Teamsters Local 670 (Stayton Canning)

-TEAMSTERS LOCAL-670 (STAYTON CANNING) Teamsters Cannery Local No. 670 - affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauf- feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America and Stayton Canning Company Cooperative' and Agripac, Inc. Cases 36-CB-1042 and `36-CB- 1043 - 28 June 1985 DECISION AND ORDER ,By CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS HUNTER AND DENNIS On 23 February 1984 Administrative Law Judge Jerrold H. Shapiro issued the attached decision. Thereafter, Respondent (the Union) filed excep- tions and a supporting brief and a motion, to reopen the record to receive additional - documentary evi- dence. The Charging Parties (the Employers) filed an exception, and the General Counsel' and the Employers filed answering briefs and briefs in op- position to the Union's motion to reopen the record. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, I and conclusions, 2 and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.3 ' The Union in its motion, requests that the record be reopened for the receipt of additional documentary evidence pertaining to the issue of whether these cases should be deferred to arbitration The Union admits this evidence was known to it at the time of the heanng, but contends that it has become material only since the judge's decision issued The Union's motion is denied since the question of whether these cases should be deferred to arbitration was, as found by the judge, untimely raised Thus, as noted by the judge, the Union"first raised this issue in its post- hearing brief and the issue was not litigated at the hearing Even if the Union had timely raised this issue, the judge noted, it is doubtful whether deferral is appropriate here In these circumstances, the evidence prof- fered by the Union is immaterial. to the issues under consideration here, and the motion is denied 2 The judge found, and we agree, that the Union violated Secs 8(b)(1)(A) and (3) and 8(d) by denying its financial core members access to its pharmacy and dental and eye clinics, and by refusing to issue them work registration certificates, in contravention of its settlement agree- ments with the Employers For the reasons relied on by the judge, we agree that the Union's conduct was unlawful even in the absence of evi- dence that the Union was using the dues of the financial core members to finance its operation of the clinics and pharmacy The Union's action contravened the provision of the settlement agree- ments that prohibited discrimination in any way for lawful activity in connection with the strike This provision concerns a mandatory subject of bargaining and, unlike our colleague, we do not think it significant that the method of discrimination that the Union chose was to withhold bene- fits that were outside the collective-bargaining agreements Additionally, we observe that the judge at fn 8 specifically found it unnecessary to pass upon the allegation that Respondent's conduct would have violated Sec 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act even if it had not been in derogation of the parties' strike settlement agreements 3 The Employers argue in their exceptions that one provision of the judge's recommended Order should be modified to more appropriately reflect the violations found. We agree We shall modify the recommend- ed Order accordingly 911 ORDER' The National Labor Relations Board adopts . the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Re- spondent, Teamsters Cannery Local No. 670, affili- ated ' with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Amer- ica, Salem, Oregon, its officers, agents, and repre- sentatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified. 1. Substitute the following for paragraph 1(b). "(b) Refusing to bargain with Stayton Canning Company, Cooperative and Agripac , Inc., by en- gaging in the above -described' conduct in contra- vention of its strike settlement agreements with the Employers." . 2. 'Substitute the attached notice for that of the administrative law' judge. MEMBER HUNTER, concurring and dissenting. I agree with the 'judge's finding and with my col- leagues that Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by denying access to its pharmacy and dental and eye clinics to financial core members employed by the Employers and by refusing to issue them work registration certificates. I do so, however, on the basis that the Union 's actions clearly were undertaken to retaliate against those who exercised their protected right to cross the picket line and return to-'work after having re- signed from full membership in the Union. As found by the judge," the Union's 'conduct was a form of economic reprisal and, as such , was coer- cive within- the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A). Even though the Union's actions were pursuant to an internal union rule and the benefits withdrawn were wholly internal union benefits, the Union's conduct here is not protected by the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) because the conduct , undertaken for a prohibited retaliatory intent, reached beyond internal matters and tended to frustrate the Act's overriding policy of protecting employee exercise of Section 7 rights. Cf. Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969). Thus, for these reasons, I agree that the Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A). I disagree, however, with the judge's reliance on Stationary Engineers Local 39 (San Jose Hospital), 240 NLRB 1122 (1979), and his finding that the Union violated Sections 8(b)(1)(A) and (3) and 8(d) on the basis the Union's conduct was in contraven- tion of a strike settlement agreement wherein the Union had agreed to refrain from discriminating against employees because of their strike activities. The benefits denied were union -provided and were completely outside the collective-bargaining con- tract. These benefits did not in any fashion concern 275 NLRB No. 127 912 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD a term or condition of employment and thus are not mandatory subjects of bargaining. The benefits are solely a service provided to members. Thus, I would find that the Union did not breach its bar- gaining obligations under the Act and I would dis- miss the allegation that the Union violated Sections 8(b)(3) and 8(d). Accordingly, I also disagree with my colleagues' finding that' the Union breached the strike settlement agreement. i APPENDIX NOTICE To MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES POSTED BY 'ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT.. refuse to issue work registration certificates to our financial-core members em- ployed by Stayton Canning Company Cooperative and Agripac, Inc. and refuse to allow them to use the pharmacy and eye and dental clinics located in our building,.in violation of the terms of our strike settlement. agreements with the Employers. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain with Stayton Canning Cooperative and Agripac, Inc. by engag- ing in the above-described conduct in contraven- tion of our - strike settlement agreements with the Employers. WE WILL NOT in any like. or related manner re- strain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL make whole our above-described fi- nancial core members for any financial losses they may have suffered as a result of our unlawful refus- al to issue them work registration, certificates and to use the pharmacy and eye and dental clinics lo- cated in our building, with interest. TEAMSTERS CANNERY LOCAL No. 670 AFFILIATED WITH INTERNATION- AL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA - DECISION , - .STATEMENT OF THE CASE :- JERROLD H. SHAPIRO, Admiiiistfative Law Judge. This proceeding, in which a heariig was' held November 8, 1983, is based on an amended coiisolidated,complaint issued by the General. Counsel of the National' Labor Re- lations Board on October 17, 1983, and on unfair labor practice charges filed on March 15, .1983, against Team- sters Cannery Local' No. 670 (Respondent) by Stayton Canning Company Cooperative (Stayton) and by Agri- pac, Inc. (Agripac) and collectively called the Employ- ers. The amended consolidated complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by re- fusing to allow the Employers' employees represented by Respondent to use Respondent's pharmacy and eye and dental clinics and by refusing to issue to these employees work registration certificates because the employees during a strike which took place during the summer of 1982 resigned from membership in Respondent. The complaint also alleges that Respondent violated Sections 8(b)(3) and 8(d) of the Act by engaging in the aforesaid conduct in derogation of the terms of its strike settlement agreements with the Employers . Respondent filed an answer denying the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices.' On the entire record , from my observation of the de- meanor of the witnesses, and having considered the posthearing briefs, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Evidence 1. The background Stayton and Agripac are grower-owned food proces- sors located in the State of Oregon. Virtually all their employees are represented by the Respondent. The em- ployees' terms and conditions of employment have been governed by a series of collective-bargaining agreements between Respondent and the respective Employers. Al- though Respondent negotiates separate contracts with Staytori and Agripack, the terms of these contracts, in significant respects, are identical. The contracts have in- cluded, among other things, a provision whereby the Employers contribute to a trust fund which provides health and welfare benefits to the employees, including prescription drugs and dental and vision benefits. In this regard the contracts which were in effect during the time material to this case provide, among other things, for the Employers to contribute to the Oregon Proces- sors Employees Trust to provide qualified employees with insurance benefits "provided in .. . Dental Plan RD 2, Vision Plan RV 2, Prescription. Drug Plan RRx." The dental, vision, and prescription drug plans permit qualified,' employees to do business with any dental or eye clinic or pharmacy and reimburse the employees for the cost of their prescription drugs and dental and eye care The pharmacy plan provides for the reimbursement of 90 percent of the cost of the employees' drugs and under the dental and eye care plans the employees after making certain minimal payment'are reimbursed for the remainder of their costs. I -Respondent's answer admits that it is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec 2(5) of the Act Also, Respondent in its answer admits that the Employers involved in this case, Stayton and Agnpac, are em- ployers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec 2(6) and (7) of the Act and meet the National Labor Relations Board's applicable discre- tionary jurisdictional standard I therefore find that the assertion of the Board's jurisdiction in these cases will effectuate the policies of the Act. TEAMSTERS LOCAL 670 (STAYTON CANNING) The building in which Respondent's offices are situat- ed has three other tenants: a pharmacy; a dental clinic; and an eye clinic. The clinics and pharmacy are open for business to the general public. The sign posted on the front of the building has a large emblem of the Interna- tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware- housemen and Helpers of America which emblem covers an entire side of the sign. The sign describes the clinic and pharmacy, as follows: TEAMSTERS LOCAL 670 DENTAL CLINIC - EYE CLINIC PHARMACY - Likewise the clinics and pharmacy advertise to the public in the telephone yellow pages as "Teamsters Local 670 Labor Center Pharmacy"; "Teamsters Local - 670 Dental Clinic"; "Teamsters Local 670 Eye Clinic." Even though the clinics and pharmacy are presented to the public. as being a part of Respondent, they are sepa- rate legal entities, who, like Respondent, rent space in the building. The record also establishes that the persons who make up the Respondent's governing body, its exec- utive board, also are the clinics' and pharmacy's board of directors, the governing body of those organizations. Respondent since at least 1959 has on request provided all laid-off employees whom it represents with work reg- istration certificates, signed by an official of-Respondent, which in essence certifies that the employee is registered for work with Respondent and will be notified of job openings communicated to Respondent. Pursuant to an agreement between Respondent and the Employment Di- vision of the State of Oregon, if employees who are seeking unemployment compensation present such a cer- tificate to the Employment Division they will be excused from making the substantial job search otherwise re- quired of unemployment compensation claimants by the State of Oregon; they are excused by, the State of Oregon from,submitting evidence that they have con- ducted an independent search for work that week. 2. The strike and the strike settlement agreements During the summer of 1982 Respondent was engaged in individual negotiations with Stayton and Agripac for new collective-bargaining contracts to replace the ones which recently terminated. On July 25, 1982, Respond- ent asked the Employers' employees to cease work and strike because the contract negotiations had failed to result in new agreements. The strike against Stayton lasted 4 days and the strike against Agnpac lasted almost 2 weeks. Some of the employees failed to support the strike; they either continued to work or returned to work prior to the end of the strike. In addition, the Em- ployers employed striker replacements. Somewhere be- tween 600 and 700 of the aforesaid employees who worked for the Employers during the strike submitted to Respondent during the period of the strike signed state- ments which in effect notified Respondent that'the sign- ers only intended to pay Respondent the money required under the contractual union-security' provision of the governing contracts, but- would not be bound by Re- 913 spondent's membership obligations. This group of em- ployees are referred to herein as financial core members. Respondent's strikes against the Employers ended when the parties reached agreement on the terms of new collective-bargaining contracts and strike settlement agreements. The collective-bargaining contract and strike settlement agreement reached by-Respondent with Agn- pac were part of one package as was the case with the contract and strike settlement agreement reached by Re- spondent with Stayton. Although the language contained in the Respondent-Agripac settlement agreement differed in- certain respects from the language in the Respondent- Stayton strike settlement agreement, in those respects material to this case the agreements were identical. The agreements read, in pertinent part, as follows:' The parties have agreed that it is in the best in- terests of the company,, the union, and all employ-' ees that any bad feelings or disharmony in the plant generated by the strike be eliminated as soon as pos- sible in the interests of efficient operations; and that no employee should suffer discrimination, harass- ment or intimidation by virtue of choices made to' support or not, to support the strike; and that every employee is entitled to a working environment free from acrimony and hard feelings. The union and the company hereby agree that no employee shall be discriminated against in any way by virtue of lawful activity engaged in during or in connection with the strike . . . . Neither party shall discriminate against or seek any penalty from any employee, including supervisory employees, because of their choices or actions with respect to financial core status or resignation. 3. The refusal to provide services for the financial - core members In December 1982, on a date not set 'forth in the record, Respondent's executive board voted to refuse to provide services to Respondent's financial core members and on the same day Respondent's executive board, now sitting 'as the board of directors of the clinics and 'phar- macy located in Respondent's building, voted that the clinics and pharmacy would also refuse to provide serv- ices to the financial core members. Thereafter in Decem- ber 1982-Respondent's, principal official, Secretary-Treas- urer L. D. Day,.who is a ,member of Respondent's exec- utive board, instructed Respondent's _office manager, Grace Hayward, that the board of -directors ,had decided that -the clinics and pharmacy located in the building would no longer service Respondent's financial core members and that Respondent would no longer issue work registration, certificates to the financial core mem- bers. Day also,, instructed Hayward to 'give the names of Respondent's financial core members to the pharmacy and the clinics., Day compiled such a- list whicli she transmitted to the pharmacy and clinics. It is undisputed that starting in December 1982 and continuing thereafter it-,has been the usual practice for the eye and dental- clinics and the pharmacy located in 914 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Respondent's building to refuse to do business with Re- spondent's financial core members and for Respondent to • refuse the requests of financial core members for work registration certificates. Due to the refusal of the clinics and pharmacy to do , business with the financial core members and due to the,, refusal of Respondent to issue them work registration certificates, they have suffered the following financial consequences. The 'unemployed financial core members refused work registration certificates are forced to con- duct an independent search for work during each of the. weeks they claimed unemployment compensation. The fi- nancial core members would have been able to avoid in- curring the expense associated with this weekly search for work if they had ,been able to present work registra- tion certificates from Respondent to the State of Oregon. The financial core members denied access to the pharma- cy in_ Respondent's building lost the 10-percent discount they would have received if they had made their drug purchases at the pharmacy. They also lost the use of the money which they had to spend to purchase their drugs from other pharmacies, inasmuch as' other pharmacies • usually demand immediate payment, whereas the phar- macy in Respondent's building in dealing with the Em- ployers' employees -represented by the Respondent ac- cepts-the employees' prescription cards which the ^ phar macy submits to . the insurance carrier for reimburse- ment.2 Likewise the -employees- employed by the. Em- ployers who are eligible under the contracts for- health and welfare benefits are not charged by, the clinics in Re- spondent's building for ,the insured portion of their,serv- - ices,3 thus, the financial core members who were forced to use other eye and dental clinics which demanded- pay- ment upon service were denied the .use of these moneys from the date of payment to the date, on which ;the.ein ployees were reimbursed by the administrator of the con- tractual health and welfare trust fund. - B. Discussion andConclusionary Findings 1. The dental -clinic,' the eye 'Clinic,' and-the - pharmacy, acted as agents of the Respondent when '," they refused to do business with Respondent's financial core members - - .Insofar as the amended consolidated complaint .alleges that Respondent violated the Act by refusing to allow.its; financial core members to use the pharmacy and eye and dental clinics, located in its building, the threshold ques tion tis whether, is alleged in the complaint, the pliarma-- :2 The prescription drug plan which istincorporated-in the collective- bargaining contracts between the Respondent and the Employers pro- vides for' reimbursement of 90' percent of the' puce `of prescription drugs The'employees eligible under the•contracts for such covefage and whose prescriptions are filled at the pharmacy pay nothing because the pharma cy.bills, the trust fund administrator ,for 90 percent of, the puce and ac- cepts that sum as payment }n full' Respondent in it's'postheanng brief iârges that_ the financial core members have'in facts`uffer'ed a de mmimis• loss-of less than the 10-percent 'discount The basis'for this argument,is allegedly, contained in a document which is not a part,of the record in this case Accordingly, I have not considered this argument a Unlike the situation with the pharmacy in the Respondent's building, the clinics in the building do not' offer a discount--to. the employees cov, ered by Respondent 's contracts with the Employers - r - ; cy, and clinics have 'acted as agents of Respondent in re- fusing to service the Respondent's financial core mem- bers. The several factors set forth hereinafter, when con- sidered together,-have persuaded me that the pharmacy amd clinics, in refusing to service Respondent's financial core members,,have acted as Respondent's agents.. Although the pharmacy and clinics are not owned or operated by Respondent, they are held out to the public, including Respondent's members, as being Respondent's pharmacy and Respondent's clinics. The board of directors of the pharmacy and the clin- ics, the persons who decided that the pharmacy and clin- ics would not- serve Respondent's financial core mem-, bers, are comprised of the same persons who comprise Respondent's governing body, its executive board. The policy of refusing to service Respondent's finan- cial core' members does not benefit the clinics or the pharmacy. Respondent is the sole beneficiary. Indeed, I think'that it is fair to presume that this policy' is. de'tri- -' mental to the interest of the pharmacy and clinic's inas-- much as'they have lost the business of Respondent's fi- nancial;core members . In analogous situations it has 'been held by the Board and the courts that the'trustees of an employee benefit 'trust `fund acted as agents of a' union for the purpose's of the case if they acted, not as fiducia- ries of'the fund's beneficianes, but for the benefit of the union. Hospital' Employees ' (Sinai Hospital), 248 NLRB 631 (1980) (Board found the union violated Sec. 8(b)(3) where union ' trustee, in denying the employer's request for, bargaining ,information, "was not acting solely in the interests of the employee participants .. '. but rather was acting to support the interests of the Unions."); NLRB v. Laborers Local 1140, 557, F.2d 16, '20 (8th Cir. 1976) (up- holding finding of agency because the 'evidence showed trustee "acted on behalf of the union" and "was motivat- ed primarily by ,a desire to advance union goals"). Here, it- is abundantly, clear that the board -of directors of the clinics and pharmacy, who also comprised Respondent's executive board, .when they directed A he • pharmacy and clinics to stop serving Respondent's financial core mem- bers; , were acting 'to further Respondent's 'goals not those of the clinic; or•pharmacy. The conduct-of Respondent's principal officer, Secre- tary-Treasurer Day,- indicates that Respondent exercises cogtrol,.over. the, business policies of the pharmacy and clinics, at least- over the type of business policy involved in., the, case. For when Stayton's industrial relations man- ager,. Jerry Butler, . complained to Day that employees who -were sympathetic toward Stayton during the 1982, strike ,were .being ,refused service" in, Respondent's phar- macy,.;Day„ instead; of, taking ,the position that Respond-. ent had no.control over the-pharmacy's business policies, responded by stating that if in fact, the pharmacy was doing, this.thatthe_ Would. see that it was stopped. 'Even, -though ;'the names--of- financial, core members Tom Gunn and Merle Trumbly were on the pharmacy's list, of, financial, core members who could not be serviced, the 'pharmacy serviced them when it was directed to do so by Respondent's office manager, Hayward, thus graphically` demonstrating that the pharmacy was acting at the direction' of Respondent in the matter of not serv- TEAMSTERS LOCAL 670 (STAYTON CANNING) ing Respondent's financial core members . (Tr. 251-253, 184-186.) In refusing to serve the Respondent's financial "core members-and their families the employees of the pharma- cy and dental clinics have explained to the financial core members or their families that it was Respondent which directed- them to refuse to serve Respondent's financial core members. Kim Hatfield, a financial core member, was informed by a pharmacist that it was pursuant to Respondent's order that the pharmacy could not serve him. Hatfield's wife was advised by a pharmacist that Respondent had made the decision that the pharmacy not serve her husband. Roger Elmore, a financial core member, was informed by a pharmacist that the reason the pharmacy could not serve him was that Respondent had told the pharmacy that it could not serve Respond- ent's financial core members. And when Nancy Gunn, whose husband is a financial core member, was refused service by a pharmacist, the pharmacist explained to Mrs: Gunn that "she was sorry that she had nothing to do with it, that it all came from upstairs [referring to Re- spondent's office]" and told Mrs. Gunn that "she wished they would do their own dirty work upstairs." Emma Jones, a financial core member, when advised by an em- ployee of the dental clinic that the clinic could no longer serve her, was told by the employee that the clinic had received orders from Respondent not to serve Jones and the other financial core members. All the foregoing factors, taken in their totality, have persuaded me that the pharmacy and the clinics were acting in concert with Respondent, that Respondent's ac- tions were intertwined with the actions of the pharmacy and the clinics, that the clinics and pharmacy were pur- suing Respondent's interests not the interests of the clin- ics or the pharmacy, and that the clinics and the pharma- cy were therefore acting on behalf of-Respondent and as an agent of Respondent when they adopted a policy of refusing to serve Respondent's financial core members.' 2. Respondent violated the terms of its strike settlement agreements with the Employers by refusing to allow the pharmacy and dental and eye clinics in its building to serve its financial core members and by refusing to issue them work registration certificates In the summer of 1982, when collective-bargaining ne- gotiations for new contracts between Respondent and the Employers failed to result in agreement, Respondent struck the Employers in support of its bargaining posi- tion. A substantial number of the Employers' employees did not support the strike and continued to work or began to work as striker replacements. Several hundred' of these employees signed and submitted in writing "fi- nancial core statements" to Respondent in which they notified Respondent that while they intended to pay Re- spondent the dues required of them by the, union-security ° In its postheanng brief Respondent cites several cases in'support of its contention that the evidence does not warrant the conclusion that the dental and the eye clinics and the pharmacy acted as agents of Respond- ent when they refused to serve Respondent's financial core members. I have considered those cases and am of the'opmion that they are factually distinguishable in significant respects from the instant situation 915 clause in the governing collective-bargaining agreement, they would not be bound by Respondent 's rules applica- ble to full members . Respondent honored these "financial core statements" and treated 'the employees who signed them as having resigned from Respondent , if they were previously members, and did not require the newly hired striker replacement to join Respondent. Prior to its strike against the Employers Respondent did not represent a single employee who was a financial core member. All of the employees who paid dues to Respondent were full members. Nor is there any evi- dence that employees, other than the aforesaid employ- ees of the Employers who became financial core mem- bers during the strike, have become financial core mem- bers. And I will not make such a presumption. In short, during all times material to this case the only employees represented by. Respondent who held the status of finan- cial core members were those employees of the Employ- ers who decided to become financial core members so that they could work during Respondent's strike without fear of being punished for violating Respondent 's mem-. bership rules. Respondent's strike against the Employers ended when the parties signed new collective-bargaining contracts and strike settlement agreements . The strike settlement agreements and the contracts were regarded by Re- spondent and the Employers as a part of one package. The strike settlement agreements, in pertinent part, pro- vided that "no employee shall be discriminated against in any way by virtue of lawful activity engaged in during or in connection with the strike" and that "neither party shall discriminate against or seek' any penalty from any employee . . . because of their choices or actions with respect to financial core status or resignation." Approximately 4-1/2'months after Respondent and the. Employers reached agreement on"the terms of new con- tracts and executed the strike settlement agreements, Re- spondent adopted a policy of not providing the same services to its financial core members at its full members. More specifically Respondent denied the financial core members work registration certificates and denied them the use of the clinics and pharmacy located on Respond- ent's premises . The discontinuance of these previously enjoyed services resulted in a financial loss to those af- fected, besides the inconvenience. Respondent's refusal to issue work registration certifi- cate's to the financial core members and its ' refusal' to allow the eye and dental clinics'and the pharmacy locat- ed on its premises to serve them were in clear derogation of the provisions in Respondent 's'strike_'settlement agree- ment with the Employers , which stated that no employ ee shall, be discriminated , against in any way,by virtue of lawful activity engaged in during or in 'connection with the strike'" - and that "neither party'- shall discriminate against or seek ,any penalty from any, employee , . F.. be- cause of- their choices or actions with respect to financial core status or resignation ." As I have found- supra, `Re- spondent's only financial core members are those em- ployees,who were employed by the..Employers during the strike and who in connection with their work for the 916 , DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Employers during the strike. opted. to become financial core members. - Respondent urges that its refusal to serve the financial core members did not breach the terms of the strike set- tlement agreements because the conduct did not affect- their, "work environment" and was not motivated by their strike-related activity. In support of the latter con- tention Respondent points to the fact that its policy ap- plies to all financial core members regardless of whether they, worked for the Employers during the strike and that the policy does not apply to Respondent's members who worked during the strike. However, there is-no Ian-, guage in the strike agreements which either directly or by implication limits the coverage of the agreements to conduct which adversely affects employees' work envi- ronment. Quite the opposite, the language of the strike settlement agreements - in this respect is without limita- tion. Regarding Respondent's contention that its conduct was not in derogation of the strike settlement agreements because it was not motivated by the, financial core mem- bers' strike-related activity,,, the record reveals -that Re- spondent instituted this policy less than 5 months-after the strike, that Respondent's only financial core members when the policy was instituted were the Employers' em- ployees. who had become financial core members in con- nection with working during Respondent's strike, and that, Respondent's office -manager-, Grace Hayward, ad- mitted that one of the reasons Respondent was withhold„ ing services from the financial core. members was due, to their failure to support Respondent's strike against -the Employers.-' These circumstances persuade me that there is sufficient evidence to warrant the inference that" the Respondent's refusal to serve the financial core members was prompted by their strike-related- conduct of becom- ing financial core members so they could work for the Employers during the, strike without fear of being disci-, plined, by Respondent.- The fact that, Respondent has,-not punished those eniployeesiwho chose to work during-the strike, but did not resign their membership in Respond- ent, does not detract from this inference? Nor is this in- ference overcome by the fact that facially Respondent's policy against serving financial core members applies to all such' persons regardless of whether or not - they, worked- for the Employers during the strike. For the' only financial core members who exist are those who worked for the Employers and became' financial' core members so they could ,work for -ihe Employers during the strike. ,6„ John Gunn, ,a financial core , member, was told by.Office.Manager, Hayward ;that ,the reasons Gunn could not use -Respondent's pharmacy; and -clinics was that, besides sighing a - financial core statement„ that he had crossed Respondent's picket line Later, that same day. Respondent's: busmess •representative, Marty- Dolan, informed Gunn that in order , for Gunn to reinstate himself, into good.standing as a;member'of Respondent, that he; would have to: explain - to Respondent. in-.wnting why. he had signed'a,financial core statement and crossed Respondent's picket, line ';I• also not that- Nancy. Gunn, the wife of a financial core member, and Ro-, salie Walker,,a financial core member,-when they were refused-services by Respondent. were told by the persons employed by the Respondent who communicated the refusal that Respondent was not providing serv- ices for the, financial core, members because they had crossed the Re-, spondent's picket line It is ' for all of the foregoing reasons that I find that commencing in December 1982 and continuing thereafter the Respondent by refusing to issue work registration certificates to the financial core members employed by the Employers and by refusing to allow them to use the eye and•dental clinics and pharmacy located on its prem- ises, acted in derogation of its strike-settlement agree- ments with the Employers , 3. Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)6 Respondent's refusal to allow the pharmacy and dental and eye-clinics in its building to do' business with its fi- nancial core members employed by the Employers and its refusal to issue them work registration certificates, in the circumstances of this case, violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. My reasons for this conclusion are as follows. Respondent's conduct reasonably tends to coerce the financial core members from exercising their right under Section 7 ' of the Act 'to refrain from being members of Respondent. For, besides the inconvenience' they have suffered by being denied the use of the two clinics and pharmacy and work registration certificates, the financial core members, as I have described in detail supra, have suffered f nancially as .a direct result of Respondent's conduct. In other 'words, Respondent's conduct consti- tutes a form of economic reprisal and as such is a form of coercion, as that'term is used within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, which reasonably tends to coerce the financial 'core members employed by the Em- ployers from continuing ' to exercise their right- under Section 7 of the Act to remain nonmembers of Respond- ent. See General Motors Corp. v.' NLRB, 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) ("It is permissible to condition employment upon membership; but membership, insofar as it has sig- nificance to, employment -rights, may in turn be condi- tioned' only upon payment of fees and dues. 'Member- ship' as 'a' condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core.") Also see NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S 175, 197 fn. 3 (1967),-and Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 •U.S. 274, 284 (1971). ' Respondent's main defense to the violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) is that its conduct in this case was privileged under, the proviso to Section 8(b)(1')(A) because Re- spondent was merely enforcing a union rule which served Respondent's legitimate interests of discriminating between Respondent's members and nonmembers. I have carefully considered this argument and I am of the opin- ion.that, in view of the Board's decision in San Jose Hos- pital ,and its progeny,? it is without merit. In San Jose Hospital. the respondent union fined and expelled, from membership -the charging party who refused to answer questions concerning, his union conduct during a strike e, Sec% 8(b)(1)(A)lof the Act, makes it an unfair labor practice for a union 'to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the not of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition 'or retention 'of membership therein " J Operating Engineers . Local 39 (San Jose Hospital), 240 NLRB 1122 (1979) See also Retail Clerks Union Local 1364 (Food Employers Council), 240 NLRB 1127 (1979), Hospital Workers Local 250 (Dameron Hospital Assn,), .248 NLRB- 1390 (1980), Hospital Workers Local 250 (Associated Hospitals of East Bay), 254 NLRB 834 (1981) TEAMSTERS LOCAL 670 (STAYTON CANNING) against his employer, although the parties had agreed that no employees would be disciplined by either-the union or the employer for.any action connected with the strike. Noting that the amnesty agreement was a product of the parties' negotiation and that the discipline' imposed by the union was in derogation of that agreement, the Board held that the union had acted in contravention of the basic policy of the Act of encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining. It also held that the union's-conduct, in derogation of the strike amnesty agreement, ran counter to the overriding national policy of favoring. the peaceful resolution of labor disputes. Thus, the Board concluded that, notwithstanding the union's assertion that its conduct served its legitimate in- terest in maintaining union solidarity' during a lawful strike, such interests must give way to the national policy.- Accordingly, the Board held that the conduct in question was not protected by the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A). More specifically, the Board stated (San Jose Hospital, supra, 240 NLRB'at 1124): Respondent's conduct' .. . was clearly in deroga- tion of the amnesty agreement . . . [and] therefore was in contravention of the basic policy of the Act of encouraging the practice and procedure of col- lective bargaining . . . [and] the peaceful resolution of labor disputes. Thus, notwithstanding [the union's] assertion here that its conduct served its le- gitimate interest in maintaining union solidarity during a lawful strike, such interest must give way to national policy. Accordingly . . . [the union's] disregard for and violation of its. collectively bar- gained-for amnesty agreement impairs congressional policy embodied in the labor laws and . . . under the principles of Scofield,.its disciplining of Davis is not protected by the-proviso'to Section 8(b)(1)(A). In the instant case, as described in detail supra, I have found that Respondent's refusal to, allow, the pharmacy and dental and eye clinics to do business with Respond- ent's financial core members employed by the Employers and its refusal to issue them work registration certificates was in derogation of the terms of the strike-settlement agreements entered into between the Respondent and the Employers. I have also found that Respondent's conduct of refusing to allow the pharmacy and dental and eye clinics -in its building to do' business with its finanoiali core members employed by the Employers 'and its refus- al to issue them work registration certificates are coer- cive -within the meaning ' of Section - 8(b)('1) of the Act' and have the foreseeable effect of coercing Respondent's' financial core members employed by the Employers from exercising their statutory right to refrain from join- ing Respondent and remain a' financial core member. In' view of these circumstances and for the reasons set forth' in San Jose Hospital, supra, I find that Respondent violat- ed Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when in derogation of the terms of its strike settlement agreements with the Employers it refused to allow.the pharmacy, and eye and, dental clinics in its building to do business with its finan- 917 cial core members employed by the Employer and re- fused -to issue them work registration certificates.8 In concluding that Respondent's conduct toward the financial core members violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act because .it breached the parties' strike-settlement agreements, I have considered' that the complaint does not contain this allegation Although the complaint al- leges that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3) of the Act by denying its financial core members employed by the Employers the use of the clinics and pharmacy and work registration certificates in derogation of the terms of the parties' strike-settlement agreements, it, does not allege that this conduct violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The complaint alleges that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by denying financial core members employed by the Employers the use of the clinics' and pharmacy and work registration certificates. Nevertheless, in the circumstances, I believe the record warrants a finding that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by virtue of the conduct against its financial core members employed by the Employers in derogation of the parties' strike-set- tlement agreements. All of the elements essential to such an allegation were fully litigated and' there is no indica- tion that Respondent's defense has-been prejudiced due to the fact that the complaint, while alleging that the conduct in question violated Section 8(b)(3), did not allege that- it violated Section 8(b)(1)(A).'See Associated Home Builders v. NLRB, 352 F.2d 745; 751-754 (9th Cir. 1965); AMC Air Conditioning, 232 NLRB 283, 285-286 (1977). . . 4. Respondent violated- Section 8(b)(3) of the Act9 Where a labor organization during the term of a col- lective-bargaining contract unilaterally without the em- ployer's consent adopts-and enforces a union policy or- rule which is in derogation of rights guaranteed the em- ployees by the' terms of the contract, the union's action violates Sections 8(b)(3) and 8(d) of the Act. See NLRB v. Communications Workers Local 1170 (Rochester Tele- phone), 474 F.2d 778, 780-782 (2d Cir. 1979); - Painters New York District Council 9 v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 783,(2d Cir. 1971), NLRB v. Teamsters Local 100, 526 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1975); Communications Workers Local 1122, 226 8 In view of my decision, I find it unnecessary to pass upon the allega-, tibn that Respondent's conduct toward the financial core members would have'violated Sec 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act even if it were not in derogation of the parties' strike-settlement agreements , 8 In its postheanng brief Respondent urges that since the dispute which this allegation encompasses is cognizable under the grievance-arbi- tration provisions in the parties' collective-bargaining contracts it' should be resolved pursuant to those provisions I have not considered the'nients of this contention because Respondent did not' raise the issue of deferral in its pleadings or at'the hearing, but first raised it in its brief Thus, as the issue was not litigated at the hearing, the record evidence before me is insufficient for- a finding that deferral is warranted Maine Yankee Atomic'Power Co', X258 NLRB 832 (1981) See also Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v NLRB,i 618 F 2d 1009, 1014-16 (3d Cir 1980) I also note that it is doubtful whether deferral to the contractual gnevance-arbitra- tion procedures is appropriate here because the Employers have no obli- gation to represent the financial core members before an arbitrator and it is uncertain whether the interests of the Employers and the financial core members are'the same See Operating Engineers Local 39 (San Jose Hospi- tal), 240 NLRB 1122 fn 1 (1979) 918 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD NLRB 97, 98 (1976); and Associated Home Builders v. NLRB, supra, 352 F.2d at 750-753 (9th Cir. 1965). ' In the instant case the strike-settlement agreements be- tween Respondent and the Employers are the product of collective bargaining and are a part of the parties' collec- tive-bargaining agreements. As described in detail supra, during the term of the strike-settlement agreements Re- spondent without the consent of the Employers acted unilaterally in derogation of the employees' rights estab- lished by the strike-settlement agreements, when, pursu- ant to a newly adopted union rule, it refused to allow the dental and eye clinic and pharmacy in its building to do business with its financial core members employed by the Employers and refused to issue them work registration certificates. If the provisions in the strike-settlement agreements which have been violated by Respondent's conduct are a mandatory subject of bargaining then Re- spondent's conduct violates Section 8(b)(3) and Section 8(d) of the Act.' 0 Section 8(d) of the Act defines 'the 'subject about which employers and unions must bargain as "wages; hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . .. " However, this definition "does not immutably fix a list of subjects for mandatory bargaining"; the broad language of Section 8(d) encompasses, at a minimum, all "issues that settle an aspect of the relationship between the employer and employees." Chemical Workers v. Pitts- burgh Glass, 404 U.S. 157, 178 (1971). Accord: NLRB 'v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner, 356 U S. 342, 350 (1950). Any determination of what is or what is not a subject for mandatory bargaining must start with the pri- mary purpose of the Act which is "to promote the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by subjecting labor-management controversies to • the mediatory' influ- ence of negotiation." Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964) While "the Act does not encourage a party to engage in fruitless marathon discussions," it at least requires him to submit a dispute to this salutory in- fluence. 379 U.S. at 214. The root, question is whether the dispute shall be resolved within "the framework [of collective bargaining] established. by Congress as most conducive to industrial peace" (id. at 211), or left outside that framework to fester without negotiation and perhaps break out in economic warfare. Given these' alternatives,. it is reasonable to assume that Congress intended the 8(d) definition-"wages, hours and other terms and condi- tions of employment"-to be a- broad one." The Su- 10 Sec 8(d) of the Act prohibits midterm. unilateral modifications and terminations of collective-bargaining agreements, but only with regard to mandatory subjects of bargaining Chemical' Workers v P,ttsbuigh 'Glass, 404 U S 157,-185-188(1971) t- . , 11 Thus, the original Wagner Act did not contain- a section like the present 8(d) purporting to define collective bargaining It did, however, state in Sec 9(a) that a majority union shall be the exclusive representa- tive "for-the purposes of-collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,' wages; hours of employment or other conditions of,employment " Legis- lative History of Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947 (G P 0,- 1948), vol 2, p 1669 When the Taft-Hartley Act was'bemg considered by Cons gress in 1947, the House added Sec 8(d) and sought to specifically enu- merate various subjects to which collective bargaining would be limited I Leg Hist 163-167, 313-314 This version of Sec 8(d) was opposed on the ground,-inter alia, that what is a proper subject for collective bargain- ing "should not be straitjacketed by legislative enactment " 1• Leg Hist 362 This reasoning apparently was persuasive in the Senate since it suc- preme Court recognizes that Section 8(d) does not immu- tably fix. a particular list of subjects for mandatory bar- gaining inasmuch as the Court has repeatedly approved the propriety of looking into industrial practices as an aid in determining the scope of Section 8(d). E.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. at 211 (1964). Guided by the aforesaid principles I am of the opinion that the sections of the strike-settlement agreements vio- lated by Respondent's conduct are mandatory subjects of bargaining. My reasons for this conclusion are as follows. As I have found supra, Respondent's refusal to issue work registration. certificates to its financial core mem- bers employed by the Employers and its refusal to allow them to use the pharmacy and eye and dental clinics lo- cated in its building violates the portions of the parties' settlement agreements which provide that "no employee shall be -discriminated against in any way by virtue of lawful activity engaged in during or in connection with the strike" and that "neither party shall - discriminate against or seek any penalty from any employee . . . be- cause of their choices or actions with respect to financial core status or resignations." These sections of the settle- ment agreements settle an aspect of the employment rela- tionship between the Employers and their employees. The purpose of these sections was to assure that those employees who worked during the strike would not be the subject of adverse action by the Respondent because they had chosen to work during the strike and in con- nection with this choice had opted to become financial core members so as to avoid being penalized by Re- spondent for their refusal to support its strike. In other words, the sections of the strike settlements which Re- spondent violated involve a highly significant aspect of the employment relationship between the Employers and their employees, namely, the employees' decision wheth- er or not to' work for the Employers ' during Respond- ent's strike. - • - Not only was the purpose of those sections of the strike-settlement agreements which were violated by Re- spondent's conduct directly related to a significant aspect of the relationship between the Employers and their em- ployees, but the manner in which Respondent violated the agreements adversely affected the employees' exist- ing terms and conditions of employment. Thus, one of the employees' benefits of employment contained in the parties' collective-bargaining agreement is' that the em- ployees may choose their own provider with respect to eye, dental, and drug services. Respondent's conduct re- stricts this benefit insofar as the financial core members are concerned by prohibiting them from using the serv- ices of the pharmacy and eye and dental clinics located in Respondent's building, even though these facilities are available to everyone else. Lastly,-in determining whether or not the strike-settle- ment' agreements herein constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining J note that the inclusion of provisions relat- cessfully resisted the House version and won acceptance of the present 8(d) language, which, as can readily be seen, is substantially identical to the Sec 9(a) language of the Wagner Act 2 Leg Hist 1541, 1668, 1669 The original Wagner'Act Sec 9(a) has remained in the Act to the present day . • . TEAMSTERS LOCAL 670 (STAYTON CANNING) 919. ing to a strike settlement as a part of a collective-bar- gaining contract is a widespread practice in all industries as a means: of settling contract disputes which have re- sulted in a strike. They appear to play a significant role' in helping the parties to develop mutually acceptable compromises during the course of the negotiations lead- ing to a cessation of a strike and. a peaceful settlement of the dispute, which is, of course, the primary purpose of the Act. - It is for all the foregoing reasons that I am persuaded,- that the sections of the strike- settlement agreements vio- lated by Respondent's conduct constitute mandatory sub- jects of. bargaining.12 I therefore find that by violating the . strike-settlement agreements Respondent violated Section 8(b)(3) and Section 8(d) of the Act as alleged in the complaint.13 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Employers, Stayton Canning Company Cooper- ative and Agnpac, Inc., each is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. - 2. The Respondent, Teamsters Cannery Local No. 670, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, - Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By refusing to issue work registration certificates to its financial core members employed by the Employers and its refusal to allow them to use the pharmacy and eye and dental clinics located in its building, in violation of the terms of its strike-settlement agreements with the Employers, the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (3) and Section 8(d) of the Act. ' 4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are ' unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent violated the Act by re- fusing to issue work registration certificates to its finan- . 12 The question of whether the sections of the stnke-settlement. agree- ments violated by the Respondent's conduct are mandatory subjects of bargaining was unfortunately not briefed by any of the parties I have not been able to locate a case where the Board has specifically discussed this precise issue However, in San Jose Hospital, supra, the Board seems to have implicitly held that a strike-settlement agreement was a mandatory subject of bargaining There, as I have described in detail supra, the Board held that a respondent union's conduct was not 'protected 'by the'' proviso to Sec 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act because'the conduct was'm'deroga-' tion of the parties ' stnke-settlement agreement , referred to as an amnesty agreement In this regard the Board (240 NLRB at 1124) explained Respondent's conduct was clearly in-derogation of the amnesty agreement [and] therefore was in 'contravention of the basid policy of the Act of encouraging the practice and procedure"of col- ' lective bargaining - [and] the peaceful resolution of labor. disputes Accordingly [the union's] disregard for and violation of , it`s collectively bargained for amnesty agreement impairs congres- sional policy embodied in the labor laws and under the pnnci ' pies of Scofield, its disciplining of Davis is not protected _by the pro- viso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) 13 The failure of the Employers to demand that Respondent bargain about or cease and desist from its disputed unilateral conduct is not, as contended by Respondent, a defense to this violation See Exxon Co U.SA.,253NLRB 213fn 2(1980) cial core members employed by Stayton Canning Com- pany Cooperative and Agripac, Inc. and its refusal- to allow them to use the pharmacy and eye and dental -clin- ics in its building in violation of the terms of its strike-, settlement agreements with the Employers, I shall rec- ommend that Respondent cease and desist. from engaging in this conduct and to make whole its-financial core, members employed by the Employers-for any. financial losses they may have suffered as a result of-Respondent's illegal conduct, with interests as provided in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977).14 The identity of the finan- cial core members affected by the Respondent's unfair labor practices and the amount of financial losses they may have suffered as the result of the unfair labor prac- tices shall be left to the compliance stage of this proceed- ing. Respondent urges that the only financial core members who suffered financial losses as a result of its unfair labor practices whose losses should be remedied are those who were specifically identified, during the. hearing in this case. I have rejected this contention because Respond- ent's unfair labor practices were not directed toward sev- eral employees but against a whole class of employees _ numbering in the hundreds. Under the circumstances leaving the determination of the identity of the employ- ees who suffered financial losses as a result of Respond- ent's unfair labor practices for the compliance ,stage of this proceeding represents an orderly and efficient means for processing a backpay order of this kind,, particularly, since the Respondent waited -until -the, hearing had opened in this case before objecting to this • procedure., See - NLRB v. Iron Workers Local 433, 600 F.2d .770,; 778 (9th Cir. 1979); Iron Workers Local'480, 235,NLRB 1511; 1514 (1978); Iron Workers Local 373, 232 NLRB:504, 506 (1977); Electrical Worker.-Systerri Council T=61BEW, 2361' NLRB 1209, 1210 (1978); Sav-On Drugs, 253 =NLRB 816, fn. 2 (1980). As the, Court' in'=Iron= Worke'rs' Local 433, supra, 600 F.2d at 778, 'explained: -- 'Although-the identification' of the individual' discn-- minatees may require more litigation than is typical for'backpay proceedings, we think' the Board' acted iii its discretion 'in reserving the issue until after en- forcement. Because the determination of whether unfair labor practices have occurred is itself subject to judicial review, there is' always a substantial risk that exten- sive proceedings to determine the amount of habil- ity may be rendered superfluous by a reversal of the. underlying violation ! .' We think that leaving the • t iF ^ 1, •. , ,. identification of the 'discriminateesl and the backpay due them to,-the„ compliance; stage of,th"e,proceed ings represents Ian orderly and 'efficient'meatis-for., processing backpay `"orders in this kind of case. 14 See generally Isis Plu»ibin`g'Co,138 NLRB'716 (1962) 920 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD On these .findings of fact and conclusions of law. and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed" ORDER The- Respondent, Teamsters Cannery Local No. 670, affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Salem, Oregon, its officers, agents, and representatives, shall - - 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to issue work registration certificates to its financial core members employed by Stayton Canning Company Cooperative and Agripac, Inc. and refusing to allow them to use the pharmacy-and eye and dental clin- ics located in its building, in violation of the terms of its strike-settlement agreements with the Employers. • (b) Refusing to -bargain- with Stayton Canning Compa- ny Cooperative and Agripac, Inc by engaging in the above-described conduct -without affording the Employ- ers, a timely opportunity to bargain within the meaning of-Section 8(d) of the Act. (c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining,, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Make whole its financial core members employed by Stayton Canning Company Cooperative and Agripac, Inc. for any financial losses they may have suffered as the result of its unlawful refusal to issue them work reg- istration certificates and to allow them to use the phar- macy and eye and dental clinics in' its building, with in- terest. (b) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay- roll-records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all -other records nec- essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. - (c) Post at Respondent's business offices and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appen- dix."16 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to members are cus- tomarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, de- faced, or covered by any other material. (d) Mail to.the Regional Director for Region 19 signed copies of the aforementioned notice for posting by Stay- ton Canning Company Cooperative and Agripac, Inc., if they are willing, in places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Copies of the notice, to be fur- nished by the Regional Director shall, after being signed by Respondent as indicated, be returned to the Regional Director. (e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the -Re- spondent has taken-to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dis- missed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not spe- cifically found herein. _ 15 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, - and recommended Order shall , as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses 16 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board "