National Micronetics, Inc.

NATIONAL MICRONETICS National Micronetics, Inc. and International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AAFL-CIO. Cases 3-CA-10123 and 3-RC-7892 9 December 1985 DECISION, ORDER, AND DIRECTION OF SECOND ELECTION BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS DENNIS AND BABSON On 31 August 1981 Administrative Law Judge Walter H. Maloney Jr. issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief. ' The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three.- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and conclusions2 as modified and to adopt the recom. mended Order as modified. Contrary to the judge, we find that the Respondent did not violate Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act or engage in objectionable conduct when it asked employees to give the em- ployer another chance or when it distributed copies of a Board decision to employees.3 1. The judge found that on two occasions the Respondent made illegal promises of benefits, by asking employees to give it another chance. The judge found in section III,A,(1) of the decision that Supervisor Sturrock summoned employee VanWa.. genen to the office a few days before the election to discuss the Union and problems at the Company. During this conversation, Sturrock asked VanWa- genen what it was he did not like about the Com- pany. Sturrock told VanWagenen the Respondent was a small Company, it was still growing, and The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge 's credibility find- ings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings. In addition, the Respondent contends that the judge's rulings , credibil- ity resolutions, and factual findings are the result of bias. After carefully examining the entire record, we are satisfied that this allegation is with- out merit. There is no basis for finding that bias and partiality existed merely because the judge resolved important factual conflicts in favor of the General Counsel's witnesses. As the Supreme Court stated in NLRB v. Pittsburgh Steamship Co., 337 U S 656, 659 (1949), "[T]otal rejection of an opposed view cannot of itself impugn the integrity or competence of a trier of fact." 2 In his discussion of the Respondent 's overly broad no-solicitation rule at sec. III,A,(s), the judge cited T.R.W. Bearings, 257 NLRB 442 (1981) We do not rely on T.R W. Bearings in finding that this rule was overly broad; rather, we rely on Our Way, inc., 268 NLRB 394 (1983), overrul- ing T.R. W. Bearings. 3 We shall modify the judge's recommended Order to follow and remedy more accurately the actual violations found , as well as to reflect these reversals, and shall issue a new notice to employees 993 there was "a lot to look forward to." Sturrock said he was aware that the Respondent had neglected to keep up with other companies in the past and asked VanWagenen to give them a second chance to see if they could make things better. The judge also found in section III,A,(x) of the decision that Vice President Robinson held a meet- ing of employees in his office soon after the repre- sentation petition was filed to ask employees not to support the Union. During this meeting, Robinson told employees he was new in his position, he was really a decent individual, and they should give him some time. The judge concluded that by asking the employees to give the Respondent more time or a second chance the Respondent meant they should vote against the Union and let the Re- spondent improve benefits and working conditions without collective bargaining. Therefore, he found these statements illegal and objectionable promises of benefits. We disagree. We find that both of these statements are too vague to rise to the level of illegal promises of ben- efits or objectionable conduct. The statements do not promise that anything in particular will happen. Instead, the Respondent indicated a general desire to make things better. Generalized expressions of this type, asking for "another chance" or "more time," have been held to be within the limits of permissible campaign propaganda.4 Therefore, we dismiss the allegations that the statements were un- lawful promises in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and we overrule the objection based on these statements.5 2. The judge found that the Respondent made objectionable threats of reprisals against employees if they selected the Union as their bargaining repre- sentative, by distributing copies of the Board deci- sion in Oxford Pickles.6 The judge found in section III,A,(q) that the Respondent distributed to all em- ployees photocopies of this decision as reported at 77 LRRM 1049, with a handwritten statement at the top saying: "HERE'S THE FACTS from the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD- THEY ARE NEUTRAL. THIS IS THE LAW- READ IT." The LRRM headnotes had been un- derlined and characterized as follows: 4 See Allied/Egry Business Systems, 169 NLRB 514, 517 (1968), where the Board found that saying the employer and the employees had a very bright future and asking the employees to give the plant manager a chance to prove they did not need an outsider to speak for them were merely vague suggestions that did not support a finding the employer had made unlawful promises to its employees. 5 We affirm the judge's finding that Supervisor Sturrock unlawfully in- terrogated employee VanWagenen in the same conversation by asking why he favored the Union. 6 190 NLRB 109 (1971) The complaint also alleged this conduct was unlawful 277 NLRB No. 95 994 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD FACT # 1 - LMRA does not require that employer accede to all union demands or, after bargaining, retain all current benefits; ... . FACT #2 - . . . in fact employer may per- manently replace economic strikers and presence of union does not prohibit an employer from moving its plant should eco- FACT #3 - nomic conditions dictate; ... . FACT #4 - . . . that all union promises of improved benefits are not attainable without prior employer assent; ... . The text of the decision had been bracketed, under- lined, and characterized as follows: TRUE - With regard to the answer to the questions, there is no requirement in the Act that an employer accede to all union demands or, after bargaining, retain all current benefits. Nor does the presence of a union prohibit an em- ployer from moving its plant should economic conditions so dictate. Similarly, an employer may permanently replace economic TRUE - strikers. . . . all union promises of improved benefits are not attainable without prior Employer assent. The judge concluded that by distributing this deci- sion to all employees with certain portions high- lighted, the Respondent made objectionable threats of reprisals, particularly noting that the Respond- ent's action took place during an election campaign marred by numerous 8(a)(1) violations and objec- tionable conduct of a similar nature. The judge cited Glassmaster Plastics Co.,7 where the Board found that disseminating the Board decision in Oxford Pickles was objectionable conduct, but dis- tinguished CBS Records Division,8 where the Board found that reading excerpts from the Oxford Pickles decision to employees was lawful. Contrary to the judge, we find CBS Records Di- vision persuasive,9 and we overrule Glassmaster Plastics Co. to the extent it is inconsistent with this decision. The highlighted portions, of the LRRM report are accurate statements of the law,1 ° and 7 203 NLRB 944 (1973). 8 223 NLRB 709, 717 at fn 18 (1976). S The judge also cited CBS Records Division in sec III,A,(f) of the de- cision, where he found an illegal interrogation. Although we agree with the judge's finding that the interrogation was coercive under the circum- stances of this case, we do not rely on the rationale in CBS Records Divi- sion to support our finding 10 An employer is not required to agree to any of the union's proposals during collective bargaining, see H K. Porter Co v. NLRB, 397 U.S 99 (1970), does not have to retain all current benefits after bargaining, see NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S 736, 745 (1962); is not prevented from moving its plant for economic reasons by the presence of a union, see Textile Work- ers V. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269-273 (1965), and may perma- nently replace economic strikers, see NLRB v Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S 333 (1938) Further, a union must obtain the employer's assent to gain improved benefits, see H. K Porter Co v NLRB, supra the Respondent had a right to disseminate such in- formation," especially when the Union had mis- stated the law on these points during the election campaign. The Respondent distributed the Board decision merely to rebut the Union's misrepresenta- tions.12 We find that distributing accurate copies of a 'Board decision with portions highlighted and characterized as "true" can in no way be construed as an illegal threat or as objectionable conduct. Therefore, we dismiss the allegation that the Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and overrule the objection regarding distribution of the Oxford Pickles decision. 3. The judge found that on three occasions during the week before the election the Respond- ent made illegal threats to close the plant and relo- cate its operations to California. The judge found in section III,A,(ee) of the decision that one day, about a week before the election, President Buoy- master gave speeches to large groups of employees at all of the Respondent's three Kingston plants, where he asked the employees to vote against the Union in the election the next week. During these speeches, Buoymaster told the employees he had a great affection for the Kingston area, but two of the Respondent's Kingston plants were losing money, the Respondent was working hard to cut these losses, and a union would not help this effort. He said the Respondent had plants in California and a plant in Mexico where the labor rate was about $1.30 an hour, he -had an obligation to the stockholders to operate the plants profitably and, if anything made them economically uncompetitive, he had the right to relocate them. Finally, he stated that the Respondent's California competitors bought their parts from the Japanese, that the Re- spondent could have saved $100,000 by doing the same thing instead of using the parts made at the Kingston plants, but that it did not want to do so. The judge found in section III,A,(k) of the deci- sion that Supervisor Hocker had a conversation about the union organizing campaign with employ- ee Tortorella later that same day, while Hocker was handing out antiunion literature. During this l i An employer may tell its employees that all of their existing benefits are negotiable and that certain benefits might be reduced or eliminated through collective bargaining, see Computer Peripherals, 215 NLRB 293 (1974), and Stumpf Motor Co, 208 NLRB 431 (1974); may tell its employ- ees that with a union economic conditions could force work to be moved, see Southern Frozen Foods, 202 NLRB 753, 754-755 (1973), enfd. 501 F.2d 868 (D.C Car 1974); and may tell its employees that economic strikers can be permanently replaced, see Eagle Comtronics, 263 NLRB 515 (1982), and Care Inn, Collierville, 202 NLRB 1065 (1973), enfd 496 F 2d 862 (6th Cir. 1974). i z During the campaign the Union told employees that the Respondent could not relocate its plant if the Union won the election, that striking employees could not be replaced, and that employees could not lose ben- efits in collective bargaining NATIONAL MICRONETICS 995 conversation, Hocker told Tortorella that in his opinion President Buoyrnaster would not hesitate to shut the plant and move it to California if the Union got in and the plant was no longer competi- tive in the Kingston area. Hocker explained that the plant was competing with the Japanese and might not be profitable with a union. The judge also found in section III,A,(n) that ,Operations Manager LaLonde summoned employ- ee Friedlander to the office the day before the election to discuss the Company's financial situa- tion. During this conversation, LaLonde told Friedlander that if the Union came into the plant it would adversely affect the profitability of the oper- ation and that he could move the floppy line in a week. The judge concluded that by equating unioniza- tion with unprofitability and unprofitability with plant relocation, the Respondent made illegal threats to close the plants and relocate if the Union won the election. He noted that these statements were not predictions based on objective facts as to probable consequences beyond the Respondent's control, which would be lawful under NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969), but rather were calculated threats uttered in the con- text of numerous other more explicit threats of a similar nature. We agree with the judge's conclusion that these statements were illegal threats, but only for the fol- lowing reasons. As we stated above, an employer may lawfully tell its employees that changed eco- nomic conditions due to unionization could cause it to move elsewhere. Thus, where an employer points out specific effects of unionization that might cause it to become unprofitable, such as higher wages or production losses during strikes, it may properly raise the possibility that a loss of jobs could result from unionization.13 In this case, how- ever, the Respondent did not point to any objec- tive facts that would be likely to change as a result of unionization and cause it to become unprofit- able. Instead, the Respondent merely noted that its Kingston plants were already uncompetitive, when compared to its plants in California and Mexico and to its Japanese suppliers, and stated that it could easily relocate these unprofitable plants if the Union won the election. Furthermore, the Re- sporldent made these statements at the end of a long antiunion election campaign during which five of its highest management officials had repeatedly made explicit threats to close the Kingston plants and relocate the work in California if the Union won the election. Therefore, we find that the Re- 13 See Tri-Cast, Inc, 274 NLRB 377 (1985). spondent's statements were not merely permissible predictions of the possible effects of unionization, but rather were illegal threats that the Respondent intended to close the Kingston plants if the em- ployees elected a union. We agree with the judge that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and engaged in objectionable conduct when it made these statements. 4. Finally, the judge found that the Respondent made illegal misstatements about an employee's right to reinstatement after a strike under Laid- law.14 The judge found in section III,A,(x) of the decision that Vice President Robinson held several meetings with employees about a week before the election, where he asked the employees to vote against the Union in the election. In these meetings, Robinson told employees that during a strike every employee could and would be permanently re- placed, that he had 400 job applications on file from people who were ready to take their jobs, that he could hire people off the street to replace strikers, and that he could make permanent jobs for those employees. When an employee objected to Robinson's statements, noting that employees could be permanently replaced only during economic strikes and that any strike against the Respondent would not be an economic strike, Robinson contra- dicted him by stating that employees could be per- manently replaced in any strike. The judge con- cluded that these statements implied that a striking employee would lose his job without any chance of returning to work and thus misrepresented an em- ployee's reinstatement rights under Laidlaw. There- fore, he found that the Respondent made illegal threats of reprisals for engaging in protected activi- ty. Although we agree with the judge's conclusion that these statements were illegal threats, we do not rely on the cases he cited in support of this conclusion. In Eagle Comtronics,15 the Board held that an employer may lawfully tell employees they are subject to permanent replacement during an economic strike without fully detailing a striker's reinstatement rights under Laidlaw, so long as the employer does not threaten that employees who strike will be deprived of their reinstatement rights or actually misrepresent a striking employee's Laid- law rights. In this case, however, the Respondent did not limit its remarks to economic strikers. In- stead, it effectively told employees that unfair labor practice strikers could be permanently replaced. In Redway Carriers, 274 NLRB 1359 (1985), the Board 14 Laidlaw Corp., 171 NLRB 1366 (1968), enfd 414 F 2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert denied 397 U.S. 920 (1970) is 263 NLRB 515 (1982) 996 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD found similar statements to be unlawful threats. Therefore, we agree with the judge that the Re- spondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and engaged, in objectionable conduct when it made these statements.I6 AMENDED CONCLUSION OF LAW substitute the following for the judge's Conclu- sion of Law 4. "4. By the acts and conduct set forth above in Conclusion of Law 3; by coercively interrogating employees' about their union sympathies and activi- ties; by threatening employees with closing or relo- cating the plant if they should select the Union as their collective-bargaining representative; by threatening to discharge employees if they engage in, or are reported to have engaged in, union ac- tivities; by threatening not to promote employees if the Union should become their collective- bargain- ing representative; by threatening employees with stricter job classifications and denial of interdepart- mental transfers if the Union should become their collective-bargaining representative; by telling em- ployees that they had forfeited any chance of ad- vancement by engaging in union activities; by cre- ating the impression among employees that their union activities are under its surveillance; by solic- iting employee grievances during the representation election campaign for the purpose of adjusting such grievances; by impliedly promising employees ben- efits in order to dissuade them from supporting the Union; by distributing discount coupons to employ- ees in such a manner as to create the impression that it is providing benefits to dissuade them from supporting the Union; by disparately maintaining a bulletin board in such a manner that prounion cam- paign propaganda can be defaced or removed, but preventing antiunion campaign propaganda from being defaced or removed; by imposing an overly broad no-solicitation rule prohibiting employees from engaging in union activities during their breaktime; by telling employees that a strike would be inevitable if the Union won the election; by tell- ing employees that it would not bargain with the Union if the Union won the election; by telling em- ployees that it would discontinue their existing ben- efits if it had to bargain with the Union; by telling employees that they could be permanently replaced in any strike; and by attempting to pin the blame for its prospective refusal to make improvements in wages and benefits on the possible action of the 16 In adopting the judge's various interrogation findings, Member Babson does not rely on the ,fudge's cite to Centre Engineering, Inc., 253 NLRB 419 ( 1980) Also, in adopting the various violations at sec. III,A,(x) of the judge's decision, he finds it unnecessary to precisely rely on all the judge's comments or case citations Union in filing objections or charges with the Board, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act." ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Re- spondent, National Micronetics , Inc., Kingston, New York, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified. 1. Substitute the following for paragraphs 1(a) through 1(o). "1. Cease and desist from "(a) Coercively interrogating employees about their union sympathies and activities. "(b) Threatening employees with closing or relo- cating the plant if they should select the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. "(c) Threatening to discharge employees if they engage in, or are reported to have engaged in, union activities. "(d) Threatening not to promote employees if the Union should become their collective -bargain- ing representative. "(e) Threatening employees with stricter job classifications and denial of interdepartmental trans- fers if the Union should become their collective- bargaining representative. "(f) Telling employees that they had forfeited any chance of advancement by engaging in union activities. "(g) Creating the impression among employees that their union activities are under its surveillance. "(h) Soliciting employee grievances during the representation election campaign for the purpose of adjusting such grievances. "(i) Impliedly promising employees benefits in order to dissuade them from supporting the Union. "(j) Distributing discount coupons to employees in such a manner as to create the impression that it is providing benefits to dissuade them from sup- porting the Union. "(k) Disparately maintaining a bulletin board in such a manner that prounion campaign propaganda can be defaced or removed but preventing antiun- ion campaign propaganda from being defaced or removed. "(1) Imposing an overly broad no-solicitation rule prohibiting employees from engaging in union ac- tivities during their breaktime. "(m) Telling employees that a strike would be in- evitable if the Union won the election. "(n) Telling employees that it would not bargain with the Union if the Union won the election. NATIONAL MICRONETICS "(o) Telling employees that it would discontinue their existing benefits if it had to bargain with the Union. "(p) Telling employees that they could be per- manently replaced in any strike. "(q) Attempting to pin the blame for its prospec- tive refusal to make improvements in wages and benefits on the possible action of the Union in filing objections or charges with the Board. "(r) Delaying promised pay increases or denying overtime to employees or otherwise discriminating against them with regard to their hire or tenure in order to discourage their support of and activities on behalf of International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization. "(s) In any other manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act." 2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the administrative law judge. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the election of 29 and 30 October 1980 among the Respondent Em- ployer's employees is set aside. [Direction of Second Election omitted from pub- lication.] APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The (`rational Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT coercively interrogate employees about their union sympathies and activities. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with closing or relocating the plant if they should select a union as their collective-bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT threaten to discharge employees if they engage in, or are reported to have engaged in, union activities. WE WILL NOT threaten not to promote employ- ees if a union should become their collective-bar- gaining representative. WE WILL NOT threaten employees with stricter job classifications and denial of interdepartmental transfers if a union should become their collective- bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT threaten employees that they have forfeited any chance of advancement by engaging in union activities. 997 WE WILL NOT create the impression among em- ployees that their union activities are under our surveillance. WE WILL NOT solicit employee grievances during a representation election campaign for the purpose of adjusting such grievances. WE WILL NOT impliedly promise employees ben- efits in order to dissuade them from supporting a union. WE WILL NOT distribute discount coupons to em- ployees in such a manner as to create the impres- sion that we are providing benefits to dissuade them from supporting a union. WE WILL NOT disparately maintain a bulletin board in such a manner that prounion campaign propaganda can be defaced or removed but pre- vent antiunion campaign propaganda from being defaced or removed. WE WILL NOT impose an overly broad no-solici- tation rule prohibiting employees from engaging in union activities during their breaktime. WE WILL NOT tell employees that a strike is in- evitable if a union becomes their collective-bargain- ing representative. WE WILL NOT tell employees that we will not bargain with a union if a union becomes their col- lective-bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT tell employees that we will dis- continue their existing benefits if we have to bar- gain with a union. WE WILL NOT tell employees that they will be permanently replaced in any strike. WE WILL NOT attempt to pin the blame for our prospective refusal to make improvements in wages and benefits on the possible action of a union in filing objections or charges with the Board. WE WILL NOT delay promised pay increases or deny overtime to employees or otherwise discrimi- nate against them with regard to their hire or tenure in order to discourage their support of and activities on behalf of International Union of Elec- trical, Radio and Machine Workers , AFL-CIO or any other labor organization. WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL make William Clark and Ronald Klaw- son whole for any loss of pay or benefits they have suffered by reason of our discrimination against them, with interest. NATIONAL MICRONETICS, INC. Thomas J. Sheridan, Esq. and Alfred M. Norek, Esq., for the General Counsel. 998 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Joseph B. Summa, Esq. and Henry Kelston, Esq., of Hart- ford, Connecticut, for the Respondent. Nicholas Lewis, Esq., of New York, New York, for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE WALTER H. MALONEY JR., Administrative Law Judge. This case came on for hearing before me at Albany and Kingston, New York, and Washington, D.C., upon an amended complaint,' consolidated with objections to an election, 2 which was issued against Respondent, National Micronetics, Inc., by the Acting Regional Director for Region 3, alleging, that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. More particularly, the amend- ed complaint alleges tha the Respondent threatened that, in the event of unionization, it would relocate plant fa- cilities, move to Mexico or California, replace existing employees with Mexican employees, purchase parts from Japan and lay off employees, replace striking employees, discharge employees, deny promotional opportunities to employees, impose more onerous working conditions upon employees, and restrict communication among and between employees. It further alleges that the Respond- ent promised employees that, if they rejected unioniza- tion, it would increase benefits, including the installation of a pension plan. It also alleges that the Respondent co- ercively interrogated employees concerning their union activities; told employees that bargaining would start at the bottom, would not bargain with a union, and would force a strike; and that the Respondent instituted in- creased benefits in the form of consumer discount cou- i The principal docket entries in Case 3-CA-10123 are as follows. Charge filed herein by International Union of Electrical, Radio and Ma- chine Workers, AFL-CIO, CLC (the Union or IUE), against the Re- spondent on November 24, 1980; amended charge filed on December 22, 1980; original complaint issued against the Respondent by the Acting Re- gional Director for Region 3 on December 22, 1980; the Respondent's answer filed on December 31, 1980; amended complaint issued against the Respondent on January 5, 1981, order consolidating case with objec- tions filed in Case 3-RC-7892 on January 6, 1981; second amendment to complaint issued on January 30, 1981, third amendment to complaint issued April 27, 1981; fourth amendment to complaint issued on May 5, 1981, the Respondent's amended answer filed on May 8, 1981, hearing held in Kingston and Albany, New York, and Washington, D.C, on May 11-13, 19, and 20 and June 12, 1981, briefs filed with me by the General Counsel and,the Respondent on or before June 27, 1981. The principal docket entries in the consolidated representation case are as follows: Peti- tion for election filed by the Union seeking to represent a unit composed of employees at the Respondent's three plants in Kingston, New York, on August 29, 1980, Stipulation for Certification Upon Consent approved by Regional Director on September 11, 1980, for election in a unit of pro- duction, maintenance, and plant clerical employees at the Respondent's three Kingston, New York plants, election held on October 29 and 30, 1981, at which the Petitioner received 121 votes, and 197 votes were cast against the Petitioner; objections to conduct of election filed by the Peti- tioner on November 6, 1980 2 The Respondent admits, and I find, that it is a New York corporation which maintains' its principal office in West Hurley, New York, and plants in West Hurley and Kingston, New York, where it is engaged in the manufacture and sale of recording heads and other technological products. In the course and conduct of its business, the Respondent annu- ally ships directly to points and places outside the State of New York goods and merchandise valued in excess of $50,000. The Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Sec 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec. 2(5) of the Act. pons for the purpose of dissuading employees from sup- porting the Union. The amended complaint also alleges that the Respondent rescinded overtime work assigned to Ronald Klawson and denied to William Clark the full amount of a promised wage increase because of union- related considerations. For the most part, these allega- tions of unlawful activity are identical to timely objec- tions to the conduct of the elections which the Charging Party herein filed on November 6, 1980. The Respondent denies the commission of each and every statutory viola- tion and act of objectionable conduct alleged herein. Upon these considerations, the issues herein were joined.4 FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION For about 12 years, Respondent has operated a plant or plants in Kingston, New York, a small town located near the Hudson River about 50 miles south of Albany. With the help of local financing and local governmental inducements, the Respondent established a plant in 1969 and it has grown to three plants plus a corporation head- quarters. At the so-called Semi-Films plant on Route 28 in West Hurley, the Respondent manufactures microelec- tronic components which are sold directly to various customers. In this operation, it employs about 70 hourly rated employees on three shifts. At the Grand Street fa- cility in Kingston, one division purchases raw powder and hot presses it into bricks and blocks. In another part of the Grand Street plant, the Respondent does glass bonding of various pieces to form components. In these operations about 120 hourly rated individuals are em- ployed. At the Broadway plant, the electronic parts are wafered, cut, and machined. About 90 hourly rated indi- viduals are employed at that plant. Most of the output of the Broadway and Grand Street plants is then trans- ferred to one of two plants which the Respondent ac- quired in 1971 from a customer. At these plants, the components are assembled, tested, and shipped. At these plants in San Diego, it employs about 400 employees. In addition, the Respondent operates a plant on a subcon- tract basis in Tijuana, Mexico, about 40 miles from the San Diego plants. The principal operating head of the Respondent com- pany is Ned Buoymaster, who founded the Company in New York and was a Kingston resident until about 2 years ago when he transferred his residence to Califor- nia. Although Buoymaster visits the Kingston plants fre- quently, the plants operate under the general direction and control of Thomas Selig, the Respondent's group vice president for Kingston activities. At no time have any of the Respondent's employees been represented by any labor organization. 3 The petition herein was filed on August 29, 1980, and the election was conducted on October 29 and 30, 1980. Accordingly, any conduct alleged as a basis for setting aside the election must have taken place within that tin eframe Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co, 138 NLRB 453 (1962) 4 Certain errors in the transcript are noted and corrected NATIONAL MICRONETICS II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO (the Union) began an organizing drive in May 1980, under the supervision of International Representative- Anthony Corrao. After the Union filed a representation petition on August 29, the campaign became heated and ended in a union defeat on October 30. With one or two exceptions, the events detailed here- inafter occurred during that period of time. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES (a) ][ credit the testimony of Maintenance Lead Opera- tor James Countryman that, early in the campaign, David LaLonde, his supervisor and now the senior man- ager at the Broadway plant, came up to Countryman at the Grand Street plant, where both were then employed, and told Countryman that the employees were talking union, Countryman replied that this was the first he had heard of it. LaLonde stated, "You know we can move this plant" and then walked away. This statement consti- tutes a threat of reprisal for union activities in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, but does not amount to ob- jectionable conduct affecting the results of the election because it occurred before the commencement of the Goodyear period. (b) A few weeks later, Countryman and LaLonde had another conversation about the organizing drive in La- Londe's office at the Grand Street' plant. During this conversation, LaLonde told Countryman about his expe- rience in another plant in Pennsylvania which was union- ized. He suggested to Countryman that people sometimes get bombs put in their mailbox and that having a union was no way to run a business. He also said that it is not a hard thing to move a plant. This latter statement consti- tutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act but is not objectionable conduct because it occurred outside the Goodyear period. (c) I credit Countryman's testimony that, on the Monday before the election, he spoke with LaLonde in the latter's new office at the Broadway plant. The pur- pose of Countryman's visit was to ask LaLonde for a raise for an employee named Stephan Burt. LaLonde told Countryman to come back Thursday "if we're still there." Countryman, who by then had surfaced as an active union adherent, told LaLonde that he had not come to the office to fight with LaLonde. The latter re- plied, "But we're in a fight."' LaLonde went on to say that if the vote on Wednesday went "yes," the first thing the Union would do would be to demand a dues check- off and close a union shop. He said that the Company would never agree to those proposals and there would be a stalemate and a strike. Countryman argued with La- Londe, saying that he did not think this would happen, reminding LaLonde that it would be the people in the plant who would have to vote to go on strike. LaLonde countered by saying that "When the union man tells you you're on strike, you're on strike." He insisted that unionization meant friction in the shop and that it was simply no way to run a business, it would mean that Countryman could not come in and talk to him on a one- on-one basis as they were doing now without a shop 999 steward. LaLonde said he was a compassionate man. He was not worried about himself, but was concerned for the people in the plant who would be out of work if a union came in. He added, "I like California. I like the weather out there." LaLonde's statement to Countryman to come back after the election "if we're still there" and similar re- marks indicating that the plant would close if the Union won the election are threats which both violate Section 8(a)(1) and constitute objectionable conduct. The further statement equating unionization with the inevitability of strikes is also objectionable conduct and a violation of the Act. Louis Gallet, Inc., 247 NLRB 63 (1980). (d) I credit Countryman's testimony that, sometime in mid-September, he had occasion to speak with Support Operations Manager Ronald Naccarato at the Broadway plant. They were near a poster of a woman who was carrying a "Strike" sign. Countryman observed that he did not think there was going to be a strike. Naccarato replied that he did not care whether there was a strike or not because he would be working in any event. He added that "We just built a building in California and this plant would fit in there perfectly." Naccarato's latter statement is a threat to move the plant in the event of unionization or a strike and is both a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and objectionable conduct.5 (e) I credit the testimony of Paul Soura that about a month before the election Machine Shop Supervisor Rich Tamburro spoke to him at the Grand Street plant and asked him what percentage of the Grand Street em- ployees had signed union cards. Soura refused to reply. This question constitutes coercive interrogation, violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and is objectionable conduct. (f) Sometime late in July or early August, Soura had a conversation with Tamburro in the latter's office. Short- ly after the conversation began, they were joined by Naccarato. Naccarato admits asking Soura, who was in the course of telling Tamburro what was wrong with the Company and how the Union could right those wrongs, what the Union could do for him. Soura replied that the Union could provide increased salary, better benefits, and more paid holidays. Naccarato replied that the wage rate at National Micronetics was about par for the area, since Kingston was a depressed area. Soura then asked Naccarato why, if the pay was so low, did he leave IBM and come to work for the Respondent. Naccarato an- swered that he thought that the Company had potential growth. I credit Soura's testimony that Naccarato added that if the Union came in with their high demands for money the Company could close "just, like that," and snapped his fingers. He also stated that the presence of a union would cause tension to exist between supervisors and union members. Naccarato's questioning of Soura in these circumstances constitutes coercive interrogation and his statement concerning the closing of the plant in the event of unionization constitutes an illegal threat. CBS Records Division, 223 NLRB 709 (1976). Although 5 Normally a violation of Sec 8(a)(1) of the Act constitutes objection- able conduct affecting the results of an election unless the violation is de minimus Dal-Tex Optical Co, 137 NLRB 1782 ( 1962), Caron Internation- al, 246 NLRB 1120 (1979). 1000 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD these utterances violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, they occurred before August 29 so they do not constitute ob- jectionable conduct. (g) Sometime in mid-September, Soura had a conversa- tion in the machine shop with Production Manager Fred Pohler, who was making a tour of the Grand Street plant at the time. I credit Soura's testimony that, in the course of:the discussion, Pohler asked Soura whether the latter had any plans for advancement. He said he had been watching Soura and liked the way he worked. He also noted that there was a supervisory position open in the department located across the hallway from the ma- chine shop and that someone like Soura could fit nicely into that job. At the time, Soura was wearing a union button or buttons. Pohler assured Soura that the fact that he was wearing union buttons had nothing to do with his statement concerning the supervisory position, but added that if the Union got in, it would be hard to go from any hourly rated position to supervisory status. Pohler's latter comment constitutes a threat in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) of the Act and also amounts to objectionable conduct. (h) Michele Conorman is a janitorial employee at the Broadway plant and works on the night shift. A few days before the October 29-30 election, Naccarato spoke with her at length concerning the Union. I credit her statement that Naccarato told her on this occasion that he had no doubt in his mind that if the Union got in, the plant would move to California and the Company would purchase the parts for its California operation from Japan. This statement is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and is also objectionable conduct. (i) Shortly before the election, Utility Operator Wil- liam Terwilliger had a brief conversation with Produc- tion Control Supervisor John Cashara near the produc- tion control room at the Grand Street plant. In the course of this discussion, Terwilliger expressed the view to Cashara that things would function a lot easier at the Company when the Union gets in. Cashara replied that Terwilliger should check with Richie Tamburro because he had worked in another plant which had shut down because of the Union.6 This statement constitutes a threat to close the plant in the event of unionization, vio- lates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and is objectionable con- duct. Centre Engineering, 253 NLRB 419 (1980); General Dynamics Corp., 250 NLRB 719 (1980). (j) Machinist Michael Modeen testified, without con- tradiction, that about a month before the election he had occasion to speak with his former supervisor Clark An- gevine in Angevine's office at the Grand Street plant. The occasion for the conversation was Modeen's period- ic performance review. In the course of this evaluation, Angevine asked Modeen how he felt about the Union. Modeen declined to answer. Under the circumstances of this questioning, Angevine's inquiry amounts to coercive interrogation, which violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and is objectionable conduct. Centre Engineering, supra. 6 Cashara's admitted statement on this occasion to Terwillinger was "check with Rtchie Tamburro He used to work for a place that had a union and ... [it is] not in existence any longer." There is no material difference between what Terwilliger testified Cashara said and what Ca- shara admitted saying (k) Ronald Tortorella is a utility operator on the second shift at the Grand Street plant. About a week before the election, he had a conversation about the or- ganizing campaign with his supervisor, Ron Hocker, while Hocker was handing out some antiunion literature. This conversation followed soon after a speech which Company President Ned Buoymaster had given to a massed assembly of Grand Street employees. Hocker told Tortorella that, in his opinion, if the Union got in, Buoymaster would exercise his right of shutting down the plant and moving it to California if he felt it was no longer competitive in the Kingston area. Tortorella asked Hocker why he felt this way and Rocker replied that the Japanese were the Company's main competitors and it was possible that the Company's profitability would no longer exist in Kingston under a union. Rock- er's admitted statement, equating unionization with lack of profitability and lack of profitability with moving the plant to California, constitutes a threat which violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and is objectionable conduct. Robert VanWagenen, a former machinist at the Grand Street plant, was summoned to the office of his supervi- sor, Robert Sturrock, a few days before the election. Sturrock is the new product design manager. Sturrock had heard from personnel specialist Brenda Hagadorn that Brenda Hagadorn's father, an official at another area plant, had interviewed VanWagenen for a job and that VanWagenen had told Hagadorn's father, in the course of that interview, that he was sure he would be fired if the Union lost the forthcoming election at National Mi- cronetics. Sturrock asked VanWagenen what it was he did not like about the Company. VanWagenen men- tioned that wages were not up to scale and that the Company lacked fringe benefits. Sturrock replied that National Micronetics was a small company and was still growing and "there's a lot to look forward to." I credit VanWagenen's testimony that Sturrock told him that he was aware that the Respondent had neglected to keep up with other companies in the past and he asked VanWa- genen to give them a second chance to see if they could make things better. Sturrock tried to assure VanWagenen that he had a good record and that he did not have to fear for his job if the Union lost. VanWagenen said he had no objection to working for Sturrock, but that the employees in the bond and bar department were working for supervisors who were very bad. He said that they needed a contract and needed to work under a set of rules which required supervisors to treat all employees alike. They discussed production problems, the purchase of ventilating equipment, and the fact that they had not gotten around to installing the ventilating equipment be- cause of production problems. Toward the end of their discussion, Sturrock asked VanWagenen why he felt the way he did about unions. VanWagenen replied that it was because unionization gave employees a chance to sit across the table with the Company' and bargain. Stur- rock's request to VanWagenen to "give the company a second chance" amounts to a promise of benefits in the event the Union is defeated and his question to VanWa- genen as to why the latter favored unions constitutes ille- gal interrogation. Both statements violate Section 8(a)(1) NATIONAL MICRONETICS of the Act and are objectionable conduct.' Hubbard Re- gional Hospital, 232 NLRB 858 (1977). (m) Just before the election, Buoymaster made a tour of each of the plants, shaking hands with each employee and, in effect, electioneering in support of a "No" vote at the election. In the course of his tour, he met VanWa- genen, who was wearing an IUE pin. I credit VanWa- genen's testimony to the effect that Buoymaster looked at his IUE pin and said that he wished VanWagenen would give him a second chance so he could keep the operation in the area. VanWagenen asked Buoymaster why he waited so long to come around and find out all the problems that the employees had, and Buoymaster gave no responsive answer. He just asked VanWagenen to reconsider his position and walked away. Buoymas- ter's request that VanWagenen give the Company a second chance to keep the Company in the area amounts to an implied threat that supporting the Union would cause the plant to move. This statement is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and is objectionable conduct. (n) The day before the election, Robert Friedlander, a machinist on the first shift at the Broadway plant, was summoned to the office of Operations Manager David LaLonde, where they discussed the financial status of the Company. During the course of this discussion, LaLonde showed Friedlander various financial statements pertain- ing to the Respondent's operations. I credit Friedlander's testimony that LaLonde told him on this occasion that if the Union came into the plant, it would adversely affect the profitability of the operation and that he could move the floppy line in a week.8 This statement amounts to a threat to relocate a portion of the Respondent's oper- ation, in the event of unionization, violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, and is objectionable conduct. (o) During September and October, Charles Havlin, an inspector at the Grand Street plant, was repeatedly ques- tioned in conversations with his supervisor, Clark Ange- vine, as to how Havlin felt about the Union, why Havlin wanted to join a union, and how many members he thought the Union had.9 This repeated interrogation vio- lates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and is objectionable con- duct. Centre Engineering, supra; Birdsall Construction Co., 198 NLRB 163 (1967), enfd. 487 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1973). (p) I credit the uncontradicted testimony of Betty Gallo, an assembly line employee at the Broadway plant, that a few days before the election her supervisor, Larry Walters, spoke to her concerning the election. He told her that she did not have to vote "yes" now but could wait, suggesting that if she did not get any benefits or what she wanted, she could vote again in 6 months or a year. This statement constitutes an implied promise that the Respondent would grant benefits to employees if 7 The fact that VanWagenen testified that he did not regard Sturrock's statements to be promises or threats is immaterial and is not even proper testimony. It went into evidence because no objection was interposed to it. It is well established that the Board utilizes an objective standard, not a subjective standard, in determining whether statements constitute threats or promises Fidelity Telephone Co, 236 NLRB 166 (1978). s In fact, the Respondent did move a portion of the, floppy line to its San Diego plant a few months later 9 Ilavlm's testimony concerning these conversations is uncontradicted, as Angevine did not testify. 1001 they voted against the Union. As such, it violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and is objectionable conduct. (q) The Respondent distributed to all its employees a xeroxed copy of the summary of a Board decision in Oxford Pickles, 190 NLRB 109 (1971), as it appeared in 77 LRRM 1049. Before distributing the copy of this page, the Respondent wrote in ink at the top of the page: "Here's the facts from the National Labor Relations Board. They are neutral. This is the law-read it." The Respondent also underlined and highlighted certain mat- ters appearing in the LRRM headnotes and summary. The Respondent underlined and characterized as "Fact No. I" the quotation, "LMRA does not require that em- ployer accede to all union demands or, after bargaining, retail all current benefits." As "Facts No. 2 and 3," it un- derlined the sentence "in fact, an employer may perma- nently replace economic strikers and presence of union does not prohibit an employer from moving its plant should economic conditions dictate." As "Fact No. 4," the Respondent underlined "all union promises of im- proved benefits are not attainable without prior employer assent." In the portion of the LRRM case report which quotes the text of the Board decision, the Respondent highlighted the statement in the Board's decision which read: With regard to the answers to the questions, there is no requirement in the Act that an employer accede to all union demands or, after bargaining, retain all current benefits. Nor does the presence of a union prohibit an employer from moving its plant should economic conditions dictate . Similarly, an employer may permanently replace economic strikers. The Respondent also emphasized with a notation "True" the statement "all union promises of improved benefits are not attainable without prior employer assent." The Board has been of two minds concerning the pro- priety of disseminating as campaign propaganda copies of its majority decision in Oxford Pickles. In Glassmaster Plastics Co., 203 NLRB 944 (1973), the Board held that such activity contained both threats of reprisal and promises of benefits and found it to be objectionable on that account. In CBS Records Division , supra, the re- spondent disseminated a copy of the Oxford Pickles deci- sion along with a cover sheet summarizing its main points. He also read at a massed assembly of employees one small excerpt from the decision relating to an em- ployer's duty to bargain and its right to replace econom- ic strikers. The Board found in CBS that the employer's conduct was not objectionable. Faced with this choice of precedents, I can only conclude that the determinative factor concerning the legality or illegality of distributing the Oxford Pickles decision as a piece of campaign propa- ganda is the context in which it is done. In this case the Respondent's action took place against a background of extensive activity which has been found to be either a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act or objectionable or both. Accordingly, as it contains this coloration, the Respondent's distribution of, the Oxford Pickles decision in this case must perforce fall under the umbrella of the Glassmaster decision, so I find it to be objectionable con- 1002 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD duct which affected the result of the October 29-30 elec- tion. (r) I credit the testimony of Diana Eckert, an employ- ee in the loading department at the West Hurley plant, that sometime in June her supervisor, Al Troccia, called her aside for a private meeting near the loading dock. In the course of this conversation, Troccia told her that a friend of hers named Connie had been "fingered" as having talked with the Union and that he had also heard her name mentioned in this connection. He told Eckert that he did not want to hear her name mentioned again in this connection or she would not have a job. He went on to say that he had received a note accusing her of taking documents from his desk and xeroxing them. He warned her if he ever had proof that she was doing this, she would be fired. Troccia's statement that Connie had been "fingered" as talking with the Union and that Diana Eckert had been mentioned in connection with union; ac- tivities is an attempt to create the impression that the union activities of employees are subject to company sur- veillance. Both this statement and his threat to Diana that she would be fired if her name again came up in the context of her union activities violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. (s) Troccia also told Diana Eckert that she could talk union on her lunch hour but not on her breaktime be- cause breaks were being paid for by the Company. This instruction imposed an overly broad no-solicitation rule on her for which there is no business justification. Ac- cordingly, it offends settled Board and court law on the subject and is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); Bandag; Inc., 225 NLRB 72 (1976), enfd. 583 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1978); Stoddard-Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962); Singer Co., 220 NLRB 1179 (1975); and Campbell Soup Co., 225 NLRB 222 (1976). See also TRW Bearings, 257 NLRB 442 (1981). (t) Diana Eckert complained that on August 23 Troc- cia rode by her house on his motorcycle and stopped to speak to her. He reportedly told her that he had been talking with a supervisor and asked her if she had signed a statement against somebody. He wanted to know if it was he that she had signed a statement against and if she knew who did sign the statement and what it was about. Troccia denies making these statements. Even if Diana Eckert's testimony is credited, the comments recounted by her as having been made on this occasion do not amount to a violation of the Act because there is no evi- dence that the statement in question related to protected activity, a Board investigation, or even to labor relations generally. Accordingly, so much of the amended com- plaint which alleges violations in this regard must be dis- missed. (u) During the organizing campaign, the Company permitted both prounion and antiunion literature to be posted on company bulletin boards. Diana Eckert com- plained that after she had posted a piece of union litera- ture on the bulletin board, it had been removed, defaced, and reposted in an altered form. In its altered form, it ap- peared to be a piece of antiunion literature. When she re- moved the defaced copy, Keith Klein, the quality assur- ance supervisor at the West Hurley plant, told her that she could not remove any literature from the bulletin board, and said she could be punished for doing so. She complained to Klein that someone had taken her litera- ture down, defaced it, and put it back on the bulletin board. Klein said there was nothing the Company could do about that because the person responsible was not seen doing so. However, Diana Eckert was seen remov- ing literature and she would be punished if she did it. An employer may, in the absence of contract provi- sions to the contrary, limit or forbid the use of an em- ployee bulletin board located on company premises for the purpose of posting any kind of personal material. Where, as here, an employer permits campaign materials to be posted, it must do so on an even-handed basis. Challenge Cook Bros., 153 NLRB 92 (1965). Group One Broadcasting Co., 222 NLRB 993, 999 (1976); Midwest Stock Exchange, 244 NLRB 1108 (1979). In the instant case, there was an obvious lack of even-handedness in maintaining the bulletin board for campaign propaganda. Diana Eckert was criticized and threatened with punish- ment for attempting to rectify the violation of the Re- spondent's rules by one of the Respondent's antiunion employees, while the Respondent professed inability to police its own rule with respect to employees who saw things the Respondent's way. Accordingly, Klein's threat to Diana Eckert was, under these circumstances, a viola- tion of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and was also objection- able conduct. (v) About a week before the election, Buoymaster told Tamburro to inform employees at the Grand Street plant that he would be going from shop to shop and from office to office and would be available to discuss any problems which employees might have. Early in the morning, employees Ken Gsell and Paul Soura requested permission to speak with Buoymaster and were able to do so. They were later joined by Joe Gleich They began bringing to his attention certain problems which they were experiencing in the machine shop and stated that they were looking to the Union for help in address- ing problems that the Company had been overlooking. Specifically, they complained about the poor ventilation, the condition of the floor, and the condition of the old machines. They also said that they wanted more sick days and more holidays. I credit Gleich's testimony that Buoymaster responded by discussing the fact that the Japanese were causing the Company to lose money and that the Respondent had lost about $1.5 million in the Kingston area. He said that they could not continue to operate and lose that kind of- money and that with a union they could not afford to go on like that. He said that the Japanese could easily supply the Respondent's West Coast division for the same price that the Kingston plants were selling that division. Gleich asked Buoymas- ter if he thought that the Kingston employees were over- paid. Buoymaster replied that he thought that there was more to it than that. To the complaints which were voiced, Buoymaster stated that at that moment his hands were tied and he could not do anything about their com7 plaints, but that he would look further into the condi- tions they mentioned. NATIONAL MICRONETICS Soliciting employee grievances during an election cam- paign with a view toward adjusting them is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and is also objectionable conduct. Reliance Electric Co., 191 NLRB 44 (1971); Hi- Lo Foods, 247 NLRB 1079 (1980); Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 NLRB 196 (1980); Berger Transfer & Storage Co., 253 NLRB 5 (1980). It is of little consequence that in the course of such solicitation an employer makes an express disclaimer of doing anything about the griev- ances it uncovers, if in fact it moves to remedy the griev- ances or if it also promises, at the same time, to look into the problems which have been brought to its attention. Illinois Central Community Hospital, 224 NLRB 632 (1976); EMR Photoelectric, 251 NLRB 1597 (1980). Stride Rite Corp., 228 NLRB 224 (1977). Statements such as "my hands are tied," made in response to employee de- mands for improvements during a representation carn- paign, have also been held to be violative of the Act, in that they have been regarded as an attempt by an em- ployer to place the stigma of refusal to grant benefits on a union. Centre Engineering, 253 NLRB 419, 421 fn. 12 and cases cited therein. In this case, Buoymaster, who makes his home in California, came to Kingston during the final week of the campaign to engage in some vigor- ous electioneering, much of which is discussed elsewhere in this decision. Making the rounds to solicit employee grievances was a part of this electioneering effort. Sounding out employees at this critical interval could have no other purpose than to implant in their minds the idea that the Company was receptive to their complaints and would do something about them. Statements like "my, hands are tied," and "I will look into your com- plaints" in no way detract from this message and serve only to reinforce an impression the Respondent wished to convey without incurring the legal onus of conveying it. Accordingly, I conclude that by soliciting grievances from Kingston employees during the final week of the campaign, Buoymaster violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and engaged in objectionable conduct. (w) For a number of years, local merchants (or local outlets o' national concerns) have supplied the Respond- ent with discount coupons or similar promotional offers which would permit employees to obtain such things as eyeglasses, auto transmission work, and rental cars at re- duced prices. Normally such discount benefits were dis- tributed to employees once or twice a year. In the course of one of the instructional meetings which the Respond- ent ]Labor Counsel Summa held for first line supervisors in July 1980, he mentioned that the Respondent was looking into developing some programs to provide bene- fits for employees as a means of counteracting the union drive that was in progress. Within the next month, the Respondent distributed to employees three discount ben- efits-one for rental cars, one for eyeglasses, and one for transmission work-which had been made available by local merchants. No such aggregation of discount bene- fits in such a short period of time had ever been previ- ously made available. It is obvious, both from the timing and bunching of discount coupons and Summa's an- nouncement to supervisors, that thses coupons were dis- tributed in the number and manner they were in order to convey the employees the idea that they did not need a 1003 union to obtain benefits as the Respondent's employees. Accordingly, this distribution constitutes a grant of bene- fits which violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Because this grant anticipated by a few weeks the filing of the representation petition, it does not constitute objection- able conduct. (x) About September 4, 1980, Wes Robinson, a vice president of the Company, held a number of small meet- ings of employees in his office at the Grand Street plant at which he discussed the organizing drive which had just reached the stage of the filing of a representation pe- tition. He held other similar meetings later in the cam- paign. Robinson had a prepared text which he used during one of these meetings. However, from time to time he departed from this text in response to employees' questions and comments or because he felt that the deliv- ery of his message would be impaired by simply reading from a piece of paper. The thrust of his text was to con- vince employees not to support the union drive. I credit the testimony of former Supervisor Ronald Klawson that at the meeting he attended Robinson told employees that if a union came in, it would make outrageous demands which would break the Company. Robinson mentioned that he was new in his particular job, that others could vouch for the fact that he was really a decent individual, and he asked employees to give him some time. He stated, in the course of the discussion, thal the Company could not deal with a union. Klawson objected and brought up the case of Chrysler and its union, observing that the two sides sat down and worked out their prob- lems. Robinson replied he felt that there was no way that the Union trying to organize National Micronetics would be agreeable and there was no way that the Company would be able to exist with them. I credit the testimony of William Morris, William Ter- williger, and Thomas Peoples to the effect that at an- other employee meeting, held by Robinson, Robinson stated the Respondent could not afford a union. He stated that if the Union came in, the Company would ne- gotiate only "by law" but there would be no contract the employees would have to "walk." Robinson also said that the employees would lose everything they now had because we "would start from the bottom and work our way up." He went on to say that every employee could be permanently replaced and that the Company had 400 applications in the office from people who were ready to take their jobs. Morris interrupted Robinson and object- ed to his statement, saying that employees could,only be permanently replaced in the event of an economic strike and, if a strike occurred, it would not be an economic strike. Robinson contradicted him, stating that employees could be permanently replaced in any strike. He also told employees that the Company could close down its Kingston operation, buy parts from Japan, and have them shipped to the West Coast plants. I credit the testimony of Robert VanWagenen that at another employee meeting Robinson told employees that if the Union won the election and the Respondent could demonstrate that it was losing money, it could either close the plant or employees could end up with less than they already have. He also said that by law the Compa- 1004 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ny had to negotiate with the Union, but it did not have to give them anything and it could force employees out on strike. He mentioned that he had 400 job applications in his office and he could hire employees off the street to replace strikers and make permanent jobs for those em- ployees. I credit the testimony of Joseph Gleich that during one of Robinson's employee meetings, Robinson stated that because of the Company's financial problems it could not afford a union. Robinson went on to say that if the Union came in, it would call an economic strike and the Company would not negotiate at all. He also in- formed employees that during an economic strike all striking employees could and would be replaced. Gleich began to ask Robinson some questions, including a ques- tion concerning a long-proposed pension plan. Robinson simply said it was in the works, but he could not promise anything since it was illegal at this point to promise ben- efits. Gleich began to argue with him, asking him why it was that he could not promise anything good but could promise employees the worst, like strikes and relocation of the plant. Robinson's reply was, "That's not a prom- ise. That's a fact." Gleich went on to ask Robinson how the Company could afford to train strike replacements. Robinson answered, "That's just it. If the Union gets in and they strike, we can't afford to replace them and train people. We'll just have to move out of the area." It is an unfair labor practice and objectionable conduct for an employer, in the course of an organizing cam- paign, to tell employees that bargaining would start "from scratch" or "from the bottom up," if the thrust of these remarks is to connote the idea that the Respondent would discontinue existing benefits if it had to engage in collective bargaining. Madison Kipp Co., 240 NLRB 879 (1979); Centre Engineering, supra; Taylor-Dunn Mfg. Co., 252 NLRB 799 (1980). Announcing an anticipatory refus- al to bargain in the event of unionization is likewise vio- lative of the Act. Buckeye Tempo Gamble-Skogmo, 240 NLRB 723 (1979). Such statements do not lose their ille- gal character because, on other occasions or indeed on the same occasion, an employer spokesman proclaims co- lorable compliance with the law by saying that it will bargain in good faith: Contradicting oneself is no defense to an unfair labor practice charge, since an employer spokesman who "carries water on both shoulders" simply leaves his hearers in the position of being reason- ably apprehensive that their employer may violate the law and interfere with their Section 7 rights. Robinson's above-quoted remarks offend in these particulars. Chester Valley, Inc., 251 NLRB 1435 (1980). Likewise, telling employees that unionization inevita- bly leads to strikes constitutes a violation of the Act. Louis Gallet, Inc., supra. As noted before, asking employ- ees to give the Employer another chance is a violation of the Act and asking employees to give the Employer more time, meaning to vote against the Union and let the Employer improve benefits and conditions without col- lective bargaining, falls in the same category. EMR Pho- toelectric, supra; C-F Air Freight, 247 NLRB 403 (1980). It has also been repeatedly held that misstatements of an employee's right of reinstatement after a strike, as set forth in Laidlaw Corp., 171 NLRB 1366 (1968), enfd. 414 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1969), is a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act because inherent in such misrepresentations or misstatements is the threat of complete loss of employ- ment in the event an employee exercises his Section 7 rights. Webel Feed Mills, 217 NLRB 815 (1975); Utlaut Memorial Hospital, 249 NLRB 1153 (1980); Peat Mfg. Co., 251 NLRB 1117 (1980); Piezo Technology, 253 NLRB 900 (1980). A threat to close the plant in the event of unionization is an obvious violation. Robinson's quoted remarks violate Section 8(a)(1) and are objection- able conduct for these reasons as well. Statements that striking employees can and will be replaced, that job ap- plications of 400 strike replacements are on file, that strikers other than economic strikers could be replaced, and that permanent jobs would be made for strike re- placements carry the unmistakable message that striking is the equivalent to losing one's job and that once an em- ployee goes out on strike, he or she has no chance of re- turning to work for the Respondent. (y) I do not credit statements by various employee witnesses that the Respondent's spokesman told them that union authorization cards would be made available to the Respondent for inspection. I believe that these em- ployees confused the announced procedure of supplying the Board with W-4 forms for verification of a showing of interest with actual inspection by the Respondent of cards which had been signed. Accordingly, I would dis- miss so much of the amended complaint which alleges surveillance or impression of surveillance of union activi- ties through inspection of union cards and would over- rule the objection to the election in this regard. (z) Sometime before the representation petition was filed, Thomas Selig, Respondent's group vice president for Kingston activities, addressed groups of employees at the Respondent's three Kingston plants. At that time, he conducted a total of nine meetings and presumably reached all or almost all the Respondent's 400 Kingston employees. He told employees that he wanted to make sure that they realized the implication of signing union cards, that it would be possible for them to end up with a union even without an election on the basis of signed cards, and he further wanted them to know that he was strongly opposed to the unionization of plants. He out- lined for them the mechanics of the Board's election pro- cedure. He informed them that the election, which would take place in the event a representation petition was filed, would be a secret-ballot election. He assured employees that the Board would oversee whatever the Company and the Union did in the way of campaigning. There was nothing in Selig's remarks on this occasion to warrant a finding of a violation. As they were made before the filing of a representation petition, they could not in any event be regarded as objectionable conduct. (aa) Shortly after the petition was filed, Selig and Edward Finnegan, the Respondent's financial and admin- istrative vice president, spoke at a series of massed as= semblies at each of the Kingston plants to discuss what the Respondent came to call its pension profit-sharing NATIONAL MICRONETICS plan.' 0' With the help of a projector and overlays, it out- lined the course of the Respondent's efforts over the past 2 years in instituting this amorphous fringe benefit-dis- playing correspondence with prospective fund adminis- trators, government agencies, and others. The outline of the Selig-Finnegan explanation stopped with a time con- temporaneous with the beginning of the union drive. I do not think that the discussion constituted anything other than an informational effort and I believe that no promises, expressed or implied, were made on those oc- casions. Accordingly, I would dismiss so much of the amended complaint which alleges a violation in this regard and overrule the objection leveled at these talks. (bb) On October 30, following the defeat of the Union at the representation election, Selig sent a memorandum to all Kingston employees which read, in pertinent part: I want to write and personally thank and congratu- late you on defeating the IUE attempt to organize our company. The IUE has one last chance to prove [to] us that they were really interested in the welfare of Nation- al Micronetics Employees and not their own treas- ury. If the IUE is truly concerned about the welfare of our employees they will accept the results of a fair secret ballot election and allow all of us to im- mediately join together and get to work solving the problems that face us. On the other hand, if the IUE does not accept the results of the fair democratic election, but instead files frivolous unfair labor practices and objections, this which would serve no purpose but to harass the company and its employees and thus delay the posi- tive measures which can only benefit all of us. This will also very clearly show us the IUE's true colors. Selig's parting shot did not explain to employees that ex- pected benefits would have to be deferred pending the outcome of an election in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety. It simply was an attempt to head off the filing of charges and objections-many which have been proven to be meritorious-by anticipatorily pinning the blame for its refusal to grant improvements and benefits to employees on a labor organization which might wish to exercise its rights under the Act, but had not yet done so. As such, this letter violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Centre Engineering, supra. (cc) Ronald Klawson was hired as a production super- visor on the night shift at the Grand Street factory. In mid-September 1980, he was demoted to a nonstiperviso- ry position but without loss of income. Late in Novem- ber he was laid off. On October 21 and again on October 10 From discussions in the record from counsel and witnesses, it is dif- ficult to determine just what kind of plan the Respondent was talking about It was not talking about the creation of a fund which would pay reined employees fixed amounts on a periodic basis (pension plan) and it was not talking about a current distribution of a portion of the profits to employee shareholders (profit-sharing plan) The shape of what emerged in this discussion was something called a profit-sharing-pension plan, but which was really not a plan for much of anything. 1005 25, Klawson authored two vigorous prounion letters which were disseminated by the Union just before the election to all the Respondent's Kingston 'employees. About October 24, John Cashara, the supervisor of pro- duction control at the Grand Street factory, called Klawson into his office and began to talk with him. He told Klawson that he was aware of his union activity and stated that he could not understand why Klawson had done what he had done. I credit Klawson's testimony that Cashara told him on this occasion that he had given up his chance for advancement in the Company and, spe- cifically, any chance of moving to Cashara's job if and when Cashara was promoted. About that time, Fred Pohler, the production manager at the Grand Street fac- tory, walked into Cashara's office from his own office next door and briefly participated in the conversation in progress. Pohler told Klawson that it was too bad that he had chosen to affiliate with the Union because he had a good background in production control and this was the kind of experience the Company was looking for. A few days later, Klawson had occasion to enter Pohler's office, where they discussed the second union campaign letter that Klawson had written. Pohler told Klawson that it was too bad that he had gone ahead with the letter and he had hoped that Klawson would have used better judgement. He told Klawson that he felt that he had given up any chance for advancement at Micronetics. Klawson replied by stating that he felt the Company needed a pension plan, that the employees were grossly underpaid, and that there were numerous safety violations in the plant. At this point, Robinson happened to walk into Pohler's office. Pohler asked Klawson to repeat to Robinson' what he had just said and Klawson did so. Robinson's reply was a request to Klawson to give him a chance because he thought that he could improve the situation. Statements by Pohler and Cashara that Klawson had forfeited any chance of advancement by engaging in union activities constitute violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. C-F Air Freight, supra. I find that they occurred before the election so they also constitute objectionable conduct. Robinson's request to Klawson to "give him a chance," because he thought he could improve the situa- tion, is an illegal promise of benefit, given for refraining from union activities, which violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and is also objectionable conduct. (dd) Keith Klein was formerly the quality assurance supervisor at the West Hurley plant (just outside Kings- ton). During the election campaign, he held frequent em- ployee meetings to discuss matters which were in issue. During one such meeting, which took place just before the election, Klein told employees that, if the Union came in, there would be strict job classifications and em- ployees would not be able to switch from department to department. He also suggested that this rigidity would probably lead to layoffs. He told employees that, for a long time, the Company has not been listening to its work force but now they were aware of its problems and there were going to be some changes made. He did not specify what those changes might be. Klein's remarks concerning strict job classifications, impai red opportunity 1006 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD to switch jobs, and possible layoffs constitutes a threat which violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and is objec- tionable conduct. His other remark about changes which were going to be made constitutes a promise of benefits which also violates Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and is ob- jectionable conduct. Hinky Dinky Super Markets, 247 NLRB 1176 (1980); Lyman Steel Co., 249 NLRB 296 (1980). (ee) On the Friday before the election, Buoymaster gave massed assembly speeches to all employees on all shifts in each of the three Kingston factories. He spoke a total of six times and attempted to deliver the same re- marks on each occasion. He did not use a text for the bulk of his remarks but did read verbatim the final state- ment on each occasion. Much of the testimony in this record is devoted to conflicting versions of just what Buoymaster said on each of these six occasions. i i Rec- onciling these differing versions is a difficult chore and, in the last analysis, a pointless one because , in the light of the violations and objectionable conduct found above, any finding relating to the Buoymaster speeches would not affect the recommended Order in the complaint case or the disposition of the representation case. Buoymaster began each of his talks by noting that a representation election was going to take place the fol- lowing week, that the decision to be made at the election was an important one, and that the he hoped the employ- ees at the Kingston plants would vote for the Company and against the Union. He recounted how the Company started in the Kingston area with the help of local banks and governmental agencies and he said he had affection for the Kingston area. t 2 However, he told them that the Company had been losing money in the Grand Street and Broadway operations, that it was working hard to cut these losses, and that a union would not help this effort. He stated that modifications were going to have to be made in order to make the Company profitable but he did not spell out what these modifications might be. He mentioned the fact that the Company had plants in San Diego and that it had a plant in Tijuana, Mexico, where the labor rate was about $1.30 per hour . He stated that he had an obligation to the stockholders to operate the plant profitably and that if anything made it impossi- ble for it to be economically competitive, the Company had the right to relocate. He also mentioned that the Company's California competitors buy their products from Japanese companies and that the Respondent could have saved $100,000 by doing the same thing rather than using the products of the Kingston plants, but it did not want to do so. i i In response to prompting by leading questions, many witnesses pro- duced by the Respondent testified that Buoymaster did not threaten to move the plant or to buy parts from the Japanese in the event of union- ization Other witnesses quite emphatically understood him to be say that if the Union came in, the Company would move to California or Mexico and the Kingston employees would lose their jobs Under well-estab- lished precedents, characterizations, reactions, and inferences drawn by members of an audience are not dispositive of whether a speech does or does not exceed permissible bounds. 12 Buoymaster lived in the Kingston area about 20 years, but moved to California about 2 years ago Since his relocation, he visits the Kingston plants on a frequent basis An employer who presses an antiunion campaign effort to the ultimate limits the law allows takes the risk that it will go too far and, when it does, the Board and the courts have expressed little sympathy with a tactic they have labeled "brinkmanship." Piezo Techonology, supra; Wausau Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 377 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1967); NLRB Y. Solbora Knitting Mills, 572 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Rollins Telecasting, 494 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1974). Although subjective reactions of particu- lar employees do not determine whether a given speech violates the Act, the risk that a reasonably prudent em- ployee may misunderstand the remarks of his employer when it urges a "No" vote, and be reasonably led to be- lieve that unionization will cause loss of jobs, plant relo- cations, and other adverse consequences is on the speak- er. The Respondent has urged me to evaluate Buoymas- ter's statements, as well as other wrongful acts alleged in the amended complaint, in proper context, and indeed I will, both as to external context of Buoymaster's state- ment concerning the Respondent's economic difficulties, its plants in other locations, the low wage rate in Tijua- na, his ability to purchase parts more cheaply from Japan, and his right to relocate the plant if it became economically unfeasible to remain in Kingston, is that they came as the final (or semifinal) blows in a constant hammering at employees that had taken place for nearly 3 months. This campaign effort, euphemistically de- scribed as vigorous or spirited, was also illegal in many particulars. As found above, company spokesmen fre- quently employed threats and promises to achieve their ends. Buoymaster's comment concerning the possibility of operating at other locations in the event of unioniza- tion was not the first talk that some employees had heard on this subject. The other expressions of this same thought were not uttered in carefully crafted phrases. If, on the basis of other employer statements, employees reasonably put two and two together in listening to Buoymaster and then came up with four, the Respondent is responsible for the sum total. With respect to the speech itself, Buoymaster's whole purpose in delivering it was to urge employees to vote against the Union and to give them reasons for doing so. His opening remarks were a "Vote No" pitch and his un- flattering references thereafter to the Union were a reit- eration of the same theme. If the "bottom line" of a speech was "Vote No," then anything said within the framework of the speech was merely for emphasis. What relevance does the existence of other plants in California, the low wage rate in Tijuana, the economic losses at Kingston, the low price of Japanese parts, and the right to relocate have in a speech urging rejection of the Union unless it was to let the audience know that these possibilities were definitely in the offing if they did not follow the speaker's advice? Buoymaster's explanation that he combined these supposedly unconnected thoughts into one statement simply to let the Kingston employees know what a generous and indulgent Company they were working for is unworthy of comment. Any doubt as to the Company's continued indulgence and generosi- ty was quickly dispelled by his reminder of its right to relocate if it became uncompetitive. Although Buoymas- NATIONAL MICRONETICS ter's explicit remarks were not that unionization equaled plant relocation, the equation he drew for employees was that unionization-lack of connpetitiveness-plant reloca- tion. This was not a Gissel-authorized prediction based on objective facts but a calculated threat spun out at some length. As such, it violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act and is objectionable conduct. B. The Alleged 8(a)(3) Violations 1. The elimination of Klawson's overtime After Klawson was demoted to a nonsupervisory posi- tion, he and other production control employees at the Grand Street plant were frequently assigned Saturday overtime on a rotating basis. On the last Saturday of each month, several employees in this section, including Klawson, normally worked together to take inventory. According to Klawson, he frequently worked in tandem with Anton W. Eisenbeil. If one had Saturday duty, the other normally did not, except on the last Saturday of the month. Recollections of witnesses differed on who worked which Saturdays in October 1980. The Respondent's records indicate that Eisenbeil worked overtime on Oc- tober 4, 11, and 25 and on November 1. They also reflect that Klawson worked overtime on October 4, 18, and 25, but not on November 1. It is the assignment of overtime to Eisenbeil on November I and not to Klawson that gives rise to Klawson's claim of discrimination. On October 21, the Respondent posted a duty roster both for regular weekly work and for Saturday schedule for Klawson and Eisenbeil during the first four Satur- days in November. Klawson was scheduled to work on November 1 and 15 and Eisenbeil was scheduled to work on November 8 and 22. On October 30, the second day of the election, Cashara told Klawson that Saturday overtime was being eliminated, except possibly on the last Saturday of each month. As a result, Klawson did not work on November 1, although he subsequently learned that Eisenbeil did. Neither worked any additional overtime in November and Klawson was laid off late in November. It should be noted that between the time that the duty roster was posted on October 21 and the time Klawson was notified on October 30 that he would not work on November 1, Klawson had blossomed forth as a leading union adherent. He wrote two widely circulated proun- ion campaign letters, which were discussed, supra, and he was the subject of several violative statements uttered by Cashara, Pohler, and Robinson during or just before the same week his overtime was canceled. Klawson was the Union's observer at the October 29-30 election and this fact became known just before his overtime was can- celed. When Cashara notified Klawson that he would not be working on November 1, the explanation that he gave was that all Saturday overtime was thereafter being can- celed, except on the last weekend of the month. This was not entirely true. Eisenbeil's overtime was not can- celed until after November 1, on which date he substitut- ed for Klawson. The Respondent's fallback explanation for this reassignment, offered at trial, was that the substi- 1007 tution of Eisenbeil for Klawson was brought about in order to follow the customary rotation of Eisenbeil and Klawson, noting that Eisenbeil had not worked on Octo- ber 18 while Klawson did, and that on October 25, the last Saturday of the month, both men had worked. This explanation ignores the fact that the November 1 assign- ment to Klawson was made in writing on October 21, the Tuesday following the Saturday when Klawson worked and Eisenbeil did not. No mention was made at that time of the excuse prompting the eventual switch and there is no reason to believe that any unfairness arose from this schedule, as posted, since Klawson worked a total of three Saturdays in October and Eisen- beil worked the same number. Based on factors of company knowledge, collateral animus, the timing of the elimination of Klawson's No- vember 1 overtime, and the deceptiveness with which it was done, I conclude that the Respondent eliminated Klawson's November 1 overtime in order to take reprisal against him for his leading effort in the unsuccessful union campaign. The Respondent's action in this regard violates Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 2. The delay in Clark's promotion Between May 5, 1980, and January 5, 1981, William Clark was employed as a vacuum technician at the Broadway Street plant. I credit his testimony to the effect that, when he was interviewed on May 5 by Nac- carato, he was told that he would be hired as a proba- tionary employee at $3.92 per hour and, if at the end of 3 months he proved satisfactory, he would be given a raise to $5 per hour and reclassified as a salaried nonexempt employee.13 On August 7, Naccarato and Clark had a performance review, in the course of which Naccarato told Clark that he had exceeded the Company's expecta- tions but that he was getting a raise only to $4.40 rather than $5 because if the Respondent gave him too much, its action could be construed as a favor designed to influ- ence him to vote against the Union. On Monday, October 19, after returning from a week- long training session in Detroit, Clark encountered Ray Grogan, who is now the Respondent's plant manager. Grogan asked Clark why he was wearing a union button, pointing out to him that the Company had just spent a lot of money to provide him with a week of training in Detroit. Clark replied that the training was the only promise the Company had kept. When he explained what had taken place at his initial interview, Grogan replied that he had not been aware of the problem but that there was nothing he could do for the moment because of the forthcoming election. He did promise Clark that after the election he would see what he could do about Clark's complaint. The week following the election Clark was given a raise to $5 per hour, as promised, and was reclas- sified into a salaried nonexempt position. It has frequently been said that when faced with the question of making wage increases and other improve- 13 In addition to demeanor, this resolution is also based on the fact that the raise which Clark ultimately received in early November, along with the reclassification, was exactly what he claims had been promised to him on May 5 1008 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD ments in benefits during an election campaign, an em- ployer is obligated to act as if there were no campaign in progress. If a promised wage increase has been sched- uled, it may take place as scheduled. Where regular and recurring increases normally fall due, they may be paid. In this instance, the Repondent did not act on August 7 as if there were no union in its labor relations picture. It denied Clark 60 cents of a promised $1.08 hourly raise under the credited reason that a representation campaign was taking shape. How the Respondent could justify a 48 cents raise at this time, despite the organizing effort which was in progress, but deny the full amount prom- ised because of possible preelection improprieties, is a question that has not been answered and which the Re- spondent sought to avoid answering by a defense, the factual premises of which has been discredited. When, on August 7, the Respondent denied Clark a promised raise and reclassification because of union-related consider- ation, it violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. When, on October 19, it again postponed this raise, it again violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act and en- gaged in objectionable conduct within the Goodyear period. On these findings of fact, and on the entire record, I make the following CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The Respondent, National Micronetics, Inc., is now and at all times material herein has been engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. International Union of Electrical, Radio and Ma- chine Workers, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. By denying overtime to Ronald Klawson and by de- nying or postponing a wage increase to William Clark because of union-related considerations, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 4. By the acts and conduct set forth above in Conclu- sion of Law 3; by threatening employees to relocate or close the plant if the Union became their bargaining agent; by coercively interrogating employees concerning their union sympathies and activities; by threatening em- ployees with stricter job classifications and denials of interdepartmental transfers in the event the Union become their bargaining agent; by coercively interrogat- ing employees concerning their union sympathies and ac- tivities; by theatening employees with stricter job classifi- cations and denials of interdepartmental transfers in the event the Union become their bargaining agent; by solic- iting employees' grievances during a representation elec- tion campaign for the purpose of adjusting them; by tell- ing employees that it would not bargain with a union if it became the duly selected bargaining agent of employees; by telling employees that they had forfeited opportunities for promotion by engaging in union activities; by im- pliedly promising benefits to employees by asking them to give the Respondent a second chance and vote against the Union; by disseminating among employees a copy of a Board decision so marked to imply that employees would be discharged for engaging in strike activity; by telling employee that another employee had been "fin- gered" as a union supporter; by threatening to discharge employees if they engaged in or were reported to have engaged in union activities; by attempting to create among employees the impression that their union activi- ties are subject to company surveillance; by disparately maintaining a bulletin board so that prounion campaign propaganda could be removed or altered with impunity while protecting procompany propaganda from being re- moved or altered; by distributing discount coupons in such a manner as to create the impression that the Com- pany was providing benefits to dissuade employees from supporting the Union; by telling employees that they would be permanently replaced for striking without let- ting them know about reinstatement rights; and by at- tempting to pin the blame for a prospective refusal to make improvements in wages and benefits on the possi- ble action of the Union in filing charges or objections with the Board, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 5. Such acts and conduct recited above in Conclusion of Law 4, which occurred between August 29 and Octo- ber 30, 1980, constitute objectionable conduct affecting the results of a representation election which was con- ducted among certain of the Respondent's Kingston em- ployees on October 29 and 30, 1980, and warrants the setting aside of said election. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices and objection- able conduct have a close, intimate, and adverse affect on the free flow of commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer- tain unfair labor practices and objectionable conduct af- fecting the conduct of an election, I will recommend that it be required to cease and desist therefrom and, to take other affirmative actions which are designed to effectu- ate the purposes of the Act. Because the independent violations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act found herein are repeated and pervasive, I will recommend to the Board a so-called 8(a)(1) remedy designed to suppress any and all violations of that Section of the Act. Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979). The recommended Order will also provide that the Respondent be required to make whole Ronald Klawson and William Clark for any loss of earn- ings which they may have suffered by reason of the dis- crimination practiced against them, in accordance with the Woolworth formula (F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950)), with interest at the adjusted prime rate used by the Internal Revenue Service for the computation of tax payments. Olympic Medical Corp., 250 NLRB 146 (1980); Isis Plumbing- Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962). I will also recommend that the Respondent be required to post the usual notice, advising its employees of their rights and the results in this case. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed14 14 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Continued NATIONAL MICRONETICS 1009 ORDER The Respondent, National Micronetics, Inc., Kingston, New York, and its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning their union sentiments and activities. (b) Threatening employees to relocate the plant or close the plant if the Union should become their bargain- ing agent. (c) Threatening employees stricter job classifications and denials of interdepartmental transfers if the Union should become their bargaining agent. (d) Soliciting grievances from employees during a rep- resentation election campaign for the purpose of redress- ing their grievances. (e) Telling employees that it would not bargain with a union if a union became their duly selected bargaining agent. (f) Impliedly promising benefits to employees to dis- suade them from supporting the Union. (g) Disseminating among employees a copy of a re- print of a Board decision marked to imply that employ- ees would be discharged for engaging in strike activity. (h) Threatening to discharge employees because they engage in or are reported to have engaged in union ac- tivities. (i) Attempting to create among employees the impres- sion that their union activities are subject to company surveillance. (j) Disparately maintaining a bulletin board in such a manner that nonunion campaign propaganda could be defaced or removed while protecting procompany cam- paign propaganda from being defaced or removed. (k) Distributing discount coupons to create the impres- sion that the Company was providing benefits to dis- suade employees from supporting the Union. (1) Telling employees that They would be permanently replaced if they exercised their right to strike. (m) Attempting to pin the blame for a prospective re- fusal to make improvements in wages and benefits on the possible action of the Union in filing charges or objec- tions with the Board. (n) Discouraging membership in and activities on behalf of International Union of Election, Radio, and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO or any other labor organi- zation by postponing promised wage increases or deny- ing employees overtime, or otherwise discriminating against employees in their hire or tenure. (o) By any other means or in any manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the .Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Make whole William Clark and Ronald Klawson for any loss of pay or benefits which they have suffered by reason of the discriminations found herein, in the manner described above in the remedy section. (b) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay- roll and other records necessary to analyze the amounts of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Post at the Respondent's place of business in and about Kingston, New York, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 15 Copies of this notice, on a form provided by the Regional Director of Region 3, shall be posted immediately on receipt and maintained by the Re- spondent for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are cus- tomarily posted . Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (d) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case 3-RC-7892 be sev- ered from Case 3-CA-10123, that the election conducted is set aside, and that Case 3-RC-7892 be remanded to the Regional Director for Region 3 for the purpose of conducting another election at such time as he deems the circumstances will permit the free choice of a bargaining agent. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, insofar as the amended consolidated complaint alleges, matters which have not been found herein to be violations of the Act are dis- missed. 15 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- Order shall, as provided in Sec 102A8 of the Rules, be adopted by the al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National poses. Labor.Relations Board."