Taylor Hospital

28 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Taylor Hospital and Local 1319, Laborers Interna- tional Union of North America, AFL-CIO. Case 4-CA-13614 31 March 1986 DECISION AND ORDER By MEMBERS JOHANSEN, BABSON, AND STEPHENS On 16 July 1985 Administrative Law Judge James J. O'Meara, Jr. issued the attached decision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General Counsel filed a reply brief.' The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge' s rulings, findings, and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. We agree with the judge that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by withdrawing recognition from the Union in the context of its un- remedied unlawful discharge of employee Leola Brown. We find it difficult to imagine a stronger statement of the futility of collective bargaining than the message conveyed by the Respondent's conduct during its 12-year history with the Union. The Union filed a representation petition in 1973. It was certified the following year. The Respond- ent litigated the certification in state and Federal court, culminating in an order to bargain with the Union in January 1981. Employee Brown, a lead- ing union supporter since 1973, was selected by her fellow employees to be the employee representa- tive on the Union's bargaining team. On the second day of negotiations, the Respondent suspended and later discharged Brown. The Board found that Brown's discharge was motivated by her union ac- tivities and the Respondent's desire to remove her from the bargaining team, thus violating Section 8(a)(3). The Board's decision was enforced by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.2 We find that the Respondent's discharge of a long-time leading union supporter and member of the Union's bargaining team at the outset of long- delayed contract negotiations was a most serious ' The Respondent filed a reply brief to the General Counsel's beef in response to the Respondent's exceptions. The Board's Executive Secre- tary's office refused to accept the Respondent 's brief, noting that the Board's Rules and Regulations do not provide for the filing of a reply beef to a reply brief, and that the Respondent did not advance sufficient reasons to warrant a departure from the Board's longstanding policy not to permit such filings We subsequently received from the General Coun- sel a motion to strike the Respondent 's reply brief In view of the action of the Executive Secretary's office, the General Counsel's motion is moot 2 Taylor Hospital v NLRB, 770 F 2d 1075 (1985) unfair labor practice. This unfair labor practice re- mained unremedied at the time the Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union. We there- fore find that, in this context, the Respondent is precluded from effectively relying on its asserted doubt of the Union's majority status. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Taylor Hos- pital, Ridgley Park, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. William Slack, Esq., and Rudi Grueneberg, Esq., for the General Counsel. James Castagnera, Esq., and James R. Redeker, Esq., for the Respondent. William T. Josem, Esq., for the Charging Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE JAMES J. O'MEARA JR., Administrative Law Judge. The complaint in this case was issued on 22 June 1983 and is based on a charge filed on 29 March 1983 by the Laborers International Union of North America, AFL- CIO (the Union) against Taylor Hospital (the Respond- ent). The complaint charges that about March 14, 1983, and continuing thereafter, the Respondent has failed and refused to bargain collectively with a representative of its employees, the Union, by withdrawing its recognition of the Union as the exclusive representative of Respond- ent's employees numbered within a specific bargaining unit in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. The Respondent denies that it is guilty of any violation of any part of the Act and affirmatively alleges that it withdrew recognition of the Union based on objective good-faith doubt concerning the Union's continued ma- jority status. This case was heard in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on 17 December 1984 and on 25-26 February 1985. The parties were given an opportunity to present evidence and argue their respective positions. At the termination of the hearing, the parties waived oral arguments and have filed briefs which have been received and duly con- sidered. Based on the evidence of record, including the testi- mony and demeanor of the witness, and in consideration of briefs filed by the parties, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION The Respondent, Taylor Hospital, is and has been at all times material herein a nonprofit corporation duly or- ganized under and existing by virtue of the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and for some time prior hereto has been engaged in providing medical and hospi- 279 NLRB No. 6 TAYLOR HOSPITAL 29 tal care to patients at its facility known as its Chester Pike Division located at Ridgley Park, Pennsylvania. During the past year Respondent has, in the course and conduct of its business operations, had gross revenues valued in excess of $100,000 and purchased and received goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from outside the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Therefore, I find that Respondent is an employer en- gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act, and further that Respondent is a health care institution within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Act. I further find that it will effectuate the policies of the Act to assert jurisdiction in this case. II. THE UNION The Union is, and has been at all times material, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE RESPONDENT'S REFUSAL TO BARGAIN AND ITS WITHDRAWAL OF RECOGNITION A. Background Prior to the exercise of jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations Board in matters involving hospitals, the Union on 15 October 1973 filed a petition for representa- tion with the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board (PLRB). During the course of the procedures conducted under this petition, an election was held on 17 January 1974, which resulted in 48 votes being cast for the Union, 42 votes for no representative, and 17 challenged ballots. A resolution of the 17 challenged ballots by the PLRB resulted in the counting of 16 of the 17 chal- lenged ballots. Thus the result of the final tally of the election was 63 votes for the Union and 43 votes for no union representation. On 27 June 1974 the PLRB issued a "Nisi Order of Certification" certifying the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit. Subsequently, the PLRB, after considering the excep- tions filed by Respondent, made the Nisi Order of Certi- fication absolute and final. On 18 September 1974 the Respondent filed its petition to set aside the order of the PLRB with the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Pennsylvania. On 12 January 1976 the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County dismissed the Re- spondent's petition to set aside the final order of the PLRB and ordered that the parties comply with the pro- visions of that order. On 9 February 1976 Respondent appealed this decision to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court where on 27 December 1977 the court affirmed the order of the Dela- ware County Court of Common Pleas. On 28 January 1978 the Respondent filed a petition for the allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. This peti- tion was denied on 14 July 1978. During the pendency of the Pennsylvania State Court proceedings in this case, the Union, on 23 September 1974, filed a charge asking the NLRB to grant comity to the certification of the PLRB. The NLRB deferred action on the Union's charge until the final decision by the Pennsylvania State Court. On 14 July 1978 the NLRB extended comity to the certification by the PLRB and entered a bargaining order against Respondent on 29 April 1980.1 The Re- spondent petitioned the U.S. District Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to review the order of the Board. The Board, in the same proceeding, petitioned for en- forcement. On 15 January 1981 Respondent's petition for review was denied and an order enforcing the Order of the NLRB was entered.2 Thus, after the disposition of the several appeals taken by Respondent, Union Business Agent Bernard Jackson, on 16 February 1981, requested bargaining negotiations with Respondent to commence immediately. The Re- spondent recognized the Union as the exclusive collec- tive-bargaining representative of the employees in the unit and requested the Union to present its specific de- mands after which the Respondent would contact the Union in order to set up dates for face-to-face negotia- tions. On 27 April the Union provided the Respondent with its proposals and advised that Respondent's employ- ee Leola Brown would be the employee representative at the face-to-face negotiations. On 12 June 1981 Respond- ent's attorney spoke to the Union confirming that negoti- ations would commence with sessions on 16 and 17 July 1981. B. The Unlawful Labor Practices Thus, after 7 years and 3 months of litigation, the par- ties sat at the negotiation table . The union team was comprised of Business Agent Jackson, Wilburn, and em- ployee Leola Brown. Brown had been employed by Re- spondent since 1966 and was an avid union supporter. During the early union efforts, Brown solicited other employees to sign authorization cards. She distributed union literature and exerted efforts to pursuade other em- ployees to vote union. During this time she was called on to testify in support of the Union in various pieces of litigation. She continued to act as a spokesperson for other employees and, in April 1981, she was elected as their representative at the negotiating table. Thus, Brown was an informed, knowledgeable, and effective member of the union bargaining team at the face -to-face negotiat- ing session of 16 July. Since Brown was to be away from her station of em- ployment while participating in these negotiations, it was necessary that she be excused from her place of employ- ment at these times . At the end of the day of the 16 July session, the parties had discussion about Brown's attend- ance at the negotiating meeting which was scheduled for the following day, 17 July. She was assured by Respond- ent's negotiating team which was comprised of Respond- ent's officers and attorney that she would not be required to report to work on the morning of 17 July and was au- thorized to attend the negotiating session to commerce at 10 a.m. on 17 July. On the following day, Brown was terminated from her employment when she failed to report for work at the normal starting time and did not appear at the hospital until the commencement of the bargaining session of 17 July. Brown's discharge was al- ' Taylor Hospital, 249 NLRB 137 (1980). 2 Taylor Hospital Y. NLRB, 642 F 2d 444 (3d Cir. 1981) 30 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD leged to be a violation of the Act. A complaint was filed alleging violation and seeking an appropriate remedy. Taylor Hospital, 272 NLRB 697 (1984). Word of Brown's discharge spread quickly through the hospital . Brown re- ceived telephone calls regarding the incident from at least 50 employees who questioned Brown about the reason for her discharge and the action being taken by the Union to remedy it. The Respondent distributed to its employees a document which described the hospital version of the occurrence leading up to and resulting in the discharge of Brown. In addition to filling a complaint with the Board, the Union held a meeting of the unit em- ployees to explore the possibility of a strike in protest of Brown's discharge. The meeting held on 31 July was at- tended by approximately 90 employees . Business Agent Jackson was publically questioned about the action the Union intended to take regarding Brown 's discharge. Other propagation to its employees of Brown's dis- charge occurred when the Board's Regional Director re- fused to file a complaint on the Union's charge and dis- missed the charge. The dismissal letter was immediately posted by Respondent including a notice informing the employees of the dismissal of the charge. The Regional Director's decision was appealed to the Board's General Counsel and the Regional Office was reversed. This notice of reversal of the original decision in the Brown case was also notice to Respondent's employees by the posting of the General Counsel's decision The complaint against Respondent was reissued in September 1982. After a hearing on the complaint it was recommended that the Board enter an order against Respondent requir- ing it to reinstate Brown, compensate her for back wages, and cease and desist from undertaking similar conduct in regard to Brown and other employees. In ad- dition to the positive acts required by the remedy against Respondent fashioned by the Board, the Respondent was required to post notice of the remedial actions required by the Board's Order. Respondent has appealed the Board's decision and that appeal is now pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Respondent has not taken any of the action required by the Board's Order nor has it informed its employees of the Board's decision. Notwithstanding the lack of finality in regard to the unfair labor practice case of Leola Brown , the discharge of Brown remained a topic of conversation in the hospi- tal for some time thereafter . Negotiations between the Union and Respondent continued during the pendency of Brown's litigation . Twelve negotiating sessions were held between 4 August 1981 and 24 January 1982 but no agreement had been reached as of 24 January 1982. On 21 January 1982 employee Richard Wheeler filed a petition seeking to decertify the Union as the collective- bargaining representative of Respondent's employees. Al- though Wheeler withdrew his petition shortly after it was filed, he filed a second decertification petition on 12 March 1982. A hearing regarding the second petition was held on 7 April 1982 and Respondent informed the hearing that it had declined to bargain with the Union during the pendency of the petition. Even though Re- spondent had refused to bargain with the Union, it did contact the Union before granting a wage increase in July 1982.$ On 30 September 1982 the Board issued its decision in Dresser Industries, 264 NLRB 1088 (1982), holding that the mere existence of a decertification peti- tion did not suspend an employer's obligation to bargain with an incoming union. In view of this recent holding, Respondent and the Union agreed to resume negotiation sessions and set the session for 15 March 1983. On 7 March 1983 employee Wheeler presented Re- spondent's president, W. Scot Murray, with a petition signed by 60 of the 135 employees in the unit represent- ed by the Union which petition indicated that the em- ployees no longer wished to be represented by the Union. Murray, on receipt of this petition, indicated to Wheeler that the 60 signatures to the petition did not comprise an majority of the unit employees. A week later, on 14 March 1983 , Wheeler presented Murray with another petition similar to that which he had previously delivered to Murray but signed by 75 of the 135 employ- ees in the unit. On receipt of that petition by Murray, the Respondent informed the Union that it no longer repre- sented a majority of its employees in the bargaining unit and that Respondent was withdrawing recognition of the Union as the bargaining representative of the employees. Since that time, 14 March 1983, Respondent has refused to recognize and bargain with the Union as the repre- sentative of the unit employees. IV. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS A. The Withdrawal of Recognition The complaint charges that about 14 March 1983 Re- spondent withdrew its recognition of the Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees in a certain described unit . By such withdrawal the General Counsel contends that the Respondent has failed and re- fused, and continues to fail and to refuse , to bargain col- lectively with the Union and that such action comprises an unfair labor practice in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. The Respondent, in answer to the complaint, affirma- tively alleges that it withdrew recognition of the Union as the exclusive representative of the employees based on an objective good-faith doubt as to the Union's contin- ued majority status and, therefore , is not violative of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. The issue, thus drawn, is whether or not the Respond- ent was legally justified in its withdrawal of recognition and the attendant refusal to bargain with the Union. The long-established principle applicable to such issue was set forth in Viking Lithographers, 184 NLRB 139, 139 (1970), where the Board held that: After the certification year has run, an employer may lawfully withdraw recognition from an incum- bent union because of an asserted doubt of the union's continued majority if its assertion of doubt is raised in a context free of unfair labor practices 3 The Union agreed to the Respondent 's granting a wage increase to its employees and informed the employees of this fact The Respondent accused the Union of taking credit for the wage increase when in fact it played no part TAYLOR HOSPITAL and supported by a showing of objective consider- ations providing reasonable grounds for a belief that a majority of the employees no longer desire union representation. The Board clarified and delineated the basic principles under which an employer could question a union's ma- jority status. The Board in Celanese Corp. of America, 95 NLRB 664, 673 (1951), held: [T]he majority issue must not have been raised by the employer in a context of illegal antiunion activi- ties, or other conduct by the employer aimed at causing dissatisfaction from the union. It is clear that the unfair labor practice was not of such a character to affect either the union status , cause employ- ee dissatisfaction, or improperly affect the bargaining re- lationship itself, then the Respondent is not precluded from questioning the union's majority status . However, the Respondent in this case has been found guilty of vio- lations of the Act and ordered to take certain remedial steps designed to overcome the effects of its conduct. A violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act has been found and the action ordered by the Board, in the form of a remedy, has not been executed by the Respondent. It must be determined whether the unfair labor practice is of such a character to affect the union's status, cause employee dissatisfaction, or improperly affect the bar- gaining relationship itself. I conclude that the nature and effect, both patent and latent, of this unfair labor practice creates an aura which permeates the employee-employer relationship in an insidious manner and as such precludes the Respondent from withdrawing recognition of the Union while this unfair labor practice remains unreme- died. C. The Unlawful Labor Practice The Board has found that the Respondent has commit- ted an unfair labor practice in that it unlawfully disci- plined and discharged Leola Brown in July 1981, in vio- lation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. The dis- charge of Brown was prior to the circulation of any em- ployee petition. The Board ordered the Respondent to take certain remedial steps in order to overcome the ef- fects of the unfair labor practice. The Respondent chose to appeal the order of the Board and the unfair labor practice has not been remedied in full or in any part. Thus, it is necessary to address the issue of the character and potential effect of the unlawful labor practice on the employee/employer relationship and to determine if it has caused employee disaffection which underlies the ob- jective indicia of the aura of antiunionism which is re- flected by the petition authored by the several employees of Respondent. The discharge of a visible union support- er when unlawful goes to the "heart of the Act," is one of the most flagrant means by which an employer can dissuade employees from engaging in prounion activity. Penn Color, 261 NLRB 395 (1982), and Apple Tree Chev- rolet, 237 NLRB 867 (1978). Brown was a visible and viable prounion employee. She was the leading union ad- herent in the bargaining unit. She was a vocal supporter of the union organizing effort since its inception . She had 31 testified in early proceedings in support of the Union and throughout the 8-year campaign has stood out as the most prominent employee lending support to the union organizing effort. She was often the informal contact em- ployees in the unit had with the Union. She was fre- quently questioned by other employees about the status of the Union's campaign. Such a posture was the reason the employees of the unit selected Brown as their repre- sentative on the union bargaining team which participat- ed in the negotiations of 15 and 17 July 1981. Brown's participation in this face-to-face negotiation with the Re- spondent preceded the day on which she was disciplined and subsequently discharged. The Board held that the discharge of Brown under the circumstances existing was evidence of union animus and was inherently distructive of Leola Brown's rights under Section 7 of the Act. Spe- cifically, the Board found that the Respondent's dis- charge of Leola Brown was an interference with the ex- ercise of her rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and was an act of discrimination in regard to tenure of employment accomplished to discourage membership in the Union and had the clear tendency to discourage other em- ployees from union participation. As the Board found in that case, Leola Brown was an employee with tenure in excess of 15 years. She was a better-than-satisfactory em- ployee who had earned good evaluations and advance- ment with the Respondent. The Respondent's discharge of Brown was also complemented by the distribution of notice to employees giving the hospital's pretext for her discharge but also clearly disclosing that the discharge of Brown came as a result of her efforts to represent the unit employees at the bargaining session of 17 July 1981. Having deemed that this discharge was an unfair labor practice, the Board tailored a course of action that was designed to remedy the unfair, unbalancing effects of the unfair labor practice. Among other things, it ordered the reinstatement and payment of backpay to Leola Brown. The Respondent, true to its course of conduct for 7 years, chose to appeal the Board's Order to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, where this matter is now pend- ing. Thus the effect on the employee/employer relation- ship sired by the unfair labor practice comprising the dis- cipline and discharge of Leola Brown remains unreme- died and unabated and precludes the Respondent's with- drawal or recognition of the Union while both objective and subjective criteria are conditioned by the unlawful conduct of the Respondent. An employer may not avoid the duty to bargain by demonstrating a loss of majority status arising from its own unfair labor practices. D. The Respondent's Case The Respondent claims to have had a good-faith doubt of the Union's majority status at the time it withdrew recognition. The Respondent bases this good-faith doubt on its perception of five events which it contends sup- port its allegation of a good-faith doubt about the contin- ued majority among the employees of the unit. Those factors are: (1) Report from Respondent supervisor indicating that five or six employees had expressed dissatisfaction with the Union. 32 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (2) The decertification petition filed in March 1982. (3) Statements made at the 7 April 1982 representation hearing indicating that a majority of the unit employees supported the petition. (4) The Union's failure to request negotiations between March 1982 and January 1983. (5) The March 1983 petition indicating that over half of the unit employees no longer desired union represen- tation. The event labeled as No. 1 above is insufficient to sup- port the Respondent's conclusion that the Union had lost its majority. A minority of the unit employees who ex- pressed a dissatisfaction with the Union is not sufficient to support the alleged good-faith doubt. The lack of zeal for the Union allegedly expressed to the Respondent's president, Murry, by his supervisors falls far short of the number considered necessary for significance. Saloon, Inc., 247 NLRB 1105, 1108 (1980). The decertification petition filed in March 1982 does not in itself destroy the presumption of continued majori- ty that the Union enjoys. Its relationship to the unreme- died unfair labor practice will be discussed below. The event labeled No. 3 above refers to a stipulation made for limited purposes in a collateral hearing. It is argued that President Murry of the Respondent heard such a stipulation and concluded therefrom that it sup- ported his doubt about the continued majority among the employees in the unit for the Union. The misinterpreta- tion of the legal effect of such a stipulation cannot be the grounds or basis to justify his later action. The Respondent argues that the Union's failure to re- quest negotiations between March 1982 and January 1983 supports its good-faith doubt of a loss of majority by the Union. A decertification petition filed on 21 Janu- ary 1982, by a "substantial" number of employees of Taylor Hospital, prompted the parties to abandon negoti- ations while that petition was pending. In January 1983 the parties agreed that under the Board's rulings a mere filing of a decertification petition would not permit an employer to withdraw from bargaining . See Dresser In- dustries, 264 NLRB 1088 (1982). Thus the Union's failure to request negotiations from January 1982 to January 1983 is not support for the Respondent's allegedly good- faith or continued union majority. The fifth and final event allegedly supporting the Re- spondent's good-faith doubt comprises a petition filed in March 1983 indicating that slightly over half of the em- ployees in the unit who signed the petition no longer de- sired union representation. This event, and the evidence establishing its factuality, gives rise to the principal issue in this case and begs the question. A further detailed dis- cussion of this phase appears in the following section. E. Respondent 's Offer of Proof As both parties agree , the issue of whether an employ- er has questioned a union's majority in good faith cannot be resolved by resorting to any simple formula. It can only be entered in the light of the totality of all the cir- cumstances involved in a particular case. Celanese Corp. of America, 95 NLRB 664 (1951). As above stated, the issue before me is whether or not the Respondent had discharged its burden of going forward with the evi- dence to establish that it had a good -faith doubt about the continued existence of the union majority among its unit employees. However, when an unremedied, unlaw- ful labor practice tends to interfere with the employee/- employer relationship by creating an attitude of dissatis- faction among its employees, evidence of that dissatisfac- tion is not probative of the issue and not admissible in evidence. The Respondent proffered such evidence from a majority of the employees within the unit . No purpose is served by establishing a negative union attitude among a majority of Respondent's employees when it is deemed that the unfair labor practice is of such character to have the tendency to infect the employee with dissatisfaction with the Union and from union participation. This tend- ency to infect the employee with union dissatisfaction which tendency arose from the unfair labor practice en- gaged in by the Respondent is reflected in the testimony which the Respondent proffered . The insidious immeas- urable impact on the employee colors the reasoning un- derlying the employee testimony regarding his state of mind. Not only is the subjective state of mind of the em- ployee so affected, but the objective results of such state of mind also is subject to distortion from the effects of the unfair labor practice. As stated in Celanese Corp. of America, supra at 673: By its very nature the issue of whether an em- ployer has questioned a union's majority in good faith cannot be resolved by resorting to any simple formula. It can only be answered in light of the totali- ty of all the circumstances involved in a particular case. But among such circumstances, two factors would seem to be essential prequisites to any find- ing that the employer raise majority issues in good faith in cases in which a union had been certified. There must, first of all, have been some reasonable grounds for believing that the union had lost its ma- jority status since its certification. And secondly, the majority issue must not have been raised by the employer in a context of illegal antiunion activities, or other conduct by the employer aimed at causing disaf- fection from the union or indicating that in raising the majority issue the employer was merely seeking to gain time in which to undermine the union. [Em- phasis added.] The second essential prerequisite required by Board policy in such cases is absent in the case at bar. The Board has found the Respondent had committed an unfair labor act in the discharge and discipline of Leola Brown. The Board ordered the Respondent to take cer- tain remedial steps which it has failed to do as of this date. The nature and character of the unlawful labor act perpetrated by the Respondent has the immeasurable effect of causing disaffection from the Union among Re- spondent's employees. The effect of the unfair labor practice can be expected to surface in both objective and subjective reflections. I am thus compelled to find that the Respondent had not raised the issue of majority status of the Union in good faith and that its withdrawal of recognition of the Union and the attendant refusal to bargain constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5). TAYLOR HOSPITAL 33 V. REMEDY Having found that the Respondent withdrew its recog- nition of the Union as the exclusive collective -bargaining representative of its employees within the appropriate bargaining unit and has thus refused to bargain with that Union, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, I shall order the Respondent to cease and desist from interfering with, restraining, or coercing its employees in any like or related manner with respect to the rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act. Respondent shall be further ordered to affirmatively recognize and, on request, bargain collectively with the Union as the ex- clusive bargaining representative of the employees in the appropriate unit and, if an understanding is reached, embody such understanding within a signed agreement and to post at its Reading Park , Pennsylvania facility copies of the attached notice all pursuant to the order following. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Taylor Hospital is an employer engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) and, further, is a health care institution within the mean- ing of Section 2(14) of the Act. 2. Local 1319, Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. Taylor Hospital has withdrawn recognition of the Union as the exclusive representative of certain bargain- ing unit employees and has refused to bargain with the Union on and since 14 March 1983 in violation of Sec- tion 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act. On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed4 ORDER The Respondent, Taylor Hospital, Ridgley Park, Penn- sylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to recognize and bargain with Local 1319, Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL- CIO, as the exclusive bargaining representative of its em- ployees within the appropriate bargaining unit described below with regard to wages, hours, working conditions, and other terms and conditions of employment: All employees of the dietary department, mainte- nance department, housekeeping department, cen- tral supply department, which is now known as the materials management department, including the cart technicians and messengers, orderly depart- ment, nurses aides and transporters but excluding management level employees, supervisors, first level supervisors, confidential employees and guards as defined in the Act. * If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec 102 46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall , as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining , or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) Recognize and, on request, bargain collectively with Local 1319, Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, as described above, with regard to employees' wages, hours, working conditions, and other terms and conditions of their employment and, if an un- derstanding is reached, embody such understanding in a signed agreement. (b) Post at its Ridley Park, Pennsylvania facility copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."5 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 4, after being signed by the Respondent's au- thorized representative, shall be posted by the Respond- ent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 con- secutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Rea- sonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. 6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. The Act gives employees the following rights. To engage in self-organization To form, join, or assist any union To bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice To act together for other mutual aid or protec- tion To choose not to engage in any of these protect- ed concerted activities. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively on request concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other terms and conditions of employment with Local 1319, Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO the exclusive representative of its employees in the following appropriate unit: 34 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD All employees of the dietary department, mainte- nance department, housekeeping department, cen- tral supply department, which is now known as the materials management department, including the cart technicians and messengers , orderly depart- ment, nurses aides and transporters but excluding management level employees, supervisors, first level supervisors, confidential employees and guards as defined in the Act. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL recognize and bargain collectively, on re- quest, with Local 1319, Laborers' International Union of North America, AFL-CIO as the exclusive bargaining representative of our employees within the appropriate bargaining unit described above, with regard to their wages, hours, working conditions , and other terms and conditions of their employment and, if an understanding is reached, we will embody such understanding in a signed agreement. TAYLOR HOSPITAL