Doglas & Lomason Co.

D()UG;I.AS & I.()MAS()N CO()MPANY7 Douglas & Lomason Company and Aluminum Work- ers International Union, AFL.-CIO. Cases 15- CA-7154 and 15-CA-7222 November 12, 1980 DECISION AND ORDER BY CItAIRNIAN FANNING ANI) M MHERS JENKINS AND P NI:ITIO On July 31, 1980, Administrative Law Judge Benjamin Schlesinger issued the attached Decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and Re- spondent filed an answering brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na- tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au- thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the at- tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, find- ings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.' ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re- lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the Respondent, Douglas & Lo- mason Company, Phenix City, Alabama, its offi- cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said recommended Order. I HB letter dated Septembehr 23, Iq0. Respondent requested Iht Board to issue its notice o employees immediately so Ihal It could he posted at Inice We deny this request bhecaue the Hoard finds it inappropriate to issue a notice before the Board has decided a case and issued a decision therein DECISION STA ITMENL OF HI CASt. BEINJAMIN SCHI.ESINGFR, Administrative Law Judge: This case was heard by me on January 10 and April 2 and 3, 1980, at Phenix City, Alabama, upon consolidated unfair labor practice complaints based upon unfair labor practice charges' alleging, inter alia, that the Respond- ent, Douglas & Lomason Company (Respondent), violat- ed Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, herein called the Act by encouraging its em- ployees to reject the Charging Party, Aluminum Work- hce unfair Ihbor practice charges were filed lon January 2, 179 as amended n Jarluary 22. 1979. and on March 9, 1979 he original coni- plaint in Case 15-CA 7154 issued on Fehruary 12, 1979. and was amend- ed on July 20, 1979, on which day a cornmplali also Is,,ued n Case 15 CA-7222 and that complaint and the earlier one were consolidated A second amendment to the complaint in Case 15 CA-7154 issued on De- cember 21, 1979 253 NLRB No. 39 ers International Union, AFL-CIO (Union), as their col- lective-bargaining representative and, eventually, by re- fusing to recognize the Union as collective-hargainling represcn!alti e of its employees. Respondent denied that it violated the Act in any way. Upon the entire record hereii, including my observa- tion of the witnesses aid their demeanor, and mn consid- eration of the inherent probability of their testimony, and my review of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and Responident. I make the following: FINDIN(jS OF F,(il I. HL:SINISS OF RSP()NI)N I I find, as Respondent admits, that it is a Michigan cor- poration engaged in the manufacture of automobile trim at its Phenix City. Alabama, facility, the only facility in- volved herein. During the 12 months preceding the issu- ance of the respective complaints. Respondent purchased and received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,(XX) directly from points located outside the State of Alabama, and sold and shipped products valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points located outside the State of Alabama. I conclude, as Respondent admits, that it is and has been at all times material herein an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 11. il t lABOR ORGANIZATION I find, as Respondent admits, that the Union is and has been at all times material herein a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. On August 5. 1977, the Union was certified by the Regional Director for Region 15 as the exclusive representative of Respondent's employees in the unit set forth below, found to be appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of em- ployment, or other conditions of employment, as follows: All production and maintenance employees and truck drivers and lead persons employed by the Re- spondent at its Phenix City, Alabama. facility; ex- cluding laboratory employees, office clerical em- ployees, plant clerical employees, confidential em- ployees, guards, technical employees, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Nation- al Labor Relations Act, as amended. Ill. HE ALEI.GED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. TheL Refusial 7 Bargain Preliminary Statement On April 14, 1978, Respondent and the Union entered into a collective-bargaining agreement which, by its terms, was to remain in full force and effect until March 1, 1979, and from year to year thereafter, unless modified or terminated in accordance with certain procedures set forth in the agreement. These procedures required that if either party wished to change, modify, or amend any provisions of the agreement or to terminate the agree- merit as of March 1, 1979, written notice had to be given to the other party by certified mail not more than 90 277 DFECISIONS OF NATIONAL I.AB()R REI.ATIONS BO()ARD days nor less than 60 days prior to March 1, 1979. Pursu- ant thereon, on December 18, 1978, the Union requested that negotiations commence in January or February 1979 for the purpose of "changing, modifying, and/or amend- ing" the agreement and stated that, if an agreement was not reached, it intended to terminate the agreement as of March 1, 1979. Nine days later, on December 27, 1978, Respondent filed a petition with Region 15 requesting that a secret- ballot election be held to determine whether its employ- ees desired to continue to be represented by the Union, relying on a petition alleged to have been signed by a majority of its employees that they no longer desired to be represented by the Union. On January 9, 1979, Re- spondent wrote to the Union that it had "a good faith doubt" that the Union represented a majority of its em- ployees and stated its belief that it could not legally meet with the Union "until such time as that doubt is re- solved." On March 1, 1979, Respondent notified the Union of the expiration of the agreement and that, be- cause of its employees' petition, it no longer recognized the Union as the representative of its employees. A fur- ther request by the Union for recognition and bargaining on July 26, 1979, was declined by Respondent on August 9, 1979. In brief, the General Counsel's case is as follows: (1) On September 20, 1978, a petition to decertify the Union was circulated among the employees. Charles Gunter2 and Randall Norris, two of Respondent's super- visors, promoted the signing of the petition by employees Kim Toson, Lynn Underwood, and Garrett Harrell.:' In addition, later that night, Gunter posted the petition on the employees' bulletin board. (2) In October and November 1978, Supervisor Wil- liam Timothy White told employees that the Union was primarily for blacks, and that, without the Union, the employees would have received two 30-cent raises, rather than the one 25-cent raise provided by the collec- tive-bargaining agreement. In addition, he interrogated one of the employees about his union sentiments. (3) The employees never presented the September pe- tition to Respondent. However, when employees circu- lated a petition in December 1978, obtained an apparent majority in favor of ousting the Union, and presented it to Respondent, the latter withdrew recognition from the Union and filed an "RM" petition with Region 15. The General Counsel claims that Respondent's actions were illegal because (a) the second petition was tainted by the unfair labor practices which occurred in connection with the first petition, and (b) Respondent had no good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status to support such action. B. The Alleged Interference With the September Petition There is little doubt that, sometime on September 20, 1978, the General Counsel's witnesses and Respondent's employees, Betty Miller, Mildred Patrick, and Willie Bel- 2 Gunter's name is misspelled in the pleadings and he record as "Gun- ther." 3 Harrell was frequently referred to by the General Counsel's witnesses as "Harold Garrett." lamy, saw something which aroused their suspicions, but what they saw is very much in doubt because of the in- consistencies of their narrations and the failure of any one of them to corroborate the testimony of either of their fllow employees. I do not doubt, for example, that Gunter talked with Toson or Underwood or Harrell, and it is probably safe to assume that Gunter was in the maintenance room when one or more of the employees signed the Septem- ber petition. 4 But, in order to establish a prima fucie case, the General Counsel must establish some nexus between Gunter's conversations and the signing of the petition by the three employees. Only one heard what Gunter said to the employees, and Toson and Harrell credibly denied that Giunter played any part in their decision to with- draw support from the Union.? Assuming that Toson's and Harrell's testimony were discredited, it would be necessary to find from the cir- cumstances of their signing the antiunion petition that Respondent must necessarily have aided and assisted them. A strong circumstantial case would be required to find such a violation, but reliably consistent evidence is lacking. Some of the inconsistencies, for example, as to the time when the perceived events took place, can be attributed merely to forgetfulness or lack of accurate perception. Thus, although Miller and Patrick placed the events at issue at approximately 5 p.m. or within a half hour later, Bellamy testified that he saw the events take place a full hour or more later. Of greater significance is the question of which group of employees were escorted by Gunter into the mainte- nance room-Toson, Underwood, and a third female em- ployee (according to Miller); Toson, Underwood, and Harrell (according to Patrick); or Toson and Harrell at one time, and only later Underwood (according to Bella- my). Although all said that Gunter accompanied the em- ployees to the maintenance room, only Bellamy added that Supervisor Norris was present when the petition was signed. Thus, there is the problem, considering the testimony of only the General Counsel's witnesses, of who escorted whom, and when. The problem of proof is compounded by the internal inconsistencies and external contradictions of the testimo- ny. Bellamy stated in his investigatory affidavit that he saw Gunter accompany only Toson and Harrell; no men- tion was made by him of Underwood, as he later testi- fied. Patrick testified that she overheard Gunter ask Har- rell whether he wanted to "sign the paper," to which Harrell responded that he did. Patrick admitted that their work place was very noisy because of the operation of the machinery, and it thus became of some importance how close she was to the conversation. She testified that she was 3-4 feet away; her investigatory affidavit, how- ever, stated 3-4 yards away, a most meaningful and criti- cal difference. 4 The General Counsel does not suggest that the maintenance room was "off limits" to supervisors, merely because the petition had been placed there. I Underwood, who, like l'oson. is Vietnamese. did not testify Toson stated that Underwood's English is so poor that she often acted as Un- derwood's interpreter 27X DOUGLAS & I()MASON C()MPANY Miller testified that she had been first told about the antiunion petition by employee Dixon. She then went to the press department and asked Patrick what was going on. Patrick told her what she had seen, to which Miller, so she testified, made no response. According to Pa- trick's recollection, however. Patrick knew nothing at the time, and Miller did all the talking and explaining. Patrick related a conversation she had with Gunter after reading the petition. Miller, who was allegedly with her at the time, did not testify to that conversation, nor did Bellamy, whom only Miller identified as being in the maintenance room at the time. Further, Miller and Pat- rick contradicted one another with respect to Gunter's activities in the break room later that evening, Miller stating that Gunter was whispering to employees who would then leave the room individually, or in groups of twos and threes; and Patrick stating that Gunter merely sat with a group of employees and drank a soft drink. I conclude, as a result of the foregoing, that there is no commonality in the General Counsel's case. Rather, I am faced with three different stories, the crediting of any one resultinq in the discrediting of the other two. There is no prima facie case here; instead, the General Counsel presents a multiple choice question, which he, in his brief, attempts to bootstrap by arguing that an adverse inference must be drawn from Respondent's failure to call Gunter to deny the allegations made against him. I reject that argument because Respondent's testimony was sufficient, if credible, to support the denial of any viola- tion, and because the General Counsel never elicited a testimonial basis for which a theory of liability might be developed. In those circumstances, it was not incumbent on Respondent to produce Gunter with respect to this allegation. More troublesome is Gunter's failure to deny any par- ticipation in the posting of the antiunion petition later that evening. Joel Miller passed the bulletin board after 10 p.m. and saw nothing there; later, after midnight, he saw Gunter pinning the petition on the bulletin board and mentioned to Gunter that it was illegal for him to become involved in a decertification effort. Miller went to get a friend to witness Gunter's acts; but, when Miller returned, the petition was no longer there. Although it is not absolutely certain that it was Gunter who posted the petition, there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to make that likely. His failure to rebut that necessary inference is persuasive, in my judgment, to find a violation of the Act. 6 C. The Alleged Unfair Labor Practices Preceding the December Petition The validity of the December petition must be consid- ered in light of the actions of Respondent's personnel manager, William Timothy White, who was named by t In his brief, the General Counsel belatedly moves to amend the com- plaint to add that, by taking down the notice, Gunter siolated the rights of employees to refuse to support a labor organizatlln, a rather uhiqui- tous theory in contrast to the nature of this proceeding, as a whole. I deny the motion to amend, as Respondent had no notice of such a iola- tion and did not litigate it In light of the lengthy time lapse between the filing of the charges. the issuance f the cmpl:ilis,, and the hearing herein, no excuse has been olffered fr the failure to amend at all earlier date employees Jimmy James and Frank Sinclair as having stated, in Octobher 1978 and on November 30. 1978, re- spectively, that the Union was comprised of a majority of blacks; that the Union had not done anything. to wit, it obtained only a single increase of 25 cents. whereas Respondent would have given two 30-cent raises; and (to Sinclair) that the Union could not negotiate success- fully for an additional holiday. but Respondent was will- ing to give one. In addition, James testified that White engaged in interrogation, asking him whether he was going to join the Union and whether his joining the Union would make any difference, and stated that, sooner or later. Respondent was going to get the Union out, because it was no good anyway. And to Sinclair. White stated that there was a petition circulating trying to get the Union out and that, the prior year, Respond- ent had lost by only four votes. With White's denials of these statements, except that he might have commented about the Union's racial com- position in answer to an employee's question,' there is a clear issue of credibility herein, an issue which is almost never easy to resolve. Nonetheless, I find that, at the very least, Frank Sinclair was a believable witness who. as a former employee and a signatory to the antiunion December petition, had no reason to misstate the truth. I found his testimony and demeanor forthright, consistent, and not evidencing prejudice. The testimony of Jimmy James gave me a little more pause, because of his initial statement that he was called by White for a friendly chat, whereas it appears that James, finding his timecard missing, knew he had to see White on a disciplinary matter. I further recognize that it is peculiar that White would make his racial comments to James, who is black. Nonetheless, the statements as related by both wit- nesses are wholly consistent, and are consistent with the testimony of Patricia Sperling, that White was more than anxious to oust the Union and made the same kind of promises of benefits without the Union and the same ap- peals to racial prejudice." White, of course, had much to gain by his denials of James' and Sinclair's testimony (he did not deny the statements attributed to him by Sperl- ing); and, although there were no internal inconsistencies in his testimony, the narrations of Sinclair and James, neither of whom had anything to gain by their testimo- ny, have that spark of truth which made their testimony I It is accurate that black, constitute a majority of the tinion', mcni- bership I rcceived and haste onsidered the testimony of Sperling onl for the purpose f background, and do not find White's statements to her constitute independent violations of the Act. as the' clearly are barredl by the Act's h-month limitatlons period In additi n, except as her testimonN evidences the same kind if conduct testified to by James and Sinclair I discredit her. finding that her dates were incorrect by a half year. that the card allegedly given to her by White was not against the Union but for its benefit, and that she was biased because of a pending workmen's compensation case against Respiondenit and testified excessively to make up fr the failure of her mother to testify n this proceeding In crediting Sperling only partially. I rely upoln the ft-quoled rule hat "It is no reason for refusing to accept evserythllg that a ss ltlless says, because ytou do not bclicst all of it; nothing is more commoin in all kinds ot'f udicial decisions than to believe some and not all " VL. R. B v 'nivtrrsi ( imerru ('orporcton. 179 F 2d 744 754 l2d Cur 51) 279 D DCISIONS OF NATI()NAL LAI()OR R.LATIONS 3()AkD most probable. I, therefore, credit them and discredit White's denials. Respondent argues that, even if I were to find that it violated the Act, the violations were isolated and de min- imis and, in any event, no employee was actually co- erced. Whatever the actual result of Respondent's ac- tions (indeed, Sinclair signed the December petition), Board law is clear that the proper test to be applied is whether the actions of Respondent were reasonably cal- culated to coerce employees in the exercise of their Sec- tion 7 rights. I find that Respondent's actions were so intended. If a Board-conducted election had been held in December, White's statements to James and Sinclair would consti- tute illegal conduct sufficient to affect the results thereof. Their effect upon the petition signing is the same, espe- cially because Respondent was admittedly aware of some disenchantment with the Union and utilized its promises of increased wages and benefits without the Union to kindle the fire of employee unrest. Although the action of Gunter may not have been sufficient to taint the De- cember petition, it is clear that the promises of wage in- creases without the Union tainted the December petition and that Respondent's withdrawal of recognition and re- fusal thereafter to bargain did not occur in a context free of unfair labor practices, but instead constituted viola- tions of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Guerdon Industries. Inc., Armnor Mobile Homes Division, 218 NLRB 658 (1975); Celanese Corporation of America, 95 NLRB 664 (1951). Because of these conclusions, it is unnecessary to dis- pose of the numerous issues raised, tried, and briefed by the parties relating to Respondent's good faith in ascer- taining whether there was a majority of employees who no longer desired to be represented by the Union. There remains, however, one other allegation of the complaint which requires resolution.' 0 At the hearing, the complaint was amended to allege a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, on the ground that George K. McPherson, attorney for Respondent, al- legedly questioned employee Toson about her testimony without giving her the necessary prerequisite admoni- tions and safeguards required by Johnnie's Poultry Co., 146 NLRB 770 (1964). I dismiss this allegation, first, be- cause Toson did not testify that McPherson interrogated her and, second, because, in any event, McPherson had twice before told Toson that she was not required to talk with him, that nothing would happen to her employment if she did or did not testify, and that it was her own choice whether to talk with him and to testify. To re- quire McPherson to repeat the Johnnie's Poultry warning ad nauseam, during preparation for defense to the 9 Respondent argues that the witnesses may have received their infor- maiion solely from the union dissidents in the plant I reject that, noting that even if they had heard of a 30 cents increase given before the advent of the Union. they never heard mention of two 30 cents increases, as hoth related that White impliedly promised o1 At the hearing. the General Counsel offered an affidavit to support certain unproved allegations of he complaint I rejected that affidavit The General Counsel, in his brief, renews its offer of the affidavit and requests reinstatement of the allegations which I dismissed at hearing The motion is denied, if only because Respondent has no ability to test the truthfulness f the affidavit charge, on the eve of hearing, during the hearing and on adjourned dates of hearing, and upon the services of a subpena, is an obsessive interpretation and unwarranted extension of Board law. IV. TilI: iFF-EC I o01: Ie UNFAIR I AOR PRAC'I'ICIS UPON COMMIERCE The activities of Respondent, set forth in section III, above, occurring in connection with Respondent's oper- ations described in section I, above, have a close, inti- mate, and substantial relationship to trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor disputes, burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce. CONCUSIONS O1: LAW 1. Douglas & Lomason Company is an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Aluminum Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. All production and maintenance employees and truck drivers and lead persons employed by the Re- spondent at its Phenix City, Alabama, facility; excluding laboratory employees, office clerical employees, plant clerical employees, confidential employees, guards, tech- nical employees, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, constitute a unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act. 4. The Union has been certified as, and is now, the ex- clusive collective-bargaining representative of all the employees in the aforesaid unit for the purposes of col- lective-bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of em- ployment. 5. By posting a petition to reject the Union; by interro- gating an employee about his union sentiments or desires and his intention to join the Union; by informing em- ployees that a majority of the Union's membership is black, thus appealing to employees' prejudices or fears in order to undermine the Union; by informing employees that they would have received more or higher wage in- creases and more paid holidays, if not for the presence of the Union; by informing employees of its intent to rid itself of the Union; and by informing employees of the existence of a petition to oust the Union, Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. 6. By failing and refusing since December 27, 1978, to bargain with the Union in the above-described unit, Re- spondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. ' I note that the General Counsel did not brief hls issue 28O D()LUGiAS & LO()MASON COMI)ANY 8. Respondent has not violated the Act in any other respects not specifically found herein. Tnt RIsiI I)Y Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it be or- dered to cease and desist therefrom and to take appropri- ate affirmati e action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The General Counsel requests, additionally, "a provi- sion which would bar the filing of a representation peli- lion for one year following the date of a final order herein," relying upon the Board's rule extending, in re- fusal-to-hargain cases. the initial year of a union's certifi- catllon. ;Jr-Jac Poulre Compunl Inc., 136 NLRB 785 (1962). The initial year herein expired on August 5, 197X, several months before Respondent committed any unfair labor practices. No authority has been cited that the rule has or should have any application to the instant facts. Further, the General Counsel requests that a broad re- medial order issue herein. I do not find Respondent's violations so egregious or widespread, or that Respond- ent has demonstrated a proclivity to violate the Act, to warrant such relief. ickmolt ltt Ioods, Inc., 242 NLRB 1357 (1979). Finally. the General Counsel requests relief which has absolutely no relationship to the allegations of the instant complaint, such as the rescission of a wage increase granted by Respondent on March 1 1979. Admittedly, on the General Counsel's rebuttal case, Ollie Cheatham, Respondent's manager of employee relations, stated that a wage increase had been granted that day, but no motion to amend the complaint was then made (nor has been made to date), no further testimony was taken, and neither party briefed the issue. I thus find, notwithstand- ing the admission that due process requires at the very least that, before relief may be granted, a matter must have been fully litigated. ' Here, it was not, and I deny the requested relief. Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and upon the entire record and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the Act, I hereby issue the following recom- mended: ORDER 'l The Respondent, Douglas & Lomason Company, Phenix City, Alabama, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall: 1. Cease and desist from: (a) Posting any petitions to reject the Union, or any other labQr organizations, on its bulletin boards or at any other locations. at Not all the rehlief granted '.as alleged with he specificiit one might deem desirable Nonerltheless, Ihe contlent of the consersations betlseen employees ad hite s: as full), liligated and briefed h the parties I: 1u the (e'enl ni exception aire iled as provided hy Sec 102 4h of the Rules arid Rgulailns of the Naliona;l L.ahor Relations Btoard. the findings, eclusilons. and recommlended Order herein shall. as pro.ided in Sec. 102 4 of he Rules and Regulatilons he adopted by the oard and become ils findings. cncluisl, n arid ()rder. and all bjections therleo shall he deemed aived for all purposes (b) Interrogating employees about their union senti- ments or desires or their intentions to join the Union or any other labor organization. (c) Informing employees that a majority of the Union's membership is black or otherwise appealing to employ- ees' racial prejudices or fears in order to undermine the Union. (d) Informing employees that they would have re- ceived more or higher wage increases, more paid holi- days, or other increased benefits, if not for the presence of the Union. (e) Informing employees of its intent to rid itself of the Union. or any other labor organization, as the bargaining representative of its employees. (f) Informing employees of the existence of any pti- tions to vote out the Union or a n1y other labor organiza- tiolts. (g) Unlawfully withdrawing recognition of, or refusing to bargain collectively concerning rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with, the Union as the exclusive bargaining representa- tive of its employees in the appropriate unit described below. (h) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action which wrill cf- fectuate the purposes of the Act: (a) Upon request, bargain with the above-named labor organization as the exclusive representanive of all em- ployees in the following appropriate unit with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours, and other terms and condi- tions of employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement: All production and maintenance employees and truck drivers and lead persons employed by the Re- spondent at its Phenix City, Alabama, facility; ex- cluding laboratory employees, office clerical em- ployees, plant clerical employees, confidential em- ployees, guards, technical employees, professional employees, and supervisors as defined in the Nation- al Labor Relations Act, as amended. (b) Post at its Phenix City, Alabama, facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 14 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 15, after being duly signed by Respondent's rep- resentative, shall be posted by it immediately upon re- ceipt thereof, and be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicious places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. i" In he evenl his Order is enforced b a Judgmenl of the [Uniled Siales Court if Appeals, the '.aords i the notice reading "Polted H) Order of the Na tional l abor Relaions Board, shall read "PostlJ l'ursu- alil TI a Judgmetlt of he Ut d Slates Court of Appeal, Ifiroirciii g an Order of the Natlinall Ilabor Relatlons Hoa;lrd " 281 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL L.ABOR RELATIONS BOARD (c) Notify the Regional Director for Region 15, in writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply herewith. 11 IS AI.SO ORI).RI I) that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. 282