Southwire Co.

SOUTHWIRE CO. 377 Southwire Company and United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. Cases 10-CA-19815-1, et al. and 10-CA-19650 12 November 1985 DECISION AND ORDER BY MEMBERS DENNIS, JOHANSEN, AND BABSON On 24 April 1985 Administrative Law Judge Karl H. Buschmann issued the attached decision. The Respondent and the General Counsel each filed exceptions and a supporting brief; the Re- spondent filed a reply brief.' The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in, this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings,2 findings,2 and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. We agree with the judge's findings that the Re- spondent violated the Act and with his dismissal of certain allegations. We want, however, to clarify two of his findings. 1. The judge found that the Respondent unlaw- fully threatened employees in speeches and notices stating that union authorization cards might be dis- closed to it and admonishing employees not to sign cards unless they knew what it would mean to them, their families, and their fellow employees. In adopting the judge's finding, we emphasize that the violation flows from the context in which the Re- spondent made the statements. The speeches and notices were made against the general background of the Respondent's history of violating the Act and in the immediate context of the pervasive vio- lations in this case, particularly those directed at open union adherents,4 including coercive interro- gations, unlawful threats, and unlawful discharges and other retaliatory discipline. In context, the Re- spondent's comments are a "rather pointed hint" that it would, on learning their identity, similarly retaliate against employees who signed cards. See J R Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 676, 686 (4th Cir. 1980), enfg. 245 NLRB 198, 216-217 (1979). In these circumstances, the Respondent's explanation that it was merely informing employees of the rele- vant law is simply artifice. 2. The judge found that the Respondent did not unlawfully issue Jackie Dennis a written warning. The General Counsel filed exceptions. Although Dennis was an open union adherent and although the Respondent may have welcomed the chance to discipline him, we agree with the judge that the Respondent would have warned Dennis even in the absence of union activity. Dennis had been absent several times in the past year and had been orally warned. Dennis was absent again on 13 Oc- tober 1983. The next day the Respondent gave him a written warning stating that he had been absent 11 times in the past 9 months and that additional absence would result in suspension. The judge found that the Respondent has shown that it would have disciplined Dennis generally for excessive ab- senteeism. We agree. Accordingly, the complaint allegation should be dismissed. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980). The General Counsel has not shown that Dennis was subject to disparate treat- ment. To the contrary, the Respondent has shown that the written warning was a reasonable step in progressive discipline for Dennis' absenteeism. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Southwire Company, Carrolton, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. Walter Bowman and Ann Leslie Unger, Esqs ., for the Gen- eral Counsel. Walter O. Lambeth Jr. and Charles A. Perry, Esqs. (Elar- bee, Thompson & Trapnell), of Atlanta, Georgia, for the Respondent. Robert S. Sarason, Esq. and Roger Bradley, Intl. Rep., of Riverdale, Georgia, for the Charging Party. i The Respondent has requested oral argument. The request is denied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues and the positions of the parties 2 The Respondent contends that the judge's conduct at the hearing and his decision are tainted by the judge's bias and prejudice We reject the contention as unsupported 3 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge's credibility find- ings The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F 2d 362 (3d Cir 1951) We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings 4 Many of the violations were against employees who wore badges supporting the Union DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE KARL H. BUSCHMANN, Administrative Law Judge. These cases were tried at Carrolton, Georgia, from I May to 4 May 1984, and from 15 May to 17 May 1984. The charges, as amended, were filed by the United Steel- workers of America, AFL-CIO (the Union) on various dates between 7 October and 8 December 1983. The General Counsel issued a complaint on 29 November 1983, an amended consolidated complaint on 31 January 1984, and a second amended consolidated complaint on 277 NLRB No. 43 378 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 21 March 1984. The second amended complaint con- tained fewer allegations than the amended complaint be- cause of the General Counsel's decision to institute con- tempt proceedings in the United States court of appeals. A portion of the omitted allegations appeared in the record in this proceeding only where necessary to indi- cate relevant background information. The primary issues are whether the Respondent, Southwire Company, had violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). On the entire record, including my observation of the demeanor of the witnesses, and after consideration of the briefs filed by the General Counsel and the Company, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT The Respondent, Southwire Company, is a Georgia corporation with an office and place of business located in Carrolton, Georgia, where it is engaged in the manu- facture, sale, and distribution of wire, cable, and related products. The Company, which employs a total of about 1500 production and maintenance employees, is admit- tedly an employer within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. Southwire has a history of past violations of the Act. As outlined in the General Counsel's brief, the most recent involvement was the discharge of Jerry L. McColley Jr., who was also a witness in the present case. See Southwire Co., 268 NLRB 726 (1984).1 The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. It commenced an organiza- tional campaign in the spring and summer of 1983. The peak period of employees' involvement in the campaign was September through December 1983, when employ- ees wore union buttons and solicited fellow employees for the Union. During that period, the Respondent stands accused of having engaged in unlawful interrogations of its employ- ees, of threatening them with loss of jobs or other repris- als because of their union activities, and surveillance of their union activities, all in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In addition, the Respondent is alleged to have engaged in discriminatory conduct toward its employees when it discharged employees Danny Ray Rowell, David Huckeba, Randall Hanson, and Arlice Smith and when it suspended employees Phillip Bell, Michael Runels, Clifford Herring, and Buford Amburgey. Certain work restrictions and a warning to employee Jackie Dennis are also challenged as discriminatory because of the employees' union activities. Independent 8(a)(1) Conduct Surveillance. Former employee Jerry McColley testi- fied that Rudy Pilney, director of corporate labor rela- tions, observed several employees on 7 October 1983 as they passed out union literature at the gate leading to the plant. Pilney walked initially past the employees to one of the plant's buildings and then stood behind a large plate glass window conversing with someone. During a time period of about 15 minutes Pilney watched the em- ployees and their union activity. In such circumstances as these, where the employees are conducting their activities in the open and on or near company premises, the Board has decided that surveil- lance is not unlawful. Porta Systems Co., 238 NLRB 192 (1978). Any allegation of unlawful sureveillance in the complaint should therefore be dismissed. Interrogations. Plant Superintendent Carl Jones stopped employee Tommy Jarrell as he was leaving his depart- ment on his way to the laboratory in June 1983. Jones asked him if it was true what he heard. Jarrell answered that he did not know. Jones then asked, how strong the Union was, and again Jarrell answered that he did not know. Jones also approached Jarrell in late September in the plant's T-wire department. Jones, upon seeing Jarrell wearing the union "volunteer organizer" badge inquired, "Just where do you think [the badge] is going to get you." Jarrell answered, "maybe a little respect."2 In late September or early October, Jarrell was at his work station in the T-wire department, when Operations Manager John Norman approached him and said that he did not want to agitate him but he could not understand why he put on a union badge, that they had been through some tough times before and he did not think that management was all that bad. Similarly, employee Gene Bass recalled that Norman walked up to him and asked why he was wearing that button and further asked what gripe he had against Southwire. Jarrell had a discussion on 11 October with Plant Manger Jim Blevins who had came to him at his ma- chine. Blevin asked Jarrell whether he had seen the other list of grievances. Jarrell did not know what Ble- vins had referred to and answered in the negative. Ble- vins then stated: "Well there is a few more names on it." He then looked at Jarrell's union badge and asked, what did he think his union badge would get him. Jarrell testi- fied that the conversation continued as follows (Tr. 594): He was getting angry. He tried to get me to tell him, he said just name one thing, just one thing what I thought the bagde was going to get me and I told him maybe a little respect, and he told me, he said, "Well, if you are not for me and Southwire, you are on the other side of the fence." And then he asked me again about the charges and I told him I didn't know, and then he said, and now this is his words as best as I can recall, he said, "Well, it really doesn't matter. I don't give a damn if there is 22 or 110 charges." ' Other adjudicated cases included Southwire Co, 133 NLRB 83 (1961), enfd 313 F 2d 638 (5th Cir 1963), Southwere Co., 145 NLRB 1329 (1964), enfd as modified 352 F 2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965), Southwire Co., 159 NLRB 394 (1966), enfd in part 383 F 2d 235 (5th Cu 1967); Southwire Co, 164 NLRB 1018 (1967), enfd. 393 F 2d 106 (5th Cu 1968); Southwtre Co, 181 NLRB 549 (1970); NLRB v. Southwtre Co., 429 F 2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1970), cert denied 401 U S 939 Then there were the conversations on 14 October be- tween Jackie Dennis and his supervisor Larry Perkins. 2 I found Jarrell's testimony credible because of his earnest and forth- right manner of testifying. Furthermore, he carefully kept a notebook and recorded most of these incidents SOUTHWIRE CO 379 Perkins had just denied Dennis' request for a vacation day for the previous day when Dennis called in to report car problems. At that time Perkins inquired what his badge or the Union could do for him. On 13 October Supervisor Steve Murphy requested Randall Hanson to see him. Murphy said, "What is this I have been hearing about you being for the Union? . . . It is all over the plant that you are for the Union, did you sign a Union card?" When Murphy threatened that he might have to inform his own boss, Pat Hannon, Hanson became defensive and suggested to Murphy "Well, why not tell him I am undecided?" The conversation contin- ued during which Murphy interrogated Hanson with ad- ditional questions such as: "Besides, what do you hope to gain from a Union? .. . Besides, what makes you think that this Company will deal with the Union?" The record contains additional but less significant in- stances of interrogations, the descriptions of which would only be redundant. For the record shows that, in at least some instances, the Respondent has stepped beyond the lawful boundaries of lawful and casual ques- tioning concerning union sympathies, and where the Re- spondent interrogated its employees in a coercive and threatening atmosphere. This occurred, for example, during the conversation on 13 October between Supervi- sor Murphy and Randall Hanson. It also occurred on 11 October 1984 when Plant Manager Blevins interrogated employee Tommy Jarrell. These conversations were not casual or conducted in a friendly atmosphere. To the contrary, the record shows that Blevins' questioning was associated with a show of anger, while Murphy's interro- gation was accompanied by threats and expressions of fear. Respondent, therefore, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Rossmore House, 269 NLRB 1176 (1984). Threats. In October 1983 employee Eddie Cantrell talked about the Union with Supervisor Carl North. North told him that Vice President Wayne McAmis and Superintendent Danny Carden were looking through Phillip Bell's records to see whether they could find a reason for which to fire Bell, a known union supporter. In another instance, on 12 October employee Randall Hanson and Supervisor Jerry Stapler had a conversation in the quality control laboratory. They discusssed a newspaper article which dealt with the Union. Stapler, discussing the consequences of a Union at Southwire, said to the employees (Tr. 91): "Your wages would drop to minimum wage, you have no benefits and no insur- ance . . . everything would have to be negotiated in a contract . . . . There is no guarantee that you will get back what you already have." During a conversation on 13 October between Super- visor Murphy and employee Hanson, Murphy expressed several threats. After telling Hanson that it was all over the plant that Hanson was for the Union, and following a discussion whether Southwire was financially able to provide wage increases, Murphy said, inter alia (Tr. 94- 8): "Besides, what makes you think that this Company will deal with a Union? . , . They may shut down, fire everyone who goes on strike and hire new people." During a followup conversation on the same day, Murphy expressed fear for his own job if the Union came to Southwire. He also stated his apprehension about damage to his car or injury to his family if it came to a strike and his obligation to cross a picket line. In that context, Murphy said that if the plant were union- ized, there would be some reorganizing and that Han- son's job as a crew chief might be eliminated. During a continuation of their conversation about an hour later, Murphy said (Tr. 97): "Randy, you have nothing to gain and everything to lose being for the Union . . . . Well, you are a Crew Chief and you are in line for a supervi- sor's job some day . . . . If you signed a union card and it is all over the plant that you did, you will probably never be promoted and you will have a long hard road ahead of you." About 15 November, Supervisor James Walker dis- cussed the Union with employees Gilber Iverson and Walter Allen in the lift ship. Allen did not recall how the conversation began, but he recalled that Walker said, "If you all get me in trouble with this damn union stuff, if you ever came out to the club out yonder, your ass is going to be raw meat." Walker made reference to a club not related to Respondent where he worked as a bounc- er. Allen, however, indicated in his testimony that he did not take this remark seriously and that the employees laughed when Walker made this statement. Not all of the above threats made by various supervisors were made in jest or with a casual intent. Numerous threats were intended to be taken seriously and clearly intended to interfere with the employees' rights to engage in protected activities. Threats made by the Respondent that the employees would lose their jobs, that the plant would close, that promotions would be denied, or that benefits would be lost if the Union came to Southwire are examples of unlawful threats. Respond- ent thereby engaged in unlawful conduct in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The allegation in the complaint that the Respondent prohibited the employees from engaging in union activi- ties in nonworking areas during their nonworking time is supported by the record. However, the prohibition was in effect for only a few hours until clarified by a higher official. Respondent admits in its brief (p. 93) that Bobby Jarrell mistakenly told William Riggins that handbilling was prohibited in certain areas. However, Riggins ob- tained a clarification of the restrictions from Jarrell's su- pervisor, John Norman, who, in effect, told Riggins that he could not do anything about the handbilhng by em- ployees as along as it was done on their own time and in a nonworking area. In view of the clarification, I would dismiss this allegation in the complaint. Finally, the com- plaint's allegation that Respondent threatened its employ- ees that their signatures on union cards would become known to the Respondent is supported by a notice posted on the Company's bulletin boards. (G.C. Exh. 17.) For practical purposes, the notices state that union cards may become public under certain circumstances and that employees be careful when they signed these cards. The subject matter of those posters was farther discussed in speeches made by Supervisors Jim Blevins and R L. Huey. (G.C. Exh. 3.) It must be recognized that even lit- eral language taken from a court's decision, if quoted out of context, may convey an erroneous message or even an 380 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD unlawful threat. Specifically, the employees were in- formed inter alia as follows (G.C. Exh. 7): It is said that when you sign no one other than a union Representative or a representative of the NLRB will ever see this card. This is not the truth. In many instances, the signed card is disclosed to the company by the union, the NLRB, or both of them. Be careful about what you sign. Don't sign anything unless you know what you are signing, and what it might mean to you, your family or your fellow employees. In the context of Respondent's other unlawful labor practices, the statement carried the obvious implication that harm or retaliation would result from disclosure of the identity of the card signers to Respondent. As the Fifth Circuit has stated: There is "no reason for inform- ing employees that they might be required to testify in open court other than to let them know that the names of union adherents could be ascertained and appropriate reprisals taken," NLRB v. Finesilver Mfg. Co., 400 F.2d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1968); Lundy Packing Co., 223 NLRB 139 (1976). I must conclude that the Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. The Discharges David Huckeba. In late September during the height of the union campaign, employee David Huckeba came to work wearing a Steelworkers' "Volunteer Organizer" badge. He had also attended several union meetings. Ap- proximately 1 week later, on 22 September 1983, the Re- spondent discharged Huckeba under circumstances which indicate disparate treatment of the employees. David Huckeba was assigned to the Cooper Refinery Department. Huckeba had been employed for 3 years and had been classified as a "tradesman B" electrician in the last 1-1/2 years of his employment. Approximately 3 weeks prior to his discharge, Huckeba had asked his su- pervisor Henry Jaillet for a promotion to tradesman A electrician. Jaillet's words: "He did very well on his work." (Tr. 990.) On 20 September 1983, Huckeba asked his supervisor Jaillet whether he would be promoted. Jaillet told him that his request for a promotion had been denied. When asked for the reason, Jaillet had no expla- nation but only shrugged his shoulders and with his head motioned towards the office of Department Manager Tony Hyde. In spite of Jaillet's recommendation for a raise, Hyde had made the decision not to promote Huck- eba. This news upset Huckeba. He told Jaillet that he had gone as far as he could with the Company, and that he was clocking out to look for another job and did not care if he put him down for being sick or leaving. Jaillet asked him whether he would be back on Friday, his next scheduled workday. Huckeba replied that he would be back bright and early on his next workday. Huckeba re- turned on Friday for his normal workday and was promptly summoned to the office of Tony Hyde. He in- formed Huckeba that he was terminated for having left his assigned work station. Hyde added that Huckeba had done well at his job and that he might be rehired after he had established a good working record with another' company. The Respondent submits that it had no choice but to terminate Huckeba for his second major rule infraction' within 1 year. Huckeba was disciplined 9 months earlier and received a week's suspension for damaging company property in violation of a company rule and was warned that a major rule violation would result in his discharge. (R. Exh. 1.) At first blush, the Respondent's position is plausible; Huckeba was simply discharged for his infraction of a company rule. However, the record contains several in- stances which show that the Respondent had considered an employee's act of leaving his job considerably less se- rious in comparable or worse situations and that, prior to the union campaign, the Company had not discharged an employee for such an offense. For example, the record shows that several employees , including Keith Webb and Tony Richardson, left their jobs without permission and without telling anyone, and that they received no more than an oral reprimand. There was also employee Terry Wayne Daniel who testified that he left his job without permission from Supervisor Carl North. On the follow- ing day he received a verbal warning and was told that only a repetition of such conduct would result in his ter- mination. Two years earlier, employee Daniel Bowe left his job without permission and received an oral repri- mand. In short, the record contains no instance where an employee had ever been terminated for having left his work station without permission. To be sure, the record does not show whether any of these employees had a prior record of discipline which, as in the case of Huck- eba, had warned that a future major infraction of compa- ny policy would result in the termination of the employ- ee. Considering, however, that the circumstances which prompted Huckeba to leave to his work were attributa- ble to the Respondent's refusal to follow through on its earlier promise to promote him, it is clear that his con- duct was not that of an irresponsible employee who simply abandoned his work. Moreover, Huckeba may not have received permission to leave, but he did notify his employer of his intentions to leave which is consider- ably less serious than simply abandoning his work station without telling anyone. Moreover, considering the miti- gating circumstances of his leaving, the Respondent was unusually severe in its treatment of Huckeba. It showed disparate treatment by the Respondent of a well-regard- ed and highly skilled employee. Huckeba was a prominent union supporter on 'his shift in the Cooper Refinery Department who attended union meetings and prominently wore a union badge. He began wearing the union badge about 1 week prior to his dis- charge. Although Jaillet,denied that the union badge had anything to do with the Company's decision not to pro- mote him, the timing of that decision suggests otherwise. The General Counsel contends , therefore, that the Company used Huckeba's conduct as a pretext to rid itself of a prominent union adherent in that department. To be sure, the record is not overwhelming as to any direct nexus between the employee's union activity and his discharge, but considering the Respondent's unex- SOUTHWIRE CO. 381 plained denial of a promised promotion , the timing of the discharge, and the disparate 1 reatment of Huckeba for his unexcused leave, all point to the inference that his open union support was the real reason for the Respondent's action. Considering further that the record in this case convincingly establishes other violations of Section 8(a)(3) and (1), it is clear that the Respondent's union animus, established by other evidence before me, is an additional and crucial factor for consideration in this context. Huckeba's wearing of the union button shortly before the Company's decision not to promote him set into motion the sequence of events which ultimately lead to his discharge. I find the Respondent 's explanation for Huckeba's discharge difficult to accept , for Huckeba was considered such a valued employee that Supervisor Hyde even offered to reinstate him after a year. Had the Respondent kept its promise to promote him, the inci- dent would not have occurred. The General Counsel had established that, without union consideration, the Re- spondent would not have discharged Huckeba following his unexcused leaving of his work station. Under ordi- nary circumstances , the Respondent would have treated this employee consistent with its treatment of the other employees who had simply abandoned their work sta- tions without any mitigating factors by issuing him no more than a verbal warning. Considering the issue from every corner, I must conclude that the Respondent un- lawfully discriminated against this employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Danny Ray Rowell. On 28 November 1983, the Re- spondent discharged Danny Ray Rowell, a production operator on the second shift assigned to the drawing and stranding department. Rowell had attended union meet- ings as early as May 1983 . In late September, he began to wear a union "Volunteer Organizer" badge. When the Respondent discharged this employee in November, 1 month after he had regularly worn that union button, Rowell had worked for Southwire for 6 years and 8 months without having incurred any disciplinary warn- ing. The circumstances of his discharge clearly show the Respondent's discrimination against this employee. The events leading up to the discharge occurred on the weekend of 26 and 27 November when Rowell was scheduled to work 12 hours each day from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. On Saturday, 26 November, Rowell asked Gerald Rooks, his department manager whether he could leave early. Rooks denied the request. Rowell subsequently asked Duma Morris, his shift supervisor, for permission to leave because his machine had become inoperable. Morris denied his request. Rowell worked the entire shift. On Sunday, 27 November, Rowell asked for permis- sion to leave at 3 p.m. in order for him to repair his truck. Rowell first asked Duna Morris, his supervisor on the 7 a.m. to 3 p.m. shift, and explained the reasons for his request. Morris gave no response . Fellow employee Kenneth Yates overheard Rowell's request for leave and corroborated Morris' failure to respond. Rowell com- menced to clean up around his machine shortly prior to 3 p.m. Morris who came by to pick up the tags, ob- served Rowell getting ready to leave. Prior to clocking out at 3 p.m., Rowell also informed Carl North, the on- coming shift supervisor, that he wanted to leave early and explained the reasons for his request . Indeed, Morris had already informed North of Rowell's leave request. Yet Supervisor North had no reaction to Rowell's re- marks.3 Morris proceeded to punch out and North ob- served Rowell leaving the plant.4 When Rowell reported for work on Monday, 28 No- vember, Gerald Rooks, department manger, called him into his office, explained that he had to terminate Rowell because he had left his job without permission. The Respondent relies on a memorandum circulated to the shift supervisors on 17 November 1983, which ad- monished them that operators scheduled for the 12-hour shift "have to work it unless one of the [the] supervisors let them off' and that the employees "could be fired for abandoning the job without being properly relieved." (R. Exh. 4.) The Respondent argues that Rowell was proper- ly discharged because he had left his job without getting permission from his supervisors. Because Rowell had been an active and highly visible union supporter, the General Counsel argues that the Re- spondent's conduct toward Rowell was discriminatory and motivated by union animus. A fair appraisal of the record evidence supports the General Counsel's position. Rowell had received no prior disciplinary warnings of' any kind. Management regarded him as an excellent em- ployee. His only violation, even assuming the Respond- ent's version of the scenario, was to leave his job at the conclusion of the 8-hour shift but prior to his scheduled 12-hour shift without obtaining express permission from his supervisors . The warning, circulated to the employ- ees on 17 November, did not mandate automatic dis- charge when employees abandoned their work. The record shows that under similar circumstances , Respond- ent had never discharged an employee in the past.5 As discussed supra, employees Keith Webb, Tony Richard- son, Terry Wayne Daniel, and James McGee! had left their jobs without obtaining permission , indeed, without informing their respective supervisors . Yet they received no more than a verbal warning. Taking into consider- ation the efforts which Rowell undertook to obtain per- mission, not only from his shift supervisor Morris, but also from his supervisor Carl North, it is clear that the Respondent's conduct was discriminatory. Not only should Rowell have safely assumed that he had permis- sion, after he carefully explained the reasons for his re- quest and had approached both of his immediate supervi- sors, but he certainly would have had implied permission under circumstances where both supervisors intentionally or carelessly had avoided giving an express and clear re- sponse. Significantly, Rowell had experienced no prob- lem on the preceding day when he requested permission to leave early . At that time the same supervisor had no 9 Rowell and fellow employee Yates testified that North acknowl- edged Rowell's request. But the General Counsel and the Respondent agree that North said nothing. 4 Although North conceded that he saw Rowell leaving , he testified that he assumed Rowell was merely going to the snackbar. Considering that Rowell had just informed him that he was about to leave, North's testimony is not persuasive on this point s As already discussed , only Huckeba was terminated for similar con- duct 382 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD difficulty expressing his unequivocal denial of Rowell's request. And Rowell, like a responsible employee, had complied with management's orders. The inference to be drawn is clear, the Respondent either created this equiv- ocal situation or used it as a pretext to retaliate against a union supporter. The Respondent's explanation that Rowell simply left his work without obtaining permis- sion and therefore had to be discharged is not persuasive. Rowell's union support began with his attendance of union meetings in early May and in the first or second week of September. In late September, Rowell started to wear a union badge regularly until his discharge on 28 November. Moreover, one day in June after Rowell had returned from a union meeting, he casually asked Super- visor North about a pay raise. According to Rowell, North replied: "Well, that just all depends on how strong the Union is. Southwire has people at the Union. They know the names of everyone who attends the meetings." The General Counsel has shown that Rowell was dis- charged because of his open union support. Absent any union consideration, the Respondent would have given Rowell at most a verbal warning, even assuming that he had left without permission. Under these circumstances, including the Respondent's proven union animus, I have no difficulty in finding that the Respondent's discharge of Rowell was motivated by pretextual reasons in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Arlice Smith. Smith had worked as fleet attendant and trailer repairman in the traffic department for 5 years. His discharge on 28 September 1983 for violating a com- pany rule which prohibited the employees from soliciting in work areas during working time was the Company's only example of enforcement of that rule. (R. Exh. 17, p. 66.) Violation of this rule was regarded as an "intoler- able" offense. Intolerable offenses are those which "en- dager life or limb, property or which severely interfere with normal work flow." These violations "may justify immediate discharge on the first offense." According to the Respondent, the "work rules provided for a balanc- ing test to determine the type of discipline." (R. Br. 54.) The record shows that Smith had briefly solicited a fellow employee, Travis George, for the Union. According to the .Respondent, Smith violated this rule on 27 September. But, according to his own testimony, Smith was not sure how he had violated the rule. He tes- tified that he had returned from a 2-week vacation on 26 September and reported for work at 6:45 a.m. and for the first time wore a union badge to work. He had at- tended the union meeting on the preceding Thursday. He was the only employee in his department who wore the union badge. He felt nervous and observed that his su- pervisor, Tony Richardson, followed him everywhere to see what he was doing. On the following day he had a heated discussion with a fellow employee, Clarence Holi- day, about the Union and about 1:30 p.m. he was told by his foreman, Wilburn Smith, that he had complaints about him. In Smith's office, Arlice Smith was told that he had harassed other employees and held them up from their work. After reciting the rule dealing with solicita- tion on company premises, Smith was terminated. Super- visor Smith refused to disclose to him the name of the employee who was harassed or any other details. Smith apparently thought that his supervisors made reference to his discussion with employee Holliday. But the Respondent produced employee Travis George as a witness who testified about an encounter with Smith on 27 September about 10 a.m. George, a truckdriver, had just finished a trip and walked by Smith's truck to get further instructions. Smith, who was standing on top of a ladder working on his truck, asked George to come closer. At that point Smith showed George his union badge and said "that he was joining forces with the union, and he wanted to know if [George] was interested." Smith also told him to sign a union card if he were interested. George went to Byron Spruill, his dispatcher, to report the conversation. He subsequently reported the matter to Wilburn Smith, his supervisor, who told him to report it to Frank Jones, vice president and director of transportation. George re- peated his story in the presence of Jones and Rudy Pilney, the Respondent's industrial relations manager. George prepared a written report which carefully and in great detail summarized the incident. (R. Exh. 18.) At the behest of Jones, Supervisor Smith then discharged Arlice Smith about 3 p.m. According to the Respondent, the termination of Arlice Smith was simply based on his "intolerable" of- fense of "Company Rule Nine." The General Counsel, on the other hand, submits that the Respondent had failed to enforce its no-solicitation rule in the past and the Company's sudden and strict enforcement of, the rules as applied to employee Smith was discriminatory and based on union considerations. In this regard the General Counsel points to numerous instances in the record where employees engaged in soliciting activities without receiving any discipline. For example, employee Jerry Ragsdale testified that he had bought several raffle tickets for a Remington rifle on 7 November 1983 in the machine shop from a fellow em- ployee. Although he bought the ticket during his break- time, the employee who solicited his purchase had ap- proached him during their working times. In October 1983, an employee solicited Ragsdale during working time to purchase a raffle ticket for a chainsaw. On an- other occasion, also during working time, another em- ployee solicited him for the purchase of a color televi- sion set. In November, Ragsdale was solicited and pur- chased a raffle ticket in the welding room during work- ing time to raise money for a high school homecoming queen. In each of these instances, Ragsdale produced, and the record contains, the actual raffle tickets which he had purchased. Ragsdale further testified about an employee named Keith, widely known as the "knifeman," who during working time solicited fellow employees and sold and traded knives. The knifeman worked directly for Rudy Pilney, the Respondent's director of corporate labor rela- tions. Another employee, Phillip King, testified that he had observed employee Gary Walker selling Girl Scout cookies to the employees during working time in early SOUTHWIRE CO. 383 1984. He testified that supervisors were aware of this ac- tivity and that Lonnie Laminack, a supervisor in quality control, was approached by Walker and purchased cook- ies during his working time.6 King also observed em- ployee Stanley Almand selling raffle tickets for a bag of groceries during work time, Employee Daniel Bowe testified about a meeting called by Supervisor Buster Hale during working time to discuss what the employees would bring to a Christmas party. Several days thereafter, the employees took up a collection among themselves during working time to purchase presents intended for their supervisors. In addi- tion, employee Eddie Bonner solicited employees to pur- chase raffle tickets for the church. Arlice Smith recalled that employee Chester Mitchell solicited money during working time for Supervisor Tab Richardson when his house had burned and that other collections of money took place for the burials of former employees, including Chester Pinkerton. In none of these instances of solicitation were the em- ployees disciplined in any way. The record also contains the testimony of several employees, including Supervisor Donald Terrill, that the employees, were not restricted from conversing among each other during working time. No one was ever disciplined-except for the instances specifically described herein-for having engaged in idle conversation during working time. The Respondent dismisses these examples of rule nine violations as charitable collections which were innocuous or noninterfering and which were largely unknown to management. The Respondent may be correct to a degree that management had not been aware of the extent of that activity or that many of those cited inci- dents had a salutary purpose. What is striking, however, is that the record reveals that the Respondent had made no effort to enforce rule nine in any way, even though management knew of it and participated in it. The record is devoid of any examples where the Respondent ever disciplined an employee for rule nine infractions in spite of an apparent widespread practice of solicitation for the sale of raffle tickets and other items. Moreover, the Re- spondent freely permitted employees to converse with each other during working time. The Respondent's sudden concern with Smith's union solicitation demon- strates a discriminatory attitude towards an employee who had been a valued worker for 5 years with an un- blemished record until, on 26 September, he appeared with a union badge. During the 2 days when he, as the only employee in his department, openly displayed his union insignia, he felt watched and observed. The record clearly shows that Smith's discharge was the direct result of his union activity, including his display of the union badge and his solicitation of a fellow employee for the Union. Resorting to rule nine in its discipline of Smith in the face of a general failure to enforce that rule in other violations was discriminatory and pretextual. Having considered all of the surrounding circumstanecs in this 6 Lammack's testimony that he was on his lunchbreak when he made the purchase does not dispute the evidence that supervisors, including Laminack, were aware that employees solicited during working time incident, it is clear that the Respondent's discharge of Smith violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Randall Hanson. On 20 October 1983, the Respondent terminated the employment of Randall Keith Hanson, who had been employed for 7 years. I-le had been a crew chief in the insulation department for approximately 2- 1/2 years. Tired of being harassed and upset about being reassigned to another job as a result of his support for the Union, Hanson gave his supervisor 2 weeks' notice of his resignation during the morning of 17 October 1983. In the evening of the same day, Hanson changed his mind and decided to withdraw it. However, the Compa- ny denied his request and permitted him to work for only 3 days before separating him from employment. The events leading up to Hanson's employment sever- ance began on 12 October with a conversation between him and Jerry Stapler, quality control supervisor, at 4:30 a.m. in the quality control lab where Hanson orally de- fended the Union. Several employees and Jerry Stapler discussed a newspaper article about the Union. As re- called by Hanson,? Stapler told him to read the newspa- per article and then said: "Do you know what would happen if the Union were to come in'? ... Your wages would drop to minimum wage, you have no benefits and no insurance . . . . Everything would have to be negoti- ated in a contract . . . . There is no guarantee that you will get back what you already have." Hanson replied, "Well, I don't believe that the United Steelworkers of America would negotiate a contract that settles for less than the employees already had." There was further dis- cussion about the advantages and disadvantages of a union at Southwire and another remark by Hanson in de- fense of the Union. On the following day, 13 October, Supervisor Steve Murphy engaged Hanson in a conversation about the Union. According to Hanson, Murphy stated: "What is this I have been hearing about you being for the Union? .. . It is all over the plant that you are for the Union, did you sign a Union card?" When Hanson replied that he did not have to answer such a question, Murphy con- tinued, "Well it is all over the plant that you did sign one and that is what I will have to tell my boss Pat Hannon . . . . Besides, what do you hope to gain from a union?" Hanson replied, "More money, better benefits, retirement and job security." Murphy, after discussing the economics of selling wire in the market place, con- cluded the conversation stating: "Besides what makes you think that this company will deal with the Union? . .. They may shut down, fire everyone who goes on strike and hire new people." Murphy approached Hanson about 30 minutes later to resume his conversation about the Union. He expressed fear of losing his job if the Union came into Southwire and his reluctance to cross a picket line for fear of damage to his car on injury to his family. Murphy said further that a Union at Southwire would mean reorga- 7 Hanson's testimony, which was only partially disputed! by other wit- nesses, was credible, forthright, and clear It was also supported by his detailed, written notes which were produced during the trial. I have credited his testimony in its entirety 384 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD nizing and the possibility of doing away with the job of crew chief. Early the next day, Murphy again began a discussion about the Union, telling Hanson that he had nothing to gain from a Union, that he would risk a promition to a supervisor's position and that he would have a difficult future at Southwire. Operations Manager John Norman who passed by Hanson at the close of the shift remarked: "I guess I am the only one here that hasn 't signed a Union card." On the following day, 15 October, Murphy contacted Hanson several times to tell him that supervisors intend- ed to meet with him. Those meetings, however, did not occur. Instead, Hanson was assigned to operating a ma- chine which he, as a crew chief, would normally only have operated on a temporary basis. Murphy also stated that certain supervisors had lost confidence in him and thought of him as a union organiz- er. Hanson was assigned to the machine operation also on the second day. Again Murphy told him several times that certain supervisors wanted to talk to him. Finally, after certain remarks were made by supervisors that an area under Hanson's machine was not properly cleaned, Hanson, during his testimony, recalled the following (Tr. 108): At this point, I was upset because I had been thinking about what was going on, what was going on to me. I had been taken off my job, placed in somebody else's job and told that if I had signed a Union card that I would probably never be promot- ed and that I would have a hard road ahead of me, and at this point, rather than talk to Pat Hannon I clocked out and told Steve Murphy who was stand- ing at the time clock that he had my two weeks notice. Hanson, however, returned to work for his evening shift on the same day and informed Supervisor Murphy that he had been upset and that he intended to withdraw his resignation. Murphy suggested that he so inform De- partment Head Pat Hannon. Murphy also said that they had put him on a machine to immobilize him and to keep him from moving around the building. At the end of his shift, Hanson saw Hannon to tell him that he had with- drawn his resignation . Hannon replied : "We didn't put you on the machine to punish you for being for the Union ... . We put you on the machine so that we could train a reserve of operators . ... Now then, if you have a religious belief or if you are for the Union, you should back that one hundred percent . . . . There is no middle ground here . . . . I expect my employees to be loyal to me and to Southwire one hundred percent .... As for as your resignation is concerned, we have already accepted it." Hanson was given until the following day to leave the Company. Hanson made a last effort to see higher-up of- ficials to explain that he wanted to withdraw his resigna- tion, but Plant Manager Blevins denied the request and stated that his only option at this point would be to fill out an application for employment. On his last day of employment Hanson wore a volun- teer union organizer badge . As Supervisor Murphy es- corted Hanson out of the plant, Murphy stated that "the worst thing that [Hanson] could have done was to wear a Union badge in .. . that it destroyed all of the confi- dence that he had in [him]." In short, the record shows that Hanson, a well-regard- ed employee for 7 years with a possibility of a future as a supervisor, was not allowed to withdrawn his oral notice to quit made on the same day. The Respondent simply stated that Hanson's notice had been accepted and his position filled by someone else. The Respondent's treat- ment of Hanson in this regard is not in accord with the Employer's past practice. The record shows that South- wire in the past had permitted other employees, who had given notice and actually left the employ to return. For example, employee Keith Webb resigned his job and left the employ of the Respondent. After several days, Webb was permitted to return to work because, in the words of Plant Superintendent Danny Carden, "We told him that we would take him back because we do prefer or do need experienced operators ." (Tr. 1149.) Similarly, em- ployee Keith Johnson had given notice of resigning to move to Florida, yet he was permitted to change his mind and remained in the Respondent 's employ. Another example was employee Charles Perry who gave notice in the spring of 1983 that he would be leaving Southwire after 2 weeks. When Perry changed his mind, his job had already been filled. Nevertheless, Perry was merely transferred to a different shift and was able to continue his employment with the Respondent. The Respondent's policy was explained by Inspection Manager Lonnie La- minack, who explained that even though an employee's job may have been filled by someone else, that employee would be given an opening elsewhere in the same de- partment. The Respondent was unable to show why it refused Hanson's attempt to withdraw his rash decision to resign. Indeed, the record is undisputed that machine operators with Hanson's skills were in demand and that the Re- spondent had difficulty filling those jobs. The Respond- ent's explanation was simply that Hanson had resigned and his job had been filled. This explanation is at odds with the Respondent's past practice and rational business judgment. It can be explained only by the Respondent's desire to be rid of another union supporter. This episode is buttressed by and consistent with the testimony of another crew chief, Larry Harper. He care- fully explained in his testimony that he had worn a union badge and served as a witness for another union support- er. Consequently, he, like Hanson, was promptly reas- signed from the duties of a crew chief to those of a ma- chine operator. While the Respondent attempted to show that the normal duties of a crew chief included the oper- ation of a machine and that in at least one case a crew chief operated a machine for as long as 2 weeks, the record nevertheless clearly established that such assign- ments were unusual and rarely, if ever, made. In the present situation, the evidence shows that Hanson's as- signment to the machine was not prompted by an emer- gency or other compelling reasons. As already stated, SOUTHWIRE CO the Respondent intended to restrict -him from moving around making contact with fellow employees. On the basis of the foregoing, the Respondent commit- ted several independent violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and, by its discriminatory reassignment of Hanson and his discharge, the Respondent violated Sec- tion 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Hanson's conversation with Steve Murphy on 13 October involved Murphy's initial accusation that it was all over the plant that Hanson was for the Union. Murphy interrogated Hanson whether he had signed a union card and what he thought he would gain from the Union. Contrary to the Re- spondent's suggestion, this was not a casual remark, but a thorough and deliberate conversation in which Murphy unlawfully interrogated this employee in violation of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. During the same conversa- tion, Murphy threatened that the Company may decide not to deal with the Union but shut down, fire everyone who goes on strike, and hire new people. Murphy there- by in a deliberate and calculated fashion threatened the employee with the loss of his job in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Similarly, Supervisor Jerry Stapler's conversation with Hanson on the preceding day, where Stapler indicated that a union at Southwire would mean that wages would drop to minimum, and that employees would have no benefits and no insurance, was a threat of loss of benefits in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Murphy's several conversations with Hanson on 13 October involved threats that the Company may shut down, fire everybody who goes on strike, and hire new people;, that there would be reorganizing and possibly doing away with the crew chief's job; and that Hanson, as a crew chief, who was known to have signed a union card, would never be promoted and would have a long hard road ahead of him. These statements can hardly be characterized as unofficial and uncoercive remarks made in a warm and friendly tone in a casual setting. Rather, these were serious conversations in which the employees and supervisors discussed the Union and in which man- agement, in a coercive and intimidating fashion attempt- ed to influence the employees. Consistent with an atmos- phere of fear and violence was Murphy's reference to people in Carroll County who would blow someone's head off for $500 and his statement, "Randy, I am scared for my job." Surely, if a supervisor expresses serious concern about his own job, his contempraneous remarks about the job of his employees have an even greater effect on his employees. Accordingly, I find that the Re- spondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. As already stated earlier, I further find that the Re- spondent's reassignment of Hanson to an operator's job and the discharge of Hanson were motivated by union animus. Such conduct violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Suspensions and Other Discriminatory Conduct Phillip Bell. On 27 October 1983 the Respondent penal- ized Phillip Bell, an employee in the drawing depart- ment, by suspending him from work for 5 days with the explanation that he had violated company rule eight, which prohibits the falsification of company records. In substance, Bell was accused of failing on his timecards to 385 subtract from his total reported production of wire for incentive pay purposes those bobbins of wire produced by the machine during its repair or testing stage, known in the trade as "downtime." Bell admitted that he had engaged in that practice and had failed to separately record the wire produced during the machine's down- time. But the record generally shows that this was a common practice which the Respondent specifically pro- hibited only 1 week after the suspension of Bell. Bell was an early union supporter who attended meet- ings and regularly wore the volunteei organizer union badge to work as of 22 September 1983. Bell testified that his supervisor reacted to his wearing of the badge as follows (Tr. 682): He just kind of watched me. He would stick around my machine. Anybody that would come over there to talk to me, he would run them off. He would let them come to other people's machines and wouldn't say nothing to them. Witness Eddie Cantrell, also a machine operator in the drawing department, testified about a conversation on 4 November with Supervisor Carl Noith about Phillip Bell. According to Cantrell, North told him that Vice President McAmis wanted to know why Bell had not been fired, that he wanted Bell fired for any reason at all. Cantrell further testified that North told him that he, North, and Danny Carden "went through Bell's records trying to come up with something to fire him for and they couldn't."8 The Respondent's industrial engineering group con- ducted an examination of Bell's production records and discovered certain discrepancies in Bell's production records when compared to the chart iecorder attached to his machine. The same group thereafter made an even more thorough examination of the records over a period of 30 days and discovered additional errors in Bell's time reports. As a result, on 27 October Bell was confronted by Supervisors North and Gerald Rooks and shown those discrepancies. They pointed out to Bell that his re- ports had included the production of wire during a ma- chine's downtime and also die changes made during downtime. Bell did not deny these practices but ex- plained that other operators had routinely done the same. Nevertheless, Bell was suspended. The only other em- ployee who had a similar interview following an exten- sive investigation of his timecards was another union supporter, John Clack. Supervisor Gerald Rooks also ac- cused Clack of falsifying his timecards and threatened that he would be suspended for a week, because he, like Bell, had made the die changes while the machine was inoperative. Clack, however, was able to convince man- agement that the discipline intended for him be reduced to a written warning without the suspension. The records supports Bell's statement that other em- ployees had engaged in the same practice of including 8 Eddie Cantrell impressed me as a credible and worthy witness whose testimony was supported by his own contemporary notes of this conver- sation Moreover, Cantrell, a 29-year employee with the Respondent, had nothing to gain by his appearance in this case 386 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD the wire produced during a machine's downtime under the incentive pay system. Employee William A. Shirey testified that he and other operators had always counted production during a machine's downtime. Similarly, Mi- chael Thompson testified that he had included in his reg- ular production the wire produced during the machine's downtime. Crew Chief Larry Harper stated unequivocal- ly in his testimony that he was unaware that this practice was even against company policy. He stated that for 7 or 8 years he had followed the same practice of including the wire produced during a mechanical breakdown of the machine. The record further shows that approximately a week or two after Bell's suspension, the Respondent held meet- ings with the machine operators to instruct them that wire produced during a machine's testing period was to be recorded in a separate report. As testified by Harper, Danny Carden instructed the operators as follows (Tr. 746): That if you were starting on mechanic or electri- cian downtime that you were suppose to start keep- ing it on a separate time card and not on an incen- tive time card. In summary, the record shows that only two employ- ees were singled out for discipline, Phillip Bell and John Clack. Both were union supporters. Clack was able to extricate himself with a mere written warning but with- out a suspension. This left Bell as the only employee to be suspended for a practice-conceivably unfair under the incentive pay system-which was commonly used by the machine operators. While I am certainly mindful of an employer's right to make its own business decisions and to correct a practice which unfairly takes advantage of its incentive pay system, I cannot ignore an employ- er's disparate treatment of one of its employees. In 1982 Bell incurred a similar problem when he erro- neously reported a stringup on his machine. He had claimed both a "dancer" and "anealer" stringup when he should only have counted the "anealer" stringup. At that time, Supervisor Rooks sent him a written note and Bell immediately corrected that practice. There is no evi- dence that Bell, then or now, had intentionally engaged in this practice to unfairly take advantage of the incen- tive system or consciously to enhance his pay. Nor is there any suggestion that the practice of reporting the downtime production of wire was somehow a scheme to defraud the Company; to the contrary, the financial ad- vantages to the employee would have been too insignifi- cant. Although the Respondent had a legitimate purpose in changing or halting the practice, the inquiry here only reaches the narrow issue of whether Bell was disciplined because of his union support or his falsification of the production records or whether the Respondent had a dual motive Considering that the practice was wide- spread among the employees, that an investigation was conducted of the two union activists, and that Bell was singled out for the suspension, the record is clear that the Respondent had engaged in discriminatory conduct. The General Counsel has further shown that manage- ment had attempted to find any excuse to discipline this employee whose union support was open and highly visi- ble. I find that the Respondent failed to show that Bell would have been disciplined in the absence of any union consideration. I find, instead , that under ordinary circum- stances Bell would have been treated like the other oper- ators, and informed to correct their reporting methods along with everyone else in the meetings conducted by Supervisor Carden. Accordingly, I find the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Clifford Herring. Clifford Herring, a forklift operator, who had been employed for about 6 years, was suspend- ed for 4 days when he reported 30 minutes late for work on 16 October 1983. Southwire's work rule one provides for progressive discipline in the event of an employee's absenteeism or tardiness . Herring has a history of absen- teeism and tardiness . He received a written warning on 23 May 1983, which indicated that he had accumulated three unexcused absences and four instances of tardiness within a 5-month period. He was warned that another of- fense of a similar nature would result in a "written warn- ing and one week's suspension." (R. Exh. 23.) Thereafter, Herring's attendance record showed no marked improve- ment. His suspension notice of 16 October reported that since the 23 May warning he had been tardy 9 times and absent 3 days. There is no dispute that Herring's attend- ance record had been excessively lax. The General Counsel submits, however , that the Re- spondent has shown much tolerance over a period of years for Herring's habitual attendance problems until this employee commenced to wear the union badge in late September. His very next infraction , the 30-minute tardiness, was promptly used by the Respondent to impose a 4-day suspension on this employee . The Re- spondent's conduct in this regard, according to the Gen- eral Counsel, showed disparate treatment of a union sup- porter. The record shows that Herring attended union meetings and regularly wore a union badge. The record also contains the attendance record of James Stephens, an employee who was not a visible union supporter and whose attendance record was about as poor as that of Herring. Stephens had not been disci- plined for his infractions of company rule one. The Re- spondent explained, however, that Stephens' attendance record showed improvement following a memorandum dated 24 March 1983 from Plant Superintendent Carden to Southwire's department heads reminding them to dis- cipline employees who were frequently absent. On the basis of the foregoing summary of the record dealing with employee Herring's suspension, I cannot detect any substantial disparate treatment of Clifford Herring. Herring was a prominent and visible union sup- porter, but the record does not show a nexus between his union activity and the suspension. To be sure, the Re- spondent did show tolerance for Herrings attendance problems over a period of time . Nevertheless, he re- ceived a written warning prior to his union activity. His attendance did not improve and at some point the Com- pany reached that point in October . The fact that it fol- lowed, by several weeks, Herring's wearing of the union badge may have been purely coincidental . Even consid- ering the Respondent's union animus, the record certain- SOUTHWIRE CO. ly established that Herring would have been disciplined because of his attendance record, even in the absence of any union considerations. I, accordingly, find that this al- legation of the complaint should be dismissed. Michael Runels. On 4 October 1983 the Respondent disciplined its employee Mike Runels, by suspending him for 1 week with the explanation that he violated rule six, "Carry Out Verbal Orders & Instructions in a Coopera- tive Manner" and the following explanation (R. Exh. 8): Mike was instructed to change his machine over from #14 to #12. He didn't change the machine over correctly. When asked why, he didn't he stated machine would not run production speed and it would run that way. When told by his Supervisor it was no[t] going to be run that way, he became offensive and made re- marks to the fact he was being discriminated against and harassed. The General Counsel, emphasizing Runels' prominent union support, argues that the discipline was motivated by union consideration , not the alleged violation of com- pany rule six. In this regard the record shows that Runels had worn the union badge, attended union meet- ings, and solicited on behalf ' of the Union. The General Counsel also points to several instances of background information9 relevant to show motivation or union animus. The first instance was a conversation in late August between Runels and Supervisor Donald Terrill . Runels was asked how he felt about the Union and told that the plant may close and that he could lose his job if the Union came in. The second conversation occurred be- tween Runels and Supervisor Randy Robinson in Sep- tember. Robinson commented about Runels' wearing of the union badge and said that "the Union wasn't going to do [them] any good and that he thought that if the Union came in, the plant would eventually close." The third instance occurred in December when Plant Manger John Norman removed a union sticker from Runel's locker and threatened him with disciplinary action for defacing company property. The events leading up to the suspension occurred on 4 October after Runels had reported for work about 3 p.m. His instructions were to change the dies in the machine from the 14-gauge production of wire to production of 12-gauge wire. Instead of following standard procedure which required a change of all 12 dies, Runels used a shortcut stringup by changing only two dies, namely, the last two dies and reducing the total number of dies to an 11 die stringup. At that point, his supervisor appeared at the machine and rebuked him for the incorrect stringup. Runels angrily retored by saying that he had run the wire in this fashion before and accused him of mistreat- ing him and harassing him. Runels was taken by Robin- son to the office of Plant Manager Blevins. The matter was discussed and Runels received his suspension with a comment by Robinson: "Mike, this Union business has 9 The episodes were not alleged as violations of the Act , but are rele- vant in considering the legality of the suspension 387 built up pressure on me and I am going to have to give you some time off." 10 The record goes into great detail about the correctness of the proper die change. It shows, in substance, that Runels and other employees had used the shortcut string- up before but that the standard stringup was the more correct procedure. In any case, Robinson had certainly every right to instruct Runels about the procedure which the Company preferred. The narrow issue is whether the suspension under these circumstances was motivated by the Respondent's union animus. The record demonstrates that the Respondent had fo- cused its union animus directly on Runels because of his prominent union support. The various comments made by members of the Respondent's supervisory hierarchy, Donald Terrill, Randy Robinson, and John Norman, to Runels about his union involvement, as well as Robin- son's explanation that his "time off" was due to the pres- sure of the union business, are clear and convincing evi- dence that Runels was disciplined because of his union support. The General Counsel has thereby met his burden of a prima facie case of an 8(a)(3) and (1) viola- tion of the Act. The further inquiry is. whether Runels would have been disciplined even in the absence of the union consideration. In this regard, the record shows that, although Runels changed the die as he was directed to do, nevertheless he overreacted to Robinson's direc- tive. Robinson testified that Runels "was kind of loud and red in his face, kind of hot and bothered" and that Runels accused him of harassing him and talking sarcasti- cally. Robinson said that Runels "kind of jumped out at him." Runels admitted that he was upset with Robinson's manner of speaking to him, that he was bothered by the fact that he was interfering with him when he was trying to do his job, and that he spoke to Runels in a loud voice accusing him of being unfair, always mistreating him, and talking to him sarcastically. Blevins had ob- served this episode and, at Robinson's motion, the three men went into Blevins' office where Runels was repri- manded and received his suspension. The record does not disclose how the Respondent had treated its employees in comparable situations. But con- sidering that Runels had received an earlier reprimand for absenteeism and warned that a future violation of company policy would result in a suspension and also considering a prior verbal warning by Supervisor Per- kins, it is entirely plausible that Runels would have been disciplined for his intemperate response even in the ab- sence'of any protected conduct. I, accordingly, find that this portion of the allegation in the complaint be dis- missed. Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980). Buford Amburgey. On 30 September 1983 the Respond- ent issued a "Record of Work Rule Violation" to Buford Amburgey for his violation of rule five: "Obey published Rules for Safety, Security and Job Performance," with the explanation : "Buford was swinging on hoist controls, (with voltage of 550 volts) on machine #0646--l. This is 10 Robinson denied making that comment , But because Runels' testi- mony impressed me as firm and candid, contrary to Robinson's testimony which seemed hesitant, I have credited Runels' version 388 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD extremely hazardous and a safety violation . [Horseplay]" (R. Exh. 37.) He was suspended for 1 week. The General Counsel contends that the suspension was totally unjustified and motivated by union animus. First, according to the General Counsel, Amburgey may have engaged in some practical joking but not in any safety violations and, second, Amburgey and fellow employee Nelson Dowdy were the only visible union supporters on the second shift in the drawing and stranding depart- ment. The Respondent's principal witness to this incident was Kenneth Hall, the second -shift superintendent, who testified that on 30 September following a production meeting, he observed Amburgey "swinging on a control cable to the hoist." He explained it as follows (Tr. 1217): "Well, it was the control cable coming down from the hoist, a safety chain, and he had his hands up above his head, both hands he had a hold of the chain, and the control cable, swinging back and forth on it . . . . He put his feet down and kicked back, put his feet down and kicked back, and I saw him approximately three or four times." Hall motioned Amburgey off the control cable and reported the incident to Sam Roberts, department manager. Amburgey's testimony indicated that he had just used his hoist to move several bobbins of wire on his machine, when Superintendent Kenneth Hall was conversing with Leonard Simpson, the department manager within view of the machine. At that point Amburgey began to act as follows (Tr. 514-515). "I went through the motion like I was climbing a horse, that I was going to climb it .. . the cable was hanging down this way and I took my hands like that [indicating] and went up like a monkey climbing a tree you see, I was playing like I was going up fast. I have done it several times before and Hall was standing over there at them steps , standing over there and this other guy, laughing and Kenneth Hall pointed his finger at me like that [indicating] and started laugh- ing." Amburgey denied that he had ever swung on the hoist. Fellow employee William Riggins, who had worked with Amburgey and stood only about 10 feet away from him during the afternoon of 30 September, testified that he did not see Amburgey swinging on the hoist. He testi- fied that Amburgey had his hands a little over his head and that he was touching the hoist. Riggins testified that he did not observe Amburgey engaging in any dangerous or improper activity. Riggins' testimony disputes Hall's testimony that Amburgey was actually swinging on the hoist with his feet off the ground, but he also did not see when Amburgey simulated a monkey's climbing motion. Amburgey had developed a reputation of drawing the attention of others, his coworkers and supervisors, to his antics and practical jokes. It would be within his general demeanor occasionally to engage in practical joking. But, as an experienced operator in the drawing department, it is unlikely that Amburgey would decide to swing on the electrical cable attached to the hoist. Indeed , his supervi- sor described in his testimony that in the past , Amburgey played little pranks but he had "never seen him do any- thing dangerous like that before." Considering Ambur- gey's admission to making the motions of a climbing will be discussed in that context. monkey and in view of Riggins' testimony who was only 10 feet from the scene that Amburgey had not been swinging on the hoist, I will credit Hall's observations only to the extent that Amburgey had engaged in some light "horseplay" and not that he had been swinging freely on the hoist with his hands on the electrical cable. The record reflects the Respondent's motivation to discipline this employee for his protected activity. Am- burgey had worked for the Company for more than 5 years without incurring any written warnings or other disciplinary action. In late September, Amburgey com- menced the wearing of a union volunteer organizer badge. He had signed a union card and had attended union meetings. He and another employee, Nelson Dowdy, were the only employees on his shift who had worn union buttons in that department. Thereafter, the Respondent's attitude towards Amburgey shifted. He was instructed by his supervisor Terrill that he had to remain at his machine and not converse with the other employees in his department. Terrill said that these in- structions applied initially only to him and Dowdy. When Amburgey asked the reason for these instructions, Terrill nodded his head towards his badge stating "that is why." (Tr. 507.) Theretofore, employees had been per- mitted to leave their work area. While the operators were responsible for the continued operation of the ma- chines, they did not require constant attention. The em- ployees were permitted to leave the immediate vicinity of their machines during short intervals. After the two union supporters, Amburgey and Dowdy, had received those instructions, they remained at their machines while other employees were able to move about as before. i i The record is accordingly clear that the Respondent had exhibited hostility towards Amburgey's protected activity. He engaged in the brief episode of clowning, but the Respondent disciplined him far out of proportion for such an offense, particularly when it is considered that other employees and supervisors would occasionally engaged in similar conduct. For the record shows that other employees and supervisors would also engage in some form of practical joking from time to time without incurring any form of discipline. It is clear therefore that the Respondent's discipline of Amburgey was primarily because of his protected activity. Moreover, the Re- spondent has failed to show that, in the absence of such union motivation, Amburgey would have been penalized. The record does not convincingly show that Amburgey had engaged in any safety violation or any activity which endangered his own safety or the safety of other employees. I accordingly find that the Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Jackie Dennis. In Respondent's employ for about 6 years, Jackie Dennis had never received a written warn- ing until 14 October 1983 shortly after his union activity, when the Respondent issued him a written warning, for excessive absenteeism. Dennis' union activity consisted of attending union meetings, the handbilling of union litera- 11 The Respondent's conduct in this regard is a separate allegation and SOUTHWIRE CO ture, and the wearing of the union badge beginning in late September. The facts leading up to the written warning occurred on 13 October 1983 when Dennis discovered prior to re- porting for his 7 a.m. shift in the T-wire department that he had problems with his car. In accordance with cus- tomary procedure he attempted to inform his supervisor Larry Perkins. Since he was not available, Dennis re- ported to Bobby Hubbard, the third-shift supervisor, that he was unable to be at work that day. He also requested that Hubbard put him down for a day of vacation. Hub- bard agreed and notified Supervisor Perkins that Dennis would not be at work that day and that he had put him down for a vacation day. On the following day, 14 October, Perkins called Dennis into his office about 2 p.m. and issued a written warning. According to Dennis, Perkins told him as fol- lows (Tr. 334): He told me that he couldn't give me a day's va- cation that day because he was going to have to write me an unexcused absence, that we are sup- posed to give a 24-hour notice on any vacation, which I ain't never been told that before . . . . He asked me about my badge, he asked me what could my badge get me, or the Union get me, and I told him it might get us a little bit better treatment. The General Counsel has questioned the existence of the "24 hour rule" stating that such a rule had not been in existence before and that the Respondent used it as a pretext to discipline Dennis for his protected activity. The Respondent argues that the discipline was for exces- sive absenteeism, including Dennis' prior attendance record and not necessarily based upon his request for the one vacation day. The written warning (R. Exh. 7) re- cites that Dennis has been absent 11 times during the last 9 months and warns that additional absences will result in his suspension. My analysis of the record indicates that the Respond- ent was motivated by union animus in arriving at its de- cision to discipline Dennis, but that the Respondent has shown Dennis would have been disciplined generally for excessive absenteeism. Dennis' absenteeism may have been of concern to the Respondent, but the record is clear that Dennis' one absence on 13 October precipitat- ed the controversy. Supervisor Perkins was unable to be specific; about the 24-hour rule or even able to explain why prior to this episode employees were able to take vacation days without complying with the 24-hour rule. For example, as recently as September 1983, Dennis was able to convert two absences into vacation days. Em- ployee Randall Vance testified unequivocally that he had not heard of the rule requiring 24 hours' advance notice and that it was a common practice to request a vacation day for a day an employee was unable to report for work. Moreover, Perkins admitted that Dennis followed correct procedure by calling in advance of his shift to inform management that he could not be at work, yet Perkins also was unable to "explain why he marked Dennis absence on October 13 with an `X,' meaning `did 389 not call in."' (R. Exh. 42.) Moreover, ]Dennis z 2 testified that he was told during the meeting of 14 October that his discipline was based upon his absence on 13 October, and that Perkins made a passing reference to his union badge. In short, Respondent acted because of its hostility towards Dennis' protected activities. On the other hand, Dennis had accumulated a record of frequent absences. He had received a verbal warning before. Respondent has shown that even in the absence of any union consid- eration, Dennis would have received a written warning for his absenteeism. Accordingly, I dismiss this aspect of the allegation in the complaint. Work Restrictions. The final allegations in the com- plaint involving discriminatory practices, involve Re- spondent's imposition of restrictions upon four employees who were prominent union supporters. The record shows that four employees, Buford Am- burgey, Nelson Dowdy, Randall Vance, and Tommy Jarrell were told by their respective supervisors that they were to remain at their immediate work area and not to converse with anyone. Supervisor Donald Terrill called Dowdy and Amburgey into his office on separate occa- sions in late September and told them to stay at their working area and their machines and not to talk to others. Amburgey asked Terrill why he gave these orders. Terrill nodded his head toward Amburgey's union badge saying, "that is why . . . you already know." The evidence further shows that Amburgey and Dowdy were the only employees in the drawing and stranding department on the second shift who were so restricted. Such restrictions had not been imposed upon these employees prior to their union activity nor upon the other employees at any time. Although the record contains Respondent's work rule (number three) which require employees to "stay at the assigned work station except for occasional brief absences for personal breaks or with prior permission from your supervisor," they were generally not followed by machine operators. Their testimony was that while the machines were running, they did not need constant attention. Employees were able to and did occasionally converse or visit each other while remaining responsible for their machines. Similarly in the case of employees Vance and Jarrell, they were instructed by their supervisor Larry Perkins in the T-wire department to stay by their machines. Vance testified that Supervisor Larry Perkins called him over to his desk after he had worn his union badge for about 1 week. Perkins told him that he "needed to stay right at [his] machine" and that he "didn't need to be talking to other people around that area and if people came to [his] work area talking to [him], he was going to run their butts off." When Vance showed him other employees standing in little groups talking, Perkins said that "it was all right for them to do that and it wasn't all right for" him. Vance appealed these newly imposed restrictions to Shift Superintendent Sanders pointing out to him that 12 Although he appeared unsophisticated and was often confused about dat1s, Dennis made an honest effort to testify correctly and truthfully Perkins, even though much more skilled and articulate, was unable to ex- plain obvious inconsistencies I have therefore credited the testimony of Dennis. 390 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD other employees were able to move about freely while he was restricted. Sanders merely told him to worry about himself, not about others. Perkins told Jarrell on 20 September to stay by his ma- chine and that he talked too much to other employees. Terrill explained that he had never received such instruc- tions during the 13 years of employment at Southwire. He testified (Tr. 591): "We usually, whenever we got our machines running and it was taken care of, we could talk to other employees in the department as long as we kept an eye on our machine." In late September, around the same time Superintendent Jones approached him on one occasion and asked him what the union badge would get him. Although Vance and Jarrell were vague in their testi- mony about whether they were positive that their fellow workers had received similar restrictions, the record gen- erally shows that other employees had not been similarly instructed. To be sure, the Respondent had work rules to that effect and, without doubt, had the authority to en- force them. But the record reflects that these four em- ployees had been singled out for specific instructions to that effect. Since the record shows that the reasons for this was the employees' protected activity, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. The Judge's Disqualification Among several motions filed by the Respondent was a motion for my disqualification. The motion was made at the conclusion of the trial. I denied the motion. Respond- ent appealed to the Board which denied the motion without prejudice to Respondent's right to renew its motion. Respondent has renewed its motion before me and states in its brief (p. 97): The inordinate disparity created by the Adminis- trative Law Judge's cross-examining almost 70% of Respondent's witnesses and less than 7% of General Counsel's witnesses, in and of itself, destroys the ap- pearance of impartiality expected of an impartial trier of fact. When coupled with the Administrative Law Judge's efforts at rehabilitating General Coun- sel's witnesses, the harsh tone and purposeful manner of questioning of Respondent's witnesses, demeaning remarks to Respondent's counsel, and consistent denial of Respondent counsel's requests and motions, the Administrative Law Judge, in effect, abandoned his impartial role and assumed the role of a prosecutor supporting the position taken by General Counsel. Respondent's motion is without merit. First, with the judge's power "to call, examine, and cross-examine wit- nesses," it is, according to Sec. 102 35 of the Board's Rules, "the duty of the administrative law judge to in- quire fully into the facts as to whether the respondent has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice . .." Second, disproportionate ruling for one side or the other are not indicative of judicial bias. NLRB v. Pitts- burgh Steamship Co., 337 U S. 656, 659 (1949); Southern Pacific Communications v. A. T. & T., 740 F.2d 980, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984). For example, the court of appeals held: "We conclude that the statistical one-sidedness of the trial court's evidentiary, factual and legal rulings simply cannot be used to support an inference of judicial bias." Id. at 995. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent, Southwire Company, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Union, United Steelworkers of America, AFL- CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(5) of the Act. 3. By coercively interrogating its employees about their union activities or those of others, Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 4. By threatening its employees with economic or other reprisals because they engage in union activities, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. By threatening its employees that Respondent would know which employees had signed union cards, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 6. By discriminatorily discharging its employees, Ran- dall Hanson, David Huckeba, Danny Rowell, and Arlice Smith, because of their union activities, Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 7. By discriminatorily suspending or disciplining its employees Buford Amburgey and Phillip Bell because of their activities on behalf of the Union, Respondent vio- lated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. 8. By discriminatorily imposing restrictions at work upon the movements and the talking of its employees Buford Amburgey, Nelson Dowdy, Tommy Jarrell and Randall Vance, because of their activities on behalf of the Union, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. All other allegations in the complaint have not been substantiated. REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer- tain unfair labor practices, I find it necessary to order it to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. The Respondent having discriminatorily discharged employees Randall Hanson, David Huckeba, Danny Rowell, and Arlice Smith it must offer them reinstate- ment and make them whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on a quarterly basis from date of proper offer of reinstatement, less any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977). Having discriminator- ily suspended employees Buford Amburgey and Phillip Bell, Respondent must make them whole for any loss of earnings or other benefits for the period of suspension in accordance with applicable law. Further, having im- posed discriminatory work restrictions upon its employ- ees Buford Amburgey, Nelson Dowdy, Tommy Jarrell, and Randall Vance, Respondent will be required to cancel its discriminatory work restrictions and so inform the employees in writing that such work restrictions are SOUTHWIRE CO. no longer valid. Respondent must remove from its files warnings, suspensions, or any other reference to the dis- criminatory terminations and suspensions and so inform the affected employees in writing that this has been done and that the discipline will not be used against any of them. Because the Respondent has a proclivity for violating the Act and because of Respondent' s egregious miscon- duct demonstrating a general disregard for the employ- ees' fundamental rights, I find it necessary to issue a broad Order, requiring the Respondent to cease and desist from infringing in any other manner on rights guaranteed employees by Section 7 of the Act. Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979). On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed13 ORDER The Respondent, South wire Company, Carrollton, Georgia, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Discharging, imposing suspensions or work restric- tions, or otherwise discriminating against any employee for supporting United Steelworkers of America, AFL- CIO or any other union. (b) Coercively interrogating any employee about union support or union activities. (c) Threatening employees with the loss of jobs or benefits, plant closure, or other reprisals if they support the Union. (d) Threatening employees with disclosure of their union cards. (e) In any other manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar- anteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Offer Randall Hanson, David Huckeba, Danny Rowell, and Arlice Smith immediate and full reinstate- ment to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without preju- dice to their seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed, and make them and employees Buford Amburgey and Phillip Bell whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the dis- crimination against them, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of this decision. (b) Remove from its records and files any warning no- tices, suspensions, or other notations dealings with the termination of the employees found to have been dis- criminated against herein. In addition, remove from its files the suspensions and written warnings issued to Buford Amburgey and Phillip Bell. Respondent shall inform in writing the affected employees that this has been done. 13 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's R ules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses 391 (c) Cancel the discriminatory work restrictions im- posed upon its employees Buford Amburgey, Nelson Dowdy, Tommy Jarrell, and Randall Vance and inform them in writing that such work restrictions are no longer valid. (d) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records nec- essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (e) Post at its facility in Carrollton, Georgia, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix,"14 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 10, after being signed by the Respondent's au- thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond- ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con- secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (f) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint is dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not specifically found. 14 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United Slates court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board." APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protec- tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities. WE WILL NOT discharge or otherwise discriminate against any of you for supporting United Steelworkers of America, AFL--CIO or any other union. WE WILL NOT coercively question you about your union support or activities. 392 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD WE WILL NOT threaten you with the disclosure of your union cards. WE WILL NOT threaten you with loss of jobs or bene- fits, plant closure, or other reprisals for supporting the Union. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, re- strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaran- teed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL offer Randall Hanson, David Huckeba, Danny Rowell, and Arlice Smith immediate and full re- instatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or privi- leges previously enjoyed and WE WILL make them whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from their discharge, less any net interim earnings, plus inter- est. WE WILL notify each of them that we have removed from our files any reference to his discharge and that the discharge will not be used against him in any way. WE WILL remove from our files any written warnings issued to Buford Amburgey and Phillip Bell and inform them by letter that this has been done. WE WILL cancel the discriminatory work restrictions imposed upon Buford Amburgey, Nelson Dowdy, Tommy Jarrell, and Randall Vance and inform them that they are no longer valid. SOUTHWIRE COMPANY