Southern Lumber Co., Inc.

SOUTHERN LUMBER CO Southern Lumber Company, Inc. and UBC, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of Amer- ica, AFL-CIO, Local 2095. Case 15-CA-9624 7 April 1986 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN DOTSON AND MEMBERS JOHANSEN AND STEPHENS On 12 December 1985 Administrative Law Judge Howard I. Grossman issued the attached de- cision. The Respondent filed exceptions and a sup- porting brief, and the General Counsel filed a brief in support of the judge's decision. The National Labor Relations Board has delegat- ed its authority in this proceeding to a three- member panel. The Board has considered the decision and the record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to affirm the judge's rulings, findings,' and conclusions and to adopt the recommended Order. ORDER The National Labor Relations Board adopts the recommended Order of the administrative law judge and orders that the Respondent, Southern Lumber Company, Inc., Crosby, Mississippi, its of- ficers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order. ' The judge found that the Respondent 's 27 August 1984 letter to the Union constituted a refusal to bargain in violation of Sec 8 (a)(5) and (1) of the Act The Respondent excepts to this finding on the grounds that neither the charge nor the complaint alleged the 27 August 1984 refusal as an unfair labor practice and , furthermore, that the 27 August 1984 letter was conduct which occurred outside the 10(b) limitation period It is well settled that "the Board treats a request for bargaining as continu- ing, at least for the period of the certification year and . the fail- ure to respond affirmatively to such a continuing request gives rise to a continuing violation of Sec 8 (a)(1) and (5) " Dardanell Enterprises, 250 NLRB 377, 379 ( 1980) Consequently , we find that the Union's request for bargaining has continued since it was first made on 21 August 1984, and the Respondent's failure to respond to it affirmatively has continued throughout the same penod Therefore, we find, as the complaint alleges, that on and since 21 September 1984, the time period which precedes the charge filing date of 21 March 1984 by 6 months and which thus is prop- erly within the period prescribed by Sec 10(b) of the Act, the Respond- ent has violated Sec 8 (a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union Timothy F. Sheridan, Esq., for the General Counsel. Emile C. Ott, Esq. (Fuselier, Ott, McKee & Walker), of Jackson, Mississippi, for the Respondent. Robert Woodson, of Jackson, Mississippi, for the Charg- ing Party. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE HOWARD I. GROSSMAN, Administrative Law Judge. The charge was filed on 21 March 1985 by UBC, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 187 2095, AFL-CIO (the Union or Local 2095). Complaint issued on 17 April 1985, and alleged that Southern Lumber Company, Inc. (Respondent) refused to recog- nize and bargain with the Union as the collective-bar- gaining representative of Respondent 's employees in an appropriate unit, in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). A hearing was held before me on these matters in Natchez, Mississippi, on 10 July 1985. Briefs have been submitted by the General Counsel and Respondent. On the entire record, including my observation of the de- meanor of the witnesses, I make the following FINDINGS OF FACT 1. JURISDICTION The pleadings establish that Respondent is a Mississip- pi corporation with a place of business in Crosby, Missis- sippi, where it is engaged in the business of operating a sawmill. During a 12-month period preceding issuance of the complaint, a representative period, Respondent sold and shipped goods and materials valued in excess of $50,000 from its Crosby, Mississippi facility directly to points located outside the State of Mississippi. I conclude that Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.I II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED The pleadings establish that the Union is a labor orga- nization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE A. The Union's Certification Pursuant to a petition filed and signed by Robert L. Woodson, an organizer and service representative for the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of Amer- ica, the Regional Director for Region 15 on 31 January 1984 approved a Stipulation for Certification upon Con- sent Election in Case 15-RC-7047. Woodson had con- ducted the organizing campaign. The stipulation was signed by Respondent's attorney indicated above and by Woodson for Local 2095. A Board election was held on 24 February 1984, at which a majority of the valid votes counted were cast for Local 2095. The tally of ballots was signed by Respondent's attorney and by Woodson. After the election Woodson held monthly meetings with the company employees. Although no union officers were appointed, the employees did elect James Thomp- son and Johnny Walker as "negotiating committeemen." Respondent filed objections to the election, which were investigated and overruled by the Regional Direc- tor. Respondent filed exceptions to the Regional Direc- tor's report and, on 6 August 1984,' the Board affirmed the Regional Director's findings and certified Local 2095 as the representative of Respondent's employees in the following unit: ' Although Respondent denies the jurisdictional conclusion , no reasons are advanced 279 NLRB No. 27 188 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD All production and maintenance employees em- C. The Meeting on 9 October 1984 ployed by the Employer at its facility located on Highway 33 in Crosby, Mississippi, including lead- men,* shipping clerks and purchasing clerks; ex- cluding all other employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. * Sam Adams, Edward Anderson, Rupert R. Toler Jr., Jerry L. Weatherspoon, Earl Webb, and Kenneth Petty (G.C. Exh. 7). B. Early Communications Between the Parties On 28 February 1984 Respondent's attorney sent Woodson, as "UBC Representative," a letter stating that Respondent intended to institute a second shift, and fol- lowed this with another letter on the same subject the next day. Woodson turned these letters over to Garrold Brown, executive secretary of the Southern Council of Industrial Workers (SCIW), a chartered subordinate of the Interna- tional, which was established for the purpose of negotiat- ing and servicing contracts of local carpenter unions. Brown wrote Respondent's attorney a letter on 6 March 1984, in which he stated that SCIW representative Ray White had been assigned to handle all affairs of the bar- gaining unit at Respondent's facility. By letter dated 12 March 1984, Respondent's attorney wrote Brown that he would "be happy to discuss with Mr. White, as spokesman for UBC, Local Union 2095," the matters raised in Respondent's letter. Company coun- sel asked for White's address, and Brown supplied it to him. In meetings with Attorney Ott early in 1984, White asked him to begin bargaining, according to White's un- contradicted testimony. On 21 August 1984, following issuance of the certifica- tion, SCIW supervisor, Robert Bracken, sent Respondent a letter under the SCIW letterhead asserting that "our organization" had been certified. The letter requested that Respondent contact Ray White for the purpose of beginning negotiations. The letter also requested informa- tion concerning employee wages, benefits, and working conditions. Bracken sent a copy of this letter to all of Respondent's employees, together with a notice about forthcoming union actions intended to begin negotia- tions. By letter dated 27 August 1984 to Ray White, Re- spondent's attorney rejected the request to bargain on the ground that the certification was erroneous, and that Respondent desired review of the matter by a Federal court. On 19 September 1984 Company Plant Manager Harvey A. Cockrill wrote White a letter announcing a forthcoming layoff. White replied a few days later with a letter to Cockrill asking for negotiations on the layoff. White and Respondent's Attorney Ott then had a con- versation agreeing on 9 October 1984 as the meeting date. White asked Ott to arrange for the release of two union committeemen. Company Attorney Ott confirmed the date by letter dated 2 October 1984 and asked White to identify the two company employees selected by the Union to assist it, so that the Company could make ar- rangements to release them and have their positions cov- ered. The Union provided this information. 1. Summary of the evidence On 9 October 1984 White and Woodson met commit- teemen Thompson and Walker in the company parking lot, and Woodson introduced White to the committee- men as the SCIW representative who would be bargain- ing for them. White, Woodson, and the two committee- men then entered the hearing room, where they met Company Attorney Ott, General Manager Rollin Tur- nage, Plant Manager Harvey A. Cockrill, and Labor Re- lations Consultant Harold Green. According to Ray White's testimony, he introduced himself as the SCIW representative who would be the spokesman for Local 2095. Walker and Thompson intro- duced themselves as the committeemen for Local 2095, and made no comment on White's designation of himself as the union spokesman. Woodson introduced himself as the representative from the UBC organizing department, and the company representatives introduced themselves. Witnesses for the Company denied some of these in- troductions. Thus, General Manager Tumage acknowl- edged meeting certain union representatives, but denied that any mention was made of Local 2095. Turnage was present at the election, but denied knowing the number of the local that had been certified. However, he ac- knowledged knowing that he was in a union meeting on 9 October, and that it pertained to Respondent's employ- ees. Turnage said that he knew Walker and Thompson were union committeemen, but denied knowing that they represented Local 2095. He did not protest the participa- tion by White or Woodson. Plant Manager Cockrill agreed that Thompson and Walker identified themselves as committeemen, but denied that they designated any local. However, on cross-examination, Cockrill admitted that he knew that they were the committeemen for the union that had been certified as the representative of Respondent's employ- ees. Cockrill did not protest White's presence at the meeting, and agreed that he had previously dealt with White as the Union's representative. Labor Relations Consultant Green gave testimony similar to that of Tur- nage and Cockrill. The substance of the meeting dealt with layoff proce- dure, and the parties appeared to reach a "gentlemen's agreement," according to White. No formal document was signed. 2. Factual analysis Cockrill's admission and the fact that Respondent re- leased Walker and Thompson for this meeting establish beyond any doubt that the Company knew that it was in a meeting with the union certified as the representative of its employees, and that Thompson and Walker were the committeemen for that union-regardless of whether the Company knew the exact number of the local. It is also obvious that White acted as the spokesman for the certified union without any opposition from the union or company representatives. I credit White's testimony. SOUTHERN LUMBER CO D. The Meeting on 17 January 1985 In the fall of 1984, the Union protested that the Com- pany was not following the layoff procedure supposedly agreed upon in the first meeting, in that certain employ- ees were being terminated instead of laid off. After an exchange of letters, the parties met for a second time on 17 January 1985. The Union was represented by the same individuals-White, Woodson, Thompson, and Walker.2 The Company was represented by the same in- dividuals with the exception of Company Attorney Ott. Labor Relations Consultant Green acted as company spokesman. The substance of the meeting again concerned the layoff procedure. At the end of this discussion, according to Union Representative White, Woodson turned to Green, the company spokesman, and said: "Why don't we stop all these frivolous charges and objections, and go ahead and negotiate a contract that will cover every- thing we talked about here today-layoffs, and wages and working conditions and all, under the Act?" Green looked at Woodson for a few minutes and then said that he had no comment on the statement. Woodson gave similar testimony. Company witnesses Green, Turnage, and Cockrill agree that Woodson requested negotiations for a contract at the 17 January meeting. Their only disagreement is that it was Turnage, rather than Green, who replied. That reply, according to the company witnesses, was that the Company was not prepared to discuss the re- quest for contract negotiations at that time. It is clear that the Union made a request for bargaining and that the Company rejected that request, regardless of which company representative did so. E. The Company's Charge Against the Union On 23 April 1985 the Company filed a charge alleging that the Union had violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. Although the charge is not in evidence, the dismis- sal letter from the Acting Regional Director for Region 15, dated 24 May 1985, shows that the charge was predi- cated on a theory that the Union had failed to represent the employees by refusing to enforce the certification. The rationale of the Acting Regional Director's dismissal letter was that the Union had represented the employees by requesting and attending two meetings concerning layoffs, by twice requesting bargaining, and by filing Section 8(a)(1) and (3) and Section 8(a)(1) and (5) unfair labor practice charges against the Company. The Company appealed the dismissal, and argued in a letter to the General Counsel that neither of the Union's requests for bargaining constituted "a request to bargain by the certified bargaining representative, UBC, Local Union 2095." The Company also argued that the Union had failed "to police its certification by refusing to file charges against the company so the representation issue (our objections) could expeditiously be reviewed by the 2 Walker had been discharged in December 1984, and the Union had filed a protest and an unfair labor practice charge Nonetheless, the con- sistent testimonies of union witness Woodson and company witness Green establish that Walker was a union representative at the 17 January meeting 189 Fifth Circuit." Included in the documents submitted on appeal was a petition assertedly signed by 77 employees stating that they were not pleased with the Union and wanted another vote. By letter dated 12 June 1985, the General Counsel denied the appeal "substantially for the reasons set forth in the Acting Regional Director's letter of 24 May 1985." F. Legal Analysis and Conclusions 1. The agency issue (a) James Thompson and Johnny Walker Respondent presents essentially the same arguments in its posthearing brief. Thus, it denies that it dealt with a representative of the certified labor organization, Local 2095. This argument is clearly without merit with respect to Thompson and Walker. The members of the certified union elected them as "negotiating committeemen." Company Attorney Ott asked Union Representative White to identify the two employees selected by the Union, and White specified Walker and Thompson. The Company released them for attendance at the 9 October meeting. Walker and Thompson identified themselves as union committeemen and participated in the two meet- ings concerning layoffs. It is clear that they were agents of the certified Union . Office Employees Local 129, 267 NLRB 1017, 1018-1019 (1983).3 (b) Robert L. Woodson, Ray White, and SCIW Whether Woodson, White, or SCIW were agents of Local 2095 is a question of agency law. "Questions of agency law under the Act are generally resolved accord- ing to common law principles." Whisper Soft Mills v. NLRB, 754 F.2d 1381, 1386 fn. 5 (9th Cir 1985), deny- ing enf. 267 NLRB 813 (1983). Authority to act on behalf of a principal can be cre- ated by conduct of a principal which, reasonably inter- preted, causes the agent to believe that the principal de- sires him so to act on the principal's account. Apparent authority is created by such conduct which causes a third person to believe that the principal consents to have the agent act on his behalf. Restatement 2d, Agency §§ 26, 27 (1958). Silence may constitute a manifestation of such consent if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the principal knowing of unau- thorized acts and not consenting to their continuance would do something to indicate his dissent (id.). Acquies- cence by the principal to a series of acts by the agent in- dicates authorization to perform similar acts in the future (id. § 43), and authority to contract may be inferred from authority to engage in a transaction on behalf of the principal (id. § 50). Woodson conducted the organizational campaign on behalf of the International. He signed the Stipulation for Certification upon Consent Election, and the tally of bal- 3 See also Mine Workers District 17 (DeHue Coal), 275 NLRB 715 101 (1985) 190 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD lots. Thereafter, he conducted monthly meetings of the employees. Woodson also met with Respondent's attor- ney early in 1984 and requested bargaining on behalf of the Union. There is no evidence of any objection from the Union to this conduct. Under these circumstances, both Woodson and Respondent could reasonably have concluded that the Union had authorized Woodson to act on its behalf. An inference that Respondent in fact arrived at this conclusion in February 1984 is warranted by the letter of its attorney to Woodson as "UBC Repre- sentative." I conclude that early in 1984 Woodson had both actual and apparent authority to act on behalf of Local 2095. This authority was never withdrawn and continued through the August 1984 and January 1985 ne- gotiating sessions. The same conclusion is warranted with respect to Ray White. In March 1984, Respondent's attorney wrote SCIW Executive Secretary Brown that he would be happy to discuss the second shift with "Mr. White, as spokesman for UBC, Local 2095." Other letters from At- torney Ott and from Plant Manager Cockrill, and Ott's conversations with White, show that Respondent dealt with him as an agent of Local 2095. At the meeting with company representatives on 9 October 1984, White intro- duced himself as the union spokesman, without objection from the company representatives or from union repre- sentatives Thompson and Walker. I conclude that begin- ning early in 1984, White had both actual and apparent authority to act on behalf of Local 2095. In Whisper Soft Mills, supra, the factual situation was the reverse of the one in this case-it was the Interna- tional (ILGWU) that had been certified, and it was a subordinate (Pacific Northwest District Council) that sought and obtained a refusal-to-bargain finding from the Board. In its denial of enforcement, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that the council proposed an agreement between it and the employer, and refused to agree to a contract between the employer and the certi- fied labor organization (ILGWU) because the latter wished to avoid liability in the matter. In response, the employer said that the Council's position "raised legal problems because only the ILGWU was the certified bargaining representative." The company continued ne- gotiating under the stated assumption that it was dealing with a representative of the ILGWU." Id. at 1383. These positions of the parties were repeated in later sessions. The court concluded that the Council was neither the certified labor organization nor an agent thereof. Regard- ing the former issue, the court noted the importance of the statutory requirement of exclusive representation, and the distinction between the International and the local. On the latter issue, the court said that the council could not have been an agent of ILGWU, because it lacked authority to commit the asserted principal (ILGWU) to a binding agreement. "The statement that the ILGWU did not want to be a party to any agree- ment due to a desire to avoid liability was in effect a claim by the Council not to be an agent of the ILGWU." Id. at 1386. The facts in this case do not parallel those in Whisper Soft. None of the various labor organization representa- tives demanded that Respondent enter into a contract with SCIW or the International, nor did they refuse to consider an agreement with the certified union, Local 2095, as signatory to a contract. Although SCIW super- visor Bracken's letter of 21 August 1984 stated that "our organization" had been certified, this was ambiguous. Be- cause the certified labor organization was a local, the pronoun "our" may well have referred to Local 2095. In any event, as indicated, Respondent's attorney specifical- ly dealt with White as "spokesman for UBC, Local Union 2095." Respondent's actions thus demonstrate that it had no doubt in 1984 about the representative status of Wood- son, White, or the SCIW as representatives of the certi- fied union, nor did it indicate a belief that it was dealing with any other labor organization. Respondent's asserted doubts on these issues first surfaced in its posthearing brief. Had such doubts been voiced at an earlier time, Local 2095, SCIW, and the International would have had an opportunity to clarify matters. In these circum- stances, Respondent is estopped to deny the representa- tive status of the union agents, or to assert that it was being asked to negotiate with any labor organization other than the certified union. Restatement 2d, Agency § 8B (1958). 2. The Union's alleged failure to police the certification Respondent's argument on this issue is the same as the one it advanced in the CB case-because the Union did not file an unfair labor practice charge until 7 months after the initial refusal to bargain (Attorney Ott's letter dated 27 August 1984), it thereby failed to police its cer- tification, and same should be revoked. This argument is invalid for the reasons explicated in the Acting Regional Director's letter dismissing the CB charge, set forth above and sustained by the General Counsel. It may be added that acceptance of Respondent's rea- soning would require a certified union to file a charge every time it believed an unfair labor practice had been committed to avoid the risk of losing its certification. Such a policy would spawn litigation and would be con- trary to the national policy favoring amicable settlement of labor disputes. There is no precedent for Respondent's argument, and I reject it. 3. The refusals to bargain There is no doubt that Attorney Ott's August 1984 letter constituted a refusal to bargain-indeed, Respond- ent's argument set forth above depends on this fact. This refusal to bargain took place more than 6 months prior to the filing of the 8(a)(5) charge. However, Respondent has not advanced an affirmative defense based on Section 10(b) of the Act. Accordingly, the date of filing does not preclude a refusal-to-bargain finding, because that section of the Act is an affirmative defense which is waived if not timely raised.' * Taft Broadcasting Co., WBRC-TV, 264 NLRB 185 (1982), Federal Management Co, 264 NLRB 107 (1982), Distilling Workers Local 122 (Oz Liquor), 261 NLRB 1070 fn 1 (1982) SOUTHERN LUMBER CO. 191 Respondent tacitly concedes that Woodson made an oral request for bargaining during the 17 January 1985 session, but contends that he was not an agent of the Union at that time. This is merely a repetition of Re- spondent's position, which I have rejected for the rea- sons given above.5 4. The Union's majority status, and conclusion of law Both of Respondent's refusals to bargain took place within 1 year following the Union's certification. Ac- cordingly, the Union at such times enjoyed an irrebutta- ble presumption of majority status. Ray Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); Pennco, Inc., 250 NLRB 716 (1980). The fact that Respondent offered to bargain on one con- dition of employment, layoff procedure, is no defense to the charge that it refused to bargain over other mandato- ry subjects of bargaining. It follows that Respondent, by its refusal to bargain on 27 August 1984 and 17 January 1985 and thereafter, vio- lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. I so find. In accordance with my findings above, I make the fol- lowing CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. Southern Lumber Company, Inc. is an employer within the meaning of Section 2(2), engaged in com- merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. 2. UBC, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, Local 2095 is a labor organiza- tion within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act. 3. The following employees constitute a unit appropri- ate for the purposes of collective-bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act: All production and maintenance employees, em- ployed by the Respondent at its facility located on Highway 33 in Crosby, Mississippi, including lead- men,' shipping clerks and purchasing clerks, ex- cluding all other employees, office clerical employ- ees, technical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. * Sam Adams, Edward Anderson, Rupert R. Toler Jr., Jerry L. Weatherspoon, Earl Webb, and Ken- neth Petty.6 4. At all times material herein, the above -named labor organization has been and now is the exclusive represent- ative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act. 5. By refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union on 27 August 1984 and again on 17 January 1985 and S The General Counsel contends that the Union's filing of the charge constituted a renewal of the request for bargaining, citing Dardanell En- terprises, 250 NLRB 377, 379 ( 1980). This contention is meritorious. 6 My finding concerning the appropriate unit is based on the Board's Decision and Certification of Representative in Case 15-RC -7047 (G C Exh 7), with its reference to Highway 33 (rather than Highway 53, as alleged in the complaint), and the identification of the leadmen thereafter, Respondent thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. 6. The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. THE REMEDY Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I recommend that it be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act. Having found that Respondent refused to bargain in good faith with the Union, I recommend that Respond- ent, on request, bargain in good faith with the Union concerning rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment and, if an under- standing is reached, embody such understanding in a written, signed agreement. Inasmuch as Respondent failed to bargain in good faith, I shall recommend that the initial period of certifi- cation be construed as beginning on the date Respondent commences to bargain in good faith with the Union as the recognized bargaining representative in the appropri- ate unit. This remedy is required "[t]o ensure that the employees are accorded the service of their selected bar- gaining agent for the period provided by law." Zayre De- partment Stores, 272 NLRB No. 84, slip op. at 5 (Sept. 28, 1984) (not reported in Board volumes.) On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the following recommend- ed7 ORDER The Respondent, Southern Lumber Company, Inc., Crosby, Mississippi, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns shall 1. Cease and desist from (a) Refusing to bargain collectively with UBC, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL- CIO, Local 2095, as the exclusive bargaining representa- tive of the employees in the following unit: All production and maintenance employees em- ployed by the Respondent at its facility located on Highway 33 in Crosby, Mississippi, including lead- men,' shipping clerks and purchasing clerks, ex- cluding all other employees, office clerical employ- ees, technical employees, professional employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act. Sam Adams, Edward Anderson, Rupert R. Toler, Jr., Jerry L. Weatherspoon, Earl Webb, and Kenneth Petty. (b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re- straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act. If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board's Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec 102 48 of the Rules , be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all pur- poses 192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. (a) On request, bargain in good faith with the Union with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other terms and conditions of employment of the em- ployees in the aforesaid unit and , if an understanding is reached, embody the understanding in a written, signed agreement. (b) Post at its facility at Highway 33 in Crosby , Missis- sippi, copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix."8 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 15, after being signed by the Re- spondent's authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respond- ent to ensure that the notices are not altered , defaced, or covered by any other material. (c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days from the date of this Order what steps the Re- spondent has taken to comply. 8 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order of the Nation- al Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board " APPENDIX NOTICE To EMPLOYEES POSTED BY ORDER OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD An Agency of the United States Government The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the National Labor Relations Act and has or- dered us to post and abide by this notice. WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with UBC, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, AFL-CIO, Local 2095, as the exclusive bar- gaining representative of the employees in the following unit: All production and maintenance employees em- ployed at our facility located on Highway 33 in Crosby, Mississippi, including leadmen,* shipping clerks and purchasing clerks , excluding all other employees, office clerical employees, technical em- ployees, professional employees, guards and super- visors as defined in the Act. * Sam Adams, Edward Anderson, Rupert R. Toler Jr., Jerry L. Weatherspoon, Earl Webb, and Kenneth Petty. WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Section 7 of the Act. WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively with the above Union as the exclusive representative of the em- ployees in the unit described above with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of work, and other terms and con- ditions of employment and, if agreement is reached, embody same in a written , signed agreement. SOUTHERN LUMBER COMPANY, INC.