Dillingham Tug & Barge Corp.

DILLINGHAM TUG & BARGE CORP. Dillingham Tug & Barge Corporation and Francis Keane Inland Boatmen's Union of the Pacific, Marine Divi- sion-International Longshoremen's and Ware- housemen's Union, Hawaii Region and Francis Keane. Cases 37-CA-2282 and 37-CB-584 17 January 1986 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS DENNIS AND BABSON On 9 May 1985 Administrative Law Judge James M. Kennedy issued the attached decision. The Respondent Union and the Respondent Em- ployer filed exceptions and supporting briefs, and the General Counsel filed an answering brief. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings,' findings, and conclusions2 and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Dillingham Tug & Barge Corporation, Honolulu, Hawaii, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, and the Respondent, Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific, Marine Division-International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Hawaii Region, Hon- olulu, Hawaii, its officers, agents, and representa- tives, shall take the action set forth in the Order. 1 The Union and the Employer have excepted to some of the fudge's credibility findings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge's'credibility resolutions unless the clear prepon- derance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F 2d 362 (3d Or 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings 2 In his decision the judge cited a 31 July 1984 decision by Judge Earl- dean V S. Robbins finding that the Respondent Union violated Sec 8(b)(2) and (1)(A) in part for attempting to have the Respondent Employ- er discharge Charging Party Keane for nonpayment of dues after he was suspended for having exercised his rights under Sec 7 We note that this decision has been affirmed by the Board See Inland Boatmen's Union (Dillingham Tug), 276 NLRB 1261 (1985). Wanda L. Pate, Esq., for the General Counsel. Randall N. Harakal, Esq., of Honolulu, Hawaii, for Re- spondent Union. Ernest C. Moore III, Esq. (with Barbara A. Petrus on brief) (Torkildson, Katz, Jossem, Fonseca & Moore), of Honolulu, Hawaii, for Respondent Employer. 83 DECISION JAMES M. KENNEDY, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried before me in Honolulu, Hawaii, on Febru- ary 7, 1985, pursuant to a consolidated complaint issued on October 30, 1984.11 It is based on charges filed on September 14 by Francis Keane, an individual. The com- plaint alleges that Dillingham Tug and Barge Corpora- tion (Respondent Employer) and Inland Boatmen's Union of the Pacific, Marine Division-International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Hawaii Region (Respondent Union)2 have engaged in certain violations of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2), respectively, of the' National Labor Relations Act. Issues There are three principal issues presented here: First, whether Respondent Union successfully caused Respond- ent Employer to discharge Keane for nonpayment of union dues for periods of time when Keane had been sus- pended from union membership and therefore had no ob- ligation to pay dues. Second, whether Respondent Union, in attempting .to enforce the union-shop clause of its collective-bargaining contract,, failed to meet its fidu- ciary duty of advising Keane how those obligations could be met. Third, whether Respondent Employer, had reasonable cause to believe that the Union's demand for Keane's discharge was illegal and that its acquiescence therein violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. All parties were given full opportunity to participate and to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally, and to file briefs. All parties who entered an appearance by counsel filed briefs and they have been carefully considered. Based on the entire record, as well as my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor, I make the follow- ing FINDINGS OF FACT 1. INTERSTATE COMMERCE Both Respondents admit and I find that ,Respondent Employer is a Hawaii corporation headquartered in Hon- olulu where it is engaged in international and interstate shipping. It annually derives gross revenues valued in excess of $50,000 for the transportation of freight and commodities from Hawaii to points outside that State. Accordingly, both Respondents admit that the Employer is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and I so find. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED Both Respondents admit that Respondent Union is now and has been at all material times, a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act, and I so find. i All the dates herem are 1984 unless otherwise noted. 2 The Union's name appears as corrected at the hearing. 278 NLRB No. 19 84 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES The salient facts in this matter are not in serious dis- pute. Keane is a lead tankerman employed by Respond- ent Employer on its barges and has been so employed for approximately 17 years and represented by Respond- ent Union. In late 1982, he engaged in activities in sup- port of a rival union, the Inland Boatmen's Union of Hawaii. This resulted in internal charges being brought against him by Respondent Union. On June 21, 1983, Re- spondent Union's trial committee found Keane and others guilty of violating certain provisions of its consti- tution. It suspended those individuals for various periods and also sought to collect certain reimbursements from them which have subsequently been characterized as nothing more than fines. Keane was suspended from membership for 15 years and fined $863. Unfair labor practice charges were filed against Re- spondent Union for this conduct and on March 6, 1984, a hearing was conducted before Administrative Law Judge Earldean V.S. Robbins. Subsequently Judge Robbins found that Respondent Union had violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) in various respects. In particular, she condemned the fines as well as Respondent Union's at- tempts to cause the discharge of Keane and others for al- legedly breaching the union -shop clause obligation at times when they were not under any obligation to pay dues because of their suspension from union membership. Apparently because of certain testimony before Judge Robbins, Respondent Union concluded that its penalty levied against Keane may have been inappropriate. Thus, on March 24, John Gouveia, Respondent Union's region- al director, sent Keane a letter stating in part: Therefore, this is to inform you that the Inland- boatmen's Union of the Pacific-Hawaii Region is recommending to the trial committee that all charges and assessments that have been filed against you, for violation of the Inland Boatmen's Union of the Pacific Constitution be dropped. The letter also stated that Keane was obligated to pay dues for the third and fourth quarters of 1983, as well as the first quarter of 1984 which ended on March 31. Gou- veia caused a copy of this letter to be sent to Respondent Employer's director of industrial relations Perry Kuro- moto. Although having received advice that Respondent Union was recommending that the charges be dropped, Keane never received any such notification. Indeed, none was sent. Yet, on July 30, Gouveia wrote Keane a letter stating: On March 24, 1984, we sent you a letter inform- ing you that Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific- Hawaii Region has dropped all charges and assess- ments filed against you. However, you are still liable for union dues. You are delinquent for the Third and Fourth quarters of 1983 of $156.00 and the First and Second quarters of 1984 of $156.00, a total amount of $312.00. The letter concluded, stating that the Union would en- force the union-shop clause against Keane if he did not pay those dues within 30 days. A copy of that letter was also sent to Kuromoto. Sometime in early August, shortly after Judge Robbins issued her decision, Rey Jonsson, Respondent Employ- er's vice president and general manager, told Keane that he was obligated to pay the dues as the Union had stated that it had dropped the charges. Keane protested that the Union had never dropped the charges or, if it had, he had never been notified. After a discussion, Jonsson asked Keane to have his lawyer, Walter Horie, call Jons- son to prove that the issue of Keane's dues liability was still under litigation. During this conversation Jonsson agreed that he had read Judge Robbins' decision. On August 7 Keane's attorney, Horie, sent Jonsson a letter transmitting a copy of the conclusions of law, remedy, and order sections of Judge Robbins' decision. In that letter Horie stated that the legal matters between Respondent Union and Respondent Employer's employ- ees were still pending. Two weeks later Jonsson called Keane to a second meeting. Jonsson told Keane that he had hoped the dis- pute with the Union would have ended after the receipt of Horie's August 7 letter, but because Respondent Em- ployer was now in negotiations with Respondent Union, Jonsson's superiors had instructed him to advise Keane that the Union would request Keane's discharge if he did not pay the dues as demanded. On September 5 or 6, while on duty in his supervisor's office, Keane had a conversation with Gouveia. Gouveia told him that the parties were in negotiations and Keane would have to pay the dues because Dillingham did not want anything to interfere with the negotiations. Gou- veia said there were three loose ends: two industrial inju- ries and Keane's case. He also said the Union would demand ,Keane's discharge if he did not pay the back dues. On September 7, Gouveia sent Kuromoto a letter ad- vising that over 31 days had passed since he had de- manded that Keane bring his dues up to date. The letter requested that Kuromoto take action according to Rule A-2 of the contract, i.e., discharge Keane. On September 10, Jonsson again called Keane to his office. At that point Jonsson handed Keane a letter stating that Keane would be discharged at 4 p.m. on September 12 unless he could clearly indicate to the Company that he had re- solved the union membership matter "to the satisfaction of the Union." Keane immediately went to his attorney Horie who, on September 12, hand-delivered a letter to Kuromoto. In pertinent part the letter says: It appears that on or about June 21, 1983, the IBU suspended certain employees of Dillingham Tug & Barge from the union for periods ranging from 8 to 19 years. Francis Keane was suspended for 15 years. The IBU furthermore imposed fines on the individuals and sought their discharge from em- ployment for failure to pay dues while they were suspended from the union. These employees sought the aid of the NLRB. While the charges of unfair DILLINGHAM TUG & BARGE CORP 85 labor practices against the IBU were pending before the NLRB, the union filed suit in the [state] District Court of the First Circuit to collect the fines and union dues from the employees. That matter was later transferred to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit under Civil No. 82184 where it is currently pending. Francis Keane is still named as a defendant in that suit filed by the IBU. Moreover, on July 31, 1984, the Administrative Law Judge for the NLRB filed her decision which concluded that the IBU was in violation of the Na-' tional Labor Relations Act. The administrative law judge ordered that the IBU cease and desist from: 1. Imposing fines on the employees, and taking legal action to collect the fines; 2. Attempting to cause Dillingham Tug & Barge to discharge the employees for failure to pay dues in accordance with the union security provision of the collective bargaining agreement while simulta- neously denying them the rights and privileges of union membership; All of the foregoing is expressly made applicable to the Francis Keane in the decision . Please read it. With regard to Francis Keane, the IBU has not even begun to comply with the order. It has simply made a statement that as to Mr. Keane the IBU in- tends - to drop all charges and assessments. However, Mr. Keane still remains a named defendant in this suit filed by the IBU. Furthermore, the IBU has not reimbursed Mr. Keane for the reasonable expenses and legal fees he incurred in defending against this action. Furthermore, if you will just look at the dates involved, you will see that the IBU is attempting to col- lect dues, which allegedly accrued during the time when Mr. Keane was,suspended from the union. The administrative law judge has already ruled that under the act it is improper for the union to seek the discharge, of any employee for failure to pay dues while the individual was suspended from the union and denied the rights and privileges of union membership. A haphazard statement by the IBU about drop- ping charges against Francis Keane (which is un- supported by any of its actions) is not sufficient to return Mr. Keane, to his pre-suspension status, nor can it be used to circumvent the Order of the ad- ministrative law judge. It is a travesty for the IBU to suggest, and it would be a tragic mistake for Dillingham Tug & Barge to accept, the fact that the IBU, having been found to be in violation of the National Labor Rela- tions Act, is now willing to "forgive" Francis Keane if he will just make payment of dues which an Administrative Law Judge for the NLRB has said he should not have to pay. Please carefully reconsider your decision to ter- minate Francis Keane. [Emphasis added.] Upon receiving this letter Jonsson postponed the effec- tive date of the termination 24 hours. It appears that thereafter he telephoned Gouveia who sent Jonsson the following letter on September 13: Inlandboatmen's Union of, the Pacific-Hawaii Region has dropped . all charges and assessments filed against Francis Keane on March 6, 1984. Francis Keane been [sic] a member of the Inland- boatmen's Union of the Pacific has [sic] all the rights and privileges as any other member of this union. Despite the language of this letter, there is no evidence that on March 6, the date of the NLRB trial before Judge Robbins, that the charges against ,Keane had been dropped. Indeed, it is totally inconsistent with the Union's March 24 letter to Keane quoted above. On receiving Gouveia's September 13 letter Jonsson caused Keane to be discharged on September 14. Thereafter correspondence ensued between Attorney Hone and the Union ultimately resulting in Horie trans- mitting the dues as requested. The -Union then refunded the amount of dues which it had claimed was owed for the third and fourth quarters of 1983. Shortly thereafter Keane was permitted to return to work. IV. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS A. Union Membership Based on the foregoing findings of fact, I conclude that the General Counsel has proven the significant alle- gations of the complaint. First, it is quite clear that Re- spondent Union never, at any time, notified Keane that the charges against him had been dropped. The March 24 letter simply says that Gouveia ,was recommending to the trial board that the charges be dropped. There is no evidence that the recommendation was ever acted on. Indeed, there is no credible evidence that Gouveia ever actually -transmitted such a recommendation to the trial board. Moreover, -the -trial board's decision in which it suspended him from membership and fined him is lengthy and detailed. It would appear that any notifica- tion that the charges had actually been dropped would at least be in writing and transmitted to -Keane in the same fashion that the initial decision had been dispatched. No such transmittal ever occurred. Moreover, it would appear that Gouveia dissembled both on the witness stand and certainly with respect to the assertion made to Respondent Employer on September 13 that the charges had been dropped on March 6. Furthermore, Gouveia's letter of July 30 in which he referred to the March 24 letter as having dropped the charges simply does not wash; that letter was clearly couched in, "recommenda- tion" language. Keane was then, and is now, perfectly entitled to rely on such plain language. Accordingly, I conclude that at no time since Keane was expelled by the decision of the trial board, for expul- sion is the true nature of a 15-year suspension, has he ever been reinstated to full membership in the Union. Furthermore, it is - clear that the expulsion and fine levied against him were based on his action in supporting the rival union. That, of course, is an activity protected by Section 7 of the Act. Respondent Union has, there- 86 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD fore, deprived Keane of the rights attendant full member- ship in the Union . Thus, when Respondent Union sus- pended him it simultaneously stripped him of any obliga- tion to pay union dues. Section 8(a)(3)(B), as incorporat- ed by Section 8(b)(2), states that it is unlawful to dis- charge or cause the discharge of an employee on union security grounds if that employee has been denied union membership for reasons other than his failure to tender periodic dues. Clearly that is the case here. Respondent Union suspended Keane because of his rival union activi- ty. By that very act it denied him membership on grounds other than a failure to pay periodic dues. He was, therefore, not obligated to pay any dues whatsoever while membership was denied him. The Board has held in such situations that a union may not invoke the union-shop provisions of its collective- bargaining contract to cause the discharge of such an employee. See Steelworkers Local 4186 (McGraw Edison Co.), 181 NLRB 992 (1970); Communication Workers Local 9509 (Pacific Telephone Co.), 193 NLRB 83 (1971); Communication Workers Local 1104 (New York Telephone Co.), 211 NLRB 114, 116 (1974), enfd. 520 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1975); Telephone Traffic Union (Upstate New York), 241 NLRB 826 (1979). In response to these cases Respondent Union argues that even though it suspended Keane, he is still obligated to pay for union representation under the "agency shop" or "financial core" doctrine. This argument is specious. The financial core argument is most clearly set forth in the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963). However, that case and all the financial core cases deal with situations where an employee voluntarily chooses to avoid union constitu- tional membership. That desire to avoid such member- ship will be honored under Section 7 of the Act if the employee maintains "financial core" membership by paying a dues equivalency in accordance with the union- shop clause. No case, to my knowlege, has ever held the converse to be true. Thus, the financial core doctrine is not available to a union in its defense where it suspends or expels a member . First, Section 8(a)(3)(B) specifically prohibits it, and second, the Board decisions cited, supra, preclude the argument. Accordingly, the argument is re- jected. As a secondary argument in support of its claim for Keane's dues during his suspension, Respondent Union cites a purported constitutional requirement that suspend- ed members pay dues, apparently article VIII. That arti- cle deals with members who become suspended for dues delinquency, not as a result of discipline . It has , no appli- cation here 'and its invocation in this context is a distor- tion of its meaning. In fact, application of such an inter- pretation becomes-another act of discrimination. The ar- gument is rejected. As I have found that Respondent Union had no right to demand dues of any kind from Keane while he was on suspension, it is unnecessary to determine whether its re- quest for payment met the fiduciary duty fully to inform a delinquent employee of his obligation under a valid union-shop clause. Until such time as the Union advises Keane that he has, in fact, been reinstated to member- ship, that duty will not arise. B. The Discharge I also conclude that Respondent Employer either knew or should have known that Respondent Union's contention that Keane had been restored to full member- ship was false. First, it knew that Respondent Union was demanding dues for the third and fourth quarters of 1983, periods when Keane was suspended. That is clearly set forth in the March 24 letter, a copy of which was sent to Respondent Employer's Kuromoto. Second, al- though Respondent Employer received a copy of the July 30 letter, it never received any letter or any other documentary evidence documenting that' Keane's mem- bership actually had been reinstated. Moreover, the July 30 letter reiterated that the third and fourth quarter 1983 dues were still owed. Finally, the September 13 letter sent by Gouveia, to Jonsson asserted that the charges and assessments filed against Keane had been dropped on March 6. Even a casual reading of these letters would lead a prudent reader to conclude that something was terribly wrong. March 6 was the date Judge"Robbins conducted her hearing. Company officials had attended that hearing and were well aware that Keane had not been reinstated at that time. Furthermore, they knew that on March 24 the Union was- only recommending that the charges be dropped. If the Union was only at the recommendation stage' on March 24, how could the March 6 date cited by Gouveia on September 13 be ac- curate? Finally, Attorney Horie's letter of September 12 was a careful recitation of the facts and should not have been so lightly disregarded. Because Jonsson had never seen any document actual- ly reinstating Keane and since he knew that there would have been such a document, due both to the promise contained in the March 24 letter and the September 13 assertion, it is puzzling to me why he honored Gouveia's demand. Accordingly, I conclude that Jonsson knew that his investigation was incomplete. In fact he knew Gou- veia's September 13 letter was untrue. Having undertak- en to investigate the facts and having learned that there was a factual dispute between Gouveia and Keane's at- torney and knowing that there must be documentary evi- dence somewhere demonstrating the accuracy of Gou- veia's assertion, Jonsson should have asked for that docu- mentation. He did not do so; nor was he misled by Re- spondent Union. He had 'another agenda: amicable con- tract negotiations. It was, therefore, unreasonable of him to conclude that the Union's version was accurate. See Valley Cabinet & Mfg., 253 NLRB 98 (1980); Conductron Corp., 183 NLRB 419, 429 (1970). Accordingly, because Respondent Employer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Keane had been reinstated to full union membership, I conclude that in discharging him at the Union's request it violated Section 8(a)(3). Likewise, of course, by attempting to cause and actually causing this Employer to discharge Keane in such circumstances, Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2). V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent Union and Respondent Employer have engaged in certain violations of Sections DILLINGHAM TUG & BARGE CORP. 87 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) and 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, respec- tively, I shall recommend that they be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act. In this regard, I shall recommend that any and all dues paid by Keane to the Union since his suspension be reim- bursed to him with interest. Furthermore, both Respond- ents shall be held jointly and severally liable for wages lost by Keane since his discharge on September 14. In- terest on these amounts shall be paid in accordance with Isis Plumbing Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962), as modified by Florida Steel Corp., 231 NLRB 651 (1977). As Keane has been reinstated to his former job, a reinstatement order is not necessary. Finally, in view of Respondent Union's argument that it is entitled under its constitution to seek financial core dues from employees whom it has suspended, a cease- and-desist order is appropriate to prevent the recurrence of this unlawful interpretation of its constitution. On these findings of fact and the entire record in this case, I make the following CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Respondent Dillingham Tug & Barge Corporation is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondent Inland Boatmen's Union of the Pacific, Marine Division-International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Hawaii Region is a labor organi- zation within the meaning of Section,2(5) of the Act. 3. Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) by in- terpreting its constitution to require employees to pay dues whose union membership had been suspended for engaging in activity protected by Section 7 of the Act. 4. Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) by attempting to cause and actually causing Dil- lingham Tug & Barge Corporation to discharge Francis Keane for failing to pay dues at a time when he was under no obligation to do so. 5. Respondent Employer violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) by discharging Francis Keane at Respondent Union's request for failing to pay dues at a time when he was under no obligation to do so. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed" ORDER A. Respondent Inland Boatmen's Union of the Pacific, Marine Division-International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Hawaii Region, its officers, agents,_and representatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Interpreting its constitution, in conjunction with the union-shop clause of its collective-bargaining con- tract, in such a way as to require employees who have been suspended or expelled from union membership for engaging in activity protected by Section 7 of the Act to pay dues as a condition of employment. (b) Requesting the discharge of employees pursuant to a union-shop clause of a collective-bargaining contract while denying them union membership because of their activities in support of another union. (c) In any like or related manner restraining or coerc- ing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action designed to ef- fectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Make Francis Keane whole for earnings lost as a result of his discharge on September 14, 1984, plus inter- est, as set forth in the remedy portion of this decision. (b) Reimburse Francis Keane for any dues which he was coerced to pay while suspended' from union mem- bership, plus interest. (c) Remove from its membership and all other records any and all references to Keane's having failed to pay dues at a time when he was under no obligation to do so, and to notify him in writing that such removal has taken place and that evidence of that supposed deliquency shall not be used as a basis for future action against him. (d) Post at Honolulu, Hawaii office and meeting halls copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix A."4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being signed by the Re- spondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to members are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond- ent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. B. Respondent Dillingham Tug & Barge Corporation, Honolulu, Hawaii, its officers, agents, successors, and as- signs, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Discharging employees at the request of Inland Boatmen's Union of the Pacific, Marine Division-Inter- national Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Hawaii Region, for failing to comply with the member- ship requirement of the union-shop clause of the applica- ble collective-bargaining contract-at a time when full membership in the labor organization was unavailable to such individuals. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. 3 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses 4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the, notice reading "Posted'by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " 88 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (a) Make Francis Keane whole for earnings lost as a result of his discharge on September 14, 1984, plus inter- est, as set forth in the remedy portion of this decision. (b) Preserve and, on request, make available to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay- roll records, social security payment records, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records nec- essary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order. (c) Remove from its files any reference to the unlawful discharge and notify the employee in writing that this has been done and that the discharge will not be used against him in any way. (d) Post at Honolulu, Hawaii facilities copies of the at- tached notice marked "Appendix B."5 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by Regional Director for Region 20, after being signed by Respondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by Respondent immediate- ly upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other materi- al. (e) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps Respondent has taken to comply. 6 See fn. 4 above APPENDIX A NOTICE To MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protec- tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities. WE WILL NOT interpret our constitution, in conjunc- tion with the union-shop clause of any collective-bar- gaining contract, in such a way as to require employees to pay union dues as a condition of employment during periods where we have suspended or expelled them from union memberhhip for engaging in activity protected by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL NOT request the discharge of employees pur- suant to a union-shop clause of a collective-bargaining contract where we have denied them union membership because of their activities in support of another union. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights guaran- teed by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL make Francis Keane whole for earnings he lost as a result of his discharge on September 14, 1984, plus interest. WE WILL reimburse Francis Keane for union dues, plus interest, coerced from him by causing his discharge. WE WILL notify Francis Keane, in writing, that we have removed any references in our records to his dis- charge and his supposed dues delinquency and that these will not be used against him in any way. INLAND BOATMEN'S UNION OF THE PACIF- IC, MARINE DIVISION-INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S AND WAREHOUSEMEN'S UNION, HAWAII REGION APPENDIX B NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights. To organize To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protec- tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities. WE WILL NOT discharge employees at the request of Inlandboatmen's Union of the Pacific, Marine Division- International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, Hawaii Region, for failing to comply with the membership obligations of the union-shop clause of our collective-bargaining contract at times when that union has denied full membership to such employees. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL make whole Francis Keane for earnings he lost, plus interest, as a result of his unlawful discharge on September 14, 1984. WE WILL notify Francis Keane that we have removed from our files any reference to his discharge and that the discharge will not be used against him in any way. DILLINGHAM TUG & BARGE CORPORATION