International Brotherhood Of Electrical Workers, Local 1547

236 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1547 and Telon Electric Corporation. Case 19-CB-5382 27 January 1986 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND BABSON On 19 September 1985 Administrative Law Judge Frederick C. Herzog issued the attached de- cision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief, and the General Counsel filed limited exceptions with respect to the recommended Order. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings," and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order as modified.2 ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge as modified below and orders that the Re- spondent, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1547, its officers, agents, and repre- sentatives, shall take the action set forth in the Order as modified. 1. Add the following as a continuation of the sentence in paragraph 2. "and from in any like or related manner restrain- ing or coercing Telon Electric Corporation in the selection of its representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or the adjustment of griev- ances." 2. Insert the following as paragraphs 3(e) and 3(f) and reletter the subsequent paragraphs. "(e) Return any fines, with interest, to Donald Stebbins and Terry Callander collected from them pursuant to any such disciplinary proceedings. "(f) Notify, in writing, Telon Electric Corpora- tion that the Respondent has no objection to Donald Stebbins working for it as a supervisor." 1 In its exceptions, the Respondent asserts that it did not contest the supervisory status of Donald Stebbins but only contested his status as col- lective-bargaining representative or grievance adjuster We agree How- ever, we fail to see how any misconstruction of the Respondent's argu- ment could have affected the result here As the judge found, Stebbins did in fact adjust grievances and is therefore unquestionably a representa- tive of Telon within the meaning of Sec 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act. 2 The judge inadvertently failed to include in the recommended Order all of the cease-and-desist provisions and affirmative relief required by his findings and reflected in his recommended notice We conform the rec- ommended Order to those findings Melvin R. Kang, Esq., for the General Counsel. Bradley D. Owens, Esq. (Jermain, Dunnagan & Owens), of Anchorage, Alaska, for the Respondent. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE FREDERICK C. HERZOG, Administrative Law Judge. This matter was tried before me in Anchorage, Alaska, on 11 June 1985.1 The charge was filed on 18 January 1985 by Telon Electric Corporation (the Employer). The complaint issued on 27 February 1985 against Interna- tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 1547 (Respondent), alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act2 by initiating internal union charges against and fining an employee of the Employer, based on conduct which occurred after the employee had resigned his membership in Respondent and by initi- ating internal union charges and fining a supervisor of the Employer, based on conduct which occurred while the supervisor was a representative of the Employer for purposes of collective bargaining or' the adjustment of grievances. At the trial all parties were afforded the right to par- ticipate, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and to produce evidence in support of their respective positions. In addition, the parties were afforded the right to file briefs and make oral argument at the conclusion of the trial. Based on the record3 thus compiled, plus my consider- ation of the demeanor of the witnesses and the briefs filed by counsel for the General Counsel and Respond- ent, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION The complaint alleges that the Employer is a Washing- ton corporation, with an office and place of business situ- ated at Woodinville, Washington, where it is engaged in 1 This method of setting forth dates conforms with current Board practice 2 29 U S C. § 151, et seq , provides, in pertinent part- Sec. 8• . . . (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor orga- nization or its agents- (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; or (B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the pur- poses of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances, . Sec. 7• Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to re- frain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3) 2 I grant the General Counsel's unopposed motion to remove R Exhs 3 and 4. Neither was offered nor received into evidence, but were, never- theless, included in the record transmitted to me after the trial by the court reporter. 278 NLRB No. 32 ELECTRICAL WORKERS IBEW LOCAL 1547 (TELON ELECTRIC) 237 the business of electrical contracting; that, during the 12 months preceding issuance of the complaint its gross sales of goods and services exceeded $500,000; that during the same period it sold and shipped goods or,pro- vided services from its Washington facilities- to customers within that State which were themselves engaged in interstate commerce by other than indirect means of a total value in excess of $50,000; and that during the same period the Employer purchased and caused to be deliv- ered to its facilities within the State of Washington goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from sources outside said State or from suppliers within said State which in turn obtained such goods and materials directly from sources outside said State. All of this was denied by Respondent's answer. How- ever, the evidence was uncontradicted at trial that the Employer, a Washington corporation, is engaged in the business of electrical contracting, and that during the .cal- endar year 1984 it performed services and sold goods di- rectly to customers outside the State of Washington valued in excess of $50,000, and, during the same calen- dar year, purchased goods directly from suppliers outside the State of Washington valued in excess of $50,000. Accordingly, I find and conclude that at all times ma- terial herein the Employer was an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Respondent is, and has been at all times material herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Sec- tion 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES A. The Facts In April 19844 a general contractor named Olympic Constructors, a division of Olympic Prefabricators, Inc., obtained a contract from Conoco, Inc. to perform con- struction work at the Milne Point Operations Complex, Milne Point, Alaska, a support facility for Conoco's oil pipeline operations. Later that same month Olympic granted the Employer a subcontract on the project. The Employer began performance of its subcontract at its facility located at Boise, Idaho. There it constructed modular units which were later shipped to'the project site, assembled, and installed. While the Employer had a collective-bargaining agreement covering its Boise oper- ations, it had no agreement with any labor organization regarding work to be performed in Alaska. The Employer's project superintendent for this sub- contract was Donald Stebbins . Stebbins was a member of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (AFL-CIO & CLC), Local Union No. 46 from 13 Feb- ruary 1980 until sometime after the commencement of his employment with the Employer. Stebbins was entirely responsible for running the project for the Employer. According to the credited tes- 4 All dates refer to the calendar year 1984 unless stated otherwise. timony of Robert Johnson, and that of Stebbins, Stebbins independently hired and fired employees on the project, authorized overtime, committed the Employer's credit, dealt with the general contractor and Alaskan state offi- cials, and settled grievances and complaints advanced by employees. By mid-August work had advanced to the point that Stebbins was ready to move the project's work from Boise to Alaska. Accordingly, he hired or caused the Employer to hire employees to go to Alaska with him. One such employee was named Terry Callander. Cal- lander, who was hired by Johnson on 18 August, was also a member of IBEW Local Union No. 46, having joined on 11 June 1975. However, based on advice he so- licited from Johnson, on 23 August (apparently-3 days before he began work in Alaska) Callander sent a letter to, IBEW` Local Union No. 46 which read as follows: To Whom it May Concern: I, Terry D. Callander, hereby change my status with the union from that of a full member in good standing, to that of a dues paying member only. I recognize my obligation to continue to tender periodic dues as uniformly required of all members. Thank you. Sincerely, /s/ Terry D. Callander Member There is no showing in the record about when, or whether, this letter's contents were passed on from IBEW Local Union No. 46 to Respondent, the local union having jurisdiction over the locale of the jobsite'in Alaska.5 Work began on the Alaska phase of the subcontract in late August, with the complement of workers eventually expanding to nearly 30. As of 23 October there were ap- proximately 20 to 25 employees, but by 4 December the work complement had shrunk to around 10 men, as the, job apparently neared completion. Respondent immediately learned of the arrival of the Employer on the scene, of course, and arranged for elec- trical workers to seek employment with it , so they could carry out- an organizational drive. One such employee wrote Respondent's business representative and organiz- er, on 15 September, in pertinent part: Well I don't know if you've herd [sic] about how we tried to run Telon's main people off the slope. We brought some pressure down on them . . . . I've got enough representation cards for 31 percent. I'll get them to you. . . . The 'Superintendent Don Stebbins is IBEW Local #46, he's been breaking every rule. Here's a list of everyone' name I've got. 5 I conclude that Respondent obviously did have some sort of contact with IBEW Local Union No. 46 concerning this matter How else would it have learned of the fact asserted in its letters to Stebbins and Callander, discussed later herein, that the Employer had a dispute with Local 46? Or possibly even the fact that Stebbins and Callander were members of Local 46 238 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Superinten [sic]-Don Stebbins Local #46 Seattle- WHSH Terry Challandar [sic] Local #46 P.S. I never got a copie [sic] of the organizing letter, please send me one for my records. On 23 October Respondent wrote to both Stebbins and Callander advising that charges had been filed against them for alleged violations of the IBEW bylaws and constitution, and notifying them of a hearing date of 20 November in Anchorage, Alaska. Each violation was stated as "solicit[ing] and knowingly [going] to work for [the Employer] on the Conoco [project]. [The Employer] is a non-union electrical contactor from Seattle who is in dispute with the I.B.E.W." On 4 December each was sent a letter by Respondent advising that Respondent's "trial board" had found them guilty of violating the IBEW's bylaws and not guilty of violating its constitu- tion. Each was notified that he had been assessed a fine of $4000, based on approximately 2 weeks' wages. Nei- ther Stebbins nor Callander has paid their fines, but each has been advised that such fines are "court collectible." B. Conclusions and Reasons 1. Donald Stebbins' fine Respondent contends that its actions regarding Steb- bins are privileged by virtue of the fact that he was a member, that he was not a supervisor, that the discipline imposed was no greater than that which it imposed on others by the same trial board, that Stebbins was not in fact a "representative for purposes of collective bargain- ing or grievance adjustment, and that neither Stebbins nor the Employer were subjectively coerced or re- strained." Although I do not agree with all of Respondent's con- tentions, I do find that Stebbins was a member of Re- spondent, that the discipline imposed on him was not out of line with that imposed on others at the same time, and that there is no showing on this record of subjective or successful coercion or restraint upon either Stebbins or the Employer. However, I have difficulty imagining a case where possession of supervisory authority could be more clear- ly shown. Stebbins was the sole management representa- tive on this project. In addition to acting independently to hire and fire, and dealing for the Employer with the general contractor and state officials, he literally lived among the employees. Nor can it seriously be claimed that he failed to adjust employees' grievances, or that he did so as a representative of the Employer, i.e., among other things, as a result of employee complaints to him he caused employees' furnaces and outhouses to be re- paired, surely 'matters of no small moment on Alaska's North Slope in the fall and winter seasons. Respondent argues that under certain cases decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appealss no violation can be found unless it is also found that a union's "true intent" or "motive" was to interfere with the Employer's selec- tion of Stebbins as its bargaining representative or griev- ance adjuster, and/or unless there is "actual" evidence of an intent by a union to represent an employer's employ- ees. Neither case nor argument is of aid to Respondent. Given the fact that the charge against Stebbins recited on its face that the Employer was "in dispute" with IBEW Local Union No. 46, and the unrebutted, clear evidence of ongoing organizational efforts, coinciding very closely in time with the filing of Respondent's charge against Stebbins, Respondent's argument in this respect can, at best, be described as specious. As noted by the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Electrical Workers IBEW Local 952, id., at 440, a union's intent or motive may be inferred from the circumstances, and when the very nature of a union's conduct leads to a natural, fore- seeable consequence, the Board is justified in finding that the result obtained was the result intended. I find that all times material Respondent sought to organize the em- ployees of the Employer. In this case the evidence is undisputed that Stebbins never worked with tools or alongside employees on the project. Thus, I have no difficulty in concluding that Re- spondent's actions against Stebbins were directed solely at his ability to represent the Employer's interests loyal- ly, and not at any dispute Respondent may have had with him as a member. Compare Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers IBEW, Local 641, 417 U.S. 790 (1974). Further, it does not assist Respondent to assert that neither Stebbins nor the Employer would admit to feel- ing subjectively coerced or restrained. For it is the exer- tion of pressures reasonably leading to such subjective feelings which the Act enjoins, and not merely those which prove successful. Compare San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union 18, 172 NLRB 2173 (1968), and American Broadcasting Co. v. Writers Guild, 437 U.S. 411, 429-436 (1978), in which the Supreme Court held that the test was whether union sanctions may adversely affect the su- pervisor's performance of his collective bargaining or grievance-adjustment tasks and thereby coerce or re- strain the employer contrary to Section 8(b)(1)(B). I find such' a possibility to have been the case here. Accordingly, I find and conclude that by initiating in- ternal union charges against and by fining a supervisor of the Employer, based on conduct which occurred while the supervisor was a representative of the Employer for purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances, Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act. 6 NLRB v. Electncal Workers IBEW Local 73, 714 F 2d 870 (9th Cir 1980), and NLRB v Electrical Workers IBEW Local 952, 758 F 2d 436 (9th Cir. 1985) ELECTRICAL WORKERS IBEW LOCAL 1547 (TELON ELECTRIC) 239 2. Terry Callander's fine A union is clearly entitled to preserve the validity and enforceability of the membership contract which its con- stitution and bylaws represent , as those rights are set forth in the proviso, to Section 8(b)(1)(A). See, e.g:, NLRB v Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. 175 (1967); Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969), and the Board's decision in Hershey Foods Corp., 207 NLRB 897 (1973), enfd. 513 F.2d 1083 (1975). Taken together, these and other cases define an employee's duty to a'union (usually, however, in connection with an attempt by the union to enforce a union-security provision in a collective -bargaining agree- ment). These cases have led the Board to declare that "`full' union membership may not be required of an employee as a condition of employment, and that the term 'mem- bership' as used in Section 8(a)(3) represents a financial obligation limited to the payment of fees and dues." Food & Commercial Workers Local 506 (Alpha Beta Co.), 265 NLRB 1290 (1982). All this, in turn, has led to situations where some employees are commonly said to have "full membership" in unions, while others are tagged with the label of "financial core members." The point of all this is that "financial core members" are not bound to the "con- tract" which "full members" have with their unions. They are thus not subject to the sanctions set up by unions in their constitutions and bylaws, for the consen- sual prerequisite for union discipline is missing. NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029, 409 U.S. 213 (1972). More recently it has been held that employees are free to resign from unions at any time . Machinists Local 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi), 270 NLRB 1330 (1984), and Pat- tern Makers v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985). Thus, it seems that Respondent's fine of Callander can be deemed lawful only if Callander remained a member of Respondent at the time he engaged in the conduct which Respondent found violative of its bylaws. This issue turns, obviously, upon whether Callander's letter, set forth above, is found to be a valid resignation from Respondent.' Respondent asserts that it was not. Yet, in its brief, Re- spondent concedes that no particular form or method is required to communicate an intent to resign so long as the intent is conveyed clearly in any feasible way . Allied Workers Local 80 (Capital-Husting), 235 NLRB 1264 (1978). I conclude that Callander's letter meets this test. Cer- tainly one would never suggest that it is a model of clar- ity, but it nonetheless seems sufficient to me to squeeze through the door marked "clear ' expression of intent." Whoever received the letter could not safely presume that Callander had no intent in writing the letter. (I make no finding that Respondent had a duty to inquire as to its meaning, though it may well have been the prudent course of action for Respondent to follow.) Despite the inartful phrasing, and the usage of the word "member" throughout, Callander's letter does seem to me to be in- capable of any construction other than a request to end whatever type membership he had previously held in Respondent . Although it makes no mention of the term "financial core," I deem that concept to also have been conveyed with sufficient clarity to have given any rea- sonable reader the requisite notice of his intent to resign. A far more difficult question is posed, and considerable light thrown on this issue, simply by asking, "What else can Callander's letter be read, to convey?" In my opinion any reasonable official of IBEW Local No. 46 would have read Callander's letter as a "Hershey letter."8 I agree with Respondent's argument that in the ab- sence of a collective-bargaining relationship, and per- force any union-security agreement, Hershey has no direct application to the issue before me. But even though it must be conceded that Callander had no power to demand that a special class of membership be created by Respondent or its sister, Local Union No. 46, I cannot agree that Respondent was free to simply ignore the arrival of Callander's letter. Because that letter con- veys clearly that Callander wanted "out" as a "full member" I find it to have been a sufficiently clear evi- dence of intent to resign, I make no decision as to whether Callander may confidently rely on that letter in someday advancing the claim that he has retained "finan- cial core" membership in Respondent since sending the letter. It follows from the above that I should, as I do, find that by initiating internal union charges against and fining an employee of the Employer based on conduct which occurred after said employee had resigned his membership, Respondent violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE The activities of Respondent set forth above have a close, intimate, and substantial relationship to trade, traf- fic, and commerce among the several States , and tend to lead to industrial strife burdening and obstructing-'com- merce. V. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in, and is engaging in, unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) and (B) of the Act, I shall order it to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative ac- tions necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. On the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and on the entire record in this case, I make the following. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The -Employer, Telon Electric Corporation, is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. 2. Respondent is a labor organization within the mean- ing of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Inasmuch as Respondent conducted proceedings based on internal union charges and/or took disciplinary action against a supervisor of the Employer for said su- 7 Regardless of whether or not it also sufficed to convert him to a "fi- nancial core " member e Referring to the case of Hershey Foods Corp, supra 240 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD pervisor's actions while he was acting as a representative of the Employer for purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(B) of the Act. '4. Inasmuch as Respondent conducted proceedings based on internal union charges and/or took disciplinary action against an employee of the Employer for that em- ployee's actions done when said employee was no longer a member of the IBEW Local No. 46, or bound by the constitutional provisions or bylaws of Respondent's inter- national union affiliate, Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record,9 I issue the following recommend- edno ORDER The Respondent, International Brotherhood of Electri- cal Workers, Local 1547, its officers, agents, and repre- sentatives, shall 1. Cease and desist from processing internal union charges and/or taking disciplinary action against non- member employees, including Terry Callander, for their having engaged in conduct thought to be violative of Respondent's or its International affiliate's constitution or bylaws, when such employees have previously resigned from Respondent or its International affiliate; and from in any like or related manner restraining or coercing em- ployees in the exercise of their rights guaranteed in Sec- tion 7 of the Act. 2. Cease and desist from processing internal union charges and/or taking disciplinary action against supervi- sors for employers, including Donald Stebbins, for their having engaged in conduct thought to be violative of Respondent's or its International affiliate's constitution or bylaws, for such supervisor's actions while acting as a representative of an employer for purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. 3. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Cancel all such outstanding disciplinary actions taken against the supervisor and the nonmember employ- ee. (b) Until authorized by the Regional Director for Region 19 to take the expunction actions, set forth below in paragraph (c), preserve, and, on request, make avail- able to the Board or its agents, all records of charges, disciplinary proceedings, and disciplinary actions taken against the supervisor and the nonmember employee. (c) Subject to the interim records-preservation require- ments, set forth above in paragraph (b), permanently remove from its union files and records all references to disciplinary proceedings and disciplinary actions taken 9 All outstanding motions, if any, mconsustent with this recommended Order are overruled 10 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses. against supervisors acting as representatives of employers for purposes of collective, bargaining or adjustment of grievances, as well as for actions taken against non- member employees for alleged violations of union rules when they were nonmembers. (d) Immediately notify the supervisor and the non- member, employee, in writing, that any disciplinary pro- ceedings or actions taken against them, as set forth above, are of no force and effect, and that internal union files and records will be purged of any references to such proceedings or actions as soon as permission is ob- tained from the Regional Director for Region 19. (e) Post the attached notice marked "Appendix."" Copies of the notice shall be prepared by the Regional Director for Region 19 and furnished to Respondent. Upon receipt they shall be signed by a responsible offi- cial of Respondent and shall be immediately posted thereafter for a period of 60 consecutive days in conspic- uous places in Respondent's offices and meeting halls, in- cluding in all locations where notices to members are customarily posted. Signed copies of said notice shall also be furnished by the Regional Director for Region 19 to the Employer for posting, provided the Employer is willing to do so. (f) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days of this Order what steps Respondent has taken to comply with it. " If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government WE WILL NOT process internal union charges, fine, and/or take disciplinary action against nonmember em- ployees, including Terry Callander, for their having en- gaged in conduct claimed to be violative of union consti- tutions or bylaws when such employees have previously resigned their membership with us or any affiliated union. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce Telon Electric Cor- poration in the selection of its representatives for the purpose of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances by preferring charges, holding a trial or fining, or attempting otherwise to cause the removal of any such representative, including Donald Stebbins, from performing supervisory, executive, or managerial func- tions for the Employer. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce Telon Electric Corporation in the selection of its ELECTRICAL WORKERS IBEW LOCAL 1547 (TELON ELECTRIC) 241 representatives for the . purpose of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. WE WILL cancel all outstanding disciplinary actions taken against Donald Stebbins and Terry Callander, and we will immediately notify Donald Stebbins and Terry Callander that the disciplinary proceedings against them are null, void, and of no force or effect, and that our in- ternal union files and records will be purged of any ref- erences to such proceedings after obtaining permission and authorization to do so from the Regional Director for Region 19 of the Board; and after obtaining such per- mission and authorization. WE WILL permanently remove from our files and records all references to such disciplinary proceedings. WE WILL return any fines, with interest, to Donald Stebbins and Terry Callander collected from them pursu- ant to any such disciplinary proceedings. WE WILL notify, in writing, Telon Electric Corpora- tion that we have no objection to Donald Stebbins work- ing for it as a supervisor. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELEC- TRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 1547