Burns International Security Services, Inc.

BURNS SECURITY SERVICES 565 Burns International Security Services, Inc. and International Union, United Plant Guard Work- ers of America (UPGWA), Petitioner. Case 39- RC-306 14 February 1986 DECISION AND DIRECTION OF ELECTION BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS DENNIS AND BABSON On a petition filed under Section 9(c) of the Na- tional Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held on various dates in March, April, May, July, August, and September 1982 before Hearing Officer Karen M. Marksteiner. After the hearing and pursuant to Section 102.67 of the Board's Rules and Regula- tions, the Regional Director for Region 1 trans- ferred this case to the Board for decision. The Em- ployer and the Petitioner filed briefs. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to'- a three- member panel. The Petitioner seeks to represent a unit of guards at the Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Haddam Neck, Connecticut. The Employer takes the position that the Petitioner cannot be cer- tified under Section 9(b)(3) of the Act and that the petition must be dismissed because: (1) the Petition- er is affiliated with an organization that admits em- ployees who are not guards to membership, and (2) the Petitioner admits nonguards to membership. Alternatively, the Employer contends, contrary to the Petitioner, that the unit should be limited to nu- clear security guards and that sergeants and lieu- tenants should be excluded as supervisors. On the entire record, the Board makes the fol- lowing findings. 1. The Employer, Burns International Security Services, Inc,, is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. We find that it will effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdiction. 2. International, Union, United Plant Guard Workers of America (UPGWA) is a labor organi- zation within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. A question affecting commerce exists concern- ing the representation of certain employees of the Employer within the meaning of Sections 9(c)(1) and 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 4. Burns contends that the hearing officer made the following erroneous rulings: a. Revocation of subpoenas. Burns served' subpoenas duces tecum on UPGWA'S president, two vice presidents, secre- tary-treasurer, and a regional director requesting them to produce various records including the fol- lowing: (1) UPGWA's constitution and by-laws; (2) Instruments relating to UPGWA's or its Local's affiliation with any other labor organi- zation; (3) UPGWA's member roster; (4) UPGWA's bargaining agreements; (5) Job descriptions of UPGWA members; (6) Facilities covered by UPGWA; (7) Board proceedings in which UPGWA or its Locals were a party; (8) Board stipulations or decisions in repre- sentation cases involving UPGWA or its Locals; (9) Private recognition agreements; (10) Grievances filed by UPGWA or its Locals; (11) Arbitration awards; (12) Unfair labor practice charges regarding the type of work performed by its members; (13) Board decisions regarding the above; (14) Documents relating to receipt of assist- ance from any other labor organization or the grant of assistance by UPGWA or its Locals to any other labor organization; (15) Attorneys retained by UPGWA or its Locals; (16) Department of Labor reports filed by UPGWA or its Locals; (17) Records of trusteeships of its Locals; (18) Records of disaffiliation by its Locals; and (19) Correspondence between UPGWA or its Locals with any organization that admits non-guards to membership. Burns served an additional subpoena duces tecum on UPGWA Local 502's custodian of records re- questing the following: (1) Membership roster; (2) Bargaining agreements; (3) Job descriptions of members; and (4) Facilities covered by Local 502 bargain- ing agreements. Burns also served subpoenas ad testificandum on a UPGWA business representative and a UPGWA regional director. The UPGWA filed motions to quash. The hearing officer deferred ruling on the matter until the end of the hearing when she quashed the subpoenas. We agree with the hearing officer's ruling. Burns primarily contends that the subpoenaed documents and testimony are relevant and neces- '1-!0 ATT U1@ XT.1 7(1 566 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD sary to show that UPGWA is affiliated, directly or indirectly, with a nonguard labor organization. Burns asserts no facts and introduced no evidence that would directly or inferentially support its as- sertion that UPGWA is affiliated with a nonguard union. Burns' broad requests for the production of records and testimony are a mere "fishing expedi- tion" not entitled to a subpoena from the Board. Morrison Turning Co., 83 NLRB 687, 689 (1949); Modern Upholstered Chair Co., 84 NLRB 95, 97 (1949). Burns also contends the information is rele- vant to show that UPGWA admits nonguards to membership and is therefore not certifiable. Burns has introduced no evidence that shows even infer- entially that UPGWA represents nonguard units of general employees. In' this respect, the subpoenas are a mere "fishing expedition." Burns has intro- duced lengthy testimony purporting to show that UPGWA has included nonguards in guard units it represents. Any additional similar evidence that the subpoenas might reveal would be cumulative. In addition, for the reasons set out below, such evi- dence is not sufficiently probative to show that UPGWA is not certifiable. b. Collective-bargaining history. Burns sought to introduce certain evidence re- garding the supervisory status of lieutenants and sergeants when Interstate Security Services, Inc. was the contractor providing security services at Connecticut Yankee. Burns contends that, as the duties of lieutenants and sergeants remained the same when Burns became the security contractor, Interstate's bargaining agreement and the underly- ing decision and direction of election' are relevant and material. Since resolution of the issues turns on how Burns runs its operation and because the record contains substantial evidence relating to the issues, the hearing officer's exclusion of the prof- fered evidence is neither erroneous nor prejudicial. c. Industry practice. Burns called an expert witness to testify about the regulation of the nuclear power industry by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Burns attempted to elicit testimony about the typical staffing of the security force at a nuclear power plant and about how employers meet NRC security contingency re- quirements. Burns asserts that the expert would have testified that NRC regulations require a con- tingency plan to provide continuous security in the event of a strike by security personnel and that such contingency plans often require _ a high number of supervisors. Even 'accepting Burns' characterization of the proffered testimony, we ' The Regional Director's decision in Interstate Security Services, Case 39-kC-7, of which we take official notice, states, "The unit is in accord with the agreement of the parties." agree with the hearing officer's ruling. Whether particular employees are or are not supervisors is governed by the Act. d. Additional evidence. Burns introduced considerable evidence purport- ing to show that UPGWA admitted nonguards into membership and was therefore not certifiable. Briefly, the evidence involved contract guard units represented by the UPGWA at several Ford Motor Company plants in Michigan, the Tiger stadium and the Silverdome stadium in Michigan, and the Beaver Valley Power Station in Pennsylvania. Burns contends the evidence shows that certain employees included in the units were not in fact guards. During the course of the hearing, Burns at- tempted to introduce additional evidence of a simi- lar nature-that UPGWA included certain non guards in contract security units at the Kennedy Space Center and at plants in Michigan, and Indi- ana. The hearing officer ruled that sufficient evidence was already in the record and refused to permit the introduction of additional evidence. Burns made an offer of proof on the record and later filed exten- sive written offers of proof. We agree with the hearing officer, and find that additional evidence would be cumulative. Also, as we find below, the evidence is not sufficiently probative to show that UPGWA is not certifiable under Section 9(b)(3). 5. On 13 June 1983 Burns filed a motion to reopen the record to admit newly discovered evi- dence, which Burns contends further shows that UPGWA is not certifiable, because it admits non- guards to membership. The evidence is an obituary in the UPGWA's newsletter. It states that prior to his retirement in October 1982, Pat Rengers was a final checker at the Louisville, Kentucky Ford Motor Company plant. Burns contends that the job is a nonguard job. The motion is denied. 6. The parties stipulated that UPGWA is a labor organization, Burns contends, however, that UPGWA is not certifiable because it is affiliated with organizations that admit nonguards to mem- bership and because it admits nonguards to mem- bership. Burns has furnished no evidence on the first contention and, as found above, the hearing officer properly quashed Burns' subpoenas seeking such information. For the following reasons, we find that Burns has submitted no competent evi- dence supporting the second contention. Burns presented witnesses and, documentary evi- dence regarding employees who worked in guard units, who were members of UPGWA, and who, according to Burns, were not statutory guards. Burns provides the security services and personnel at the Beaver Vally Power Station at Shipping- BURNS SECURITY SERVICES 567 sport, Pennsylvania. Of the approximately 200 Burns employees in the Beaver Valley unit, 14 are central alarm station/secondary alarm station oper- ators, all of whom are UPGWA members. Burns contends they are not guards ; UPGWA contends they are. In the Detroit, Michigan area, Burns provides se- curity services at several ]Ford Motor Company plants, the Silverdome stadium, and the Tiger stadi- um. It has a collective-bargaining agreement with UPGWA covering these employees; the agreement requires employees to join UPGWA after 30 days. Burns contends that at the Ford plants 39 guard- unit employees are not statutory guards including location leaders, console operators , receptionists, mail couriers, mailroom attendants, a carpool at- tendant, a print room attendant , and a finished product checker. Burns introduced testimony by management officials that it asserts shows the vari- ous categories of employees are not guards; UPGWA introduced testimony by union officials that it asserts shows the various categories are guards. Burns contends the dispatchers at the Tiger stadium and the Silverdome stadium are not statu- tory guards. Burns also contends that the clerk/timekeeper at the Tiger stadium is not a guard. A review of the evidence presented shows that, at most, Burns has raised close factual questions re- garding the guard status of these employees. If, as asserted by Burns, the employees are not statutory guards, they at least perform some guard-like duties. The evidence presented by Burns raises bor- derline cases. The central alarm station secondary alarm sta- tion operators at Beaver Valley principally monitor closed-circuit television screens covering various sensitive areas of the site including fence lines, doors, and gates. They also monitor intrusion alarms. , The operators do not patrol the site and do not interchange with watchmen, access controllers, or response teams. The alarm stations are central to the power station's security; they are required under Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations. In a very real sense the alarm station operators serve as , the eyes and the ears of the security force. Burns introduced evidence that at the Ford plants the location leaders, either site or shift lead- ers, are responsible for acting as liaisons between Burns and Ford . UPGWA introduced evidence supporting its contention that they all perform unit work. Bums introduced evidence that there are several console operators at various Ford plants, that they monitor alarm equipment, and that in some cases they dispatch 'guards to answer alarms. The con- sole operators' duties vary somewhat from plant to plant depending on the type and location of moni- toring equipment. UPGWA introduced evidence that at least some operators also perform patrol duties. The console operators work on site. Burns introduced evidence that there are several receptionists/telephone operators at various Ford plants. Apparently, at one plant the two or three receptionists are also console operators. Although their duties vary somewhat from plant to plant, the receptionists, according to Burns, are responsible for answering phones and transferring calls, hand- ing out passes to visitors, and asking visitors to sign a logbook. UPGWA introduced evidence that the receptionists control access to the offices, inspect packages, and report rule violations. Burns introduced evidence that there -are three mail couriers at two Ford plants and three mail- room attendants at three other Ford plants. Ac- cording to Burns, these employees are responsible solely for various mail-related' functions such as sorting and delivering mail and transporting mail to and from Ford plants. UPGWA introduced evi- dence that the couriers and attendants were uni- formed and were responsible for handling and de- livering computer tapes and printouts and mail in- cluding some marked "addressee only." UPGWA also introduced testimony that the mailroom at- tendants substitute for receptionists. Burns introduced testimony that one Ford plant has a printroom attendant who is responsible for making copies of Ford papers and for helping the mailroom attendant. UPGWA introduced evidence that the printroom attendant is uniformed, controls access to the printroom, and is responsible for han- dling sensitive and confidential materials. The at- tendant is also responsible for following scrap and trash trucks to see that the materials reach their proper destinations. Burns introduced evidence that a carpool atten- dent works at a Ford plant, where he maintains and cleans cars, sees to the repairs of cars, and takes care of incidental paperwork. There is a con- flict over whether the attendant is uniformed. UPGWA introduced evidence that the attendant enforces Ford's rules over the use of pool cars, controls the release and return of the cars, and keeps the car keys in a locked area. Burns introduced evidence that at one Ford plant there is one finished product checker who is responsible for comparing invoice serial numbers with the serial numbers on tractors and for making sure that proper accessories have been installed. UPGWA introduced evidence that there are two finished product checkers at the plant-one for railroad shipping and one for truck shipping. The 568 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD checkers are also responsible for inspecting the tractors to make sure that there are no concealed extra parts and for general security surveillance of the shipping area. Burns introduced evidence that at both the Sil- verdome and Tiger stadiums it employs dispatchers who are responsible for monitoring telephone and radio communications and for dispatching guards to various locations. UPGWA introduced testimo- ny that the dispatchers are uniformed and work on site. UPGWA contends the positions must be manned for Burns to fulfill its mission . In addition, UPGWA contends that, until recently, the Silver- dome dispatchers also worked as special events guards. Burns introduced evidence that at the Tiger sta- dium it employs a clerk/timekeeper who answers telephone calls, completes payroll sheets, and issues badges to Burns employees. UPGWA introduced testimony that the timekeeper receives calls for as- sistance and is subject to assignment to other loca- tions as a guard.'In addition, the record shows that by the close of the hearing the position was no longer held by a bargaining unit employee. Burns contends that the employees referred to above are not guards, that UPGWA admits them to membership, and therefore that UPGWA is not certifiable under 9(b)(3). We do not agree. In enacting Section 9(b)(3) Congress intended to give guards as employees the full protection of the Act. Section 9(b) states: (b) The Board shall decide in each case wheth- er, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining . . . Provided, that the Board shall not . . . (3) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, to- gether with other employees, any individual employed as a guard to enforce against em- ployees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety of persons on the employer's premises; but no labor organization shall be certified as the representative of employees in a bargaining unit of guards if such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indi- rectly with an organization which admits to membership, employees other than guards. The House of Representatives initially decided to exclude guards, as well as supervisors, as agents of employers. Instead, Section 9(b)(3) was ultimately enacted. Senator Taft stated in debate:2 2 2 Leg Hist 1572 (LMRA 1947), By the provision of the House bill plant guards were completely excluded from the Wagner Act. We compromised with the House by providing they should have the pro- tection of the Wagner Act, but in a separate unit from the workers in the plants. This is certainly a change-although a minor one, nevertheless a reasonable one-and certainly it is a compromise with the extreme position taken by the House. Thus, within the constraints of the guard proviso to Section 9(b), guards are fully entitled to repre- sentatives of their own choosing and to join and form local and national labor organizations. Con- comitantly, a guard union is fully entitled to seek certification as the representative of guard employ- ees and to include all guards in any appropriate units. Although the proviso restricts guards in their choice of bargaining representative, Section 9(b) requires that within these restrictions we are to assure employees the fullest freedom in exercising their rights. Accordingly, we find that the proviso to Section 9(b), when read in context, requires that the noncertifiability of a guard union must be shown by definitive evidence. Otherwise the rights of guards to be represented by a union and of guard unions to represent guards would be serious- ly undermined. We also find, for the reasons below, that Burns has failed to make such a defini- tive showing. First, UPGWA seeks to represent only guards. Its constitution and bylaws state in article VI, sec- tion 2: All employees employed as guards, Security Officers and Security Police Officers as de- fined in the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (as amended), to enforce against employ- ees and other persons rules to protect the property of the private or public employer or to protect the safety of persons on said em- ployers' premises shall be eligible for member- ship in this International union. UPGWA's contract covering Burns' employees in the Michigan area states that the employer recog- nizes the UPGWA as the representative of employ- ees "performing plant protection duties." In addi- tion, there is no showing that UPGWA represents any general or production and maintenance em- ployees or that it admits such employees to mem- bership. Further, there is no showing that UPGWA has continued to represent or admit to membership any employee determined not to be a guard by agreement with an employer or through an appropriate Board proceeding. BURNS SECURITY SERVICES 569 Second, the employees that Burns contends are not guards all perform guard-related duties. Wheth- er they are or are not guards presents close factual questions that can be answered only by carefully examining their duties. Whether, for example, mail- room attendants and couriers are guards will depend largely on the extent to which they protect Ford property. The distinction between guards and nonguards often presents close issues. In Chance Vought Aircraft, 110 NLRB 1342 (1954), for exam- ple, the Board found that dispatchers were guards, and in Caterpillar Tractor, 109 NLRB 871 (1954), the Board found that dispatchers were not guards. In Republic Aviation, 106 NLRB 91 (1953), the Board found that receptionists who screened visi- tors, issued passes, and checked deliveries were guards. Similarly, in Thunderbird Hotel, 144 NLRB 84 (1963), the Board found that timekeepers who prevented unauthorized entrance and made sure property was not improperly brought in or out were guards. Compare Ford Motor Co., 116 NLRB 1995 (1956), where the Board found a receptionist was not a guard. Third, to attempt to litigate borderline issues of whether Pennsylvania and Michigan employees are guards in a representation proceeding held in Con- necticut and involving Connecticut employees is difficult and impracticable, if not impossible. Ob- taining reliable evidence in these circumstances is sufficiently difficult to raise questions about the trustworthiness of any evidence presented. Fourth, UPGWA represents over 25,000 em- ployees-in over 1000 bargaining units serviced by over 160 locals. In an organization this size there will be some close issues of guard status, and it is to be expected that some of the employees that UPGWA believes to be guards are in fact not. In view of the often close factual issues involved, it is likely that UPGWA may represent someone some- where who we would find in an appropriate pro- ceeding is not a guard. Whether employees are guards may not have been litigated because of in- advertence or the stipulation of the parties. Fur- ther, duties change over time and because of new technologies. Thus, to apply Section 9(b)(3) in a strictly literal sense would require us to find that a national guard union such as UPGWA is not certi- fiable because it admits "close-call" nonguards to membership. This is contrary to the clear intent of Congress. It would either effectively prohibit large national unions for guards or would require guard unions to so strictly police their membership to ex- clude employees whose, status presents close factual issues that numerous statutory guards would be precluded from exercising the right to representa- tion'under the Act. Fifth, the issues raised by Burns do not present the type of conflict of interests that is the para- mount concern of Section 9(b)(3). Section 9(b)(3) was enacted by Congress' largely in response to the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416 (1947), which re- versed the Sixth Circuit's decision. - Congress was impressed with the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit's decision.3 The court stated in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 154 F.2d 932, 935 (6th Cir. 1946): In the case of industrial unrest and strikes on the part of the production employees, the obli- gations of the plant guards to the municipality and state would be incompatible with their ob- ligations to the Union which,.,since it repre- sents production employees, authorizes and di- rects the strike. In debate Senator Taft stated, "[A]s to plant guards we provided that they could have the protection of the Wagner Act only if they had a union separate and apart from the union of general employees."4 In the ' instant case, Burns has introduced evidence only on borderline cases. All the purported non- guards perform guard-related duties; none are gen- eral employees that would involve UPGWA in a conflict of interests in the event of a strike. For the foregoing reasons we find that UPGWA is a guard union that is certifiable under Section 9(b)(3). The evidence submitted by Burns ,does not show and is not sufficiently probative to show that UPGWA is not certifiable. 7. The UPGWA has petitioned for a unit of all Burns' statutory guards employed at the Connecti- cut Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The power sta- tion, which is located on a 500-acre site in Haddam Neck, Connecticut, is owned by the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company. In early Novem- ber 1981 Burns was notified that it was the success- ful bidder for security services at ' 'Connecticut Yankee. When it took over from Interstate Securi- ty Services, it offered positions to all Interstate ser- geants and higher officers; they all accepted. Since the beginning of 1982, Burns has provided a securi- ty force of approximately 100 persons at the Con- necticut Yankee station. Connecticut Yankee, like other nuclear power plants, is required to comply with the regulations issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, in- cluding extensive regulations on .plant security. For example, the regulations specify the location of $ See Senator Taft's extended remarks 2 Leg Hist. 1541 (LMRA 1947) 4 2 Leg Hist 1544 (LMRA 1947). 570 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD vital security equipment, that access must be strict- ly controlled, and that the plant have a safeguard contingency plan to ensure continuous security in the event of an emergency or strike. Beginning in 1976, Connecticut Yankee designed and installed a sophisticated physical security system, including a perimeter protection system with multiple fences and microwave and energy field detection equip- ment; a primary and a secondary access point with metal detection devices, explosive detection de- vices, radiation detection devices, electronic pas- sage systems, and bullet-resistant components; and a sophisticated monitoring system and communica- tions system housed in the central alarm station and the secondary alarm station. Burns provides securi- ty in accord with the site security plan approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company has a small staff to oversee the plant's security pro- visions and to make sure Burns is complying with the terms of the purchase order. Connecticut Yankee has a security manager, a security coordi- nator, and five security shift supervisors. One secu- rity supervisor is assigned to each shift to oversee day-to-day security. The security supervisors have no direct contact with Burns' security guards. The highest Burns official at the plant is the chief of security. The next highest is the captain. Both normally work during the day, Monday through Friday. Burns has three lieutenants, one for each shift Monday through Friday, and 20 to 23 sergeants. Burns also employs approximately 60 security officers, i.e., guards, at the site. These em- ployees are, as stated by Burns in its brief, "indis- putably guards." In addition' to the security force, Burns employs a training instructor, a secretary, and a payroll clerk. The parties stipulated that these employees should be excluded from the unit. On occasion Burns has added a guard to patrol the parking lot, which is outside the secured area. Burns contends that the unit should be limited to nuclear security guards. Although at the time of the hearing the only guards Burns employed at Connecticut Yankee were nuclear guards, Burns on occasion had had nonnuclear guards on the prem- ises. In any event, we do not distinguish for unit purposes between nuclear guards and other guards. Wackenhut Corp., 224 NLRB 1142 (1976). Accord- ingly, we find that the appropriate unit consists of all guards employed by Burns at the Connecticut Yankee power station. Burns and UPGWA agree that the security chief and the captain are supervisors; they disagree about the supervisory status of sergeants and lieutenants. For the reasons set forth below we find that ser- geants and lieutenants are supervisors. Burns has three lieutenants at the site-one per shift Monday through Friday. They spend the bulk of their time in the lieutenants' office handling pa- perwork. Although they do not have the authority to hire or fire employees, they do have the author- ity, and have exercised the authority, to suspend guards. The suspension of an employee is not nec- essarily or always subject to review. In its brief the UPGWA concedes that "the UPGWA finds the supervisory responsibilities of lieutenants to be mar- ginal, at best." Based on their authority independ- ently to suspend guards, we find that lieutenants are supervisors. Sergeants, like lieutenants, receive greater pay than security guards, wear uniforms distinguishable from those of guards, attend monthly management meetings, participate on the board for promotion of guards, prepare written evaluations of guards, and make recommendations for commendations for guards' outstanding work. Burns employs from 20 to 23 sergeants at the Connecticut Yankee plant, with 5 to 7 assigned per shift, 7 days a week. Ser- geants rotate their days off. The sergeants' basic duties are to ensure that all procedures and assign- ments are carried out. During a shift, sergeants rotate positions, which include central alarm sta- tion, secondary alarm station, primary access point, and field posts. The responsibilities at each position vary. On weekends and other times when lieuten- ants are absent, sergeants act as shift supervisors on a rotational basis. The central alarm station and secondary alarm station at Connecticut Yankee are staffed exclusive- ly by sergeants. The principal duty at both stations is to monitor televisions and other alarms. The sec- ondary station serves as a backup and a check on the central station. The sergeant at the central sta- tion, in the case of an alarm, will dispatch a guard to assess the problem. Depending on the guard's report, the sergeant will tell the guard to return to his post or remain in position or will order a re sponse team to the alarm location. The primary access point guard is responsible for seeing that the duties of guards at that point and the alternate access point,are properly carried out. The guards' duties include escorting visitors, processing passes to the site, conducting pat downs, and inspecting vehicles. The sergeant filling the post of field su- pervisor issues weapons and radios to security per- sonnel, makes post checks to ensure that guards are properly covering their stations, and leads response teams. A sergeant acting as a shift lieutenant per- forms a lieutenant's duties 'and often is the highest officer present. Although a shift lieutenant may suspend a guard, his action, unlike a regular lieu- BURNS SECURITY SERVICES tenant's, is always subject to independent investiga- tion. In addition to the specialized duties above, all sergeants train, retrain , and evaluate probationary guards. Sergeants also do routine retraining as re- quired by Burns' contract with Connecticut Yankee and by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. One sergeant per shift, on a rotational basis, makes post assignments for guards on the shift . Although ser- geants do not have the authority to suspend em- ployees, they do have, and do exercise, the author- ity to give oral and written reprimands . If a guard is improperly performing his duties , a sergeant can remove the guard from his -post and require the guard to submit to retraining. A sergeant does not need the approval of a lieutenant or higher man- agement to order retraining . Often the sergeant conducts the retraining before any higher officer is aware of the incident. If a guard refused retraining, the guard would not be allowed to work the post and ultimately would be suspended . Although a guard can , protest a retraining order, such orders are not routinely reviewed . A retraining reprimand is written 'up by the sergeant and is made part of the guard's personnel file. Sergeants also are involved in rating probation- ary guards. Significantly, because Burns had re- cently taken over the provision of security services at Connecticut Yankee, all guards were probation- ary. Two sergeants on the shift with the guard meet with the lieutenant on the shift to reach a 571 consensus on the guards being evaluated. In one in- stance, the sergeants persuaded the lieutenant that a guard was salvageable, and the guard was put on another shift. Moreover, Burns has decided that sergeants will similarly participate in the periodic evaluation of all guards. Based on the foregoing, we find that sergeants are supervisors. Although their authority is limited, they do play significant roles in - evaluating and dis- ciplining guards. Their evaluations help determine whether a guard ,should be retained; their discipline can' lead to a guard's discharge. Although the ap- proximately 2-to-1 ratio of guards to supervisors seems, as argued by UPGWA, disproportionate, the ratio is explained in part by the strict security requirements at a nuclear power, plant. Connecticut Yankee's site security plan includes sergeants as part of the contingency security forced under Nu- clear Regulatory Commission regulations unit em- ployees may not be part of that force. I In accord with our decision herein we find the following unit to be appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All guards employed by the Employer at the Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Haddam Neck, Connecticut, excluding all other employees, sergeants, lieutenants, and all other supervisors as defined in the Act. [Direction of, Election omitted from publication.]