Local 456, Teamsters And Chauffeurs Union

516 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR 'RELATIONS BOARD Local 456, Teamsters and Chauffeurs Union, affili- ated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and. Carvel Corporation. Case 2-CC-1541 14 December 1984 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS ZIMMERMAN AND HUNTER Upon a charge duly filed on , 17 March 1978 by Carve! Corporation, herein called Carve!, against Respondent Teamsters Local' 456, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board, bY the Acting Regional Director for Region 2, issued a complaint on 14 April 1978, alleging that the Re- spondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act. Copies of the charge and complaint and notice of hearing before an administrative law judge were duly served on the Respondent and the Charging Party. Thereafter, the Respondent filed a timely answer denying the commission of any unfair labor practices. A hearing before an adminis- trative law judge was scheduled for 15 May 1978. Meanwhile, pursuant to the provisions of Section 10(1) of the Act, a petition for an injunction was filed by the Acting Regional Director for Region 2 on behalf of the National Labor Relations Board in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. In lieu of a hearing on the petition for an injunction, the parties agreed to submit to the court, as the official record, the testi- mony and exhibits adduced at the hearing before an administrative law judge. A hearing was held on 15 May 1978, before Ad- ministrative Law Judge George F. McInerny at which time certain exhibits were received into evi- dence and certain stipulations were entered into on the record. At the close of the hearing, the judge granted the General Counsel's motion to transfer the proceeding to the Board for decision. By order dated 3 August 1978, the Board granted the Gener- al Counsel's motion, transferred the proceeding to itself, and set a date for the filing of briefs. There- after, briefs were filed by the General Counsel and the Respondent. On 10 October 1978, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York granted the Board's petition for a preliminary in- junction.' The National Labor Relations Board has:delegat- ed its -authority: in this proceeding to 'a. three- member panel. - - The Board .' has considered the entire' record heteni:' including briefs,, and makes the- _ . ing ,findings. , . L JURISDICTION Cal Vel Cbrpbration is a Delaware' 'corpOrntiOn with' its principal office and place of business 'in Yonkers, New. ,York,' where it maintains its office's and warehotise ficilities. Carver 'is primarily en- gaged in the licensing of individuals to operate retail ice cream stores and in the servicing of those ice cream stores. The complaint alleges, and the Respondent admits, that .during the calendar .year ending 31 December 1977, a representative period, Carvel, in the course and conduct of its business, purchased and received goods and services valued in excess of $50,000 from outside the State of New York. The answer also admits, and we find, that Carvel is an employer within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(2) of the Act and that it is engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The complaint further alleges, and the Respond- ent admits, that Barbara Grossman, herein Gross- man, is an individual proprietor engaged in operat- ing a retail ice cream store in Elmsford, New York, pursuant to a licensing agreement with Carvel. The Respondent also admits, and we find, that Gross- man is a person within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Act. In the absence of facts either in the pleadings or elsewhere in the record sufficient to prove that Grossman is, in fact, engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, and since jurisdiction is otherwise es- tablished to our satisfaction, we need not make any findings regarding the "commerce" status of Gross- man. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Local 456, Teamsters and Chauffeurs Union, af- filiated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Facts In March 1978, 2 the Respondent began a cam- paign to organize a unit of drivers, dispatchers, and 1 Bennett v. Teamsters Local 456, 459 F Supp 223 All dates are in 1978 unless otherwise indicated. 273 NLRB No. 81 TEAMSTERS LOCAL 456 (CARVEL CORP.) 517 warehousemen employed by Carvel at its ware- house in Yonkers, New York. On 8 March the Re- spondent requested that Carvel recognize and bar- gain with it as the representative of those employ- ees, which request Carve! refused. The Respondent then commenced picketing at the warehouse loca- tion in order to obtain . recognition. On or about 25 March the Respondent sent a letter to independent- ly operated Carvel licensees indicating its intention to set up picket lines at selected Carvel ice cream stores. On .1 April the Respondent picketed the store owned and operated by Grossman with picket signs saying, "Local 456 International Broth- erhood of Teamsters to the Public Do Not 'Buy Carvel Corp. Products." The parties stipulated that the Respondent has no labor dispute with 'Gross- man or other ;Carvel licensees, its dispute , being only with Carvel Corporation. AS noted, Carvel is in the business of licensing individuals, such as Grossman, to operate stores which sell Caniel ice cream products. Pursuant to a license agreement drawn up by Carvel, the li- censee obtains the right to operate the store under the Carvel name and to sell, at retail, Carvel prod- ucts. Although Carvel Corporation does not manu-_ facture its own products, it licenses independently owned and operated dairies to prepare the ice cream mix according to a recipe originated by Carvel. Carvel also: licenses independent companies to manufacture the various paper and service goods such as napkins, plastic serving dishes, etc., utilized by the stores. Such -items are required to have the Carve' name and trademark imprinted on them. Carvel receives - revenues from two major sources: store operations and trademarks. The former includes the -sale of goods and services, such as ice cream mix, commissary items, and equipment and machinery, to store owners. The latter includes trademark license fees for the con- tinuous "rental" of the use of the Carvel name and trademark. 3 It also includes a royalty fee, currently set' at 59 cents a gallon, attached to each -gallon Of ice cream mix purchased by a store owner. Carvel 'Corporation has assumed the responsibil- ity of arranging for national advertising of Carvel products. To, this end, it has established a "fair share" advertising program pursuant to which - a majority of store owners contribute a sum , of money, added on to each gallon of ice cream pur- chased by them, to help defray advertising costs, Until recently, a store owner was not required to participate in this advertising program.- However, present licensing agreements require that advertis- 3 Barbara Grossman's initial license fee was 515,000 ing payments be made, even though a store owner may also advertise on his own. In order to apply for a license agreement, a pro- spective licensee must, after certain preliminaries, submit to a credit review and advance a good-faith deposit of $1000. Generally, a prospective licensee will suggest a general geographic area for the loca- tion of his store, and Carvel will search its files to determine if the requested area previously had been surveyed by it -and found to 'be suitable. If so, this information is presented to a prospective licensee who must give final approval of any suggested site. If the location is considered to be inadequate or if Carvel had not done a prior market survey, Carvel would look for and survey a new location. After the applicant has approved the location for the store, the real estate subsidiary of Carvel nego- tiates with the owner of the property to obtain a lease. Carvel is involved in these negotiations for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the fact that Carvel has bargaining power not available to the average licensee. Utilizing Carvel's real estate knowledge will usually result in a better deal for the licensee. The real estate subsidiary signs the lease which contains a provision allowing Carvel to assign the lease. After the lease is, in fact, as- signed to the licensee, he 'pays' rent directly to the owner of the property, not to Carvel. The actual licensing agreement is issued to the licensee simul- taneously with the lease for the premises. The actual construction of the ice cream store is the responsibility of the licensee although Carvel, because of its knowledge of the business, provides plans and specifications' for the licensee to submit to his contractor. However, the licensee may make changes in those plans, the most common of which is -the addition of more equipment. In most in- stances, a licensee purchases his equipment and ma- chinery directly from Carvel. Except for certain items available only from Carvel, the licensee re- mains free' to purchase most other equipment and machinery from sources other than Carvel, al- though Carvel- must approve that outside source. As -a pradtical matter, most licensees do purchase their equipment from Carve!, since Carvel can pro- vide them more cheaply because it buys these items in large quantities. Furthermore, since most licens- ees must finance these major purchases, they turn to Carvel who will finance only equipment pur- chased from it, not from other sources. However, a licensee -is not obligated to obtain financing from Carvel and, in fact, is encouraged to seek financing elsewhere. Two items which Carvel requires the licensees to have are leased, rather than sold, by Carvel: the front gate plate assembly, which is an attachment 518 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR, RELATIONS BOARD to the ice _cream machine, and the Carvel sign on the exterior of the store. Carvel and the licensee enter into a separate, sign-equipment lease to cover these two items,' which are patented by- Carvel. The license agreement governs the, rights and ob- ligations of the parties thereto. The licensee is also required to adhere to the provisions of the Stand- ard Operating Procedure manual which contains, inter alia, trade secrets relating to the manufacture of Carvel ice cream. Failure to abide by the terms of the license agreement or, the SOP Manual _is considered a breach of the agreement. The licensee is, for the most part, free to operate his store as he sees fit. Pursuant to the terms of the license agreement, the licensee is required to oper- ate the store 11 months of the year and the hours of the day as specified in the manual. Additionally, Carve! suggests that the store remain open 7 days a week. In actual practice, a licensee is free to deter- mine his own hours and days of operation without prior consulation- with or approval from Carvel. Carvel also suggests the price at which a -particular product may be sold, although a licensee may sell his products at any price he wants. Carvel retains the right to inspect the store at any time. Most problems found either in the appearance or oper- ation of the store are of a minor nature and the owner is asked to correct them- and to certify that they 'have been remedied. The most flagrant viola- tion of the license agreement is the, sale of non- Carve] products, which constitutes a breach of a primary provision in the agreement by which a li- censee agrees to sell only Carvel products. Such a breach could lead to the termination, by Carvel,. of the agreement. Grossman testified that she sells only ice cream products,, although it ' appears that Carvel does supply pretzels to, some stores. While a licensee may sell such items . as , coffee and soft drinks, these items account fore only a negligible percentage of; sales. While. only Carvel products may be sold as a general rule, the licensee is , not required to sell all the items in the Carvel products line; he may choose from :among, those items. The. licensee agrees to purchase from Carvel, or some other source approved by Carvel, "all special formula mixes, toppings, flavorings, and other in- gredients, cones and any other items sold as a part of the end product that is offered for consumption to the retail purchaser"; certain items of machin- ery, as noted infra, and commissary items (spoons, dishes, etc:). While the majority of ingredients used in the Preparation -of ice cream products are pur- chased from Carvel, the licensee is free to purchase such items as coffee, fruit, and milk from sources which do not require Carvel's approval. Should,a licensee wish to purchase printed items, such as napkins, from a source other than Carvel, he _must obtain: written approval from Carvel which will then enter into a license arrangement with the out- side source to have . the required name ,and trade- marks printed on the requested items. A' licensee is not required to pay -to Carvel any percentage of his gross profits. A licensee may ad- vertise on his own and, even if he does , contribute to the national advertising program Managed by Carve!, he is not required to participate in the sale of advertised specials. Carvel 'ha's -no involvement in the labor relations policies, set by the licensee who may hire and fire employees as he -sees fit and who may determine salaries, benefits,, and other terms and conditions of employment. The license agreement requires only that the licensee undergo a period 'of training and staff his store with properly trained personnel. Carvel may inform a licensee, that an employee has , - not been trained properly and that it expects that • 'a ' • Corrective action will be 'taken. However, that is-as far as Carvel could pursue the matter s inasmuch as it has not reserved the right to tell a licensee to ter- minate an employee. All ice -cream products sold ai retail by an indi- vidual store are manufactured s in that store. As noted' previously, Caryel does not manufaciurelany products. Each store owner has been trained to mantifacture his own ice cream' products -using the machinery in his own store. When in need of ice cream mix, a store owner contacts Carvel which transmits an o:rder to the appropriately licensed dairy which in turn makes delivery directly to the store.' Packaging and' service items, while not man- ufactlired by , 'Carve!, are -warehoused by Carvel and delivered to the stores on request: The majori- ty of these item's are delivered by Carvef trucks: B. Contentions of the Parties_ — The' General Counsel contends that the Respond- ent's threat to picket licensee,S and its actual picket- ing.:Tof Grossman's store was conduct directed toward secondary persons in violation of Section 8(b)(4)(i) and (ii)(B) of the ',Act.' According to the General: Counsel; an object of the Respondent's Conduct was to force or require ,Grossman and other licensees to cease doing business with Carvel. Tile' General Coungel disputes the . Respondent's claim s the licensees are, in effect, allied with Cafvel and thus not entitled to the Act's protection of - -neutral' parties. The General Counsel further argites' that this 'case is distinguishable from Tree Friiits.4' Thus; 'the General Counsel notes that li- 4 NLRB v Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 337 U S 588 (1964) . TEAMSTERS LOCAL censees buy from Carvel the components necessary to make the final product which is sold to the public, ` , and that those components are integrated into that product in such a manner that the con- sumer cannot boycott Carvel Corporation without boycotting the entire operation of the licensee, thus forcing the licensee out of business. ' The Respondent initially contends that Carvel and its licensees are so closely related in an interde- pendent straight line operation as to negate their status as neutrals in this dispute. In support of this argument, the Respondent urges that the provisions of the license agreement reveal that the integration of operations between Carvel and its licensees is all pervasive. The Respondent claims that its argu- ment is particularly telling where, as here, the sole purpose for the existence of the licensee is to dis- tribute and sell the products of Carvel Corporation. Contrary to the General Counsel, the Respondent argues that Tree Fruits does, in fact, apply to the instant case. C. Analysis and Conclusions Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act permits a union to exert economic pressure on an employer with which it has a primary labor dispute. At the same time, it prohibits activity aimed at an employer with which a union does not directly have a labor dispute in order to disrupt that employer's relations with the primary employer. Thus, this section of the Act was designed to insulate neutral third par- ties from labor disputes in which they are not in- volved. However, the protection of the Act is not afforded to a third party employer which is so closely identified or allied with the primary em- ployer that it ceases to be a neutral to the dispute. With these considerations in mind, 'our initial in- quiry herein is whether Grossman, the licensee, is a neutral party and thus subject to protection by the Act from secondary picketing. The answer to that question "can be resolved only by considering on a case-by-case basis the factual relationship which the secondary employer bears to the primary em- ployer up against the intent of the. Congress as ex- pressed in the Act to protect employers who are 'wholly unconcerned' and not involved in the labor dispute between the primary employer, and the union." In resolving this question, the Board tradi- tionally looks to such factors as the degree of common ownership; common control of daily ac- tivities, including labor kelations policies; the extent of integration of business operations; and the de- pendence of one employer on the other for a sub- Vulcan Materials Co v Steelworkers of America, 430 F 2d 446, 451 (5th Cif 1970) 456 (CARVEL CORP ), 519 stantial portion of its business. 6 No one 'of these factors is, in and of itself, sufficient to, either con- film or deny the alleged neutral status of a party'to a dispute. Rather, all . factors must be weighed in order to assess accurately the nature of the parties' relationship. Applying these principles to the facts of the instant case, we find that Grossman and Carvel are neutral parties in their relationship to one another. Thus, at the outset, there is no common owner- ship between the parties here; neither party owns stock in the other and there are no interlocking di- rectorates. Neither party shares the other's prem- ises; there is no exchange of employees; and there is no interchange of functions. The store and its contents, save for the two 'leased items, are owned by the licensee. Additionally, the licensee operates his business on a daily basis with a high degree of autonomy, notwithstanding the provisions of the li- cense agreement. There is no active or actual con- trol by Carvel in the daily management of the li- censee's business. In this regard, the licensee makes his own, marketing decisions, as he decides which products to sell and at' 'what price. A licensee may advertise on his .own in addition to participating in Carvel's national advertising program. Further- more, the licensee decides where his store is to be located,, how it is Jo be set up, .and what hours it will remain open. Moreover, the licensee decides' how and with 'whom his store will be staffed and what the labor relations policies pertaining to that 'staff will be, all without the involvement of Carvel. On the other hand, there are Certain critical areas in which the licensee' is heavily dependent on Carvel. The mbst obvious is the total reliance on Carvel as the exclusive supplier of the liquid ice cream mix used by a licensee to manufacture the ice cream products sold in his store. There is no other source for this secret mix which is critical to the operation of a licensee's store as a Carvel fran- chise. In addition, Carvel is the sole supplier of the front gate plate assembly of the ice cream machine. The assembly apparently is not necessary to the operation of the machine, but every licensee has one. 7 Carvel also supplies a sign for the exterior of -the store; the store could clearly operate without it, -although it is good advertising and the licensee is required to have it. It is in the area of integration of operations and economic interdependency where the licensee is linked most closely to 'Carve!. Such mutual interde- 6 Graphic Arts Local 262 (London Press), 208 NLRB 37, 39 (1973) 7 The franchisee is much more dependent on Carve] than is Carvel on any one franchisee This factor, among others, persuaded the district court that Grossman was a neutral party in the Respondent's dispute with Carvel See Bennett v Teamsters Local 456, fn 1 above 520 DECISIONS. OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD pendence, necessary -for the economic survival of both parties, is characteristic of franchise oper- ations. However, the level of economic interde- pendence and functional integration here does not lead to the conclusion that the licensee has, in fact, lost 'its neutral status, for-there are other factors to consider in assessing the parties' relationship. • Again, we note that there is neither common ownership nor common managerial control. Fur- thermore, the factor of most significance is control of labor relations policies: . Grossman and other li- censees operate their businesses almost entirely in- dependent of Carvel, the provisions of the license agreement to the- contrary notwithstanding. They are free to hire and fire employees, and set their salaries, benefits, and 'other terms and conditions of employment without- Carvel's approval or interfer- ence. - Accordingly and considering all the circum- stances, it is our opinion that Grossman is, in fact, just the type of neutral third party which the Act was intended to protect from disputes not her own. We turn now to a, determination of the legality of the Respondent's picketing of this neutral third party. In finding that the Respondent has violated Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) Of the Act, we rely on the Su- preme Court's', decision in NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Local 1001 (Safeco Title Insurance C6.).e Safeco underwrote real estate title insurance through the Land Title Company, which has five local subsidiaries engaged in issuing title insurance -policies, the majority of which are underwritten by Safeco,,Safeco owned from 12 percent to 53 per- cent of the outstanding stock in each of the five subsidiaries. An officer of Safeco had always served as an officer and member of the board of di- rectors of each land title company. Local 1001 rep- resented certain Safeco employees. When contract negotiations reached an impasse, the union picketed not only Safeco's office, but also . picketed, each of the five Land Title Company locations. Picket signs read as follows: "Safeco Nonunion—Does not Employ Members of or have Contract With Retail Store Employees Local 1001."- The issue before the Supreme Court was wheth- er the Act prohibited the above-described picketing where "such picketing predictably encourages con- sumers to boycott.a neutral party's business."9 At the outset, the Court reviewed the applicabil- ity to Safeco of its Tree Fruits 151 decision. In that 8 447 U S 607 (1980) - . 9 Id at 609 The Court expressly noted, at fn 5 of its decision, that there was no challenge to an underlying finding that the title companies are neutral parties in the dispute Id at 611 " 377 U.S 58 case, :a union engaged in secondary picketing' of a retail store in order to persuade customers Of that store not to buy apples from a company with which the union had a primary dispute. The retail store- sold numerous other products in addition to apples, the struck product. The Supreme Court de- termined that it was not the plan of Congress to proscribe all consumer picketing at secondary sites; such picketing would be deemed unlawful when it was used to "persuade the customers of thesecond- ary employer to cease trading with him in order to force him to cease dealing with, or to put pressure upon, the primary employer." 11 It was the opinion of the Court that this reflects the critical distinction between picketing at the secondary site which is directed toward the nonpurchase of only the struck product and picketing at the secondary site which is, directed toward requesting the consumer not to trade at all with the secondary employer. In Tree Fruits, the product of the primary employer, apples, was the struck product and was clearly dis- tinguishable from other products sold by the sec- ondary. The Court held, therefore, that the union could, and did, lawfully picket the secondary since it confined its public appeal to the struck product. In Safeco, the Court went on to note that there was a "critical , difference" between the picketing there and that in Tree Fruits. In Tree Fruits, the struck product was but one of-many items offered for sale by the supermarket and any successful con- sumer appeal against that product would result in a decline in sales or in the supermarket dropping the item. The Court was careful to point out that • ."marginal injury to the .neutral retailer [supermar- ket] is purely incidental to the product boycott."12 However, the Court observed , that the Tree Fruits situation contrasted starkly with the Safeco facts, in that the title companies sell only one prod- uct, i.e., the primary employer's product. The result that predictably follows from picketing of the neutral iecondary party is desCribed by the Court: Secondary picketing against consumption of the primary product leaves responsive consum- ers no realistic option other than to boycott -the title companies altogether. If the appeal succeeds, each company "stops buying the struck product, not ' because of a falling demand, but in response to pressure designed to inflict injury on. [its] business generally." Thus, "the 'union does more than merely follow the struck product; it creates a separate dispute with the secondary employer." . . . " Id at 63 2 Safeco, supra at 613 TEAMSTERS LOCAL 456 (CARVEL CORP.) 521 Such an expansion of labor discord was one of the evils that Congress intended § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) to prevent. [Citations omitted.]13 The Court summarized its holding in Safeco by noting that lals long as secondary picketing only discourages consumption of a struck product, inci- dental injury to the neutral is a natural conse- quence of an effective primary boycott." 14. HoWev,: er, Local 1001's appeal in Safeco was . • . "reasonably calculated to induce custom- ers not to patronize the neutrals at all." The resulting injury to their businesses is distinctly different from the injury that the Court con- sidered in. Tree Fruits. Product picketing that reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss simply does not square with the language or the pur- pose of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B): [Citations orriitted.]' 5 Accordingly, the Court concluded that Local 1001's picketing of the secondary employers in Safeco "violates the statutory ban on- the coercion of neutrals"' 6 under Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The Supreme Court did not limit its discussion to the facts presented in Safeco. Nonetheless, the Court exhibited its awareness of the extent to which factual situations differ: The picketing in Tree Fruits and the picketing in this case [Safecoj are relatively extreme ex- amples of the spectrum of conduct that the Board and the Courts will encounter in com- plaints charging violations of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). If secondary picketing were directed against a product representing a major portion of a neu- tral's business, but significantly less than that represented by a ,single dominant product, nei- ther Tree Fruits nor today's decision necessari- ly would control. , The critical question would be whether, by encouraging customers to reject the struck product, the secondary appeal is reasonably likely to threaten the neutral party with ruin or substantial loss. Resolution of the question in ' each case will be entrusted to the Board's expertise.' 7 In our opinion, the facts of the instant case fall squarely within the Court's discussion in Safeco, for here, as in that case, the neutral secondary has only one significant product for sale, i.e., the primary 13 Id at 613-614 i4 at 614 19 Id at 614-615 16 Id at 615 17 Id at 615-616 fn 11 employer's product, which is Carvel ice cream." The Union's appeal here, as in that case, was di- rected towards that one -product. A successful con- sumer boycott of that product would inescapably lead to the total collapse of Grossman's business, for she has no goods to sell other than the struck product. Obviously, then, the Union is requesting that the public -cease dealing with Grossman, that the public not trade at all with her. To reiterate what the Court stated .in Safeco: "Product picketing that reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with ruin . . . simply does not square with the language or the purpose of § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)."19 Accordingly, we find that the Union violated the Act by its picketing of Grossman. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of the Respondent set forth above have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce ,among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Carvel Corporation is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Local 456, Teamkers and Chauffeurs Union, affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By its picketing at the premises of Barbara Grossman in furtherance of a dispute with Carvel Corporation, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the Act. 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist thereform and to take certain af- firmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. 18 The fact that the ice cream is offered for sale in a variety of forms and the fact that items such as coffee and pretzels may be sold does not detract from our decision Safeco, supra at 614-615 522 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDER The National Labor Relations Board -orders that the Respondent, Local 456, Teamsters and Chauf- feurs Union, affiliated with the International Broth- erhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehobsemen and Helpers of Americã, Elmsford, New York, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and 'desist from , threatening, coercing, or restraining Barbara Grossman, or any other person, where an object thereof is to force or re- quire any of them to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of Carvel Corporation, or to cease doing business with Carvel Corporation. - 2. Take the following affirmative- action which the Board finds will effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Post at its business offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix."2° Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for _Region 2, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representa- tive, shall be posted by the Respondent immediate- ly upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent " If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board" shall read ,"Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (b) Furnish to the Regional Director copies of the aforementioned notice for posting by Barbara Grossman, if willing, at her picketed ice cream store. - (c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply., APPENDIX NOTICE TO MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS. BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE . WILL NOT, by picketing her premises, threat- en, coerce, or restrain Barbara Grossman, or any other person, where an object thereof is to force or require any of them to cease using, selling, han- dling, transporting, or otherwise - dealing in the products of Carvel Corporation, or to cease doing business with Carve! Corporation. LOCAL 456, TEAMSTERS AND CHAUF- FEURS UNION; AFFILIATED WITH THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WARE- HOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMER- ICA