union's telegram of 26 August and the Respondent's letter of 1 September, respectively, constituted a re- quest and refusal to sign the collective-bargaining agreement An un- equivocal request to sign the contract was contained in the Union's letter of 10 September Therefore, as the Respondent has failed to show suffi- cient evidence that it had a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status on 14 September when It refused to comply with the Union's 10 September unequivocal request to sign the contract, we find that it vio- lated Sec 8(a)(5) • Additionally, in light of the finding that the Respondent did not have a reasonably based good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status when it refused to execute the contract, Chairman Dotson and Members Hunter and Dennis find it unnecessary to rely on the judge's finding that once final agreement on the substantive terms of the contract was reached, re- gardless of the status of any written agreement, the Respondent was not free to refuse to bargain even if It then had lawful grounds for believing that the Union had subsequently lost its majonty status Member Zimmerman would adopt the judge's findings that the Union's telegram constituted a request and the Respondent's reply letter constitut- ed a refusal to sign the collective-bargaining agreement, and that such re- fusal was unlawful He, like the judge, finds that even if the Respondent had been able to establish that as early as 1 September it had a reasonable doubt of the Union's continued majonty status, so as to legitimize its withdrawal of recognition from the Union, the Respondent would still have been obligated to execute its 26 August 1982 collective-bargaining agreement with the Union, and its failure to do so would still have been, as it was here, a violation of Sec 8(a)(5) The Respondent's obligation to execute the collective-bargaining agreement arose, and is retroactive to, 26 August, when the Union notified the Respondent of the former's ac- ceptance of the latter's 8 June offer Subsequent manifestations of possible loss of majonty support for the Union would not serve to relieve the Re- spondent of its obligation to execute and give retroactive effect to the agreement it had reached with the Union on 26 August North Bros Ford, Inc , 220 NLRB 1021 (1975), Utility Tree Service, 215 NLRB 806 (1974), affd 218 NLRB 784 (1975) See also Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc , 183 NLRB 213, 217 (1970) Member Dennis also notes that while the Respondent raised the exist- ence of a "decertification petition" supporting its 14 September refusal to execute the contract, the record shows that no question concerning rep- resentation existed until 21 September when a petition was actually filed 273 NLRB No. 63 CONSUMAT SYSTEMS 411 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Re- spondent, Consumat Systems, Inc., Mechanicsville, Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall take the action set forth in .the Order as modified. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(a). "(a) On 14 September 1982, failing or refusing, on request, to execute and give effect to a written agreement incorporating the agreement reached with the International Brotherhood of Boilermak- ers, - Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers." DECISION FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW BENJAMIN SCHLESINGER, Administrative Law Judge. On August 27, 1981, the National Labor Relations Board in Case 5-RC-11447 certified Charging Party Interna- tional Brotherhood of Boilermakers; Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers (Union) as the collec- tive-bargaining representative for a unit of "all produc- tion and maintenance employees employed at Consumat Systems, Inc.'s Mechanicsville, Virginia location, exclud- ing office clerical employees, professional employees, technicians, over the road truckdnvers and their helpers, guards and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations, Act." Thereafter, about September 4, 1981, Re- spondent and the Union commenced bargaining and on Feb'ruary' 9, 1981, 1 'negotiators displeased with* the offer, presented it to the union membership, who promptly re- jected it. - Little progress was made over the next- several months. Rather, Respondent's financial position, none toot good to begin with, became worse. Contracts were lost or postponed, some indefinitely As a consequence, on June 8, Respondent renewed its previous written offer, with three modifications: it withdrew its prior op- position to the checkoff of union dues and initiation fees, it reduced its wage offer of an annual 5-percent increase for 3 ,years to no increase at al1, 2, and it orally agreed to a 1-year contract, 3 rather than the 3-year, contract it originally proposed. The union negotiators were no more pleased with this proposal than they were with the one., in February; but they did not outrightly reject Respond- ent's latest proposal either, again stating that they would take up the proposal with the membership. That, howev- er, did not occur until Thursday, August 26, the last day of the Union's first year as the employee's collective-bar- gaining representative, when Bartley sent the following . mailgram . to Thomas J. Manely, Respondent's attorney and principal negotiator: 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all dates refer to the year 1982 2 Union International Representative Phillip Bartley , testified that the wage offer was orally withdrawn in March 3 Other than this oral agreement, the contract proposal was written Please be, advised that the employees of Consumat Systems, Inc. voted this day to accept the Compa- ny's offer made to the Union on 6/8/82. I will be in contact with you in the very near ;future for the purpose of signing this, agreement. On Monday, August 30, the next business day, 4 word of the membership ratification spread quickly Two em- ployees, incensed that the contract (with no wage in- crease) had been ratified and that they had been given insufficient notice of the action to be taken at the union meeting the prior Thursday, circulated a petition stating the desire of the signatories for a "fair meeting with ad- vance notice of a vote before a labor contract is made with" Respondent. A telephone call on Tuesday evening from one of the employees to Bartley met with a firm reply that the Union had already accepted the agreement and no new vote would be taken. On Wednesday, September 1, in response to Bartley's refusal to conduct another vote, the same two employees circulated a new petition proclaiming that the signatories no longer wanted the Union to represent them. That was forwarded to the Regional Office of the Board on Sep- tember -2, and a copy of it, allegedly signed by 35 of 60 employees, 3 was presented to Ron Mancuso, Respond- ent's director of manufacturing The employees' petition apparently led to the filing of a formal decertification pe- tition on September 21. In the meantime, delivery -of Bartley's mailgram had been yielayed Manley testified that 'he received it in his office no earlier than Monday, August 30, although it was sent the prior - Thursday and although Bartley re- ceived a confirmation copy on Friday I find it surprising that Manley did not forward it to his client immediately, in any event, Mancuso, who had been told on Monday by a 'union negotiating committee member that the con- tract had been ratified, said he did not receive the mail- gram -until Tuesday,'August 31, the same day, he testi- fied, -that he was presented with the first petition. 6 The following day Mancuso' wrote to Bartley that, before re- ceiving the mailgram, he had "received information that a majority of the men believed the vote, referred to was improper and questioning the' Union's representation." (Any "questioning [of] the' Union's representation" ocurred, however, no earlier than September 1, the day after Mancuso received the mailgram ) He further stated 4 Respondent was then working a 4-day workweek, Monday through Thursday 5. The entire petition was never properly authenticated and admitted in evidence Thus, the record proof does not adequately demonstrate that a majority of employees did not desire the Union to represent them and Respondent had a good-faith doubt that the Union represented a majon- ty See Dresser Industries, 264 NLRB 1088 (1982) However, in the event that the failure to introduce the entire petition was merely the result of inadvertent and excusable error, and on the assumption the document demonstrates that the Union lost majonty support, this decision would be no different 6 Mancuso prepared a memorandum which noted that he received the first petition on September 1, not August 31 It is unnecessary to resolve this inconsistency, first, because good-faith doubt obtained after the agreement was made is Irrelevant and, second, because the first petition indicated only employee disagreement with the ratification vote and not a clear intention that a majonty of the employees no longer wished to be represented by the Union Gregory's Inc. 242 NLRB 644, 648 (1979) 412 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL ' LABOR RELATIONS BOARD that because Respondent had received no response to its last offer from the Union for several months, he was in doubt as to the "lawfulness" of concluding or not con- cluding a contract • On September 10 Bartley wrote Manley requesting signed copies of the "recently negotiated" contract for his signature. Manley replied on September 14 that Re- spondent had not received any explanation or clarifica- tion as requested in the September 1 letter, that the em- ployees did nbt wish to be represented by the Union, that the employees did not authorize the Union to con- clude an agreement with Respondent, and that the ein- ployees had petitioned the Board for a decertification election: "Under the circumstances Consumat does not believe it is lawful or appropriate to conclude - a -labor contract with your union." Again, by letter dated Octo- ber 18, Mancuso advised Bartley that because he had re- ceived no clarifications from the Union in reply to his earlier September 1 and 14 letters, because Respondent's employees had advised Respondent that they no longer wished to be associated with the Union, and because they had filed a decertification petition, Respondent "does not believe it may any longer lawfully recognize or bargain with your union as the representative of our employees." Two complaints herein, as consolidated:7 allege that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, et seq., by refusing since September 14 to execute a written contract embodying the agreement which the Union accepted on August 26 and that on October 18 Respondent withdrew recognition of the Union as the exclusive collective-bar- gaining representative of its production and maintenance employees,: Respondent denied that it violated the Act in any manner.8 In the absence of unusual circumstances, a certified, union's majority status must be honored for 1 year, even if an employer has evidence of the union's loss of majori- ty. That rule was established in order to permit collec- tive bargaining to •function and to stabilize industrial rela- tions. Even if the decertification petition had. been filed prior to August 26, although it would have possibly per- mitted an election to be held, but only after the expira- tion of the 1-year period, Respondent would not have been permitted to rely thereon and cease bargaining during the 1-year period. Once having continued 'to bar- gain, an employer would be bound by any agreement it struck during the year. The relevant docket entries are as follows The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge in Case 5-CA-14719 on Sejitember 27, 1982, and a complaint issued on October 26 The Union filed its Charge in Case 5- CA-14826 on October 29 and a compliant issued on November 22 The complaints were consolidated by order of the Regional Director for Region 5 on November 23 and a heanng was held before me on January 3 and 4, 1983, in Richmond, Virginia 8 There is no question as to jurisdiction herein Respondent admits, and I find, that it is a Virginia corporation with an office and place of busi- ness in Mechanicsville, Virginia, where it engaged in the manufacturing of energy recovery incinerators During the 12 months preceding the Is- suance of each complaint, it sold and shipped products valued' in excess of $50,000 directly to points outside the State of Virginia I conclude that It is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act and that_the Union, as admitted by Respondent, is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec 2(5) of the Act That being stated, the first issue presented is whether a contract was made on August 26. Respondent made its last complete proposal on June 8. The Union did not reply' to that offer until August 26, a' fact which Re- spondent admitted in its September- 1 letter. I refuse to credit Mancuso's testimony that; in a telephone conversa- tion with Bartley on August 26, Mancuso told Bartley that the offer had been withdrawn' by Respondent. Bart- ley denied such statement, and none of Respondent's let- ters rely on its withdrawal of the offer, or on the Union's rejection of it, or on the fact that the offer had lapsed by the passage of time.8 "The -Board is [not] strictly bound by the technical rules of contract law." NLRB v. Donkin's Inn; 532 F.2d 138, 141-142 (9th Cir. 1976); Penasquitos Gardens, 236 NLRB 994, 995 fn. 8 (1978), enfd. 603 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1979). Even when a contract proposal has been rejected, the Board has frequently held that the proposal survives, enabling the party which previously rejected it to re- verse itself and accept it. The Board affirmed thi g view in Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 251 NLRB 187, 189 (1980), as follows. [A] complete package proposal made on behalf of either party through negotiations .remains viable, and upon acceptance in toto must be executed as part of the statutory duty to bargain in good faith, unless expressly withdrawn prior to- such accept- ance, or defeased by an event upon which the offer was expressly made contingent at a time prior to ac- ceptance See also -Presto Casting Co., 262 NLRB 346 (1982). Pepsi- Cola was enforced at 659 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1981), the Court noting at 90 fn. 3, that there appears to be con- trary authority, some cited by Respondent, which can be explained solely by the fact that the Board is continuing to develop the law in this area. Respondent's offer was on the table for 2-1/2 months - before the Union accepted it. The Board has held that 4 months before acceptance is not unreasonable delay, bar- ring intervening events that make it unfair to do so. Wor- rell Newspapers, 232 NLRB 402 (1977); contra, Scientific Research Co., 110 NLRB 393 (1954). Respondent offers no cogent showing of unfairness. That it has suffered losses of business is not attributed to labor costs; and its contract offer of no wage increase is not claimed to be a further impairment of its financial condition. 1° Finally, I • 9 Mancuso testified that Bartley, prior to cOnducting 'the union vote, called Mancuso to tell him that the employees were getting ready to vote and inquired about the effective date of the agreement Mancuso asked what the Union was voting 'on When Bartley replied the June offer, Mancuso testified, he told Bartley that the present condition of Respond- ent and the delay of 2 months in the Union's response made the offer "no longer available" Bartley testified, however, that an entirely different conversation took place, that he called Mancuso to inquire about whether the effective date of the contract would be June 8, the date of the last offer, or that day, August 26, when the Union accepted the offer, and that Mancuso replied that the contract became effective only when it was accepted I credit Bartley's version 10 The record is barren of what, if any, financial gains were made by the Union CONSUMAT SYSTEMS 413. find that Respondent's June offer was a continuing offer. Indeed, the day after it was made, Bartley telephoned Manley's legal assistant to advise that he was going to reevaluate the Union's position and, if Respondent changed its position, that Respondent should so advise him Respondent never advised Bartley that it withdrew its offer or amended it in any wiy. The Union's acceptance occurred when the Union no- tified Respondent of that fact; and it was the transmittal or the mailgram, not its receipt by Respondent, that gov- erns the date of acceptance and the contract. Raybestos- Manhattan, 183 NLRB 213, 218 (1970). Bartley's mail- gram of August 26 to Respondent notifying that he would soon be in contact for the purpose of signing the agreement gave Respondent sufficient notice of a request for its execution. Mancuso's reply of September 1 Setting forth his "doubt" about concluding the agreement dem- onstrated that Mancuso understood what Bartley was re- questing and constitutes a refusal to execute the agree- ment. It is well settled that the failure to sign, on request, a written memorandum of the agreement made is a per se refiisal to bargain. Section 8(d) of the Act; H.J Heinz v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941); Big Run Coal & Clay Co, 152 NLRB 1144 (1965), enfd. 385 -F 2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967); Lozano Enterprises v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1964). However, by the time it received Bartley's August 26 mailgram, Respondent argues, it already knew of em- ployee discontent with the method of the ratification vote and, a day or two later, employee desire no longer. to be represented by the Union. Thus, the remaining issue is whether employee action after the contract had been made permitted Respondent to avoid what was oth- erwise its obligation under Section 8(a)(5). To paraphase the Board in North Bros. Ford, 220 NLRB 1021, 1022 (1975), on facts strikingly similar to those herein, final agreement was reached no later than August 26, well before the employee petitions disavowing representation by the Union and for decertification were filed. Once final agreement on the substantive terms of the contract was reached, and regardless of the status of any written instrument incorporating that agreement, Respondent was not free to refuse to bargain even if it then had lawful grounds for believing that the Union had subse- quently lost its majority status. See, e.g., Utility Tree Service, 215 NLRB 806 (1974), enfd. 539 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1976); Raybestos-Manhattan, supra. Finally, to the extent that Respondent continues to urge that I erred in excluding testimony regarding the validity of the Union's ratification vote, I adhere to my prior rulings at the hearing. Although the Union clearly stated that ratification by its membership was necessary for it to make a final and binding agreement, no agree- ment was made by the parties that made ratification nec- essary and no requirement that this occurrence was in- corporated into the written contract proposal prepared by Respondent Martin J. Barry Co., 241 NLRB 1011, 1013 (1979). "Furthermore, even if ratification were a precondition . . . Respondent has no standing to ques- tion the validity of the procedures used by the Union in ratifying the agreement. It is well settled that ratification is an internal union matter which is not subject to ques- tion by an employer" Id., M&M Oldsmobile, 156 NLRB 903, 905 (1966), enfd. on other grounds 377 F.2d 712 (2d Cir 1967), London Chop House, 264 NLRB 638, 639 (1982) Accordingly, I conclude that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to execute the agreement and by withdrawing recognition from the Union. These activities occurring in connection with Re- spondent's operations have a close, intimate, and substan- tial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes bur- dening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. THE REMEDY I will, accordingly, recommend that Respondent be or- dered to cease and desist from its illegal activities and take certain affirmative action necessary to effectuate the polices of the Act. I shall also recommend that Respond- ent be ordered to execute the agreement which it negoti- ated, on request of the Union, comply with all the provi- sions thereof retroactive to August 26, 1982, the date such agreement was consumated, and make all employ- ees whole for any losses. they may have suffered by Re- spondent's failUre to sign the agreement. Backpay, if any, shall be computed in accordance with F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with interest computed in ac- cordance with Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977) " It is possible that the 1-year agreement will have expired before Respondent complies with the order recommended herein. In such event, the recommended Order will provide an option to the Union to request' that Respondent sign the agreed-upon contract or resume bargaining and, if an agreement is reached, embody it in a signed agreement. Big Run Coal & Clay Co., supra; Worrell Newspapers, supra. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire recoid, 12 I issue the following recommend- ed" ORDER The Respondent, Consumat Systems, Inc , Mechanics- ville, Virginia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Failing or refusing, on request, to execute and give effect to, retroactive to August 26, 1982, a written agree- ment incorporating the agreement reached with the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship- builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers. " See generally Isis Plumbing Go, 139 NLRB 716 (1962), enf denied on other grounds 322 F 2d 913 (9th Or 1963) " The General Counsel and Respondent both moved to correct the official transcript in certain respects There being no opposition to Re- spondent's motion and Respondent having agreed to the General Coun- sel's motion, the motions are granted and the transcript amended accord- ingly " If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and an objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses 414 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (b) Failing or refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union concerning issues which have arisen, or may arise, during the terms of the aforesaid agreement. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the 'exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act: 2. Take the following affirmative action found neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) On request of the Union, execute and give effect, retroactive to August 26, 1982, to the written agreement embodying, the terms reached between it and the Union; deliver an executed copy to the Union, and make the employees whole for any losses they may have suffered by its failure to sign the aforesaid agreement, with inter- est, as provided in the remedy section of this decision (b) On request of the Union, bargain , collectively with the Union concerning any question which has arisen or which may arise under the terms of the aforesaid agree- ment, including the settlement of grievances and disputes entitled to arbitration as therein provided. (c) In the event that the term of the aforesaid agree- ment has expired before it is signed by Respondent, and on -request of the Union, bargain with the Union as the collective-bargaining representative of its employees in a unit composed of all production and maintenance em- ployees employed at Respondent's Mechanicsville, Vir- ginia location, excluding office clerical employees, pro- fessional employees, technicians, over-the-road truckdriv- ers and their helpers, guards, and supervisors as defined in the ,Act, and if an agreement is reached, embody the same into a signed contract. (d) Post at its plant in Mechanicsville, Virginia copies. of the attached notice marked "Appendix."l 4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 5, after being signed by the Respondent's au- thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond- ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con- secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced,_ or covered by any other material. 14 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of " Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor -Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to'a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Natimi- al Labor Relations Board" (e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has . taken to comply. APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT fail or refuse, on request, to execute 'and give effect to, retroactive to August 26, 1982, a written agreement incorporating the agreement reached with the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Ship- builders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers. WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to recognize and bargain with the Union concerning issues which have arisen, or - may arise, during the term of the aforesaid agreement. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, on request of the Union, execute and give effect, retroactive to August 26, 1982, to the written agreement embodying the terms reached between us and the Union, deliver an executed copy thereof, to the Union, and make our employees whole for any- losses - they may have suffered by our failure to sign the afore- said agreement, with interest. WE WILL, on request of the Union, bargain collective- ly with the Union concerning any question which has arisen or which may arise under the terms of the afore- said - agreement, including the settlement of grievances and disputes- entitled' to arbitration as therein provided. WE WILL in the event that the term of the aforesaid agreement has expired before it is signed by us and, on request of the Union, bargain with the Union as the col-' lective-bargaining representative of our employees in a unit composed of all production and maintenance em- ployees employed at our Mechanicsville, Virginia loca- tion, excluding office clerical , employees, professional employees, technicians, over-the-road , truck drivers and their helpers, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act and, if an agreement is reached, embody the same into'a signed contract. CONSUMAT SYSTEMS, INC.