Proto Plastics Co.

PROTO PLASTICS CO 1379 Proto Plastics Co. and Oil,. Chemical and Atomic Workers Union. Case 10-CA-20433 5 August 1985 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS HUNTER AND DENNIS On 28 February 1985 Administrative Law Judge William N. Cates issued the attached decision in this proceeding. Thereafter, the Charging Party filed exceptions. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. - The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and conclu- sions2 and to-adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Proto Plas- tics Company, Johnson City,. Tennessee, its offi- cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. I The Charging Party has excepted to some of the judge's credibility findings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administra- tive law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for re- versing the findings The Charging Party also asserts that the judge was biased and preju- diced against it This contention is based on the judge 's assistance at the hearing to the Respondent, who was unrepresented by counsel We reject the Charging Party's assertion that the judge was biased and prejudiced as unsupported by the record 2 We adopt the judge's conclusion that the Respondent did not violate Sec 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging employee Jenkins In so doing, we find that even assuming arguendo that the General Counsel es- tablished a prima facie case, the Respondent has demonstrated that it would have discharged Jenkins even absent her union activity Finally, in the absence of exceptions, we adopt, pro forma, the judge's conclusion that the Respondent violated Sec 8(a)(1) of the Act based on the statement of the Respondent's vice president to employee Burleson Member Dennis does not "assum[e] arguendo" that the General Coun- sel established a prima facie case, but accepts the judge's finding of a prima facie case Member Dennis also finds unnecessary her colleagues' "pro forma" reference to the 8(a)(1) violation A "pro forma" adoption of a judge's unfair labor practice decision has traditionally implied that the Board has doubts about the judge's decision 16, 1985.1 The charge was filed by Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union (Union) on September 4, and amended on October 19. A complaint and notice of hear- ing issued on November _8, on behalf of the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) by the Regional Director of the Board for Region 10,. al- leging that Proto-Plastics Company (Respondent) has en- gaged and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act)" Specifically, the complaint alleges that Respondent about September 24 solicited its employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act to engage in direct bargaining with Respondent in circum- vention of the Union, the employees' duly designated collective-bargaining representative It is also alleged that about August 27 Respondent discharged and there- after failed and refused 'to reinstate its employee Faye Jenkins because of her membership in and activities on behalf of the Union and because she engaged in concert- ed activities with other employees for the purposes of collective bargaining and other mutual aid and protec- iion.. About November 19, Respondent wrote the Re- gional Director for Region 10 a letter which was consid- ered to constitute an answer to the complaint.2 Respond- ent by stipulations at trial amended its letter answer to admit certain allegations of the complaint but denied it had committed any, unfair labor practices within the meaning of the Act. On the entire record made in this proceeding, includ- ing my observation of each witness who testified herein, and after due consideration of the General Counsel's brief, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Respondent, a Tennessee corporation, with an office acid place of business in Johnson City, Tennessee, is en- gaged, in the production of plastic injection molding products. During the year preceding the issuance of the complaint herein, a representative period, Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business, sold and shipped from its Johnson City, Tennessee facility finished prod- ucts valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers lo- cated outside the State of Tennessee. The complaint al- leges, Respondent admits, and' I find Respondent is and has been at all times material herein an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. ' 11. LABOR ORGANIZATION DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE WILLIAM N. CATES, Administrative Law Judge: This matter was heard at Kingsport, Tennessee, on January It is admitted and I find the Union is and at all times material has been a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. I All dates hereinafter are 1984 unless otherwise indicated 2 Respondent did not serve a copy of its letter to the Regional Direc- tor on the Union, however, the Union requested and the Regional Office provided it with a copy of the letter 275 NLRB No. 188 1380 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD IiI. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ' "try to meet [their] demands and try to straighten every- thing out with [them] " Burleson told Vice. President Ellis she would do as he had asked. Burleson asserts she relayed Vice President Ellis' offer to those present at the union meeting and it was rejected Burleson stated that on yet another occasion in April 1983 Vice President Ellis called her and Jenkins into his office and told them he would not meet nor negotiate with the Union, that the employees did not need^,a third •.par:ty, to ,arbitrate their differences. • Jenkins stated Vice President Ellis wanted to know why-the employees were suing him and indicated he would negotiate with the employees but not with the Union.' . - Jenkins testified Vice President Ellis,- spoke to her while she was alone in the breakroom at the plant in April 1983 and told her he would not negotiate with the Union, that he did not need anyone else telling him how to run his business. Ellis did not deny making the statements -Burleson, Baird, and Jenkins attribute to him. Ellis did testify he had made an effort to separate beliefs of his that he con- sidered personal from decisions he had to make on behalf of Respondent It is undisputed that Vice President Ellis, pursuant to the informal settlement agreement referred to earlier in this decision, posted a notice at the plant which stated Respondent would bargain with the Union. It' is also undisputed that the-parties met for a number of bar- gaining sessions. Additionally, Respondent allowed the Union to audit its records regarding its' financial stand- ing. I find Vice President Ellis made the statements in 1983 that Burleson, Baird," and Jenkins attributed to him. Al- though I, have expressed doubt elsewhere in this decision about Jenkins' overall credibility, I nevertheless credit her undenied and uncontradicted testimony regarding her 1983 conversations with Vice• President Ellis. Jen- kins' - testimony regarding Ellis' ' 1983 conversations is supported by that of Burleson and Baird. The, fact that Vice.'President Ellis did, at a later time, meet with the Union and bargain does not make unbelievable the un- denied testimony of Burleson, Baird, and Jenkins that he made the 1983 comments which I find he made regard- ing the Union and bargaining. No violations of the Act may be based on the above statements of Vice President Ellis because the statements were made more than , 6 months before the original charge in the instant case was filed and because the Gen- eral Counsel -never at any point sought to have the previ- ously mentioned informal settlement agreement'set'aside. Although no violations bf the Act may be based on the above factual findings, such facts' may nevertheless be considered as background evidence and 'relied on to shed light on timely' allegations contained` in 'the complaint. She, e.g., Trrt-City Electric Co:, 264 NLRB 1407, 1408 (1982); and Riley-Begird, Inc.,''271 NLRB 155 fn. 1 (1984). Accordingly, I shall, as, I have indicated 'else"- where in this decision, consider Vice President Ellis' 1983 comments in evaluating, timely allegations in the complaint. A. Background The Union conducted an organizational campaign at Respondent in the'springof 1983. The campaign culmi- nated in a Board-conducted election. The Union was cer- tified in Case 10-RC-12764 as the collective-bargaining representative for the production and maintenance em- ployees of Respondent: ' Certain employees testified, they had conversations with Respondent's vice president-James R Ellis' (Vice President Ellis) during the Union's 1983 campaign. Fran- cis Burleson (Burleson), who after the Union was certi- fied became its Local president, testified she and certain other employees who did not support the Union were not laid off 3 Burleson testified that after.she returned to work from layoff she had various conversations in the spring of 1983 with Vice President Ellis about the Union. Burleson stated that one of the conversations took place' in Vice, President Ellis' office in April 1983. According to Burleson, when she arrived at Ellis' office he told her he had a speech he wanted to make to her Burleson told Vice President Ellis she thought she ought to tell him she was a' member `of the Union. Vice President Ellis then told Burleson he could not make the speech he had planned to. Vice President Ellis told Burleson he would not negotiate with the Union nor would he have any part of it because'the Union was communistic and it was against his religion' to have anything to do with unions. Vice President Ellis handled Burleson what she ' de- scribed as a _"religious book" and asked her to read it. Burleson stated Vice President Ellis told her one of the passages in the book stated that if a union came into his place of business he was to-close his doors and have no part of it Burleson also testified that during the spring -of 1983 Vice President Ellis 'spoke with her and, fellow employ- ees'Carolyn Baird (Baird) and Faye Jenkins (Jenkins) in the breakroom 'about the Union: In' the conversation, Vice President Ellis told the, three of them he would not negotiate with the Union and wanted' no part of it be- cause the Union was evil and- communistic.' Burleson testified Vice President Ellis told' her in mid-April. 1983 that he had heard there was-going to be a union meeting in `the parking lot at Respondent's facility. Burleson told Vice President Ellis she would not' lie to him, that they were going to have a union meeting but. it was not going 'to.be in.Respondent's parking. lot. According to Burle- son, Vice, President Ellis then asked if she "would go to the. girls and tell them that, if [they] would drop the Union . he would sit down . . and- negotiate with [them]." Vice President Ellis . toldy Burleson he would 9 Pursuant to an informal settlement agreement approved by Region 10 of Board, the employees who were laid off and recalled in March 1983 were made whole for any losses they suffered as a result of their having been laid off Additionally, the settlement agreement covered various other alleged violations of the-Act ' ' , % 4 Baird corroborated Burleson's testimony-as outlined above Addition- ally, Baird testified about various other conversations she had with Ellis in the spring of 1983 In the additional conversations that Baird testified about, she asserts Vice President Ellis said he could not allow a union at Respondent, and that he would have to take his family and go to the mountains if the employees joined a union . I I ' PROTO PLASTICS CO 1381 B. Alleged Solicitation to Engage in Direct Bargaining It is alleged at complaint paragraph 7 that Vice Presi- dent Ellis about September 24, in the vicinity of the plant, solicited employees to engage in direct bargaining with Respondent in circumvention of the Union, the em- ployees' duly designated collective-bargaining represent- ative. Burleson testified she went to the plant in September to-obtain'her paycheck and -while - there Vice President Ellis spoke with her. Burleson asserts Vice President Ellis said. . . ' [H]e had heard a rumor that there was none of the Union left but dust me, and . . . stated . . . if it is dust you and I, let's sit down together and -pull- this plant out of the hole, and put the Union aside, and we will pull together, and pull this plant out of the hole it is in. - Burleson stated no one else was present when Vice President Ellis spoke with her. Burleson made no re- sponse to Ellis' comment I credit the above undenied testimony of Burleson. Burleson's testimony had a ring of truth to it. The com- ments Vice President Ellis made to his employees in the spring of 1983 demonstrate his displeasure with and per- sonal dislike for the Union, and such lends credence to Burleson's undenied testimony. At first glance, it might appear that since Burleson was president of the Local Union, Ellis was not attempting to bypass the Union when he spoke with her However, I am persuaded Ellis was not attempting to meet with Burleson in her official capacity as president of the Local Union because he asked her to "put,the Union aside " I am convinced Vice President Ellis attempted to bargain directly with Burle- son as an employee and not as president of the Local Union. Accordingly, I find that Vice President Ellis by his actions outlined above attempted to engage in direct bargaining with one of Respondent's employees in cir-' cumvention of the Union, the employees'-duly designat- ed collective-bargaining representative. Such conduct on the part of Ellis constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. See K & K Transportation Corp., 254 NLRB 722, 735 (1981); and Scotto's I.G.A., 249 NLRB 909, 914 (1980). C: The Discharge of Faye Jenkins It is alleged at.complaint'paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 that Respondent in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act discharged employee Faye Jenkins about August 27, and thereafter failed and refused to-reinstate her because of her membership in and activities on behalf of the Union and because she engaged in concerted activities with other employees for the purposes of collective bar- gaining and other mutual aid and, protection.. ,_ Jenkins commenced work for Respondent in, 1978 and throughout her employment worked as a press operator. Jenkins was the most senior employee at Respondent. Jenkins participated in the Union's 1983 organizational campaign She signed a union card, wore a union button, and attended union meetings. After the Union was certi- fied as the collective-bargaining representative for Re- spondent's production and maintenance employees, Jen- kins served its local as vice chairman. Jenkins was one of a number of employees who were laid off for a brief period of time in the spring' of 1983. Jenkins, like' the others, was made whole-for any losses she suffered as a result'of her having been laid off. Additionally, as noted in .the section of this decision entitled "Background," Vice President Ellis told Jenkins and others that he would not negotiate with the Union Some of the operative facts related 'to Jenkins' employ- ment immediately prior•to her departure from Respond- ent are in conflict: I have set forth the events as I am persuaded they happened, and in doing so I have dis- credited the testimony of Jenkins where her testimony conflicted with that of Respondent's witnesses, 'particu- larly where it conflicted with the testimony of Vice President Ellis and Plant Manager John A. Patterson Jr (Patterson).' Ellis impressed me as being unreservedly honest He was forthright and candid and although at times he may not have been the most sophisticated wit- ness, I am nevertheless persuaded he told the truth. Pat- terson impressed me 'as being honest and other record evidence tended to support his testimony. in contrast to Ellis and Patterson, Jenkins appeared to be somewhat nervous, ill at ease, and hostile while testifying, and as such I am persuaded her testimony cannot be regarded as wholly trustworthy, accurate, or reliable. It, is undisputed that Jenkins suffered an on-the-job injury in 1984 which resulted in her being away from work for a number of days. Jenkins first injured her arm on April 6.5 Prior to her arm injury, Jenkins had not had a significant problem with being absent from work. However, after her arm injury she missed work often in April and May. On May 9, Jenkins was granted a leave of absence from work because Respondent had no light duty for her to perform 6 At the conclusion of her.leave of absence which was in the latter part of May, Jenkins asked for and was granted a week's vacation. Thereafter, Jenkins returned. to work 'but was again away from work during the last. 2 weeks in July -because' of her arm injury Jenkins worked on August 1, but left work com- plaining 'her arm was' hurting. Jenkins did not return to the plant' until August 17. On 'that day she went by 'the plant and spoke with-Vice President Ellis. Leonard Ellis (Vice President Ellis' son) 'was present at the conversa- tion between Jenkins and Vice President Ellis During Jenkins' conversation' with Ellis, she was offered a layoff slip. Jenkins wore a sling type support on her arm at the meeting: -According to' Leonard Ellis, whose testimony I credit,- Jenkins told Vice President Ellis she would have to 'wear the arm sling at work even when operating her machine. Vice President Ellis told Jenkins that work-' men's compensation 7 'would not cover that type of situa- 5 On direct examination, Jenkins stated she injured her arm on July 13, however, on cross-examination she acknowledged she first inured her arm (pulled a ligament) in April . 6 Jenkins received compensation for the time she was on leave of ab- sence - Respondent was dropped from-coverage by one workmen's compen- sation carrier on August 8, but was picked up as an assigned risk policy holder by a different carrier on August 15 1382 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR, RELATIONS BOARD tion . He also told Jenkins she would not be able to get her arm, with the sling on it, into the machine to operate the machine properly.. Jenkins telephoned,.Vice President Ellis the following Monday, August 20„and informed him she had been ad- vised by counsel to reject his offer of a layoff slip be- cause she would lose her seniority if she, accepted one. On August i 22, Vice President Ellis attempted two or three times to telephone Jenkins before he left the ,plant at 4 p.m. on that date. Ellis' left instructions at the plant that if Jenkins called he wanted her to be told she was to meet with him in his office at the plant at 3 p.m. on August 24 Vice President Ellis stated he had obtained some less strenuous work for Jenkins to perform that would take her away from her.regularly assigned ma- chine - and he wanted to "give her- her work assign= ments," and "tell her what [he] had laid out for her [to do]." Jenkins telephoned the plant at approximately 4:30 p.m. on August 22. Patterson took the call. Jenkins asked for Vice President Ellis and was told he was not there. Jenkins asked if Ellis was "supposed to get back in touch with [her] about something." Patterson told Jenkins he ,had no idea what it would lie about Jenkins thanked Patterson and ended the conversation. - Francis Ellis _(Vice President' Ellis' wife) was working in the plant office at the time Jenkins spoke with Patter- son: Francis Ellis overheard-Patterson's part of the con- versation and attempted but was unable to get his atten- tion while he spoke with'Jenkins -on the phone. As soon as Patterson finished 'speaking with Jenkins,. Francis Ellis told him' she had been trying to get in touch with Jen- kins to tell her that-Vice President Ellis wanted'to meet with-her at 3 p.m. on August 24. Francis Ellis told Pat- terson to telephone Jenkins back and tell her of Vice President Ellis' desire to meet with ,her at 3 p.m. on August-24.8 . Plant Manager -Patterson followed Francis Ellis' in- struction and immediately telephoned Jenkins.9 Patterson informed Jenkins of the date,, time, and place of the meeting and even repeated the information to her ' be- cause -Jenkins hesitated, "as if she , was writing it down." to ' Vice President Ellis .was present at the,.-plant on August 24 and remained there until . approximately 5 p m.; however, Jenkins -never showed for the meeting, nor called to.explain,her absence.'[, Vice President Ellis stated he did not discharge Jenkins,.that after she-did not show for the meeting or call to explain her absence, he simply considered she had quit her employment. Vice President Ellis told Francis Ellis later,, that, same -day 8,Francis Ellis also showed Patterson Vice;President Ellis' desk calen- dar which reflected a notation of the meeting.., .1 1. - 8 Francis Ellis corroborated Patterson's testimony that he immediately telephoned Jenkins and informed her'of the scheduled meeting with Vice President Ellis E ' 10 Although Jenkins acknowledges Patterson called her a second time on August 22 and told her on Friday, August 24, she denied Patterson mentioned any meeting in the conversation or that he told her to be at the plant at 3 p m on August 24 1 specifically discredit Jenkins' testimo- ny that Patterson did not mention a meeting for August 24 at 3 p in in his conversation with her Vice President Ellis testified he expedited a business, trip he had made to Alabama in order to be present for the meeting (August 24) he guessed Jenkins had quit her employment with Respondent. Francis Ellis prepared a Tennessee Department of Em- ployment Security separation notice for Jenkins and mailed it to her on August 27. The separation notice stated "quit without notice to employer " Francis Ellis credibly testified it was "a long, long, time" thereafter before Jenkins telephoned to say she had not quit Vice President Ellis stated it was "about two to two and a half weeks" before Jenkins made Respondent. aware that she did not consider that she had quit her employment. i 2 D. Analysis and Conclusions In evaluating the evidence to determine if Respondent violated the Act when it discharged Jenkins, I am guided by the principles set forth in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1981), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), approved in NLRB v. Trans- portation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). Under Wright Line analysis, the General Counsel has the initial burden of demonstrating a prima facie case that protect- ed conduct was a "motivating factor" in Respondent's decision to terminate the alleged discriminatee. Once the General Counsel has made_ such.a showing, the burden then shifts to Respondent to demonstrate that it would have taken the same action it did absent the protected conduct. I am persuaded the General Counsel has met her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. One thing abso- lutely clear on this record is that Vice President Ellis has a strong dislike, for the Union. Standing alone, an ex- pressed dislike for unions in general or a dislike for a particular union does not violate the Act; however, in Vice President Ellis' case, he went beyond merely ex- pressing a dislike for unions in general and this Union in particular in that on several occasions in 1983 he indicat- ed he would not bargain with the Union and stated he felt unions were evil and communistic . Although no vio- lations of the Act can be based on Vice President Ellis' 1983 comments, such comments do illuminate his strong animus against unions in general and this Union in par- ticular It cannot be disputed that Jenkins was a support- er of the Union and that Respondent-was aware of her support inasmuch as she served as vice chairman of the Local Union. Jenkins had a long work history with Re- spondent and was in fact the most senior employee of Respondent. The above confluence of factors persuades me the General Counsel has established a prima facie case: As the General Counsel has established a prima facie case of.- unlawful motivation in the discharging of Jen- kins, the remaining question under the Wright Line analy- sis is whether Respondent has demonstrated it would have discharged Jenkins absent her protected activity. I am fully persuaded Respondent met its burden of estab- lishing it would have taken the same action it did absent 12 Jenkins was somewhat 'uncertain as to when she actually received her separation notice She could not recall if it was within a day or two of August'24 or if it was in September I specifically discredit Jenkins' testimony that she telephoned the plant the day she got her separation notice to inform Respondent she had not quit PROTO PLASTICS CO. - 1383 any protected conduct by Jenkins. Jenkins was specifical- ly directed to meet with Vice President Ellis at 3 p.m. on August 24, For reasons not reflected in this record, Jenkins not only did not show for the meeting, but did not even bother to explain her absence to Respondent. In fact, Jenkins did not even contact Respondent for ap- proximately' 2 weeks after-she received notice that Re- spondent considered, she had voluntarily quit her em- ployment. Respondent- demonstrated it had discharged ` employees • irrithe'past for failing -to report for scheduled work. Although the instant situation involving Jenkins was a failure to report for a scheduled meeting, I do not view that to be a material difference such as to remove it from Respondent's established policy of discharging em- ployees who fail to report for a scheduled event be it work or a meeting with management I am ,fully persuad- ed Jenkins' discharge about August 27 was brought about by her failure to attend a scheduled 'meeting with Vice President Ellis on August 24. Accordingly, I find Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act when-it discharged Jenkins. 1. Cease and desist from (a) Soliciting its employees to engage-in direct bargain- ing with it in circumvention of the Union, the employ- ees' duly designated collective-bargaining representative. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. • 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. - (a) Mail to all its employees employed on September 24, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 14 Copies of the notice mailed to employees shall be on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10 and shall be signed by an authorized representative of Respondent. (b) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. - IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the act not specifically found. - CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce with the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section-2(5) of the Act. 3. By, about September 24, soliciting its employees to engage in direct bargaining with it in circumvention of the Union,-the employees' duly designated collective-bar- gaining representative, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the act - • I • 4. Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(3) -and '(1) of the Act by discharging its employee Faye Jenkins- on August 27.' - - THE REMEDY , Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order it. to cease and desist and to take cetain affirmative action de- signed to.effectuate the policies of the Act. Inasmuch as it appears Respondent has :gone oui of business, I shall recommend that it mail the attached notice to all em- ployees who were employed by 'it-on' September 24. On' these findings of fact and 'conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed13 ORDER The Respondent, Proto Plastics Company, Johnson City, Tennessee, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall . , 13 If-no exceptions, are, filed as provided by Sec .102 46 of the Board's Rules and. Regulations, the findings,, conclusions,., and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all. pur- poses • 14 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Na- tional Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX • NOTICE To EMPLOYEES • POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. - Section 7- of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize • To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities:- , i•- - - WE WILL NOT solicit you to engage in direct bargain- ing with us in circumvention of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, your duly designated collective- bargaining representative. 'WE WILL NOT in any'like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights -guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act.- PROTO PLASTICS COMPANY , To act together for other mutual aid or protec-