Carpenters Local 470 (Tacoma Boatbuilding)

CARPENTERS LOCAL 470 (TACOMA BOATBUILDING) Carpenters Local 470, United Brotherhood of Car- penters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO and Tacoma District Council of Carpenters and 'Tacoma Boatbuilding Company International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades Local 64, AFL-CIO and Tacoma Boat- building Company Painters District Council No. 5 and Tacoma Boat- building Company United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local 82 and Tacoma Boatbuilding Company International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, Local 568, AFL-CIO and Tacoma Boatbuilding Company Sheet Metal Workers Union Local 150 and Tacoma Boatbuilding Company Laborers' International Union of North America, Local No. 252, AFL.-CIO and Tacoma Boat- building Company. Cases 19-CB-4945, 19-CB- 4947, 19-CB-5099, 19-CB-4949, 19-CB-4985, 19-CB-5001, 19-CB--5004, 19-CB-4950, 19- CB-5098, 19-CB-4986, and 19-CB-5010 19 November 1985 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS DENNIS AND BABSON On 28 August 1984 Administrative Law Judge Timothy D. Nelson issued the attached decisions The General Counsel filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief, and the Respondents filed cross-ex- ceptions and a supporting brief. 1 The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions, cross-exceptions, and briefs, and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions2 of the judge only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order. " Subsequently, the Board received an amicus curiae brief submitted by Ronald Chaney, the Charging Party in Case 20-CB-6093, in support of the General Counsel's exceptions. z We agree with the judge's conclusion, for the reasons set forth by him, that Respondents Plumbers Local 82 and Sheet Metal Workers Local 150 engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by the processing of charges and the imposition of fines for crossing the picket line against 19 Tacoma Boatbuilding Compa- ny employees who were admittedly not union members. The General Counsel excepted to the failure of the judge to include as part of his order a make-whole remedy for any moneys paid by the employees toward the fines imposed. We find merit in the exceptions and amend the remedy accordingly. 513 The facts, as more fully set forth in the judge's decision, show the Respondent Unions conducted an economic strike against Tacoma Boatbuilding Company (TBC) between 26 July 19833 and 3 Oc- tober and picketed the Tacoma facility as part of their strike. At various dates during the strike, 30 employees who were union members submitted, or tried to submit, to their respective unions a com- pleted copy of the following form letter: Name of Your Union Address City State Zip GENTLEMEN: I am an employee of Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. in Tacoma, Washington. This better will serve as notification that I am changing my member- ship status in (name and number of local) from that of a "full" member to that of a "financial core" member. As a"financial core" member, I will continue to pay to the union all initiation fees and dues uniformly required of all members for maintaining membership. I am not resigning from the union, I am only chang- ing my membership status. I will not, hence- forth, be subject to any obligations of member- ship other than that of paying uniformly re- quired dues and initiation fees required of all (name of union) members. The employees then returned to work at TBC. Thereafter, the Respondents initiated internal union charges and in most cases imposed fines against these employees for crossing a sanctioned picket line. The judge concluded that the Unions did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by initiating the charges and imposing the fines because the form letter did not clearly and unequivocally convey the critical resignation message. He thus found the letters were on their face insufficient to provide the Unions with reasonable notice of the signers' intentions to resign from membership and the membership tie was therefore never severed. We reverse the judge's decision and find that the Respondent Unions violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by initiating charges and imposing fines against employees for their actions subsequent to the receipt of the letters by the respective Unions. ' All dates are in 1983 unless otherwise indicated 277 NLRB No. 20 514 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The judge found the phrase in the form letter, "I am not resigning," critical in rendering the form letter's message "hopelessly equivocal." Contrary to the judge we conclude that the phrase, "I am not resigning" cannot be read in isolation from the rest of the sentence and the letter as a whole. Both before and after the phrase, the letter clearly sets forth that the employee will only accept the status of a financial core member, and the obligations of a financial core member are stated as only that of paying uniformly required dues and fees. Financial core membership has long been recognized as dis- tinct from full membership. See Hershey Foods Corp.4 The form letter submitted by the employee members reasonably placed the respective unions on notice that the members were resigning from full union membership. 5 The judge, in finding that the letter was critical- ly flawed, found it unnecessary to make any fur- ther fording whether the letter would otherwise have been adequate for resignation-notice purposes. In other words, the judge did not pass on whether financial core members could nevertheless be sub- ject to union discipline. This issue was raised col- laterally in Union Starch & Refining Co., 87 NLRB 779 (1949), enfd. 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied 342 U.S. 315 (1951), when the Board, in overruling the trial examiner, found that a union under Section 8(a)(3) could demand no more than that an employee tender dues and fees. The trial examiner had expressed concern that under such an interpretation of Section 8(a)(3) "[i]t [the union] could exercise no discipline whatever over the em- ployees in the bargaining unit, and would be unable to guarantee the performance of its contracts on the part of employees in a strike situation or other situation necessitating control of some kind over its members." Union Starch, 87 NLRB at 804. The Board concluded that its construction of Section 8(a)(3) was compelled by the Act's legislative his- tory despite the trial examiner's concern that such a construction would destroy all union security. Union Starch, 87 NLRB at 786. Thus, Union Starch appears to be an early recognition by the Board of the concept that an employee who is no more than a financial core member cannot be subject to inter- nal union discipline. In NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967), the Supreme Court did uphold a union's right to discipline its mem- 4 207 NLRB 897 (1973), enfd 513 F 2d 1083 (9th Cir 1975). s In light of our conclusions that the form letter was sufficiently clear to establish financial core status, we find it unnecessary to rule on the General Counsel's exceptions to the judge's findings that the Unions do not have a burden to show that they in fact do not subjectively under- stand what the letter signer was attempting to do or his finding that if the Unions were in doubt they did not have a duty to inquire into the letter signer's intent before imposing discipline. bers, but noted that the members in that case were clearly full union members. The Court stated it took no view on the question of whether a union could lawfully impose fines on members whose membership was limited to dues payments, as that question was not before the court. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 196-197. Thereafter, the Court held in NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, Granite State Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213 (1972), that even a full union member could avoid union discipline for his conduct by first resigning his union membership. The Board has recently refined this protection by finding that under Section 8(b)(1)(A) a union may not lawfully restrict the right of its members to resign. See Ma- chinists Local 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi), 270 NLRB 1330 (1984). In finding restrictions on the right to resign unlawful, the Board utilized the Su- preme Court's Scofield test that "Section 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, im- pairs no policy Congress has embedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule." Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969). The Board, in applying the test, con- cluded that, while the union had a legitimate inter- est in maintaining strike solidarity by restricting resignations, such an interest impaired the funda- mental policy of Section 7 that granted employees "the right to refrain from any or all" protected concerted activities. Neufeld, 270 NLRB at 1333. This, combined with the requirement that an em- ployee be free to leave the union, rendered the re- strictions unlawful. Likewise, in the recent case of Professional Engineers Local 151 (General Dynam- ics), 272 NLRB 1051 (1984), we found the imposi- tion of a second initiation fee on those who had re- signed from full union membership was, in effect, a penalty for their exercise of Section 7 rights to resign. The fees were therefore levied in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A). Thus, regardless of the legiti- macy of a union's interests they cannot negate fun- damental Section 7 rights. Moreover, while there is a voluntary aspect to the assumption of financial core status, when there is a union-security clause in effect an employee must retain financial core status as a condition for employment. To then say, how- ever, that a financial core member is subject to the same discipline as a full member is to render mean- ingless the third part of the Scofield test, namely, that a member is free to leave the union and escape the rule. If a union cannot demand under Section 8(a)(3) that a financial core member take an oath or attend meetings (Union Starch, supra); fill out application CARPENTERS LOCAL 470 (TACOMA BOATBUILDING) forms (Service Employees Local 680 (Stanford Uni- versity)), 232 NLRB 326 (1977), enfd. 601 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1979)); accept membership (Hershey Foods, 207 NLRB 897 (1973), enfd. 513 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1975)); or otherwise do anything more than tender dues and fees (NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742-743 (1963)), it follows that a union cannot compel a financial core member by way of court collectible fines to support its strike or other activities which that employee has a Sec- tion 7 right to refrain from engaging in.6 For, as we noted in Neufeld, 270 NLRB at 1336, "a `right' to act, but at the risk of a debilitating fine, is no right at all." We find, therefore, that the Respond- ents' efforts to discipline financial core members, to the extent that the discipline was for actions subse- quent to the receipt of their financial core letters, violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.7 Respondents Plumbers, Carpenters, Laborers, Sheet Metal Workers, and Painters processed charges and in most cases imposed fines on 25 em- ployees of TBC who had been members, but who had submitted financial core letters. Stipulations or uncontradicted testimony establish that the letters were received by the respective Unions on a date prior to that on which the employees returned to work or at least prior to the time of the offense for which the employee was charged. 11 Pattern Makers v. NLRB, 105 S.Ct. 3064, 3071 fn 16 (1985) Respondents Boilermakers, Painters, Carpenters, and Sheet Metal Workers argue that even if the wording of the form letters was otherwise adequate to terminate full union membership , restrictions in the union constitutions foreclose giving the letters any effect. Thus Boilermakers provides a withdrawal card only if a member is going into business or entering another occupation Painters will not accept a resignation during a strike and will otherwise accept a resignation only if a member is leav- ing the trade and the membership votes to accept it Carpenters requires a vote of the members on resignation and will not accept the resignation when it is known that it is submitted for the purpose of violating trade rules Sheet Metal Workers requires a resignation be mailed to the finan- cial secretary-treasurer by certified or registered mail and no resignation will be accepted during a strike. As we found in Local 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi), 270 NLRB 1330 (1984), a union may not lawfully restrict the right of its members to resign from membership Therefore, to the extent that these constitutional provisions are restrictions on the right to resign, they are not a valid defense. Even assuming the remaining proce- dural restrictions of the Sheet Metal Workers were otherwise valid, these restrictions are nevertheless not a valid defense in this case While Sheet Metal members Joseph Okihara, Gary Rowe, Richard Meyer, and Roger Drake did not deliver their letters by certified or registered mail or deliv- ered their letters to a union agent other than the financial secretary-treas- urer, the parties stipulated that the letters were , in fact, received by the Union and were received on a date prior to the employees crossing the picket line. See Auto Workers Local 1384 (Ex-Cell-O Corp), 227 NLRB 1045, 1049 and fn. 24 (1977) 8 Certain employees under the Painters jurisdiction returned to work either the same day the letter was received or prior to receipt However, evidence shows they were all disciplined for offenses after receipt, Pok Su Choe and Kwan Cho Kim were charged with crossing the picket line at 8 am on 12 September However, Choe had hand delivered the finan- cial core letters for himself and Kim poor to 8 a m. that day Alexander Ignancio returned to work 17 August His letter was received on 18 August, but he was charged for offenses occurring on 22, 24, and 26 August Ted Kelly hand delivered his letter on 23 August and returned to work that day His offense occurred on 7 September William L 515 Boilermakers Local 568 processed charges and imposed fines on five employees under its jurisdic- tion: John LaRose, Kenneth McCoy, Donald Austin, Robert Woodard, and Nahm Van Trinh. Contrary to the other Respondents, Boilermakers denies that it ever received financial core letters from any of its members. Inasmuch as the judge concluded that the financial core letters were inef- fective as a means of communicating an intention to resign, he declined to decide the litigated ques- tion as to whether Boilermakers received the let- ters or whether, under the circumstances, the Union is estopped from denying receipt. The Gen- eral Counsel argues that the Boilermakers engaged in a course of conduct designed to make any at- tempt to deliver financial core letters futile. We agree, based on the record discussed below, that Respondent Boilermakers consistently refused to accept communications from the employees who crossed the picket line and as a result it is estopped from alleging nonreceipt of the letters as a defense. John LaRose was disciplined for crossing the picket line on 25 August. He had returned to work on 15 August and had mailed his financial core letter certified mail, return receipt requested, on 16 August. While the letter was eventually returned unclaimed to LaRose, markings on the envelope show the postal service attempted delivery on 17 August and 25 August. Thus, the offense for which he was disciplined occurred 8 days after the first attempted delivery.9 Kenneth McCoy testified that in August, prior to returning to work on 25 August, he went in person to the Boilermakers union hall to deliver his finan- Franklin returned to work 23 August. His letter was received on 25 August, but his offense occurred on 21 September. Johnny W Pierce tes- tified that he hand delivered his letter the day before he returned to work However, although the parties stipulated that receipt of the letter and his return to work were both 16 August, his offense did not occur until 24 August The parties also stipulated that while the letter from Bruce A Putz was delivered on 22 August and he crossed the picket line on 22 August, the delivery occurred first Moreover, the offenses for which he was charged occurred on 24 and 26 August. B LaRose had been suspended from Boilermakers about February for nonpayment of dues . Under art XXX of the Boilermakers' constitution, a member in arrears for 2 months is automatically suspended from all rights, privileges, and benefits. Under art. XXV, sec 5, membership rights terminate on suspension. The parties stipulated that at all relevant times up through October, LaRose was under suspension Around No- vember, subsequent to the termination of the strike, LaRose paid $500 and was reinstated The General Counsel argues that LaRose's suspension rendered him a nonmember and thereby insulated him from the imposi- tion of any discipline for working during the strike The Respondent argues that it should be presumed that the $500 included back dues for the period of the strike and since he effectively and retroactively reinstat- ed his membership, discipline could be lawfully imposed The Judge's de- cision contains no discussion of this issue, but does include LaRose in the list of "members" of the Boilermakers The General Counsel excepts to this "finding " In light of our conclusion that Boilermakers effectively re- ceived a financial core letter from LaRose prior to the offense for which he was disciplined, we find it unnecessary to decide if LaRose's prestrike suspension rendered him a nonmember for discipline purposes 516 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD cial core letter, He spoke to a clerical identified only as Dorothy , but who was someone to whom McCoy had made dues payments in the past. McCoy testified that when he asked Dorothy if she would accept his financial core letter, her response was, "No, we won't accept it." She indicated that he must send it registered mail.' 0 McCoy then mailed the letter certified mail, return receipt re- quested. The postal service attempted delivery on 26 August and 1 September before returning the letter unclaimed to McCoy. McCoy was disci- plined for crossing the picket line on 30 August, a date after both the attempted hand delivery and the postal service's first attempt at delivery . McCoy's mother, Vera McCoy, testified that she had a tele- phone conversation with another clerical at the union office in September when she called to check on the status of her son 's dues. She had dealt with this clerical in the past when making dues pay- ments on behalf of her son . According to Mrs. McCoy's testimony, when she asked if Ken had been in to deliver his financial core letter , the cleri- cal admitted that he had been in, but receipt of the letter had been refused , and Ken had been told to send the letter certified or registered mail. Mrs. McCoy further testified that when she asked if the Union had received the certified letter, the clerical responded that it had come, but delivery had been refused because it was addressed to Don Foreman and he was not there to sign for it at the time. Don Foreman was the business manager of the Local and a stipulated agent of the Respondent. Donald Austin testified that in August, prior to his return to work, he was at the Boilermakers union hall along with other members signing up for the strike fund. He observed Bob Moriarty, a union member, attempt to hand deliver a financial core letter to Dorothy. Austin testified that he heard Dorothy tell Moriarty that they were not going to accept the letter and heard her call Moriarty a scab and tell him to get out of the union hall. Thereaf- ter, when Austin decided to return to work him- self, he mailed a financial core letter certified mail, return receipt requested . The postal service at- tempted delivery on 30 August and 9 September. Union charges filed against him on 1 September allege Austin crossed the picket line on 29 August. However, since the parties stipulated that Austin did not return to work until 30 August , the charges against him cannot relate to any conduct prior to 30 August. See Typographical Union 101 (Photo-Ty- pography), 243 NLRB 675, 676 (1979). The time of his offense is listed as 0730 but there is no indica- to The Respondent did not call Dorothy or any other clerical from the Union as a witness to contradict this or any other testimony concerning conduct attributed to it. tion of whether this was am or pm. There is like- wise no indication of the hour in which the postal service attempted delivery. Therefore the letter is presumed to have been effectively received at an hour before the employee crossed the picket line in the absence of evidence to the contrary. See Team- sters Local 610 (Browning-Ferris Industries), 264 NLRB 886, 899-900 (1982); Hendricks-Miller Typo- graphic Co., 240 NLRB 1082, 1088 (1979). Robert Woodard testified he sent his financial core letter by regular mail on 23 August. However, he had a notary public accompany him to the mail- box and attest under seal to the mailing of the letter. Moreover, Woodard testified that he had af- fixed sufficient postage to the letter, that it was correctly addressed, and that it contained Woo- dard's return address. Woodard crossed the picket line the next day. Although the letter was never re- turned to Woodard, the Respondent Union main- tains through counsel that the letter was never re- ceived." There is a presumption that mail correct- ly addressed, with' sufficient postage, is received. Under the circumstances, we find the presumption has not been rebutted. Charges filed against Woo- dard on 1 September allege he crossed the picket line on 29 August, and charges filed against him on 2 September apparently allege he crossed the picket line on 25 August.12 Since the offenses were 6 days and 2 days, respectively, from the posting of his letter, we will presume delivery occurred prior to the offense. Nahm Van Trinh sent his financial core letter by registered mail to the Union on 18 August. The postal service attempted delivery on 19 August and 29 August before returning the letter unclaimed. Trinh returned to work on 2 September. The union charges filed against him on 14 November allege the date of his offense only as September 1983. However, even assuming the offense was 2 Sep- tember, the first day he returned to work, there had already been two attempts to deliver his letter prior to that date. Thus, although John LaRose, Kenneth McCoy, Donald Austin, Robert Woodard, and Nahm Van Trinh made reasonable efforts to effectuate deliv- ery of their resignations, their efforts failed only 11 Woodard testified that Dan Taylor, local president, admitted to him in a telephone conversation on 26 August that the Union had received the letter. Taylor testified that he did not receive the Ietter. He admitted to two telephone conversations with Woodard but testified at one point that the letter was never mentioned and testified later that he could not remember if it was mentioned However, it is undisputed that Taylor does not have responsibility for the receipt of general correspondence Most mail directed to him concerns the processing of internal union charges. Those charged with receipt of general mail did not testify 12 The handwritten date on the charge itself appears to read "Out " Since Woodard returned to work on 24 August and the charge was filed on 2 September, it will be presumed that the misprinted word is August CARPENTERS LOCAL 470 (TACOMA BOATBUILDING) 517 because of the Boilermakers' course of conduct to avoid receipt. We therefore conclude that Boiler- makers is estopped from denying receipt, and the charges and fines levied against LaRose, McCoy, Austin, Woodard, and Trinh were effectively for postresignatidn conduct in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. REMEDY Having found that the Respondents have en- gaged in and are engaging in certain unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (b)(1)(A) of the Act, we shall order them to cease and desist therefrom. We shall order the Respondents to re- scind the unlawful charges , disciplinary actions, and fines, expunge all references to them from the Respondents' records, and notify each employee in writing of the rescission and expunction. We shall also order the Respondents to refund any moneys paid as a result of the fines imposed, plus interest as computed in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977). See generally Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). We shall also order the Respondents to post an appropriate notice to members. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Tacoma Boatbuilding Company is an employ- er engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. The Respondent Unions are labor organiza- tions within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By processing internal union charges, impos- ing and collecting fines against the below-named employees of Tacoma Boatbuilding Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership even though they continued to agree to tender dues and fees, all Respondent Unions have engaged in, and are engaging , in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Plumbers Local 82 Sang Won Park Kyoo Seung Lee Sheet Metal Workers Local 150 Joseph Okihara Gary L. Rowe Richard Meyer Roger E. Drake Carpenters Local 470 & Tacoma District Council Joseph R. J. DeRosier Kenneth McKeen Steven P. Nicholas Boilermakers Local 568 John LaRose Kenneth McCoy Donald Austin Robert Woodard Nahm Van Trinh Laborers' Local 252 Bernard A. Odanovich David Lockridge Painters Local 64 & District Council No. 5 Victor Resop Jr. Wayne D. Crump Bruce A. Putz Darwyn Stubblefield Pok Su Choe Kwan Cho Kim Robert Southern Harvey E. Woods Jr. Robert D. Derricott Alexander Ignacio Ted Kelly William L. Franklin Johnny W. Pierce Dan Munk 4. By processing internal union charges, impos- ing and collecting fines against the below-named employees of Tacoma Boatbuilding Company for activities in which they engaged while they were not members, Respondent Unions United Associa- tion of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumb- ing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local 82 and Sheet Metal Workers Union Local 150 have engaged in, and are engag- ing in, unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Plumbers Local 82 Edward Gonzales William H. Moore Jerry Sadowski John D. Long Robert Payne Sallie Raico Roxanne Stierle Carolyn K. Bergren Bruce B. McCluskey Jack Magerstaedt Tracy Magerstaedt Choon B. Lee Seung H. Kim Roy D. Holland Devin Freeman Michael McCluskey Sheet Metal Workers Local 150 Jasper O. Hickey Francisco Toves Bret J. Meyer 5. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 518 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ORDER The National Labor Relations Board orders that A. Respondents United Association of Journey- men and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, Local 82, and Sheet Metal Workers Union Local 150, their officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Processing internal union charges and impos- ing or collecting fines against employees of Tacoma Boatbuilding Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership even though they con- tinue to agree to tender dues and fees. (b) Processing internal union charges and impos- ing or collecting fines against employees of Tacoma Boatbuilding Company for activities in which they engaged while they were not members. (c) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Rescind all charges and fines imposed on Tacoma Boatbuilding Company employees for ac- tivities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership and refund to them the moneys they have paid as a result of the Respondents' imposition of such fines in the manner set forth in the Remedy section of the deci- sion. (b) Rescind all charges and fines imposed on Tacoma Boatbuilding employees for activities in which they engaged while they were not members and refund to them the moneys they have paid as a result of the Respondents' imposition of such fines in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the decision. (c) Expunge from the respective Unions' records all references to the unlawful charges and fines and notify each employee in writing that all charges and fines imposed against them have been rescind- ed and all records have been expunged. (d) Post at its business offices and meeting halls copies of the appropriate attached notice marked respectively "Appendices A and B."13 Copies of the notices, on forms provided by the Regional Di- rector for Region 19, after being signed by the Re- spondents' authorized representatives, shall be posted by the Respondents immediately upon re- ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in 13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " conspicuous places including all places where no- tices to members are customarily posted. Reasona- ble steps shall be taken by the Respondents to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Sign and return to the Regional Director suf- ficient copies of the notices for posting by Tacoma Boatbuilding Company, if willing, at all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. (f) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondents have taken to comply. B. Respondents Carpenters Local 470, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO and Tacoma District Council of Car- penters; International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades Local 64, AFL-CIO and Painters District Council No. 5; International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, Local 568, AFL-CIO; and Laborers' International Union of North America, Local No. 252, AFL-CIO, their officers, agents, and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Processing internal union charges and impos- ing or collecting fines against employees of Tacoma Boatbuilding Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership even though they con- tinue to agree to tender dues and fees. (b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Rescind all charges and fines imposed on Tacoma Boatbuilding Company employees for ac- tivities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership and refund to them the moneys they have paid as a result of the Respondents' imposition of such fines in the manner set forth in the remedy section of the deci- sion. (b) Expunge from the respective unions' records all references to the unlawful charges and fines and notify each employee in writing that all charges, and fines imposed against them have been rescind- ed and all records have been expunged. (c) Post at its business offices and meeting hall copies of the appropriate attached notices marked respectively "Appendices C through F." 14 Copies of the notices, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 19, after being signed by the Respondents' authorized representatives, shall be 14 See fn 13, above CARPENTERS LOCAL 470 (TACOMA BOATBUILDING) 519 posted by the Respondents immediately upon re- ceipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where no- tices to members are customarily posted. Reasona- ble steps shall be taken by the Respondents to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Sign and return to the Regional Director suf- ficient copies of the notices for posting by Tacoma Boatbuilding Company, if willing, at all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. (e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondents have taken to comply. APPENDIX A John D. Long Sallie Raico Jerry Sadowski Carolyn K. Bergren Robert Payne Devin Freeman William H. Moore Choon B. Lee WE WILL expunge all references to the unlawful charges and fines from our records. WE WILL notify each of the above-named indi- viduals in writing that all unlawful charges and fines have been rescinded and that all references to such have been expunged from our records. UNITED ASSOCIATION OF JOURNEY- MEN AND' APPRENTICES OF THE PLUMBING AND PIPE FITTING INDUS- TRY OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, LOCAL 82 NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT process internal union charges and impose or collect any fines against employees of Tacoma Boatbuilding Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership even though they con- tinue to agree to tender dues and fees. WE WILL NOT process internal union charges and impose or collect any fines against employees of Tacoma Boatbuilding Company for activities in which they engaged while they were not members. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner re- strain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL rescind all charges and fines imposed on the following employees of Tacoma Boatbuild- ing Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership and WE WILL refund any moneys they may have paid in such fines, plus interest: Sang Won Park Kyoo Seung Lee WE WILL rescind all charges and fines imposed on the following employees of Tacoma Boatbuild- ing Company for activities in which they engaged when they were not members and WE WILL refund any moneys they may have paid in such fines, plus interest: Edward Gonzales Roy D. Holland Seung H. Kim Tracy Magerstaedt Jack Magerstaedt Michael McCluskey Roxanne Stierle Bruce B. McCluskey APPENDIX B NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT process internal union charges and impose or collect any fines against employees of Tacoma Boatbuilding Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership even though they con- tinue to agree to tender dues and fees. WE WILL NOT process internal union charges and impose or collect any fines against employees of Tacoma Boatbuilding Company for activities in which they engaged while they were not members. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner re- strain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL rescind all charges and fines imposed on the following employees of Tacoma Boatbuild- ing Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership and WE WILL refund any moneys they may have paid in such fines, plus interest: Joseph Okihara Richard Meyer Gary L. Rowe Roger E. Drake WE WILL rescind all charges and fines imposed on the following employees of Tacoma Boatbuild- ing Company for activities in which they engaged when they were not members and WE WILL refund any moneys they may have paid in such fines, plus interest: Jasper O. Hickey Francisco Toves 520 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Bret J. Meyer WE WILL expunge all references to the unlawful charges and fines from our records. WE WILL notify each of the above-named indi- viduals in writing that all charges and fines have been rescinded and that all references to such have been expunged from our records. SHEET METAL WORKERS UNION LOCAL 150 APPENDIX C NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT process internal union charges and impose or collect any fines against employees of Tacoma Boatbuilding Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership even though they con- tinue to agree to tender dues and fees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner re- strain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL rescind all charges and fines imposed on the following employees of Tacoma Boatbuild- ing Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership and WE WILL refund any moneys they may have paid in such fines, plus interest: Joseph R. J. DeRosier Kenneth McKeen Steven P. Nicholas WE WILL expunge all references to the unlawful charges and fines from our records. WE WILL notify each of the above-named indi- viduals in writing that all charges and fines have been rescinded and that all references to such have been expunged from our records. CARPENTERS LOCAL 470, UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS & JOINERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO AND TACOMA DISTRICT COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS APPENDIX D NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT process internal union charges and impose or collect any fines against employees of Tacoma Boatbuilding Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership even though they con- tinue to agree to tender dues and fees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner re- strain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL rescind all charges and fines imposed on the following employees of Tacoma Boatbuild- ing Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership and WE WILL refund any moneys they may have paid in such fines, plus interest: David Lockridge Bernard A. Odanovich WE WILL expunge all references to the unlawful charges and fines from our, records. WE WILL notify each of the above-named indi- viduals in writing that all charges and fines have been rescinded and that all references to such have been expunged from our records. LABORERS' INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH AMERICA , LOCAL No. 252, AFL-CIO APPENDIX E NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT process internal union charges and impose or collect any fines against employees of Tacoma Boatbuilding Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership even though they con- tinue to agree to tender dues and fees. CARPENTERS LOCAL 470 (TACOMA BOATBUILDING) 521 WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner re- strain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL rescind all charges and fines imposed on the following employees of Tacoma Boatbuild- ing Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership and WE WILL refund any moneys they may have paid in such fines, plus interest: Victor Resop, Jr. Ted Kelly Kwan Cho Kim Robert D. Derricott Dan Munk Darwyn Stubblefield Wayne D. Crump William L. Franklin Robert Southern Alexander Ignacio Pok Su Choe Harvey E. Woods, Jr. Bruce A. Putz Johnny W. Pierce WE WILL expunge all references to the unlawful charges and fines from our records. WE WILL notify each of the above-named indi- viduals in writing that all charges and fines have been rescinded and that all references to such have been expunged from our records. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF PAINTERS AND ALLIED TRADES LOCAL 64, AFL-CIO AND PAINTERS DISTRICT COUNCIL No. 5 APPENDIX F NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT process internal union charges and impose or collect any fines against employees of Tacoma Boatbuilding Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership even though they con- tinue to agree to tender dues and fees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner re- strain or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL rescind all charges and fines imposed on the following employees of Tacoma Boatbuild- ing Company for activities in which they engaged subsequent to their resignation from full union membership and WE WILL refund any moneys they may have paid in such fines, plus interest: John LaRose Donald Austin Nahm Van Trinh Kenneth McCoy Robert Woodward WE WILL expunge all references to the unlawful charges and fines from our records. WE WILL notify each of the above-named indi- viduals in writing that all charges and fines have been rescinded and that all references to such have been expunged from our records. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF BOILERS, IRON SHIPBUILDERS, BLACKSMITHS, FORGERS AND HELP- ERS, LOCAL 568, AFL-CIO Melvin R. Kang and Eduardo Ecamilla, Esqs., for the General Counsel. David A. Rosenfeld, Esq., of San Francisco, California, for the Respondent Unions. Jerome F. McCarthy, Esq., of Tacoma, Washington, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE TIMOTHY D. NELSON, Administrative Law Judge. I heard these consolidated cases in trial at Tacoma, Wash- ington, on April 30 and May 1 1984. They arose from a lengthy series of separate timely unfair labor practice charges filed under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act) by Tacoma Boatbuilding Company (TBC) against the respective Unions named in the case caption (collectively, the Unions; respectively, by popular name and local number , e.g., Boilermakers 568). The charges were investigated by the Regional Direc- tor for Region 19 of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) who thereafter issued a series of separate com- plaints against each Respondent Union . The complaints were consolidated for purposes of hearing and decision by order of the Regional Director dated April 20, 1984. The complaints commonly allege in substance that the Unions unlawfully restrained and coerced employees of TBC within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by seeking to impose internal union discipline against those employees for strikebreaking under circumstances where those employees had previously "tendered .. . letters which changed their status from full constitutional membership to financial core membership." The Unions duly answered, denying all wrongdoing. All parties appeared at the trial through counsel and extensive stipulations of fact were reached thereafter, leaving for litigation only some marginal questions which I will not find it necessary to decide in the light of my recommended disposition. The parties filed posttrial briefs which I have carefully reviewed. THE ISSUES The greatest number of individual cases presented for decision involve employee-members who signed and ten- dered to their respective Unions a form letter, drafted by TBC, stating in pertinent part that each was "changing 522 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD my membership status from that of a `full' member to that of a `financial core' member", but which also stated, "I am not resigning from the union, I am only changing my membership status." The legally unique question common to all such cases is whether, in the circumstances, such letters may be treated in law as effectively severing the union member- ship tie of the signers, in order to insulate the signers from union discipline for their strikebreaking activities thereafter. For reasons elaborated below, I conclude that such letters did not clearly convey to the Unions the signers' unequivocal intention to resign and that the Unions therefore were free under established law to conduct dis- ciplinary proceedings and to impose disciplinary sanc- tions against the signers for strikebreaking. There is also a separate class of cases in which it was shown that Plumbers 82 and Sheet Metal workers 1 50 conducted disciplinary proceedings against persons who (as those Unions now acknowledge) were not "mem- bers" by any definitional yardstick at the times they en- gaged in the strikbreaking conduct which was the sub- ject of the disciplinary proceedings. In those cases, the question presented is quite conventional: Did such disci- plinary proceedings and actions against nonmembers vio- late Section 8(b)(1)(A)? Applying established principles, I conclude below that such actions were unlawful. From the admitted pleadings and the parties' stipula- tions and from the undisputed portions of the record I make these FINDINGS OF FACT 1. GENERAL BACKGROUND A. Business of the Employer TBC is a Washington corporation which manufactures and repairs boats and ships at its facility in Tacoma, Washington. i The Unions herein represent craft employ- ees of TBC. Those employees have been historically covered by successive multicraft, multiemployer, master labor agreements, the most recent of which expired on June 30, 1983.2 Between July 26 and October 3 the Unions conducted an economic strike against TBC and picketed its Tacoma facility. B. TBC Sends Information Packet to Employees, Some Employee/Members Tender TBC's "Financial Core" Letters to Their Unions On August 10, TBC sent a letter with enclosed packet of materials to all its striking employees, including to all employees involved herein. That packet of materials con- tains what amounts to legal advice to strikers about means by which they might return to work during the strike without being vulnerable to internal union disci- pline. The adequacy and legal accuracy of that advice is 1 In the representative 12-month period before these complaints issued TBC sold and shipped more than $50,000 worth of products or services directly to customers outside Washington or to Washington customers who themselves were engaged in interstate commerce other than indi- rectly 2 All dates hereafter are in 1983 unless otherwise specified. a collateral feature of this case, but it is apparent that employees involved herein relied upon TBC's explana- tion of their legal options by later sending (or attempting to send) to their respective Unions suitably tailored, signed copies of a specimen letter included in TBC's packet. I set forth below the pertinent "advice" passages from TBC's covering letter and from its enclosed document captioned "Answers to Employee Questions."3 There are two ways a union member who chooses to work behind a picket line can avoid the possibility of being fined by his union. The FIRST way is to resign from membership in the union. Such a resignation must be uncondi- tional. Once such a resignation is received by a union, the union loses all power to fine the former member for subsequently crossing a picket line. The bad part about resigning from a union during a strike is that if the strike is finally settled with an agreement requiring membership in the union as a condition of employment, the union may require a new initiation fee from a resigned member. Additionally, there are some questions about the circumstances under which a union may refuse to accept a resignation. We have asked our legal counsel to review the Constitu- tions and By-laws of each of the local unions who are members of the Metal Trades Council. A SECOND way a member can avoid the possi- bility of being fined, and to avoid any penalty or reprisals is to change your membership status. If you change your membership status from that of a "full" member to that of a "financial core" member, your union loses all power over your ac- tions and cannot subsequently fine you for cross- ing a picket line. As a "financial core" member, you must offer to pay all dues and fees normally required, thereby meeting all "financial" obliga- tions to the union. BUT, you are then free to reject the union's authority to regulate your con- duct and you may work without future threat to your job, your seniority or any of your other ac- crued benefits. If you desire to change your membership status to avoid the possibility of being fined, your notice indicating your change of status MUST be delivered to the union either personally or by certified mail, return receipt requested. Remem- ber, your change in status is not effective until actu- ally received by the union. The union is therefore, empowered to fine you for any actions you may take before your letter is received You should understand that changing your status from a "full" member to a "financial core" member could result in the union's refusing to allow you to be involved in any internal union 3 All emphasis below is in original text CARPENTERS LOCAL 470 (TACOMA BOATBUILDING) matters, such a voting on contract offers, voting for union officers, etc. The change, however, would have absolutely NO effect, now or in the future on any terms or conditions of employment you would have while working for Tacoma Boat or any other employer, unionized or not. Wages, pensions, dues, health and welfare programs, must be the same for all, regardless of member- ship status. Moreover, your union can not take any reprisals against you here at TBC or anywhere else because of that decision. Your freedom to choose is protected by the National Labor Relations Act. The legal validity of this action is reflected in a recent legal case in Seattle which is summarized in the enclosed article from the Seattle Times. Should you, yourself, choose to exercise this option, a letter such as the one enclosed will pro- vide you this right to work. Again, we do not direct or recommend that anyone abandon the strike, return to work, resign from the union, or change the form of his or her membership. This is a personal decision that you, and any other free American in similar circum- stances, must elect for themselves in a strike situ- ation. We will respect whatever decisions you make under these difficult circumstances, and these trying economic times. We have also enclosed answers to questions that have been asked by some of you. We have also tried to cover areas we think might be of value to you. Please continue to call our "Tacoma Boat" hotline to receive, on a daily basis, the latest strike information. It is a toll free call (1- 800-633-7515). If you have personal inquiries, we will try to answer your specific questions, if you call our Personnel Office (206-572-3600, ext. 208). It is important for you to know what your rights are and how they can be exercised. If you have any questions about the information provided above, you can call the Personnel Department or, if you'd prefer to talk to a neutral party, call the National Labor Relations Board in Seattle. The NLRB's telephone number is 442-4532. Sincerely, TACOMA BOATBUILDING CO. B. James Lowe President [From "Answers to Employee Questions"] 4. Will I be fined if I cross the picket line and return to work? Yes, if you are a "full" union member. Union Constitutions, By-laws, and Working Rules give them the right to fine members who break their rules. One of their rules prohibits working behind a picket line. Those fines are collectible and have been upheld by the courts. 523 5. Can I avoid union fines or discipline and be free to work behind a picket line? Yes. There is a way to avoid the possibility of fines. A union cannot fine a member who has effec- tively changed from a "full" membership to a "fi- nancial core" membership before crossing a picket line if, before crossing the picket line, you write a letter to your union (and they have received it) stat- ing that you no longer desire to be a "full" union member; instead, you choose to be a "financial core" member' and you are willing to continue to make any dues, and fees payments uniformly re- quired by the union. Having made this change in membership status, you may not later be fined by the union having crossed a picket line. You thereby retain the option to exercise your personal choice concerning whether to work or not work without fear of being subjected to the possibility of fines. Moreover, since you have retained your member- ship, you cannot later be required to pay a new ini- tiation fee or back dues if the strike is concluded with an agreement with the Metal Trades Council which requires membership in a union as a condi- tion of employment. The only drawback to "finan- cial core" membership is that in all probability the union will not allow you to vote on any contract proposals or to have a vote in other internal union affairs. Remember, your letter must actually be re- ceived by your union before it's effective. 6. Can the union suspend me if I become a "finan- cial core" member? No. 7. Will I lose any of the benefits that I have accrued as an employee of TBC by changing my member- ship to "financial core"? No. Neither the employer nor the union may dis- criminate against you in any manner because you choose "financial core" membership over full mem- bership. You are entitled to the same pension, health and welfare, seniority, etc. as you would be entitled to as a full member. 8. Could the union at a later time blackball me or prevent me from getting employment elsewhere if I became a 'financial core" member? No. It is illegal for a union to discriminate against you in referrals to other employers just as it is ille- gal for an employer to discriminate against you be- cause of your union membership. 9. Why do 'financial core" members have to continue to pay dues? In order to avoid the possibility of having to pay a new initiation fee at a later time. 10. May I withdraw from the union and avoid being fined for crossing the picket line? 524 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Generally, no. A union may lawfully refuse to issue a withdrawal card to a member during a labor dispute. Moreover, the By-laws and Constitutions of many unions provide that a withdrawal card termi- nates in the event a withdrawn member crosses a picket line. Yes, however, you might at a later time have to pay a new initiation fee if ultimately the strike is con- cluded with an agreement requiring membership in the union as a condition of employment. this is the text of the specimen letter enclosed in TBC's packet: Name of your Union Address City State Zip GENTLEMEN: I am an employee of Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. in Tacoma, Washington. This letter will serve as noti- fication that I am changing my membership status in (name and number of local) from that of a "full" member to that of a "financial core" member. As a "financial core" member, I will con- tinue to pay to the union all initiation fees and dues uniformly required of all members for maintaining membership. I am not resigning from the union, I am only changing my membership status. I will not, henceforth, be subject to any obligations of mem- bership other than that of paying uniformly re- quired dues and initiation fees required of all (name of union) members. Thereafter, a total of 49 employees submitted (or tried to submit) letters to their respective Unions containing text identical to that contained in TBC's specimen. They then returned to work at TBC. The parties stipulated that the 25 employees named below were union members when they sent their letters and that their respective Union received their letters: Plumbers 82 Sang Won Park Kyoo Seung Lee Carpenters 470/Carpenters Distr. Council Joseph R. J. DeRosier Kenneth McKeen Steven P. Nicholas Laborers 252 Bernd A. Odanovich David Lockridge Sheet Metal 150 Joseph Okihara Gary L. Rowe Richard Meyer Roger E. Drake Painters 64/Painters Distr. Council Victor Resop, Jr. Wayne D. Crump Bruce A. Putz Darwyn Stubblefield Pok Su Choe Kwan Cho Kim Robert Southern Harvey E. Woods, Jr. Robert D. Derricott Alexander Ignacio Ted Kelly William L. Franklin Johnny W. Pierce Dan Munk The parties stipulated that these additional five em- ployees were members of Boilermakers 568, but there was dispute whether their letters were received by that union:4 John LaRose Ken McCoy Donald Austin Robert Woodard Nam Van Trinh In addition, the parties stipulated that an additional 19 employees submitted such letters to the Union identified below, but that those employees were not members of those employees were not members of the Unions when the letters were mailed. Plumbers 82 Edward Gonzales William H. Moore Jerry Sadowski John D. Long Robert Payne Sallie Raico Roxanne Stierle Michael McCluskey Bruce B. McCluskey Jack Magerstaedt Tracy Magerstaedt Choon B. Lee Seung H. Kim Roy D. Holland Devin Freeman Carolyn K. Bergren Sheet Metal Wkrs. 150 Jasper O. Hickey Bret J. Meyer Francisco Toves The parties stipulated that internal union charges for strikebreaking were filed and processed against the 19 4 Inasmuch as I conclude that their letters, like the others, were inef- fective as a means of communicating an intention to resign, I do not decide the litigated question whether Boilermakers 568 "received" those letters or whether, in the circumstances, that union is stopped from deny- ing that there was such receipt CARPENTERS LOCAL 470 (TACOMA BOATBUILDING) latter-named nonmembers, in some cases resulting in the imposition of disciplinary fines. I set aside consideration of those cases for the time being and focus next solely on the efficacy for immunity-from-discipline purposes of the letters signed by these 30 employees first named above who were union members. II. ANALYSIS; CONCLUSIONS OF LAW A. Introduction; General Legal Setting Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act outlaws a union's "re-, straints or coercion" of employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Section 7 guar- antees, inter alia, the right of employees to "refrain" from union-supportive activities "except to the extent that such right may be affected by a ["union shop" agreement] as authorized in Section 8(a)(3)." The proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) states, however, that "[t]his para- graph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein." There is a tension between the affirmative proscrip- tions in Section 8(b)(1)(A) against union restraint and co- ercion of employees in the exercise of protected rights and the rights retained by a union, as reflected in the above-quoted proviso, to make and enforce internal rules binding on its membership. Thus, when a union imposes a fine against a member who works for an employer against whom the union has called a lawful strike, such disciplinary action, however coercive of an employee/member's right under Section 7 to "refrain from" activities supportive of the union, does not violate Section 8(b)(l)(A). Rather, it falls within the ambit of permissible union actions vis-a-vis its members under the proviso. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 195 (1967). Following the reasoning of Allis-Chalmers, the Court later established in Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 430 (1969), the general rule that: Section 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no policy Congress has im- bedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule. Consistent with the rule in Scofield, the Court has held that when an employhee has resigned membership in a union before violating its internal rule, the union no longer retains the privilege under the proviso to impose disipline for breach of the rule. Therefore, postresigna- tion strikebreakers are immune from union discipline and the union's attempts to impose discipline in such cases violates Section 8(b)(1)(A). NLRB v. Granite State Joint Board, Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213, 217 (1972). See also Booster Lodge 405 Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84, 88 (1973). It is thus clear-and no one contends otherwise herein-that so long as an employee has resigned his union membership, he is immune from discipline for any breach thereafter of the union's internal rules; and that so 525 long as an employee retains his membership status, he is vulnerable to internal discipline for such breaches. The principal question at issue herein is thus not what rights and/or vulnerabilities to discipline are possessed by a member or a nonmember rather, the question is whether by the tender of the specimen letter prepared by TBC, the employee/members now in question effectively "resigned" their memberships. Of course, a simple answer to that question is that the employees in question did not "resign," for their letters contain exactly that statement; i.e., "I am not resigning from the union I am only changing my membership status." But that answer-at least at this stage-would be overly facile; for to appreciate the full significance of these letters to the question whether the signer thereby immunized him- self from the union dicipline requires some understanding of the notion of the "financial core" concept of "mem- bership" as it has arisen under Section (a)(3) of the Act. B. The Legal Notion of "Membership "'for 8(a)(3) Purposes as Entailing No More Than a "Financial Core" Relationship With a Union The notion of a "financial core" relationship5 between an employee and his exclusive union representative stems from the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1962). There, against the employer's contention that the union's agency shop proposal, which did not require union membership, was not a mandatory subject of bar- gaining, the Court noted that (id. at 742): ... the 1947 amendments not only abolish the closed shop but also made significant alterations in the meaning of "membership" for the purposes of union-security contracts. Under the second proviso to Section 8(a)(3), the burdens of membership upon which employment may be conditioned are express- ly limited to the payment of initiation fees and monthly dues. It is permissible to condition employ- ment upon membership, but membership, insofar as it has significance to employment rights, may in turn be conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues. "Membership" as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core. It is important to recognize that the General Motors Court, in its reference to "financial core" status, was not thereby purporting to engraft onto union constitutions some new definition of "membership," a definitional matter which the above-quoted proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) expressly reserves to unions in the manage- ment of their internal affairs. Rather, the Court merely defined the limits on the definition of "membership" as that term is used in the "union security" proviso to Sec- tion 8(a)(3) of the Act. Thus, the Court noted a declared congressional purpose that "expulsion from a union 5 Consistent with the view expressed below that such expressions as "financial core member" are productive of legal confusion, I will use the terms financial core "relationship" to refer to the legally enforceable con- nection which an employee subject to a union-security clause must main- tain with his bargaining agent 526 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD cannot be a ground of compulsory discharge if the worker is not delinquent in paying his initiation fee or dues' (373 U.S. at 741, citing legislative history) and rea- soned (id. at 743): If an employee in a union shop unit refuses to re- spect any union-imposed obligations other than the duty to pay dues and fees, and membership in the union is therefore denied or terminated, the condi- tion of "membership" for Section 8(a)(3) purposes is nevertheless satisfied and the employee may not be discharged for nonmembership even though he is not a formal member. [emphasis added.] The foregoing passages thus make abundantly clear that the Court envisioned the that an employee having a "financial core" relationship with a union need not be a "member" of the union order to be immune from dis charge under a union-security clause. Indeed, the Court plainly viewed such "financial core" status as having nothing to do with "formal" union membership. Under- stood this way, it should therefore be equally clear that the expression "financial core member" involves an in- herent confusion of concepts. For it is essential to the notion of "financial core" status as the General Motors Court used that term that such status will not literally in- volve "membership" in the union.° The foregoing is not intended to suggest that the ex- pression "financial core membership" is utterly without utility. It is harmless enough as a shorthand expression for use in Section 8(b)(2)/(8)(a)(3) cases involving alleg- edly wrongful applications of union-security clauses.' And it was in that shorthand sense that the Board re- ferred to the "now recognized distinction between full membership and financial core members" in the Section 8(b)(2)/8(a)(3) case of Hershey Foods Corp., 207 NLRB 879 (1973).8 In sum, the notion of "financial core membership" is in reality a notion which presumes the lack of actual mem- bership in a union.9 And, as I discuss next, while the 9 It bears recalling here that the Court pointedly used quotation marks in referring to "`membership' , whittled down to its financial core," in the first passage quoted above r TBC claims on brief that "The terms 'full member' or 'full member- ship,' and 'financial core membership' or 'financial core member' have been the subject of much litigation through the years and are terms of common usage with a settled meaning, at least to those involved with labor relations on an on-going basis " I do not adopt this statement Indeed , for all the reasons discussed herein, I would take issue with any claim that such terminology has a "settled meaning" for purposes of deal- ing with union discipline cases under Sec 8(b)(1)(A) And neither the General Counsel nor the Charging Party has called to my attention any cases ansmg under that section of the Act in which the Board has used the legally inartful phrase "financial core membership" to describe the status of an employee who may properly claim immunity from union dis- cipline. (Cf The Board's use of that expression in Hershey Foods is dis- cussed next in main text ) To that extent, therefore, TBC's quoted state- ment is not so much a reflection of settled law as it is a begging of one of the main questions at issue herein a Hershey, supra, involved an employee, Brewer, who had unequivocal- ly resigned his membership, but who thereafter complied with all "finan- cial core" obligations The only question there was whether, under a union-security clause , the union could insist on Brewer's acquisition of formal membership The Board held that the union could not do so 9 Despite the General Counsel's regular use of the expression "financial core member" throughout his brief, the General Counsel appears to rec- ognize that, in fact, an employee occupying financial core status will not phrase may be harmless and merely inartful when em- ployed in cases raising 8(a)(3) union-security proviso issues, it becomes positively productive of confusion when it is uncritically adapted for use as a means of es- caping union discipline, especially so when it is used in conjunction with the statement "I am not resigning from the union." C. The Efficacy of the "Financial Core" Letters as a Means of Escaping Union Discipline It is no longer open to doubt that the right of a union to impose internal discipline upon its members, memori- alized by the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A), derives from the "contract" between the member and his union, a contract which itself derives from the presumption that, when a employee becomes a union member, he thereby voluntarily binds himself to its internal rules. Allis- Chalmer, supra, 388 U.S. at 182, and authorities cited. See also, e.g., NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 75-76 (1973). It is, therefore, the fact of their union member- ship which is the critical nexus enabling a union to impose internal discipline on employees who breach union rules. And it is equally clear-virtually definition- ally so-that there must be a severance of that member- ship tie for an employee to become immune from such discipline. Consistent with this, as noted in the introductory sec- tion herein, the Board and the courts have regularly held that resignation from membership is the device by which an employee may escape union discipline. E.g., Scofield, supra, 394 U.S. at 430 ("Section 8(b)(1) leaves a union free to enforce a . . . rule . . . against members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule"). See also, e.g., Buckley v. Television Artists AFTRA, 496 F.2d 305, 313 (2d Cir. 1974). ("The union .. . acknowledges that Buckley and Evans can avoid any other [internal] sanc- tions which the union might seek to impose on them by resigning from 'full-fledged membership while continuing to pay dues."' (Id. at fn. 5) and "appellees' right to con- tinued media employment will not be endangered should they seek to crystallize their conflict with the union by resigning from full-fleged union membership." (Id. at fn. 6.) The complaining parties have not called to my atten- tion any authority for the proposition that an employee may unilaterally put limits on his contract of membership in a union while at the same time enjoying statutory im- munity from discipline for breach of the union's rules. This is hardly surprising, for it would be anomalous, indeed, for a party to a contract of membership in an as- sociation to be legally entitled to declare himself a "member" for some purposes, in order to retain certain presumed benefits which flow therefrom, but that he will not be a "member" insofar as that membership may re- quire him to comply with the association's rules against misconduct. be a union member Thus, during this trial, one of the General Counsel's trial lawyers used the expression "financial core payor" in referring to such employees Explaining this phraseology , counsel stated "I'm not going to call them members because they're not members " CARPENTERS LOCAL 470 (TACOMA BOATBUILDING) With all the foregoing in mind, I conclude that the let- ters drafted by TBC and used by employee/members herein were ineffective for purposes of immunizing them- selves from further union discipline. Indeed, viewed against the background of TBC's legal advice in its infor- mation packet, it is plain, despite the General Counsel's contrary assertion, that the employee/members who signed the "financial core" letters were effectively seek- ing thereby both to have their cake and eat it. For they chose an "option" suggested by TBC which was calcu- lated to preserve certain benefits which they presumable would obtain if they maintained actual membership, and they ignored the other, outright resignation, "option" which TBC suggested to them which would clearly have the effect of immunizing them from discipline, but only at the presumed expense of creating a later obligation to pay initiation fees.' o Resignation from membership is thus the means by which immunity from further union dicipline is achieved. And such a severance of the membership tie may be ac- complished only by the member's "clearly conveying to the union his unequivocal intent to resign." Machinists Districts 99 and 2139 (General Electric), 194 NLRB 938 (1972).11 In the cited General Electric case, employee Neveux told his union agent that he was "thinking of getting out of the union" and that he "wanted to stop the dues being taken out of my pay." Neveux later wrote a letter to General Electric canceling his prior dues-check- off authorization and mailed a copy to the union. These statements and actions were deemed by the Board to be "insufficient to put Respondents on notice of Neveux's 10 On this record one could only speculate about what legal reasoning underlay TBC's advice that employees occupying the self-labeled status of "financial core members" might avoid paying a later initiation fee whereas employees who had simply "resigned" their membership might be vulnerable to discharge if they failed to pay such a fee TBC had not attempted in its brief to defend these presumed distinctions nor any other feature of its reasoning in this regard . Neither would it matter to the out- come whether TBC's reasoning were correct, or defectively incomplete, or simply fundamentally erroneous For the proper focus here is on the adequacy of the "financial core" letters themselves as "notice" to the Unions of an intent to resign-a matter which is unaffected by the pri- vate legal judgments of the letter -draftsipen. In any case, TBC's assump- tions about the future union-security implications of "resignation" v "fi- nancial core membership" status are not before me to judge. For these reasons, I will not embark herein on an exploration of the legally com- plex and purely hypothetical 8(a)(3) questions implicated by TBC's sug- gestions to its striking employees It deserves recording, however, in the light of the Court's reasoning in General Motors, that it would be difficult for a union lawfully to demand as a condition of employment that one group of employees pay a new initiation fee, while waiving that demand for the other group, where the sole feature distinguishing them was that one group had resigned their membership and the other group had merely declared themselves to have "changed" their "membership" to that of "financial core" status while declaring simultaneously that they were not "resigning." For, in such an instance, the difference in treat- ment could only derive from the "membership" tie to the union held by the latter group-a feature which the General Motors Court clearly held may not be the governing consideration in applying a union-security clause. And if a contrary view underlay TBC's reasoning in suggesting that employees pursue the financial core "options ," I would reject it as unprecedented and unsound. i i To similar effect see Distillery Workers Local 80 (Capitol-Husting Co.), 235 NLRB 1264, 1265 (1978) ("An employee may communicate his resignation from membership in any feasible way and no particular form or method is required so long as he clearly indicates that he no longer wishes to remain a member" (emphasis added), citing Potters Local 340 (Macomb Pottery), 175 NLRB 756, 760 fn. 14 (1969). 527 intention to resign." Id. at 938. Significantly, the Board there drew a distinction between Neveux's "subjective intent to resign" (which the board found to be "ampl[y] support[ed] in the record") and the inadequacy of his at- tempt to convey that intent to the union. Ibid. Accord- ingly, it does not ultimately matter what subjective inten- tions may have been held by the signers of the TBC- drafted letters. 12 Applying the foregoing general considerations and the particular tests set forth by the Board for determining the efficacy of purported resignations from a union causes nie to conclude that the TBC-drafted letters signed by the member/employees did not "clearly" and "unequivocally" convey the critical resignation message. They were thus insufficient to provide the Unions with reasonable notice of the signers' intentions to resign from membership. Of central significance to this conclusion, of course, is the fact that, whatever other message may have been contained therein, those letters contained the statement: "I am not resigning from the union, I am only changing my membership status." Thus, even if the remaining statements of a desire to "change" to a supposed "finan- cial core member" status were construable, standing alone, as a desire to achieve that status of actual non- membership about which the Court spoke in General Motors, the additional declaration, "I am not resigning, necessarily rendered hopelessly equivocal the overall' message conveyed to the Unions. i 3 The General Counsel argues additionally, in substance; (a) that the Unions "did not present any relevant evi- dence that they were in doubt" about the meaning of the letters in question; and (b) that even if the Unions enter- tained a "sincere" doubt on this score, they had some "duty" to take affirmative steps to inquire about the sign- er's intentions before conducting disciplinary proceed- ings. I reject each position. Concerning point (a), it is sufficient to observe that the burden is not on the Unions to show that they did not, in fact, subjectively understand what it was the letter sign- ers were attempting; rather, the proper focus is on whether the letters were clear and unequivocal in con- veying a "resignation" message. General Electric, supra; Capitol-Husting, supra. And where, as here, the letters themselves were facially equivocal on that very point, the Unions had no duty to come forward during the trial to prove affirmatively that they did not "understand" the message. 14 iz The record herein reflects some attempts by all counsel to extract from some of the letter signers statements about their subjective inten- tions. I place no ultimate reliance on any such testimony The proper focus under such cases as General Electric, supra, is clearly on the reason- ableness of the "notice to the union, and not on the private intentions of the parties who gave such notice." 11 I therefore do not determine herein whether the letters would have been adequate for resignation-notice purposes if they had merely confined themselves to statements that the signers wished to be treated as "finan- cial core members " For it is the added ingredient of the statement "I am not resigning" which influences my recommended result. 14 It is thus incidental and of no significance one way or another that the trial record shows that Carpenters District Council did, in fact, write to one such letter signer, DeRosier, stating that it was "uncertain at this point whether you wish to be a member of the union or not," and re- questing that DeRosier "advise us by return mail of your position." 528 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Concerning point (b), that the unions were under some "duty" to inquire further before imposing discipline against such letter signers for later strikebreaking, the General Counsel clearly reaches beyond the precedents. Thus, the General Counsel cites as the only authority for this proposition Teamsters Local 610 (Browning-Ferris In- dustries), 264 NLRB 886, 900-902 (1982). The cited por- tion of that case is inapposite, however, for it did not in- volve a supposed "duty to inquire" on a union's part where it was unsure of the putative resigner 's intentions. Rather, that case involved unmistakable communications to the union that the member wished to resign, but which communications failed to conform to the union's constitutional restrictions on the right to resign. And it was in that context that the Board sustained the judge's view that "once the Union's receipt of a nonconforming resignation letter showed that the employee wanted to resign but was unaware of the governing constitutional requirements, that resignation was effective unless the Union took reasonably prompt steps to tell the employee about the constitutional restrictions on resignation." 264 NLRB at 901. But this is not a case, like Browning-Ferris, involving questions about the legal impact of plain resig- nations which fail to conform to union constitutional lim- itations on the right to resign. This case involves the question whether the letters themselves communicated a desire to resign on the signers ' part. And Browning-Ferris did not disturb the established Board doctrine set forth in, e.g., General Electric, supra, that a purported resigna- tion must be clearly and unequivocally communicated in order to be effective. 15 D. The Legality of the Disciplinary Action Taken by Plumbers 82 and Sheet Metal Workers 150 Against the 19 Nonmembers As found above, Plumbers 82 processed internal charges for strikebreaking against 14 employees, and Sheet Metal Workers 150 processed such charges against 3 employees, under circumstances when the charged em- ployees were admittedly nonmembers of those organiza- tions at relevant times. I conclude, consistent with the discussion of general principles in the introductory por- tion of this section , that such actions violated Section 8(b)(1)(A). In summary , a union is without power to dis- cipline nonmembers for breaches of union rules while they were nonmembers, there being lacking the critical contract of membership from which arises the union's right under the 8(bx1)(A) proviso to impose such disci- pline. I deal below with two lingering defensive conten- tions made by Plumbers 82 and Sheet Metal Workers 150. 15 Neither does a supposed union's "duty to inquire" when it receives an equivocal communication from a would-be resigner derive from the more general "duty of fair representation" which an exclusive bargaining representative owes to employees in the represented unit Cf Miranda Fuel Co., 144 NLRB 181 (1962), enf. denied 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir 1963) By its terms, that duty only applies to unions acting in their "representa- tive" capacity, i e, when acting on "matters affecting [unit employees'] employment," 140 NLRB at 185 Here, however, we are not dealing with the Unions' acting in any "representative" capacity to affect employees' employment, Rather, we are dealing only with the Unions' purely "inter- nal" actions, actions, which are not subject to the "fair representation" standard The principal defense raised by those Unions is clearly specious and involves an obvious exercise in circular rea- soning. Thus, they seize on the allegation in the com- plaint that those unions sought in some cases to impose "court-collectible" fines against such nonmembers and argue, correctly, that any such fines would not be "court-collectible" because the unions admittedly were without legal power to impose them in the first instance. This argument relies at bottom on the ultra vires charac- ter of the fines as the basis for a claim that they were not unlawful under Section 8(b)(1)(A). Since these unions' arguments are unsupported by any citation to precedent, I regard them as being merely coy and not deserving of extensive discussion. It suffices to point out that those unions have given undue emphasis to the "court-collect- ible" language in the complaint and have ignored the more fundamental reason discipline against nonmembers violates Section 8(b)(1)(A); namely, that such discipline (whether or not ultimately enforceable in court) neces- sarily tends to "restrain or coerce employees" in the ex- ercise of Section 7-protected rights-most notably, the right to "refrain from" union-supportive activities, a right which is limited only to the extent that the employ- ee himself voluntarily enters into a contract of member- ship which limits his exercise of those rights, or who takes employment in settings governed by a lawful union-security clause. The unions also argue that "where no discipline is im- posed, but charges are preferred and processed, there is no violation of the Act." At my request, the parties briefed the question whether the mere "processing" of charges implicates Section 8(b)(1)(A) to the same extent that the actual imposition of discipline does. The General Counsel has persuaded me that the authorities do not readily admit of such a distinction, at least where the person initiating the charge is a union officer or agent. See, e.g., Oil Workers Local 6-578 (Gordy's Inc.), 238 NLRB 1227, 1231 (1978), enfd. 619 F.2d 708 (8th Cir. 1980).16 It is true, however, that in many instances herein the parties initiating charges against the nonmembers were not union agents and, arguably, a distinction might prop- erly be made on that ground alone; for, at least in some circumstances, a union could not know until it has "processed" the internal charge to some point whether the facts were sufficient to permit it under law to impose discipline. These, however, are questions for another case. For here, the relevant facts bearing on whether or not the unions could properly pursue the internal charges did not require "outside" investigation, nor the conduct- ing of trial proceedings. Rather, the fact of the nonmem- bership of the 19 employees in question was the disposi- tive fact dictating that the internal charges must be dis- missed and that fact was either known to the unions' offi- cers or was readily knowable by a simple review of the 16 Compare, e g, Musicians (Don Glasser), 165 NLRB 789, 800-801 (1967) (mere processing of charges under union constitution no violation of Sec 8(b)(2), upheld in pertinent part sub nom. Glasser Y NLRB, 395 F.2d 401, 404-405 (2d Cir 1968)); but see Electrical Workers IBEW Local 11 (Bergelectric Corp.), 271 NLRB 25 (1984) (rejecting application of Glasser rationale in the peculiar circumstances) CARPENTERS LOCAL 470 (TACOMA BOATBUILDING) unions' membership rolls. The charges were nevertheless allowed by those unions to remain outstanding and they continued to be processed (including, in many instances to the point of imposition of disciplinary fines) long beyond the point at which the unions should have recog- nized that they, lacked threshold jurisdiction over the 19 employees in question.17 Accordingly, I conclude that the two unions in ques- tion violated Section 8(b)(l)(A) by their continued proc- essing of charges against the 19 nonmembers in question (and by their imposition in many cases of disciplinary action pursuant to the charges). And I shall recommend that those respondents be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take appropriate affirmative action, in- cluding canceling all disciplinary action taken , expunging from their records all records of proceedings against those nonmembers, notifying those nonmembers in writ- ing that it has taken such curative actions, and posting appropriate remedial notices. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. TBC is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Each of the Unions named in the case caption are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The Board's jurisdiction is properly invoked herein because each of the said Unions was shown to have taken complained-of actions against employees employed by TBC, thus implicating the operations of an employer engaged in commerce. 4. Inasmuch as the below-named employee/members of the Unions failed to give clear and unequivocal notice of resignation to their respective unions, those Unions did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, as alleged, by processing internal union charges and/or taking disci- plinary action against them for their having admittedly engaged in strikebreaking: Plumbers 82 Sang Won Park Kyoo Seung Le Carpenters 470/Carpenters Distr. Council Joseph R. J. DeRosier Kenneth McKeen Steven P. Nicholas 11 In the case of Plumbers 82, internal charges were filed against the 16 nonmembers on various dates in August. Notice of the filing of those charges was later sent by that union to each of the nonmembers in Octo- ber, and that union actually imposed disciplinary fines against seven of the nonmembers on dates ranging between October and February of the following year In the case of Sheet Metal Workers 150, the three non- members were charged on various dates between August 25 and Septem- ber 14 and that union was still processing those charges (by the issuance of "notice" letters) between October 1$ and November 2, although none of the charges resulted in the imposition of disciplinary fines or other penalties. Laborers 252 Bernd A. Odanovich David Lockridge Sheet Metal 150 Joseph Okihara Gary L, Rowe Richard Meyer Roger E. Drake Painters 64/Painters District Council Victor Resop, Jr. Wayne D. Crump Bruce A. Putz Darwyn Stubblefield Pok Su Choe Kwan Cho Kim Robert Southern Harvey E. Woods, Jr. Robert D. Derricott Alexander Ignacio Ted Kelly William L. Franklin Johnny W. Pierce Dan Munk 529 5. Inasmuch as Plumbers 82 and Sheet Metal Workers 150 conducted proceedings on internal union charges and/or took disciplinary action against the employees named below for those employees' actions done when they were not union members, those unions have en- gaged in and are engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act: Plumbers 82 Edward Gonzales William H. Moore Jerry Sadowski John D. Long Robert Payne Sallie Raico Roxanne Stierle Michael McCluskey Bruce B. McCluskey Jack Magerstaedt Tracy Magerstaedt Choon B. Lee Seung H. Kim Roy D. Holland Devin Freeman Carolyn K. Bergren Sheet Metal Workers 150 Jasper O. Hickey Bret J. Meyer Francisco Toves [Recommended Order omitted from publication.]