Queen Anne Record Sales, Inc.

TOWER BOOKS 671 Queen Anne Record Sales, Inc. d/b/a Tower Books and Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, chartered by United Food and Commercial Workers International _Union, AFL-CIO. Cases 19-CA-15570 and 19-CA-15724 14 December 1984 -DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS ZIMMERMAN AND HUNTER On 4 November 1983 Administrative Law Judge James M. Kennedy issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief in sup- port of the administrative law judge's decision. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, 1 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modified. • We agree with the judge's findings regarding the Respondent's failure to provide relevant material to the Union and its refusal to meet to negotiate a col- lective-bargaining agreement. With regard to the Respondent's failure to supply relevant informa- tion, we note the following. On 3 March 1983 the union president wrote to the Respondent's counsel Robert Scolnik requesting, inter alia, wage and hour data for the 12 bargaining unit employees em- ployed by the Respondent at its Seattle, Washing- ton store. The information was requested by the Union under its newly acquired obligation to nego- tiate a bargaining agreement for these employees. In his first letter of response, Scolnik indicated he had referred the request to company headquarters. In his second letter he made no reference to the in- formation request. In his third letter, mailed a month after the initial request for information, Scolnik offered to make the information available for inspection and copying at its payroll headquar- ters in Sacramento, California. Alternatively he suggested that the Respondent would compile the information and make copies of documents "at the Union's expense for clerical and administrative time and copying time expenses." This offer by the Re- spondent to' make copies was conditioned on the Union paying copying and administrative expenses in advance, yet the cost of these expenses was not Although we agree with the judge's finding that the Respondent at- tempted to construct artificial barriers around the bargaining process, in reaching our conclusion we disavow -reliance on his determination that the Respondent conditioned bargaining on satisfaction of a lawsuit disclosed. The Union was therefore expected to commit itself in advance to paying an undisclosed amount for copying and administrative fees. If the Respondent were serious -about sending the infor- mation, at the very least it would have said what the charges would be per page for copying and what the administrative fees would be based on an hourly rate so that the Union would have some ob- jective basis on which to render a decision. Our dissenting colleague 'cites United Aircraft Corp. 2 for the proposition that the union is obligat- ed to pay for the expenses related to compiling the request information. The law is riot so clearcut as the dissent would make it. Although in the cited case the union was obligated to pay, the informa- tion request there was extensive and the expenses amounted to over $50,000. Here, the Union re- quested information such as the names, addresses, and job classifications of only 12 employees, and their wakes, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.' The information sought ,was' basic and encompassed matters which -employers are re- quired to provide to enable unions to bargain intel- ligently and to fulfill their obligations as the select- ed representative of the employer's employees.3 The cost and burden , of compliance ordinarily will not justify an initial, categorical refusal to supply relevant data. 4 "If there are substantial costs in- volved in compiling the information in ,the precise form at the intervals requested by the Union, the parties must bargain in good faith as to who shall bear such costs . . . ."5 The Respondent expressed no willingness to bargain about costs. Additionally, the onus is on the Respondent to show that 'pro- duction of the data would be unduly burdensome. There is nothing in the record to substantiate such a claim. On the contrary, it can be inferred from the Respondent's failure to produce evidence of substantial cost in response to the Union's claim that the cost Would be "de minimis," that the costs for compiling basic information on only 12 employ- ees was indeed negligible. Mindful that each case 2 192 NLRB 382 (1971), en fd in relevant part 534 F 2d 422 (2d Or 1975) In American Telephone & Telegraph Go, 250 NLRB 47 (1980), enfd sub nom Communications, Workers Local 1051 v NLRB, 644 F 2d 923 (1st Cir 1981), another case cited by the dissent for the proposition that photocopying costs are to be borne by the union, it is significant to note that the union itself requested to pay the photocopying costs which It had calculated would cost 10 cents .a page Rather than sanction an ar- bitrary figure, the Board ordered that the parties bargain over the reason- able cost 3 See, e g, Union Carbide Corp, 197 NLRB 717 (1972) 4 See Electrical Workers IUE v NLRB, 648 F 2d 18 at 26 (D C 1980) 5 Food Employers Council, 197 NLRB 651 , (1972) Contrary to the as- sertion of our dissenting colleague, this case indicates that there is indeed a sound basis in the law for the Union's request that the Respondent dem- onstrate a burdensome financial Impact before the Union would discuss costs 273 NLRB No. 96 672 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD of what constitutes good-faith bargaining must turn on its, particular facts, it is clear that the Respond- ent's refusal to supply the information—while nei- ther justifying its request for costs nor offering to bargain over the matter—was unreasonable. A lack of good faith can be inferred therefrom.- The Respondent's underlying motive was to forestall sending. the requested information and thereby forestall actual negotiation until it knew what the bargaining chips were going to be. A re- curring theme throughout the. Respondent's corre- spondence was its request that the Union submit its initial contract proposals in advance. In his fourth letter to the Union, the Respondent's counsel de- clared, „ If . . . the -Union is really desirous of bar- gaining, then I suggest you put the cards face up on the table and send me your written con- tract proposals so that the Company can see what is really involved here—in terms , of the real sUbstance—and see what the prospects are. If we are in the same ballpark, some tele- phone conversations, some exchanges of con- tract language, some correspondence, etc. will most likely, be sufficient to wrap it up. Why play games? Why not get down to the guts of the matter9 But why not get it out into the open? Put the real substantive issues on the table, instead of horsing around. If we can make a "deal" '(in the honorable sense of the word, of course), we can do it by phone in short order, provided that we get started. This letter speaks. for itself as to the Respond- ent's recalcitrant -reluctance to send the requested information. Thus,. the judge was warranted in finding that the Respondent's insistence on advance payment for the _ requested information was a "phony issue." , The second issue is whether the Respondent un- lawfully re-fused to meet with the Union to negoti- ate _a collective-bargaining agreement. The judge's rationale for discounting the Respondent's good faith is supported by the record. Since the affected employees and Union were located in Seattle, Washington, the Respondent's headquarters office and wage data were located ,in Sacramento, Cali- fornia, and the Respondent's attorney wag located in San Francisco, California, it is clear that some travel might be involved in order to' negotiate ef- fectively a collective-bargaining agreement. By the mere fact that the Respondent suggested meeting halfway between Seattle and Sacramento (or San Francisco) at some undesignated location ,entirely unrelated to any of the , parties it has in essence conceded that negotiations could in fact take place away from headquarters or the Respondent's coun- sel office. As noted by the dissent, "the record con- tains no evidence as to the extent to which Re- spondent's headquarters otherwise controls or deals with business matters arising within its Seattle store." If there were any overriding reason compel- ling negotiations to take place in Sacramento, the Respondent surely would have come forward with such a justification in its correspondence. Its failure to do so calls into question its intransigent , insist- ence in refusing to consider negotiations in Seattle. Under these circumstances, the Respondent refused to make a reasonable and sincere effort to meet and confer with the certified representative of its em- ployees. Applicable -here is the court's observation in NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co:6 • The collective bargaining features of the stat- ute_ cannot be made effective unless employer and employees cooperate in the give and take of personal conferences . . . the employer must make his representatives available for conferences at the plant where the controversy is in progress, and at reasonable times and places, so that personnel negotiations are practicable. [Emphasis added.] The Board also has found that emploj Ters have violated_ Section- 8(a)(1) and '(5) when an employer has refused to meet near the locale of the repre- sented employees. 7 The conditioning of the com- mencement of contract discussions on the Union's Willingness to meet at a place over 700 miles from the store and employees involved does not meet the statutory test of good-faith bargaining.8 Finally, we disagree with the judge's finding that the Respondent violated the Act by making pay adjustments in May 1983 without negotiating with the Union. The Respondent had a prior practice of granting regular periodic automatic and merit in- creases. In November 1982, the Union sent the Re- spondent a letter specifically requesting that it con- tinue its past practice of wage increases and Christ- mas bonuses, and promising not to file unfair labor practice charges. 6 117 F 2d 921, 924 (6th Cir 1941) In the Lorillard case, the Respond- ent insisted on bargaining in New York although the plant involved was located in Middletown, Ohio See, e g, Sempera Pacific, 237 NLRB 478 (1978), N C Coastal Motor Lines, 219 NLRB 1009, 1013 (1975) 8 Westinghduse Pacific Coast Brake Co. 89 NLRB 145 (1950), Mid. America Transportation Co. 141 NLRB 326 (1963) Contrary to the assertion made by the 'dissent, we do not, by any means, advocate a per se approach to deciding where bargaining should take place Nor does Semi-writ Pacific, supra, stand for such a proposition We have considered all the relevant circumstances beanng on the issue in this case and have concluded that all the factors, taken as a whole, lead to the conclusion that the Respondent was not bargaining in good faith, but was merely using this Issue as a stratagem to delay or avoid bargain- ing TOWER BOOKS 673 In good-faith reliance on this request and repre- sentation, the Respondent granted May wage, in- creases. Although the certification -was , issued in February 1983 .therehy activating, under normal circumstances, the obligation to bargain about wage adjustments, the. Union here specifically 're- quested that the Respondent continue its past:wage Practices. This , request :was open ended, with nO time limits specified, implying that the Respondent would be free fo make these 'adjustments until" a collective-bargaining agreement Was' ,reached. Under these * circumstanceS we find that the Re- spondent's unilateral action, 'taken' in reliance on the Union's representation, was lawful `and mit vio- lative of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.' , ORDER. The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of thi : adrninistrative law judge as modified below' and orders 'that the Re- spondent; Queen 'Anne Rebord Sales, Inc. d/b/a Tower Books, Seattle, Washington, its officers, agents, successors; and assigns; shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified:, 1. Delete paragaph 1(c) :and- reletter the remain- ing paragraph. . :• - 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the administrative law judge. 9 , . . MEMBER HUNTER, diSSeilting. . I agree- with my colleagues' conclusion that the Respondent did not 'violate_ Secti6n 8(a)(5) and (1.) of the Act by making pay adjustiiients' in May 1983 without negotiating 'With the Union. However, I cannot agree to adopt the judge's ConClusion that the Respondent violated the' Act by failing to pro- vide information to the Union and refusingto meet to negotiate a collective-bargaining -agreement. , In my judgment, the evidence favors a'cOnclusion that the Respondent "did not act 'unlawfully in its deal- ings with the Uni6n. - The Respondent operates approximately 50 stores in various States'and has its headquarters in Sacramento, California. On 7. February 1983 1 the Union was certified by the Board as the exclusive representative of the employees located at- the. Re- spondent's Mercer Street, Seattle, Washington store. On 3 March , the,Union, also located in Seat- tle, wrote to the Respondent's counsel in San Fran- cisco, California, requesting certain information as to unit employees. -This, information included ,em- , ployees' names, job: classifications, dates of hire, - rates of pay, dates and amounts of lost wage- in- creases, average number of hours worked during the previous 3-month period, and health insurance and, retirement benefits. On 9 March the Respond- ent's counsel informed the .Union that its request was being_ transmitted, to the Respondent's head- quarters „where both the Respondent's labor rela- tions offices and the requested information were lo- cated: On 15 March the Union acknowledged this response and requested that the data be provided no later than 24 March. On 21 March the Respondent's counsel informed the Union that - the Respondent considered the Board's certification to be invalid and that the Re- spondent was considering whether to "appeal" the certification by refusing to bargain. Noting that its negotiators were located in Sacramento, the Re- spondent's counsel referred to the expenses in- volved in .either challenging the Board's certifica- tion -through the Federal courts or bargaining in Seattle, Washington. He informed the Union that, as , a ;matter of good,faith-comproMise, the Re- spondent would forgo a legal battle over the certi- fication if a mutually satisfactory agreement could be worked out as to the time, place, and extent of negotiations. Toward that end, the Respondent's counsel, proposed that negotiations be held either in Sacramento _or San' Francisco. He further noted ,since a great 'deal of the negotiating -could be ac- complished by the exchange of written proposals, revisions, -and drafts, and in view of the geographi- cal separation of the principals, face-to-face meet- ings _on ,a ,,monthly basis seemed appropriate and reasonable. _The Respondent's counsel stated that he would, give . full consideration to any counter- proposals the Union would offer and suggested that- the Union might propose alternating negotia- tions between Seattle ,and Sacramento (or San Francisco), or conducting negotiations at a conven- , ient place halfway betWeen these cities. The letter invited the Union to contact the Respondent if it were. interested in working out a mutually agree- able system of conducting negotiations in lieu of -further litigation. - On . 8 April the Union replied to the Respond- ent's _letter, saying that the Union did not have the resources to meet ,with the Respondent in Califor- nia and that the Respondent's proposal appeared to be an effort to frustrate bargaining. The Union pro- posed that the parties meeting "marathon" negotia- tions and offered to , pick up the Respondent's nego- tiators at the .Seattle airport. The Union also re- newed its request -fox:information. • On the same date the Union prepared the forego- ing response, the Respondent's counsel wrote to , • 9 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, 'the words in the riiitice reading "Posted - by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board" 'shall 'read "Posted PursUant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board All dates are in 1983 except as indicated • " - 674 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the Union offering to provide the information re- quested in the Union's 3 March letter by making it available for inspection and copying at its payroll and labor relations office in Sacramento. He added that, as a gesture of good faith and, if the Union wished, the Respondent would ' compile the infor- mation and make copies of relevant documents and records but that the Union would be' required to pay for the copying and administrative expenses in advance. The Respondent also noted that it had not yet received a response from the Union as to its 21 March letter and that the Respondent was anxious to move ahead on its decision regarding negotiations and needed the Union's position in a timely fashion. On 15 April the Union replied to the Respond- ent's 8 April letter. The Union contended that as the monetary impact of providing the information was "de minimis," the administrative costs should be borne by the Respondent. The Union further contended that it had a fundamental right to the in- formation regardless of cost, but that if the Re- spondent would provide "clear and convincing evi- dence" that the request would impose substantial fi- nancial impact, the Union would consider sharing the expenses. On 23 April the Respondent wrote the Union re- jecting its 8 April counterproposal as to the meet- ing place for negotiations and the concept of "mar- athon" negotiations. The Respondent proposed monthly meetings starting at 9:30 a.m., with a 2- hour caucus for lunch and review ' of' documents, and concluding at 5 p.m. The Respondent offered to consider further proposals from the Union on these matters and suggested that the Union submit a contract proposal by mail which the parties could negotiate telephonically or by mail. On 12 May the Union wrote to the Respondent expressing astonishment that the Respondent would not come to Seattle to negotiate. The Respondent replied on 17 May reaffirming its previous positions and emphasizing once more that it was not insisting on any particular proposal and had tried to 'remain as flexible as possible in its approach to negOtia- dons. On 20 May the Union replied indicating. that the Respondent's positions as to providing informa- tion and meeting in California were totally inapprO- priate. The Union said that negotiations by tele- phone were "terribly inconvenient" and that the Respondent should meet in Seattle as a show of good faith. On these facts the judge concluded that the Re- spondent acted in bad faith in failing to provide in- formation to the Union and in refusing to agree to negotiate in Seattle, Washington. In so doing, the judge concluded that the information requested by the Union and not provided by the Respondent was relevant and necessary' to the Union's role as bargaining agent. The judge concluded that the Respondent's insistence on advance payment before supplying the information was a "phony issue," saying "whether or not the Union is obligated to pay for such information, Respondent never ad- vised the Union how much_ the billing would be, despite a suggestion from a Union official that it would consider paying for the information if [Re- spondent's attorney] would do so." -In addition, the judge concluded that the Respondent had unlaw- fully conditioned bargaining by agreeing to forgo a test of the Board's certification of the Union if the Union would meet in California, and had ap- proached bargaining in bad faith by arbitrarily re- fusing to meet in Seattle. In the latter regard, the judge noted that the Respondent's suggestion that the parties meet at a location . between Sacramento and Seattle was "preposterous," and revealed its lack of sincerity,, as did the Respondent's sugges- tion that the ,Union provide it with an initial writ- ten contract proposal while .at the same time refus- ing to supply information needed for bargaining. Because I believe that the judge misapplied both the facts and the governing law in reaching his conclusions, I would reverse the judge and dismiss the complaint in its entirety. At the outset, I would note that the record here contains no , evidence or suggestion that the Re- spondent delegated bargaining authority or misrep- resented the location of its labor relations functions or information in an effort to impede bargaining. Thus, we are faced with a situation where ,preexist- ing circumstances have created a geographical sep- aration between the principals involved in collec- tive bargaining and the information relevant to the bargaining process. Moreover, the record contains no evidence as to the extent to which the Respond- ent's headquarters otherwise controls or deals with business matters arising within its- Seattle store, or the nature of communications between the two. While the judge found it unnecessary to decide whether the Union was obligated to pay for the in- formation requested by it, the law is clear that the Union was so obligated. In United Aircraft Corp., 192 NLRB 382 (1971), enfd. in relevant part 534 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1975), the Board examined a con- tention that the employer, who was willing to allow the union access to its records, nonetheless violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by refusing to prepare -at its own cost certain reports and informa- tion requested by the union.- In rejecting the con- tention the Board said: TOWER BOOKS 675 An employer, if it is -to fulfill its bargaining obligation under Section 8(a)(5), is required to furnish relevant information requested by the employee • representative. But it does not follow that the union is entitled to such infor- illation in the exact fOrm or on the exact terms requested. 'It is sufficient if the information is made available in a manner not so burdensome or time-consuming as to impede the process' of bargaining." "Good-faith bargaining requires only that such information be made available at a reasonable time and in a reasonable place and with an opportunity for the Union to .. make a copy of such information if it so de- sires." These , are the terms upon which Re- spondent generally - offered to make available the information requested by the Unions. Re- spondent was not required to duplicate or con- form its ,records, at its own cost, for the con- venience of the Unions. [192 NLRB at 389, footnotes and citations omitted.] , In addition, in Amêrican Telephone & Telegraph Co., 250 NLRB 47 (1980), enfd sub nom. Commu- nications Workers Local' 1051 v. NLRB, 644 F.2d 923 (1st Cir. 1981)„ the Board was faced with the issue of whether the employer was required to fur- nish photocopies of documents -requested by the union. While , agreeing with the judge that absent unusual circumstances the employer was so re- quired; the Board stated (250 NLRB at 47 fn. 2): r; We, further note that the Administrative Law Judge ordered that Respondent furnish the photocopies to the, Union "at a rate of no -, more than 10 cents a photocopy page." We shall modify this portion of the recommended Order to order Respondent to provide, or allow the Union to make, the photocopies, and to bargain overthe reasonable additional costs to the Employer, for. furnishing the ,requested • information. The reasonable additional costs shall 'be assumed by the Union. [Emphasis added.] •The foregoing cases make clear that an employer is not required to absorb the expenses of compiling and photocopying information and will not be found to violate Section "8(a)(5) so long as it acts reasonably in attempting to make relevant informa- tion available to the Union. In the instant case the judge concluded that the Respondent acted in bad faith because it failed to advise the Union how much the billing would be, despite the . Union's sug- gestion that it would consider paying for the infor- mation if the Respondent did so. The judge's con- clusion misstates the facts. The 'record reveals that the Respondent offered to make its records avail- able to the Union in Sacramento, or to compile and forward the informatiOn if 'the Union would agree to pay the costs. The Union did not indicate a will- ingness to consider the Respondent's offer, but re- plied instead that it had a fundamental right to the information and that 'the Respondent should bear the costs of ,compiling the information unless it could demonstrate by "clear and convincing evi- dence" that the Compilation process involved "sub- stantial and/or burdensome financial impact," whereupon the . Union would consider sharing the expenses. Under no construction of these facts can the Union be Said to have indicated a willingness to consider paying the costs if informed of such by the Respondent. Moreover, there is no basis in the law for ,the Union, t'o' require that the Respondent demonstrate burdensome financial impact by clear and convincing evidence before the' Union would discuss costs. 2 Accordingly, I would find that it was the Union's intransigence and not -a lack of good faith which caned `the Respondent to refuse to supply the 'information, to the Union and I would therefore dismiss this allegation of the com- plaint. Similarly, the judge felied on an erroneous con- struction of the facts to conclude that the Respond- ent refused to meet and negotiate with the Union. The complaint in the instant case alleged that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act and that since 9. March 1963 it has refused to meet and bargain with the Union near the locale of 2 Food Employers Council, 197 NLRB 651 (1972), does not support the majority's contrary conclusion In' that ease, the employer flatly refused to provide information requested by, the union The Board found a viola- tion but noted that the employer had at an earlier time furnished some of the requested information to the union, albeit in a form other than desired by the union The Board further noted the unsupported assertion of each party that an onerous burden would be placed (in it should the Board require production of the requested information in a form desired by the adverse party Unable to niake a judgment on this Issue, the Board or- dered the parties to bargain "if there are substantial costs involved in compiling the information in the precise form and at the intervals re- quested by the Union" The Board added, however, "if no agreement can be reached, the Union is entitled in any event to access to records from which It can reasonably-compile the information" (citations omitted) Id at 651 Thus, even in the remedial posture of the case, the Board declined to require that the employer bear the costs of producing information, in- cluding that categorically denied the union The existing law clearly per- mits an employer to unilaterally shift to the union the financial burden of compiling and reproducing information by allowing access to records from which the requeited information may be gathered Cincinnati Steel Castings Co, 86 NLRB 592, 593 (1949) Where circumstances are such that access to an employer's .records will not reasonably satisfy the union's needs, an employer may be required to compile or photocopy in- formaiiOn, but the union must bear the reason'able'costs involved Ameri- can Telephone & Telegraph Co. supra, United Aircraft Corp, supra In the Instant case, the Respondent offered the Union access to its records, lo- cated in Sacramento, and offered to compile and forward information to the Union, if it preferred, on payment of costs There is no indication that the Respondent's offer contemplated other than reasonable costs in this regard Assuming that the Union's needs could not reasonably be met by access to records, located in Sacramento, it was obliged to' bear the rea- sonable costs of the Respondent in compiling the information and for- warding it to Seattle 676 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the unit. In adopting the judge's conclusion, my colleagues expressly disavow reliance on his deter- mination that "Respondent conditioned bargaining on satisfaction of a lawsuit." Presumably, this is a reference to the judge's conclusion that the Re- spondent conditioned a waiver of its right to con- test the Board's certification of the Union, on the Union's agreement to meet in California. I agree with my colleagues that the Respondent did not condition bargaining on such a waiver, but I dis- agree that the evidence otherwise supports the finding of a violation. In its communications to the Union, the Re- spondent made it clear that it was concerned with the high costs associated with conducting extensive face-to-face negotiations in Seattle, when the Re- spondent's negotiators were located in Sacramento. It proposed that all negotiation meetings be con- ducted in Sacramento and added: The Company will appreciate your response in the same (good faith)' spirit and will give full and serious consideration to any and all coun- terproposals you wish to make. For example, you may feel that the location of negotiation meetings should be alternated, one time in Sac- • ramento (or San Francisco), and the next time in Seattle. Or; you may feel that a better solu- tion would be to meet at some convenient place halfway in between Seattle and Sacra- mento (or San Francisco). Or you may have some other proposal or proposals. In addition, the Respondent informed the Union of its belief that the parties could reasonably con- duct negotiations through a combination of written exchanges and face-to-face sessions: [T]he Company would like to know what pro- posals you wish to make concerning the fre- quency of meetings and the time periods for each meeting. Since a great deal can be ac- complished by the submission of written con- tract proposals, counterproposals, revisions, drafts, etc., and in view of the distances in- volved, meetings once a month seem appropri- ate and reasonable as a general plan, subject to change by mutual agreement depending on the particular circumstances. Likewise, in view of the distances, scheduling each meeting for 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. (with an ade- quate lunch period for conferring, preparation, etc.) seems appropriate and reasonable, subject, again, to change by mutual ,agreement depend- ing on particular circumstances. At a later point, the Respondent urged the Union to begin the negotiation process by submitting a contract proposal by mail, which could have been further discussed by the parties telephonically, or by mail. At the same time, the Respondent indicat- ed a willingness to consider any other proposals the Union would advance. For its part, the Union adhered to its position that the Respondent should agree to negotiate in Seattle, and that its refusal to supply the information requested by the Union made submission of bargaining proposals impossi- ble. The judge found that the Respondent's only con- tention in regard , to the site for negotiations was that it Would be "inconvenient" to . negotiate in Se- attle because the Company's records were in Sacra- mento. In addition, the judge found that the Re- spondent's suggested -counterproposal of negotiat- ing in a location between 'Seattle and Sacramento was "preposterous," and that the Respondent' disin- genuously contended that the Union's failure to provide an initial proposal prevented negotiations from beginning inasmuch as the Respondent re- fused to provide the =Union with information neces- sary to con-struction of such proposal. Without regard to whether the Union's refusal to submit an initial contract proposal is of significance in this case, for the reasons indicated above; I would" not find that the Respondent unlawfully re- fused to provide information to the Union and do not believe the judge could rely on this allegation in support 'of his conelusion here. Further, the judge's rationale for otherwise discounting the Re- spondent's good faith is not supported by the record. As the facts above reveal, the Respondent immediately and clearly expressed its concerns over the financial impact of extended negotiations in Seattle and indicated its belief that great progress could be made through a procedure com- bining mail and face-to-face negotiations. In addi- tion, there is absolutely no evidence on the record to support the judge's conclusion thai the Respond- ent's suggestion of possible negotiations at a loca- tion between Seattle and Sacramento was not a viable alternative' in terms of convenience or cost. Rather, it appears a literal attempt to meet the Unidn halfway. Finally, there is no evidence that the Respondent failed or refused to promptly and directly address itself to the Union's communica- tions, or engaged in any other conduct which would support a finding that the Respondent re- fused to bargain in good faith: In these circum- stances, I find that the RespOndent could lawfully refuse to agree to the Union's proposal, as Section 8(d) of the Act does not require that it concede its TOWER BOOKS 677 position in negotiations. 3 As the Respondent was at all -times willing to negotiate with the Union, I would dismiss this allegation of the complaint as well. - 3 I agree that an employer may violate Sec 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by refusing to bargain near the locale of the represented employees However, unlike my colleagues, I am not willing to adopt the per se ap- proach found in Semperit Pacific, 237 NLRB 478 (1978) Whether an em- ployer's conduct constitutes a refusal to bargain in good faith is a matter which requires consideration of all relevant circumstances bearing on the issue Rhodes-Holland Chevrolet Co, 146 NLRB' 1304 (1964) In addition, Sec 8(d) of the Act allows the parties discretion to seek the most advan- tageous bargain while also prohibiting the Board from requiring conces- sions in negotiations Thus, the parties should be given considerable leeway in reasonably pursuing bargaining arrangements favorable to their respective interests In the instant case, the Respondent had a reasonable basis for pursuing negotiations in locations other than Seattle Over a rel- atively brief period, the Respondent sought the Union's agreement to ne- gotiate in Sacramento, or to alternate negotiations between Sacramento and Seattle The Respondent also 'ekpresied its willingness to consider other arrangements proposed by the Union and offered alternatives for the Union's consideration While the Union rejected the Respondent's proposals, it was not prepared to begin negotiations until the Respondent provided information requested by the Union, and I have found above that the Respondent did not violate the Act by refusing to provide the - information Under the circumstances, I do not find that the Respondent unlawfully refused to bargain near the locale of the represented employ- ees APPENDIX NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representa- tives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or pro- tection , .To choose not to engage in any of these protected concerted activities. - WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Union certified as the exclusive representative Of employees at our store located on Mercer Street in Seattle, Washington. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with that Union, Retail Store Employees Local 1001, chartered by United Food and Commercial Workers Internation- al ‘Union, AFL-CIO by refusing to supply it with wage and personnel data relevant to collective bar- gaining. WE WILL NOT refuse to meet with the Union in or near Seattle to engage in good-faith collective bargaining in the appropriate unit. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed you by 'Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL immediately , supply to the Union the ,wage and personnel data sought by it on 3 March 1983. WE WILL, on request, bargain with the Union, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit described below, with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. The bargaining unit is: All employees employed at the Respondent's facility located at 20 Mercer Street, Seattle, Washington, excluding all office clerical em- ployees, deposit clerks, professional employees, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act. QUEEN ANNE , RECORD SALES, INC. , D/B/A TOWER BOOKS' DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES M. KENNEDY, Administrative Law Judge. On June 6, 1983, the Acting Regional Director for the Na- tional Labor Relations Board for Region 19 issued a con- solidated complaint accusing Queene Anne Record Sales, Inc. d/b/a Tower Books (Respondent) of having violat- ed Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act (the Act). It is based on charges filed on April 4 and May 19, 1983, by Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, chartered by United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, AFL-CIO (the Union). Although an answer was filed to the consolidated com- plaint, the parties on August 17-19 executed a stipulation of facts in lieu of hearing in which they agreed that there are no disputed issues of fact, waived a hearing, and fur- ther_ stipulated that the case be decided on the stipula- tions of fact as supplemented by the formal papers. Thereafter the General Counsel and Respondent filed briefs which have been carefully considered. Issues Whether Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by: (1) failing to provide the Union with ma- terial relevant to collective bargaining; (2) refusing to meet with union representatives for the purpose of nego- tiating a collective-bargaining contract; and (3) unilater- ally, and without notice to the Union, making certain pay rate changes or whether the Union waived its right to complain of such changes. Pursuant to the stipulation I make the following 678 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FINDINGS, OF FACT I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER Respondent. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of MTS, In- corporated, a California corporation headquartered in Sacramento, California, and from which it operates ap- proximately 50 Stores in California, Washington, Oregon, Nevada, Arizona, Hawaii, and New York, During the past 12 months, a representative period, Respondent's gross sales of goods and services exceeded $500,000 and during the same period it purchased and caused to be transferred and delivered to its facilities within the State of Washington goods and materials valued in excess ,of $50,000 from sources outside the State. The parties agree, therefore, that Respondent is an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION 'INVOLVED The parties stipulate, and I find, that the Union is and has been at all times material, a. labor organization Within the meaning of Section.2(5) of the Act. - III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. Background The store in question is located on Mercer Street in Seattle, Washington: On January 15, 1982, the Board conducted a representation election among the employ- ees at that store. Due to challenged ballots' the results of the election were indeterminative. Thereafter Respond- ent filed objections to the Union's conduct affecting the outcome of the election. Later a hearing' was held on February 11, 1982, to resolve challenged ballots and ob- jections. The hearing officer issued a report on March 5 and on July 16 the Board chreded the opening of one 'of the ballots. Respondent filed a motion for reconsider- ation which was dented on September 9. The challenged ballot was 'opened on September 20_ and a 'revised tally issued that day showing that 'five employees had voted for union representation with four against. Respondent then filed an 'additional objection to the conduct of the election with respect to the marking of the opened ballot. The Regional Director issued a report recOm- mending that the objection be overruled; Respondent again excepted. Finally, on February 7, 1983, the Board issued- its decision and certification of representative in the agreed-upon unit.' B. The Refusal to Supply Information On March 3, 1983, approximately 3 weeks after the certification of representative was issued, the Union's president, Steve Gouras, wrote Respondent's counsel, Robert J. Scolnik,. advising him.of the Union's desire to negotiate a labor agreement. He asked for the following information so that he could' prepare for negotiations: The name of each bargaining unit employee, his or her 1 Although Respondent - argues to me that it was-an error for 'the Board to have issued the certification;' I am bound by the .136ard's action and do not consider any attack on It job classification,, hire date, rate of , pay, date, and amounts of last wage increase, average, number of hours worked in the last 3 months and copies of "health insur- ance or retirement benefits available to your bargaining unit employees." On March 9, Respondent's counsel stated that all of the information which the Union sought was located in Respondent's Sacramento headquarters and that he was transmitting the request to the appropriate officials there. On March 15, another union official, Grievance Director Fred Rosenberry, wrote Scolnik acknowledging the re- sponse and asking that the material be provided no later than March 24. By letter of March 21, Scolnik advised the Union of his client's.position: Although he raised a number of mat- ters which will be discussed in the section of this deci- sion dealing with the refusal to' meet, section III, C, infra, he did not transmit any of the information which the Union sought. By letter dated April 8 Rosenberry again sought the material. Also by letter dated April 8 Scolnik wrote the Union offering to provide the informa- tion' to the Union by making it available for inspection and copying at its payroll and labor relations office in Sacramento. He said as a "gesture of good faith" the Company, if the Union wished, would compile the infor- mation and make copies of the documents and records but that the Union must pay for the copying and admin- istrative expenses in -advance He did not suggest what the cost would be By letter dated April 15„ another union official, Louis T. Spignesi, asserted to Scolnik that the monetary impact of providing the information was _"de minimis" at best and that the administrative costs should be borne by the Employer. Although he contended the Union had a "fundamental: right" to the 'information regardless of cost, he said Respondent would provide "clear and con- vincing evidence" that, ,the request would impose "sub- stantial and/or burdensome financial impact," the Union would consider sharing the expense's. By letter dated April 20, Scolnik asserted the Union was refusing to come to Sacramento and refusing to bear the cost for assembling and 'sending the information. He said assuming he was correct, the parties were "at an im- passe concerning these procedural issues," i e., both the information iequest and other matters. He suggested the reason , implied in the Union's April 8 and 15 letters for refusing to accept or consider ,Company's "proposal" was "the Union's claimed inability to _pay." He then de- manded a large amount of financial data from the Union. However, he did not transmit any of the material sought. By 'letter dated May 12, Rosenberry advised Scolnik the Union still needed the information listed in . Gouras' March 3 letter. In his reply of May 17, Scolnik said Re- spondent "specifically reaffirms its position with respect to the information you_ have requested." He referred to his April 8 and 20 letters' He said, "We seem to be in' an inif)ASse on that subject as well." One of the- themes which is' found throughout_ Scol- nik's letters is that before agreeing to meet with the union officials, the Union should provide him with its initial contract proposals. The Union's standard reply in TOWER BOOKS 679 each case was that to formulate an initial proposal it needed the information sought in its March 3 letter. At no time did Respondent ever provide the inforthation; neither did _ it tell the Union the nature of the work needed to assemble it or its cost. The Supreme Court has consistently held that Section 8(d) of the Act imposes an affirmative duty on an em- ployer to supply the union with information relevant to collective bargaining. A breach of that duty is a violation of Section 8(a)(5). See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967): Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979). Furthermore, it has long been held that wage data is pre- sumptively relevant to collective bargaining. Curtiss- Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965). Indeed, the underlying Board decision in Curtiss-Wright, 145 NLRI3 152, 157 (1963), clearly holds that there is a presumption of relevance when the sought-for data covers employees in the bargaining unit, as it does here. Thus the Union seeks the names of unit employees, their job classifications, dates of their hire (i.e., seniority, their pay rates, the amount of their last pay increase, the aver- age number of hours worked in the most recent 3-month period and copies of the health and pension plans avail- able to them Respondent has made no effort to rebut the presumption of relevance. Moreover, the case law is contrary to Respondent here. The Board decision in Curtiss-Wright, supra, specif- ically dealt with a similar refusal to turn over job classifi- cation data and wage information. Indeed wage histories were early required to be divulged Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F 2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1942). Both the re- quest for the last pay increase and the average number of hours worked fall into that category. Moreover, health and retirement plan information have also been deemed relevant whether as wages or as a term and condition of employment. NLRB v. Feed & Supply Center, 294 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1961). Finally, although mentioned first by the union, the names of the unit employees must be dis- closed to permit the union to perform its statutory duty of representation. Magma Copper Co., 208 NLRB 329 (1974). See also Harvey's Wagon Wheel, 236 NLRB 1670 (1978). The simple fact is Respondent never supplied any of the information. Its only advance reason for refusing to do so was that it wished reimbursement, in advance, for the cost of providing it. Whether or not the Union is ob- ligated to pay for such information, Respondent never advised the Union how much the billing would be, de- spite a suggestion from a union official that it would con- sider paying for the information if Scolnik would do so. Scolnik never did. I hold that Section 8(d) of the Act obligated Respond- ent to provide the information sought in the March 3 letter and that by failing to do so it violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. I also find Scolnik's insistence on advance payment without advice regarding theactual cost to be, simply put, a phony issue. If it had been a le- gitimate issue he would have, at the very least, given the Union some sort of means of estimating the cost. More- over, it seems likely that all the information would have been at the fingertips of either the personnel or payroll offices and easy to marshal. C. The Refusal to Meet In his letter of March 15, Union Grievance Director Rosenberry had asked that the wage data be provided by March 24. Scolnik in his reply of March 21 responded that the Board certification was "invalid." He 1-Jointed out that Respondent was considering appealing the certi- fication by refusing to bargain, the standard manner by which Board certifications are challenged. He then com- pared the expense of litigating that question with the ex- pense of negotiating a contract in Seattle observing that the appropriate company officials were located in Sacra- mento. He asserted: The company is willing, as a matter of good faith compromise 'of a dispute concerning the validity of the NLRB's decision and certification, to waive its rights to challenge that decision and certification and to go through the various legal steps and proce- dures leading to judicial review in the United 'States Court of Appeals, if a mutually satisfactory arrange- ment can be worked out with your union concern- ing the time and place of negotiation meetings and frequency and extent of such meetings Supposedly attempting to work out such an arrangement, Scolnik proposed "all" negotiations be conducted either in Sacramento or San Francisco. He said he would "give full and serious consideration to any and all counter-pro- posals [the Union wished] to make." He suggested the Union might Wish to propose alternating the California cities with Seattle or some "convenient place half-way between Seattle and Sacramento (or San Francisco)." (Parenthesis in original ) He also wanted to know what the Union proposed with respect to the frequency of the meetings and the time period for each meeting. He said, "Since a great deal can be accomplished by the submis- sion of written contract proposals, counter-proposals, re- visions, drafts, etc., in view of the distances involved, meetings once a month seem appropriate and reasonable as a general plan . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) He also sug- gested meetings take place from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. with an adequate lunch period for conferring, preparation, etc. •He concluded saying, "If you are interested in work- ing out a mutually agreeable system of conducting bar- gaining negotiations, in lieu of further litigation, please let me know." (Emphasis , added.) Rosenberry replied by letter of April 8, saying the Union did not have the re- sources to meet with Respondent in California. He also said Scolnik's proposal appeared to be an effort to frus- trate the bargaining process. Even so, Rosenberry of- fered to pick up the Employer's representatives at the Seattle airport. With respect to the frequency of meet- ings, Rosenberry suggested "marathon negotiations" and observed that bargaining should be a 'relatively easy process since the store was less than a mile from the Union's office. Scolnik's April 8 letter stated his client was "anxious to make a decision concerning collective bargaining ne- gotiations." He said that no decision had been made or 680 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD could be made until the Union's position had been ascer- tained. Thus, he said, he was repeating his offer to nego- tiate rather than litigate if the expenses of negotiating were less than litigating. The Union's April 15 letter did not refer to the ques- tion of where to meet or the frequency of meetings , But Scolnik's April 20 letter rejected the Union's "counter- proposal" which the Union wished to make. He also re- jected the concept of "marathon negotiations." Instead, he proposed "monthly meetings starting at 9:30 a.m., with a 2-hour caucus for lunch and assessment of posi- tions, review of documents and . materials presented during, the meeting, and recessing at 5 p.m. until the next meeting." He said he would consider further counter- proposals. Also in this letter he asserted that the parties were at an impasse regarding these "procedural issues" but said he was not declaring an impasse. In his May 12 letter Rosenberry expressed astonish- ment that Respondent would not come to Seattle to deal withlthe representative of its Seattle,employees.. • Scolnik in his May 17 letter "renew[ed his client's] po- sition" as stated in his previous letters and "specifically reaffirm[ed] them" saying that it was ,"prepared to waive its right to contest the Board's certification if bargaining negotiations can be conducted in any mutually agreeable, reasonable times and places." He claimed Respondent was not insisting on any particular proposal. He later said Respondent had "tried to be as flexible as possible In my [Scolnik's] opinion, but for the Union's adamant insistence on its position we could have and would'have made substantial "progress by now." No further corre- spondence occurred. Seetion 8(d) of the Act obligates the parties "to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of em- ployment." The question therefore is whether or not Re- spondent's conduct here was in good faith or whether it was an outright refusal to meet. • ' In this case I find 'myself most unimpressed with the conditions imposed on bargaining by Mr. Scolnik. He has conditioned collective bargaining by offering not to litigate the certification question if the Union would agree to meet in California. Assuming that negotiating the procedures for-collective bargaining is a mandatory subject of bargaining, it is quite clear that conditioning bargaining on satisfaction of a lawsuit is unlawful for that is a nonmandatory topic. Peerless Food Products, 231 NLRB 530 (1977); Kit Mfg. Co., 142 NLRB 957, 971 (1963), enfd. 335 F.2d 166 ' (9th • Cir • 1964). Thus, Re- spondent has approached bargaining here by construct- ing an artificial barrier around the bargaining process. Moreover, while imposing .the barrier, Scolnik asserts that Respondent is ready, willing, and able to bargain with the Union, but only if the Union agrees to the pro- cedures he has proposed, his disclaimers notwithstanding. Finally, his only explanation for refusing initially to meet with the Union in Seattle is that it was "inconvenient." There is no real explanation of why it is inconvenient other than the fact that the company headquarters- records are in Sacramento. That hardly seems to be an insurmountable problem considering the fact that Re- spondent no doubt routinely deals with the Seattle store on other bUsiness matters. Indeed, his suggested union counterproposal to meet halfway (somewhere in Ore- gon?) is a Preposterous one. Why would any negotiator wish to meet at a place where neither party- could con- sult with its principals? Finally, 'I note that Respondent claims one of the reasons it should not travel to Seattle is the Union's failure to provide it with an initial proposal. Considering the fact that Respondent has unlawfully re- fused to provide the information the Union sought, such a contention is -purely disingenuous. -Accordingly, I find Respondent-, has approached - bargaining in a bad-faith manner, and that its refusal to negotiate in Seattle is a breach of the ,obligation set forth in Section 8(d). Sem- perit Pacific, 237 NLRB 478 (1978), and the cases cited at 488. Compare Case, Inc., 237 NLRB 798 (1978), wherein an administrative law,-judge found that an offer to- nego- tiate by conference. call or by mail was an impediment to good-faith 'bargaining. I also note that Respondent's pro- posal with respect to the -manner - of. bargaining here is designed to frustrate the process. Its proposal to meet 1 day a month with 2-hour lunch ,periods cannot be con- strued as reasonable. See General Motors Acceptance Corp.,. 196 NLRB .137, 138 (1972), where the employer allowed only ,J0, half, days for bargaining during a .6- month period. , - ' D. The Unilateral Wage Change . • It will be reCalled that the election was held on Janu- ary 15, 1982. On 'November 18, some 11 months after the election, the union official responsible for the organiza- tion drive, Mike Orth, wrote a letter to William Fratzke, Respondent's store manager. The letter reads as follows: It has been. brought to my attention that you intend to freeze or withhold- all wage increases for your employees, including the past practice of providing Christmas bonuses for fear of charges being filed by •this local union. The National Labor Relations Board prohibits the employer . from:, "Promising or granting promotions, pay raises, or other benefits, to influence an EMPLOYEE'S VOTE, by a party capable of carrying out such -promise." As you 'are aware, the -N.L.R.B. secret ballot elec- tion, has already been concluded and for that reason I request that you continue your practice of provid- ing periodic wage increases as -well as maintaining your Christmas bonuses for all of your employees. You have the word of this local union that we will not file 'Charges against' Queen' Anne Record Sales, Inc., d(b/a Tower Books for providing wage in- creases and other benefits that will provide a better way of life for your VALUED employees. As previously found the Board's certification of repre- sentative was issued on February , 7, 1983. The parties stipulated that on or about May 1, 1983, Respondent ad- justed the wages of unit. employees and did so without TOWER BOOKS 681 previous notice to the Union or affording the Union an opportunity to negotiate, and ;bargain as the employees' exclusive representative. The salary adjustments included three automatic step increases and six discretionary merit increases. According to the"- stipulation; Respondent's policy and practice with respect to automatic step in- creases was "25 cents per hour after 5, 8, and 12 months." After the final automatic step increase, • per- formande reviews are made semiannually, generally Jan- uary and July. Increases' based on merit are 'generally ef- fected in February and August of each year. The stipula- tion also states the delay until May 1983 was' the result of an accidental misfiling of Orth's letter.' A divisional manager of Respondent, Heidi Keller, did advise the Union, by letter ,dated May 6, 1983, :that Respondent had "adjusted some of the salaries" of the Seattle employees "to be iii keeping with the wage policies in our other stores." She did not give any other details. The parties further stipulated that Respondent in gbocl faith believed Orth's letter was intended to apply to any wage increases but that the Union intended it to apply only to automatic step increases, not merit increases. Clearly the tenor of the letter was to ask Respondent not to freeze or withhold routine wage increases or Christmas bonuses out of, fear that the Union filed charges over ,them. The organizer,- in the apparent belief that the Act only prohibited an employer from attempt- ing to influence the election via wage increases, said that since the election was over, , the Company could continue its practice of providing "periodic.,wage increases as well as maintaining . . Christmas bonuses for all of your em- ployees." He said if that was done the Union would not file unfair labor practice charges. Whatever legal questions might be raised with , respect to wage increases, . whether discretionary or nondiscre- tionary, given after the November 18 letter, the signifi- cant fact is the certification of representative was issued on February 7, 1982. The wage increases which are the subject of complaint were granted in May, 3 months later. While the letter may well have insulated Respond- ent from any unfair labor practice charges with respect to nondiscretionary increases prior to the certification and arguably may have insulated it from those dealing with nondiscretionary increases, the efficacy of the letter expired with issuance of the certification, for it ended the election process. Once the certification was issued Re- spondent no longer had the exclusive authority to make wage changes. It was obligated to first deal with the Union on all questions of wages. It did not do so. Thus, the fact that it in good faith relied on the letter (even though it had misplaced it) to grant the increases is no defense. The Board's certification is the controlling doc- ument. Allstate Insurance Co., 236 NLRB 193 (1978).2 The unilateral wage increases are clearly barred by the Act in that circumstance. Katz v. NLRB, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); Say-On Drugs, 261 NLRB 1168 (1982), enfd. 716 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1983); Master Slack Corp., 230 NLRB 2 Allstate also governs whether or not Respondent may refuse to bar- gain pending a challenge to the Certification of Representative Clearly It may not 1054 (1977), enfd. 618 F.2d 6 (6th Cir. 1980) (unilateral change issue not pressed on appeal). Accordingly, I find that the May 1983 wage increases, both discretionary and nondiscretionary, were given without notice to the Union and without giving the Union the opportunity to bargain over them. In that cir- cumstance Respondent is guilty of making unilateral wage changes in breach of the good-faith bargaining ob- ligation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1). TV: THE REMEDY - Having found that Respondent has engaged in various acts and conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1), I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The affirmative action shall include an order requiring Respondent to provide, at its expense, the information the Union sought in its letter of March 3, 1983, and that it be ordered to bargain in 'good faith with the Union, at the Union's re- quest, at a reasonable location near the Seattle store. -The cease-and-desist order shall be construed so as not to de- prive any employee from any wage or salary increase he or she may have received by Respondent's unlawful uni- lateral increases. 3 In addition, I shall recommend that the Certification of Representative be extended until such time as Respondent begins to bargain with the Union in good faith. See Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 136 NLRB 785 (1962); Lamar Hotel, 140 NLRB 226, 229 (1962), enfd. 328 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied 379 U.S 817. On the foregoing findings of fact and on the entire record in this case, I make the following CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1., Respondent Queen Anne Record Sales, Inc. d/b/a Tower Books is an . employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, char- tered by United Food and Commercial Workers Interna- tional Union, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The following employees of Respondent constitute an appropriate unit for collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All employees employed at Respondent's facility lo- cated at 20 Mercer Street, Seattle; Washington; ex- cluding all office clerical employees, deposit clerks, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. 4. Since February 7, 1983, the Union has been the ex- clusive collective-bargaining representative of all the em- ployees in the appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. On the dates shown in the foregoing decision Re- spondent has failed to bargain in good faith with the Union and has therefore violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by. Keystone Steel & Wire, 248 NLRB 283 (1980) 682 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (a) Refusing to honor the Union's request to provide information relevant to the performance of its duty as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of Re- spondent's employees in the appropriate unit. (b) Refusing to meet with the Union for the purpose of engaging in good-faith collective bargaining. (c) Making unilateral wage increases to the employees in the bargaining unit without first bargaining with the Union. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed4 ORDER The Respondent, Queen Anne Record Sales, Inc. d/b/a Tower Books, Seattle, Washington, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with Retail Store Employees Union Local 1001, chartered by United Food and Commercial Workers International Union, AFL- CIO by refusing to supply it with wage and personnel data relevant to collective bargaining in the appropriate unit. (b) Refusing to meet with the Union in or near Seattle Washington to engage in good-faith collective bargaining with respect to the wages, hours, and terms and condi- tions of the employees in the appropriate unit. (c) Unilaterally and without notice to the Union changing the wages of the employees in the bargaining unit. 4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses (d) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar- anteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 5 - 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Immediately supply the Union with the material it sought in its letter of March 3, 1983; the expense of pro- viding such information to be borne by Respondent. (b) On request, bargain in good faith with the Union at a reasonable location near its Seattle, Washington store with respect to a collective-bargaining agreement cover- ing employees in the appropriate unit and, if an under- standing is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (c) Post at its Mercer Street location in Seattle, Wash- ington, copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix." Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19, after being signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond- ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Board should order the Certification of Representative extended as .dis- cussed above in the Remedy portion of this decision. 5 In view of the fact that Respondent's conduct here constitutes a re- jection of the pnnciple of collective bargaining, a broad order is appro- pnate 1-hckmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979) 6 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order Of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order_of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board"