International Association Of Bridge, Structural And Ornamental Iron Workers (Walker Construction Co.)

IRON WORKERS (WALKER CONSTRUCTION) International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers (Walker Construction Company) and James W. Stevens. Case 16-CB- 2255 13 December 1985 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS BABSON AND DENNIS On 8 June 1984 Administrative Law Judge Wil- liam N. . Cates issued the attached decision. The General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed an answering brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings, and conclusions only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Order. The judge found that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by disciplin- ing Local President Stevens for filing charges with the Board against the Respondent. He found the act to be a legitimate exercise of internal union dis- cipline. We disagree. The facts are fully set forth by the judge. In brief, Stevens was president of Local 263 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers. The International, the Respondent here, entered into a collective-bargain- ing agreement between the North Texas Contrac- tors Association and the Iron Workers District Council, of which Local 263 is a member. Stevens objected to the contract and filed an unfair labor practice charge against the International, naming Local 263 as the Charging Party. The Regional Director for Region 16 dismissed the complaint, but the International filed internal charges against Stevens for, inter alia, misuse of his office. An internal union hearing resulted in a find- ing that he violated the International's constitution and his oath of office. As a separate matter, he was also found guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation.' Stevens was fined, removed from office, and sus- pended from membership. The complaint alleges that the discipline violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The Respodnent contends that it was a legitimate exercise of inter- nal union discipline warranted by Steven's alleged- ly unauthorized act. ' We agree with the judge's finding that it is unnecessary to pass on the implications of this alleged fraudulent misrepresentation 1071 The judge first considered the Respondent's con- tention that Stevens had misused his office by acting without authority from the membership or the executive board . Although Stevens told each of the members of the executive board beforehand that he intended to file charges, he did not seek their explicit permission , and accordingly the judge found that he did not have their authorization. Moreover, the judge interpreted the International's constitution and the Local's bylaws as requiring ex- plicit approval from the membership for Stevens to act. In this regard, the judge determined that the membership 's vote of disapproval of the collective- bargaining agreement did not constitute authoriza- tion to file charges. The judge further determined, however, that the Respondent's discipline of Stevens was a legitimate internal union matter unprotected by public policy consideration . In this regard, he relied on the test set forth in Buffalo Newspaper Guild Local 26 (Buf- falo Courier), 265 NLRB 382 ( 1982).2 Moreover, because the Respondent maintained throughout that Stevens was not disciplined for filing Board charges, but for acting without authorization, the judge found the policy of preserving access to the Board was not harmed. In Operating Engineers Local 138 (Charles S. Skura), 148 NLRB 679 ( 1964), referred to with ap- proval by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968), the Board considered a factual situation almost identi- cal to the instant one . There, employee Skura filed an unfair labor practice charge against the union al- leging it had discriminatorily refused to refer him to available employment . The union fined Skura, contending that the fine was not for filing charges but for failing to exhaust his internal union reme- dies. The union argued, inter alia, that the disci- pline was a legitimate exercise of its right to admin- ister its internal affairs. The Board rejected the union's arguments by concluding that a union's re- striction of employee access to the Board is analo- gous to unlawful coercion by an employer under Section 8(a)(4). Consistent with the analogy to Section 8(a)(4), the Board in Skura found that since the right to file charges is indispensable to the administration of the Act, protection of that right must be strictly safe- guarded. And "not only does the Board have the power to protect employees who participate in the 2 The test in Buffalo Newspaper Guild would allow a union to enforce disciplinary action against a member for rule violations when its enforce- ment meets four tests . Thus the union rule must be properly adopted, re- flect a legitimate union interest, not impair any policy Congress has im- bedded in the labor laws , and be reasonably enforced against members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule. 277 NLRB No. 99 1072 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Board's processes, but it has been held that the Board has an affirmative duty to exercise its au- thority to its outermost limits to protect such em- ployees." Id at 681. In this regard the Board con- cluded that the union's institutional interests cannot be given the same status as the statutory right of access to the Board. Moreover, this policy of pre- serving unimpeded access requires that "[n]o pri- vate organization should be permitted to prevent or regulate access to the Board." Skura, supra at 682.3 Turning to the question of whether the union's dis- ciplining of Skura was unlawfully coercive, the Board determined that the discipline had the effect of restraining Skura's access to the Board. The Board noted that "[t]he union's conduct is no less coercive where the filing of the charge is alleged to be in conflict with an internal union rule or policy and the fine imposed allegedly to enforce that internal policy." Skura, supra at 682. Clearly, the instant case is thoroughly analogous to Skura. Stevens, like Skura, filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Union. And the Union here disciplined Stevens, arguing that its decision to do so was an internal union affair. We conclude, as the Board did in Skura, that the Union here was not entitled even to protect its legitimate institu- tional interests, to restrain an employee's access to the Board, and that the actions taken by the Re- spondent here were coercive within the meaning of the Act. We note, moreover, that Respondent's disciplin- ing of Stevens because he filed charges with the Board is not rendered lawful because it may also have been motivated by a legitimate reason such as Stevens' alleged fraudulent misrepresentations. Unlike 8(a)(3) violations which hinge on motiva- tion, the violation alleged here turns on the coer- cive nature of the Respondent's conduct. While motivation may be a factor to be considered in cases of this nature, neither the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations nor any other asserted internal union considerations raised by the Respondent here can prevail in the face of "the overriding public in- terest" in "unimpeded access to the Board."4 Additionally, we conclude, contrary to the judge, that because the union conduct conflicts 3 This sentiment was echoed recently in the Board decision in Machin- ists Local 1414 (Neufeld Porsche Audi), 270 NLRB 1330 (1984) There the Board concluded that a union may not lawfully restrict the right of its members to resign from membership during a strike. In so doing the Board stated emphathicaly, "any effort to equate the institutional interests of a union with the statutory rights of employees is inappropriate " Id at 1334. See also H. B. Roberts Y. NLRB, 350 F.2d 427 (D C. Cir 1964), enfg 148 NLRB 674 (1964), where based on facts similar to those here it was found that by filing a charge with the Board, the employee "stepped beyond the internal affairs of the union and into the public domain " Id. at 429. 4 NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, supra at 424 with this policy of preserving access to the Board it does not satisfy the test in Buffalo Newspaper Guild, supra. As noted earlier, one prong of that test requires that for conduct to be deemed inter- nal, it must not run contrary to any policy Con- gress has imbedded in the labor laws. The evidence establishes that the discipline was an attempt to deny Stevens' access to the procedures of the Board. It therefore runs contrary to the established policy of fostering unimpeded access, for once a charge has been filed, "it is not merely the private right of the parties which are involved in the dis- pute, but the enforcement of public law and the as- sertion of the public interest thereof."5 Finally, we cannot agree with the judge's reli- ance on the Union's contention that Stevens was not restricted by the Union's conduct because he was free to file charges as an individual. In this regard, the fact that the discipline was directed at the president may increase the chilling effect on other employees, contributing to its coerciveness. Thus, in Auto Workers Local 212 (Chrysler Corp.), 257 NLRB 637 (1981), enfd. 640 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1982), the Board found a union's disciplining a union officer to be a "two-edged sword." The Board stated it is "too speculative to contend that other unit members might distinguish the discipline meted out to [the union officer] on the basis that he is a union officer and they are not . . . . For an- other union member might just as reasonably view the fact that Respondent meted out discipline to an officer for filing charges with the Board as indicat- ing the fact that Respondent would be even less hesitant to impose discipline on rank-and-file mem- bers for such charges." Id. at 637. In light of all the foregoing, we conclude that the Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act in disciplining Stevens. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Walker Construction Company is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Respondent, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, is a labor organization within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(5) of the Act. 3. By disciplining Stevens for filing charges with the Board, the Respondent has restrained or co- erced an employee in the exercise of his rights guaranteed under the Act and thereby has engaged in unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. 5 General Services, 229 NLRB 940 (1977) IRON WORKERS (WALKER CONSTRUCTION) 4. The above-described unfair labor practice is an unfair labor practice affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. REMEDY Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain af- firmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. We shall order the Respondent to rein- state Stevens as president of Local 263 and remove all sanctions against him. In the event Stevens paid the fine unlawfully imposed on him, we also order the Respondent to reimburse and make him whole for the amount unlawfully exacted from him with interest, as provided in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950). ORDER The National Labor Relations Board orders that the Respondent, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Washington, D.C., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Disciplining employees for filing unfair labor practices charges with the Board or otherwise par- ticipating in or cooperating in Board proceedings. (b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action neces- sary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Reinstate Stevens as president of Local 263 and remove all sanctions agaisnt him. (b) In the event Stevens paid the fine unlawfully imposed on him, make him whole for the amount exacted from him, with interest thereon as set forth in the remedy section of the decision. (c) Post at its offices copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."s Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 16, after being signed by the Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and main- tained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to mem- bers are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the no- tices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 1073 (d) Notify the Employer, Walker Construction Company, by mailing to the employees a ' copy of the attached notice marked "Appendix," that, its policy found herein to be violative of the Act will be given no further force or effect. (e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has taken to comply. MEMBER DENNIS, concurring. I agree, for the reasons below, that the Respond- ent International violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by disciplining Local President James Stevens. As the majority opinion emphasizes, a strong public interest protects free access to the Board's processes.' The right of access, however, is not ab- solute, as the majority suggests; union discipline imposed because of the unauthorized filing of unfair labor practice charges in the union's name is not necessarily unlawful. A union has a legitimate interest in controlling the conduct of its officers and agents and maintaining a unified leadership and consistent policy in dealing with employers. The Board must consider such interests in addition to the need for free access to the Board in determin- ing whether discipline for unauthorized filing of unfair labor practice charges violates Section 8(b)(1)(A). In this case it is necessary to decide the Re- spondent's motivation in imposing discipline on Stevens. Did it discipline him to further its legiti- mate interest of policing an officer's unauthorized conduct or misrepresentations, as it contends, or for the purpose of retaliating against him for filing unfair labor practice charges againts it? Applying a Wright Line2 analysis to resolve the motivation question, 3 I conclude that the General Counsel has established an 8(b)(1)(A) violation. In reaching this conclusion, I consider it impor- tant that the Local's constitution and bylaws do not prohibit the president from filing unfair labor practice charges on behalf of the Local; before filing charges Stevens consulted each member of the Local's executive board and explained his in- tention to file charges; and Steven's action was consistent with the membership's view expressed at the Local's 4 January 1983 meeting. Most signifi- cantly, the Local, which had the primary interest in controlling its president's conduct, did not pro- test Steven's action. The Respondent International, which the unfair labor practice charges attacked, i Sec . 8(a)(4) of the Act, NLRB v Marine & Shipbuilding Workers, 391 U.S 418 ( 1968). 2 Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980). 8 See Plasterers Local 121 (Associated Building Contractors), 264 NLRB 192 (1982). 1074 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD was the organization that instituted internal union procedure against Stevens and imposed discipline upon him. These circumstances convince me that the Respondent unlawfully disciplined Stevens, co- ercing him and other employee members.4 4 A different result might be warranted where, for example, a union's constitution required a membership vote to authorize filing a charge with the Board on ,behalf of the union, and a union officer, in defiance of the requirement and contrary to the membership's wishes, filed an unfair labor practice charge against an employer, thereby damaging relations between the union and the employer. In such circumstances the union's legitimate interest in defending itself and its members against the errant officer might well justify the action. APPENDIX NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT discipline employees for filing unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board or otherwise participating in or cooperating in National Labor Relations Board proceedings. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exer- cise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL reinstate James W. Stevens as presi- dent of Local 263 and remove all sanctions against him. In the event Stevens paid the fine unlawfully imposed on him, we will make him whole for the amount exacted from him, with interest. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BRIDGE, STRUCTURAL AND ORNA- MENTAL IRON WORKERS Janine Lee Bruton, Esq., for the General Counsel. Victor Van Bourg, Esq. and Paul Supton, Esq., of San Francisco, California, for the Respondent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE WILLIAM N. CATES, Administrative Law Judge. The trial in this case, held on March 20, 1984, is based on an unfair labor practice charge filed on November 7, 1983, by James W. Stevens, an individual, against International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers (Respondent). A complaint and notice of hear- ing issued December 15, 1983, and an amendment to the complaint issued on March 9, 1984, by the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (Board) alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, by removing Stevens from the office of the president of Local Union No. 263 of the Respondent; by filing intraunion charges against Stevens; by conducting a hearing on those intraunion charges; by assessing a fine against Stevens, prohibiting him for being a candidate for office in any local or repre- senting any local of the Respondent for 4 years, and pro- hibiting Stevens from attending any meetings of any local of the Respondent for 4 years because he filed charges against Respondent with the Board on Decem- ber 14, 1982, and March 10, 1983. Respondent filed timely answers to the complaint and the amendment to the complaint in which it denied the commission of any unfair labor practices. All parties were given full opportunity to participate, to produce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-ex- amine witnesses, t to argue orally, 2 and to file briefs. Briefs filed on behalf of the General Counsel and Re- spondent have been carefully considered. On the entire record of the case and from my observa- tion of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the fol- lowing FINDINGS OF FACT I. JURISDICTION Walker Construction Company is a Texas corporation with facilities in Fort Worth and Dallas, Texas, where it is engaged in the general contracting business. During the preceding issuance of the complaint, a representative period, Walker Construction purchased goods and mate- rials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points out- side the State of Texas. The parties stipulated, the record establishes, and I find that Walker Construction is an em- ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The evidence establishes, the parties stipulated, and I find that Walker Construction is, and has been at all times material, an employer-member of the North Texas Contractors Association (NTCA). The Respondent admits and I find that NTCA is an organization composed of employers engaged in the con- struction industry and which exists for the purpose, inter aha, of representing its employer-members in negotiating and administering collective-bargaining agreements with various labor organizations including some labor organi- zations affiliated with the Respondent. During the year preceding issuance of the complaint, a representative period, various members of NTCA, singularly and joint- ly, provided services valued in excess of $50,000 directly to customers located outside the State of Texas. I find NTCA, as well as its employer-members, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. i The General Counsel presented three witnesses in support of the complaint allegations The Respondent rested without calling any wit- nesses Only the Respondent engaged in oral argument at the conclusion of the trial IRON WORKERS (WALKER CONSTRUCTION) 1075 II. RESPONDENT'S STATUS AS A LABOR ORGANIZATION The Respondent, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, is admittedly a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. It is- clear from the above job descriptions and from actual exercise of such duties by certain of those occupy- ing the positions set forth above that they each are now and at all material times herein have been agents of the Respondent within the meaning of the Act and I so find.5 See, e.g., Auto Workers Local 212, 257 NLRB 637 at 638 fn. 5 (1981). III. THE AGENCY STATUS ISSUE The General Counsel alleges at paragraph 6 of the complaint that Respondent General3 President John H. Lyons; General Vice President Joseph W. Merritt; Gen- eral Secretary Juel D. Drake; General Treasurer John T. Traylor; General Organizer James Martin; and Business Manager Charlie B. Lowery are agents of the Respond- ent acting in its behalf and are now, and have been at all times material herein, agents of the Respondent within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act.4 The Respond- ent denied the above-named individuals were agents of the Respondent within the meaning of the Act. The Respondent's constitution states the general presi- dent shall "exercise a general supervision over the affairs of the International Association, its officers and organiz- ers, and assign them to their respective duties . . . pre- side at all . . . meetings of the International Association or subordinate bodies . . . suspend any officer of the International Association, or any of its chartered bodies . .. investigate, personally, through the General Auditor and/or International Respresentative, the affairs of Local Unions and the administrations of all General and Local Officers." (G.C. Exh. 12, art. IX, secs. 1, 2, 3, 13, and 18.) The Respondent's constitution states in part as follows regarding the general vice president: "The General President shall assign to any of the General Vice Presi- dents any particular duty to assist the General President which in the General President's judgment they are best able to perform in the interests of the Association." (G.C. Exh. 12, art. XI, sec. 1.) The Respondent's constitution states the general secre- tary "shall receive, consider and attend to all official cor- respondence and to devote the time of the General Sec- retary to the interests of the International Associa- tion. . . . safely keep all important papers. . . . be the official correspondent." (G.C. Exh. 12, art. X, secs. 1, 4, and 9.) According to the Respondent's contitution the general treasurer shall "receive all monies due the International Association. . . . keep adequate and true accounts and records of all funds. . . . disbursements and withdraw- als. . . . shall be made on the signature of the General Treasurer only . ..." (G.C. Exh. 12, art. X-A, secs. 1, 4, and 6.) The Respondent's constitution states: "General Orga- nizers shall perform the duties assigned to them by the General President." (G.C. Exh. 12, art. XI-A, sec. 1.) 3 The term "general" denotes International organization level 4 Sec. 2(13) of the Act states, "In determining whether any person is acting as an `agent' of another person so as to make such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts per- formed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." IV. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Evidences Stevens has been an ironworker for approximately 12 years. At the time of the trial, he had last been employed in his trade in November 1983. During 1983 Stevens worked for seven employers in the construction industry, one of which was Walker Construction.7 Stevens has been a member of Local Union No. 264, Fort Worth, Texas (Local 263), of the Respondent for 12 years. He has held two positions with the Local. He served in an appointed position as delegate to the Tar- rant County (Texas) Central Labor Council and in July 1982 was elected president of Local 263.8 At all times during Steven's term as president there was a collective- bargaining agreement in effect between NTCA and the Iron Workers' District Council of the State of Texas (District Council) for and on behalf of Local 263 and Local Union No. 481, Dallas, Texas (Local 481), of the Respondent (G.C. Exhs. 7 and 8).. Steven testified he was asked by Local 263 Business Manager Lowery to attend a meeting in Dallas, Texas, on December 10, 1982. Those present at the meeting were members of a promotional group composed of rep- resentatives from labor and management covered by the collective-bargaining agreement referred to above. Ste- vens stated that each person present was asked to proof- read a copy of an agreement entitled "Stipulation Agree- ment Under the Top Hand Program" (Top Hand Agree- ment) which had been entered into between NTCA and the District Council for and on behalf of Local 263 and Local 481. Stevens stated he had no knowledge of the agreement prior to December 10, 1982. According to Stevens, the Top Hand Agreement had been negotiated between representatives of NTCA and Local 263 Busi- ness Manager Lowery, Local 481 Business Manager Jen- kins, and District Council President Williamson. Thereafter Stevens received comments from members of Local 263 regarding the Top Hand Agreement. On December 11, 1982, Stevens who was not working at the time went to various sites where members of the -execu- tive board of Local 263 were working and spoke with them about the Top Hand Agreement. Stevens stated: 5 Business Manager Charlie B. Lowery's status will be alluded to else- where in this decision 8 The facts as outlined are taken primarily from the testimony of Ste- vens (the Respondent presented no witnesses ) and from certain trial' ex- hibits I credit the portions of Steven's testimony that are set forth herein ' The parties stipulated that Stevens was not a supervisor within the meaning of Sec 2(11) of the Act with regard to his employment with the seven employers 8 The office of president is a nonpaid position However, the dues and assessments of the president are paid by Local 263. 1076 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD I told them that I was going to file unfair labor practices against the International because I felt like that they were trying to force a contract in the middle of a contract that was already in existence. Stevens stated that those he spoke with were Matt Gra- vette, Frank Henderson, Charlie Rains, Ronnie Allen, Scotty Wimberly, and Thomas Martin. Stevens stated each, with the exception of Ronnie Allen, told him, "If I felt like I could stop it, I should try to and that they were in accord with it." Thereafter on December 14, 1982, Stevens signed a Board charge in Case 16-CB-2072 against the Respond- ent naming Local 263 as the Charging Party. The basis of the charge was as follows: On or about December 10, 1982, and continuously thereafter, it, a labor organization, by its officers, agents and representatives, restrained and coerced and is restraining and coercing its Local Union No. 263 in the exercise of its rights guaranteed in Sec- tion 7 of the said Act by entering into a stipulation agreement with the North Texas Contractors Asso- ciation thereby changing the collective bargaining agreement already in effect between its Local No. 263 and the North Texas Contractors Association. [G.C. Exh. 14a.] The charge was received by the Respondent on Decem- ber 17, 1982 (G.C. Exh. 14c). Thereafter at some date unspecified on this record,9 Stevens signed a withdrawal of the charge in Case 16-CB-2072. A regular membership meeting of Local 263, was held January 4, 1983. At the meeting Local 263 Business Manager Lowery read the Top Hand Agreement to those members present at the meeting. Stevens gave a copy of the Top Hand Agreement to each member who was present at the meeting. According to Stevens, the members had "a heated discussion" after the reading of the Top Hand Agreement and one member asked Busi- ness Manager Lowery if this was the law and if there was anything he could do about it. Lowery stated he had signed it and' it was binding. Lowery also commented, "Now, I understand that Brother Stevens has Board charges, and I understand that he withdrew them, but he has his own opinion." Stevens testified a standing vote was taken to see who was in favor of the Agreement. According to Stevens, the vote was 90-to-6 in opposition to the Top Hand Agreement. Local 263 member J.D. Smith asked Stevens if he needed a motion to refile the Board charges. Stevens testified he responded to Smith by stating, "I told him, no, I didn't need the authority because the bylaws and the necessary documents that I had prevailed me the right to come to the NLRB to stop a bad contract." Stevens attended a meeting of Local 263's executive board on March 7, 1983. A letter signed by General President Lyons was presented to the executive board at the meeting. In the letter Lyons had given his approval to the Top Hand Agreement. 9 It appears the charge was withdrawn prior to January 4, 1983 Thereafter on March 10, 1983, Stevens signed a second Board charge (Case 16-CB-2125) against the Re- spondent naming Local 263 as the Charging Party. The basis of the March 10 charge was identical to that in the earlier filed charge in Case 16-CB-2027.10 Subsequently the charge in Case 16-CB-2125 was dismissed by the Re- gional Director f o r Region 16 of the Board. i i General Organizer Martin had delivered a letter to Stevens on July 6, 1983, dated June 29, 1983, from Gen- eral President Lyons. In the letter Stevens was informed that he was being suspended and removed from any office or official position in Local 263 pending an investi- gation of accusations against him. The letter in pertinent part stated: Information has been received by this office that you have misused the title of President of Local Union No. 263, Fort Worth, Texas and have mis- used your office in connection with accusations made against individuals and this International As- sociation. For these and other reasons which have been brought to the attention of this office, it has been determined that effective immediately upon delivery of'this letter, you are suspended and re- moved from the office of President of Local Union No. 263, Fort Worth, Texas... . Specifically, any individual has the right to file charges and make accusations against this Interna- tional Association but may not purport to do so in his official capacity or on behalf of the Local Union unless authorized by the description of his office or by appropriate and lawful action of the member- ship. We are making this statement so that you may not misconstrue the scope of our investigation. [G.C. Exh. 16.] Stevens testified he asked General Organizer Martin for a bill of particulars on the charges. Thereafter on August 15, 1983, Stevens met with Gen- eral Organizer Martin at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Fort Worth, Texas. Acting Local 263 Vice Pesident Matt Gravette was present for the Respondent at the meeting between Martin and Stevens. Stevens had fellow members Jerry Hensarling and J.D. Smith present with him at the meeting. Martin told Stevens in the meeting that he had been appointed by General President Lyons to investigate Stevens' duties and activities as president of Local 263. Martin told Stevens he was the first one that ever had filed Board charges against General Presi- dent Lyons. Stevens stated Martin asked him by what authority or why he had filed the charges. Stevens told Martin that he "had taken the action upon [himself] under the authority granted to [him] by the bylaws and the duties of the president in the constitution." In a letter to General President Lyons dated Septem- ber 9, 1983, General Organizer Martin preferred charges against Stevens. The charges were: 10 The basis of the earlier charge is set forth in full elsewhere in this decision, I 1 The date of the dismissal action is not reflected in the record. IRON WORKERS (WALKER CONSTRUCTION) These charges are preferred pursuant to Article XIX, Section 10, of the Constitution of this Interna- tional Association of Bridge, Structural and Orna- mental Ironworkers for the commission of the fol- lowing offenses: I charge that James W. Stevens. Membership No. 777557, has violated Article II, Section 5; Article XIX, Section 10, Paragraphs 2, 4, 7, 10, as well as Article XXVI, Section 18, entitled "Obligation of Members" and Article XXVI, Section 19, enti- tled "Obligation of Officers" and all other appli- cable sections of the Constitution of this Interna- tional Association. 1. On December 14, 1982, James W. Stevens, as President of the Local Union, filed National Labor Relations Board Charges for the Intenia- tional Association of Bridge, Structural and Orna- mental Ironworkes Local Union No. 263 against the International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Ironworkers through their repre- sentative, General President John H. Lyons, Case No. 16-CB-2072. James W. Stevens took his action without any authorization from the Consti- tution of this International Association nor did he have the authority of either the Executive Board or the membership of Local Union No. 263. This charge is not brought against Brother Stevens for filing a charge with the National Labor Relations Board since he has the lawful right to do so. It is brought because he misused the title of his office and did so without authority from the Union and against the Constitution. He misused his title as President by giving the impression he was filing a charge in his official capacity as President of the Union. 2. On March 10, 1983, James W. Stevens, as Presi- dent of the Local Union, filed National Labor Re- lations Board Charges for the International Asso- ciation of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron- workers Local Union No. 263 against the Interna- tional Association of Bridge, Structural and Orna- mental Ironworkers through their representative, General President John H. Lyons, Case No. 16- CB-2125. James W. Stevens took this action with- out any authorization from the Constitution of this International Association nor did he have the au- thority of either the Executive Board or the mem- bership of Local Union No. 264. This charge is not brought against Brother Stevens for filing a charge with the National Labor Relations Board since he has the lawful right to do so. It is brought because he misused the title of his office and did so without authority from the Union and against the Constitution. He misused his title as President by giving the impression that he was filing a charge in his official capacity as President of the Union. 3. During the period James Stevens was serving as President of Local Union No. 263, Fort Worth, Texas, he used the letterhead of Campbell Con- 1077 struction Company of 905 Samuels Avenue, Fort Worth, Texas, a company by which he was never employed. Using that Company's letterhead Brother Stevens corresponded with several of the Business Managers of the Texas Local Unions, some of who were: Gene A. Allen, the Business Manager of Local Union No. 125, Beaumont, Texas; George R. Gibson, the Business Agent of Local Union No. 775, El Paso, Texas; Roy Lee Chmer, the Business Agent of Local Union No. 408, Amarillo, Texas; and Carl E. Crawford, the Business Agent of Local Union No. 789, Midland, Texas, respectively. In his correspondence Broth- er Stevens fraudulently identified himself as Su- perintendent of Campbell Construction Company. It should be noted that Campbell Construction Company has a collective bargaining agreement with Local Union No. 263, Fort Worth, Texas. By his action he exposed Local Union No. 263 to potential legal liability for fraudulent misuse of their letterhead. In the letters, Brother Stevens ad- vised each of the respective Business Agents named above, that Campbell Construction Compa- ny was bidding some work in the Local Union area. He then asked, allegedly on behalf of Camp- bell Construction Company, whether the stipula- tion which he attached to each letter would be used. Through this fraudulent device and others, he attempted to obtain confidential information from other affiliated Local Unions of this Interna- tional Association. These charges are being preferred since by these and other acts, Brother Stevens has violated the Constitution of this International Association and his oath of office. In my judgment the offenses enu- merated in the charges are of such a nature that they have seriously affected the employment rights of the members of this International Association. In addition, they have not only hindered the local union from carrying out its legal contractual obliga- tions but have also restricted the local union's abili- ty to conduct its day to day business. I, therefore, respectively request that a trial be conducted in ac- cordance with the provisions of the Constitution of this International Association as expeditiously as possible. [G.C. Exh. 19.] General President Lyons notified Stevens in a letter dated September 26, 1983, that charges had been pre- ferred against him by General Organizer Martin. Lyons also informed Stevens in the letter that a hearing would be conducted on the charges before General Vice Presi- dent Joseph W. Merritt on October 26, 1983, in Fort Worth, Texas. [R. Exh. 1 attachment, prosecution Exh. 2.] A hearing was conducted by General Vice President Merrit on October 26, 1983. Stevens was present at the hearing and he was represented by members Hensarling and Smith (R. Exh. 1). 1078 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The general executive board of the Respondent met12 on January 23, 1984, for the purpose of reviewing the record of the October 16, 1983 hearing involving the al- legations against Stevens . The general executive board's finding were in pertinent part as follows: During the discussion and review of the charges, the recommendation of the hearing officer and the evidence set forth in the transcript of the trial, the members of the General Executive Board unani- mously agreed that the evidence proved beyond any doubt that Brother Stevens had committed the acts as charged and by doing so had violated his ob- ligation as a member, his obligation as an officer and other applicable sections of the Constitution of this International Association . The General Execu- tive Board noted that Brother Stevens engaged in personal conduct using his elected office to pursue his own goals without knowledge or approval of the membership and without authority of the Con- stitution and By-Laws. During its deliberations, the General Executive Board . . . noted that Brother Stevens has an abso- lute right to file unfair labor practice charges as an individual against the International Union, the Local Union or any other entity. However, he did not file charges as an individual , but rather in the name of the Local Union using his official office to commence such litigation in the name of and on behalf of the Local Union. The General Executive Board further noted the transcript of the trial clear- ly establishes that Brother Stevens filed the charges in the name of and on behalf of the Local Union without either possessing the necessary constitution- al authority or having the approval of the member- ship. After careful consideration and deliberation, the General Executive Board found Brother Stevens guilty of all the charges as specified. . . . [R. Exh. 6.] In a letter dated January 25, 1984, General President Lyons notified Stevens that the general executive board of the Respondent had found him guilty on all charges and had imposed sentence on him. The sentence, as set forth in the letter was as follows: That you, the accused, JAMES W. STEVENS, Membership No. 777557. 1. Be fined the sum of $2,000.00. $1,800.00 of the $2,000.00 fine is suspended and shall be wholly ex- punged from your record if you are not found guilty of a violation of the International Constitu- tion of the International Association or any Local Union's By-Laws for twenty-four (24) months. The remaining $200.00 of the $2,000.00 fine should be paid to the General Treasurer of this International Association forthwith. 12 Those present at the meeting were General President Lyons, Gener- al Secretary Drake, and General Treasurer Traylor. 2. Be prohibited from being a candidate for office in any Local Union of the International Association or the International Association and from repre- senting any Local Union in the International As- sociation or the International Association for a period of four (4) years. 3. Be prohibited from attending any meetings of any Local Union of the International Association or the International Association for a period of four (4) years. [R. Exh. 5.] Although the facts surrounding Campbell Construction Company's existence and Steven's involvement therewith are available in the record, I find it unnecessary in decid- ing the instant case to address or consider Steven's alleg- edly fraudulent activities on behalf of the Campbell Con- struction Company. B. Positions of the Parties I shall set forth a brief summary of the positions of the parties. I have considered all contentions , arguments, and positions of the parties whether discussed herein or not. 1. General Counsel's position The General Counsel contends that any individual has the right to seek assistance from the Board and be pro- tected against coercion or retaliation for doing so. She asserts Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act makes it unlawful for a union to coerce employees in their right to file unfair labor practice charges with the Board. She states it is without question that Respondent removed Stevens from office for having filed charges with the Board against the Respondent and in doing so Respondent vio- lated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The General Counsel asserts that Stevens' suspension and removal from office is doubly coercive in that it not only impacts on him but it also discourages others from a willingness to seek access to the Board. The General Counsel contends that Respondent's posi- tion that it removed Stevens from office, not because he filed charges with the Board but because he filed the charges in the name of the Local and without authority to be untenable. The General Counsel argues that the Respondent's position is nothing more than a distinction without a difference. The General Counsel acknowledges a union has freedom of self-regulation where legitimate internal union affairs are concerned, but she asserts that where the issue is access to the Board that the overriding public interest of unimpeded access to the Board comes into play and precludes a union from penalizing one of its members for filing unfair labor practice charges with the Board. The General Counsel contends that when Ste- vens filed charges with the Board, he stepped beyond the internal affairs of the union and into the public domain, and that when Respondent removed him from office for filing the charges it violated the Act and lost any immunity it might have had under the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The General Counsel contends that not only is the Re- spondent's position legally untenable, but it is also factu- ally untenable. The General Counsel asserts that the Re- IRON WORKERS (WALKER CONSTRUCTION) 1079 spondent's constitution states a local president shall sign all necessary legal documents of the local and as such she argues Stevens was authorized to sign the charges he filed with the Board particularly since the constitution did not specifically prohibit him from doing so. She as- serts Stevens had the support of a majority of Local 263's executive board before he filed the charges with the Board. She likewise asserts that the 90-to-6 member- ship vote against the Top Hand Agreement indicated im- plicit support by the membership for Stevens filing charges with the Board. She thus contends that Steven's actions were authorized by both the executive board and the membership of Local 264. The General Counsel con- tends that both legally and factually she has established the violations of the Act alleged in the complaint. 2. Respondent's position The Respondent contends its actions agaist Stevens were based on his unauthorized filing of unfair labor practice charges in the name of Local 263. Respondent argues Stevens acted without constitutional authorization or local membership approval. The Respondent readily acknowledges it could not legally have taken any action against Stevens if he had filed the charges he did as an individual against the Respondent or any other entity. The Respondent argues a labor organization may protect itself and secure the integrity of its role as collective-bar- gaining representative of employees by disciplining offi- cials who act beyond their authority to the detriment of that role. Respondent argues that Steven's conduct-pre- tending to be acting for and on behalf of Local 263 by filing unfair labor practice charges seeking to have the recently entered into Top Hand Agreement set aside- had potential and actual detriment to the Respondent and was in derogation of its relationship with its contrac- tual employers. The Respondent asserts it must be free to act in its own defense as it did and that such defensive conduct on its part is guaranteed by the proviso to Sec- tion 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act. The Respondent's position in summary form is that Stevens filed charges with the Board on behalf of Local 263 without authorization from the Local and Respond- ent's conduct toward Stevens was a "plainly internal" matter and that the proscriptions of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act do not guarantee access to the Board where such clearly internal affairs of a union are involved. C. Analysis and Conclusions The record establishes that during 1983 Stevens worked in his trade as an ironworker for at least seven contractors, one of which was Walker Construction. The parties stipulated that Stevens did not have or exercise any supervisory authority within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act with regard to his employment with these seven contractors. I conclude and find that Stevens was an employee within the meaning of the Act at all times material.' a I shall first address the issue of whether Stevens had authorization to file the charges he did with the Board on behalf of Local 263 from either the executive board or the membership of the local. I am persuaded the facts do not establish that he had authorization from either. The evidence establishes Stevens went to each of the ex- ecutive board members at their place of work on Decem- ber 11, 1982, and "told them [he] was going to file unfair labor practices against the International ." Stevens did not ask their permission or seek their approval to file charges on behalf of Local 263 but rather told each what he was going to do. Stevens did not call any special meeting of the executive board to consider the matter of his filing charges on behalf of Local 263. It is of no consequence that each of the executive board members except one told Stevens that "if [he] felt. like [he] could stop it [Top Hand Agreement], [he] should try to and that they were in accord with it." Their response may well have indicat- ed their desire to have relief from the Top Hand Agree- ment but their responses did not in my opinion amount to an` express authorization for Stevens to file Board charges on behalf of Local 263 against the Respondent even if the executive board could, without membership approval, validly grant such authorization. The facts likewise establish that Stevens did not have or obtain authorization from the, membership of Local 263 to file the charges he did on their behalf . The Janu- ary 4, 1983 vote of 90-to-6 against the Top Hand Agree- ment was not authorization for Stevens to file charges on behalf of Local 263 against the Respondent . In fact, Ste- vens precluded the matter of authorization to file charges from being voted on by the membership of Local 263 by telling the individual who raised the matter that he did not need such authority because the bylaws and neces- sary documents authorized him to file such charges. Thus Stevens, by his own actions, foreclosed Local 263 from voting on the matter and it would be speculation on my part to conclude that, because those present voted their disapproval of the Top Hand Agreement , that they would want to or authorized Local 263 to take legal action against the Respondent. Having found that Stevens did not have authorization from Local 263's executive board and/or membership, I shall now examine to see if the Respondent's constitution or Local 263's bylaws authorized Stevens to take the action he did on behalf of the Local. The bylaws of Local 263 state in part as follows: The duties of the local union officers shall be those as provided for in Article XXVI of the Internation- al Constitution. [G.C. Exh. 13, art. III, sec. 3(B).] The President shall, in accordance with the applica- ble provisions of the International Constitution, ap- point all committees, and shall act as ex-officio member of all such committees. [G.C. Exh. 13, art. IX.] 13 I find it unnecessary to address the issue of what impact, if any, Ste- ven's status with Campbell Construction Co might have on the instant case. 1080 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD The bylaws indicate that the local president is a member of the local's negotiating committee . 14 There is no express authorization in Local 263 's bylaws for the filing of charges with the Board . Thereafter, if authoriza- tion is to be found it must be found in the Respondent's constitution which is referenced in Local 263's bylaws. However, before turning to the Respondent 's constitu- tion to ascertain if the description of the duties for a local president authorized the filing of charges with the Board, it is important to note and examine other provi- sions of Local 263's bylaws which shed light on the powers of the local president and on what requirements Local 263 had with respect to authorization for action of any nature on its behalf. For example the bylaws state that the funds of Local 263 are for the protection, assist- ance, and relief of its members and shall not be expended except by membership approval. (G.C. Exh. 13, art. II, sec. 4.) The bylaws indicate that at Local 263 meetings a member may only speak once on a subject matter- and then only for 5 minutes until all have spoken and that member will not be allowed the floor more than twice except by consent of the Local. (G.C. Exh. 13, art, I, sec. 1(c)(3).) Article II, section 8 of Local 263's bylaws states: No individual member shall solicit other local unions for donations or sell tickets for any purpose whatsoever in the name of this Local Union except by approval of the Local Union in regular meeting. Proposed amendments to the local 's bylaws must be by a majority vote for all members present at the third con- secutive meeting on the matter and then the proposed amendments are forwarded to the International. (G.C. Exh. 13, art. XI.) The bylaws as a whole indicate that no action can to be taken or obligations made in the name of Local 263 without explicit membership approval. The Respondent's constitution at article XXVI, section 2, "Duties of President" states as follows: The President shall be in the President's official place at all regular and special meetings and call the meeting to order. The President shall fill vacancies caused by absence or otherwise. All such vacancies shall be filled within sixty (60) days following the effective date of the official vacancy. The President shall see that all fines are duly paid and penalties enforced. The President shall appoint all commit- tees, except otherwise provided for, and shall act as an ex-officio member of all committees . The Presi- dent shall sign all necessary legal and financial doc- uments of the Local Union and orders on the Treas- urer. While occupying the chair, the President shall take no part in debate, except by consent of the ma- jority of the members present. The President shall enforce this Constitution. 14 It is noted that the collective -bargaining agreement in question as well as the Top Hand Agreement were both negotiated by the District Council (not Local 263) for and on behalf of Local 263 and Local 481 A local president is also a member of the local execu- tive committee. The duties of a local executive commit- tee member are, in part, as follows: Par. 1. The Executive Committee shall consist of the President, Recording Secretary and five (5) members to be elected from the body, outside of salaried officers. The General Executive Board may,, upon request of a Local Union, grant permis- sion to allow the Business Agent of the Local Union to become a member of the Executive Com- mittee. The duties of the Executive Committee shall be advisory and deliberative. They, shall meet at least once in every month and shall consider all matters referred to them by the organization, or brought to their attention by members of the Local, and be subject to the call of the President to adjust all labor troubles appertaining to the Local Union and enforce the rules and agreements adopted by the Local Union ; assume control and have supervi- sion of all affairs of the Local Union in conformity with the International Constitution. The President shall have the right to call a special meeting of the Executive Committee if the President deems it nec- essary, [G.C. Exh. 12, art. XXVI, sec. 11, par. 1.] Although the above-referenced portions of the Respond- ent's constitution states that a local president signs all necessary legal and financial documents, it does not state or indicate that he, acting alone, may authorize legal ac- tions or financial expenditures . There is no explicit au- thorization in the description of a president 's duties for a local president acting on his own to file charges with the Board or to take any other legal action without the ap- proval of the local membership. Although the Respond- ent's constitution and Local 263 's bylaws do not contain a prohibition against the local president filing Board charges on behalf of the Local, both of those documents (constitution and bylaws) taken together support a con- clusion that any such action by the local president on behalf of the local would have to be by authorization of the local membership at a membership meeting. I am persuaded and find that neither the Respondent's consti- tution nor Local 263's bylaws authorized Stevens to take the action he did of filing charges with the Board against the Respondent in the name of Local 263. The fact that Stevens did not have the authorization from Local 263's executive board or membership nor the fact that neither the Respondent's constitution or the local's bylaws granted him such authority does not dis- pose of the instant case . The issue becomes whether the Respondent could lawfully discipline Stevens pursuant to the proviso to Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act" or wheth- er an overriding public policy favoring unimpeded access, to the Board's processes would preclude the Respondent from lawfully disciplining him. is Sec. 8(b)(l)(A) of the Act provides "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization of its agents-(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed in Section 7. Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein " IRON WORKERS, (WALKER CONSTRUCTION) The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Shipbuilders, 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968), addressed the issue of whether a union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by expelling a member for filing a charge with the Board without first having exhausted all intraunion procedures available to the members. With respect to Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act the Supreme Court held: Thus § 8(bXl)(A) assures a. union freedom of self- regulation where its legitimate internal affairs are concerned. But where a union rule penalizes a member for filing an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, other considerations of pubic policy come into play. A proceeding by the Board is not to adju- dicate private rights but to effectuate a public policy. The Board cannot initiate its own proceed- ings; implementation of the Act is dependent "upon the initiative of individual persons." Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 238. The policy of keeping people "completely free from coercion," ibid., against making complaints to the Board is therefore important in the functioning of the Act as an organic whole. . . . A healthy interplay of the forces governed and protected by the Act means that there should be as great a freedom to ask the Board for relief as there is to petition any other de- partment of government for a redress of grievances. Any coercion used to discourage, retard, or defeat that access is beyond the legitimate interests of a labor organization. That was the philosophy of the Board in the Skura case, Local 138, International Union of Operating Engineers, 148 NLRB 679; and we agree that the overriding public interest makes unimpeded access to the Board the only healthy al- ternative, except and unless plainly internal affairs of the union are involved. The Supreme Court further held "the proviso in § 8(b)(1)(A) that unions may design their own rules re- specting `the acquisition or retention of membership' is not so broad as to give the union power to penalize a member who invokes the protection of the Act for a matter that is in the public domain and beyond the inter- nal affairs of a union," ibid. at 425. The question in the instant case becomes one of whether Steven's unauthorized actions were protected by public policy considerations or whether the Respond- ent could, as it actually did, discipline him for affairs plainly internal to the union.'s The General Counsel as- serts Auto Workers Local 212 (Chrysler Corp.), 257 NLRB 637 (1981), is virtually identical to the instant case and is controlling. The Board in Local 212 held the union had violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by removing one Melvin Nance from his position as chairman of its fair employment practices committee because he filed 16 The Respondent concedes it could not lawfully have disciplined Stevens had he filed charges as an individual instead of in the name of Local 263. In fact, the Respondent, at all stages of its actions involving Stevens, informed him of his right to file charges with the Board as an individual 1081 charges with the Board against the union. The Board stated: Respondent's contention is that, inasmuch as Nance's removal did not affect his employment status or cause him to suffer any loss of seniority, money, or union membership , the removal was an internal union affair not subject to the prohibitions of Section 8(b)(1)(A). However, the removal was motivated by Nance's having filed a Board charge. The Administrative Law Judge so found and Respondent concedes as much. To that extent the discipline implicates a policy imbedded in Federal labor law, "the policy of keeping people `completely free from coercion' . .. against making complaints to the Board." NLRB- v. Industrial Union of Marine_& Shipbuilding Workers of America and its Local 22 [United States Lines Co.], 391 U.S. 418, 424 (1968). "Any coercion used to discourage, retard, or defeat that access is beyond the legitimate interests of a labor organiza- tion." Id. Therefore, simply because the discipline imposed here, as Respondent alleges, results in no loss of se- niority, money, or membership does not dictate the conclusion that the discipline was a plainly internal union affair left unregulated by Section 8(b)(1)(A) by virtue of the proviso to it. While losses of senior- ity, money, or membership may be relevant to the inquiry into whether or not the discipline indeed was "coercive," the absence of such particular ef- fects does not negate a finding that the discipline here was coercive. Patently, Nance was coerced. That Respondent openly would remove him from office because he filed a charge with the Board is likely to have an adverse impact upon his willing- ness to seek access to the Board in the future. The removal is further likely to indicate to other unit employees that the exercise of their right to file charges against Respondent might result in union sanctions. Given the importance of the policy favor- ing unfettered employee access to the Board, it is too speculative to contend that other unit members might distinguish the discipline meted out to Nance on the basis that he is a union officer and they are not. In any event, that would appear to be two- edged. For another unit member might just as rea- sonably view the fact that Respondent meted out discipline to an officer for filing charges with the Board as indicating the fact that Respondent would be even less hesitant to impose discipline to rank- and-file members for filing such charges. Although we recognize the important interests served by a union being able to fill its offices and internal committee memberships with individuals it believes best will serve the union and its member- ship, prohibiting a union from removing an officer because he or she has filed a charge with the Board hardly undermines that interest to any substantial degree. 1082 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Local 212 is distinguishable from the instant case in that the charging party in that case was an individual. Fur- thermore, the motivation for disciplining Stevens in the instant case, unlike Local 212, was not because he filed charges with the Baord, but because he filed charges with the Board without authorization from the local on whose behalf he filed the charges. There can be no ques- tion but that the action the Respondent took against Ste- vens was coercive but it was not unlawful coercion. I reject the General Counsel's argument that to distinguish between an individual filing a charge and the same indi- vidual signing a charge on behalf of a local union is to make an untenable distinction without a difference. Clearly the Respondent could not have lawfully disci- plined Stevens had he filed the charges he did with the Board in his own name; however, the Respondent had and still has a legitimate interest in who files Board charges in the name of its local. In the instant case the Respondent did not attempt to regulate its member's access to the Board; it only called into question a mem- ber's filing charges with the Board on behalf of one of its locals without authorization from that local. I find Re- spondent's discipline of Stevens to be a "plainly internal" matter. The Respondent not only did not impede Ste- ven's access to the Board but its actions are not reason- ably likely to have any chilling effect on others because the Respondent made it clear throughout its proceedings involving Stevens that any individual, as an individual, could and had the right to lawfully file charges with the Board against the Respondent. The Board approved Judge Robert C. Batson's holding in Buffalo Newspaper Guild Local 26, 265 NLRB 382, 384 (1982), that a union did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when it ex- pelled and fine a member because he filed EEOC charges in his official capacity as grievance chairman without proper authorization. The instant case involves a like situation where the individual signing the charges on behalf of the union was doing so without authorization from the union and, as such, the individual may be law- fully subjected to discipline for his unauthorized actions. As Judge Batson noted in Buffalo Newspaper Guild, supra, citing Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969), a union may enforce disciplinary action against a member for rule violations where its enforcement meets four tests. All four tests were met by the Respondent in the instant case. The first test is whether-the rule in question was properly adopted. I agree with the Respondent that there has been no showing in the instant case that the Respondent's constitution or Local 263's bylaws were improperly adopted. Therefore, in my opinion, the rule gleaned from those documents that actions taken on behalf of the local must be done with membership or ex- ecutive committee approval was properly adopted. The second test is that the rule must reflect a legitimate union interest. It is clear in the instant case that the Respondent had and continues to have a legitimate interest in prohib- iting interferences with its administering of its collective- bargaining agreements. The third test states the rule must not impair any policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws. As fully set forth elsewhere in this decision, the rule enforced by the Respondent herein did not in any manner impair an individual's access to the Board where the individual was acting as an individual. The final test is that the rule be reasonably enforced against members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule. Stevens could have left Local 263 without any impact on his employment rights and he could have filed the charges he did as an individual. Considering all the foregoing, I find that Stevens' con- duct is the type of conduct for which a union member may be removed from the office of local president, pro- hibited from attending local union meetings, prohibited from being a candidate for office, or representing any local for a specified number of years, and be fined. Ac- cordingly, I find Respondent did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act when it filed intraunion charges against Stevens, conducted a hearing involving him, found him guilty, and imposed sentence on him. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Walker Construction Company and the North Texas Contractors Association and its members are individually and collectively engaged in commerce within the mean- ing of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. The Respondent, International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent did not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by filing Intraunion charges against James W. Ste- vens and thereafter conducting a hearing involving those charges which resulted in a finding of guilt and imposing of a sentence on him. 4. Respondent has engaged in no unfair labor practices violative of the Act. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed17 ORDER The complaint is dismissed. 17 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses